Binding Judgment of the Judicial Board:
Re: Chair of the Dalhousie Student Union Council
2014 DSUJB 1
Dalhousie Student Union Judicial Board
Halifax, Nova Scotia
Christine Conrad (Chair), Mary Brown and Liam O’Reilly (Members)
Heard: September 29, 2014
Oral Decision: September 29, 2014
Written Decision: October 8, 2014
Upon Submissions of:
Dalhousie Student Union Executive, Applicant
William Coney, Respondent
Decision of the Judicial Board rendered by:
Christine Conrad, Mary Brown and Liam O’Reilly
Background
[1]
The Dalhousie Student Union (“the DSU”) Executive (“the Applicant”) voted to
request a binding, authoritative judgment from the Dalhousie Student Union Judicial
Board (“the Board”) pursuant to s. 4 of By-Law V of the Constitution of the Dalhousie
Student Union (“the Constitution”).
[2]
The request was sent to the Board on August 27, 2014. As this was during
summer break, the Applicant recognized it was not reasonably possible to hold the
hearing within two weeks according to s. 9 of By-Law V of the Constitution.
[3]
The Applicant identified William Coney as the Respondent.
[4]
The Board set the hearing date for September 15, 2014. Following several
procedural questions from the Applicant, the Board decided to hold a public information
session instead of the hearing on September 15, 2014, as a modification under s. 3 of the
Judicial Board Regulations (“the Regulations”). Representatives for the Applicant and
the Respondent attended this information session. At this meeting, the Board explained
the hearing process and set a timeline for sending written submissions to the Board. The
hearing date was set for September 29, 2014.
Issues
[5]
The Executive referred the following questions to the Board:
1. Is the Chair of DSU Council (the "Chair") compelled to cast a vote to break a
tie in a matter before Council?
2. If yes, from what source does the Chair derive its authority to cast its vote?
[6]
In their written submissions, the Respondent added the following questions:
3. Is the DSU Council permitted to suspend the rules in order to remove the need
for notification of motion for motions presented to council?
4. Is the request to allow an honorary member (which is a non-voting member of
the Union, see By-Law II.6 [sic]) to serve as the Chair a motion which can be
considered at a normal council meeting?
5. Is such a request the actions of a DSU Councillor who “Exercises the care,
diligence and skill of a reasonably prudent person?”
[7]
The Board determined that these additional questions were not sufficiently similar
to the Applicant’s questions to merit joining the applications under s. 14 of the
Regulations.
Positions of the Parties
(i) The Applicant
[8]
The Applicant chose not to submit written submissions. At the hearing Jennifer
Nowoselski, Vice-President Internal, presented oral submissions on behalf of the
Applicant.
[9]
The Applicant argued that the Chair is compelled to cast a vote to break a tie in a
matter before Council, according to s. 18(h) of the Union Rules and Procedures Policy
(“the Policy”).
[10] The Applicant further submitted that the Chair derives this authority by being
appointed as Chair of the Council, and that Council derives this authority by being
elected.
(ii) The Respondent
[11] In their written submissions, the Respondent also argued that the Chair is
compelled to cast a vote to break a tie in a matter before Council, according to s. 18(h) of
the Policy.
[12] The Respondent also referred to Robert’s Rules of Order (11th ed.), which he
argued were inconsistent with the Policy. Specifically, he referred to Robert’s Rule at p.
467, which states that a “member of assembly who acts as its parliamentarian … does not
cast a deciding vote, even if his vote would affect the result, since that would interfere
with the chair’s prerogative…”
[13] The Respondent noted in their submissions that Robert’s Rules of Order are
subordinate to an organization’s By-Laws.
Judicial Board’s Decision
[14]
The Board issued an oral decision following the hearing.
[15] For the first question, the Board ruled that the DSU Council Chair is compelled to
cast a vote to break a tie in a matter before Council.
[16] For the second question, the Board noted that the Constitution is silent as to
whether the Chair of the DSU Council is compelled to vote to break a tie in a matter
before Council.
[17] The Board then referred to s. 18(h) of the Union Rules and Procedures Policy,
which states:
18. Voting
…
(h) the Chair of Council does not have the right to vote, except when there is a tie
in the vote, in which case the Chair shall break the tie by voting his or her own
judgment of the issue.
[18] The Board also considered the following sections of By-Law XII of the
Constitution:
By-law XII – Policy
1. Policies are statements of principle and fundamental belief of the Union.
Policies may be used as guides in interpretation of the Constitution. The policies
of the Union shall be collected in a policy manual, which shall be published by
the Union.
Policies are binding
2. Policies are binding on Executive, Staff, Council, and the Board.
…
Hierarchy of governing documents
4. Policy shall be subordinate to By-laws and referenda results. No Policy may
contradict or be inconsistent with these By-Laws or the results of a referendum.
[19] The Board determined that s. 18(h) of the Union Rules and Procedures Policy is
not inconsistent with any By-Law of the Constitution. The Policy is therefore binding on
the Board according to s. 2 of By-Law XII of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Board
ruled that the Chair’s authority to vote in order to break a tie in a matter before Council is
derived from s. 18(h) of the Union Rules and Procedures Policy.