FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 23662/12
Slavko VUKOVIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on
25 November 2014 as a Chamber composed of:
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Ksenija Turković,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 April 2012,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Slavko Vuković, is a Croatian national, who was
born in 1937 and lives in Split. He was represented before the Court by
Mr I. Mirošević, an advocate practising in Split.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
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VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
4. By decisions of 15 February and 10 November 1983 the Split
Municipality (a) declared that four plots of land in Split in the applicant’s
possession had been nationalised and become socially-owned already on
8 August 1968 with the entry into force of the Croatia’s Act Designating the
Construction Land in Towns and Urban Areas (see paragraphs 23-24
below), and (b) dispossessed the applicant of the land at issue with a view to
constructing a block of flats and an elementary school on them.
5. By a decision of 5 April 1985 the Split Municipality expropriated the
house owned by the applicant which was built on one of the plots in
question.
6. On 11 December 1989 the Split Municipality offered the applicant as
compensation permanent usage (trajno korištenje) of another plot of land
for the construction of a house. The applicant refused the offer and
instituted non-contentious proceedings with the Split Municipal Court
(Općinski sud u Splitu) with a view to obtaining compensation for his
nationalised and expropriated property under the 1978 Expropriation Act.
7. On 18 February 1994 the new Expropriation Act (hereafter “the 1994
Expropriation Act”, see paragraph 26 below) entered into force. Shortly
afterwards, the case was transferred to the administrative authorities, in
particular to the regional office of the state administration in the SplitDalmatia County (Ured državne uprave u Splitsko-dalmatinskoj županiji,
hereinafter “the County Office”).
8. On 17 September 1995 the tax authorities carried out an onsite
inspection of the nationalised land and assessed its value at
3,302,604.77 Croatian kunas (HRK).
9. On 23 May 1996 the applicant requested a total amount of
HRK 9,430,140 for the land and the house.
10. On 22 September 2000 the applicant amended his request, asking for
HRK 7,446.227.95 in total.
11. On 23 October 2000 the tax authorities carried out another onsite
inspection and assessed the value of the nationalised land at
HRK 5,304,992. On 23 April 2001 the tax authorities assessed the value of
the expropriated house at HRK 514,009.01.
12. At the hearing of 6 March 2002 the applicant contested the findings
of the tax authorities and undertook to submit proof of the current market
value of the appropriated property.
13. The applicant engaged a court expert, Mr R., to carry out the
property valuation. On 3 April 2002 Mr R. drew up a report establishing the
market value of the nationalised land at HRK 7,338,715.80. The applicant
submitted the report to the County Office on 19 April 2002.
14. On 12 October 2003 the applicant increased his request for
compensation, arguing that the value of the nationalised land had
meanwhile risen to HRK 10,361,736. He relied on the rise of land prices in
2002 and 2003 caused by the construction of the Split ring-road.
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
3
15. By a decision of 23 June 2004 the County Office awarded the
applicant compensation in the overall amount of HRK 8,344,393.72.
Specifically, it relied on Mr R.’s expert opinion of 19 April 2002 (see
paragraph 13 above) and awarded HRK 7,338,715.80 for the nationalised
land. It further awarded HRK 514,009.01 for the expropriated house, relying
on valuation by the tax authorities of 23 April 2001. Lastly, it awarded
HRK 491,668.91 for the construction improvements and agricultural crops,
relying on an older valuation by the tax authorities. The relevant part of that
decision reads as follows:
“The market value is the price which an immovable property can obtain on the
market, dependent on supply and demand at the time of its determination.
According to the ... valuation by the tax authorities of 1995, the immovable
property’s value is HRK 368 per square metre ... according to the 2000 valuation, it is
HRK 616 per square metre.
According to the valuation submitted by [the applicant], carried out by the court
expert for civil engineering and property valuation, Mr. R., in 2002, the immovable
property’s value is EUR 100 per square metre (HRK 741).
As the valuation of the court expert Mr. R. is newer and does not significantly differ
from the valuation [by the tax authorities] ... there were no reasons for dismissing the
[Mr R.’s] valuation as it represents the price of construction land in that location.”
