ClimateSmart – Scaling-up Climate Smart Agriculture
in Eastern and Southern Africa
Business Case
Final
29 November 2011
CONTENTS
1. Strategic Case ...................................................................................................... 6
A. Context and need for DFID intervention ............................................................. 6
B. Impact and Outcome ........................................................................................ 14
2. Appraisal Case ................................................................................................... 18
A. Feasible options ............................................................................................... 18
B. Evidence Base for the feasible Options ........................................................... 18
C. Appraisal of options ......................................................................................... 24
D. Measures used to assess value for money ..................................................... 32
E. Value for Money of the preferred Option .......................................................... 32
3. Commercial Case ............................................................................................... 33
A. Justification of procurement mechanisms .......... Error! Bookmark not defined.
B. Value for money through procurement ............................................................. 35
4. Financial Case .................................................................................................... 36
A. How much it will cost ........................................................................................ 36
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin .............................................. 37
C. How funds will be paid out ............................................................................... 37
D Assessment of Financial Risk and Fraud .......................................................... 38
E. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for .................... 39
5. Management Case ............................................................................................. 40
A. Management Arrangements for Implementation .............................................. 40
B. Risks and how they will be managed ............................................................... 45
C. Conditionality ................................................................................................... 47
D. How Progress and Results will be Monitored, measured and Evaluated ......... 47
References.............................................................................................................. 50
Glossary
AFOLU
CA
CAADP
CC
CFU
COMESA
COP
CSA
CSO
DFID
ESA
GDP
HMG
ICF
MDG
PMU
PRP
REC
REDD
RVAA
SADC
TLC
Tripartite
VAA
VAC
VfM
Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Uses
Conservation Agriculture
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
Climate Change
Conservation Farming Unit (Zambia based organisation)
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
Conference of the Parties (to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change)
Climate Smart Agriculture
Civil Society Organisation
Department for International Development (UK Aid)
Eastern and Southern Africa
Gross Domestic Product
Her Majesty’s Government (UK)
Investment Climate Facility for Africa
Millennium Development Goal
Programme Management Unit
Protracted Relief Programme (in Zimbabwe)
Regional Economic Community (e.g. SADC, COMESA & EAC)
Reducing Emmissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis
Southern Africa Development Community
Total Land Care (CSA NGO based in Malawi)
Joined-up working of SADC, COMESA & EAC
Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis
Vulnerability Assessment Committee
Value for Money
Note on Programme Titles
We need to try and be consistent. I am suggesting we use the following:
Africa Climate Solution – the overall Tripartite CC Programme (to which this
business case is a contributor)
ClimateSmart – shorthand for the DFID programme (e.g. this business case)
ClimateMark – the unit within COMESA, but located at the Pretoria
TradeMark offices, responsible for the Results Facility, managing the
Evidence sub-contract and some other functions.
Intervention Summary
Title: ClimateSmart – Climate Smart Agriculture in Eastern and Southern
Africa
What support will the UK provide?
How much funding does the UK expect to provide?
£38 million
Period of funding
4 yrs (with option for extending for further 4 years)
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
45 million rural households in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) suffer from reduced production
and/or food insecurity because their mean production is low and subject to unpredicted troughs, mainly
due to rainfall scarcity, that lead to livelihood disruption, asset depletion, absence from school, ill
health, malnutrition and in extreme cases death. Low agricultural production and high variability
constrains the development of stable markets and economic growth.
Climate change modelling suggests that this scenario will get worse for most of the region in coming
years. Moreover the potential for agricultural land uses in the region to sequester carbon and contribute
to climate change mitigation (and benefit from carbon markets and mitigation funding) is not being
realised. Agricultural practices that fail to maintain soil fertility and increase erosion are contributing to
the overall yield under-performance and create externalities like reservoir siltation and downstream
flooding.
What will we do to tackle this problem?
The programme will develop the evidence base (what works, where and for whom) for a range of low
cost Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) technologies, based on Conservation Agriculture (CA), that
increase yields, increase resilience to drought, reduce erosion, maintain soil fertility and increase
carbon sequestration – the five wins. This will include Conservation Agriculture and agro-forestry,
combined, where appropriate, with linked support to integrated pest management, improved water
management and drought resilient crop and livestock breeds and practices for which there is significant
emerging experience in the region. In countries with significant CA pilot experience there will be a
scaling-up process; in countries with less experience there will be a series of pilots to set the
foundation for scale-up. Smaller expenditure in broader CSA technologies/practices can be funded if
innovation potential is demonstrated, however, there is a need to focus most resources on a narrower
range of practices to avoid spreading ourselves too thinly and reducing the likelihood of major impact.
Policy advocacy will develop the ‘Africa Climate Solution’ to attract climate change mitigation and
adaptation funds to effective programmes on the ground. National policy and capacity will be
developed to be more supportive of up-scaling CSA, including the involvement of agricultural unions
and the private sector.
Vulnerability analysis and assessment (VAA) capacity will be developed to ensure CSA approaches
are appropriate to the most vulnerable households. Increased VAA capacity will also mean that when
severe weather events overwhelm the resilience ability of CSA, relief can be better targeted to be cost-
effective and timely, thereby minimising livelihood destruction and suffering.
Who will be implementing the support we provide?
The programme will be implemented mainly through COMESA as part of the Tripartite and also
involving SADC and EAC and integrated with the CAADP process. Evidence gathering and
dissemination will be by an independent research organisation. Projects on the ground will be
implemented by a variety of organisations contracted through a Results Facility.
What are the expected results?
Impact
Food security for an increasing number of households will improve, the prevalence of
malnutrition will reduce and an increasing number of countries will support Climate Smart
Agriculture as the normal approach.
Outcome
By 2015 an additional 250,000 farmers will be using CSA approaches based on robust
evidence and successful practical experience. $300 million of climate finance will be flowing to
the region. Policies addressing vulnerability and responses to crop failure will be based on
sound assessment and analysis.
Outputs

African Climate Solution internationally accepted and attracting financial flows;

14 countries in ESA with climate smart investment frameworks;

VAA being used in poverty reduction and/or climate adaptation policies in at least 15
countries and being fully funded by 5 national governments;

5 CA/CSA fast track pilot projects and 14 scale-up anchor projects involving 1.2 million
farmers (40% women) – 250,000 directly attributable to DFID;

2 million additional farmers receiving evidence based CA/CSA advice appropriate to their
local circumstance;

Robust evidence on CA/CSA (what works, where, why and for whom) affecting national
and regional policy and practice and setting the foundation for future programming.
1. Strategic Case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
There is a clear need for a programme to increase food security and climate resilience in Southern
Africa and Eastern Africa, for the following reasons;
 Food insecurity is already severe and a leading cause of child stunting
 Climate change will have severe impacts, and if nothing is done will reduce staple food
production and increase household vulnerability further.
 Climate finance can be harnessed through working with regional champions that will increase
the impact of the Investment Climate facility for Africa’s (ICF) investment and contribute to a
major transformation in African agriculture and food security
1. The food security and climate change context
Southern and Eastern Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change, with direct impacts on both
food and economic security. Climate change projections suggest that eastern and southern Africa
will suffer greater water stress, more frequent droughts, floods and variability in rainfall, and
increases in extreme weather events, resulting in lower agriculture yields unless climate adaptation
actions are taken1.
Fig 1: Climate change will depress agriculture yields in most of Africa
The vulnerability of African
countries to climate change is
compounded by strong
dependence on rainfed
agriculture and natural
resources, high levels of
poverty, low levels of human
capital, and poor infrastructure.
The effects of climate change
on African agriculture will be
severe and one of the largest
challenges to household
livelihoods. Sub-Saharan
African agriculture is 96% rainfed2 and employs 67%3 of the
workforce. Agriculture yields
could fall by as much as 50%
by 2050 in parts of Africa, with
most countries in the region
likely to experience yield losses
of between 5 and 20%4 within that period.
Figure 1 illustrates most countries will experience falling yields given current agriculture practices,
although these estimates may be conservative as they do not take into account increases in extreme
events or agricultural pests5 6. Moreover, climate change may reduce the land suitable for agriculture,
potentially leading to increases in clearing native forest and pasture lands for crop cultivation, with a
consequent significant increase in carbon release.
Stern estimates that global climate change will lead to reductions in per capita consumption of 4-5%
for Africa7, greater than in other regions of the world. For instance, economists warn that Tanzania
has just 20 years to adapt its agriculture sector to climate change or face major impacts that will
cascade through the country’s entire economy. Agriculture underpins the livelihoods of 80% of the
population and by 2030 climate change in the agriculture sector will reduce the nation’s total GDP by
0.6-1%8 .
Food security is a function of food availability, food access, utilisation (through access to clean water,
sanitation and adequate diet), and stability (e.g. access at all times despite economic crises or
climatic shocks). Current projections are that higher temperatures and lower rainfall in parts of Africa,
combined with doubling of the population, will lead to a 43% increase in food insecurity, and will
induce a 60% increase in food aid expenditures during the next 2 decades9.
Food and nutritional security is already a profound challenge in Eastern and Southern Africa. For
example, in the SADC region, some 6-10 million people are food insecure today10. And in 7 SADC
countries rates of child stunting are considered critical, above 40%. Such high levels of undernutrition
demonstrate that food insecurity (quantity, quality and seasonality) is a profound problem in the
SADC region. In the COMESA region, agricultural productivity rates per person are falling, poverty
rates are increasing and agriculture and food imports are increasing at 13 percent a year 11. With
present trends, the MDG of halving hunger by 2015 will not be reached.
Climate change has an impact on food insecurity directly through impacting the quantity of food
produced, its quality and seasonality as drought periods in some areas become longer or seasons
become less predictable. The impacts of food insecurity are intergenerational and reinforcing; undernutrition at key stages of development has permanent consequences and affects capacity for work in
adulthood12. Low income countries tend to have weak or absent social protection and health
systems and insurance markets. They also tend to lack early warning systems and broader climate
information. The poor have little financial, food or health reserves to withstand climate shocks which
could result in them being pushed deeper into poverty13.
2. Constraints to agricultural production and climate resilience
Despite some achievements made in agricultural production in Eastern and Southern Africa over the
past twenty years (e.g. improved varieties of maize), agricultural production systems in Africa face
severe constraints, including reliance on rainfed systems, poor soil fertility and quality, land
degradation, lack of water storage and irrigation, lack of access to necessary inputs and lack of
access to relevant training and knowledge14. A key challenge in particular is poor soil fertility,
reduced soil organic matter, and increased occurrence of acidified soils, due in part to limited fallow
periods, limited use of fertilizers, and poor cultivation practices. This is further exacerbated by limited
functioning of markets and prohibitive trade policies, constraining access to inputs15.
As a result, the average yields of grain crops in sub-Saharan Africa have stayed below 1 tonne per
hectare since the 1960s, compared with average cereal yields of 2.5 t/ha in South Asia and 4.5 t/ha
in East Asia16. Smallholder farmers, with limited capacity to invest or manage risk due to poorly
functioning credit and insurance markets, are constrained in their ability to increase yields and
incomes, and are particularly vulnerable to impacts of climate change and current climate variability.
Women farmers are particularly vulnerable, as they are estimated to receive less than 5% of
extension, and less than 1% of agricultural credit17.
Enhancing agricultural production and food security in Africa requires strengthening
agricultural systems to be more resilient, i.e. more capable of performing well in the face of
adverse events18. This requires transformations in managing land, water, soil, and genetic resources
for more efficient and resilient production. Such practices could generate mitigation benefits by
increasing carbon sinks and reducing emissions from agriculture. This includes sustainable
agricultural practices such as improved soil and water management; soil fertility enhancement; and
use of crop varieties and livestock breeds resistant to drought, floods, salinity and disease. There
are a number of agricultural practices that can help increase climate resilience of smallholder
farmers. These include19:

Conservation agriculture practices involving reduced or no tillage and the use of cover crops to
improve soil fertility and water retention, reduce soil erosion and improve recharge of aquifers

Integrated pest management (IPM) using, among other things, pest’s natural predators as an
alternative or addition to pesticide use

Improved water management, including drainage, micro-irrigation and in-field rainwater
management to increase productivity and prevent salinisation

Crop rotation to prevent build up of pathogens and pests, replenish nitrogen through use of
legumes, and to improve soil structure and fertility

Agroforestry to create diverse and productive land-use systems that can reduce soil erosion,
increase soil fertility, and provide outputs (e.g. fodder) for livestock

Access to stress-tolerant crop and livestock varieties (resistant to drought, floods, salinity).
For African smallholder farmers to be able to take up these practices, they require access to
appropriate technological information, access to weather and climate information, appropriate inputs,
effective output markets to sell agricultural products, and capacity to invest and manage risk.
Measures that address agriculture’s resilience to climate change can therefore not be treated in a
vacuum and policies and practices must recognise this broader context.
Agriculture in Southern and Eastern Africa is extremely diverse, ranging from large mechanised
farms, through various sizes of smallholder production using both animal traction and hoe cultivation,
to extremely small but nevertheless productive and important kitchen gardens and peri-urban
farming. On the livestock side the range is through large scale ranches, nomadic and semi-nomadic
pastoralism, crop cultivators having one or more cows, sheep, pigs or goats and backyard chickens,
to intensive pig, chicken and dairy units and urban livestock keeping. The interaction between
pastoralists and cultivators is a key issue, particularly in East Africa.
Throughout the area, the poor in particular are also dependent on common land for wild meats, fruits,
roots and fuel. This resource can become particularly critical in time of hunger.
Soil fertility gradients and management intensity can vary between ‘in-fields’ next to the homesteads
and ‘out-fields’ which may be as little as 75m distant but have very different characteristics20. In the
face of such variability there is no universal solution. However it is possible to identify some of the
characteristics required of more climate resilient and productive agriculture:
(a) Less susceptible to drought - including mid-season dry spells and shorter seasons (especially
Southern Africa);
(b) Less susceptible to intense heavy rain – soil more protected from erosion and less susceptible
to flooding and water-logging (especially East Africa);
(c) More diversified food and income – this may involve crop diversification, but can also include
improved crop storage, savings, crop insurance, off-farm income sources etc.
Understanding and targeting the most vulnerable: To increase a households climate resilience,
one has to understand their underlying vulnerability and increase their broader resilience. The
underlying resilience of a household is a function of a number of factors, including level of assets,
production, policies and social provision by the state, access to income or food, and access to and
ability to participate in functioning markets. Understanding where the vulnerable are, why they are
vulnerable and what responses will increase their resilience is key to being able to address the
increasing shocks of climate change such as floods and droughts in an effective way.
Vulnerability assessment is a key aspect of incorporating assessments of climate change impacts
with current development planning. Methods of vulnerability assessment have been developed over
several decades of natural hazards, food security, poverty analysis, sustainable livelihoods and
related fields. These approaches – each with their own nuances – provide a core set of best
practices for use in studies of climate change vulnerability and adaptation21.
A number of indicator-based approaches have been developed to improve the performance of early
warning systems. The SADC Secretariat, - supported by DFID and others partners - has adopted a
livelihoods approach to vulnerability analysis, focused on food security. This approach is based on an
analysis of the social vulnerability of livelihoods to a range of threats, including climatic, economic
and resource changes. This has provided an effective means of both monitoring and forecasting food
security status, and developing effective policy responses to both chronic and transient food
insecurity. This can include:

The use of cash transfers as opposed to food aid in situations where a market based approach
to food insecurity can be developed;

The effective development of social protection measures for the chronically vulnerable, including
agriculture subsidies;

The development of market interventions and public works programmes;

The application of financial and insurance measures;

The promotion of effective livelihood protection measures such as conservation farming and
agroforestry.
Our analysis of the impact of climate variability and change on food security and livelihoods will build
upon these existing systems, primarily through the integration of projected climate impacts into
existing risk analyses.
3. Policy context
Global Policy
The impact of climate change crosses national boundaries. Global climate negotiations have not yet
resulted in a legally binding agreement. However, the Copenhagen Accord committed developed
countries to provide $30 billion in fast start financing from 2010-2012 (divided equally between
adaptation and mitigation) and set a goal to mobilise US $100 billion by 2020 in the context of
mitigation. Pledged resources for fast track financing are estimated to be between US $27.9 and US
$ 29 billion as of August 201022. Whilst past experience has found large gaps between pledged and
disbursed commitments, it is reasonable to assume there will be a significant flow of climate finance
that initiatives such as the one included in this programme could lever.
Further, as some forms of agriculture practices sequester carbon there is the possibility of mitigation
finance to be accessed. Table 1 illustrates this potential ranging from 0.1 to 9 t/ha/yr.
Table 1
Africa and Regional Policy
African countries face common challenges across shared agro-ecological zones and shared river
basins. Problems of land degradation, decreasing soil fertility, and decreasing water quality and
quantity cross borders, yet there is little sharing of lessons and opportunities to enhance agricultural
production. Furthermore regional trade policies may inhibit affordability and accessibility of
agricultural inputs by smallholder farmers.
The 2003 commitment by African Heads of State and Government to establish the Comprehensive
African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)23 recognised under-investment in African
Agriculture, the need for regional coordination of agriculture policy and the urgent need to increase
agricultural productivity in order to achieve MDG1 in Africa. However, CAADP has faced numerous
challenges and until 2008, there had been few incentives to support it24. Most countries do not have
national climate policies and plans. Where they do exist, the ability of countries to absorb large
quantities of climate finance in ways that deliver sustainable results is lacking. There is a role for
regional economic communities to play a leadership role in developing clear climate policies and
plans, and to provide a conduit for climate finance to be channelled to successful national
programmes until national systems themselves are strengthened and able to directly absorb climate
finance.
Responding to this gap, the COMESA Secretariat has developed the Tripartite “Africa Solution” with
the other Tripartite members of SADC and EAC. The programme is focussed on addressing
adaptation and mitigation challenges in Southern and Eastern Africa. Central to the initiative is
influencing the global negotiations and accessing climate finance for climate smart agriculture within
the CAADP objectives (pillar 1). Norway and the EU are other development partners behind the
Africa Solution. Planned Norway funding is approx $50,000,000 and current EU funding is Euro 4m
behind the initiative.
4. Evidence
The evidence of need for an intervention that addresses food security and climate resilience at a
regional level is considered to be strong. While evidence exists on the potential of the good
agricultural practices to contribute to climate resilience, more evidence is needed to demonstrate
what works in different contexts and why. For example, conservation agriculture has been
successful in increasing yields in some areas of Zimbabwe and Zambia25. However, given the
variability in agro-ecological zones it is necessary to understand what techniques and practices are
effective in other agro-ecological niches and country contexts26. Moreover, learning-oriented
approaches are needed to adapt good agricultural practices for maximum potential in local specific
contexts and for the poorest households.
Overall, there is a need and opportunity to synthesize and promote access to knowledge and
evidence on climate smart agricultural practices -- what works where and why -- in different agroecological contexts in Africa. Similarly, there is an opportunity to systematically document what
practices and enabling conditions are effective to scale-up such practices, which can help inform
regional and national policy directions. There is limited capacity at a country level to conduct such
research. By working at a regional level, economies of scale and technology transfers can be
achieved
5. Relevance to ICF
ICF Policy
Africa is a priority for fast adaptation response under the ICF implementation plan and Southern
Africa is specifically identified for rapid scale up. The ICF has committed 50% of its total funding to
adaptation. The ICF identifies agriculture and food security as key areas for intervening. This
programme will work with leading champions in Africa on increasing the evidence on how to scale up
climate resilient agriculture farming practices and will demonstrate to potential climate financiers that
investment can achieve increases in productivity. Through working with private sector associations
(such as farmer federations and regional confederations of agriculture unions- both regionally and
nationally) and linking this to climate finance, a transformation in the productivity of agriculture in
Southern Africa and some countries in Eastern Africa could be achieved.
A number of African countries are identified by the ICF as highly vulnerable and where scale up CSA
should be immediate. These include Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Zambia and
Zimbabwe are identified as highly vulnerable but with capacity constraints on delivery in the DFID
offices – however Africa Regional, through this programme, can supplement country office capacity
and increase reach in countries where no DFID offices exist. This programme can also provide
regional complementarities that will increase the adaptation response of country offices.
6. Current relevant HMG programmes
DFID has been developing this business case with three country offices – Zambia, Malawi,
Zimbabwe – identified in the Tripartite Africa Solution programme documentation and given ICF
priorities. All three DFID country offices are supportive of this regional programme and have been
involved in the development of the concept note. By combining efforts at the DFID regional and
country levels greater impact can be achieved. The comparative advantage of the regional
programme includes;
 Our ability to work with regional champions (Tripartite) to access climate finance through
policy development and demonstration pilots;
 A stronger voice using political leverage to increase country level momentum behind
implementation;
 Our ability to assess who are vulnerable and provide evidence based policy
recommendations to respond to short and medium term climate shocks by providing technical
support, quality assurance and methodological rigour to national Vulnerability Assessment
Committees
 Underpinning country level climate resilient agriculture initiatives with rigorous research,
monitoring and evaluation across the region that feeds into regional learning centres;
 Investing in scaling up of climate resilient agriculture practices at a country level through the
Tripartite Africa Solution.
Table 2 summarises existing relevant programmes at a regional or country level (Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Malawi) either operational or planned. These programmes address the wider factors that enable
agriculture systems and climate resilience to be strengthened. This business case looks at one
aspect of addressing food security and climate resilience, but we recognise the necessity of these
complementary initiatives.
At the regional level improved transboundary water management forms a platform upon which future
agriculture productivity will be based. The Regional Agriculture Markets programme will be designed
closely with this programme. The Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme is coming to an end.
It includes the Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis work that operates closely with some country
offices (e.g. Malawi and Zimbabwe). We recommend its incorporation into this programme. The
Africa Risk Capacity programme addresses weather risk pooling at a regional level.
Country level programmes in markets, production and social protection will complement the
evidence, policy and production focus of this programme and will be designed in conjunction. For
instance in Malawi the country office is active in food security and agriculture. They have requested
that this programme continues support for Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (VAA), links the
country level production work into the regional accessing of climate finance and provides a
complementary evidence component. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, in addition to these areas, direct
interventions to increase climate resilient agriculture practices are being discussed.
Table 2: Summary of Relevant Country and Regional Programmes
Programme
Country
Type
Status
Regional
Transboundary Water
Programme
Regional
Strengthening water management of
shared river basins
Phase 2 operational
Regional Climate
Change Programme
Regional
Supporting evidence based
negotiations and increased research
on adaptation
Operational
Regional Hunger and
Vulnerability
Programme
Regional
Supporting SADC’s Vulnerability
Assessment and Analysis (VAA)
workstream. Developing baselines,
monitoring vulnerability and providing
regional and national level
recommendations to increase
resilience.
Existing – current
programme coming to
an end (Dec 2011)
Suggested for
incorporation into this
programme
Africa Risk Capacity
Regional
Pooled funding for weather insurance.
Inception phase
Regional Agriculture
Markets Programme
Regional
Removing constraints along the value
chain of food staples in East and
Southern Africa
Design
Rural Markets
Programme
Zambia
Agricultural markets programme
Design
Agricultural Production
Malawi
Input availability, conservation
agriculture, dairy
Being designed
linked to developing a
SWAP
Private sector
development
Malawi
Agricultural markets
Design
Community resilience
Malawi
Including improving and diversifying
agriculture and Malawi Vulnerability
Assessment Committee (MVAC)
Operational
Phase 3 in design
Protracted Relief
Programme
Zimbabwe
Agricultural markets and production
programme
Operational
DFID Zambia Social
Cash Transfers
Programme
Zambia
Cash transfers programme
Operational
Pilot Programme for
Climate Resilience
Policy
Division
MDB funding through Climate
Investment Funds operational in
Zambia and Mozambique –
Operational
Adaptation for
Smallholder
Agriculture
Policy
Division
Implemented by IFAD, supports
smallholder adaptation including
conservation agriculture. Global not
yet specified target countries.
Opportunities for synergies on
research/evidence and
implementation.
Inception
Due to finish June
2012
Consequences of not intervening.
Three main consequences from not intervening are likely to arise;
 Southern and Eastern Africa are unlikely to access the level of climate finance at their
potential disposal - resulting in millions of smallholder farmers and their families becoming
more food insecure and vulnerable to climate shocks
 At least 250,000 farmers (each with four dependents) will remain food insecure
 The evidence base for effective interventions to increase the resilience of agriculture will
remain weak, delaying adequate adaptation and resulting in inefficient allocation of resources.
Champions exist at the present time – in particular this is a priority of the Tripartite – to deliver a
transformation in African agriculture that goes beyond direct funding of this programme.
B. Impact and Outcome
ClimateSmart - Scaling-up Climate Smart Agriculture in Southern and Eastern Africa programme, will
deliver support to the Tripartite Africa Solution embodied in their “Programme on Climate Change
Adaptation and Mitigation in the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Region”. It will
enable evidence based policy interventions to increase climate resilience, particularly linked to food
security, across countries in Southern Africa and those in East Africa that are prioritised by the ICF. It
will provide targeted evidenced based training to small-scale farmers to introduce climate smart
agriculture practices. Demonstration of success of trials and scaled up practices will be used to
access climate finance through the championship of the Tripartite. It is recommended the programme
is an eight-year programme with funding only approved for the first four years and continuation to the
full eight years subject to a decision point in year 3. The following section outlines impact, outcome,
output and activities and illustrates the results chain assumptions.
The total amount for the “Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Region” is US$110,200,000 (approx £71m) of which
approximately 55% will be funded by DFID. The Outcomes and Outputs listed below are for the total
multi-donor programme. With a DFID contribution of £38m, the attribution to DFID would be about
55%. More details of attribution are given in the logical framework.
Impact: Improved food and agricultural security of poor in East and Southern Africa
Indicators by 2020:
-
Number of people food insecure – down from 8 million to 3 million in the SADC area27
-
Prevalence of malnutrition – stunting down from 36% to 18% and underweight down from
15% to 7.5%
-
Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) becomes standard smallholder practice – with 8
Governments taking it to scale using climate finance and reaching 10 million farmers on 2.5
million ha
Outcome: Improved knowledge, policies and longer-term incentives drive increased
uptake of Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) in COMESA-EAC-SADC member states
Indicators by 2015:
-
Number of farmers using climate smart agriculture practices (CSA) based on sound evidence
– 250,00028 adopting directly and 2 million influenced through better knowledge
-
Finance for climate smart agriculture received from international community and national
governments – an additional $300 million
-
Climate resilient policy and programme responses informed by climate smart regional and
national vulnerability assessments and analysis (VAA) in the Tripartite and at least 15
member states
Assumption to move from outcome to impact:
A critical mass of farmers practising CSA, combined with appropriate financial incentives and
evidence based policies will lead to wide-scale adoption of CSA and additional sustained finance.
Use of CSA, coupled with effective response to VAA, results in reduced food insecurity and reduced
malnutrition and continued wider-spread adoption.
Outputs:
Output 1: Improved policy on climate smart agriculture, informed by evidence,
supported by the global community and attracting adaptation and mitigation finance.
Indicators by 2015:
-
Africa Climate Solution accepted by the global community and attracting finance to the
tripartite and member states
-
14 member states have developed gender sensitive AFOLU/CSA investment frameworks and
strategies.
-
Mitigation solutions being applied in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region by RECs with carbon
trading benefits (relating to carbon sequestration of agriculture).
Assumption to move from output to outcome:
Climate finance commitments, investment frameworks and carbon trading funds are implemented in
a way that provides sufficient incentive for farmers to adopt climate smart agriculture. RECs facilitate
direct applications for carbon financing at national and local level, rather than creating an additional
layer of bureaucracy to jump through.
Activities:
-
Policy advocacy at COP17 and successors led by the RECs (or nominated REC leads)
-
Support to the development of national CSA/AFOLU strategies and investment frameworks
-
Developing climate smart agricultural opportunities that can access carbon finance.
Output 2: Policy responses to vulnerability constantly informed and influenced by
improved assessment of climate vulnerability (who, where, why) across the region
Indicators by 2015:
-
National VAA procedures operational with regular reports in at least 10 member countries and
VAA cost covered by at least 5 national governments.
-
National VAA output reflected in policy and programmes with at least 15 poverty reduction
and/or climate mitigation/adaptation policies and/or programmes making demonstrable use of
VAA
-
Regional VAA output accessible and communicated with at least one analytical or
methodological report of regional relevance and/or with multinational coverage, one regional
VAA dissemination report and 15 national VAA reports published on SADC website annually
Assumption to move from output to outcome:
Climate aware vulnerability analysis leads to improved policies that encourage uptake of climate
smart agriculture and effective vulnerability reducing responses.
Activities:
-
Expanding VAA to additional countries, including those outside of SADC
-
Developing livelihoods mapping that integrate climate and social vulnerability and assessing
regional / national climate hotspots
-
Developing VAA methodology to assess the impact of CSA on vulnerability
-
Communicate results to feed into policy analysis (including trends)
-
Advocacy to ensure that the findings from VAA are used appropriately by the wider
ClimateSmart programme, the Tripartite, member states, donors, NGOs and other
stakeholders.
Output 3: Farmers using improved, locally relevant, climate smart agricultural
practices in order to increase their climate resilience.
Indicators by 2015:
-
Number of small-scale farmers trained in locally specific climate smart agricultural practices –
2 million using programme derived evidence or training materials
-
Conservation Agriculture, agroforestry and CSA projects piloted and scale-up fast-tracked – 5
CSA pilot and 14 anchor investment projects
-
250,000 million farmers involved in CA/CSA fast track pilot and anchor investment projects, at
least 40% of whom are women (direct attribution)
Assumption to move from output to outcome:
Training in climate smart agriculture and participation in conservation agriculture and agroforestry
exemplar projects leads to longer-term adoption and spread of CSA
Activities:
-
Development of independent Results Facility able to investigate, assess, channel funds and
monitor CSA projects
-
CSA projects (pilot and scale-up) developed, selected and supported through the Results
Facility
-
Monitoring, lesson learning and impact assessment of CSA projects (supported by Output 4)
-
Develop and use innovative communication approaches to spread the learning from the pilots
and the research from Output 4 to a wider section of farmers, with collaboration from the
agricultural unions and other stakeholders.
-
Develop links between commercial farmers, farmer organisations and input supply chains to
support CA/CSA adoption by smallholders
Output 4: Evidence and learning on climate smart agricultural practices used to
enhance effectiveness of programme delivery and global knowledge
Indicators by 2015:
-
Robust evidence of the impact and operational lessons of climate smart agricultural
interventions made available, including a synthesis of existing knowledge, at least two peer
reviewed papers and lessons from selected CA/CSA projects across the region.
-
Action research tested and tailored selected agricultural practices developed which are
applicable to diverse agro-ecological, socio-economic conditions and by gender - at least 6
advice packages in use and the outcome of using them being monitored
-
Learning on CSA in Southern and Eastern Africa being used to improve policy and practice
with evidence of research results, combined with practitioner experience, being used by
women and men farmers and the results being monitored.
Assumption to move from output to outcome:
Sufficient locally appropriate agricultural practices can be identified that are sufficiently advantageous
to farmers. Good research evidence does get used for improved policy and is used to improve
farmer practice.
Activities:
-
Synthesis of knowledge on key climate resilient agriculture practices
-
Robust research and impact evaluation on programmes going to scale, to generate evidence
of impact, and of what works in what contexts and why, including gender considerations.
-
Adaptive research to test and tailor select agricultural practices to diverse agro-ecological and
socio-economic conditions
-
Communicating evidence to inform ongoing programme delivery and feed into policy
-
Strengthened dialogue and collaboration among RECs, NEPAD, CGIAR, NARS, Regional
Centres of Excellence, agricultural unions and NGOs. This can include international expertise
such as that developing in Brazil (e.g. Embrapa) and Australia.
Sustainability
A number of aspects of the programme will contribute towards sustainability:
1) Accessing climate finance (both public and private) creating a stream of funding over the medium
term will overcome one major constraint (finance) of climate smart agriculture practices to be
brought to scale.
2)
Improving the evidence base, enabling practices to be tailored to local context.
3) Drawing on the capacity of commercial farmers and regional private sector agriculture
associations to embed knowledge,
4) Strengthen national level action research capacity, linked to a regional centre of excellence,
building on existing African institutions,
5) Backing a fully African owned initiative with strong regional and national level champions behind
the Africa Solution, CAADP initiative and action plans.
A distinction is made between capacity building of the institutions and results on the ground. This
programme is focused on results on the ground, but capacity building will be conducted if this
maximises the likelihood and scale of results.
2. Appraisal Case
A. Feasible options
In the design stage 4 technical options and a ‘Do Nothing’ option will be considered;
Option 1: scaling up conservation agriculture (CA) practices
Option 2: scaling up CA and complementary agro-forestry and other climate smart agriculture practices (CSA)
Option 3: Option 2 (CSA) + a component on evidence research and dissemination
Option 4: Option 3 + supporting the Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis of broader climate resilience as it
relates to food security.
Option 5: Do nothing (counterfactual)
In addition to technical options the appraisal will look at 2 delivery options:
1. The programme is delivered by a managing consultant appointed through an international tendering
process.
2. The programme is delivered by the Tripartite through the COMESA and SADC Secretariats.
B. Evidence Base for the feasible Options
Evidence for Option 1: Conservation Agriculture
Conservation Agriculture (CA) is a blanket term which is applied to a wide range of techniques, the three core
parts are usually considered to be:

