RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, SELF-REFLECTION AND DISCLOSURE IN
ACCOUNTING: A SYNTHESIS OF HABERMAS AND HEIDEGGER
Helen Oakesa and John Francis McKernanb
a
KEELE MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
KEELE UNIVERSITY
KEELE
STAFFORDSHIRE ST5 5BG
UNITED KINGDOM
Email: h.oakes@econ.keele.ac.uk
Tel +44 (0)1782 732000
Fax +44 (0)1782 734277
b
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
GLASGOW G12 8QQ
UNITED KINGDOM
Email: John.McKernan@glasgow.ac.uk
Tel: +44(0)141 330 3993
Abstract
This paper defends Habermas’ reconstructive theory against recent criticisms in the
accounting literature of his procedural model, arguing that Habermas creates a
communicative rationality that has potentially fruitful implications for critical accounting
rather than reinforcing an inappropriate instrumental rationality. We suggest that he
identifies and transforms some important aspects of conventional rationalism. However, we
acknowledge that his communicative rationality fails to achieve the balance of hermeneutical
reflection and “objective” linguistic structuralism that he seems to have intended. It is argued
that Heidegger’s theory can help to redress this imbalance. The paper therefore focuses on
supplementing Habermas’ theory with themes from Heidegger. We discuss first-order and
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second-order disclosure concentrating on second-order disclosure where a moment of
interpretive insight can open up a myriad of possibilities for accounting change. Moods and
emotions are discussed as catalysts for disclosure in accounting. Art, recognition of one’s
own mortality and phenomenological time are treated as aspects of disclosure with
implications for accounting. A model for the reconstruction of accounting is presented
summarising key themes from the synthesis of Habermas and Heidegger.
1.Introduction
In the context of the many repressive regimes and exploitative practices that currently exist, it
is particularly important that we develop the conceptual resources to be able to envisage new
emancipatory possibilities for accounting. A number of accounting researchers have called
for a re-conceptualisation of accounting language, processes and ways of thinking as a
precursor to accounting transformation (e.g. Laughlin, 1987; Tinker, 1991; Molisa, 2011).
Lehman (2010) emphasizes the importance of critique and interpretation in environmental
and social accounting. Habermas’ critical theory has been influential in suggesting how new
accountings might emerge through his reconstructive approach (e.g. Laughlin, 1987;
Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991). In addition, Habermas’ democratic procedures have been
regarded by some scholars as crucial for accounting change (e.g. Broadbent and Laughlin,
1997, Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Dillard and Yuthus, 2006). Whilst in practice the
planning and decision making process often does not adhere to the idealised model of rational
choice theory (Brunsson, 1982) and the implementation of democratically agreed visions and
plans may well lead to some unintended consequences, we assume that proposing and
discussing emancipatory alternatives has the potential to provide a basis for positive change.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that adopting authentic Habermasian democratic
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procedures is difficult to achieve in practice in a business context and compromise is often
coercive (e.g. Archel et al. 2011). However, in our view Habermasian theory provides a
strong basis for the possibility of attaining a more just society in future. This paper
synthesizes theory from Habermas (1972; 1974; 1976; 1989;1991; 1996; 1998) and
Heidegger (1978) to consider one approach to begin understanding how we can conceptualise
new emancipatory accountings. Such an approach depends on the practical knowledge of
agents and on their ‘practical ability to see more in things than they are’ (Kompridis, 2006b,
p. 258). This paper is concerned with understanding the nature of accounting critique. It also
contributes to the discussion concerning what we need to change in and through accounting,
and continues the on-going necessary justification for accounting critique in the face of
widespread lack of awareness of problems associated with accounting, institutionalised
apathy to accounting change and pervasive disinformation.
It has been suggested that accounting should move away from its close association with the
logic of economics which tends to reduce decisions to purely technical questions (Lehman,
2006). Lehman (2006; 2010) contends that Habermas’ rationalistic emphasis on rules and
procedures, and his attempt to offer impartiality through universalism, tend to reinforce the
very technical rationality that accounting needs to escape. He also argues that ‘Habermas’
reliance on a procedural approach submerges how language opens people to different ideas
and strategies’ (Lehman, 2010, p. 728). This paper attempts to justify Habermas’ procedural
approach, but also argues that the approach can benefit from being supplemented by several
themes from Heidegger. We focus particularly on Heidegger’s themes of disclosure,
intentionality, moods, death and phenomenological time in the search for authentic self and
society. In our view introducing Heidegger’s concept of disclosure may allay criticisms of
Habermas’ rationalism and may help towards realising Habermas’ intention to combine a
3
hermeneutical and self-reflective dimension with “objective” linguistic structuralism.
We
suggest that exploring one of the key sources of interpretive research through Heidegger may
help to provide a renewed identity for interpretive research that some interpretive researchers
believe is lacking (see Ahrens et al., 2008). Drawing on Kompridis (1994; 2006a; 2006b)
and Benhabib (1986), we propose that triggered by emotions, Heidegger’s concept of
disclosure can enhance Habermas’ process of reconstruction (including rational
reconstruction, self-reflection and societal reconstruction) for accounting and society.
Guignon (1999) observes that Heidegger’s thought has been highly influential for 20th
century philosophy including phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, postmodernism
and pragmatism. The paper focuses on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (1978) which is
generally considered to be a major part of Heidegger’s output. We have tried to read ‘Being
and Time’ in isolation from information about Heidegger’s associations with Naziism,
apparent a few years after the publication of ‘Being and Time’ (see Sheenan, 1999).
Heidegger has received relatively little attention in the accounting literature, although his
work has clearly influenced accounting research indirectly through research that has drawn
on philosophical texts influenced by Heidegger. Ezzamel and Robson (1995) apply
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to time to accounting time. Chabrak (2005) refers
briefly to Heidegger when she discusses hermeneutic phenomenology in general and its
implications for accounting policy. She argues for the importance of intentionality in
accounting policy and we continue to develop the theme of intentionality and its implications
for accounting in this paper as part of Heidegger’s concept of disclosure. Although
Habermas is critical of Heidegger (discussed in 4.2) we identify some important links
between the two theorists. By attempting to reinvigorate Habermas’ theory with themes from
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Heidegger, we aim to build on existing literature that applies Habermas and Heidegger to
accounting issues.
The paper briefly examines Habermas’ critical reconstructive theory. Next, Heidegger’s
theme of disclosure is introduced drawing on Kompridis’ (1994) distinction between firstorder and second-order disclosure. The following key aspects of Heidegger’s concept of
disclosure are explored in separate sections: intentionality, the search for Being, constraints to
disclosure, personal responsibility, moods and emotions, disclosure through death and art,
and phenomenological time. Within these sections some comparisons between Heidegger
and Habermas are drawn, and benefits of Heidegger’s themes for Habermas’ theory are
discussed. In addition, some implications of Heidegger’s themes for an emancipatory
accounting are considered. The penultimate section is divided into three sub-sections that
briefly reflect on our synthesis of Habermas and Heidegger. In the third sub-section a model
for the reconstruction of accounting is presented summarising key themes from the synthesis
of Habermas and Heidegger. Ways in which the key themes can be applied to accounting are
indicated. It is hoped the model could be used by accounting researchers or practitioners
when trying to critically reconstruct an understanding of a particular context. The concluding
main section draws together key arguments in the paper.
2. Habermas
This section briefly discusses Habermas’ critical reconstructive theory to indicate the form
that its rationality takes. We justify his procedural approach arguing that his rationalism has
much to offer accounting researchers and practitioners. We also illustrate how Habermas
5
attempts to provide a balance between formal rationalism and interpretation that reconciles
modernism with postmodernism. Nevertheless, we suggest that his interpretive dimension
can be enhanced by being supplemented with themes from Heidegger’s phenomenological
theory. We conclude this section by outlining Habermas’ concept of self-reflection and
linking it with Heidegger’s concept of disclosure.
2.1 Habermas’ rationalism and reconstructive critical theory
Habermas has been rejected for developing an overly rationalistic approach that is unsuitable
as a basis for a critique of accounting (Lehman, 2006). There are many examples of
rationalism in Habermas’ work. One example is the way he derives a complex, interconnected, theoretical system from the small building block of the speech act (a purposive
utterance such as a request or complaint) using traditional philosophical methods of formal
and logical argumentation. Habermas (1991) provides further evidence of the rationalist
elements of his work by drawing on Kohlberg’s rationalistic theory of moral development
and Piaget’s stage theory of child development. The development of individual moral
consciousness for Kohlberg and Habermas involves an increasing concern with rules and
abstract principles. In this sophisticated version of rationalism, based on Piaget, the
individual learns to distinguish themselves from the environment and others and becomes
increasingly reflective, critical and morally autonomous. Habermas (1991) adds a seventh
stage to Kohlberg’s moral consciousness where a reflective individual learns to assess and
contribute to discursively agreed norms.