16. The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before the
Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravosuđa Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter
“the Ministry”), arguing, inter alia, that under section 33 of the 1994
Expropriation Act (see paragraph 26 below) the compensation should have
been calculated on the basis of the market value at the time when the
decision on compensation was adopted. He submitted a number of items of
evidence, such as newspaper articles and decisions on compensation in
other cases, pointing out that the market value had risen during 2002 and
2003.
17. On 31 May 2005 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s appeal in the
part concerning the compensation for the nationalised land. At the same
time it quashed the first-instance decision in the remaining part (including
the compensation for the expropriated house) and remitted the case. The
relevant part of that decision reads as follows:
“The level of compensation for the undeveloped construction land [the applicant]
was dispossessed of was correctly determined. The first-instance authority accepted
the expert opinion of Mr R. of 3 April 2002, and not the earlier valuations by the tax
authorities ...
The argument raised in the appeal ... that the compensation was set ... too low is
unfounded.
Namely, in proceedings involving dispossession compensation is fixed by applying
provisions of the Expropriation Act on market value compensation. However, [in such
cases] the market value compensation must be determined with regard to the state of
the immovable property and the modes of its usage at the time of deprivation. [The
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VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
applicant’s data on the higher price of construction land] concern construction land
with the entire necessary infrastructure, whereas the land in question did not have the
entire infrastructure at the time of deprivation [i.e. dispossession in 1983]. Therefore,
the current market value of the land in the same [location] in Split (Pujanke) cannot be
used for comparison, as the state of immovable property in question in 1983 and today
differs significantly in terms of infrastructure. In addition, the construction of roads
and the ring-road in 2003 and 2004 contributed significantly to the rise of the price of
construction land, but has no significance for the level of compensation correctly
established in 2002. Therefore, the expert opinion cannot be deemed too old with
regard to the date of the adoption of the first-instance decision... as it sets the price in
euros as well ...
However, [the applicant’s] appeal is well-founded in part concerning the
compensation for the house, the construction improvements and the agricultural crops.
... [Valuations] by the tax authorities [in respect of that property] do not include any
reasoning and it is unclear on the basis of which criteria this part of the compensation
has been determined.
Therefore, such findings cannot serve as a starting point for fixing the compensation
for that property ...”
18. The applicant then brought an action for judicial review in the Split
County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) against the Ministry’s decision,
maintaining that the amount of compensation for the nationalised land had
not been established in accordance with the relevant legislation (see
paragraph 16 above). He requested HRK 11,199,192 for the land in
question.
19. By a judgment of 26 March 2007 the Split County Court dismissed
the applicant’s action, endorsing the reasoning given by the Ministry. The
relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“It is undisputed that in the present case the compensation for the immovable
property ... the plaintiff was dispossessed of must be determined in accordance with
[section 46 of the 1994 Expropriation Act] given that he was dispossessed of [that]
property by the final decisions ... of the Split Municipality of 15 February and
10 November 1983 and because ... a final decision on compensation has not been
rendered [before the entry into force of the 1994 Expropriation Act].
When compensation ... is being determined by applying section 46 of the [1994]
Expropriation Act it must be fixed with regard to the state of the immovable property
and the modes of its usage at the time of deprivation and the market value [of such
property] ... at the time the compensation was being determined (section 33 of the
[1994] Expropriation Act).
...
In determining level of compensation the administrative authorities assessed all the
relevant circumstances, in particular the state of the immovable property at the time of
deprivation (construction land without any infrastructure) [and] market supply and
demand of the land of the same or similar characteristics ... at the time of assessing its
value. ...
[Therefore,] by fixing the compensation for the immovable property the plaintiff had
been dispossessed of at HRK 7,338,715.80 the first- and the second-instance
administrative authority correctly applied section 33 of the [1994] Expropriation Act.”
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
5
20. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with
the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) against that judgment,
reiterating his previous arguments.
