Not Protectively Marked
Tactical Operational Guidance
Part One
Initial Attendance
Aide Memoire and Flowchart
Part Two
Detailed Considerations to Assist
Incident Command
Significant Hazards and
Control Measures
Part Three
Incident Review
Incident Review Considerations
Part Four
Cylinder Fire
Document References
Relevant References
Technical References
Document overview
Incidents involving cylinders.
If acetylene cylinders are involved, refer to acetylene operational guidance.
If a cylinder(s) is leaking and not involved in fire, also refer to Hazardous
Materials operational guidance.
Ref no:
Date of issue:
Version no:
Page 1 of 29
H2.2.0
05/06/2014
1
Lead FRS:
Review date:
Protective
marking:
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Dorset
04/06/2017
None
Cylinder Fires
Part One – Initial Attendance Aide Memoire
1
Initial considerations
En route
 Firemet/other approach information
 Visual/external prompts on approach
 Assess approach to scene
 Approach from upwind if possible
 Site appliances away from potential
projectiles
On arrival
 Initial default 200m hazard zone
 Nominate marshalling/RVP
 Extreme caution for cylinders directly
involved with fire for unknown time
 Address immediate risks
o Immediate life saving intervention
o Prioritise public safety/evacuation
 Establish initial cordons (200m default
where cylinder(s) subjected to heat)
2
Incident information
 Establish extent and overview
 Wind direction
 Consider multiple sources of information
(360 survey/thermal image camera/
MDT/owner/occupier/ witnesses/Site
Specific Risk Information (SSRI))
3
 Determine
o Cylinder(s) involvement
o Timeline of fire development
o Likely number involved
 Take action to prevent escalation:
o Cool cylinders (if safe to do)
o Move cylinders not involved (if safe)
 Establish cylinder(s) contents. If in
doubt, default to acetylene procedure
 Type of cylinder(s) (steel or composite)
 Consider signage, Emergency Action
Code (EAC) or Additional Personal
Protection (APP) code
 Utilise SSRI/Hazmat reference materials
Resource information
 Consider PDA/ETA and make up
 Seek HMEPA advice
 Specialist advice on or off–site
Page 2 of 29
 Consider Police for outer cordons
 Consider other agencies (local authority,
HART, others) in attendance/required
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Cylinder Fires
4
Risk information to inform planning
Key hazards
Key control measures
Confirm relevance of key hazards below:
 Cylinder failure
o Boiling Liquid Vapour Explosion
(BLEVE)
o Fireball
o Projectiles
o Blast wave
 Exposure to hazardous materials
 Flammable/explosive atmosphere
 Fire, heat and smoke
 Structural damage/collapse
Other key hazards identified at incident
Identify controls for additional key hazards
(refer to relevant guidance)
Confirm relevance of key control measures
below:
 Establish and maintain cordons
 Substantial cover
 Full PPE within hazard zone, including:
o Fire hoods up
o Eye protection
 BA procedures (if working within 25m)
 Jets/monitors for: cooling, firefighting,
dispersal, containment and safety
 Thermal image camera
 Utilise avoidance routes
 Minimise exposure times
 Hazmat procedures (if appropriate)
5
Planning
Common prompts
Ensure plan:
 Is based on relevant information
 Follows a logical sequence
 Is appropriately delegated
 Balances risks and benefit
 Aligns to Tactical Mode






Is correctly resourced
Is communicated and understood
Is flexible
Is resilient e.g. ‘plan B’
Is regularly reviewed
Be prepared to brief/hand over
Incident specific prompts




Effects of cordons on local area
Reducing cordons when safe to do so
Gas monitoring equipment
Availability of remotely operated vehicles
(ROV)
 Turning off cylinders burning from valve
in preference to extinguishing
 Weather conditions/CHEMET
Page 3 of 29





Elimination of ignition sources
Intrinsically safe equipment
Tactical ventilation/PPV
Consider hearing protection
Advice from British Compressed Gas
Association (BCGA)
 Media messages
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Cylinder Fires
Aide Memoire – Flowchart
En route brief
SSRI, visual indicators
Incident information
 Wind direction
 Gather
information
 Timeline of fire
 Steel/composite?
 Hazard signage
 Hazmat information
sources
 RVP/marshalling
Hazard zone size
considerations
 Substantial
shielding
 Impact of heat
 Any leaks
 Contents
 Available
shielding
No
On arrival







