Protection of Property Rights through Unambiguous Environmental
Conservation Legislation
MALS 4020 Graduate Research and Writing
Timothy J Howell
University of Denver University College
Fall 2013
Instructor: Jennifer B. Seely
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Abstract
The successful execution of environmental conservation demands the
cooperation of enforcement agencies and private property owners. Effective
participation of these landowners in federal conservation efforts, such as the
Clean Water Act, require that the laws and policies governing said efforts
have a clear delineation of their limits and intentions in order to protect
property rights. The evasive, nondescript language used to pen legislation as
a means to facilitate the evolution of the law also may enable unintended
reach or misinterpretation by controlling agencies. This paper reviews three
U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
interpretation and enforcement of the Clean Water Act to demonstrate how
federal agencies’ interpretation of policies affect private land owners.
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Protection of Property Rights through Unambiguous Environmental
Conservation Legislation
A delicate balance must be maintained between regulatory control
and private property rights. “[E]nvironmental provisions almost always limit
someone’s property rights in one or another way. Therefore the tension
between individual and public … interests arises” (Puraite 2012, 665-666).
This tension can interfere with the effective operation of government
agencies and the execution of their assigned duties. Several of these
entities, ranging from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to local
zoning boards, are tasked with managing and conserving our natural
resources and protecting these public interests. These agents are granted
authority through open ended legislation whose subjective interpretations
can potentially lead to legally questionable enforcement practices.
While employed as a land surveyor, I have been told by various
landowners that they had intentionally obliterated all traces of protected
resources, such as wetlands, in an attempt to avoid costly conservation
efforts or even the effective loss of useable areas of their land. These acts
are never beneficial to the environment and seldom end in amicable
relationships between land owners and regulatory agencies.
The successful execution of environmental conservation demands the
cooperation of all concerned parties. Effective participation of private
landowners in federal conservation efforts require that the laws and policies
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governing said efforts protect property rights through the clear delineation of
their limits and intentions.
Background
In a 1921 interview about his impressions of America, Albert Einstein
said this about prohibition, “For nothing is more destructive of respect for
the government and the law of the land than passing laws which cannot be
enforced” (Einstein 1960, 6). Albert Einstein could have just as easily been
speaking of the unintelligible dialect used in environmental regulations.
Ineffectual language has created policies that lack limits on scope and a
clearly defined intent. Although equivocal language may allow these laws to
evolve and account for unpredictable situations, it also permits reach beyond
its envisioned scope or misinterpretation of its intent. Judicial review of
existing legislation consistently enlightens the inconstant nature of the
interpretation and enforcement of these laws.
Federal Conservation Regulation and Enforcement
Congressional policies are enacted by the representatives of the people
for an intended purpose. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was passed
to aid in the prevention of pollution of the waters of the United States and to
facilitate the restoration of said waters to a better condition. One form of
this pollution is the filling or dredging of said waters. As this process can be
necessary for various reasons, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was tasked
with issuing permits for this purpose.
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was originally enacted
in 1948. Also known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), it is “the principal law
governing pollution of the nation’s surface waters” (Copeland 2010, 1). The
CWA regulates the discharge of effluent into U.S. waters and mandates the
control of dredging and filling of navigable waterways. The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE) considers the CWA to include waters or wetlands
adjacent or connected to navigable waters (Rapanos v. US 2006). As the
EPA estimates that “approximately 75 percent of wetlands are privately
owned” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012), this regulation can
significantly impact landowners.
In Rapanos v. US, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court had previously instructed the EPA and the USACE to establish
definable limits regarding the CWA that may be adhered to, which they
failed to do. He went on to state, “It is unfortunate that no opinion
commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress' limits
on the reach of the Clean Water Act” (Rapanos v. US 2006). This lack of
decisive legislation enables policy enforcers to control as far as they choose
until overruled by judicial review and places the burden of proof on the
individual landowner.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was tasked under section
404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to issue permits for
filling or dredging within the waters of the United States. Congress
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also granted the USACE the right to create regulations necessary to
accomplish said task. Congress and the CWA failed to define clear limits of
what waters of the United States are. In 33 U.S.C. 502.7 (2002), the CWA
states, “The term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States.”