21. By a judgment of 29 April 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the
applicant’s appeal on points of law, endorsing the reasoning of the Split
County Court and the Ministry. The relevant part of that judgment reads as
follows:
“As regards the plaintiff’s arguments that the compensation was not determined in
accordance with the market value [of the land] at the time of adoption of the firstinstance decision ... the County Court was correct to agree with the findings of the
first- and the second-instance [administrative authority] whereby those arguments had
been dismissed as unfounded.
In so doing sufficient reasons were given, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff
was examined and it was established that the data submitted [by the plaintiff] concern
the immovable property which significantly differ (in terms of infrastructure) from
that he had been dispossessed of. For that reason it was not possible to compare the
state and the current market value of that immovable property with the state of the
immovable property the plaintiff had been dispossessed of in 1983.”
22. By a decision of 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court
(Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s subsequent
constitutional complaint.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Federal Act Designating the Construction Land in Towns and
Urban Areas
23. The relevant provisions of the Act Designating the Construction
Land in Towns and Urban Areas (Zakon o određivanju građevinskog
zemljišta u gradovima i naseljima gradskog karaktera, Official Gazette of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 5/68 and 20/69), which
entered into force on 15 February 1968, read as follows:
Section 1
“The construction land as defined in the Nationalisation of Rental Buildings and
Construction Land Act [located] in towns and urban areas shall become [land] in
social ownership under the conditions set out in this Act.
Former owners of the construction land shall have the right to a fair compensation in
accordance with the Expropriation Act.”
Section 2(1)
“The construction land in towns and urban areas shall be specified by ... legislation
[enacted by the constituent republics of the SFRY].
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VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
Section 3(1)
“Former owner of undeveloped construction land shall have the right to use it until
the day he or she has, on the basis of the decision by the relevant authority, to
surrender it to its [new] user.”
2. Croatia’s Act Designating the Construction Land in Towns and
Urban Areas
24. By the Act Designating the Construction Land in Towns and Urban
Areas (Zakon o određivanju građevinskog zemljišta u gradovima i
naseljima gradskog karaktera, Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia no. 30/68), which entered into force on 8 August 1968, Croatia
fulfilled its obligation stemming from section 2(1) of the above federal
legislation (see the preceding paragraph) and specified construction land in
Croatian towns and urban areas, including the town of Split, which had been
nationalised by the operation of law (ex lege).
3. Construction Land Act
25. The relevant provision of the Construction Land Act (Zakon o
građevinskom zemljištu, Official Gazette of Croatia no. 54/80 with
subsequent amendments), which was in force between 8 January 1981 and
31 December 1996, at the material time read as follows:
Section 32(1)
“The former owner of the construction land which became land in social ownership
shall have the right to a fair compensation which shall be determined in the manner and in
the procedure prescribed by the Expropriation Act”
Section 35(1)
“The decision to take the construction land from the possession of its former owner or
its user, as well as to award that land for use [to a new user] in accordance with this Act
shall be made by [the municipality] after having conducted the proceedings provided in this
Act.”
4. The 1994 Expropriation Act
(a) Relevant provisions
26. The relevant provisions of the Expropriation Act (Zakon o
izvlaštenju, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 9/94 with
subsequent amendments), which was in force between 18 February 1994
and 25 June 2014, read as follows:
Section 33
“(1) ... compensation [for the expropriated immovable property] shall be awarded
as a sum of money equivalent to the market value of the expropriated immovable
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
7
property at the time of the adoption of the first-instance decision on expropriation or
at the time of reaching a settlement.
(2) The market value is the price which an immovable property can obtain on the
market, dependent on supply and demand at the time of its determination.”
Section 46
“This Act is applicable to all pending expropriation proceedings in which, before
this Act’s entry into force, a final decision has not been adopted, as well as to
compensation proceedings in which a final decision has not been adopted or has been
annulled or quashed.”