Initial safety
Initial 200m default
hazard zone
Assess approach to scene
Establish and maintain
cordons
Identify suitable substantial
shielding before advancing
closer than 200m
Full PPE within 200m
(fire hood, eye protection)
BA within 25m of cylinder(s)
Has cylinder been exposed to
heat or does it show signs of
heat or flame contact?
Signs of heating
Burnt labels
Is cylinder
Melted plastic
Yes
Yes
leaking?
ring
 Scorched paint
 Visible bulges
Consider Hazmat
 Pressure relief
procedures if
devices
appropriate and
No
operating
resolve incident
 Cylinder
steaming
Yes
Is cylinder  Eye witness
acetylene or is
No further action
there doubt?
Use acetylene
by FRS, hand over
procedures
to owner or
responsible person
No








Safety critical actions
Public evacuation/safety/shelter in
place for developing fires
Cool cylinder(s) (where safe to do)
Move cylinders not affected
Extinguish fires affecting cylinders as
soon as possible
Avoid extinguishing fire at valve
Page 4 of 29






A
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED





Resources info
Park resources
away from
potential
projectiles
HMEPA advice
On site/specialist
advice
Police for outer
cordons
Local
authority/HART?
FireMet/CHEMET
Key hazards
Cylinder failure
o BLEVE
o Fireball (25m)
o Projectiles (200m)
 Blast wave
 Exposure to
hazardous
materials
 Flammable/explosi
ve atmosphere
 Fire, heat and
smoke
 Structural collapse

Other hazards
Exposure to
extremes of
temperature
 Asbestos
containing
materials
 Poor visibility
 Incorrect manual
handling
 Excessive noise
 Intimidation/violen
Immediate life ce
saving
intervention
Prioritise public safety/evacuation
Minimise exposure times
Avoidance routes
Protect surrounding risks
Use thermal image
camera/remote thermometer
HMEPA/specialist advice

B
Cylinder Fires
A
Is cylinder(s) leaking
or damaged?
Does cylinder(s)
contain hazardous
material?

Yes
No
No



Yes
Continue
cooling
B
Continue cooling until all
heat sources are removed
and cylinder shell at
ambient temperature




Consider Hazmat
procedures if
appropriate and
resolve incident
No further action
by FRS, hand over
to owner or
responsible person









Page 5 of 29
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Consider
Effects of cordons on
local area – reduce
cordons when safe to do
so
Monitors or lashed jets
Safety, dispersal and
containment jets
Movement of unaffected
cylinders away from risk
Turning off cylinders
leaking from valve
Any leaking gas
properties and behaviour
Potential for a BLEVE
Gas monitoring
equipment
Eliminating ignition
sources
Intrinsically safe
equipment
HMEPA advice on
relaxation fire hoods and
eye protection
Advice from BCGA
Media message
Hearing protection
Tactical ventilation
ROV (if available)
Inform cylinder owner
Cylinder Fires
Part Two – Detailed Considerations to Assist
Incident Command
1
Initial considerations
1.1
En route:
a)
Assessing approach to scene

Consider available SSRI.

Consider requesting FireMet information.

Assess any marshalling/RVP arrangements.

Approaching the incident from upwind if conditions permit.
1.2
On Arrival
a)
Identifying initial hazard zone and initial cordon
b)

200m is the default initial hazard zone for one or more cylinders
involved in a fire.

Establish an initial cordon around the hazard zone.

To assist in estimating the extent of the potential hazard zone take
into account:
o
Incident indicators such as smoke, flame, gas, and vapour
clouds, spills, unexplained noises and odours.
o
Shielding provided by any buildings or structures.
o
Type and extent of adjacent structures.
o
Local topography (e.g. protection provided by slopes and
gradients).
o
Public reaction.
Initial priorities


Page 6 of 29
Initial information gathering. Establish:
o
What has happened?
o
What is happening now?
o
What is likely to happen?
o
Who/what is at risk?
Consider the immediate risk to people, property and the
environment:
o
Conduct immediate lifesaving rescues.
o
Consider evacuation requirements.
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Cylinder Fires

c)
o
Approach from a safe location. Extreme caution for cylinders
directly involved with fire for unknown time.
o
Actions to prevent escalation.
Working within the hazard zone:
o
Minimum personnel.
o
Full firefighting PPE, fire hoods up and eye protection.
o
Personnel who could be affected by a fireball should also wear
BA.
o
Consider hearing protection for those crews at risk.
Determining cylinder involvement

Use a thermal image camera or remote thermometer.