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Habermas’ rationalistic faith in rules and procedures is evident in his 1991 depiction of the
evolutionary development of society. He argues that society has developed morally over time
evidenced through the gradual development of systems of justice. In his analysis, legalistic,
rational procedures provide the basis for a legitimacy which underpins social order. He
argues that in a historical development within Western society characterised by Rousseau and
Kant, formal procedures of reason replaced material principles like Nature or God as
justifications for norms and actions. Habermas (1991, p. 184) states that:
‘Since ultimate grounds can no longer be made plausible, the formal conditions of
justification themselves obtain legitimating force. The procedures and presuppositions of
rational agreement themselves become principles.’
Habermas describes these societal changes as new learning levels which are also reflected in
developments in the legal system and the development of democratic systems. Such legal
developments affect the individual’s self- perception and identity. For example, role identity
is replaced with ego identity and people see themselves as ‘free and equal subjects of civil
law’ (Habermas, 1991, p. 114). Linked to the development of moral consciousness through a
pre-occupation with procedures, the new societal ‘theoretical attitude’ moves away from
dogmatism to become ‘reflective’ (Habermas, 1991, p.105). He places the responsibility for
devising ethical codes and political courses of action on society to determine through
deliberative democracy.
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Habermas adopts rationalism and proceduralism for positive purposes with beneficial
implications for accounting. For example, he develops communicative rationality rather than
instrumental rationality. His universal discourse principle that links to the speech act is used
to counter the extreme relativism of postmodernism (where there are no principles for
deciding between competing knowledge claims) through a consensus theory of truth. It also
provides validity for moral norms which have been subjected to philosophical scepticism
since Nietzsche and the turn of the 20th century (McCarthy, 1978). In addition, the universal
discourse principle is used as a basis for Habermas’ influential, procedural democratic theory
which arguably has the potential to reduce dogmatism and bring about significant accounting
transformations because all interested parties are granted equal voice (see Oakes and Oakes,
2012). Furthermore, Habermas problematises the type of instrumental economic rationality
that has been criticised by accounting scholars. For example, he argues for a type of
intersubjective, consensual, communicative rationality that differs from the selfish
individualism of conventional, neo-classical economic rationality where utility is maximised
and it is assumed that ‘the egoistic freedom of one is compatible with that of all’ (Habermas
cited in McCarthy, 1978, p. 351).
Although Habermas is influenced by Kant, his concept of reason differs from Socratic
dialogue and the transcendental reason championed by Descartes and Kant (McCarthy,
1978). He attempts to balance his rationalism with interpretive approaches. Thus he
proposes a reconstructive critical theory that emphasizes hermeneutic sciences and
intersubjective communication rather than technical scientific knowledge and control. His
theory promotes analysis and reconstruction of the past with a view to revealing
emancipatory possibilities for the future. Furthermore, any reconstruction would be
provisional because, following Gadamer, history for Habermas is viewed as constantly being
8
re-shaped and related to the context of the observer (McCarthy, 1978). His theory moves
away from instrumental rationality, drawing on interpretive Freudian psychoanalysis. Like
psychoanalysts, accounting participants can adopt a reconstructive approach to attempt to
bring to light a suppression of understanding (see Laughlin, 1987). Underlying societal
distortions are diagnosed in a similar way to psychoanalysis which applies an interpretive
framework to reconstruct individual life histories (McCarthy, 1978). Such analysis is
intended to allow participants to see themselves and society in new ways and to disclose
inequalities, injustices and alternative meanings of which participants may be unaware and
which may be symptoms of Habermas’ (1976) legitimation crises. This method avoids a
technical approach with rationally goal-directed means and the ‘rational selection of
instrumental alternatives’ focusing instead on practical questions ‘with a view to acceptance
or rejection of norms’ (Habermas, 1974, p. 3).
In the spirit of interpretivism, Habermas accepts that knowledge is socially constructed,
contextual and theory laden and therefore the hidden, alternative meanings revealed by
psychoanalytic reconstructions should not be read to imply that there are underlying absolute
independent truths that can be revealed, hidden beneath existing meanings. Rather they
suggest alternative ways of seeing. There is no guarantee that the alternative perspectives
which are uncovered are more valid than existing perspectives, apart from their ability to
command consensus, and the constraints of an external reality. Critical interpretivism is also
suggested in the way Habermas’ reconstructive approach requires individual and social
learning and moral development to reveal alternative and hidden perspectives as a precursor
to developing new emancipatory theories and social evolution rather than an emphasis on
innate ideas or primitive behaviouralism. Since Habermas takes a contextual approach to
truth, he will be aware of Kompridis’ (2006b) point that his procedural approach is not
9
neutral or devoid of ethical assumptions or content. For example, Habermas uses his
procedural approach to support modernism and a particular form of western rationality.
However, in our view, Habermas’ procedural approach does take us away from extreme
dogmatism. Habermas (1991) also suggests that his procedural approach provides a defence
against postmodern loss of both meaning and motivation.
2.2 Some criticisms of Habermas
Although Habermas’ reconstructive theory tries to blend the constructivism of
phenomenology and hermeneutics with a type of objectivity provided by the ideal speech
situation, some scholars feel that his abstract structuralistic theory and proceduralism lacks
something. The unwillingness of the theory to specify and discuss particular normative
content seems to be an issue. For example, Molisa (2011) argues that critical accounting
theory in general lacks a spiritual dimension and should emphasize love. McKernan and
MacLullich (2004) add ethical content to Habermas’ procedural theory. Drawing on
Ricoeur’s work, they propose that Habermas’ communicative ethics should be enlarged to
promote love for the other in addition to justice.
McCarthy (1978) criticises Habermas’ attempt to blend a form of objectivity with interpretive
hermeneutics in his reconstructive, critical rationalism, suggesting that through the
identification of universal linguistic structures, Habermas’ philosophy becomes more of a
Kantian reconstruction of historical materialism as opposed to a phenomenological selfreflection. McCarthy (1978, p. 264) notes that the theoretical nature of Habermas’ work
‘seems to exclude precisely the practical and hermeneutic dimension that made critical theory
10
methodologically distinct from traditional theory.’ Thus in his view Habermas fails to create
a materialistically transformed phenomenology. McCarthy (1978, p. 272) reminds us that
‘Habermas’s entire project, from the critique of contemporary scientism to the reconstruction
of historical materialism, rests on the possibility of providing an account of communication
that is both theoretical and normative, that goes beyond a pure hermeneutics without being
reducible to a strictly empirical-analytic science.’
We have argued that Habermas’ procedural approach as vital for a fairer accounting.
However, we also agree with Habermas’ critics that there seems be an inadequate
development of the phenomenological dimension of his theory crucial to reconciling
modernism with postmodernism. As Kompridis (2006b, p. 78) observes, given Habermas’
concern with semantic degradation and impoverishment of everyday life and culture (the
“lifeworld”), his lack of explanation as to ‘how modernity might recover its semantic
resources’ is surprising. In the next main section we therefore explore some of Heidegger’s
ideas to see if they can reduce the abstract quality in Habermas’ philosophy of reconstruction
and reinforce the hermeneutic and questioning orientation intended for Habermas’ ideal
speech rationality. Before focusing on Heidegger’s concept of disclosure we discuss
Habermas’ concept of self-reflection.
2.3 Self-reflection
This section outlines an important connection between Habermas’ theory of reconstruction
and Heidegger’s concept of disclosure. In ‘Theory and Practice’ (1974, p. 23), Habermas,
introduces the concept of reflection into his construct of societal reconstruction. He
distinguishes two aspects of reflection which are linked to societal reconstruction: rational
11
reconstruction and self-reflection. He identifies rational reconstruction as the recovery of an
unconsciously functioning system of anonymous rules (“know how” or theoretical
knowledge) that provides reasoned, posterior justification but no practical consequences.
However, self-reflection (analogous to psychoanalytic dialogue) is the recovery of insight
that can be tested discursively and has the potential for authenticity and practical
emancipatory consequences. According to Habermas (1974, p. 24), rational reconstruction
‘permits the theoretical development of self-reflection’. Habermas’ self-reflection is similar
to Heidegger’s concept of disclosure, although the associated ideas are more developed in
Heidegger.
3. Heidegger and disclosure
The concept of disclosure is central to Heidegger (1978) and it draws upon a pre-reflective
world that Habermas acknowledges. For Heidegger and Kompridis (1994; 2006a; 2006b),
the insights of the pre-reflective world are disclosed rather than recovered or reconstructed.
For Heidegger, disclosure is an ‘‘uncovering’, which draws upon the Greek concept of aletheia as un-concealing possibilities. Heidegger’s disclosure opens up of the ‘space of
intelligibility’ (Mulhall, 2005, p. 101). Kompridis (2006a, p. 335) points out that
Heidegger’s spontaneous, pre-reflective world produces change which ‘is not rulegoverned...and does not refer back to any rule-governed competence for initiating change.’