Reduced tillage of the soil29;

Developing a mulch to protect the soil surface;

Crop rotation.
Although the details of the CA menu can be quite site specific, the core concept embodied by these three
components is relatively universal and is applicable to a wide range of farming, from large-scale mechanised to
small-scale hoe farming. The principle behind CA is maintaining more natural conditions in the soil by not
regularly disturbing it through cultivation, leaving the soil surface protected from the sun and rain with plant
remains and using rotations of crops to exploit different parts of the soil, building soil structure and using
legumes to replace nitrogen.
In Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, farmers have had successful increases in production of cereal and legumes:
(a) Results from Total Land Care in Malawi for 193 farmers over four years gave a 20% increase in yield, 46%
reduction in labour and a 70% increase in gross margin30.
(b) Experience from 13 semi-arid Districts in Zimbabwe show a consistent increase in yield across a number of
different crops from CA31. CA demonstrations in Zimbabwe have been supported with inputs, however
farmers have nevertheless attributed the yield benefits in CA to several factors, which include timely planting
of CA fields, availability and precision placement of fertilizers and better moisture conservation (Nyagumbo
et al., 2009)32
(c) The Conservation Farming Unit in Zambia’s analysis of multi-year experiences with CA found that
conservation ‘basin’ farming increased maize yields by 68%, regression analysis showed that 50% of the
yield increase was due to improved timing of planting and weed control (this was achieved through CA, but
would not necessarily be exclusive to CA)33.
(d) Results from introducing CA in Northern Tanzania using a farmer field school (FFS) methodology with 130
FFSs and 3,500 farmers gave significantly increased yields (75%) while using less labour. Cover crops were
preferred to the use of herbicide. However there was tension with pastoralists due to crop farmers stopping
grazing on their fields.34
The evidence suggests that, where an appropriate CA menu has been developed for a particular agroclimatic and socio-economic area, potential exists for yield increases of 20-75%. Larger yield increases of 75120% are also reported in the literature for Latin America, Asia and Africa, but may reflect the incorporation of
other inputs alongside CA35. There is evidence that CA is more resilient to drought periods compared to
conventional tillage36.
However it should also be noted that there is ample evidence of site/CA combinations that result in a depression
in yield, particularly in the first few years37. This may be because the CA package is not appropriate to the site,
or it may be a site in which the conditions are just not appropriate to CA. Other issues which have constrained
uptake or adoption of conservation agriculture include competition for crop residues (i.e. mulch material would
be more profitably used by livestock – or where its consumption by neighbours’ livestock cannot be prevented in
the case of open grazing areas); constrained labour at key periods during the cropping cycle; increased weeding
demands which transfer labour burden to women when herbicides are not used; lack of money to invest in
external inputs; and lack of output markets to sell legume crops38.
The evidence suggests that Conservation Agriculture (CA) can improve yields and resilience to drought
in a significant number of agro-ecological zones by at least 20%.
Evidence for Option 2: Climate Smart Agriculture
There are a number of agricultural practices in addition to CA that can contribute to climate resilient agricultural
systems. These practices aim to improve soil fertility, structure and moisture; support efficient use of water
resources, and enhance combinations of organic, biological and mineral resources39. As a result, these climate
resilient agriculture practices have merit in terms of increasing yields, including through drought periods and
some have the additional benefit of carbon sequestration. These practices in addition to conservation agriculture
include agro-forestry; integrated pest management; optimum cropping density; better weed control; water
management - through for example micro-irrigation; improved stress-resistant seed varieties and integrated
crop-livestock management. Often, several of these practices, including conservation agriculture practices, may
be implemented simultaneously to maximise synergies and give higher yields and environmental impacts.
Successful programmes which incorporate CA usually include other ‘wins’ such as improved varieties, access to
appropriate inputs, integrated pest management and marketing. This provides a mutually supporting menu of
options for the farmer. For instance the benefits of early planting made possible by CA may only be fully realised
if appropriate seed varieties are available. The benefits of legume rotation may only be realised if there is a
market for legumes. Training in herbicide use only makes sense if there is a functioning input supply chain40.
Integrated Pest management (IPM) can be a cost effective approach to increasing the resilience of all
agriculture and it makes sense to incorporate it into interventions encouraging CA. The range of possible climate
resilient agricultural interventions also includes micro-irrigation, crop-livestock integration, storage and
marketing. Established programmes encouraging CA have found an integrated approach to better farming, with
CA as a core component, and with other improvements offered alongside provides the most attractive overall
package to farmers41. The costs of developing a system for accessing and building the confidence of farmers
means being able to give advice at the same time on the recommended varieties to use or where to sell the
legume in the CA rotation makes sense.
Total Land Care have found working with a mutually supporting package of measures to be most effective. Their
package of sustainable agricultural practices (to improve food security, nutrition, and incomes) include42:




Integration of conservation measures, e.g., conservation agriculture, agroforestry, organic manures,
intercropping, and legume rotations to improve soils and crop yields at low cost
Sound agronomic practices with respect to selection of suitable crops and varieties adapted to local
conditions, with proper attention to planting time, weeding, and other cultural practices for sound land and
water management.
Low cost systems of irrigation that require no external sources of energy - stream diversion, treadle pumps,
and water harvesting.
Farm diversification to reduce risk and vulnerability to erratic rainfall and climate change while optimizing
business/market opportunities emphasizing crops and livestock adapted to the local agro-ecology and in
high demand by markets.
There are some agro-ecologies where agro-forestry can be an important contributor to both increased resilience
and carbon sequestration43. For instance the leguminous tree Faidherbia albida can increase the productivity of
crops growing beneath the canopy and sequester significant amounts of carbon44. The future potential of
accessing longer-term climate change mitigation funds to support carbon sequestration in CA and agro-forestry
provides opportunities to develop longer-term financial incentives to maintain changed farmer practice.
The evidence for many of the potential complementary interventions is relatively robust as many are the subject
of years of on-station and on-farm trials in southern and eastern Africa. The research evidence for
complementarity of a combination of interventions in different agro-socio-economic conditions is less complete
but the theoretical logic of complementarity is compelling. The practical experience from successful small-scale
interventions on the ground seems to be in favour of focussing on a relatively limited range of complementary
interventions or ‘best bets’ (see the experience of CFU and TLC above). There are economies of scale in
offering a number of complementary extension messages, particularly if they have peak workloads in different
parts of the season. The skill is often in choosing what these ‘best bets’ are in different areas, which often
requires adaptive research and responsiveness to local conditions.
There is a danger that focus is lost if too many agricultural technologies are included. Therefore it is intended the
programme will focus on CA and agro-forestry, with other technologies included only to complement the main
focus. This approach is referred to in this proposal as Climate Smart Agriculture as it results in both Climate
Change adaptation (resilience) and mitigation (carbon sequestration).
The evidence suggests that carefully selected climate smart agricultural (CSA) practices may be more
effective than CA alone in delivering food security. Broadening the possible range of interventions
broadens the evidence base for each area. However a component of evidence gathering and
dissemination may be needed to ensure the optimum practices are on the menu for farmers in a
particular area.
Evidence for Option 3: Climate smart agriculture practices + strong evidence component
With respect to CA, agro-forestry, livestock integration and improved crop varieties, evidence exists in some
contexts that warrants scaling up, however climate resilient practices remain limited in implementation across
Southern Africa. For instance Table 1 illustrates that although CA has been adopted in Latin America, USA and
Australia (e.g. Brazil 76%), in Africa it is practiced in less than 2.4% of total crop area in any country. Part of the
reason for this lack of adoption is lack of disseminated evidence of locally appropriate solutions.
There are a number of different types of evidence needed:
1) Better synthesised and disseminated existing evidence about what works, where, when and for whom. –
mainly of use to those designing and implementing CSA;
2) Evidence on the externalities (carbon sequestration, siltation, less need for emergency responses etc.) that
can be used to drive improvements to the incentive environment for farmers – for policy makers and
negotiators of novel funding streams;
3) Disseminated action research on what works in specific agro-socio-economic environments – for CSA
practitioners and farmers.
4) Evidence of the outcome and impact of CSA interventions funded under this proposal – to learn
implementation lessons and justify external funding.
Successful CA programmes, like those of the CFU and TLC, have tended to have action research components
to inform their own activities. However resources have not often been available for robust scientific rigor in
developing the evidence, dissemination to a wider audience and synthesis at regional and other levels. Typical
rates of return found for research and dissemination suggest that this would be an effective addition to the
programme.
Table 1 - Conservation Agriculture adoption over past 30 years (in 1000 ha) and in percentage of total arable and
permanent cropland area for 2008-0945
Country
1973-77
1978-82
1983-87
1988-92
1993-97
1998-02
2003-07
2008-10
CA% of 2008/10 crop area
15
33
0.6%
0.13
0.13
<0.1%
9
9
0.2%
300
368
2.4%
40
0.8%
15
0.4%
19,719
25,533
76%
9,000
17,000
38%
S & E Africa
Kenya
Lesotho
Mozambique
South Africa
1
1
Zambia
40
Zimbabwe
Rest of World
Argentina
2
6
500
3,950
15,001
Australia
100
100
400
400
Brazil
57
232
650
1,350
8,847
18,744
25,502
25,502
38%
USA
2,200
2,200
4,800
6,839
17,361
22,400
26,500
26,500
15%
50
50
50
50
150
200
10%
France
The case has been made that the impact of the overall programme can be improved by rigorous
generation, synthesis and dissemination of evidence.
Option 4: Climate resilient agriculture + evidence + Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (VAA)
Under the policy and political leadership of SADC, annual VAA processes that usually cost less than USD
100,000, inform the appropriate targeting of relief efforts, primarily responding to climatic shocks, with budgets
that run into millions of dollars. In the eight countries supported by DFID funding it has been shown that VAA
makes support to food insecure and vulnerable livelihoods more cost effective, by helping to pinpoint target
groups and identify the relief strategies that will assist them most efficiently.
Overall, in all eight of the countries reviewed, VAA is now the central instrument for guiding short-term
responses to livelihood shocks among the rural population. Work done in southern Africa has often identified
gender and other differentials as factors in the strength or weakness of livelihoods, but has not reported
systematically on these factors or led to gender-specific short-term response measures. Examples of the results
chain of VAA impact are provided as follows:
Lesotho
In 2006-07, VAA was part of the stimulus for government to respond to food deficits with cash as well as food
support to affected households. It was at this time that Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VACs) around the
region began to report food deficits in cash terms as well as in quantities of grain.
The 2006-07 season was described by some as Lesotho’s worst drought year for over three decades. Part of
government’s response was provision of LSL 72m (approx. £7m) for labour-intensive public works that focused
on natural resource conservation measures like tree planting and gully reclamation. This programme was
undertaken alongside food relief provided by WFP. Through the Disaster Management Unit in which it was
housed, the VAC was responsible for applying VAA to identify where this assistance should be targeted. When
crop production again fell short in 2008, Lesotho’s VAA proposed a mix of cash and food responses.
Zimbabwe
The major Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) that was funded by DFID also relied largely on national VAA for
its targeting of areas for support and intervention strategies to apply– fertiliser in some places, for example, or
support for livestock development in others. One of the agencies implementing the PRP used the core approach
of VAA to build a community-based targeting system for its relief efforts in the Zambezi valley. Through the Food
Economy Group, DFID also used the VAA methodology for impact monitoring of the PRP. In total, some 23
NGOs now use the VAA’s methodological framework for Zimbabwe to structure their monitoring and evaluation.
Malawi
By the time a new food crisis loomed with the poor harvests of the 2004-05 production year, Malawi was better
equipped to identify the threat, analyse it and develop appropriate responses as VAA was instituted in the
annual procedures of the Malawi VAC, which forecast the livelihood shocks promptly through modelling various
scenarios of crop production, food prices and other factors. In an integrated analytical approach, FEWS NET
(Famine Early Warning System Network) worked with VAA data to help identify how food availability, access
and price scenarios would apply where and when. Food relief delivered by the World Food Programme (WFP)
and other agencies reached the target groups more promptly than in 2002, when between 47,000 –100,000
deaths were reported. The levels of hunger and starvation suffered in 2002 did not recur in 2005.
Evidence for the value of VAA can be seen from the commitment of DFID country offices in Malawi and
Zimbabwe. It is also significant that three middle income countries – Botswana, Namibia and South Africa –
have all committed to VAA and to VAC structures and systems over the last five years. These comparatively
well-resourced countries had no immediate or compelling need to join the SADC VAA system, but have been
convinced of the merits.
The case for including VAA within the climate smart agriculture programme is:
1) With the impact of increasing food security, VAA can complement the preventative approach of CSA
with an effective and targeted ‘curative’ response in those (hopefully diminishing) cases when a
direct response is necessary.
2) VAA can provide a qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence base that can feed into both learning
about CSA programme implementation and national and regional policy improvement in favour of
approaches that work in response to climate change threats. In particular VAA can ensure that the
most vulnerable are being included and beneficially impacted by CSA programming.
Table 2 summarises the level of evidence for each option which ranges between Medium and high.
Table 2 – Evidence base for different Options
Option
Evidence
rating
Comment
1 - CA
Medium/
limited
There is significant evidence of CA examples but the general
applicability is contested46
2 – CA/CSA
Medium
Strength of evidence varies between different technologies
3 – CA/CSA+ Evidence
Medium
/high
Research and dissemination generate positive returns in most
cases studied. The action research capacity will improve the
application of the evidence for CA/CSA
4 – CA/CSA+ Evidence
+VAA
Medium
VAA has been shown to generate positive response outcomes.
Evidence for VAA driving preventative outcomes is less strong
1 – Management Consultant
High
There is significant experience within DFID and elsewhere on
the pros and cons of management consultants.
2 – COMESA & SADC
Medium
COMESA is delivering a number of programmes including
TradeMark. SADC has been implementing the previous RVAA
with management consultant involvement as well.
Delivery Options
All options are expected to generate positive environmental outcomes of less erosion, more tree cover and more
carbon sequestration (summarised in Table 3). There will be increased herbicide use, the environmental impact
of this can be mitigated by choice of chemicals and training. The net impact of herbicide is expected to be
positive due to reduced damage caused by inappropriate soil disturbance. The delivery option is considered
unlikely to change the environment or climate impact.
Table 3 – Climate and Environment Impact
Option
Climate change and environment
risks (Negative Impacts)
Climate change and environment
opportunities (Positive Impacts)
1 - CA
Low
High
2 – CA/CSA
Low
High
3 – CA/CSA+
Evidence
Low
High
4 – CA/CSA+
Evidence +VAA
Low
High
C. Appraisal of options
Social appraisal
All options are focused on addressing food security and agriculture resilience for the lowest quintile of people
within the region. Options 1 and 2 which focus on implementation of climate resilient farming practices
demonstrates medium quality evidence that strong yield and income benefits can result to households
participating in this method of farming. Whilst there is no referenceable evidence that nutritional outcomes will
result, given increased food security and a broader mix of crops inherent in key approaches like conservation
agriculture this could be an additional benefit to the poor. One criticism of conservation agriculture specifically is
that the method of farming can increase the labour requirements on women, there is some evidence that this is
the case, although in verbal discussions with female farmers the benefits from increased income often outweigh
such shortcomings47. However, this would suggest Option 2 is preferable to Option 1 to avoid an overly heavy
focus on a single intervention approach that could in some contexts present challenges for women.
Option 3 recommends including a strong evidence component and this would include assessing the gender
aspects of scaling up climate resilient farming practice as well as adaptive research to test and tailor select
agricultural practice to diverse agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions. The aim would be to enable work
within this initial programme, and any future work, to have strong poverty and gender impacts, both at inter and
intra household level. Including the evidence component will help make the programme more sensitive and
responsive to the social conditions on the ground.
Finally option 4, by including broader vulnerability analysis and assessment, will enable a detailed country and
local level assessment of vulnerability. It will be targeted at leveraging policy change at both these levels. By
incorporating vulnerability assessment and analysis work, the aim will be to have impact on the lives of a wider
number of the most vulnerable and tackle some of the underpinning drivers of vulnerability that constrain climate
smart agriculture scale up.
The delivery mechanism is unlikely to have a significant impact on the social outcome. The do nothing option
would leave a deteriorating situation.
Social appraisal suggests that Option 4 is preferred to meet the needs of poorer households and women
Political appraisal
Key political stakeholders in the process are COMESA, SADC, EAC, member states, SACAU/EAFF, other
donors and the private sector. Both COMESA and SADC have demonstrated commitment to the scaling up of
climate smart agriculture practices and in particular conservation agriculture. They have also both committed to
leading climate change within the Tripartite. COMESA has developed the Tripartite Africa Solution in
cooperation with the EAC and SADC and the Heads of member governments. Significant consultations have
taken place and it seems that all major stakeholders are satisfied with all the individual components contained in
this proposal – therefore all options except Option 5 would be acceptable. SADC would like to see VAA included
and so would politically support Option 4.
In Options 1-4 there is a risk that national Governments may object to COMESA (and other RECs) promoting
particular approaches (e.g. CSA/Agroforestry/VAA) and exemplar projects in their countries. This is a risk that
needs to be managed through a combination of sensitivity by the RECs and increased understanding at national
level of the role of the RECs and the role of the nation states in directing the activities of the RECs in their name.
The role of the Programme Advisory Committee will be important here.
The do nothing Option 5 would be resisted politically at the COMESA and SADC levels.
The delivery mechanism may be more politically sensitive. COMESA, and at least in principle the other
members of the tripartite would prefer mechanism 2. Mechanism 2 (though COMESA/Tripartite/SADC) is likely
to be significantly more effective in influencing member governments and climate change negotiations than
mechanism 1. Institutional links already exist between COMESA/Tripartite and SACAU/EAFF and the Private
Sector, and these would be built-on using mechanism 2.
Option 1 may enable decisions such as which projects to fund through the Results Facility to be taken on purely
technical grounds, rather than be subject to vested interests. However the political buy-in and sustainability for
the programme as a whole is likely to be much weaker for Option 1.
Including ClimateMark and the Results Facility with an independent Investment Board as a ‘arms-length’
delivery mechanism, within COMESA’s overall delivery, should combine the political buy-in of Option 2 with the
objectivity desired from Option 1.
Achieving food security, resilience and climate resilience outcomes are dependent on political support as well as
technical capacity. Whilst this programme focuses mostly on the technical side the championship by COMESA,
EAC and SADC will be influential in addressing some political bottlenecks to achieving outcomes. This is an
advantage of a regional approach.
Political appraisal suggests Option 4 delivered through Mechanism 2 (COMESA/SADC with ClimateMark
and an independent Results Facility) would be most appropriate.
Regional Appraisal
Do all the options make use of a regional approach to addressing hunger and vulnerability which justifies the
involvement of the DFID regional office and working through the RECs?
It is important to understand all the options as part of a larger picture of agricultural research, extension and
policy work that is largely already being delivered and funded at a national level. Some is also done at the
International level through FAO and the CG network. The different options in this Business Case are basically
supporting the regional work in the middle – which needs to be supportive and catalytic for the larger body of
national work.
It has been established that there has been insufficient sharing of what works (and what does not) across
country boundaries (see Section 1 A – Context and Need).
The Results Facility, by funding regional exemplars on merit (rather than on a country by country basis) –
