INR 6337 – Selden - Department of Political Science

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Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
INR 6337: International Security
This course is designed to familiarize graduate students with the broad concepts used in
the study of international security. We will explore questions such as the causes of war,
the impact of doctrine and strategy, and the effects of norms in international security. In
addition, the course will delve into issues such as nuclear proliferation and the role of
alliances in international security.
Grading
Participation
15%
Discussion leadership 5%
Reaction Paper
20%
Research Proposal
30%
Final exam question 30%
This course requires active student participation. Attendance is obviously part of the
participation grade as is the quality and relevance of the student’s commentary. Each
student will lead the class discussion one week by introducing the reading and offering
several discussion questions to stimulate debate.
The written work for the course will consist of three items:
Reaction paper: a 5-7 page paper that focuses on a particular question relevant to one or
more of the readings. The idea of this is to develop an interesting question rather than
simply summarize the reading.
Research proposal: This should be approximately 10 pages and based on any topic
relevant to the course. The purpose of this is to stimulate your thinking about how to
pursue a research topic by developing a question or puzzle to be answered, a summary of
the relevant literature upon which you are building, and a methodology for answering
your question or puzzle.
Final Exam: A 5-7 page written response to a question that you will receive during the
final class session.
Grading Scale
93 and above= A.
90-92 = A-.
87-89= B+.
83-86=B.
80-82= B-.
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Reading
Much of the reading is in the form of articles that can be accessed through the library
website. Book chapters (indicated with an asterisk) are available through the reserve
reading website for the course (http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/ click on course reserves).
All other books are on reserve at the library or can be purchased on Amazon or similar
sites. You do not necessarily need to buy all of these if you want to rely on the reserve
reading at the library, but they are some of the classics in security studies and worth
having on your shelf if you plan to concentrate in this subfield.
 Brown, M. et al (eds.) Offense, Defense and War (Cambridge: MIT Press 2004).
 Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1989).
 Copeland, D. The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000)
 Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981)
 Katzenstein, P. The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1996)
 Pape, R. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1996).
Week 1: Intro to Security Studies
Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies
Quarterly, 35:2 (1991), pp. 211-239
Richard Betts, "Should Security Studies Survive?" World Politics, vol. 50, no.
1 (1997), pp. 7-33.
Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security
Studies,” International Security, 23:4 (Spring 1999), 5–48.
Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" International Security vol. 2 5, no. 2
(Fall 2000), pp. 5-50.
*David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1992). Pp. 1-15
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Ken Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security,
Summer2000, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p5-41,
Andrew Krepinevitch, “From Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of Military
Revolutions,” The National Interest, Fall 1994.
Week 2: World War I
Brown, M. et al (eds.) Offense, Defense and War (Cambridge: MIT Press)
2004. Read chapter 2, 3,4,5 or look up the original articles below (with
the exception of the piece by Quester).
Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914
and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 108-146
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First
World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107
Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,”
International Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 151-175
George Quester, “Offense and Defense in the International System,”
*Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine Chapter 1
Week 3: The Nuclear Revolution
*Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 1-34
*Lawrence Freedman (1986) “The First Two Generations of Nuclear
Strategists,” in Peter Paret, et al. (eds.) Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press) chapter 25, 735–778
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American
Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-745
Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chap. 4
Scott D. Sagan (1996/97) Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three
Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security. 21(3)Winter, 54–86
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Mueller, John, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in
the Postwar World,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp.
55-79.
Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar
International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring
1986), pp. 99-142
Week 4: Systemic level and Security Studies
Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,”
World Politics 40, no. 1 (October 1987): 82-107
*Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton,
2001), 334-359
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30,
no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214
Eric Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War
Aims,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997).
Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,"
International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95), 50-90
Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance?
International Security 22 (Spring 1998), 44-82
Week 5: War and Peace among Great Powers
Copeland, D. The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2000) Introduction, chapters 1 and 5
Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981) Chapters 5 and 6.