Ascertain the timeline of the fire and cylinder involvement where
possible.

Steel cylinders are at risk of failure from about 300˚C.

The resin in composite cylinders softens and melts after a few
minutes of direct flame impingement. The inner liners will melt or
burn away and the cylinder contents, generally Liquefied Petroleum
Gas (LPG), will breathe through the cylinder wall burning with the
fire.

Check for other indicators of direct flame contact or heat damage
such as:

Page 7 of 29
o
Scorched cylinders.
o
Burnt labels or melted plastic guard/test rings.
o
Burnt or blistered paintwork on cylinders.
o
Cylinders steaming violently when water is applied.
o
Bulges in cylinders.
o
Eye witness reporting seeing direct flame contact.
o
Pressure relief devices operating.
If a pressure relief disc or fusible plug is operating in a fire this
indicates an increased likelihood of catastrophic failure. Note: the
absence of a device operating is not an indicator of safety given that
not all cylinders have a device.
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Cylinder Fires
2
Detailed information gathering
2.1
Common
a)
Confirm situation and overview including local factors such as weather,
time of day, slope of ground etc.
b)
Establish incident parameters:

Dynamic or static

Widespread or local
c)
Confirm multiple sources of information (360 survey with thermal image
camera/MDT/owner/occupier/witnesses/SSRI, incident type specific
information) have been considered and information is current and up to
date
d)
Establish a common overview with other responders, reconciling any
differences in situational awareness and resolving any conflicting priorities
e)
Consider METHANE structure
f)
Consider use of CHEMET, FireMet etc.
2.2
Fires
a)
To inform planning try to establish:

How did the fire start?

How has it developed?

Predicted fire spread before ‘Stop’ can be achieved

Fire location known/not known

What material(s) are burning:

o
Can fuel be isolated?
o
Can separation/firebreaks be used or created?
Wind/weather effects on fire spread.
b)
Sufficient extinguishing media available/en route or required.
2.3
Rescues
a)
Who requires rescue?
b)
Prioritise saveable lives/those most at risk?
c)
How is rescue best carried out?
d)
Are there any barriers to overcome?
e)
Collapse – assess stability and predict further collapse.
Page 8 of 29
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Cylinder Fires
2.4
Hazardous materials and environmental protection
a)
Use SSRI if available.
b)
Inform plan by utilisation information gathered from HMEPA/specialist
advice.
c)
Can contamination of environment be prevented or minimised by:

Isolating/containing/controlling leaks and/or spillages.

Protecting risks (drains, rivers etc.)

Managing fire water run–off and/or smoke plume.
2.5
Identifying cylinders
a)
Work from behind substantial shielding/cover and try to confirm:

Quantity and size of cylinders involved.

If they are involved in fire (direct flame contact, radiated heat or the
valve assembly is on fire). Utilise thermal image camera to assist.

Are cylinders leaking, venting, bulging or steaming?

What cylinder contents are involved (in particular acetylene)?

Is it a steel or composite cylinder(s)? (Seek information from
operators).
b)
If in doubt of the contents, treat the cylinder(s) as acetylene until a
positive identification can be made.
c)
Colour classification by hazard property:
GAS TYPE
COLOUR
Inert
Bright green
Oxidising
Light blue
Flammable
Red
Toxic and/or corrosive
Yellow

Gas and gas mixtures can be identified by a colour classification
indicating gas properties in accordance with the risk diamond on the
cylinder label, unless otherwise specified.

Colour coding is applied to the shoulder, or curved part, at the top of
the cylinder and is used to identify the properties of the gas in the
cylinder.
Page 9 of 29
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Cylinder Fires

d)
To show where a gas has more than one property two concentric bands
may be used or, alternatively, the two colours may be painted in quarters
around the shoulder.

e)
A number of gases have been assigned a specific colour. The
properties of the gas are indicated where a gas does not have a
specific colour.
In the case of gas mixtures there is no specific guidance in BS EN
1089–3 (Transportable Gas Cylinders – Gas cylinder identification –
excluding LPG), and different gas suppliers may use their own
preferred system.
Specific gases.
GAS TYPE
COLOUR
Acetylene
C2H2
Maroon
Oxygen
O2
White
Nitrous oxide
N2 O
Blue
Argon
Ar
Dark green
Nitrogen
N2
Black
Carbon dioxide
CO2
Grey
Helium
He
Brown
Air or synthetic air
O2 ˂ or =
23.5%
Bright green
Page 10 of 29
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Cylinder Fires
f)
Cylinder shoulder label.