Section 47(1)
“Provisions of this Act concerning determination of compensation for expropriated
immovable property shall apply mutatis mutandis to cases where the expropriation
was carried out in accordance with the expropriation legislation in force before
22 March 1978, if the compensation was not paid before this Act’s entry into force ...”
(b) The case-law of the Administrative Court
27. According to the opinion by the plenary session of judges of the
Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) held on
19 December 1998, the administrative authorities when applying sections
46 and 47 of the 1994 Expropriation Act, that is, in determining
compensation for the immovable property expropriated before that Act’s
entry into force, had to take into account (a) the state of the property at the
time of expropriation, and (b) the market value of such property at the time
the compensation was being determined. The conclusion reads as follows:
“When compensation for the expropriated immovable property is being determined
by applying sections 46 and 47 of the Expropriation Act, [it] shall be determined
according to the state of the immovable property at the moment of expropriation but
in accordance with the market value at the time of fixing the compensation (section 33
of the [1994] Expropriation Act).”
28. In its judgment no. Us-2034/1996 of 22 August 1996 the
Administrative Court held that sections 46-47 of the 1994 Expropriation Act
applied also to those cases where an immovable property (in that case, the
construction land) had been appropriated by means other than expropriation
(for example, by nationalisation) and its owner dispossessed of it, and the
law in force at the time of the dispossession provided for compensation that
had to be determined pursuant to expropriation legislation, which
compensation had not been fixed or paid before the entry into force of the
1994 Expropriation Act.
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
8
COMPLAINTS
29. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention that in the above administrative proceedings the domestic
authorities had wrongly applied the domestic law when determining the
level of compensation for the deprivation of his property.
30. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
about the unfairness of those administrative proceedings.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
31. The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had
misapplied the relevant domestic law and had thus awarded him
compensation for his appropriated property in the amount below the market
value, contrary to the law. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
32. The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint by
arguing that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies and that
the complaint was, in any event, manifestly ill-founded.
1. The parties’ arguments
(a) The Government
33. The Government argued that the application was unclear and that the
decision of the Ministry (see paragraph 17 above) had separated the
proceedings concerning compensation for the plots of land from those
concerning compensation for the house, construction improvements and
agricultural crops. In respect of the latter, the applicant had failed to use any
of the available domestic remedies.
34. The Government further argued that the applicant had had no
legitimate expectation to receive a higher amount of compensation, as he
had been awarded adequate compensation that had corresponded to the
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
9
market value of the land. Moreover, the Government considered the
applicant’s claim of 12 October 2003 unfounded, as he had failed to request
another valuation of the land or submit evidence for the alleged rise in
prices. The Government also relied on the opinion by the Administrative
Court plenary session (see paragraph 27 above) and submitted that the state
of the applicant’s plots of land at the time of the dispossession had not been
comparable to the state of the surrounding plots, expropriated much later,
and so the market value was not the same. In their view, the construction of
roads in 2003 and 2004, significantly raising the price of construction land
in the area, could not have influenced the applicant’s compensation. The
Government further argued that the administrative authorities could not
have been requested to obtain property valuations at the same time as they
were rendering decisions on the compensation, as that would have
amounted to excessive formalism. Lastly, the Government considered that,
if there had been any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the
applicant’s possessions, it had been prescribed by law, had served a general
interest of constructing housing and a school, and had struck a fair balance
between the general interest of the community and the applicant’s property
rights.
(b) The applicant
35. The applicant argued that his application clearly concerned the
amount of compensation received for the four plots of land, in respect of
which he had complied with the exhaustion requirements.
36. He further argued that the domestic authorities had failed to decide
on the amount of compensation for that land in accordance with section 33
of the 1994 Expropriation Act (see paragraph 26 above). Specifically, he
submitted that the domestic authorities had not taken into account the
increase in the price of construction land between the expert valuation of the
property and the decision of the County Office. In his view, he had proved
that prices had in fact risen between 2002 and 2004. Moreover, he had
urged the County Office to render its decision earlier. He added that
whether the prices were quoted in euros was irrelevant, as they were rising
in absolute terms.
2. The Court’s assessment
37. The Court first notes that the applicant in the present case
complained about the level of compensation received for the appropriation
of his four plots of land in 1983 and not about the level of compensation due
for his house appropriated in 1985 (see paragraphs 4-5 and 35 above).
