Memorandum #2: Stakeholder Analysis
Shrinking the Policy Process: The Press and the 1980 Love Canal Relocation
Harben Porter
October 22, 2012
Dr. Sheldon Gen
PA 715
Policy Problem
From 1943 to 1980, residents of the small neighborhood of Love Canal, New
York, experienced increased rates of miscarriages, birth defects, cancer and inexplicable
illness. Though the community was knowingly built on the remnants of Hooker
Chemical's toxic dump site, the locality was met with inaction on the part of local and
state government to investigate and properly clean up the hazardous material that lay
beneath the blue collar community. As journalists and citizen activists voiced concern,
the EPA and several key Federal players stepped in to research the potential correlation
between the resident's ailments and exposure to toxic waste. After two years of heated
debate, 31 New York Times articles, and citizen outrage, the State and Federal
government declared Love Canal a public health emergency, necessitating action and the
resident relocation. Responsibility surrounding the cost to relocate, and the funding to do
so resulted in a tumultuous exchange between State, Federal and informal policy players,
the entirety of which was captured in headline news. Eventually, in a landmark lawsuit,
the EPA settled with Hooker Chemical's parent company for $129 million dollars. It was
the first time in history a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) was held accountable for
damages incurred by previous actions.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, commonly known as Superfund, came into effect in response to the Love Canal
catastrophe and Hooker Chemical's role in its origin. This watershed legislation
“established nationwide industry liability for the effects of abandoned toxic wastes that
endanger people or the environment,” and dictated that culpable parties are fiscally
responsible for the clean up of such materials (Linksy, 1985). Though Love Canal was a
focusing event, creating an open window to enact PRP and toxic waste policies, the case
is deemed avoidable and one of “the most appalling environmental tragedies in American
history” (Kingdon, 2010, Birkland, 1997, Beck, 1979).
Stakeholders
The following table depicts the stakeholders involved in the Love Canal crisis,
their preferences and leverages.
Player
Preference
Leverage
• - As the original source of
the contamination,
Hooker Chemical had
a primary interest in
avoiding blame and
responsibility for the
detriment it caused
the residents of Love
Canal.
• - The electrochemical
company, worth $1.7
Hooker Chemical (Elites)
billion in 1978,
retained a position of
fiscal
unaccountability in
the decades after the
mile-long property
was sold to the
Niagara Falls Board
of Education for $1.
• - In addition to claiming no
responsibility,
Hooker Chemical
argued for state
• - Claims that the company
had explicitly warned
the Board that the
land was not suitable
for construction or
development were
made known at the
time of purchase.
• - Outcomes of Love Canal
research studies were
merely “suggestive”
and did not prove a
causal relationship
between toxicity and
health repercussions.
liability and
restitution.
Outcome: Ultimately, a
Federal judge found Hooker
Chemical's parent company to
be “negligent but not reckless”
in their disposal of toxic waste;
a decision that impacted
federal policy and changed the
definition of liability clauses
for hazardous materials.
- Local authorities dismissed
the resident's claims of illness
and concern, and attempted to
thwart the news-generating
citizen outcry with denial and
inaction.
Local Government (Formal)
- Initially hoped that public,
state and federal apathy
would accompany their
denial.
- Eventually looked to state
and federal governments for
accountability.
Outcome: Federal, state and
bureaucratic players
intervened. Local authorities
were chastised by citizens and
the media for their lack of
support, and for the absence of
• - “Problems may be kept
off a systemic or
institutional agenda
in various ways. At
the local level,
particularly, force
may be utilized”
(Anderson, pg. 100).
This was the case for
local authorities in
Love Canal, who
chose to place citizen
health concerns in the
framework of
individual
responsibility.
foresight in urban planning on
a toxic waste site.
- Though Carey was slow to
act, serving as a roadblock to
federal action, he eventually
Governor Carey (Executive)
became a proponent for
permanent resident relocation
and looked to the federal
government for financial
responsibility.
- Carey was aware of the
amount of pressure President
Carter was under to act, and
was able to utilize the media
and capitalize on public
opinion to negotiate for
federal support.
Outcome: The federal
government paid in part for the
cost to relocate, while the state
covered the remainder.
- Rep. LaFalce partnered with
citizen activists and supported
- Citizen and public support.
research initiatives to win the
- “Pollution and its
support of many informal
consequences affect
Rep. LaFalce & Senators
policy players.
everyone... and politicians
Moynihan and Javits
- Preferences from these
supporting pollution control
(Legislative)
legislative powers were that
can portray themselves as on
Gov. Carey, the federal
the side of the angels and as
government and the EPA stop
protectors of the public
passing the buck and address
interest” (Anderson 106).
the immediate human need.
Outcome: These formal
players were integral members
in the formation of the
Superfund legislation, and
bolstered the argument to
relocate and evacuate all
residents.