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Primary identification of compressed gases is by means of the
shoulder label with the name and chemical formula.
Company name.
Address of the company in the UK.
Risk and safety phrases relating to the product.
Hazard symbols.
European Commission (EC) label (for pure substances only).
Revision number (gas company use to identify label revision).
EC number, if applicable.
Product name.
UN identification number and proper shipping name (given by product
name).
Additional information, e.g. fill pressure.
Emergency contact telephone number.
Page 11 of 29
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3
Resource requirements
Resources that are available or may be required and arrangements needed to
manage them.
3.1
Resources
a)
Consider PDA, ETA and what is:

Already deployed.

In attendance but not yet deployed.

En route and expected to be available for deployment when
prioritising objectives.

Required to meet initial and developing incident priorities and
objectives and contingencies.

Not needed and can be returned.
b)
Consider additional FRS resources that may be needed: appliances,
personnel, specialists, equipment, fire fighting media, consumables (fuel,
BA cylinders etc.)
c)
Consider the role and resources of other agencies, in particular what:

Is in attendance and how can it be used to assist with the incident?

May be needed to deal traffic management or public control etc?

Specialists and/or subject matter advisers that might assist with
information or resources such as specialist heavy recovery
equipment or to assist with clean up etc?
d)
Regularly review and adjust resources as necessary to meet the needs of
the plan.
3.2
Resource management
a)
Record resource deployment and availability – consider a resource
deployment site plan.
b)
Establish and maintain safe access and egress.
c)
Access and space for specials.
d)
Consult SSRI.
e)
RVP/marshalling, staging or holding areas/cordon control
f)
Support sectors: logistics, water, BA etc.
g)
Equipment: pools, recovery arrangements, servicing, repairs and spares,
defect and other recording etc.
h)
Reliefs and welfare arrangements.
i)
Consider how to limit and or reduce the impact on the surrounding
community and ensure the security of resources.
j)
Continually review resource management arrangements.
Page 12 of 29
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4
Risk information
Consider and review significant hazards and appropriate control measures.
The table below identifies the significant hazards and control measures identified
through pre–planning. Develop risk assessments appropriate to the dynamics of
the situation utilising information on significant hazards where relevant and the
risk information gathered at the incident.
4.1
Significant hazards
Cylinder failure



All pressurised cylinders, regardless
of content are at the greatest risk of
failure when subjected to direct
flame contact
When a single cylinder fails, the
escaping gas, if flammable, can
ignite causing a fireball of up to 25m
Fragments and debris can be
projected up to 200m or
alternatively, through failure of the
valve assembly, the cylinder may be
propelled like a rocket over a similar
distance

The blast pressure wave created
when a cylinder fails may cause
injuries to personnel or damage to
buildings which may also lead to
structural collapse of nearby
buildings

Cylinders also have the potential to
fail as a result of mechanical shock
after the cylinder wall has lost its
strength because of localised
heating
Page 13 of 29
4.2
Control measures

En route: receive/request
information from control regarding
safe approach to incident








Approach from upwind and upslope

Seek additional advice from
specialist adviser
Establish and maintain cordons
Substantial cover
Eliminate sources of ignition
BA procedures
Cooling jets/ground monitors
Thermal imaging camera
Prevent movement of cylinder(s)
until cooled
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
Cylinder Fires

Materials may be liquid, gas,
cryogenic, oxidising, flammable,
toxic as well as flammable or
explosive identified above
Position appliances at the nominated
initial generic cordon distance


Approach upwind/upslope
The risk of asphyxiation or narcotic
effects are created by gas leaks
within a confined space


Utilise avoidance routes
If there has been a fire: toxic fumes
are a risk during the fire, turning
over and damping down stages


Establish and maintain inner cordon

Contact with hazardous material to
be as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP)




