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A-PHIL 3327: Justification Essay
Date:
My moral dilemma consisted of a friend who, sober for twelve years, started drinking
again and whether I, as a bartender but also as his friend, would confront him about it by refusing
to serve him. The values I considered when analyzing the moral dilemma included (but were not
limited to) honesty, respect, loyalty, tolerance, compassion, courage, love, life, autonomy,
privacy, community and friendship. In applying these values to both sides of the dilemma I
found that, though they overlapped a great deal, the strongest arguments all pointed to
confrontation over silence. The primary value that supported this reason was that of friendship,
which I felt incorporated all the other values I considered. Based on what I value in a friendship
– compassion, respect, love and honesty – I have a moral obligation to refuse to serve my friend
and be candid about the reasons. The moral rule guiding this decision is that a true friend is
honest.
For Virtue Ethics, this moral rule finds its root in the notion of the character of the
individual. It has at its core a question: what kind of friend do I want to be?
The philosophical theory of Virtue Ethics began with the Greeks and notably found
expression with Aristotle, who believed that human beings were born with natural internal
tendencies that had to be nurtured into character traits by society to reach their full virtuous
potential (Athanassoulis). This classical version, known as Eudaimonistic ethics, has two key
components: first it presumes that morality and life are coterminous and therefore should not be
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divided into separate spheres of attention or impact; and second, it asserts that everyone has a
duty to moral development and growth. Aristotle’s coterminous claim that the good is good for
us ((Pojman 166) extends to the duty of moral growth because the good is also good for the
community. Pursuing and perfecting the virtues allowed individuals to achieve eudiamonia
(commonly translated as “flourishing”) setting an example which extended to the social sphere,
benefitting the entire community. This aspect of a responsibility to moral evolution is distinctive
to Virtue Ethics in that it sees morality as both an achievement and an ongoing assignment: the
more virtuous we are, the more virtuous we become – to the advantage of ourselves and society.
Inherent in this notion of moral growth is a promise of capacity: all people can achieve some
level of virtue as “a matter of degree” (Hursthouse 3), increased through our efforts. The duty to
moral growth has an appealing momentum in parallels to aspects of intellectual growth: the
more effort we exert, the more we attain. When I ask myself what type of friend I want to be, I
consider those traits I value in friendship; the more I cultivate the virtues of friendship the more
readily and easily I will act on those virtues as they become a part of my character, in part
because I have worked to make them so.
The principles of Virtue Ethics emphasize the role of character in the habituation of
virtuous traits, taking into account the motives and emotions inevitably involved in moral
decisions. Virtue Ethics is concerned with who we are as much as with what we do. This
internal focus sets Virtue Ethics apart from both deontological “rule” and consequentialist
“result” theories where the morality of the action is either a rigidly prescribed rule in the former
or dependent upon the consequences in the latter. Virtue Ethics places a premium on being rather
than doing by asking us to consider what kind of person we want to be (Pojman 166). In the
example of my moral dilemma, I must consider my values, emotions and inclinations when
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making a moral decision, and I have to ask what constitutes friendship. What examples do I
have to guide me? In the past I had a friend who, in his confrontation of my behavior, exhibited
great concern and care for me. I found my respect for him elevated by his willingness to engage
in something unpleasant (confrontation) in order to preserve something of great value
(friendship). The premium he placed on honesty made an impression on me. If that is the kind of
friend I want to be, I have an obligation to be honest with my friend not just for his sake, but for
the sake the values, or virtues, I seek to cultivate in myself as well.
This communal feature of Virtue Ethics is important because it relates to the interconnected aspect of a virtuous inner moral life and social flourishing. Led by the examples of
the virtuous, we practice and nurture good character traits in ourselves, leading us to become
good people who act virtuously because we have cultivated a disposition to do so: we are good
for the sake of being good and in doing so we become an example for others, fostering further
goodness in society.