Heidegger’s disclosure can introduce alternative meanings and vocabularies that are
dissonant with current meanings (Kompridis, 2006b). It can involve refocusing disparate or
anomalous facts of our pre-understanding (Kompridis, 2006b), making new connections and
uncovering ‘in a different light something that has already been disclosed independently of
language’ (Kompridis, 2006b, p. 37). The term ‘disclosure’ suggests that secret meanings
12
and possibilities may not be clearly revealed and may be partial and fragmented, supporting
Heidegger’s view that an entirely transparent revelation of meaning as an absolute objective
truth or a complete totality is not possible because we are always dependent on pre-existing
contextual meanings. For Rouse (1981) Heidegger’s disclosure includes the notion that we
are always open to the possibility of our own failure. Kompridis (2006b, p. 220) interprets
disclosure to entail the revelation of ‘endangered “local worlds”’ not large scale final visions.
In his view, this prevents both the loss of recognition of multiple voices and the foreclosure
of on-going critique. However, in our view large-scale visions may be attempted even while
we recognise Rouse’s (1981) Heideggarian point that the world will always be more than we
can disclose. All disclosures and visions would need to be supported by Habermasian
democratic discussion.
Kompridis’(1994, p. 29) reading of Heidegger distinguishes first-order disclosure which is
the ‘disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is,
within which we always already find ourselves’ and second-order disclosure which ‘describes
a meaning-creative process capable of making, unmaking and remaking worlds.’ Secondorder disclosure provokes utopian possibilities. Kompridis (1994) observes that first-order
disclosure and second-order disclosure are interconnected and sometimes difficult to
distinguish in practice. We see them as extensions of Habermas’ (1974) concept of selfreflection.
Kompridis (2006b, p. 34) interprets Heidegger’s disclosure as a dynamic, ‘on-going process’.
He develops Heidegger’s disclosure into a non-instrumental ‘self-decentred learning process’
(Kompridis, 2006b, p. 221) that represents ‘the kind of learning that precludes knowing in
13
advance what it is we are going to learn’ (Kompridis, 2006b, p. 222). Furthermore, it is
‘dependent on, receptivity- on paying attention in a way that lets something new happen’
(Kompridis, 2006b, p. 222). Disclosure is not just about enlarging perspectives but also
involves changes to our normative self-understanding that aim to ‘renew trust, and to
facilitate commitment to ongoing processes of cooperative problem solving’ (Kompridis,
2006b, p. 262).
According to Kompridis (2006b p. 222) his own definition of disclosure as a self-decentering
learning process renders it impossible to disclose an unjust world. However, we take the
view that there is no guarantee that disclosure or Habermasian democratic procedures will
result in a just world, although we conjecture that they are likely to represent an improvement
to our current social and institutional arrangements. Kompridis (2006b, p. 255) argues that
the goal of critique should not (and cannot) be Habermasian consensus, but should be ‘the
self-decentering disclosure of meaning and possibility’. However, he overlooks the
significance of Habermasian consensus and democratic procedure for practical change. In
our view the utopian possibilities suggested through disclosure still need to be assessed
according to Habermas’ discursive procedures. It is hoped this might reduce the chance of
developing non-emancipatory disclosures in practice.
The next few sections discuss several manifestations of disclosure in Heidegger and their
implications for re-conceptualising accounting as a precursor to accounting change. We
continue by discussing Heidegger’s intentionality as first-order disclosure and include some
implications for accounting. We then discuss second-order disclosure in Heidegger.
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3.1 Intentionality and disclosure
Heidegger provides insight into Habermas’ pre-reflective world through his important
concept of intentionality. He opposes the traditional representationalist view of theory and
practice and Cartesian dualism exemplified in the accounting literature by Mattessich (2003).
The Cartesian approach premises a basic ontological disconnection between mental and
physical substance and then searches for indubitable connections (e.g. the knowledge of the
existence of a thinking subject) (Couzens Hoy, 1999, p. 176). Heidegger’s hermeneutics
represents a radical change to orthodox philosophy by viewing the subject as already in the
world. Thus, in his view mind and body (subject and object) should be understood as
inextricably linked though intentionality rather than being taken as separate entities. The
subject and the world are coterminous, forming a hermeneutic circle where knowledge is
‘always already meaning-laden and interpretive’ (Couzens Hoy, 1999, p. 179). Therefore the
terms “subject” and “object” as ordinarily understood are misleading. Heidegger avoids the
Cartesian problem of a postulating a gap between ourselves and the world and then never
being able to close that gap (Rouse, 1981). He refers to the human being as “Dasein”,
avoiding the term “subject” that would imply dualism (Dreyfus, 1993).
Heidegger’s intentionality or being-in-the-world includes everyday activity that often
involves a type of automatic behaviour which cannot be explained as rational purposive
action because the person does not experience a sense of having intentions that cause the
action (Dreyfus, 1993). Furthermore, they would find it difficult to supply a breakdown of
their activities after or during the event. Talking, driving and playing a musical instrument
are examples of this type of behaviour. For Heidegger, our everyday engagement in the
15
world involves absorption with a world that is already familiar to us. A person is thrown into
the world and therefore understands the world automatically and unreflectively. According
to Heidegger, Dasein relates to the objects in the external world in terms of the purposes for
which they can be used as ‘ready-to-hand’. When we come across things which have no
apparent purpose, we notice them only in so far as they have no use for us. They generally
merge into the background as insignificant and we overlook them. Our primordial experience
of objects is that we encounter things as equipment ‘in-order-to’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 97)
perform an act and we become absorbed in using these tools. For example, we do not see
accounting numbers as lines on a page, but we are unreflectively absorbed with them as
meaningful indicators that we can use and manipulate. Similarly, investment appraisal is not
viewed as an abstract concept derived from economics, but we are conventionally preoccupied with it as a tool that we believe can assist managerial decision making. Thus, such
tools are perspectival and non-neutral. Following Heidegger, Kompridis (1994; 2006a)
suggests that our automatic absorption with the world through practical engagement produces
a pre-reflective, tacit knowledge that may have the potential to be a source of authenticity and
first-order disclosure. This may occur in accountants’ practical engagement with the tools of
accounting and can be linked with emotions aroused by accounting (discussed in Section
3.5).
Heidegger distinguishes the ‘ready-to-hand’ from the ‘present-at-hand’. In the case of
experiencing objects as ‘present-at-hand’, they are experienced inauthentically in the
detached manner of conventional dualism or science, offering no possibility of authenticity or
disclosure for Dasein. Heidegger argues that existential phenomenology and his version of
intentionality represents a much more fundamental explanation of being-in-the-world than
attempts to objectify phenomena as ‘present-at-hand’ through mathematical natural sciences.
16
Although both Heidegger and Habermas acknowledge the value of conventional scientific
method for certain purposes, they both undermine the notion of instrumental scientific
rationality and objective absolute truths (even in logic) because in their view all knowledge is
theory-laden and contextual. In Heidegger’s view, all truths arise from the context of Dasein
through its automatic connection to the world. Recognising accounting as ‘ready-to-hand’
undermines its instrumental uses. The Heideggarian approach acknowledges that a science
that does not overstate its knowledge claims may be usefully applied to accounting
(illustrated in Section 4.3). It also emphasizes that scientific language and thinking
represents only one of a number of possible accounting languages and ways of thinking about
accounting.
Heidegger’s hermeneutical intentionality leads to the use of dichotomous terms such as
“authentic” or “inauthentic” and “transparent” or “opaque” rather than “true” or “false”,
suggesting that interpretive understandings may often be better judged by labels other than
“true” or “false” (Couzens Hoy, 1999, p.181). The recognition that truth is not absolute (or
monistic) allows for the possibility of rich description that includes multiple, complex,
evocative, poetic and subtle interpretations of research findings. It also accepts the
incompleteness, ambiguity and indeterminacy of some interpretations. Interpretive
accounting literature has provided many examples of rich descriptions (e.g. Boland, 1993;
Chua, 1995; Preston et al., 1996; Czarniawska, 2012b) that can be linked back to Heidegger’s
intentionality. Combining Habermas with Heidegger aims to ensure that rich interpretations
are maintained within research informed by Habermas’ communicative rationality. The
representationalist dualistic assumption that the mind is independent of an objective reality
can be linked with three key accounting problems that Heidegger’s intentionality arguably
overcomes. First, the exaggeration of accounting knowledge claims by presenting them as
17
eternal (absolute) truths because it is believed that they can somehow be known
independently from the observer. Second, claiming that accounting knowledge is neutral
when it is actually partisan and theory-laden (Tinker, 1991). Third, the implication of
accounting in the legitimisation and normalisation of socially undesirable practices through
incorrectly presenting accounting as unquestionable, objective and a purveyor of absolute
truth (Neu et al., 2001; Chwastiak and Lehman, 2008).