Seek HMEPA advice

Consider requesting Police for outer
cordon

Seek specialist advice from
competent person on/off site










Consider gas monitoring equipment

Consider specialist adviser to
isolate/assist with isolation of fuel
source

Consider gas monitoring equipment
Exposure to hazardous materials



Flammable/explosive atmosphere

If the cylinder(s) contains a
flammable liquefied gas, the liquid
may be sprayed and form a mist
increasing the danger of
ignition/explosion causing severe
burns especially to unprotected skin
Page 14 of 29
Seek hazardous information
markings, signage and placarding
Appropriate level of PPE to be worn
as indicated by EAC/APP code
Minimise exposure times within the
risk area
Consider use of CHEMET/FireMet
Utilise Hazmat reference materials
Decontamination procedures
appropriate to exposure and
urgency
Consider attendance of HART
Establish and maintain cordons
Eliminate ignition sources
Consider dispersal/containment jet
Safety jet
Consider intrinsically safe equipment
BA procedures
HMEPA
Seek additional information from
specialist adviser
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Cylinder Fires
Fire, heat and smoke

Potential for burns and scalds from
exposure to heat, steam and flames
Structural collapse

As a result of an explosion
Exposure to extremes of
temperature


Includes cryogenic substances
Contact with gases and liquids
leaking under pressure may cause
cold burns or skin irritation e.g. LPG
or carbon dioxide
Asbestos–containing materials

Present as a filler material in some
older acetylene cylinders

Cylinder failure in proximity to
buildings with cement/sheet
asbestos roofing/building materials
also risks exposure to asbestos if
the materials are compromised
Note: if acetylene cylinders are
suspected acetylene procedures
should be followed
Poor visibility due to environmental
conditions

Smoke, weather conditions and time
of day have an effect on visibility
Page 15 of 29







Establish and maintain cordons




Establish and maintain cordons

Appropriate level of PPE to be worn
as indicated by EAC/APP code














Welfare arrangements
BA procedures
Firefighting jet
Safety jet
Tactical ventilation
Consider P3 Respiratory Protection
Consider positive pressure
ventilation (to keep smoke away)
Utilise building collapse procedures
Establish and maintain cordons
Isolate leak
o Where safe to do so
o Seek specialist advice where
appropriate
Upwind approach
Establish and maintain cordons
Minimum personnel in risk area
Damping down
Seek HMEPA advice
Decontamination procedures
Hygiene procedures
Health surveillance
Consider P3 respiratory protection
Consider BA procedures
Consider CHEMET and FireMet
Establish and maintain cordons
Lighting
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Cylinder Fires
Incorrect manual handling

The noise caused by a high pressure
gas or liquid release may be in
excess of that safely tolerated by
the ear
Intimidation and violence


Correct use of manual handling
techniques: task, individual, load
and environment (TILE)






Eliminate source


Establish and maintain cordons
Manual Handling injuries may occur
due to the possibility of needing to
lift or move cylinders away from the
fire or other risk
Note: acetylene cylinders are
considerably heavier than other
equivalently sized cylinders
Excessive noise


Intimidation from members of the
public/affected persons can lead to
the ‘moral pressure’ to act/not act
and affect the judgment of the
officer concerned
Pressure may also be encountered
because of any implemented
evacuation zone where occupiers
wish to return to their premises
Minimise exposure
Increase distance
Crew rotation
Hearing protection
Utilise FRS violence/aggression
procedures
If violent and confrontational
conditions are identified or are likely
to be expected consider Police
assistance/ support
4.3
BLEVE
a)
A BLEVE may result from LPG cylinders failing under heat. This is where
the boiling liquid in the cylinder rapidly vaporises and expands explosively
bursting the cylinder.
4.4
Composite cylinders
a)
The resin in composite cylinders will begin to melt when directly involved
with a fire for a few minutes. A fusible plug (if fitted) may also actuate.
b)
The cylinder contents will be released and intensify the fire as the inner
linings begin to burn or melt.
c)
Composite cylinders are designed to vent in this way without leading to the
cylinder bursting explosively.
d)
Unburnt LPG (a heavier than air flammable gas) will vaporise and increase
the risk of an explosive atmosphere.
e)
Acetylene is not contained in these types of cylinders.
Page 16 of 29
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5
Planning
5.1
Aim, objectives and priorities
The objectives or steps necessary to achieve the aim will need to be prioritised
according to the circumstances of the incident.
When the hazards presented by cylinders in a fire are eliminated, there is a
reduction in the risks to the public and firefighters.
Establish the overall FRS aim and communicate it to all.
Planned tasks or actions undertaken to achieve the prioritised objectives might
include:
a)
b)
Life critical

Save saveable lives.

Prioritise those at most risk.