President Carter
- In an election year full of
- Knowing that the state
(Executive)
political uncertainty, civil
needed financial help, Carter
unrest, and a natural disaster,
was able to enter negotiations
Love Canal was not initially a
with an upper hand, all the
priority for the President.
while feeling the sting of
- Carter negotiated with
media attention and public
Carey and other players for
discourse.
increased financial support
from the state to relocate
residents.
Outcome: Though burdened
with an acute media spotlight
and the pressure to act, Carter
hesitantly declared Love Canal
a public health emergency and
agreed to pay for much of the
cost to permanently relocate
residents.
- The federal agencies aimed
to act swiftly and
appropriately to address
human need, while improving
EPA & HHS
their public appearances and
(Bureaucracy)
perception of competency.
- Both agencies desired
evidence-based, accurate
research to inform their
decisions.
Outcome: The EPA
recognized the severity of the
situation, and used the failure
of the Love Canal crisis to
outline the need for federal
policy implementation.
- The EPA attempted to use
expertise, but the
questionable method of
Picciano's study and the
uncertainty of results
hampered the agency's ability
to act.
Citizens, the HOA and Lois
Gibbs
(Special Interests/ informal)
- The citizens, championed by
- The HOA's direct access to
the vocal and persistent Lois
the media helped to
Gibbs, wanted action and
contribute to the urgency of
permanent relocation.
the situation and generate
- Residents demanded
public outrage and support.
decisive and conclusive
- Residents were able to
information, as well as
leverage their collective
government support in
power in a pivotal moment in
evacuating the entirety of the
which EPA officials were held
neighborhood.
hostage with demands to
speak to President Carter.
Outcome: Residents were
relocated, their homes
purchased. Lois Gibbs remains
a leader and activist.
- Media preference was to
bring justice to the residents
Media
(New York Times, Niagara
Gazette, Buffalo News, NBC,
CBS)
of Love Canal, and spur the
- The media utilized their
aforementioned policy
access to the public and
players to action with
placed pressure on policy
headline news detailing
players to act.
leaked information.
- In reference to Love Canal:
- To bring this story to the
“the press began national
attention of the public.
coverage of the story,
- As the media is wont to sell
escalating the urgency of
copies or reach viewers, it
the situation and forcing
would appear their detailed
the president to become
coverage of Love Canal did
involved (Linsky, 1986).
not negatively impact
revenue.
Outcome: Inevitably, media
declarations and disclosure
necessitated a government
response; an outcome that may
have not occurred without
media interference (Enders,
2012).
Conflicts were numerous in the actions surrounding Love Canal. Observed in
interactions between state and federal players, appropriate action was delayed in many
instances due to a primary debate over financial responsibility. Disagreements between
federal and state players in regards to compensation did little for public opinion of
governmental effectiveness. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the accuracy of a crucial
pilot study spurred contention throughout the various players as to the degree of
emergency and concern.
Coalitions were formed among the informal players of the tragedy. The media and
the citizens of Love Canal supported one another in reaching large audiences, garnering
public support and showcasing the necessity for timely decisions. Leaders and such as
David Pollack, Michael Brown and Lois Gibbs were instrumental in enacting change
through public discourse, by utilizing the press' influence on policy decisions (Linsky
1986). These united voices formed the call to action that demanded governmental redress
and federal regulations for disposal of toxic waste.
The informal players were clearly the most influential in affecting policy in
response to Love Canal, followed by the EPA and formal decision makers. As a
triggering event, Love Canal could have faded into obscure history without the influence
of the correct social and national environment (Birkland 1997, Theodoulou & Cahn,
2013). The media and citizens created the receptive climate that focusing require, as well
as informing the public and policy makers of its existence nearly simultaneously
(Birkland, 1997). Although a tragedy by any standard, Love Canal is a case
demonstrating the power of informal players, void of elites, to affect the formal policy
process.
References:
Anderson, J.E. (2011). Public Policy Making. (Seventh Addition). Boston, MA:
Wadsworth, Cengage ____Learning.
Birkland, T. (1997). After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events.
Washington D. C.: Georgetown University.
Endres, R. (2012, September 24). Review of Impact: How the press affects Federal
policymaking by
Robin Endres. Linsky, M. (1986) Impact: How the press affects Federal
policymaking. New York, N.Y., W.W. Norton & Co.
Kingdon, J. (2010). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. (Updated 2nd ed.). Boston,
MA:
___Longman.
Linsky, M. (1986). Impact: How the press affects Federal policymaking. New York,
N.Y., W.W. Norton
____& Co.
Linsky, M. (1985) Shrinking the Policy process: The press and the 1980 love canal
relocation. Boston, ____MA: Harvard University.
Beck, E. C. (1979). The love canal tragedy. EPA Journal,16(2), Retrieved from
http://www.epa.gov/ history/topics/lovecanal/01.html
Theodoulou, S. & Cahn, M. (2013). Public Policy the Essential Readings (2nd ed.).
Boston:
____Pearson.