3.2 The search for Being: an objective of disclosure
In ‘Being and Time’ Heidegger’s hermeneutics aims to uncover fundamental, primordial
commonalities of human existence that apply to everyday, average, general experiences. He
is concerned to understand the meaning of Being. Heidegger does not provide a definition of
Being but reveals its meaning throughout the text. “Being” in a simplistic sense refers to the
meaning of existence. Understanding Being includes the search for who I am, what is my
purpose and what is my relationship to the world and others? These are, of course, important
questions for the construct of accounting and also for accountants and accounting researchers
when considering accounting change. For Heidegger, the understanding of oneself is an
essential precondition to enhancing society. Thus Mulhall (2005, p.193) says that Heidegger
believes that an individual’s ‘capacity to grasp...the best destiny of her community’ is
dependent on ‘an anticipatory grasp of her own future.’ The search for Being involves
questioning assumptions and acknowledging the contextual nature of any philosophical
questions that are posed. Mulhall (2005, p. 157) regards Heidegger’s quest to understand
Being as ‘Heidegger’s attempt to make his own life an integral and singular whole’ or his
search for personal authenticity.
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Being is described by Heidegger as an issue for Dasein in that ‘every choice it makes...is a
choice about the form that its own life will take’ (Mulhall, 2005, p. 66). The understanding
of Being would be the ultimate objective of disclosure. Heidegger’s notions of
intersubjectivity and intentionality mean that any attempt to understanding oneself or any
individual authentic disclosure cannot escape its links with the language and culture that we
share with others. Furthermore, any individual disclosure is always influenced by others
through their actions. Thus a private transformation or following a rule that no-one else
could follow is a contradiction in terms (Mulhall, 2005). Similarly, from a Habermasian
perspective answers to questions such as “who am I?”, “what is my purpose?” and “what is
my relationship to the world and others?” would be intersubjectively constituted. Unlike
Heidegger, Habermas would emphasize the importance of open discussion and democratic
procedures in addressing these questions.
3.3 Intersubjectivity, “they” and constraints to disclosure
Although the relationship of Dasein with others is seen as a fundamental part of the
disclosure of Being, such intersubjectivity is portrayed as complex with the potential to
hinder or enhance disclosure, lying somewhere on a continuum of a dominating or a
liberating relationship. In his words:
‘Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive
solicitude-that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates.’
(Heidegger, 1978, p. 159)
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The everyday, inauthentic relationship with others is not regarded as fundamentally one of
empathy. It is a relationship of intentionality where people come into focus because of their
purpose for us and vice versa. Heidegger (1978) acknowledges power relations stating that
we may seek to dominate the other or to differentiate ourselves from the other. He describes
a particular as a form of domination whereby the individual becomes trapped by
unquestioningly following the general view. Thus he says:
‘What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been
taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and
enhances their power.’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 164)
Heidegger is more critical of the public than Habermas. Whilst Habermas emphasizes the
importance of the public for democratic accountability, Heidegger reminds us that their views
may not always result in appropriate conclusions for disclosure. For Heidegger our everyday
involvement with “they” can lead to following fashions and trends automatically without
reflection or critique. He notes that “they” often show idle curiosity and an obsession with
trivial novelty and he describes the “they” as ‘levelling down’ (p.165) and as never getting to
‘the heart of the matter’ (p. 165).
The condition of “they” is linked to a form of communication which Heidegger designates
“idle talk”. This includes gossip, closing-off discussion and new inquiry and superficial
understanding. When engaged in “idle talk”, Dasein is said to be in a state of fallenness,
defined as follows:
20
‘“Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as
the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity.’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 220)
The pre-occupation with idle talk and the opinions of mass culture is associated with
complacency, self-delusion, and alienation. Thus Heidegger (1978, p. 222) says:
‘When Dasein, tranquillized, and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with
everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being
is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at
the same time alienating.’
The falling of Dasein constrains disclosure and change, as follows:
‘This downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic Being of the
“they”, has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the
projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that it possesses
everything, or that everything is within reach’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 223).
21
According to Heidegger, a preoccupation with the opinions and beliefs of an uninformed
public also leads to a lack of individual responsibility and a lack of accountability. In
Heidegger’s words:
‘Yet because the “they” presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the
particular Dasein of its answerability…It ‘was’ always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be
said that it has been ‘no one’. In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most
things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”.’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.
165)
Mulhall (2005) interprets Heidegger’s critique of “they” as a critique of popular culture
where the unusual and the difficult are avoided, and the prevailing opinion is accepted
without question. The theme of idle talk has resonance to-day with the superficial, wasteful
and distracting culture of celebrity in which accounting is implicated. Heidegger (1978, p.
223) evokes the image of an insatiable, unreflective consumerism, fuelled by unchecked
capitalism, eroding scarce resources by producing endless unnecessary goods overconfidently assuming ‘that everything is within reach’. Such a society is currently supported
by accounting, although accounting could use its tools that purport to measure efficiency and
effectiveness, and are implicated in resource allocation, to undermine and critique these
excesses. The critique of the “they” has resonance with the current context of accounting
where there has been a rise of conservative governments ‘that manipulate media and
intelligence’ creating ‘a depoliticised and uninformed citizenry’ (Lehman, 2010, p. 734) and
where governments are also constrained by a conservative media.
22
In order to be able to detach ourselves from the opinions of “they”, Heidegger’s critique
implies a need to supplement Habermas’ theory with proposals for how the public might have
access to wider ranging, more transparent and more representative information to enhance
democratic accountability. Since we are intrinsically connected to the world and to the other
through being-in-the-world, Mulhall (2005, p. 73) observes that the type of change through
disclosure envisaged by Heidegger, ‘must be a modification rather than a transcendence’ of
our life. Similarly, Kompridis (2006b, p. 73) emphasizes that Heidegger is not arguing that
Dasein should or could heroically escape the other, but rather that authenticity depends on
transforming both our relationships with others and the constraints of everyday practice in
which others are implicated. For Kompridis (2006b, p. 74), Heidegger is not concerned with
a critique of mass culture as mass deception, but he is interested in ‘recovering the everyday,
rescuing its semantic resources from daily degradation.’
Heidegger’s phenomenology arguably offers an additional dimension to developing ways of
analysing micro politics and power relations extending Habermas’ more abstract, formal
philosophical argument. Heidegger’s description of the everyday, inauthentic relationships of
domination with “they” and his emphasis on emotions (discussed in Section 3.5) suggest that
specific individuals can sometimes impose severe emancipatory constraints on others that
seem to extend negatively beyond the institutional disciplinary requirements of their role.
Whilst this type of abuse of power can cause individual misery for participants who may feel
coerced to participate in actions that conflict with their own personal (or professional) ethical
principles , it may sometimes be linked to corruption in accounting affecting society more
widely (e.g. see Sikka, 2003).
23
3.4 Personal responsibility for disclosure
Mulhall (2005, p. 66) observes that Heidegger’s ‘intersubjectivity is not the denial of
subjectivity’. We note Heidegger’s emphasis on personal responsibility for disclosure. Such
“subjectivity” includes self-awareness and the potential for authentic individualism and
personal responsibility. Heidegger emphasizes the importance of personal responsibility in
identifying future possibilities and working towards personal authenticity. He also highlights
the significance of self-accountability as follows:
‘But this ‘public conscience’-what else is it than the voice of the “they”? A ‘worldconscience’ is a dubious fabrication, and Dasein can come to this only because conscience, in
its basis and its essence, is in each case mine…’ (p. 323)
Similarly Habermas (1991) highlights the importance of individual self-critique and
individual responsibility in the development of moral consciousness.
Applied to accounting
Habermas’ view combined with Heideggarian themes of individual responsibility and
authenticity (personal and societal) implies that many accountants and accounting academics
should try to increase their moral responsibility and that it should be directed towards a wider
range of stakeholders.
3.5 Moods, emotions and disclosure
Mulhall (2005) observes that Heidegger introduces moods and emotions as socially
conditioned phenomena that are connected with disclosure. Similarly Rouse (1981, p. 278)
notes that for Heidegger ‘mood and understanding are co-determining’ and that certain
24
moods can influence Dasein’s potential to envisage possibilities whereas others may hinder
disclosure. Heidegger discusses a variety of moods and emotions which are seen as
important to the meaning of Being. Heidegger draws heavily on emotions emphasized in
Christian theology including “the call”, “guilt”, “lostness” and a concern with death. Anxiety
is an important emotion in the meaning of Being that Mulhall (2005) links with philosophical
scepticism. It arises when Dasein becomes aware of its freedom to choose certain paths.
Thus Heidegger (1978, p. 232) says:
‘Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-that
is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings
Dasein face to face with…the authenticity of its Being...’
Dasein tends to behave in an automatic way in its daily routines which Heidegger (1978, p.
229) refers to as ‘fleeing in the face of itself’. However, from time to time it becomes aware
of its possibilities and experiences anxiety and ‘uncanniness’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 233).