Critics assert a deficiency of moral direction in classic Virtue Ethics by claiming that it
suffers from “a problem of application” (Pojman 176): because it “does not produce codifiable
principles” (Hursthouse 6) it cannot tell us what to do. Pojman quotes William Frankena in
assessing this perceived weakness of Virtue Ethics: “Traits without principles are blind, but
principles without traits are impotent” (179). An incorporation of Virtue Ethics with Deontic
ethics sought to include guiding principles or “countervailing virtues” that corresponded with
what might be considered primary virtues: fairness, honesty, beneficence, and non-maleficence
(Pojman 178). This principle-guided form of Virtue Ethics placed the emphasis on the rule to
indicate the virtue: each would be assessed separately as the rule would be primary and the virtue
would supplement motivation (Hursthouse 7).
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. While the Correspondence Thesis does help alleviate Virtue Ethics’ anemic overt
guidance, it resorts to the deontic emphasis on action: on doing rather than being. This
compromises the inherent value of virtues: that they “are not merely instrumental but constitutive
of the good life” (Pojman, 181). One of the lovely aspects of Virtue Ethics is its faith in
humanity; these inclinations that are innate can be nurtured to fruition by a conscientious society.
It’s a way of saying we all have the potential to be good; that we even have a natural inclination
toward it that can be encouraged (or thwarted) over the course of our lives. When we make
morality prescriptive we compromise the autonomy that is an inspirational aspect of being
virtuous. If I am honest with my friend primarily from a duty to tell the truth, with the virtue of
being an honest person secondary to action taken on the behalf of a principle, I compromise my
moral growth (and negate an example for others to emulate) because I was directed externally to
do so rather than compelled from internal inclinations toward the virtue of honesty.
Another criticism about Virtue Ethics lack of codifiable principles is that the virtues
cannot be easily delineated or universalized. How do we identify the virtues when the theory
itself acknowledges that Cultural Relativism means societal virtues change across time and
communities? But Virtue Ethics’ encouragement of moral growth offers the potential for cultural
change, an extension of how the good is good for us and society as well. A responsibility to
moral growth equates to an ethical evolution that helps societies as well as individuals flourish.
Action-based ethics like Deontology and Consequentialism may prescribe our actions but do not
equate to a moral, or virtuous, life because they simply tell us what to do, not how to be. Duty
for duty’s sake does not enhance our moral character; acting in the anticipation of the best
overall consequences fails to consider the individual role in the moral equation. Virtue Ethics
combines a duty for moral growth with individual intuition for moral behavior by incorporating
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emotions, motives, inclinations, character, relationships, and situational discernment. This
intuitive appeal is engaging rather than prescriptive. It allows us to be good and feel good about
it because the choice we make is a reflection of who we are (or hope to be).
But Virtue Ethics’ emphasis on emotions has a complication: how do we avoid slipping
to the extremes of excess or deficiency in regard to our character traits? The range of expression
exists as a wide continuum between too little or too much. Aristotle posited the Golden Mean to
discern moderation of the virtues: we use our unique human reasoning (which Kant would like)
to determine the medium of the extremes relative to each of us. Note that the focus is still
internal. This internal locus on the agent does not descend into Egoism, as occasionally asserted
in criticisms, because Virtue Ethics emphasizes responsibility to the community in the individual
duty to moral growth. According to Pojman, Aristotle claimed the virtues were “simply those
characteristics that enable individuals to live well in communities” (172) so that society could
flourish. The moral virtues must be taught by example and exercised to be incorporated into the
good character. This necessitates a virtuous model for others to emulate so they might practice
in order to become virtuous. With regard to my moral dilemma I must decide the medium of
friendship (with hostility as the deficiency and obsequiousness as the extreme) and honesty (with
deception as the deficiency and brusqueness as the extreme) with regard to this specific dilemma.
It’s up to me to find the medium that allows me to express and nurture the virtues of honesty and
friendship that I value for myself. This is the learned, or experienced, aspect of Virtue Ethics:
that we must practice or habituate ourselves to the morally virtuous life.