reinforcing the regional rather than multi-country approach. Options 1 and 2 increase the base of exemplar CA
(Option 1) and CA/CSA (Option 2) experience available across the region for future learning. However Options 3
and 4 really enable this knowledge to have a firm evidence base and to be shared across the region. Option 4
brings in the additional VAA lens. Although much VAA work is centred on national capacity and assessments,
the information is critical for both national and regional responses to crises. Comparability of methodology
across the region and the distancing of some analysis from national politics enables a more transparent
regionally prioritised response by donors and others.
Options 3 and 4 have the strongest regional benefits.
Technical Appraisal – Options
Experience suggests a balance needs to be struck between a focus on a particular technology (e.g. CA – Option
1) and general extension. It is considered that Climate Smart Agriculture, grounded on CA but with additional
proven technologies, strikes the right balance (e.g. Options 2-4).
The inadequacy of effective evidence (despite quite a lot of data) noted earlier in this business case, points to
the need for more effective collection and use of evidence. Use of this evidence would also reduce the risk and
improve Output 3 (pilot and anchor projects). This suggests a preference for Options 3 and 4.
If VAA can be effectively integrated into the programme this will add value in two ways. There will be a check on
whether the CSA approach is applicable to the poorest and women farmers. This will be partly covered by the
evidence component, but the VAA approach has a different starting point/methodology. Secondly, by
maintaining the ability to respond to food security crises that would overwhelm CSA, VAA provides a sensible
complement to the CSA approach. This suggests a preference for Option 4.
It is possible to look at how the Options are likely to affect some critical success criteria.
Each CSC is weighted 1 to 5, where 1 is least important and 5 is most important based on the relative
importance of each criterion to the success of the intervention.
Table 3 – Critical Success Criteria
CSC
Description
Weighting (15)
1
Locally appropriate Climate Smart Agricultural practices exist and can be
identified which result in sufficient benefits to farmers for their widespread
adoption
5
2
The results facility will catalyse sufficient high quality and effective pilot and
scaling-up CSA interventions
5
3
CSA policies in regional and national institutions improve the environment for
longer-term adoption
4
4
National governments use evidence based VAA analysis to improve CSA
policies and emergency responses
4
5
Robust climate finance systems are developed at scale, that demonstrate
VfM for investors and farmers
3
6
Private sector is integrated into the programme to increase pace of
transformation and contribute to finance
2
Table 4 – Analysis of options against Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
CSC
Weight
(1-5)
Option 1
Score
(1-5)
Weighted
Score
Option 2
Score
(1-5)
Weighted
Score
Option 3
Score
(1-5)
Weighted
Option 4
Score
Score
Weighted
Score
1 Locally appropriate Climate
Smart Agricultural practices
exist and can be identified
which result in sufficient
benefits to farmers for their
widespread adoption
5
3
15
4
20
5
25
5
25
2 The results facility will
catalyse sufficient high quality
and effective pilot and scalingup CSA interventions
5
4
20
4
20
4
20
3
15
3 CSA policies in regional and
national institutions improve
the environment for longerterm adoption
4
3
12
4
16
5
20
5
20
National governments use
evidence based VAA analysis
to improve CSA policies and
emergency responses
4
2
8
2
8
2
8
4
16
Robust
systems
3
2
6
3
9
5
15
5
15
climate
finance
are developed at
scale, that demonstrate VfM
for investors and farmers
Private sector is integrated
into
the
programme
to
increase
pace
of
transformation and contribute
to finance
Totals
2
3
6
53
3
6
79
5
10
98
5
10
101
Technical appraisal suggests that Option 4 is likely to be most successful in delivering the purpose.
Economic Appraisal
The economic analysis for the four options is presented in the Table 5. The benefits of the different options that
fall outside of the economic calculations are listed in the last row of Table 5. The comparison of the four options
is followed by a sensitivity analysis on some of the assumptions made to check the robustness of the overall
economic case.
The calculations assume that for Option 1 the number of households reached with CA correspond to the costs of
£18 per year, which is the current unit costs of the COMESA/CFU programme. This Option will result in both
yield benefits and carbon sequestration. It is assumed that 75% of those farmers that participate in the
programme will continue after support is withdrawn. Moreover it is assumed that because of labour and other
constraints they will only practice the improved technology on about half of their 1Ha of land. It is also assumed
that the programme, with its policy work and training materials, will support other CA projects and contribute to
some spontaneous adoption. However only 10% of this spontaneous adoption is attributable to this programme.
A relatively modest 20% increase in yield is modelled on land used for CA. Estimates of the range of carbon
sequestration for CA (0.3-0.8 T/ha/yr – Lal 1999) are wide and subject to some dispute (see section 1A). An
extremely conservative figure of 0.2 T/ha/yr is used in the model.
Option 2 includes a wider menu of CSA technologies as well as CA. It is assumed that this will involve some
extra costs (e.g. in supporting agroforestry or IPM) and the increased range of technologies being offered will
slightly reduce the number of farmers reached by each extension worker. Therefore the number of farmers
being reached will be reduced by 25% but there will be additional yield (30%) and carbon sequestration benefits
(0.3 T/ha/yr) from the delivery of this wider and complementary menu of CSA practices, which include
agroforestry with its higher C sequestration benefits – both these estimates are considered to still be
conservative
Option 3 adds an evidence and dissemination component to Option 2. The money spent on the Research and
Evidence, reduces the amount available for the CA/CSA components and therefore the number of households
reached is decreased still further. However the action research and better adapted extension menus and
methodology is assumed to have additional yield and carbon sequestration benefits. However the big outcome
is to be able to disseminate better evidence and training materials much more widely beyond the direct
beneficiaries, so the indirect beneficiaries are higher.
Option 4 adds a Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment (VAA) to the programme. The money spent on the VAA
reduces the budget and therefore the number of households reached by the other components is reduced still
further. Unfortunately it has not been possible to quantify the economic benefits of the VAA from the bottom-up,
so these are not included in the benefits of Option 4 – which just illustrates the economic case for the smaller
number of households reached. The costs of the VAA are included in this calculation, which thus gives rise to a
lower BCR and NPV compared to option 3. The BCR calculated amounts to 1.7 compared to 2.2 for option 3.
In order to achieve a BCR of 2.2 the VAA component would need to have show benefits of at least £17m, with
its £9m cost. So the VAA component alone would need a BCR of almost 2.
The non-quantified benefits are listed in the last row of the table. An analysis of the overall programme Impact
level (from the top-down) suggests the economic benefits from lives saved and improved of reaching the Impact
would be very high indeed (in the order of $4 billion). Judging what proportion of this benefit to attribute to this
particular programme is extremely difficult. However the top-down valuation does indicate the potential benefits
of reaching the purpose and contributing to the overall impact, and VAA is seen as an important part of this. As
seen by the evidence section of the merits of VAA and DFID experience of VAA, we take the view that it is likely
to give rise to benefits of at least £17m, thus bringing the overall BCR up to 2.2, and comparable to Option 3.
These assumptions made in the economic modelling are considered to be quite conservative, and returns in
practice may be significantly higher. For more details of the assumptions made in the economic modelling
including an assessment of the VAA component (although not directly comparable and therefore not included in
the comparison table) please see annexes available on request.
Table 5 – Economic analysis of the different options
Costs £m
Conservation Agriculture
Other Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) technologies
Evidence component
Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (VAA)
Admin overheads + DFID costs
Total cost
Total economic costs (discounted at 10%/yr)
Number of households benefiting
Direct beneficiary HHs
Indirect beneficiary HHs
DFID attributable indirect beneficiary HHs (10%)
Total DFID attributable beneficiaries
Cost per attributable beneficiary HH with changed
practice
Yield and carbon outcomes
Yield increase % for those adopting
Average additional yield per attributable HH (75%
adoption rate, with technology practiced on 50% of
typical 1 Ha plot yielding 1 tonne/yr) tonne/yr
Additional yield value per HH at £110 per tonne - £/yr
Tonnes C02 (carbon) sequestered per ha of adopted
CA/CSA
Tonnes C02e sequestered per HH (75% adoption rate,
with technology practiced on 50% of typical 1 Ha plot)
Carbon value used per tonne (DECC central case
scenario traded sector price)
Present value of Benefits £m
Direct yield improvement benefits to 2025
Indirect yield improvement benefits (as above but 10%
attribution to programme) to 2025?
Direct carbon sequestration benefits to 2025
Indirect carbon sequestration benefits (10% attribution)
to 2025?
Total benefit
Economic analysis
Net Present Value
Option 1
CA
Option 2
CA + other
CSA
Option 3
CA + other
CSA
+ Evidence
CA + CSA
+ Evidence +
VAA
Option 4
£35m
£3.2m
£38.2m
£32.8m
£17.5m
£17.5m
£3.2m
£38.2m
£32.8m
£15m
£15m
£5m
£3.2m
£38.2m
£32.8m
£10.5m
£10.5m
£5m
£9m
£3.2m
£38.2m
£32.8m
478,888
478,888
47,888
526,779
£62
359,166
359,166
35,916
395,083
£83
307,856
1,539,281
153,928
461,784
£71
215,499
1,539,281
153,928
369,427
£89
20%
.075
20+10 %
.11
20+10 +10%
.15
20+10+10%
.15
£8
0.73 (0.2)
£12
1.1 (0.3)
£16
1.1 (0.3)
£16
1.1 (0.3)
0.27
0.41
0.41
0.41
£14 to £43 up
to 2025
£14 to £43
up to 2025
£14 to £43 up
to 2025
£14 to £43 up
to 2025
25
2.5
28.5
2.9
32.9
16.4
21.9
15.7
16
1.8
17.8
1.8
15.3
7.7
10.3
7.4
45.3
50.9
72.3
55.3
12.5
18.0
39.5
22.5
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Total tonnes CO2 saved (direct and indirect) million
tonnes
Non-monetised benefits
1.4
2.5
Increased
resilience.
1.6
3.0
Increased
resilience,
2.2
3.4
1.8
2.7
Increased
resilience,
Evidence for
future
programmes
Increased
resilience,
Evidence for
future
programmes,
improved
policy
environment
and
emergency
response
Option 3 has the best net present value (NPV) and equal best Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR). This is because the interaction
between the different components produce positive yield, carbon and spillover benefits. These synergies outweigh the
reduction in direct beneficiary numbers caused by the higher unit costs of the combined approach. Benefits accruing from
indirect beneficiaries are significant from the evidence component, which emphasises the importance of effective
dissemination of the evidence.
The greatest carbon savings also come from Option 3, however since the impact of the programme is increased food
security, the carbon saving, while important, should not be the decisive driver of option choice.
Although Option 4 has a lower NPV than Option 3, there are significant other benefits stemming from the inclusion of VAA
that have not been valued. Other ways at looking at the economic value of VAA suggest it is extremely high, even though
difficult to model directly (see Annex). Given that we take the view that the NPV of Option 4 is likely to be comparable to
that of Option 3 if VAA is valued, Option 3 & 4 both appear suitable.
Economic appraisal suggests Option 3 or 4 are most suitable.
Counterfactual scenario – Option 0
All the above options have been assessed against the baseline counterfactual scenario, in which case there is
no intervention. In the case of no DFID funding the question arises as to whether any other donor, government
or other agent would invest in these activities, thus giving rise to similar impacts. The Norwegian donors will e
funding 40% of the climate smart agriculture and CA. (The modelling for the options has been undertaken just
for DFID attributable spend). So in the absence of DFID funding there will be some benefits, albeit of a much
smaller magnitude. More importantly, the programme will be less effective because the VAA component and
the evidence component will not be funded. It is difficult to quantify this scenario accurately, but it can be stated
that in the absence of the DFID funding, significant net benefits ranging from £12m to £39m would not be
realised, thus resulting in a loss of welfare to society. This loss would manifest itself in the following way:
 Between 215,000 and 1.5m farmers (each with four dependents) will miss the opportunity to
benefit from higher crop yields and will remain food insecure, thus giving rise further
malnutrition;
 Missed opportunities of knock on impacts in terms of better nutrition due to better people
benefiting from higher incomes/food supply; spillover or replication benefits in terms of other
farmers replicating the practices.
 No reduction in smallholder farm level input costs, particularly fuel costs, and making investment
in fertiliser and herbicide more effective;
 Between 2.5m and 3.4m tonnes of carbon will not be sequestered as carbon will not be retained
in the soil and the agricultural frontier will advance into forest lands;
 No reduction in BAU rate of crop failure in years of moderate drought – CA tends to result in
greater rainfall infiltration, more water storage in the soil, deeper rooting and less surface
evaporation – all helpful in climate change adaptation;
 No obvious potential for reduced workload for smallholder farm owners, particularly for women
and children;
 Missed opportunities for wider social environmental benefits - reducing soil degradation and
erosion, with external cost savings in regard to dam siltation and irrigation investment;
 The evidence base for effective interventions to increase the resilience of agriculture will remain
weak, delaying adequate adaptation and resulting in inefficient allocation of resources;
 Reduction in the smaller holder farmers’ contribution to economic growth in the region.
Technical details of economic cost benefit analysis
A social discount rate of 10% is used. This reflects the social time preference and risks within the region, and is
calculated using the Ramsey equation from HMT Greenbook guidance.
Benefits are modelled up to 2025, so for a total of 14 years. This timescale is chosen because it was considered
the length to which implemented policies would result in realisable benefits – it takes time for benefits to start
accruing, and they are likely to continue beyond the duration of the programme. Any timescale longer than that
is unrealistic, and in any case such benefits beyond 15 years would be immaterial as they would be heavily
discounted so far in the future.
Risk and uncertainty
There is significant uncertainty around some of the assumptions used in the modelling, so it is prudent to
undertake sensitivity analyses in order mitigate concerns of the robustness of the modelling to risk and
uncertainty.
Two pessimistic scenario analyses are undertaken here for Option 4.
These are:
Scenario 1: Administrative overhead is £5m instead of £3m
Scenario 2: The number of households reached and adopting the practices is half what was assumed in the
modelling.
Scenario 1 Results: (higher admin overheads at £5m instead of £3m)
Balance of costs and benefits
Administrative overhead
Direct No. households reached
Indirect no. households reached
NPV £m
BCR
Option 4
£3m
215,499
1,539,281
22.5
1.8
Option 4 with
scenario 1
£5m
194,756
1,539,281
20.3
1.6
As can be seen from scenario 1, the results are quite similar to Option 4, and still give positive economic returns.
So increasing the admin overhead from £3m to £5m has limited impact, thus the modelling is robust to the
uncertainty of administrative overheads.
Scenario 2 Results: Half the number of households reached
Balance of costs and benefits
Option 4
Option 4 with
scenario 1
No. households reached directly
No. households reached indirectly (10% attribution)
NPV £m
BCR
215,499
1,539,281
22.5
1.8
107,749
850,655
-5.3
0.84
The scenario looks at what would happen if the unit costs of extension rise, adoption rates fall or the capacity to
organise the programmes to reach farmers is not sufficient and as a result only half the numbers of farmers
adopt CSA practices. In this case the outcome is very different to option 4 and the NPV is slightly negative, with
a BCR under 1. In other words if half the expected number of beneficiaries is reached the programme is
performs slightly lower than the breakeven point. This is a reasonable margin in relation to uncertainty in
beneficiary numbers, it does however focus on the need to ensure the projected beneficiary numbers are
reached.
D. Measures used to assess value for money
The economic valuation and individual appraisals were done in comparison to the counterfactual do nothing
scenario.
Table – Summary Comparison of the Options
Net Present Value
Benefit-Cost Ratio
Cost per attributable beneficiary HH with
changed practice
Value of increased yield (not discounted)
Value of carbon saved (not discounted)
Non-monetised benefits
Positive Climate Change & Environment
Impacts
Social Appraisal
Regional Appraisal
Political Appraisal
Critical Success Criteria score
Technical Appraisal
Option 1
CA
Option 2
CA + other CSA
Option 3
CA + other CSA
+ Evidence
39.5
2.2
£71
12.5
1.4
£62
18.0
1.6
£83
£27.5m
£17.8m
Increased
resilience
£31.4m
£19.6m
Increased
resilience,
£49.3m
£23m
Increased
resilience,
Evidence for
future
programmes