‘…as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday
familiarity collapses…Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the “not-at-home”’
(Heidegger, 1978, p. 233).
One example of anxiety might be an accountant performing routine tasks and feeling a sense
of disappointment or alienation in that accounting appears to be inadequately assisting in the
25
improvement of society. Emotions can trigger first-order disclosure in accounting. For
example, in three case studies Oakes and Berry (2009) observed how accounting in its
everyday ready-to-hand use was sometimes associated by organisational managers with
feelings of pain. We could say that the pain was linked to a raised awareness of accounting as
problematic acting as a potential precursor to second order disclosure that considers
alternative possibilities.
For Heidegger (1978), a basic structure of Dasein is ‘care’ which has three sub-categories:
‘facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling’ (p. 329). We note that although
care is a general concept in Heidegger’s ontology, it has emotional elements and
connotations. For example, ‘the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt are
anchored in the phenomenon of care’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 365). “Care” is also linked with
“concern”. Mulhall (2005, p. 112) interprets Heidegger’s “concern” to mean that ‘Dasein is
always occupied with the entities it encounters in the world-concerned about ready-to-hand
and present-at-hand entities, and solicitous of other human beings...The world and everything
in it is something that cannot fail to matter to it.’ Although concern may involve particular
instances of lack of concern, Dasein’s basic orientation is as a being capable of concern
(Mulhall, 2005). In our view, this suggests Dasein has, at its root, the potential for positive
emotions that can trigger disclosure and positive actions towards others.
Two other emotions that have the potential to trigger disclosure are the call of conscience and
guilt. Thus, Dasein gains awareness of its potential for self-direction through a call of
conscience and it experiences guilt. Heidegger (1978, p. 333) says:
26
‘This calling-back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that Dasein
itself…is to bring itself back from its lostness in the “they”; and this means that it is guilty’.
The call of conscience acts as a catalyst for suggesting utopian possibilities (second-order
disclosure). It can be read as intersubjective and dialogical, recognising that others can both
provide reassurance that we have our own voice and make us question whether the voice that
we have is our own (Kompridis, 2006b). In contrast to emotions and moods that have the
potential to trigger disclosure, wishing represents a sublimation of Dasein’s authentic
awareness of its own possibilities. It involves a perpetual dissatisfaction with current
material possessions and a ‘hankering after possibilities’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 239) and desire
for new possessions.
A positive reading of Heidegger could envisage authentic versions of Heidegger’s themes of
care and concern to recognise the emotional resonance of these constructs. Such a reading
(informed by Guignon, 1999, discussed in Section 4.1) would include care and concern for
others as well as care for self. Interpreting Heidegger’s theme of care and concern in this
way allows us to highlight the emotional impact of accounting on others, to raise awareness
of the needs of others and to press for those needs to be satisfied. Various types of respect
and love for others have been discussed in accounting research by Macintosh et al. (2009)
who draw on Levinas and also by Molisa (2011) who proposes the transformation of egoic
consciousness to attain an egoless state. However, Heidegger’s concepts of care and concern
do not require the total self-sacrifice of Molisa’s (2011) idealised, unconditional spiritual love
27
of the other or the almost coercive obligation to the other evoked by Macintosh et al. (2009).
This chimes with Habermas’ (1996) concern with the rights of the individual as well as the
rights of the other and the group. Heidegger could be interpreted as balancing a care and
concern for self and self-emancipation with a care and concern for others and their
emancipation. Such a view is suggested by the lack of clear distinction between subject and
object arising from Heidegger’s intentionality.
Care and concern for self would not involve
the conventional self-interest of accounting and economics but would focus on a noninstrumentalized co-operation requiring ‘commitment to a process that we can neither control
nor direct’ (Kompridis, 2006b, p. 50). It would involve moral and cognitive learning ‘that
may require a change in how we, speak, think, and act’ (Kompridis, 2006b, p. 50).
It has been argued that Habermas’ rationalism is de-humanised and does not recognise the
significance of emotions (e.g. Benhabib, 1986; Mouffe, 1998; Brown, 2009). Benhabib
(1986) observes that the ideal speech situation was not intended merely as a legalistic
procedure aiming at improving justice but was to be concerned through psychoanalytic
reconstruction with improving the happiness of the community and individuals. Heidegger’s
approach reinforces Benhabib’s (1986) proposal for an extension to Habermas’ theory.
Through privileging emotions and moods and suggesting care for self and others,
Heidegger’s theory supports the importance of empowering an individual to be able to
express their own emotions and needs to others and can be interpreted to promote the
happiness and wellbeing of self and others. It assists in recognising Benhabib’s (1986)
notion of distinctive individuals, focusing on their identities, beliefs, needs, desires, feelings
and emotions. In addition, the dignity of the other would be acknowledged, along with an
empathetic approach towards the other, respecting their ‘differences, individual life-histories
and concrete needs’ (Benhabib, 1986, p. 351).
28
3.6 Disclosure through death and art
Dasein does not necessarily remain fallen and lost. It can project itself and become aware of
its possibilities. Projection is an authentic mode of Being representing an understanding that
reveals the ‘truth of existence’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 264). It is linked to resoluteness where
Dasein is aware of its own possibilities through facing up to the inevitability of death. The
possibilities which become evident are conceived as practical and achievable as indicated in
the following extract:
‘Neither does anticipatory resoluteness stem from ‘idealistic’ exactions soaring above
existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the
basic possibilities for Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 358).
Everyday Dasein evades its own mortality, encouraged by its preoccupation with following
the opinions of “they”. However, the ultimate meaning of Being is Dasein facing up to its
own inevitable death. In Heidegger’s words:
‘Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.
307).
29
The acknowledgement of death is a revelatory moment of disclosure for Dasein allowing it to
create authentic possibilities for the future, spurred on by the urgency of the relative shortness
of life. Recognition of one’s own death frees Dasein from the superficiality of the general
opinions of “they”. Heidegger (1978, p. 308) observes:
‘When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one’s own death, one is liberated from one’s
lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is
liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose
among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped.’
When Dasein is in this authentic mode in the present it is open to new horizons and visions,
as follows:
‘When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in
order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of vision’ as regards the Situation
which has been disclosed’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 376).
Mulhall (2005, p. 159) notes that ‘resoluteness discloses the current moment of Dasein’s
existence as a situation for choice and action’ and it ‘implies a triple but internally related
openness to future, past and present’ (Mulhall, 2005, p. 160) with particular emphasis on the
future through anticipation.
30
Heidegger’s description of the moment of insight where possibilities for an authentic
existence are opened up is linked to an awareness of one’s mortality but also resonates with
the disclosure that can be provided in a work of art. For example, he links poetry with
disclosure as follows:
‘In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-ofmind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence’ (Heidegger,
1978, p. 205).
Kompridis (2006a, p. 335) argues that the rational reconstructions of Habermas ‘can never
serve as a bridge between what is and what might be, between actuality and possibility’.
Thus they cannot yield the utopian ideas that should be the outcome of critique. Kompridis
(1994) notes that instead of Habermasian reason-giving, an alternative Heideggarian
rationality is required which may, like a work of art, ‘light up a world’ and ‘open our eyes’
(p. 35) ‘disclosing alternative horizons of meaning’ (p. 40). In our view Heidegger’s
moments of insight could supplement Habermasian reason-giving. If accounting were linked
to Heideggarian second-order disclosure, it could be viewed more widely as art, and existing
connections with artistic and creative thinking could be extended, potentially creating new
ways of seeing and opening up the utopian possibilities that Habermas intended.
Although Habermas does not regard poetic or fictional language as ideally suited to practical
discourse, McKernan and MacLullich (2004) observe that it is widely used in problem
solving and are sceptical about Habermas’ attempt to exclude it from debate. Heidegger
shows us by example in his writing style that poetry can have a powerful persuasive influence
and may on occasion have a more direct appeal for some than the more objective style of
31
Habermas. Thus we suggest that when considering accounting change, Habermas’ idealised
“force of the better argument” should include a kind of rationality that after disclosure of
possibilities sometimes makes use of non-coercive rhetoric, emotions and poetry to try to
achieve consensus as part of a decision-making process. However, we recognise that it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish coercive from non-coercive rhetoric. It must be persuasive
but not intentionally deceptive and it must be open to self-critique (Kompridis, 2006b). In
some cases it would need to be presented with irony to highlight its persuasive and
manipulative attributes.
3.7 Disclosure through phenomenological time
The recognition of one’s mortality is linked to an existential phenomenological understanding
of time. Heidegger refers to the phenomenon of the future, the character of having been and
the present as the “ecstasies” of temporality. He says that:
‘Temporalizing does not signify that ecstasies come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later
than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes
itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.
401).