This ambiguous definition leaves the particulars of the scope to subsequent
regulations stipulated by the governing agencies responsible for its
enforcement.
The governing regulations employed by the Corps of Engineers are
written by the Corps of Engineers, approved by Congress, and ultimately
verified by the judicial system. Congress and the court system, in general,
accept the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as the final authority in scientific
matters concerning their coverage area. In short, the Corps of Engineers
writes their own regulations and additionally establishes the definitions that
ultimately approve and verify them.
Within the very regulations that define the limits of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers coverage area, the following passage exists:
Precise definitions of “navigable waters of the United States” or
“navigability” are ultimately dependent on judicial interpretation and
cannot be made conclusively by administrative agencies. However, the
policies and criteria contained in this regulation are in close
conformance with the tests used by Federal courts and determinations
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made under this regulation are considered binding in regard to the
activities of the Corps of Engineers. 33 CFR § 329.3 (2004).
The Corps of Engineers determines their regulations from Federal cases yet
many of these same cases based their decisions upon the interpretations of
the Corps of Engineers regulations.
Failure to comply with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
can carry significant fines and penalties. In the 2006 U.S. Supreme
Court case, Rapanos v. US, the opinion of the Court ruling opens with “The
burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in
locations denominated ‘waters of the United States’ is not trivial” (Rapanos
v. US 2006, 721). Justice Scalia goes on to explain that “the average
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in
completing the process … not counting costs of mitigation or design
changes” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 721). He further explains that these costs
are unavoidable as there are civil and criminal liabilities tied to the Clean
Water Act.
While the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers is responsible for issuing
permits, it is up to the EPA to levy fines and penalties. The Environmental
Protection Agency states in their Environmental Responsibilities guide that
the “EPA may impose administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions on a
property owner and/or a contractor for failure to comply with the CWA.
Administrative penalties can reach $157,500 and civil penalties – imposed in
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a judicial proceeding – can reach $32,500 per violation per day” (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency n.d., 29). It is being said that the EPA can
assess up to $157,000 in penalties administratively without any judicial
proceedings and if a trial is carried out, the penalties could be assessed at a
staggering $32,500 per day per violation. The CWA, under certain
conditions, allows for criminal penalties of as much as 30 years
imprisonment 33 USC § 1319 (2012). Criminal prosecution notwithstanding,
the financial burden for failing to comply is staggering yet the expense of
compliance can be just as high.
Conclusions
Although potentially intended to allow room for either its own evolution
or for the inability to anticipate every possible scenario, the lack of definition
of scope and intent in many laws and policies leaves them confusing.
Whether this obscurity is intentional or not, it can produce costly situations
requiring use of significant time and money by all parties concerned.
Decisions are made by both regulatory enforcement agencies and
landowners that are reliant upon these ambiguous policies. Misinterpretation
by either party can create unnecessary tension between them and may
result in costly fines, court cases or the potential destruction of private
property rights or the environment for which the laws were meant to
protect. Analysis of specific instances will highlight the inconsistent
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interpretation of the laws and ultimately demonstrate the need for concise
legislation with decisive wording.
Analysis
Jerrold A. Long, a law professor, explains the dependency of laws on
grammar. “[L]anguage matters in the law. Even at its most generic, the law
is a distinct linguistic environment in which word choices, and definitions,
have significant consequences” (Long 2013, 308). The U.S. legal system is
based entirely around how these words and sentences are interpreted. By
the bending and stretching of the meanings of these words, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the EPA have consistently expanded their policies.
They have constantly extended them to encompass areas not traditionally
federally regulated and have potentially impinged upon the rights of private
property owners (Rapanos v US 2006).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. In 1976,
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (RBH) began preparing an eighty acre site in
Michigan. The site consisted of “low-lying, marshy land near the shores of
Lake St. Clair in Macomb County” (United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. 1986). RBH filled these lowlands in an effort to develop their
property. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) believed this site to
qualify as waters of the United States, as it was wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters, and therefore requiring a permit to fill said lowlands. RBH
failed to obtain such a permit before filling their land.
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The USACE filed suit against RBH in district court, citing a 1975
regulation that defined the waters of the state, to include adjacent wetlands.
