Annual Review - Summary Sheet
Title: Independent Directorate of Local Governance Technical Assistance Programme
Programme Value: £2.9m
Programme Code: 203309
Review Date: February 2015
Start Date: March 2013
End Date: March 2016
Summary of Programme Performance
2013-14
2014-15
Year
B
A
Programme Score
Risk Rating
High
Medium
Summary of progress and lessons learnt since last review
Since the last Annual Review the programme responded to the uncertain political environment in
Afghanistan by focusing activities to support the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) to
strengthen local governance. This led to two work streams being discontinued shortly after the last
Annual Review. The Review recommended the programme prioritise support to IDLG core functions and
focus on areas where support could be most effective. It also led to a change from an output-based
contracting model to an input-based contracting model to enable the programme to adapt in response to
political uncertainty during the Presidential election period. The programme scaled-down through a ‘slow
down’ period from May to December 2014 and has begun to scale-up again now the new President and
some Cabinet appointments have been made.
The programme responded to feedback from the last Annual Review and the need to clarify the role and
functions of the IDLG in supporting sub-national governance in Afghanistan by undertaking a strategic
review. This made recommendations on the role of IDLG, a policy of de-concentrated sub-national
governance rather than devolution, improved organisational effectiveness of IDLG. As a result, IDLG
clarified its role and produced a strategy that focuses on three main areas:
1. Upward accountability – Clarifying and coding the interactions between Governors and service
delivery agencies.
2. Downward accountability – strengthening the representational capabilities of councillors to
amplify citizens’ voice.
3. Acting as a conduit to amplify and elevate citizen needs to ensure that the relevant central
government line ministries and agencies take account.
IDLG showed strong ownership during the development of the Strategic Review and the draft workplan,
which ensured that the programme was aligned with the emerging consensus between Afghan
counterparts on sub-national governance policy. The Strategic Review was approved by the IDLG Senior
Management Committee in October 2014.
Lessons learned
IDLG’s strong ownership of the programme and cooperative working relationships with the UK and the
implementing partner has supported the programme to deliver its Outputs. This has supported the
alignment of UK and IDLG priorities.
There was a delay in updating the logframe which was scheduled to happen once new IDLG leadership
had approved a programme workplan following the election. However, this has been delayed as IDLG
leadership is yet to be confirmed. In the future, logframe updates should be in advance of major political
events such as elections, or else be made promptly after annual reviews; they should avoid being tied to
political events.
1
Sub-national governance programming across Afghanistan can be improved through effective donor
coordination which until now has been ad-hoc.
Summary of recommendations for the next year

The programme will need to assess the degree of political will and GIRoA’s policy priorities. It should
continue to support IDLG strategy development, on upward and downward accountability and remain
flexible to respond to the changing political context and any changes in IDLG or sub-national
governance institutions.

The programme workplan should be reviewed updated and approved based on a refreshed analysis
of the political situation by April 2015.

It is important that the implementing partner works with IDLG to ensure it collects monitoring data on
a regular basis in future so that it can monitor the sub-national impact of strategic reforms at the
centre. If this is not possible, new indicators will have to be introduced or an outcome assessment
measure developed for the Programme Completion Review in February/March 2016.

Where the implementing partner is providing strategic support to IDLG, it should focus on capacity
building to ensure that support does not substitute capacity in IDLG.

IDLG should commence donor coordination on sub-national governance in coordination with other
relevant Government counterparts to ensure coordinated support as it develops policy and strategy.
The upcoming sub-national governance forum which should take place by May 2015, should be an
opportunity to convene a donor coordination group.

In the future, logframe updates should be made in advance of major political events such as
elections, or else be made promptly after annual review; they should avoid being tied to political
events.