Mulhall (2005, p.206) notes that ‘the temporality of Dasein’s Being means that Dasein is [or
exists as] time rather than existing in time’. Dasein projects into the future but is also aware
of its past or ‘having been’, thus releasing itself from its inauthentic, superficial present
where it is distracted by “they”. Time is treated through intentionality as purposeful ‘for-the32
sake-of-which’ (Heidegger, 1978, p. 467) rather than being treated conventionally, and
inauthentically, as a scientific object for measurement or as a subjective experience. Time is
regarded as fundamental to existence and the quest to understand Being because it relates to
the anticipation of death. For Heidegger the conventional view of time covers up the
awareness of death and consequential authentic possibilities. He says:
‘The principal thesis of the ordinary way of interpreting time-namely that time is ‘infinite’makes manifest most impressively the way in which world-time and accordingly temporality
in general have been levelled off and covered up by such an interpretation. It is held that
time presents itself proximally as an uninterrupted sequence of “nows”’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.
476).
Heidegger’s emphasis on phenomenological time can be contrasted with disciplinary and
political uses of conventional linear accounting time (see Ezzamel and Robson, 1995).
Consideration of phenomenological time suggests emancipatory potential for the use of time
in accounting with broader societal implications. For example, accounting divides time up
artificially and focuses on the short-term, whereas environmental problems require a longterm approach (Jones, 2010). Heidegger’s emphasis on projection towards future
possibilities informed by the past supports a long-term strategic approach required for
environmental accounting. Mulhall (2005, p. 192) observes that Heidegger’s ‘critique of the
present must be guided by a disclosure of the true heritage of existentiell possibilities from
which an individual and a community can project that future’. Heidegger’s concept of
phenomenological time has links with Habermas’ psychoanalytic reconstruction where the
33
interpretation of the past becomes significant for the present and the future. Indeed future
projections are always linked to the past and rendered intelligible by past meanings.
Kompridis (2006b) amplifies Heidegger’s emphasis on unclosing the past to reopen the future
by noting that in a modernistic age where the past tends to be erased and newness is idolised
for its own sake, when developing alternative possibilities we need to be receptive to what
has been lost (p. 265) and we need to recover ‘the speech of those who would otherwise have
been silenced’ (p. 269), re-awakening utopias. For Heidegger, past, present and future appear
to co-exist in the second-order disclosure of new possibilities, triggered by emotions such as
anxiety and recognition of one’s mortality. In such disclosure, the past, the present and the
future reciprocally question and illuminate one another (Mulhall, 2005). History is fluid for
both Habermas and Heidegger. However, for Habermas the process of reconstruction
through history is more methodological, scientific and self-conscious than Heidegger’s
visionary, intuitive disclosure of possibilities.
Heidegger’s concept of time is fundamental to the notion of disclosure and it has important
implications for accounting change. In addition to utilising Habermasian reconstructive
insights, accounting has the potential to contribute positively to emancipatory goals if it
opens up to Heidegger’s phenomenological notion of time, allowing interpretations of past
present and future to intermingle. From a Heideggarian perspective, accounting can project
new possibilities by drawing on its emotional associations to precipitate disclosure and also
by developing its associations with art. It must also recognise the need for timely action
given the finitude of an individual’s existence. Mouffe (1998) argues that Habermas’
consensus ultimately closes off possibilities. However, combining communicative rationality
34
with Heidegger’s disclosure through phenomenological time can assist by opening up
possibilities for the self and other, accommodating Benhabib’s (1986) extension to Habermas
that highlights the importance of giving voice to, and extending rights for diverse groups (e.g.
groups categorised by disability, ethnicity, gender, age and sexuality) that are not specifically
identified in Habermas’ early texts and are often neglected in accounting and accountability.
4. Reflection on the synthesis of Habermas and Heidegger
This section briefly reflects on several key interpretations of Heidegger including Habermas’
critique of Heidegger. It also defends synthesizing Habermas and Heidegger. It concludes
by presenting a model for the reconstruction of accounting that includes our synthesis of
Habermas and Heidegger.
4.1 Reading Heidegger
The ambiguity in Heidegger’s writing suggests many possibilities (Smith, 2002), and we are
aware of a number of contradictory readings offered by scholars. For example, Smith (2002)
argues that Heidegger has no moral dimension. In contradistinction, Guignon (1999, p.2)
indicates that Heidegger takes a Hegelian communitarian stance. He states that because we
are inextricably linked to objects and others, Heidegger’s authenticity ‘can be nothing other
than a fuller and richer form of participation in the public context’ (Guignon, 1999, p. 228).
Thus he argues that Heidegger’s intentionality and intersubjectivity entail a community and
moral perspective. Guignon (1999) indicates that Heidegger’s concept of “authentic
historicity” supports this interpretation. In his words:
35
‘Where inauthentic Dasein just drifts along with the latest trends, authentic Dasein
“remembers” its rootedness in the wider unfolding culture’ (Guignon, 1999, p. 234)
Hence, authentic Dasein does recognise its links with the community and the shared quest for
‘fairness, honesty, dignity, benevolence, achievement, and so on’ (Guignon, 1999, p. 235).
Freedom arises from gaining ‘clarity and depth’ about this community context which already
shapes our lives, rather than having unconstrained freedom (Guignon, 1999, p. 235).
According to Guignon (1999), Dasein understands historicity and community through
narratives which always have a normative dimension. Thus fact and value or ‘is’ and
‘ought’, as Heidegger suggests, cannot be separated. For Guignon (1999), Heidegger
escapes the relativism of many possibilities with no reason for choosing one over the other,
by having a concept of community that provides a reason for making particular choices
regarding the future. This reading aligns Heidegger quite closely to Habermas’ notion of
communicative action. Furthermore Guignon observes that Heidegger suggests the
individual may become more attuned to their moral role, as follows:
‘What is important is building myself as this kind of person, not scoring points or getting
rewards “down the road”’ (Guignon, 1999 p. 231).
This chimes with Habermas’ (1991) theme of the development of individual moral
consciousness. Despite the arguments for Heidegger’s community perspective, we note the
36
powerful narrative of individualism in Heidegger which would reveal itself in Habermasian
communicative rationality as Benhabib’s (1986, p. 348) ‘unity-in-difference’. For example,
Heidegger (1978, p. 326) states that future vision is personal, localised and contextual, as
follows:
‘When the call gives us potentiality-for-Being to understand, it does not give us one which is
ideal and universal; it discloses it as that which has been currently individualized and which
belongs to that particular Dasein.’
We resolve this slight theoretical mismatch by suggesting that both Heidegger and Habermas
offer a balance between individualism and community orientation.
4.2 Some limitations and objections to Heidegger
In our view, Heidegger’s emphasis on individualism and his ambivalence towards “they”
from whom the individual must break free suggests that his notion of community is different
from Habermas’ conception of community. For Heidegger, others are often associated with
inauthenticity and seen as a constraint on the freedom of individuals. Furthermore, he does
not develop his notion of intersubjectivity and does not specify how others might be viewed
in an authentic context. In contrast, Habermas respects and demands the opinion of the
ordinary person, speaks positively about grass roots organisations as sources of liberation and
critiques the notion of “experts”. We have interpreted Heidegger as championing the
concept of individual emancipation and social emancipation through disclosing possibilities
as the ultimate meaning of Being, yet unlike Habermas he offers no specific suggestions
37
about how such emancipation might be achieved by an individual or through social
mechanisms. Furthermore, whilst Heidegger draws attention to a necessity for individual
accountability and individual responsibility for emancipation, unlike Habermas he does not
discuss how conflicting individual visions might be resolved. Thus in our view Heidegger’s
theory should be regarded as an adjunct to Habermas’ theory rather than being treated as the
main theory.
Habermas is highly critical of Heidegger and it is unlikely that he would support our
synthesis. One key argument offered by Habermas (1998) is that Heidegger never manages
to escape the subjectivity of the philosophy of consciousness and therefore Heidegger’s
position is solipsistic and he is unable to justify a critical or emancipatory stance. We counter
by noting that as a consequence of Heidegger’s intentionality, the individual is automatically
connected to others and shaped by others and therefore his subjectivity cannot be solipsistic.
Habermas also criticises Heidegger’s individualism and unlike Guignon (1999) does not
recognise Heidegger’s concern for the community. Heidegger’s subjectivism is problematic
for Habermas (1998) in part because it reintroduces individual needs and the possibility of
utilitarianism as a justification for ethical principles where it is assumed that the freedom of
one individual can substitute for the freedom of every individual. However, we read
Heidegger as supporting a subjectivism that balances a care for self and community. Such
subjectivism is capable of suggesting emancipatory possibilities drawing on own our
phenomenological relationship with time.
A number of scholars have argued that Habermas’ theory is inadequate in general (e.g.
Mouffe, 1998) or inadequate for accounting critique (e.g. Lehman, 2006; Brown, 2009). We
concur with scholars who have argued that Habermas’ theory although impressively
38
comprehensive and unified, needs extending (e.g. Benhabib, 1986) and we have followed
Kompridis (1994; 2006a; 2006b) in using Heidegger to extend Habermasian theory.