Prevent catastrophic event.
Safety critical

Public safety.
o

c)
Evacuate public from hazard zone (or stay put if appropriate).
Safety of all responders.
o
Establish and maintain cordons to restrict access to the hazard
zone to essential risk assessed tasks.
o
Consider use (if available) of Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV)
for inspection of any cylinders which are or have been exposed
to direct flame impingement. Account should also be taken of
the time it would take for the ROV to arrive at the scene.
Prevent escalation and spread

Use ground monitors/lashed jets (if safe to achieve) where the
cylinder(s) has been exposed to prolonged heating and flame
impingement.

Extinguish all fires affecting the cylinders and cool the cylinders as
soon as possible where safe to do so. This applies to any cylinder
regardless of its contents.

Avoid extinguishing any flames from the cylinder valve group (to
mitigate against flammable atmosphere).

If non–acetylene cylinder(s) has been heated but is (are) not
damaged, cool with water or allow to air cool then hand over to the
site supervisor.

Refer to acetylene procedures for specific cooling guidance where
applicable.
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



d)
The flame is coming from beyond the valve assembly.
o
The valve is undamaged and appears fully operable.
Moving cylinders in a developing fire situation.
o
Assess if movement of any unaffected cylinders away from the
fire is required to prevent situation worsening.
o
Be careful with composite cylinders which have been in direct
flame contact because of possible weakened resin walls. These
cylinders may leak if handled – therefore consider leaving
these in place.
Leaking cylinders.
o
If cylinders are leaking and not involved in fire, identify
contents and treat as a Hazmat incident where appropriate.
o
If flammable gas involved, remove all ignition sources from the
hazard zone as far as possible.
o
Turn off cylinder(s) if valve is undamaged and safe to do so.
o
If valves are damaged the cordon should be extended where
necessary, for example downwind.
Protection of property.
Follow hazardous materials and environmental protection procedures
where appropriate.
Return to normality.

f)
o
Environmental protection.

e)
Cylinders may be turned off provided:
Reducing cordons.
o
Reduce cordons following a risk assessment.
o
Liaise with the HMEPA.
o
Liaise with other specialists if available.

Consider specialist advice from British Compressed Gas Association
or cylinder owner (i.e. cylinder company).

Media messages – consider warning and informing such as:
o
Go In – to a safe building.
o
Stay In – until you are advised to do otherwise.
o
Tune In – to local TV or radio for more information.

Scaled down operations.

Actions to assist recovery.
To ensure the overall aim is achieved the following will need to be
considered when reviewing progress against the plan or when monitoring
or taking over an incident:

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Information available (situation, resources and risks).
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6

Are the identified objectives, priorities and tasks appropriate?

Does planning apply a reasonable test of risk v benefit?

How effective and appropriate are any plans or actions already
underway? – actual progress against anticipated timeline.

How effective are incident ground organisation/control and
communication arrangements?

Confirm the extent of incident (major incident etc.)

Have alternative plans been considered, are suitable and with
sufficient contingency arrangements in place? (‘plan B’ – what if?)
Command and control
Contract activities via the command structure and incident ground organisation.
a)
The IC should confirm that the needs of the plan are met by the command
structure:

Incident command at an appropriate level.

Delegated roles, responsibilities and authority limits that are clearly
understood and within the experience and capability of individuals
within the command team.

Manageable spans of control.

Sectors (operational and support if required), with coordinated
working.

Establish clearly defined reporting lines.

Clearly defined communication routes/methods appropriate to the
circumstances.