“The District Court held that the portion of respondent's property lying below
575.5 feet above sea level was a covered wetland” (United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 1986) and therefore under the purview of the
USACE. In 1980, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling, again
requiring a permit to fill the site. RBH appealed yet again, this time in the
U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1984.
In their final ruling and in an attempt to avoid potential takings issues
(the idea that a governmental agency, through regulations, significantly
reduces the value of property with due process or just compensation), the
district court chose to use a narrow interpretation of wetlands (United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes 1984). This narrow interpretation stated that
wetlands under the purview of the USACE “thus covers marshes, swamps,
and bogs directly created by [navigable waters], but not inland low-lying
areas such as the one in question here that sometimes become saturated
with water” (United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes 1984). By this
interpretation, in order for the USACE to have jurisdiction over wetlands, the
wetlands must be inundated directly by waters of the United States. The
court clearly defined the limits of the Corps of Engineers reach and produced
a viable definition that a landowner could understand. Using this definition,
the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the prior rulings and
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removed the Riverside Bayview Homes property from the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court was petitioned to review
this situation. They chose to hear the case and the issue before them being,
Whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) … together with certain
regulations promulgated under its authority by the Army Corps of
Engineers, authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain
permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. (United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 1986, 123)
The intent was not to question the authority of the Corps of Engineers to
issue filling and dredging permits into navigable waters; that was directly
established by the Clean Water Act in section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The
issue was to determine if, as the USACE had asserted, wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters should include those not directly inundated by said waters.
The Supreme Court addressed the Circuit Court’s ruling regarding need
to narrow the interpretation of the USACE regulations to reduce the potential
takings cases. In delivering the Supreme Court’s opinion, Justice White
stated:
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in
any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that
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permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the
property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may
be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is
denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent "economically viable"
use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.
(United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 1985, 127)
In essence, Justices White’s opinion states, that as long as there is the
potential for a land owner to be granted a permit, the property remains
financially viable and therefore is not taken. He explained that, because this
could not be an issue of taking, the Court of Appeals was wrong to demand a
narrow reading of the regulations (United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. 1985).
In reviewing the history of the Clean Water Act and based largely on
the USACE and the EPA’s environmental explanation of the interconnectivity
of wetlands to water quality, the Supreme Court found in favor of the Corps.
In the final opinion, the Court stated “that the language, policies, and history
of the Clean Water Act compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably
in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill material into
wetlands adjacent to the ‘waters of the United States’” (United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 1985, 139). This firmly established the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineer’s assertion that certain wetlands fall under their
purview. The decision also removed any clearly defined understanding of
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adjacent. Property owners would again need to petition the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to make a determination if their land was subject to the Clean
Water Act.
The reach of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was to be tested
again. Still dealing with filling or dredging within the waters of the United
States, the case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers was brought in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2001. “The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC), is a consortium of 23 suburban Chicago cities and villages that
united in an effort to locate and develop a disposal site for baled
nonhazardous solid waste” (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
Army Corps of Engineers 2001, 163). They acquired 533 acres comprising an
abandoned gravel quarry. The property had been operated as a sand and
gravel pit for over thirty years but had been abandoned the approximately
twenty seven years leading up to this situation. The indigenous forests had
reclaimed much of the property with the various excavations forming
“permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size (from under one-tenth of an
acre to several acres) and depth (from several inches to several feet)” (Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers 2001, 163).
The Corps of Engineers took interest in these wet areas.
Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act grants the USACE authority to
issue permits for filling or dredging waters of the United States. Under 33
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C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), the Corps of Engineers defined waters of the
United States to include, “waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce...” This 1999 definition included a significant portion of all the
waters located within the United States, much of which is located upon
private property; therefore subjecting any landowner to potential civil or
criminal actions for disturbing these waters.
The only limits this regulation imposed were that these waters must
affect “interstate or foreign commerce” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999).
Unfortunately for the private landowner, the identification of interstate
commerce is not limited to direct use in the traditional sense like
transportation of goods upon the water. It also includes those activities that
may include use by interstate or foreign persons, like an out of state tourist
fishing in a pond. Because a landowner theoretically could determine if his
land was being used for interstate commerce, he could therefore determine
if it was subject to the Corps permitting process.