Furthermore, we observe some similarities between the theories of Habermas and Heidegger
that facilitate such a synthesis. First we observe a similarity between Habermas’ privileging
of the lifeworld and Heidegger’s privileging primordial experience. Second, Heidegger
wishes for a society that moves beyond the world of the uninformed “they” whereas
Habermas aims for a society that overcomes the colonization of the lifeworld. Third, they
both search for hidden meanings and they both place an emphasis on critically interpreting
the past to provide future possibilities. Fourth, they both emphasize the contextual nature of
knowledge.
4.3 A reconstruction of accounting
We can apply the interplay of the theories of Habermas and Heidegger to propose a
reconstruction of accounting that would involve a fundamental re-think of the assumptions of
accounting, including its knowledge claims and its objectives. We use the term
‘reconstruction’ to comprise Habermas’ rational reconstruction and self-reflection,
Heidegger’s disclosure and Habermas’ societal reconstruction. Habermas’ attempt to link
interpretive procedures from hermeneutics and phenomenology with grand social theory,
supported by Heidegger’s disclosure, suggests an ambitious framework for accounting
researchers and accounting practitioners. It is intended that Heidegger’s phenomenological
perspective would be interwoven with a range of critical approaches when reflecting on a
context in order to suggest emancipatory possibilities for change underpinned by
Habermasian democratic procedures. The framework incorporates five dimensions: historical
critique, philosophical critique, phenomenological critique, political critique and
emancipatory procedures and possibilities (see figure one).
39
Figure 1: The reconstruction of accounting
Historical Critique
Philosophical
Critique
Phenomenological
Critique
Political Critique
Examine changing
histories
Question assumptions
Draw on:
Identify:
Acknowledge
provisional status of
knowledge claims
Emotions
Legitimation crises
Intuitive
experiences of
disclosure
Power relations in
macro and micro
politics
Search for hidden
meanings
Revelation of the
relative freedom to
consider
potentially
authentic
possibilities
Inauthentic
consumerism
Develop emancipatory approaches
Communicative action
Deliberative democracy
New artistic ways of thinking
New symbols and new language
Self-critique in moral consciousness
Expand lifeworld
Extend care and concern for self and
others
New democratic, ethically conscious
accounting tools
The historical critique includes attempts to identify possible misinterpretations of tradition
and ‘concrete possibilities in the tradition that have currently been lost from sight’ (Couzens
Hoy, 1999, p.191) as a basis for disclosing future possibilities. The philosophical critique
40
would include continuing to develop our understanding of the nature of accounting. This
could include asking why certain types of management accounting information and financial
accounting information are provided rather than other types. It would promote a questioning
of assumptions that lie behind International Accounting Standards and Tax avoidance
regulations and it would encourage the Heideggerian disclosure of alternatives. The
philosophical critique suggests that organisational reports increasingly should become
narratives that move beyond the concerns prescribed by convention or by the organisation,
discovering other possibilities. As an example, University operational reports in the U.K.
could include data on staff and student wellbeing in addition to the typical data on student
demand, retention, progression, academic attainment and module evaluation.
Heidegger’s idle talk can be applied to orthodox accounting’s assumption that markets
represent the best way to allocate resources. Idle talk also occurs when the limitations of
markets are acknowledged but there is general unwillingness to develop or consider
alternative models. Further examples of idle talk include conventional accounting’s emphasis
on the values of business and competition, and its tendency to exclude other discourses,
focusing solely on profit and cost reduction. Our Habermasian and Heidegerrian approach
suggests that we need to reflect on (and critique) all the tools and regulations of accounting
that are implicated in idle talk that glorifies markets and privileges business language and
objectives. It suggests that we should devise new tools and forms of accounting where
appropriate. Furthermore, the philosophical critique would not overstate the knowledge
claims of accounting, acknowledging its uncertainties and limitations. For example, Brown
(2009, p. 330) develops a Sustainability Assessment Model (SAM) that ‘seeks to deal openly
with scientific uncertainty (e.g. reporting estimates in terms of ranges rather than single
41
numbers)’. Similarly, Gallhofer and Haslam (1996) propose that accountants could
demonstrate their uncertainty and fallibility by using question marks in annual reports.
The political critique would include analysing inauthentic consumerism and the influence of
the “they” in accounting. Heidegger’s critique of consumerism provides further justification
for sustainability and environmental reporting and suggests we should carefully consider
which businesses are legalised, supported and allowed to advertise. The political critique
would explore power relations including disputes and compromises at macro and micro level
in which accounting is implicated, developing an historical understanding, and using
Habermas’ (1976) Legitimation crisis where appropriate. It could also draw on sociological
theories including Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociology of worth described by Annisette and
Richardson (2011) to identify current processes of compromise. These processes would then
be subjected to philosophical critique as a precursor to trying to understand how we might
move towards a more authentically democratic Habermasian compromise, potentially leading
to a fairer alternative to capitalism.
The political critique suggests that we need to consider whether the types of organisation and
society that accounting supports are appropriate for our needs. The Habermasian model of
reconstruction should help to secure positive accounting change and beneficial societal
reform by encouraging inner reflection and giving voice to all affected parties. Habermasian
reconstruction requires a move to new organisation structures with increased democratic
power arrangements and an enhanced concern for others in a process of moral development.
Through Habermasian reconstruction we hopefully move towards new less selfish ethical
principles which we must enact, and we develop new roles for accountants, auditors and tax
42
advisors. Accounting and accountants can become increasingly involved in improving
equality of opportunity and justice in regard to ethnicity, age, disability, gender and class,
developing appropriate accounting regulations, reports, models and tools. Brown (2009)
provides an example of how critical dialogic principles can be applied to the SAM. In
Brown’s (2009) model, various participants construct their own SAM which can be used as a
basis for negotiation. This gives voice to all interested parties and has the potential to
undermine powerful elite groups. Although informed by agonistic democracy, Brown’s
(2009, p. 333) dialogic SAM reflects themes from our Habermasian Heideggerian approach
including recognizing ‘the subjective and contestable nature of what is included’, enabling
‘accessibility for non-experts’, ensuring ‘effective participatory processes’ and using SAMS
‘to challenge power elites’. Social accounts could be produced by alliances of groups within
and across organisations (e.g. trade unions) potentially contributing towards a prefiguration
of a new non-capitalist social order (Lee and Cassell, 2008). Applying a Habermasian
approach to organisational budgets would make them more transparent and participatory.
Genuine rather than pseudo-participation is necessary. In in some organisations, participation
in strategy formulation (disclosing the future) may become more authentic to lower level
employees if linkages between strategic documents, operational budgets and organisational
timeframes are clarified in order to demonstrate how strategic objectives might be enacted.
Evans (2004) argues that deliberative democracy is feasible from an economic perspective
and provides two examples of deliberative democracy in practice at local level in Kerala and
Porto Alegre. Such projects may provide the starting point for a wider development of
deliberative democracy at local and national level.
The phenomenological critique draws on Heidegger in five key ways. First, through
Heideggerian intentionality, we recognise the value of multiple perspectives which supports
43
Habermas’ communicative rationality and deliberative democracy. Second, it acknowledges
the value of non-rational, intuitive, improvisatory and artistic approaches to emancipatory
thinking in accounting and the significant role of moods in triggering disclosure. Third, it
recognises the partial, incomplete nature of knowledge and the way some tacit knowledge
cannot be fully grasped or reconstructed. Fourth, the approach acknowledges that two
different interpretations may sometimes be equally plausible and equally justifiable. This
alleviates any dogmatism that might arise when a Habermasian consensus is required for
decision making but there isn’t a “better” argument. Fifth, the phenomenological conception
of time connects all parts of the reconstructive disclosure. Past, present and future coincide
in the disclosure of new possibilities, triggered by emotions such as anxiety and recognition
of one’s mortality.
The combination of Habermas with Heidegger’s intentionality provides philosophical
justification for alternative social or sustainable accounts. As Cooper and Thomson (2000,
p.27) suggest, since accounting ‘is not an independent scientific language’ but is perspectival
and politicised, many types of accounts are possible not merely ‘simple single monolithic
accounts’ (Cooper and Thomson, 2000, p. 27). They argue for accounts that involve ‘softer
valuation concepts, multiple accounting entities, stressing interrelationship rather than
dominance, stressing non-financial measures, using narrative, making less claim to objective
scientific truth and giving voice to those silenced by current hegemonies’ (Cooper and
Thomson, 2000, p. 27). As a specific example, they argue that National Accounts could
include many excluded items such as the distribution of income, payment and valuation of
domestic labour, valuation of leisure time, an analysis of the quality of work required and an
assessment of future costs associated with current activities.