Jervis, R. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics vol.30,
no.2 (January 1978), pp. 167–174;
Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security
Studies, 18:3 (2009) pp. 587-623
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Week 6: Domestic Level Factors in Security
*Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace” and “Why Democratic
Peace?” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean
M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 58105
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign
Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 79-97
Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland
Islands,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July 2006): 431-463
Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace,” American
Political Science Review, 97:4 (2003), pp. 582-602
Marc Trachtenberg, “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security
Studies 21: 1 (2012) pp. 3-42.
Week 7: Individual level Factors in Security
Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men:
Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring
2001): 107-146
Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict:
Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” in Handbook of War Studies II, ed.
Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193221
Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chap. 5
*Dominic D. P. Johnson, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of
Positive Illusions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-34
*Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992), pp. 3-18.
Barbara Vis, “Prospect Theory and Political Decision-making,” Political
Studies Review, Vol. 9 2011, pp. 334-343.
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Week 8: Regimes and Norms in Security
Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security Chapters 1, 2, 5
Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,”
International Security (Spring 2005), Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 5-49.
Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in
Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998),
141-170.
Week 9: Proliferation and Arms Control
Alexander H. Montgomery (2005) Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle
an Atomic Bomb Network. International Security. 30(2)Fall, 153–187
Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan (2009) The Perils of Predicting
Proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(2)April
Una Becker, et al. “Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control- Destiny or
Ambiguity?” Security Studies, 17: 4 (2008) pp. 810-854.
Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb2012, Vol.
91,
Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs,
Jul/Aug2012, Vol. 91, Issue 4
Sidney Drell and James Goodby, “The Reality: A goal of a world without
nuclear weapons in essential,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2008,
pp. 23-32.
Fred Ikle, “Nuclear Abolition: A Reverie,” The National Interest,
September/October 2009, pp. 4-7
Week 10: Terrorism and Counter-insurgency
*John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2002), 15-33
Andrew J. R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of
Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-200
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, III, “Rage against the Machines: Explaining
Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization
Paul Dixon, “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to
Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32:3 (2009)
Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American
Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-361
Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of
Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 29, no. 8 (December 2006): 707-729
Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31,
no. 2 (Fall 2006): 42-78
Week 11: Coercion
Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in The United
States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin
(USIP, 2003), 359-420
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International
Organization 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 643-659
Andrew L. Stigler, “A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to
Invade Kosovo,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 124157
Pape, R. Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Chapters 1,
3.
Week 12: Intelligence and Security
Betts, Richard, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are
Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1978), pp. 61-89.
Shirley, Edward G. “Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game”, The Atlantic
Monthly, Feb 1998. pp. 4-13.
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
Warner, Michael, “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence”, Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 6. no. 3, 2002. pp. 1-11.
Johnson, Loch K. “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,”
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-28.
*Gaddis, John Lewis, Chapter Five, “Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War
History,” in, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications,
Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1992), pp. 87-104.
Week 13: International Institutions, alliances and Security
John Mearshimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,”
International Security 19:3 (1994/95), pp. 5-49
Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory:
Response to John Mearshimer,” International Security 20:1 (1995), pp. 3951
Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliance Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security
Studies, 20:3 (2011) pp. 350-377
Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain gangs and passed bucks:
predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity,” International Organization
44:2 (1990), pp. 137-168
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State
back in,” International Security, 19: 1 (1994)
The Culture of National Security, Chapter 10
Robert Ross, Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China:
Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studies 15:3 (2006)
pp. 355-395
Week 14: Strategy and Policy
Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,”
International Security 22:1 (1997), pp. 86-124.
Dr. Selden
Office Hours: Monday and Friday 3:00-5:00
Anderson 004
William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International
Security, Vol. 24, No.1 (Summer 1999), p. 5-41
Randall Schweller and Xiaoya Pu, “After Unipoliarity, China’s Vision of
International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security 36:1
(2011)
Robert Lieber, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy,
Policy, and Grand Strategy,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:4 (2011)
pp.509-530
Charles Kupchan, “Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future,”
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, no. 23 (Winter 2012).
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