53
79
98
Option 4
CA + CSA
+ Evidence + VAA
22.5
1.8
£89
£37.6m
£17.7m
Increased
resilience,
Evidence for
future
programmes,
improved policy
environment and
emergency
response




101

Delivery Options
The two delivery options are appraised in Section 3 (following). It finds that delivery through COMESA and
SADC would be more politically acceptable, would be delivered by a team which was technically more
integrated into the region and costs would likely to be lower.
Table – Summary comparison of the Delivery Mechanisms (ND = No Difference)
Mechanism 1
Mechanism 2
Management Consultant COMESA & SADC
CC & Environment
ND
ND
Social appraisal
ND
ND
Political appraisal
X

Technical appraisal
X

Economic
X

E. Value for Money of the preferred Option
The preferred option is Option 4 combining Climate Smart Agriculture, evidence research and dissemination and
VAA; delivered through COMESA and SADC. The total expected cost is £38 million over 4 years.
Although Option 4 is the most costly to deliver per household, it scores equal first on benefit cost ratio. Although
the net present value of option 3 is better, this is because the additional economic benefit of Option 4 has not
been valued. Option 4 scores highest on the social, political and technical appraisals. It is marginally ahead of
Option 3 in the critical success criteria. The positive net present value and benefit cost ratio of 2.2 indicates that
the overall programme offers value for money.
Delivery through COMESA and SADC scored most highly in the political and technical appraisals.
3.Commercial Case
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of agreement the right
one for this intervention, with this development partner
The complexity and geographic dispersal of the programme exceeds the capacity of DFID to deliver
the interventions directly, and to manage the numerous contracts for inputs of goods and services
that this would require.
The programme will be delivered by the Tripartite through the following delivery mechanisms:
a. Outputs 1, 2 and 4 will be delivered through the COMESA Secretariat.
b. The RVAA output 2 will be delivered by SADC and the Wahenga Institute.
Consideration was given to deliver the programme through a management consultant which is
technically simpler and less likely to get bogged-down with politics. However there are serious
constraints to using a management consultant:
(i) The regional market is not currently sufficiently developed to generate an adequate
competitive response to a tender and contract process. In order to draw upon a wider pool of
potential bidders, the programme would need to consider using additional organisations from
outside the region: this is unlikely to deliver value for money, and may also undermine
ownership of important key regional institutions (EAC, COMESA & SADC) as well as National
Governments. Experience from working with SADC & COMESA shows that these regional
institutions preference is to drive the implementing process by directly managing all technical
assistance.
(ii) Experience from other regional programmes (RHVP & RCCP) shows that international
consultants tend not to fully understand the political sensitivities and environment the
programme needs to operate in and consequently find it difficult to build productive
relationships. This hampers pace of implementation and is not cost effective.
(iii) A commercial company would incorporate an element of overheads (normally 10-15%) to
fee rates as well as normally a 5-7% management fee for funding interventions upfront.
COMESA management fee is normally set at around 2%48 and costs of the majority of longterm staff required to work on each work streams will be salaried as opposed to fees. Thus
value for money would be better.
(v) Given political importance of UK Government demonstrating quick results of its Fast Start
Climate Change commitments, using a commercial tendering process would delay achieving
results. Using an indirect route enables quick mobilisation.
(vi) The established Southern Africa Trademark Programme uses COMESA as an indirect
programme route and this is proving to be successful and cost effective. This is a model
which is owned by the Tripartite and not surprisingly consultation to date with key partners
would want the Climate Smart Agriculture programme to adopt this model. It is proposed that
the ClimateMark team of this programme uses the same offices as Trademark and adopt
similar management, finance and procurement systems that meet international standards.
Consideration was given to put DFID funding through SACAU or through other private agriculture
associations but there is no evidence which suggests that they have the capacity to manage a
programme of this complexity on top of what they are already managing. The fiduciary risk
considerations alone would be too high for a programme of this magnitude.
Consideration was also given to COMESA managing all procurement of the programme but SADC
have strongly intimated to DFID that this would not be acceptable to SADC. We are therefore going
to continue with the proven existing procurement mechanism under the RHVP programme for
delivery of the RVAA output. Procurement of this output will be through an MOU with SADC and an
accountable grant with the Wahenga Institute. The MOU which DFID currently has with SADC for
implementing RVAA under RHVP is around £0.5M. These costs support core costs of the SADC
RVAA Unit. There is limited procurement activity undertaken by SADC. The workplan of the SADC
RVAA Unit which requires specialist technical assistance is currently procured or implemented by the
Wahenga Institute who have the specialist knowledge and have been working on RVAA issues in the
region for the past 3 years. This model has proven to be highly effective under RHVP and SADC’s
preference is that we continue with this model until SADC’s financial and procurement systems meet
international standards. Recent institutional and financial assessment of SADC carried out by the EU
concluded that SADC’s systems are likely to be acceptable to donors in the first quarter of 2012.
DFID will therefore consider in Year 2 of this programme to phase out the Accountable Grant with the
Wahenga Institute and allow SADC to manage some (or all) all procurement activity under the RVAA
output.
B. Value for money through procurement
Value for money will be achieved by delivery institutions using a combination of competitive and noncompetitive processes.
Competition will be used where there are sufficient organisations to compete in order to drive-up
quality and drive-down costs. It is estimated that up to 80% of the cost of the programme will require
some form of competition process. For example, delivery of output 3 – the Results Facility – costing
£24M the bulk of which will involve a competitive process through a “Call for Proposals”. It is
envisaged that a range of organisations such as international and regional NGOs, government
departments, universities, farmer organisations and private companies will respond to the ‘Call for
Proposals’. Quality and capacity is very variable and so the assessment process will be thorough
and be based on past experience, on-the-ground capacity and ability to deliver tangible results at
reasonable costs. This process and rigorous grant management will drive Value for Money.
Where non-competitive processes are used, a negotiated and agreed schedule of prices and
rigorous expectation of results will also ensure value for money.
A number of additional factors are important for ensuring value of money through procurement:
1. Experience from the Southern Africa Trademark programme shows that COMESA manages
fiduciary risk to a high level – ensuring full compliance to all procurement policies.
2. The Southern Africa Trademark programme has a Programme Management Manual which
sets out the operating procedures of the programme including a clear recruitment and
procurement policy which meet internationally recognised standards. It is the intension that
the Climate Resilient Agriculture Programme will adopt a similar manual with significant
emphasis on value for money.
3. To mitigate against the risk of not achieving VFM, DFID, COMESA and SADC will consider
commissioning within the second year of implementation a Value for Money study which will
deliver a clear set of recommendations to enhance Value for Money
C. Financial Case
D. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure
accurate forecasting
The expected cost of the programme is £38 million over 4 years. If progress is good in the first 18
months DFID could consider adding additional funding to the programme with necessary revisions to
the business case. The design of ClimateMark and the Results Facility makes it possible to add
either additional funding or additional components relatively easy. An evaluation at the start of Year 3
will assess whether there should be a further 4 years of the programme or whether an exit strategy
should be followed to terminate at the end of year 4.
The approximate breakdown of costs by year is as follows, this will be revisited upon commencement
of programme1:
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
£1m
£8m
£14.5m
£14.5m
The approximate allocation of funds to individual components of the programme will be as follows:
Intervention
Output 1: Improved quality and harmonisation of policy on climate
resilient agriculture, informed by evidence
Output 2: Policy responses to vulnerability constantly informed and
influenced by improved assessment of climate vulnerability (who,
where and why) across the region.
Output 3: Farmers using improved, locally relevant climate resilient
agriculture practices in order to increase their climate resilience.
Output 4: Evidence and learning on climate resilient agriculture
practices to enhance effectiveness of programme delivery and
global knowledge.
Total
Amount
% of total
£3,000,000
8%
£6,000,000
16%
£24,000,000 63%
£5,000,000
13%
£38,000,000 100%
The Deputy Programme Manager will develop a working relationship with the COMESA Secretariat,
SADC RVAA Unit and Wahenga Institute to enable effective engagement on programme issues
including financial management issues. All delivery institutions will be submitting quarterly financial
and narrative progress report which will also include an assessment of risks associated with delivery.
These reports will clearly indicate realistic projection of spend for the current financial year broken
down by quarter on all budget activity lines. The Deputy Programme Manager will rigorously
reconcile these forecasts against (i) relevant data on Aries; (ii) annual workplans and budget; (iii)
previous quarterly reports; (iv) previous disbursements and past spending trend. Any discrepancies
1
The spend profile used for the economic appraisal was £5, £13m, £15m, £5m over a four year
period. The revised spend profile will not significantly change results – given the backloading of
spend the net present value and benefit cost ratio will be higher.
will be quickly raised with implementers and necessary changes to forecasts will be agreed. The
Lead Adviser will also be consulted on all financial issues identified as well as any changes to
forecasts on Aries that need to be made.
Financial fraud/mismanagement is always present as a risk. The probability of it occurring has been
rated as “medium” given the scale of the programme and number of sub-grantees that will be
benefitting from funding under the programme. The impact is considered “low”. A zero tolerance
policy will be enforced across the programme. To reduce this risk still further COMESA has arranged
to buy in additional financing capacity from their core funding, we have allocated sufficient
programme resources for management (0.4 FTE) and we will ensure adequate financial capacity
under ClimateMark to scrutinise the grantees. See the Risk Matrix for additional mitigation action
pp45
The programme was initially designed as a 48 month programme but due to delays outside the DFID
team’s control the programme has a spending window of December 2011 to March 31 2015 (the
Comprehensive Spending Review end date). This may challenge deliver of the full results within the
timeframe as farmers tend to need 3 years of training before they can be graduated. An increase in
yields is not always experienced in early years and is also subject to weather cycles. It is the
Outcome 1 indicator that will be ambitious to fully achieve. Whilst we will aim to fully deliver within the
CSR period by the end of 12 months of operation we will know whether full results will only be
achievable with an extension to the programme. The programme is designed to be extendable to
eight years and this recognises the ambition of the Impact level indicators and the transformative role
this programme seeks to play in Africa.
E. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin
The programme will be funded from programme resources and has been budgeted for in the Africa
Regional Operational Plan. There are no contingent or actual liabilities.
F. How funds will be paid out
COMESA and SADC will administer the programme funds through an MOU with DFID. The
Wahenga Institute will also administer programme funds through an accountable grant with DFID.
Payments to all three institutions will be made in advance on a quarterly basis in accordance with
costed workplans and balances in hand from previous quarters.
COMESA will pass funds on to other implementing agencies (such as ClimateMark) through similar
arrangements or by making payments to sub-contractors on a reimbursable basis.
D Assessment of Financial Risk and Fraud
Risk
Financial mismanagement
or fraud within COMESA
Financial mismanagement
or fraud within SADC
Financial mismanagement
or Fraud with the Wahenga
Institute
Financial mismanagement
or Fraud within the
Evidence Partner
Financial mismanagement
or Fraud within ClimateMark
Financial mismanagement
or Fraud by projects funded
through the Results Facility
Delays in approval and
transfer of funds by DFID
and other funding partners
Analysis and Mitigation
This would be extremely serious as most money passes through COMESA.
However the risk is considered low as in a 2010 report on the ‘Institutional
Capacity and Suitability of COMESA as a potential implementing partner for
TradeMark Southern Africa Programme” found that “COMESA has the
institutional capacity and framework to manage programmes. It is ideally
suited to be TMSA’s implementing partner.” In practice COMESA’s
implementation of TradeMark has been found to be satisfactory. In addition
COMESA’s fiduciary systems meet both EU and World Bank requirements.
Annual external audits will provide additional control.
The EU carried out in May/June 2011 an institutional and financial
assessment of SADC which concluded SADC are moving in the right
direction in improving systems relating to audit, accounting, financial controls
and procurement. Discussion with the EU Delegation to Botswana revealed
that the EU will be carrying out a further assessment in November 2011. The
EU are confident that this assessment will indicate SADC will meet all EU
fiduciary risk requirements. The EU do though suspect they will have
continued concerns on the absorptive capacity of SADC. SADC’s audits to
date of the RVAA unit do not reveal any evidence of financial
mismanagement or fraudulent activities. During the 1st year of implementation
SADC will manage sufficient funds to enable the SADC RVAA unit to
function. Any decision to scale up funding directly to the SADC RVAA Unit
over the lifetime of the programme will depend on the outcome of the EU
assessment as well SADC’s performance on managing EU and other donors
funds on SADC programmes. DFID-SA will continue to consult with the EU
and other donors as appropriate. SADC’s annual audits will mitigate against
any potential risk of financial mismanagement or fraud.
To date there have been no institutional of financial assessment of Wahenga
Institute. However the Institute has managed DFID funds effectively under
RHVP. External audit reports reveal no evidence of financial
mismanagement or any fraudulent activity. Under this programme the
Institute will be submitting annual audited statements. In addition a systems
audit may be carried out. Institute of Wahenga will also be required to report
to SADC RVAA as beneficiary. These audits and reporting requirements
should mitigate against any potential risks
Acceptable fiduciary capacity will be part of the tender assessment process.
Funds will be paid out in instalments against satisfactory progress and
financial reporting. An audit may be requested.
ClimateMark will come within COMESA financial control and internal audit
systems. Day to day financial systems may be shared with TradeMark which
has a proven track record.
This is probably where the highest risk exists, although it is spread across a
diverse portfolio. The Results Facility is a means of bringing high quality
systems to manage this risk and to divide it up into a number of discrete
contracts. No partnership will be too big or too politically sensitive to fail.
Grantees will be informed of a zero tolerance policy towards fraud. Financial
capacity and track record will be part of the assessment process. Funds will
be released in limited tranches against clear expected outputs and financial
reporting requirements. External audits will be carried out on a sample of
Grantees. Funding will be terminated if any evidence of financial
mismanagement or fraudulent activities is identified or if performance targets
are not met.
This is a serious risk with large consequences. In particular rainfed
agricultural programmes need to be implemented on time or a whole year of
results can be lost. Implementing partners, through the Tripartite and
oversight committee will demand timely action from the donor partners. Donor
performance will be on the ToR of the evaluations.
E. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
All delivery institutions will be required to submit quarterly financial expenditure reports along with a
narrative report on progress against the annual workplan and budgets. These reports will clearly
show detailed expenditure against approved budget lines. The Deputy Programme Manager will
rigorously reconcile expenditure reports,(as mentioned in Section A of the Financial Case) against (i)
relevant data on Aries; (ii) approved annual workplans and budget; and previous expenditure reports.
Any discrepancies will be quickly raised with implementers and where required revisions to
expenditure reports will be made. By this rigorous reconciliation, DFID will ensure that no illegitimate
or unapproved expenditure will be funded by DFID as well as ensuring that no further tranches will be
made if satisfactory performance is not evidenced by the reports.
In addition all delivery institutions will report to the Oversight Committee in terms of programme
progress and spend. The Oversight Committee will be responsible for approving work programmes.
During the course of the programme DFID will ensure there will be clear, concise and timely
communication to all institutions on all exit strategies. This will be particularly relevant to the
Wahenga Institute during the first years of implementation. It may also be relevant to COMESA and
SADC following the impact evaluation after Year 3 or as the programme comes to an end in Year 4.
These communications will help all institutions to predict funding gaps for future years and plan
accordingly.
Audit
The Programme will be subject to regular internal and annual external audit mechanisms driven by
the COMESA and SADC Secretariat as well as requirements of standard DFID MOUs and
Accountable Grants.
The donors will participate in the development of audit terms of reference, and in the selection of
auditors, the auditors’ briefings and in the endorsement of final reports.
The RECs will be responsible for ensuring that all audits are fully supported, undertaken
professionally, and that feedback mechanisms exist that will incorporate the results into improving the
relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of programme delivery.
Climate Mark will also commission an external audit on a sample of projects that are funded by the
Results Facility. Organisations benefitting form the Results Facility will have a requirement in their
Grant Agreements to submit annual audited statements.
G. Management Case
H. Management Arrangements for Implementation
Accountability Principles
The principle is that there should be an identifiable person accountable for each output and a body
accountable for the overall Outcome. Therefore any structure should be traceable through to the Outcome
and Outputs. It is important that this is ‘one programme’, exploiting the synergies between them, rather than