The motivational aspect of Virtue Ethics is a particularly strong point in the philosophy.
The duty it requires of us (moral growth) is not a grudging obligation but an opportunity: it
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offers inspiration even as it incorporates the very same emotions and inclinations that Kant’s
deontological system would have us deny and consequentialist systems would have us ignore.
Virtue Ethics wants me to consider my inclinations and emotions concerning the moral dilemma
I face with my once-sober friend. My compassion for his struggle with addiction is important;
my concern for his family, friends, and the community as a whole is equally valid. These
responses to my friend’s plight stem from character traits that should act in concert to help me
reach a decision with regard to my moral dilemma. The difficulty with Virtue Ethics is that it
will not tell me what the right choice is: there is no rule I can readily apply, no scale of
consequence I can reference that solves my moral dilemma for me. This is Virtue Ethics’
blessing and its curse: the autonomy it affords me can also seem to abandon me to the whims of
circumstance. It suggests that, similar to economic and social schisms, some people might be
positioned for moral growth more favorably than others. If I have never had a good friend or my
friendships have been poor in quality, I have no virtuous example to emulate. My moral
development might be stunted by the conditions and events of my life. Morality consists of rules
and guidelines used to assign praise or blame for behavior; could Virtue Ethics blame the victim
of circumstance? Virtue Ethics retorts that the duty to moral growth suggests a promise of
capacity: human beings have inherent traits that can be developed to achieve some level of
virtue as a matter of degree, increased through effort. The internal locus on the agent allows for
such degrees of virtuous attainment, though with the evidently elitist understanding that some
will reach greater heights of virtue than others. But Virtue Ethics also places a duty on society at
large through the individual duty to moral growth; we can all be examples as we continue our
efforts toward excellence, providing the necessary resources for virtuous growth in our
community.
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If I said nothing to my friend about my concerns, I could retain the friendship and he
would be none the wiser. And on some level I could still consider myself his friend because I
had extended compassion, loyalty and tolerance toward him. But Virtue Ethics demands an
emphasis on the character of the moral agent, not the action he or she takes or the consequences
that derive from it. By confronting my friend about his drinking, at a minimum I protect both my
friend and the community from him driving home drunk; a consequentialist result. From a
deontological perspective I should be truthful with my friend out of duty to both my employer
and a moral duty to be honest. Both theories can be applied to my ultimate decision to confront
my friend about my concerns. But they represent a minimalist approach to morality: Kant seems
rigid and cold, while consequentialism reduces morality to a mathematic equation. Virtue Ethics
supplies an internal motivation which compels me to candid confrontation because of the kind of
moral life I want to lead and have a duty to develop. Virtue Ethics asserts that as I display the
virtues of honesty and friendship, I set an example for others even as I reinforce those traits
within myself.
Intuitively, Virtue Ethics makes the most sense to me as it seems to incorporate the
individual and society in morality. The internal focus is important to me: that instinctive,
gnostic sense of knowing what is right and wrong is part of what we talk about when we discuss
good character. The people we hold in esteem reflect what we value; what we want for and
cultivate in ourselves. I don’t believe I should remove my emotions and inclinations from a
moral dilemma when reaching a decision; it seems intrinsic to me that any conclusion I reach is
shaped by them. Action-based theories fall short of incorporating the human element on both the
individual and communal scale. With Virtue Ethics, a spiritual need is fulfilled as I endeavor to
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reach a decision which incorporates my emotions, intuitions, experience and knowledge with my
desire to develop a virtuous life: to be good for goodness sake.
Works Cited
Athanassoulis, Nafsika. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. University of Tennessee at
Martin, 2010.Web. 7 March 2011.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford U, 2007. Web. 7 March
2011.
Pojman, Louis P. How Should We Live? An Introduction to Ethics. California: Thomson, 2005.
Print.