38. The Court further reiterates that an applicant may allege a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions relate
to his or her “possessions” within the meaning of that provision.
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VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
“Possessions” can be “existing possessions” or claims that are sufficiently
established to be regarded as “assets”.
39. In this connection the Court notes that, unlike the applicant’s house,
the four plots of land in his ownership were not expropriated but
nationalised (see paragraph 4 above). It also observes that the applicant had
been deprived of ownership already in 1968 and that in 1983 he was only
dispossessed of the land at issue which he had been entitled to use thus far
(see paragraphs 4 and 23-24 above).
40. The Court further notes that these events occurred before the
Convention and its Protocols entered into force in respect of Croatia on
5 November 1997. Therefore, the violation complained of cannot be equated
to a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of
the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see
Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, nos.
29813/96 and 30229/96, § 48, ECHR 2000-I). Rather, it falls to be
examined under the first sentence of that paragraph, which lays down the
principle of peaceful enjoyment of property in general terms (see Almeida
Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão, loc. cit.).
41. The Court further reiterates that the Convention imposes no specific
obligation on the Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or
damage caused prior to that date (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC],
no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004-IX). Therefore, Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the
Contracting States to restore property which was transferred to them before
they ratified the Convention. Nor does Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 impose
any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to determine the scope
of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they agree
to restore property rights of former owners (see Kopecký, cited above, § 35;
and Jantner v. Slovakia, no. 39050/97, § 34, 4 March 2003).
42. However, once a Contracting State, having ratified the Convention
including Protocol No. 1, enacts legislation providing for the full or partial
restoration of property confiscated under a previous regime, such legislation
may be regarded as generating a new property right protected by Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying the requirements for entitlement.
The same may apply in respect of arrangements for restitution or
compensation established under pre-ratification legislation, if such
legislation remained in force after the Contracting State’s ratification of
Protocol No. 1 (see Kopecký, loc. cit.). That is precisely the situation in the
present case where the applicant was entitled to obtain compensation for the
land in question under sections 46-47 of the 1994 Expropriation Act (see
paragraph 26 above) as interpreted by the Administrative Court (see
paragraphs 27-28 above). It follows, in the light of the foregoing, that the
proprietary interest relied on by the applicant in the present case is in the
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
11
nature of a claim and cannot be characterised as an “existing possession”
within the meaning of the Court’s case-law.
43. The Court reiterates in this regard that where a proprietary interest is
in the nature of a claim, it may be regarded as an “asset” and therefore a
“possession” attracting the guarantees of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, only if there is a sufficient basis for that interest in national law
(for example, where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts
confirming it), that is, when the claim is sufficiently established to be
enforceable (see Kopecký, cited above, §§ 49 and 52, and Stran Greek
Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 9 December 1994, § 59, Series
A no. 301-B). The Government did not argue that the applicant was not
entitled under the domestic law to compensation for the land at issue or that
his claim could not have been regarded as a “possession” protected under
that Article. The Court, having regard to all the material in its possession
and its case-law on the subject, has no reason to hold otherwise. Therefore,
the only issue to be examined is whether the way in which the domestic
authorities applied the 1994 Expropriation Act to the applicant’s case
contravened Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
44. However, the Court’s power to examine whether the domestic
authorities in the present case determined the level of compensation in
compliance with the domestic law is rather limited.
45. First, in expropriation cases the Court’s power of review is in any
event limited to ascertaining whether the choice of compensation terms falls
outside the State’s margin of appreciation (see James and Others v. the
United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 54, Series A no. 98; Andersson v.