In 1986, the United States Corps of Engineers further expanded this
definition of interstate commerce use to include those waters that might be
used by various migratory birds. This inclusion was done under the
assumption that these birds affected commerce. This section became known
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as the Migratory Bird Rule (51 Fed. Reg. 41217). Though this understanding,
if a Canadian goose was to feed in a lowland field en route to its winter
home and later, the land owner chose to plow this field, he could be subject
to civil and criminal penalties if the required permits were not obtained.
In reviewing the property of SWANCC, “The Corps found that
approximately 121 bird species had been observed at the site, including
several known to depend upon aquatic environments for a significant portion
of their life requirements” (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
Army Corps of Engineers 2001, 164). Subsequently, the Corps determined
that “the project site, while not wetlands, did qualify as `waters of the
United States'” (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of
Engineers 2001, 164) and therefore chose not to issue a permit to the Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County. Following several rulings in favor of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, SWANCC pleaded their case in front of
the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found in favor of SWANCC and
overturned the previous courts’ rulings. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers (2001), the court stated, “We hold
that [the USACE definition of waters of the United States] as clarified and
applied to [SWANCC’s] balefill site pursuant to the ‘Migratory Bird Rule,’ …
exceeds the authority granted to [the Corps] under … the CWA.” They
further state, “Permitting [the USACE] to claim federal jurisdiction over
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ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over
land and water use” (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army
Corps of Engineers 2001, 174). This ruling effectually declared the Migratory
Bird Rule in violation of existing regulations and limits. Subsequently, after
about fifteen years of enforcing it, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
rescinded the Migratory Bird Rule. This ruling can be seen as a triumph by
landowners as it again reigned in the Corps of Engineers (Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers 2001).
2006 found the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers yet again in front
of the U.S. Supreme Court. This case was a consolidation of two separate
cases, Rapanos and Carabell, where the U.S. Supreme Court “consider[ed]
whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made drains
that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute ‘waters of
the United States’ within the meaning of the [Clean Water] Act” (Rapanos v.
US 2006, 729).
In the Carbell case, the property involved nearly twenty acres with
approximately eighty percent being covered with forested wetlands. These
wetlands were separated from Lake St. Clair with a manmade berm that
isolated the waters under normal conditions from the manmade ditch. “The
ditch connects with the Sutherland-Oemig Drain, which carries water
continuously throughout the year and empties into Auvase Creek. The creek
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in turn empties into Lake St. Clair” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 764). Testimony in
the administrative hearing by Carbell’s expert noted that in a ten year storm
event, there might be some overflow (Rapanos v. US 2006).
According to Rapanos v. US (2006), the Carbells filed for a permit from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to fill approximately 12 acres of their
wetlands to build a condominium development. The USACE denied their
permit to fill wetlands because the property represented water storage and
that increased runoff could be detrimental to the drainage basin. Even with
the isolation this property had under most conditions from any other waters
of the United States, the Corps extended their control, making the Carbell’s
property functionally unusable and virtually worthless.
In Rapanos v. US (2006), the Rapanos case involved Mr. Rapanos
filling roughly fifty four acres of wetlands he and others owned in Michigan.
The property located between eleven and twenty miles from the nearest
navigable waters were filled without a permit to do so. The Corps of
engineers determined that these wetlands were adjacent to navigable waters
and therefore subject to their permitting process. Filling the wetlands
without the necessary permits brought Mr. Rapanos into court. The initial
ruling and subsequent appeals found in favor of the regulatory interpretation
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes and as a result, “Mr. Rapanos faced 63 months in prison and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines” (Rapanos v. US
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2006). Subsequently, Mr. Rapanos requested a hearing in front of the U.S.
Supreme Court which was decided by a deeply divided majority.
As term navigable waters need not only apply to navigable-in-fact
waterways had been previously established (United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. 1985), the court chose to deflect this portion of
Rapanos’ argument to those prior rulings. They focused instead on the term
waters with emphasis on the “s”. It is their interpretation that Congress
placed that s on the word, not to pluralize it, but to specify bodies of water.
The court’s final determination of waters of the United States relied heavily
on the definition of waters in Webster’s Second Addition. It was the Court’s
determination that waters referred to “permanent, standing, or continuously
flowing bodies of water” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 739) and that intermittent or
temporary channels are not included.
They further established that “only those wetlands with a continuous
surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their
own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and
wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by the Act” (Rapanos v.