Adequate resources.
b)
Establish command support and locate and identify suitable command post.
c)
Clearly communicate any changes in the command structure and relevant
details of the plan so they are known to all on the incident ground.
d)
Maintain effective command incorporating the previous IC/command team.
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7
Safety and welfare
7.1
Safety considerations
a)
Conduct suitable and sufficient DRA/ARA and appropriately review.
b)
Balance benefit against risk in operating practices.
c)
Clearly brief Safety Observers or Safety Officer(s) regarding area(s) of
responsibility and confirm clear reporting line(s).
d)
Establish cordons, control/entry records.
e)
Safety briefings.
f)
Evacuation systems/routes.
g)
First aid/ambulance service.
h)
Exposure to heat, cold and weather limited or mitigated.
i)
Record safety events initiate investigation.
7.2
Welfare considerations
a)
Crew rotation and reliefs.
b)
Hydration, rest, feeding, toilet facilities.
c)
Protracted incident.
d)
Shelter/support for displaced residents (in consultation with local
authority).
e)
Support from voluntary services (Red Cross, St John, RVS etc.)
8
Communication
Establish reliable, accurate, timely communications
8.1
FRS exchange of information
a)
Regular command team briefings/updates/relevant information sharing.
b)
Clear briefings by delegated command team/officers to cascade
information.
c)
Establish clear lines of communication.
d)
Confirmation that information passed is received, understood and being
acted upon.
e)
Communication format is determined by incident needs (e.g. runners if
poor radio reception).
f)
Maintain communication discipline.
g)
Broadcast Tactical Mode changes/updates.
h)
Share changes to the plan.
i)
Seek and give regular feedback regarding progress.
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j)
Messages, e.g. standard messages, METHANE.
k)
Brief senior commanders and interested parties remote from incident.
9
Liaison
Building of shared situational awareness through effective liaison with external
agencies and interested parties.
9.1
Who?
a)
Emergency responders.
b)
HMEPA.
c)
Local authority officers.
d)
Structural engineers.
e)
Occupiers/on–site knowledge.
f)
Cylinder owner (i.e. cylinder company).
g)
British Compressed Gas Association (BCGA).
h)
Experts/specialists/site specialists.
i)
Fire Control.
j)
Utilities and other agencies.
k)
Public.
l)
FRS media department/media.
9.2
How?
a)
Formal.
b)
Media briefings.
c)
Informal – working alongside other agencies.
d)
Liaison with off–site advisers.
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9.3
Why?
a)
Sharing of safety information.
b)
Common aims/unity of purpose.
c)
Confirm specific responsibilities.
d)
Share relevant information.
e)
Involve and maximise assistance.
f)
Better informed decisions.
g)
Address conflicting priorities of other agencies.
h)
Supports needs of other agencies.
i)
Positive PR/accurate/common media messages.
j)
Warning/informing public.
10
Closing stages and post incident considerations
10.1 Scaling down operations
a)
Address community impacts, such as removing cordons as early as
possible.
b)
Withdraw personnel and equipment from risk area once operational activity
is completed.
c)
Maintain recording, logging, Tactical Mode.
10.2 Investigations
a)
Scene preservation.
b)
Logging any FRS photo/video evidence.
c)
Fire investigation.
d)
Cylinder failure (HSE investigation).
10.3 Community safety activity
a)
Initiate community safety activities as appropriate.
10.4 Equipment issues
a)
Return equipment, cleaned or bagged as appropriate.
b)
Manage impounded equipment as appropriate.
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10.5 Economic considerations
a)
Pass FRS incident number to people likely to have experienced financial
loss.
b)
Discuss owner/occupier insurance matters (if appropriate).
c)
Consider local business as usual/return to normality issues as far as
reasonable.
10.6 Incident recording
a)
Gather info for Incident Recording System (IRS).
b)
Gather all incident command paperwork.
c)
Secure decision logs.
10.7 Debriefing and post incident welfare
a)
Carry out hot incident debrief (include other agencies if appropriate).
b)
Assess crew welfare issues.
c)
Consider need for formal multi–agency debriefs.
10.8 Handover and site security
a)
Potential collection by or advice from cylinder company. When contacting
include:

Name of caller and FRS.

Premises name, location and directions.

State the response required, either onsite or telephone advice.

The number of cylinders and if they require recovering.
b)
Prepare/undertake handover with safety brief.
c)
Handover to appropriate person/authority. Use documentation for
handover if appropriate.
d)
Consider site security.
e)
Consider/organise re–inspection.
10.9 Other issues
a)
Potential breach of fire safety legislation.
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Part Three – Incident Review
Incident review considerations
Incident specific
1
User notes
Initial actions
 Was available information/guidance
gathered and considered?
 Were DRA/ARA completed and acted
upon?
 Was initial hazard zone/cordon
appropriate?
 Did initial actions/approach to scene
balance risk and benefit?
 Were resources sited at appropriate
distances from the risk?
 Were initial priorities and sequence of
objectives appropriate?
 Were adequate resources secured and
managed?
 Were effective command, control and
communication arrangements in place?
 Are remedial actions required?
2