Sweden, no. 14083/88, Commission decision of 7 January 1991,
unpublished; and Grainger and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.),
no. 34940/10, ECHR 10 July 2012). Furthermore, while Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 in principle recognises a right to compensation in the case of
expropriation, it does not guarantee the right to a particular amount of
compensation, except where a reduction affects the very substance of the
right to compensation (see Company X. v. Austria, no. 7987/77,
Commission decision of 13 December 1979, Decisions and Reports (DR)
18, p.p. 31 and 48; K. v. Austria, no. 18809/91, Commission decision of
13 January 1992, unpublished; Firma F.M. Zumtobel and Zumtobel. v.
Austria, no. 12235/86, Commission decision of 15 October 1991,
unpublished, and E., I. and M. v. Finland, no. 21342/93, Commission
decision of 12 April 1996, unpublished). In the Court’s view, these
considerations apply even more so in the situations such as the one in the
present case where the deprivation of property occurred before the entry
into force of the Convention in respect of the State concerned given that, as
noted above (see paragraph 41), in such cases Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
does not impose any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to
determine the scope of property restitution or compensation and to choose
12
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
the conditions under which they agree to restore, or compensate for such
property. It is precisely for that reasons that the Court has held that in such
cases it had no power to examine, among other matters, the issues linked to
the amount of compensation (see Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão
and Others, cited above, § 48; Jorge Nina Jorge and Others v. Portugal, no.
52662/99, § 42, 19 February 2004; Fernandes Formigal de Arriaga and 15
other “Agrarian Reform” cases v. Portugal, no. 24678/06 and others, § 14,
13 July 2010; and Sancho Cruz and 14 other “Agrarian Reform” cases v.
Portugal, no. 8851/07 and others, § 12, 18 January 2011).
46. Second, regardless of these limitations specific to expropriation
cases, the Court reiterates that its power to review compliance with
domestic law is generally limited (see, among other authorities, Allan
Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2), 19 February 1998, § 57, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998‑I). It is in the first place for the national authorities,
notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields
where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that law, since the national
authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the
issues arising in this connection (see Pavlinović and Tonić v. Croatia (dec.),
no. 17124/05 and 17126/05, 3 September 2009). This is particularly true
when the case turns upon difficult questions of interpretation of domestic
law (see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 83, ECHR
2007‑I).
47. The applicant’s main argument in present case was that the domestic
authorities had misapplied the domestic law because they had relied on an
expert opinion on the market value of the land in question prepared some
two years before they had rendered the first-instance decision on
compensation (see paragraphs 16, 18, 20, 29, 31 and 36 above). In his view
that was contrary to section 33 of the 1994 Expropriation Act which
provided that compensation for expropriated property had to be equivalent
to the market value of that property at the time of adoption of the firstinstance decision on compensation (see paragraph 26 above). In particular,
he argued (see paragraph 14, 16, 18 and 20 above), and it is undisputed (see
paragraphs 17 and 34 above), that in those two years, owing to the
construction of the Split ring-road in 2003 and 2004, the price of
construction land in the surrounding area increased.
48. However, the Court notes that under the 1994 Expropriation Act, as
interpreted by the Administrative Court, the applicant was entitled to
compensation that had to be determined by taking into account the market
value of his property at the time of fixing the compensation and the state of
that property at the time he had been dispossessed of it in 1983 (see
paragraph 27 above). In the context of that rule the fact that the price of
construction land in the surrounding area rose in the two years between the
preparation of the expert opinion and the adoption of the first-instance
decision owing to the construction of the Split ring-road indeed appears
VUKOVIĆ v. CROATIA DECISION
13
irrelevant, as the domestic authorities held. Therefore, having regard to its
limited power to review compliance with the domestic law (see paragraph
46 above), the Court considers that the findings of the domestic authorities
that in those two years there had been no change in the market value of the
land with similar characteristics to that of the applicant at the time of
dispossession, seem plausible, especially because the applicant did not
argue that the price of such land in Split in those two years rose regardless
of the construction of the Split ring-road. Their decisions therefore cannot
be regarded as contrary to the relevant provisions of the 1994 Expropriation
Act. Nor can it be said that those authorities failed to consider the arguments
put forward by the applicant (see, mutatis mutandis, E., I. and M. v.
Finland, cited above).
49. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the
applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is
inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly illfounded and thus must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
B. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
50. The applicant also complained, under Article 6 of the Convention,
by merely invoking that provision.
51. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that
this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation
of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a)
as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of
the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Søren Nielsen
Registrar
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre
President