US 2006, 742). The Court continued to explain, “Wetlands with only an
intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the
United States’ … lack the necessary connection to covered waters” (Rapanos
v. US 2006, 742).
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The ruling in Rapanos v. US failed to establish a clear delineation
between what is and what is not waters of the United States. The decision,
while clear and concise, lacked significant support. The ruling was divided
that even the plurality’s reasons for voting the way they did was
incongruent.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated, “The enforcement
proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small part of the immense expansion
of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water
Act” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 722). The Corps’ 2000 regulation “extended ‘the
waters of the United States’ to virtually any land feature over which
rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark— even if only ‘the
presence of litter and debris’” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 725). Justice Scalia
further determined that the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had
continued this expansion without changing the government statute. He
explains that the entire United States rests within a drainage basin and that
“entire cities and immense arid wastelands” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 722) are
included in this definition of waters of the United States. This allencompassing definition and Justice Scalia’s dislike of it permeated his
opinion.
Justice Kennedy, although agreeing with the final decision, came to
that conclusion differently than Justice Scalia and others. Kennedy notes
that neither the plurality nor the dissenting utilized the previously
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established decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army
Corps of Engineers (2001) requiring a significant nexus, or a direct
hydrologic connection, must be established to navigable waters of the United
States.
Justice Kennedy states, “though the Court of Appeals recognized the
test's applicability, it did not consider all the factors necessary to determine
whether the lands in question had, or did not have, the requisite nexus”
(Rapanos v. US 2006, 759). Kennedy further notes that although there may
be a significant nexus and therefore the Corps would have jurisdiction, the
issue was not specifically addressed and therefore “a remand is appropriate,
in my view, for application of the controlling legal standard” (Rapanos v. US
2006, 783).
While both Justices Kennedy and Scalia agree with remand, their
reasons behind their decisions are polarized. This dissention among the
plurality creates more confusion than it resolves. While the final order
states, “We vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit … and remand both
cases for further proceedings” (Rapanos v. US 2006, 757), this simply
requires that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers establish a different angle in
which to include these wetlands into their jurisdiction and makes no clear
requirement of change to the Corps’ regulations.
In the final paragraph of the Rapanos v. US (2006) decision,
dissenting Justice Breyer states:
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If one thing is clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps of
Engineers to make the complex technical judgments that lie at the
heart of the [Rapanos and Carbell] cases (subject to deferential
judicial review). In the absence of updated regulations, courts will
have to make ad hoc determinations that run the risk of transforming
scientific questions into matters of law. That is not the system
Congress intended. Hence I believe that today's opinions, taken
together, call for the Army Corps of Engineers to write new
regulations, and speedily so. (811-812)
No matter which side of the debate, it is clear that well defined regulations
are necessary to ensure that private property rights and the environment
are protected.
Conclusion
It would be understandable that the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers,
following the Rapanos v. US ruling, should enact clearer definitions of their
coverage. It would also follow that Congress would make the changes
suggested by the court. Neither of these situations is true at this time.
The span of coverage that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers applies to
the Clean Water Act has been ever growing since their assignment to the
permitting process. This expansion and subsequent muddied definitions
leave landowners subject to expensive litigation as well as civil and criminal
repercussions. The case by case basis for determining if property lies within
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the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers and under the Clean Water Act
offers property owners no clear way to determine liabilities when purchasing
property or planning the future use of it and forces the burden of proof, both
financially and chronologically, upon said owners.
This issue is not limited to large land developers looking to profit from
property; it also affects anyone who may want to physical alter his or her
land for a multitude of reasons. The act of filling an old farm pond that has
become a mosquito habitat may be subject to this costly, expansive
coverage and can result in fines and incarceration.
This expansive reach has caused the validity of many of these
regulations to be brought into question nearly continually in court cases. The
ambiguity with which these laws are written undermines the authority of the
agencies tasked with their implementation. As regulatory compliance
requires an understanding of the scope of coverage the regulation carries as
well as a recognition of its authority over the situation, it is necessary that
Congress enact legislation with unambiguous intent and clearly defined limits
for the betterment of the environment while preserving private property
rights.
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–––. n.d. Managing Your Environmental Responsibilities: Section IV –
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