44
Intentionality has implications for models of accounting decision making. The close linkage
between orthodox accounting and neo-class economics means that it typically adopts a
rational decision making model that privileges self-interest (Shearer, 2002). One reason why
this model is inappropriate is because we are not independent rational subjects assessing the
world in an unbiased way, as the model suggests. Adopting a Heideggarian approach, we are
already thrown into the world and ‘we accept a Symbolic Order which is already in place’
(Cooper and Thomson, 2000, p. 27). Since Dasein is inextricably connected to the world,
Heidegger’s view can be argued to decentre humans and emphasize care for all beings and
for the environment (Zimmerman, 1999) supporting environmental reporting and reporting
for animal rights. Furthermore, since a Heideggarian approach suggests that decision making
is perspectival, non-neutral and not absolute, alternative decision making models can be
considered. For example, investment appraisal models can focus on other objectives that
may place less emphasis on self-interest, profit maximisation, and net present value and more
emphasis on care for others.
In regard to the value of artistic approaches to emancipatory thinking in accounting,
Heidegger suggests a type of reflection which is less rational and less formal than Habermas’
concept of reflection. This type of reflection underpins Heidegger’s disclosure of
possibilities and is closely linked to creative thinking and artistic interpretation. It allows us
to draw on half formed memories of past events and vague recollections of ethical rules that
we think may have guided past decisions. Using Habermasian rationality we can try to bring
them in to focus and interrogate them. Creative thinking allows us to draw inspiration from
artworks and metaphors which may suggest several partially indistinct ideas as we sketch and
design new possibilities for accounting and society. As we clarify and refine our visions for
45
accounting and society, we discuss them with others through Habermas’ deliberative
democracy.
Czarniawska (2012a) reminds us that accounting is already implicated in generating fictions
in organizations. Therefore, an extension of the fictionalizing role of accounting to disclose
positive beneficial emancipatory possibilities and utopias seems feasible. Indeed, fictions can
be implicated in actions and Heidegger’s possibilities are practical, being inevitably grounded
in concrete situations. Thus, society can work towards achieving the possibilities disclosed.
Gallhofer and Haslam (1996) exemplify creative disclosure by showing how the form of
accounting reports, informed by critical artworks, could be transformed into more authentic
and emancipatory forms of communication. For example, they discuss how positive and
negative environmental and social implications of projects could be demonstrated through
contrasting visual media. In addition, accounting reports could partly be used didactically to
raise awareness of emancipatory issue, and their medium of communication could be more
diverse (possibly including stories, songs and plays) in order to reach a wider audience
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 1996).
Our Heideggarian perspective suggests that rather than the discussion and reporting of moods
and emotions being discouraged and even eradicated from some forms of organisational
discourse, moods and emotions could be routinely discussed and reported as potential
indicators of problems that may need addressing. For example, organisations could discuss
occasions when accounting is implicated in anxiety and distress and could consider such
moments as catalysts for change. Anxiety linked to cost reductions in public sector
organisations in the U.K. could be discussed openly in written and verbal communications
46
without fear of retribution. Currently, in some organisations, stress and anxiety is reported
anonymously by a Union and is not openly discussed or reported through other channels.
Adopting Heidegger’s disclosure and concern with authenticity, U.K. public service
organisations in general might openly discuss problems relating to reductions in service
quality that are linked to cost reductions, rather than distractingly over-emphasizing other
discourses, as is sometimes the case. Those who offer critique, such as ‘whistleblowers’,
would be protected rather than vilified, as sometimes occurs. The phenomenological critique
would also encourage the reflective approach described by Dunham (2010, p. 524) requiring
‘the full engagement of one’s emotional, imaginative and moral capacities’.
In regard to the partial, incomplete nature of knowledge, Gallhofer and Haslam (1996)
demonstrate how artistic arrangements of accounting information could be used to
demonstrate the perspectival and ambiguous nature of accounting, reinforcing Heidegger’s
hermeneutics. Furthermore, in Heidegger’s disclosure we should not be afraid to articulate
half formed memories that are not necessarily totally rational and to present ideas in a more
artistic format, perhaps using less orthodox forms and extending metaphor. For example,
Gibbon (2012) found that the use of a garden metaphor helped to develop her understanding
and practical application of social accounting. Re-constructions of accounting theory and
accounting tools would be disseminated through accounting teaching, text books and
practice. Baxter et al. (2008) note that interpretive research could be further developed to
assist in the education of accounting and management students. We suggest that further
research could explore ways in which a study of Heidegger could assist in developing
managerial approaches to practical problem solving.
47
5. Conclusions
The discussion of Habermas’ discursive theory of reconstruction in this paper suggests that
Habermas develops a form of rationalism which transcends instrumental, conventional
rationalism by developing communicative rationality. The current paper has indicated that
Habermas’ reconstructive theory of communicative rationality is significant for accounting
change for a number of reasons. First, it emphasizes the need to provide reasons for
proposals that would be debated democratically, rather than reverting to irrationality and
extreme relativism. Second, it provides a justification of moral truth through procedure with
the proviso that such truth is always open to question and capable of change. Third, it offers
procedures to enhance democracy and justice. Fourth, it provides a political critique of the
status quo. Fifth, it indicates a way forward through extending learning and moral
development. Despite the strengths and scope of Habermas’ integrated theory, we concur
with McCarthy (1978) that Habermas’ intention to combine a hermeneutical and selfreflective dimension with his “objective” linguistic structuralism has not been realised in the
works we have considered. For example, several scholars have argued that Habermas
emphasizes rationalism at the expense of hermeneutics (e.g. Benhabib, 1986; Lehman, 2006).
The paper has proposed supplementing Habermas’ theory with several themes from
Heidegger’s work to help to move towards a balance between rationalism and critical
interpretivism. Heidegger’s work discusses a form of disclosure which emphasizes that a
range of experiences including tacit learning and creative insight can provide resources for
suggesting new possibilities, in addition to formal rationalistic thinking. For example, in
first-order disclosure, reflection on our experiences when we are absorbed in the ready-tohand, and reflection on tacit learning can draw attention to practices that may require change.
Kompridis (1994) observes that second-order disclosure highlights the importance of
48
moments of insight, intuition and revelation similar to those that can occur when we are
contemplating art or engaged in art. These forms of disclosure emphasize interpretive critical
reflection and creative processes of imagination crucial to accounting change. Heidegger
emphasizes that emotions such as anxiety, concern and the call of conscience can also act as
catalysts for disclosure. Furthermore, Heidegger’s use of poetry and rhetoric suggests a
possible value in extending their use in accounting. Indeed, Heidegger’s concept of
disclosure reinforces the idea that alternative languages and alternative ways of seeing are
possible for accounting through our process of reconstruction. A further key aspect of
disclosure is Heidegger’s phenomenology of time which suggests that we should not be
distracted by the trivial. Instead, spurred on by the recognition of our own mortality, we
should draw on our fundamental urge to project future potentially authentic possibilities,
acknowledge our relative freedom to create and choose such possibilities, and make choices
from these possibilities. Although Heidegger does not focus directly on questions of justice
as Habermas does, he can be interpreted to suggest a form of disclosure that opens
possibilities for the future and drives us towards exploring utopian possibilities of change
through his view of Being and Time. Such disclosure would be partial and on-going and it
would be associated with modification rather than transcendence of our lives. It would
involve extending self-decentred learning, the renewal of trust, increased individual
responsibility for problem-solving, expanding co-operative problem solving (Kompridis,
2006b) and it would require enhancing public access to a wider range of information. The
proposed alternatives arising from disclosure would be debated democratically according to
Habermasian procedures.
Whereas some have felt that Habermas’ modernistic rationality and goal of consensus
ultimately fixes and closes off truth and change possibilities (e.g. Mouffe, 1998), Heidegger
49
provides a bridge that opens up theory to allow the adoption of certain ideas from
postmodernism (e.g. indeterminacy of meaning, différance) that can enhance our
understanding of accounting. Heidegger emphasizes that truth is always open to question and
we do not have to rely solely on the scientific view of the world. Thus we can include a
range of perspectives and can move away from instrumental rationality. Supplementing
Habermas with Heidegger keeps our theoretical options open and expands theoretical space.
We have provided a model summarizing a Habermasian reconstructive approach that
incorporates Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective and we have illustrated some of the
implications of our Habermasian and Heideggerian synthesis for accounting. We have
attempted to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Habermas’ theory for emancipatory
accounting, even though it has recently been the subject of criticism in some accounting
literature. We have suggested that Heidegger’s theory is a significant underpinning theory of
interpretive accounting research and we have endeavoured to give a flavour of the potential
of both Habermasian and Heideggerian theory for stimulating many further insights and
developments in accounting and accounting research. Although it is expected that the
Habermasian reconstruction of accounting we have presented would be challenging for
accounting researchers and accounting practitioners, we hope that it can be used by these
groups when trying to critically reconstruct an understanding of a particular context, with a
view to contributing to a move towards a more emancipatory accounting and a fairer society.
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