a collection of projects grouped together for convenience under one heading.
Tripartite taskforce
Heads of 3 RECs
Donor Investment Committe
DFID and other donors
Oversight Committee
Directors 3 RECs + Donor reps
.
Outcome
.
Tripartite CC Programme
COMESA Lead
.
.
CC Policy Team
Tripartite CC Programme
Steering Committee
RVAA Programme
SADC Lead
VAA Steering Committee
Technical Advisory Committee
ClimateMark
RVAA Team
Country Task Forces
Climate Negotiations
Results Facility
Output 1
CA/CSA Implementers
Output 4
Output 2
Improved policy on CSA
attracting adaptation and
mitigation finance
Pilot & Anchor investments
Evidence/learning on
CA/CSA being used
Improved policy
responsive to
vulnerability
Government, Private Sector
Farmer Organisation & NGO Partners
Evidence Partner
National VAA Teams
Output 3
Farmers using CA/CSA
The programme is located within the emerging Tripartite framework of the three RECs (COMESA, SADC
and EAC). These structures are still being developed and so the final structure may change as the details of
how the three RECs will work together is negotiated. There is potential flexibility within the structure to add
additional work (e.g. through EAC or on REDD+) at a later date. These management arrangements will be
revisited within 6 months of programme approval allowing for the start of Tripartite functions to be developed
and prove themselves.
The Programme Oversight Committee is a small functional group meeting at least quarterly. The group
reviews annual workplans and gives guidance on significant decisions that fall outside of workplans. The
group reviews quarterly progress reports and provides the first line in accountability for both donors and
other stakeholders.
It is intended that different donors will work in a harmonised way through the investment committee and
their representatives on the Oversight Committee. A donor harmonised approach is preferred. Where
possible, in relation to different donor regulations, donors will contribute in an un-earmarked fashion to a
consolidated budget. They will hold the consolidated programme to account jointly against fiduciary and
results criteria. It is expected that the Donor Investment Committee will meet at least annually.
The Programme Steering Committee (PSC) is made up of the Directors of Agriculture, Environment and
Natural Resources from the three RECs and representatives of five member states at the level of Director or
Principle Secretary. In addition there will be a representative from each of the main agricultural union
federations SACAU and EAFF. The PSC will provide guidance on overall strategic direction of the
programme as well as providing a broad pool of technical expertise and experience. It is expected that the
PSC will meet annually. PSC members will also act as programme advocates in their own countries and
own organisations.
The Programme is a programme of the Tripartite, so is ultimately accountable to Tripartite structures. In this
case accountability is to the Tripartite Task Force made up of the Chief Executive of each REC.
The primary stakeholders are the smallholder farmers of ESA, with a particular emphasis on women
farmers. They will be most directly involved through the individual CSA projects supported by the
programme. The involvement of confederations of farmer associations and unions will also provide an
additional element of involvement. Rural households should also be represented in the policy development
work through national elected representatives and the CSA Task Forces. It is recognised that the
involvement of women and girls, as well as the poorest rural households, tends to be weak in all these
mechanisms. Where possible, positive action will be incorporated to increase the involvement of women
and poorer households in decision-making and accountability mechanisms.
Management
The DFID funded programme described in this business case supports two existing programmes being
developed by the RECs – the ‘Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the Eastern and
Southern African (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Region which has been developed by COMESA49. The second
programme is the SADC developed ‘ Building Resilience to Climate Change and Other Causes of Poverty:
Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Strategic Plan 2012-2016’50 which is a continuation of a
programme that is being funded by DFID.
The RVAA programme is now described within the COMESA developed document but further discussions
are needed to develop the modalities of how these different components lead by different RECs fit together.
The DFID funded programme described in this business case provides clear accountability for DFID results
within this emerging tripartite structure. Other donors might want to put their funding through a joint donor
arrangement described in this business case – and provision is made for this with a donor investment
committee.
There is a clear map across between the DFID funding and outputs and the budgets and outputs of the two
programmes as shown in the table:
Relationship between the DFID Business Case and the Tripartite CC and RVAA Programmes
DFID Outputs
1: Improved quality and
harmonisation of policy
on climate resilient
agriculture, informed by
evidence
DFID 4yr
Budget
In individual
outputs
£3,000,000
Tripartite CC Specific Objectives
COMESA PMU management
1 To ensure that the African
Climate Solution is accepted by
the global community and
Climate Change mainstreamed in
national planning
5yr
budget
$11.1m
$9.3m
RVAA Programme
Purpose
2: Policy responses to
vulnerability constantly
informed and
influenced by improved
assessment of climate
vulnerability (who,
where and why) across
the region.
3: Farmers using
improved, locally
relevant climate
resilient agriculture
practices in order to
increase their climate
resilience.
£6,000,000
4: Evidence and
learning on climate
resilient agriculture
practices to enhance
effectiveness of
programme delivery
and global knowledge.
£5,000,000
2 To support member states to
access Adaptation funds and
other climate change financing
sources and mechanisms through
national investment frameworks
for climate adaptation in
agriculture, forestry and other
land uses.
7 To apply Mitigation solutions in
the COMESA-EAC-SADC region
with carbon trading benefits.
6 To enhance capacity for carry
out climate vulnerability
assessments in the Region
$2.1m
$3.3m
$12.8m
Enhanced regional
and national
response to climate
change, poverty and
livelihood
vulnerability
£12.3m
£24,000,000
3 To enhance adoption of
$7.3m
Climate-Smart Agriculture in the
COMESA-EAC-SADC region
5 To establish a regional Catalytic
$71m
Facility/Challenge Account to
support investments in national
climate smart agriculture
programs
4 To strengthen capacity in
$3.5m
national research and training
institutions and implementation of
research programs
Independent Evidence Partner contracted
DFIDs fiduciary responsibility will be managed through a number of MoUs and accountable grants:
MoU/Accountable Grant
Partner
Main aspects covered
COMESA
Management of ClimateMark for delivery of Outputs 3 & 4, and Policy
work delivering Output 1
SADC
Support to the SADC RVAA Unit core costs delivering the RVAA
Programme delivering Output 2.
Wahenga Institute
Support to the RVAA Programme delivering Output 2
Outcome
The Oversight Committee will be responsible for the overall Outcome of the programme, which is a product
of the four Outputs. A major role will be to ensure that the four output areas work together to deliver the
overall Outcome. As the Tripartite structures develop the programme might come under a single Tripartite
Director, however the Oversight Committee will continue to provide guidance through agreeing priorities in
annual workplans, discussing and agreeing major divergences from the workplan and monitoring overall
performance.
Output 1
The Policy Team will be located in the COMESA office in Lusaka and be accountable for the delivery of
Output 1. The COMESA based team will work with key focal points in the other RECs and in member
Governments, with the purpose of advancing the Africa Solution and developing adaptation and mitigation
funding streams. Progress will be measured against clear milestones. Additional staff required for the team
include a Policy Team Manager, a Climate Change Negotiations Adviser and a CC Financial Services and
Resource Mobilisation Adviser.
National work will include support to national CA/CSA Task Forces and the development of National
CSA/AFOLU Investment Frameworks. Several countries already have CA coordination structures and in
order to strengthen existing capacities and accelerate delivery, these structures will be used. Governments
are responsible for providing the policy guidance to, and for hosting the national Task Forces, designating
ministry focal points that will support day-to-day programme implementation and for coordinating and
integrating programme activities with national planning objectives. Where existing thematic coordination
structures do not exist, membership of the Task Forces will comprise appropriate sector ministries, farmers’
organizations, the private sector, and relevant CSOs. The national Task Forces are envisaged to be
permanent entities in each country, integrated into the planning processes in each member state.
National CSA/AFOLU Investment Frameworks will have an objective of generating the maximum number of
poor and women farmers successfully practising CSA. Priority investments are likely to be different in each
country, depending on locally specific bottlenecks that need to be overcome; they may involve investment
in:
1. Specific Pilot and Anchor CSA projects;
2. Policy development
3. Lesson learning and knowledge dissemination
4. Capacity building (e.g. of Farmer Organisations promoting CSA).
In some cases the investment priorities may be funded through the Results Facility (Output 3), however
most of the investment is expected to be levered in from other sources.
Output 2
Output 2 is the responsibility of the SADC Secretariat Director responsible for FANR . The RVAA
programme 2011-2016 is set-out in the proposal SADC document ‘Regional Vulnerability Assessment and
Analysis Strategic Plan and Funding Document’. This builds on a previous successful plan which was partly
funded by DFID. The RVAA work funded through this programme would be managed through an MoU
between DFID and SADC Secretariat to support the operational costs of the Programme Management Unit
which is within the SADC Secretariat and through an accountable grant with the Wahenga Institute to
support implementation of activities of the programme. This is the current arrangement which DFID is using
to fund the RVAA programme. . The Wahenga Institute will be fully accountable to SADC Secretariat
through the Programme Management Unit of the RVAA. SADC will lead the VAA component and be
responsible for the implementation and the results.
The regional VAA Director will manage the outputs of the VAA team, which are based in the SADC Offices
in Gaborone, and be responsible for the achievement of Output 2 and its associated milestones. Additional
oversight will be provided by the VAA Steering Committee, which is currently a SADC body, but could be
broadened out during the life of the contract to reflect a broader tripartite membership.
The RVAAC Technical Committee will be re-configured with added membership of technical agencies who
are developing VAA tools linked to the RVAA programme – institutions engaged with climate
change, chronic vulnerability, poverty, urban environments etc. This will allow the development of improved
methods, tools and the opportunity for the programme to progress beyond early warning and short-term
response.
Outputs 3 & 4 – ClimateMark
The ClimateMark Director will be responsible for Output 3 and Output 4. ClimateMark will probably be
located in the TradeMark offices in Pretoria. They will be managerially independent of TradeMark, while
sharing some back-office capacity to reduce costs. This will also enhance the opportunity for institutions
cross-learning. ClimateMark will follow a project Management Manual similar to that used by TradeMark.
ClimateMark will comprise a small professional team recruited by COMESA. Some of the posts, including
the Climatemark Director, Evidence Manager and the Results Facility Manager are likely to be recruited
internationally. Other staff in ClimateMark include a Climate Smart Agriculture Adviser, an Innovative
Communications Adviser, a Finance Officer and four administrative staff. ClimateMark will be supported by
technical units within COMESA including procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation,
technical support and audit services.
Output 3
Output 3 will be delivered through a ‘Results Facility’ that will channel funding and other support for a
number of pilot and anchor investments in CA and CSA in ESA Countries. There will be a transparent
competitive application procedure, with decisions taken by an independent Investment Board free of vested
interests. It is likely that the Investment Committee would be made-up of five independent professionals
with a mix of skills including CA/CSA, gender, communications, impact assessment, finance and project
management. Members of the Investment Board will be present in their individual capacity as technical
experts, rather than as representatives of organisations. The tripartite hierarchy will have a responsibility to
ensure the system is working properly but will not have approval responsibility over individual grants.
Funding can be awarded through a number of different rounds with different closing dates, different criteria,
different geographical spread and different funding levels User-friendly application procedures will make the
process attractive and fair to those organisations whose strength is implementation on the ground rather
than writing complicated application documents (or paying consultants to do this).
Applicants will be expected to be compatible with National Investment Frameworks (a product of Output1)
but will be selected on their own merits. Technical backstopping will be provided during implementation, with
a particular emphasis of cross-learning between different grantees. There will be rigorous fiduciary control
and monitoring. Support for action research, outcome monitoring and impact assessment within the grantee
projects will be provided by the Evidence Partner (Output 4).
Country interventions funded by the facility fall into 3 categories.
1. Pilots up to 5,000 farmers: countries where little if no climate resilient agriculture has been
undertaken.
2. Anchor investments – 5,000 to 15,000 farmers: where evidence exists of success in climate resilient
farming practices but with limited numbers of farmers.
3. Scale up – 50,000 to 100,000 farmers: where strong evidence exists for scaling up climate resilient
agriculture practices.
Limited advisory support can be provided before assessment (e.g. by the CSA Advisor and
Evidence Manager) to ensure bids are of high quality. However more support will be provided to
grantees once funding is approved to ensure results are of high quality. The combined team of
ClimateMark CA/CSA Adviser, Evidence Manager and Innovative Communications Manager will
have significant capacity to advise. In addition other partners like CFU and TLC or local
consultants may be contracted in to provide additional support.
Grantees will also be linked to the Independent Evidence Partner to contribute to the overall impact
research and lesson learning.
The results facility will fund a portfolio of projects of different sizes and covering a range of
approaches – thereby maximising the opportunity for learning. There will be also an opportunity to
spread risk across the portfolio, with some high risk innovative projects balanced by other less
risky but less innovative ones.
The Innovative Communications Technical Adviser will assist grantees to use new technologies to expand
communication to farmers and to encourage lesson learning between grantees. The adviser will also work
with the Evidence Partner on innovative ways to disseminate research results.
Output 4
Output 4 will be the responsibility of the Evidence Research Partner under a sub-contract with ClimateMark.
The Research partner will deliver against a clear set of milestones identified in the contract ToR. They will
be responsible for:
1. Synthesis of knowledge of key climate resilient agricultural practices relevant to ESA.
2. Research and evaluation of impact on scaling-up of conservation agriculture programmes in
Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia
3. Adaptive research to test and tailor select agricultural practices to diverse agro-ecological and socioeconomic conditions.
4. Communication and dissemination of research results
The Research Partner will work with the grantees of the results facility, the VAA and Policy Teams to assess
impact, learn lessons and disseminate knowledge. The research partner will also have a relationship with
the COMESA M&E Unit in terms of producing the monitoring data for delivery to programme managers, the
oversight committee and the other oversight stakeholders, including donors.
The ClimateMark Evidence Director will be responsible for ensuring that the different stakeholders work
together to produce robust monitoring data and research evidence. The Innovative Communications Adviser
will work with the Evidence Partner on disseminating research findings and with the facility grantees on
using innovative communications within their projects.
Emphasis in this output will be on engagement of African research partners and institutions in conducting
and disseminating research with aim of strengthening local research and dissemination capacity. There is
some additional budget availability beyond that earmarked for the Evidence Partner that will be channelled
to regional and national research initiatives and centres of excellence. This will be done through application
to the Results Facility and help deliver on the CC Programme Specific Objective 4 (see table above).
Some rapid evidence gathering is planned in early 2012, before the Evidence Partner is likely to be in
operation, so as not to miss learning from agricultural season 2011/12 which can be fed into the
implementation for season 2012/13.
DFID management
There will be approximately 0.6 FTE of DFID technical input including time spent on influencing agendas
within the programme. A further 0.4 FTE will be administrative input from DFID.
Annual Reviews will draw on the cadre 10% contribution of advisors across DFID and would seek input from
Research and Evidence Division.
I. Risks and how they will be managed
Risk
External
Probability
Impact
Mitigation Management
1. Severe and/or successive
years of widespread drought
disrupt farmer benefits from
CSA and new farmers’ ability
to trial CSA approaches.
Medium Medium
/High
Spread interventions across the region.
Keep climate resilience at the forefront of
the technology menu. Be prepared to extend
the programme period if drought is very
severe. Possibly integrate labour intensive
CSA technologies (basin making, irrigation
infrastructure) into emergency response.
2. Interest in tripartite working
does not materialise between
the REC partners
Medium Low/
medium
Constant monitoring of political will to cooperate. Use of political influence to
encourage co-operation. If this fails, timely
removal of programme from joint
implementation and implementation through
other channels (e.g. direct with ClimateMark
and national partners).
3. Benefits of CA/CSA to
farmers (including women)
insufficient to drive adoption
and spread
Medium High
Build on existing technology approaches
(e.g. CFU/TLC) with a proven track record.
Use the evidence partner to develop robust
technology menus. Find innovative ways of
transferring external benefits (e.g. carbon
sequestration) to farmer incentives. If
insurmountable, ensure robust
documentation to prevent repeat.
3. Member states lack
commitment to REC driven
national programmes
Low/
Low/
medium medium
Constant monitoring and early application of
political influence. Clarity on role of national
governments – designing interventions so
that they can add value but don’t derail
interventions.
Rich countries not prepared or
able (because of recession) to
disburse significant mitigation
and/or adaptation funds
Medium Low/
medium
This would affect the future incentive
environment – but not necessarily the
programme directly as long as it is fully
funded. Effective advocacy at COP 17.
Partner organisations
(COMESA, SADC, EAC,
SACAU, National Task Forces,
Evidence Partner) and their
staff fail to perform
Medium Medium
Clear performance targets and timely
monitoring to identify and manage underperformance. Staff recruitment on merit,