Incident information
What has happened?
What is happening now?
What is likely to happen?
Who/what is at risk?
Establish the parameters of the incident
Are there any immediate risks?
Is immediate action required?
Are local factors understood and being
addressed (weather, time of day, slope of
ground etc.)?
Are the wider impacts understood and
being addressed?
Are equality and diversity implications
being addressed?
Has SSRI, operational guidance been
consulted?
Are actions in line with operational
guidance?
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Incident specific
3
User notes
Resources information
 Confirm resource requirements, consider:
o FRS
o Other agencies
o Contingencies
 Are resources appropriate to plan?
 Is resource management adequate?
4
Hazard and safety information
 Are DRA/ARA/Pre-planned RA significant
hazards and control measures
incorporated into incident planning?
 Has operational guidance/SSRI
considered?
 Do actions balance risk against benefits?
5
Planning
5.1 Aims, objectives and priorities



Objectives identified and priorities
appropriate – public safety incorporated
Incident activity appropriate?
cylinders flowchart utilised?
5.2 Plan
 Is there a plan and is it working?
 Will it deliver the actions required to meet
the priorities and objectives of the
incident:
o Is it appropriate to the incident type?
o Is it based on relevant information?
o Does it follow a logical sequence?
o Is it appropriately delegated?
o Does it align with the Tactical Mode?
o Is it correctly resourced?
o Is it communicated and understood?
o Is it flexible?
o Is it resilient e.g. ‘plan B’/
contingencies?
 Is it monitored, reviewed, evaluated,
maintained, if amended, communicated?
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Incident specific
6
User notes
Command and control
Confirm existing arrangements meet the
needs of the incident, with appropriate:
 Level of command
 Organisational structure
 Sectorisation (operational and support)
 Roles and responsibilities, (clearly defined
and understood)
 Spans of control
 Clear communication routes
 Continuity – initial IC/command team
 Resources
 Shared situational awareness FRS/others
 Command support/command post
 Changes communicated to all
7
Safety and welfare
Confirm adequate safety arrangements:
 DRA/ARA conducted and reviewed
 PPE in risk areas appropriate
 Cordons appropriate to risk
 Safety briefings
 Safety Observers/Safety Officer(s)
 Cordons established, controlled, reviewed
 Holding areas
 Evacuation systems/routes
 First aid/ambulance service
 Safety events recorded/investigation
 Welfare of personnel and others
 Protracted incident
 Crew rotation and reliefs
 Rest, feeding, hydration
 Evacuation shelter – local authority
8
Communications
 Briefings and information
exchange/cascade:
o FRS to FRS
o FRS to others
 Clear lines of communication established:
o Incident to Fire Control
o Incident FRS to FRS
o Incident FRS to others
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Incident specific
User notes







Communication format appropriate
Tactical Mode changes/updates broadcast
Changes to plan are shared
Changes in IC/command team shared
Regular feedback/sit reps
Messages, METHANE
Brief senior commanders and interested
parties remote from incident
 Technical considerations addressed
9
Liaison with other agencies and interested parties
Consider and confirm:
Who:
 Emergency responders
 HMEPA
 Local authority officers
 Structural engineers
 Occupiers/on–site knowledge
 Cylinder owner (i.e. cylinder company)
 British Compressed Gas Association
 Experts/specialists/site specialists
 Fire Control
 Utilities and other agencies
 Public
 FRS media department/Media
How:
 Formal
 Media briefings
 Informal – working alongside other
agencies
 Liaison with off–site advisers
Why:
 Sharing of safety information
 Common aims/unity of purpose
 Confirm specific responsibilities
 Share relevant information
 Involve and maximise assistance
 Better informed decisions
 Address conflicting priorities of other
agencies
 Supports needs of other agencies
 Positive PR/accurate/common media
messages
 Warning/informing public
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Incident specific
10









User notes
Closing stages and post incident considerations
Scaling down operations
Investigations, (HSE for cylinder failure)
Community safety activity
Equipment issues
Economic considerations
o Owner/occupier loss/insurance
Incident recording
Debriefing and post incident welfare
Handover and site security
o Safety issues/brief
o Organise re–inspection
Potential fire safety breaches
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Part Four – Document References
1.
Relevant references
This incident type is potentially linked to the following other operational guidance
documents:
Document name
Link to document
To be populated
2.
Technical references

FRS Operational Guidance – Incidents involving Hazardous material Part C–5
– UN Class 2 Gases.



British Compressed Gases Association.
Technical Information Sheet 6 2012.
Transportable gas cylinders – Fully wrapped composite cylinders, EN 12245,
Feb 2002.
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