performance monitoring and clear timely
personnel procedures to tackle underperformance. Clarity on who is responsible
for different Outputs.
Donors and/or Programme
managers delay and miss key
agricultural deadlines needed
to achieve targets
Medium Medium
Use of a results framework to drive clear
activity timeline with annual deadlines set by
the agricultural calendar. Oversight
Committee monitors timeline and is
prepared to enforce action including the
transfer of funds to those that can deliver.
Intervention implementers (of
in-country field programmes)
under-perform
Medium High
Effective competitive selection process by
Results Facility. Timely monitoring of
progress. Being prepared to take early and
decisive action in cases of
underperformance. Having a diverse
Internal
portfolio of intervention implementers.
Fraudulent mis-use of funds by
partners or Result Facility
grantees
Medium Low
Ensure the main partners, COMESA and
SADC continue to meet fiduciary criteria.
Make clear a zero tolerance policy for all
partners. Timely audit and monitoring
backed by immediate investigation and
action if required. Efficient regular cash
transfer systems against robust
documentation.
National Governments do not
accept the role of RECs in
promoting particular
approaches or exemplar
projects in their countries
Medium Medium
REC staff must be sensitive to this and work
with national governments in a collaborative
way. Good communication is important. The
role of the Advisory Committee is important
in advising REC staff of the best approaches
and preparing the ground in their own
countries.
Delays in ICF approval system
and BAR announcements
seriously delay programme
implementation making
achievement of results within
CSR period difficult to achieve.
High
Programme commencement will already be
delayed from initial expected start date. A
fast start up will be required to ensure
possibility of full outcomes being reached
within the CSR period. Dedicated advisory
capacity will be applied at the start up phase
to get programme running quickly.
Medium
C. Conditionality
Not applicable. The programme does not involve financial aid to government.
D. How Progress and Results will be Monitored, Measured and Evaluated
Monitoring and Evaluation of this programme is particularly important for a number of reasons:
1. Conservation Agriculture has suffered from high expectations but low continued adoption once support
has been removed. It is important therefore to learn from the start about what drives genuine adoption
and to monitor if this is happening. A specific evidence research partner is being contracted to support
this.
2. The programme is expected to prove the case for Climate Smart Agriculture in advance of a later large
scale-up. Therefore it is vital the case is made in a robust way.
3. Some aspects of the programme are relatively untried, including the incorporation of carbon
sequestration funding into incentives – this will require robust evidence.
The DFID input will be monitored and evaluated against the DFID logframe (attached). Indicators in this
logframe will be compatible with indicators in the larger COMESA-EAC-SADC Climate Change Programme
logframe and the SADC RVAA logframe nested within that. It should be noted that the DFID logframe
includes multi-donor funding towards the programme – with the DFID contribution clearly identified.
A task at the start of the programme, and ongoing at appropriate stages, will be to ensure the indicators in
the different logframes are, and remain compatible. This will enable a single set of indicators to be collected
and avoid duplication.
The responsibility for collecting key monitoring indicators is defined in the DFID logframe. Responsibilities
for different indicators include the COMESA M&E Dept, the Tripartite CC Director, the Results Facility
Manager, the RVAA Director and the Evidence Partner. The M&E Manager, sitting within ClimateMark will
be responsible for ensuring that the different people produce the data on time and to the requisite standard.
He/she will work with the COMESA M&E Department to synthesize this data into quarterly and annual
reports for the Oversight Committee.
Some of the indicators are the responsibility of the evidence research partner; they will need the
cooperation of some of the implementing partners of the interventions to collect the raw data (e.g. on
numbers of farmers reached etc.). An important task of the research partner will be to ground truth and
validate some of this raw data.
It will be the responsibility of the Results Facility Manager to work with the research partner to ensure the
contracts of interventions funded through the facility include appropriate data collection and that this part of
the contract is complied with. The Results Facility Manager will be responsible for analysing the monitoring
data provided by the different grantees against their contract to assess whether performance is acceptable.
The ClimateMark M&E Manager will provide technical support in ensuring data is compatible and of
sufficient quality.
The evidence research partner has responsibilities beyond the indicators in the logframe for providing
evidence on the outcome and impact of the various interventions. This will be defined in the contract with
the research partner. It is important to note that the research partner will be providing suggestions of bestbet technologies, feeding in to training materials and providing learning on what works in encouraging
adoption. Therefore the evidence research partner is an integral part of the success of the programme and
is not meant to be an independent observer.
The research partner contract will also include provision for an independent impact evaluation in year three
and year five. Baseline data will require collecting in the first 6 months of programme commencement. The
methodology for the impact evaluation is likely to be a randomised controlled trial, including the
counterfactual, for output 3, and a qualitative approach for outputs 1 and 2. Baselines will be identified
within the first 6 months. It is envisaged that the RCT sample will include farmers beyond the immediate
ClimateSmart programme but include farmers receiving training under other DFID country programmes and
potentially non DFID programmes to ensure a large sample size and strengthen the general body of
evidence.
Evaluation Plan
Purpose
An independent assessment of progress made towards outcome and impact and
of lessons learnt. Provide recommendations for key decisions on the
programme’s future.
Key Users
Partner implementers and Managers throughout the programme. Donor decision
makers and designers of future phases and program(s).
Timing
Yr 3 – Recommendation on 2nd phase – whether needed, approach, size and
length. Recommendations on changes in strategy and implementation.
Yr 5 - Ex Post if no 2nd Phase – to show sustained Outcome Impact and Lessons
learnt. If 2nd phase – still an evaluation in Yr 5.
Key evaluation
Questions
1. Are the Outcome and Impact results being achieved?
2. Are lessons being learnt and disseminated – e.g. on what works, where and
why?
3. Recommendations for improving result delivery
4. Should the programme continue? at what scale? And for how long?
Design and methods
1. Validate and use the baseline, monitoring and research data;
2. Qualitative interaction with partners, stakeholders and disinterested parties;
3. Assess range of alternative delivery options in light of evidence
4. Run stakeholder workshop to discuss findings, explore alternative options
and present recommendations.
Baseline and
monitoring data
Responsibilities have been clearly identified in logframe. Quality control is
needed through the research partner and M&E Manager. There is no excuse for
failure to provide robust and timely data.
Fit with existing
evidence base
An initial task of the Research partner is to synthesise the existing evidence
base, use evidence to improve delivery and develop action research to fill some
of the gaps
Role of Stakeholders
To provide evidence and suggestions, interact and provide feedback on different
options and recommendations. Understand and where possible own
recommendations and decisions coming from them.
Identifying and
contracting evaluators
Open tender process.
Communication
Strategy
Workshop for key stakeholders. Web-based dissemination of analysis and
recommendations.
References
1
The IPCC suggests that warming is very likely to be greater than the global annual mean warning throughout the continent
and in all seasons, with drier subtropical regions warming more than the moister tropics; 2) rainfall in southern Africa is
likely to decrease in much of the winter rainfall region and western margins; and 3) There is likely to be an increase in
annual mean rainfall in East Africa.. Christenson et al (2007). Regional Climate Projections, in IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report "Climate Change 2007: The Scientific Basis”, Cambridge University Press.
2 “The Agenda for Agriculture Based Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,” extracted from the World Bank’s 2008 World
Development Report, Agriculture for Development.
3 FAO 1999, “Filling the Data Gap: Gender Sensitive Statistics for Agricultural Development”
4 Müller, C., A. Bondeau, A. Popp, K. Waha, and M. Fader. 2009. “Climate Change Impacts on Agricultural Yields.”
Background note for the WDR2010.
5 World Bank Development Report 2010 (Chapter 3 – Managing Land and Water to Feed Nine Billion People and Protect
Natural Systems) and Lobell, D.B., M. Burke, C. Tebaldi, M.D. Mastrandrea, W.P.Falcom, and R.L.Naylor. 2008.
“Prioritising Climate Change Adaptation Needs for Food Security in 2030.” Science 319 (5863): 607-10.
6 An analysis of 12 food-insecure regions using crop models and outputs from 20 global climate models indicates that without adaptation Asia and Africa will suffer particularly severe drops in yields by 2030, including crops critical for food
security such as maize in Southern Africa. World Bank Development Report 2010 (Chapter 3 – Managing Land and Water
to Feed Nine Billion People and Protect Natural Systems)
7 Stern 2007 need full reference
8 Chambwera, Muyeye, MacGregor, James, “Cultivating success: the need to climate-proof Tanzanian agriculture”,
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) Briefing Papers, 2009, IIED code: 17073IIED
9 Funk CC and Brown ME (2009). Declining global per capita agricultural production and warming oceans threaten food
security. Food Security 1: 271-289
10 SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Annual Reporting since 2006 finds the food insecure population
fluctuates between 6 and 10 million in any particular year.
11 COMESA Agriculture Strategy 2010
12 DFID Nutrition Strategy, 2010
13 Zimmerman and Carter, 2003. Barrett 2004.
14 IFAD (2010). Rural Poverty Report 2011: New realities, new challenges: new opportunities for a new generation. Rome:
IFAD.
15 For example, in 2002 improved varieties were planted on less than 25 per cent of the land under cereal across the region;
fertilizer was applied at less than 10 kilograms of nutrients per hectare (a figure unchanged since 1980); and only 4 per cent
of total cropland in this region was irrigated. IFAD 2011.
16 (FAO 2008 -- FAOSTAT datab ase. Poruduction: crops. Avaiable: http://faostat/fao.org/site/567/default.aspx. Accessed
18 December 2008 in Garrity et al.
17 IFAD 2007 – need full reference.
18 FAO 2010. “Climate-Smart” Agriculture. Policies, practices and financing for food security, adaptation and mitigation.
Rome: FAO.
19 IFAD 2011. ibid
20 S.N. Guto, P. Pypers, B. Vanlauwe, N. de Ridder, and K.E. Giller* 2011 - Socio-ecological Niches for Minimum Tillage
and Crop-residue Retention in Continuous Maize Cropping Systems in Smallholder Farms of Central Kenya. Agronomy
Journal Volume 103, Issue 3. and K.E Giller et al 2011 – Soyabeans and sustainable agriculture in southern Africa.
Earthscan International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability
http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/earthscan/14735903/v9n1/s6.pdf?expires=1303542272&id=62416654
&titleid=75005120&accname=Guest+User&checksum=30F95708FC8A6AE5ED414009CE42F185
21 “Vulnerability assessment for climate adaptation” - Adaptation Planning Framework Technical Paper 3, Lead Authors:
Thomas E Downing and Anand Patwardhan. Contributing authors: Elija Mukhala , Linda Stephen , Manuel Winograd ,
Gina Ziervogel. Version: Habana/Oxford 20-sep-02
22 “Climate Smart” Agriculture,” FAO, 2010
23 CAADP is the AU-NEPAD’s Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme. CAADP was established by
the African Union in 2003 at its summit of heads of state and government who agreed to invest 10% of their national
budgets in raising agricultural productivity growth to 6% per year in order to help meet MDG1.
24 These include: (i) limited engagement by national governments in the CAADP process; (ii) slow progress in reaching
agricultural financing commitments; (iii) too little involvement of the private sector, civil society and farmers’ (both men’s
and women’s) organisations in the CAADP process ; (iv) the limited capacity of RECs to organise country round tables and
develop regional compacts; (v) weak information flow between African organisations and between them and development
partners; and (vi) patchy communication about CAADP within development partner organisations e.g. between headquarters
and field level operations
25 FAO (2011). Socioeconomic analysis of conservation agriculture in Southern Africa. Rome: FAO.
26 Examples of key issues requiring further evidence and research include impacts on yield, socio-economic aspects,
environmental aspects (soil fertility, water conservation). In the case of conservation agriculture, key questions include:
Which legumes best fit within various cropping systems?; What is the extent of water conservation of conservation
agrictulure practices? What minimum amounts of crop residues are required to provide benefits of mulching? What fertilizer
rates are rquired to increase production and counter possible N immobilisation by ceresal residues? See Giller et al (2011).
A Research agenda to explore the role of conservation agriculture in Africa smallholder farming systems. Field Crops
Research [in press]
27 According to VAC assessments, the food food insecure population has ranged from an average of 1.2 million to 10
million over the past 7 years or so . In the log frame we predicted reduction of the food insecure population to 4 million by
2015 based on the following:
1) The overall SADC goal on food security as stipulated both in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and
the subsequent declaration by SADC Heads of States at the Dar es Salaam Summit on Food Security is to halve the food
insecure population by 2015.
2) The trend analysis of the food insecure population from the VAC assessments over the past couple of years shows a
declining number of the population that is food insecure from around 8 million in 2003/04 to about 6 million in 2010/11.
To note that the caveat in this is that there no major climatic disasters e.g. heavy floods and droughts.
28
The cost of CA ranges from £19 to £50 per year. Training should be conducted for at least 3 year. Estimates of number of
farmers that can be reached have taken this range into account. By partnering with governments and other partners DFID
funding will reach more farmers.
29 However in some smallholder systems ‘potholing’ (plant establishment in permanent basins) is a preferred method, which
involves quite a significant up-front investment in cultivation, but less thereafter.
30 Trent Bunderson, John Chisui, Richard Musekaand Amos Ngwira 2010 - Promoting Conservation Agriculture in Malawi
by Total LandCare with Support from CIMMYT: Presentation at the National Symposium on Conservation Agriculture
Capital Hotel, Lilongwe May 18-21, 2010
31 Twomlow S, Urovov J, Jenrich M and Oldrieve B 2008: lessons from the field Zimbabwe’s Conservation Agriculture
Task Force. Journal of SAT Agricultural Research 6.
32 Nyagumbo, I., Mbvumi, B. M., Mutsamba, E., 2009, ‘CA in Zimbabwe: socio-economic and biophysical studies’, a paper
presented at the SADC Regional Conference on Sustainable Land Management, Windhoek, Namibia, 7–11 September.
33 Langmead P (undated) - Hoe conservation farming of maize in Zambia
http://www.langmead.com/research/conservationfarming/1234.pdf
34 Conservation agriculture (CA) in Tanzania: the case of the Mwangaza B CA farmer field school (FFS), Rhotia Village,
Karatu District, Arusha International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 9(1) 2011 pp. 145-152
Authors: Owenya, Marietha Z.; Mariki, Wilfred L.; Kienzle, Josef; Friedrich, Theodor; Kassam, Amir
35 Derpsch, R., Roth, C.H., Sidiras, N. and Kopke, U. (1991) Controle da erosa˜o no Parana´ , Brasil: sistemas
de cobertura do solo, plantio direto e preparo conservacionista do solo. Eschborn, Germany: GTZ. Pretty, J., Noble, A.D.,
Bossio, D., Dixon, J., Hine, R.E., Penning de Vries, F.W.T. and Morison, J.I.L. (2006) Resource-conserving agriculture
increases yields in developing countries. Environmental Science & Technology 3 (1), 24–43. Landers, J. (2007) Tropical
Crop-Livestock Systems in Conservation Agriculture: The Brazilian Experience. Integrated Crop Management, Vol. 5.
Rome: FAO. Ernstein, O., Sayer, K., Wall, P., Dixon, J. and Hellin, J. (2008) Adapting no-tillage agriculture to the
smallholder maize and wheat farmers in the tropics and sub-tropics. In: T. Goddard, M.A. Zoebisch, Y.T. Gan, W. Ellis, A.
Watson and S. Sombatpanit (eds) No-Till Farming Systems. Special Publication No. 3 (pp. 253–277). Bangkok: World
Association of Soil and Water Conservation (WASWC). Hengxin, L., Hongwen, L., Xuemin, F. and Liyu, X. (2008) The
current status of conservation tillage in China. In: T. Goddard, M.A. Zoebisch, Y.T. Gan, W. Ellis, A. Watson and S.
Sombatpanit (eds) No-Till Farming Systems. Special Publication No. 3 (pp. 413–428). Bangkok: World Association of Soil
and Water Conservation (WASWC). Rockstrom, J., Kaumbutho, P., Mwalley, J., Nzabi, A.W., Temesgen, M., Mawenya,
L., Barron, J., Mutua, J. and Damgaard-Larsen, S. (2009) Conservation farming strategies in East and Southern Africa:
yields and rain water productivity from on-farm action research. Soil & Tillage Research 103, 23–32.
36 Thierfelder, C.,Wall, P.C., 2010a, ‘Investigating conservation agriculture (CA) systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe to
mitigate future effects of climate change,’ Journal of Crop Improvement 24, 113-121
37 See discussion in Giller et al (2009) Conservation agriculture and smallholder farming in Africa: the heretic’s view. Field
Crops Research 114:23-34.
38 See Giller et al 2009 ibid and FAO 2011. Climate Risk Analysis in Conservation Agriculture in Varied Biophysical and
Socioeconomic settings in Southern Africa. Rome: FAO.
39 IFAD 2011. ibid
40 See CFU and Total Land care annual reports and technical manuals and Trent Bunderson, John Chisui, Richard
Musekaand Amos Ngwira 2010 - Promoting Conservation Agriculture in Malawi by Total LandCare with Support from
CIMMYT: Presentation at the National Symposium on Conservation Agriculture Capital Hotel, Lilongwe May 18-21, 2010.
41
42
CFU 2011 – The Practice of Conventional and Conservation Agriculture in Ast and Southern Africa
http://www.totallandcare.org/Profile/TLCInterventions/tabid/59/Default.aspx
43
Earthscan 2011 – Agricultural Success from Africa: The case of fertiliser tree systems in Southern Africa.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY 9(1) 2011
44COMESA 2010 – Agroforestry Fund proposal
45 FAO AQUASTAT, 2009; http://www.fao.org/ag/ca; FAO STAT, 2009. quoted in Kassam et Al 2009 The spread of
Conservation Agriculture: Justification, sustainability and uptake. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL
SUSTAINABILITY 7(4) 2009, PAGES 292–320 and updated from FAO website
Whiteside 2011 – Evidence base for climate resilient and productive agriculture in Southern Africa
Whiteside M. – PRA results from work with farmers in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Kenya in programmes run
by CARE, Concern and Aga Khan Foundation 2004-2011
46
47
48
TradeMark SA whose delivery model the Climate Resilient Agriculture programme will be replicating
COMESA-EAC-SADC - Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the Eastern and Southern
African (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Region which has been developed by COMESA. September 2011
50 Building Resilience to Climate Change and Other Causes of Poverty: Regional Vulnerability Assessment and
Analysis Strategic Plan and Funding Document January 2012 – December 2016 Penultimate Draft Revised June
30th 2011
49