DFID should coordinate the update of the logframe and theory of change to reflect the shift in output
support to ensure it is a clear reflection of the current outputs and the link to the programme outcome
by May 2015.
A. Introduction and Context
DevTracker Link to Business Case:
DevTracker Link to Logframe:
http://iati.DFID.gov.uk/iati_documents/4241900.doc
http://iati.DFID.gov.uk/iati_documents/4326622.xlsx
Outline of the programme
The UK is providing up to £2.9m over three years for technical assistance to sub-national government
through IDLG. IDLG was established in 2007, through a Presidential decree and is responsible for
supporting provincial, district and municipal tiers of government. IDLG reports to the Office of the
President. The UK’s support is provided through a consulting firm (the ‘implementing partner’).
The programme aims to strengthen IDLG’s core functions and support governance reforms at subnational levels. This Annual Review covers the second year of the programme: March 2014-March 2015.
DFID agreed with IDLG a ‘slow down’ period from May to December 2014 due to political uncertainty
during and after the disputed Presidential election. During this time, the size of the programme team and
number of activities were reduced and the programme team produced a revised workplan for the
remainder of the programme period with an inception report. The logframe was revised accordingly.
2
What are the expected results?
The overall goal (impact) of the programme is that the Government of Afghanistan is capable of
responding to local needs in an accountable manner, resulting in greater legitimacy.
The outcome (purpose) of the programme is that Provincial Governors' Offices and Provincial Councils
produce more coherent and more accountable provincial administration, with the support of IDLG.
The outputs of the programme are as follows:
1. Improved IDLG core functions;
2. IDLG is enabling Governors' Offices to play an effective leadership and coordination function;
3. IDLG is enabling local representative bodies to play an improved accountability function.
What is the context in which UK support is provided?
The President emphasised the importance of sub-national governance policy in the Government’s
‘Realising Self Reliance Paper’, produced in advance of the November 2014 London Conference on
Afghanistan. He committed to renew Afghanistan’s sub-national governance policy1.
The Afghan administration approaches sub-national governance through a very limited form of ‘deconcentration’ of authority and resources. Officials are usually centrally appointed, managed and
assigned to Provinces and Districts by their respective Line Ministries. Government activities at subnational levels are defined by and resourced through the budgets of Line Ministries, functioning as local
units of their central ministries which retain hierarchical accountability. Although provincial and district
governments produce plans each year, these have only been loosely linked to central resource
allocations via Line Ministries. Governors’ roles are defined primarily in terms of representation and
coordination, though in reality their de facto influence over how resources are spent varies widely and
depend on both their central and local power bases. Accountability bodies, particularly Provincial
Councils which are the only elected bodies at sub-national level, remain generally weak.
Whilst positive progress has been made in recent years, the Government’s ability to deliver basic
services such as health and education remains weak, with Afghanistan remaining low on the UN’s 2014
Human Development Index (HDI)– ranking 169th out of 187 countries in 20132. In conflict-affected areas,
this is made worse by insecurity and tenuous state legitimacy which have limited the Government’s
presence to provincial and district centres. However, even in stable areas the Government still lacks the
capacity to deliver services that are accountable to local people and respond effectively to their needs. In
part this is due to the limited involvement of local government bodies in planning and implementing the
services described above. It is also caused by unclear roles and responsibilities of key sub-national
bodies – Provincial and District Governors, Provincial Councils and district representative bodies – which
creates confusion and reduces the Government’s effectiveness at local levels.3
Within the existing, highly centralised, government system in Afghanistan there is much that can be done
to strengthen the Government’s performance at sub-national levels. Firstly, there is scope to increase
the extent of de-concentration of authority and resources within Line Ministries, thereby increasing
planning and spending at provincial and district levels. Secondly, it is possible to better define the roles
and relationships of government bodies at local levels and to provide them with the staff and resources
they need to properly fulfil their responsibilities.
The programme intends to work within existing statutory systems in Afghanistan in order to support the
Government’s efforts to enhance de-concentration and improve local accountability and service delivery.
In doing this, it seeks to contribute to the ‘viable state’ strand of the UK’s National Security Council
Strategy and the sub-national governance objectives of DFID’s Operational Plan (2011-2015).
Specifically, and as a first step, the programme aims to clarify the functions of key government bodies
and reforming structures to be better able to perform their core functions of planning, co-ordinating and
1
GIROA (2014), Realising Self Reliance: Commitments to reforms and renewed partnerships.
UN Human Development Index 2014(refers to 2013); p159. http://hdr.undp.org/en/
3 World Bank (2014), Binding Constraints to Service Delivery
2
3
overseeing local services. Since IDLG is charged with supporting governance bodies at sub-national
levels, the programme also seeks to strengthen its core functions in order to deliver and sustain these
reforms.
There are new programmes on sub-national governance being developed by other donors. Therefore it
will be important for IDLG to coordinate donor activities through regular donor meetings. In addition,
donors will also need to coordinate closely between programmes. The upcoming sub-national
governance forum, coordinated by IDLG to reach consensus amongst government entities on
subnational governance priorities will provide an opportunity for this to commence. The Forum is
expected to take place in May 2015.
4
B: PERFORMANCE AND CONCLUSIONS
Annual outcome assessment
Outcome
Provincial Governors' Offices and Provincial Councils produce more coherent and
more accountable provincial administration, with the support of IDLG
Indicator(s)
1. Clear roles and
responsibilities of the
subnational government
entities and provincial
administration.
Milestones (end March 2015)
Local Administration Law
enacted and disseminated to
Subnational Governance entities
and other relevant stakeholders
Progress
Substantially did not meet expectation - The
Local Administration Law is not yet enacted due
to delays surrounding the Presidential Election
and delay in the appointment of a Cabinet in
2014.
2. Provincial Councils
playing accountability role
within a clarified legal and
regulatory framework.
Awareness and understanding
of regulatory document provided
by IDLG amongst at least 60%
of Provincial Councils and 60%
of polled Provincial Governors'
Office (PGO) staff
Moderately did not meet expectation. 44% of
PGOs polled (sample of 16 provinces) were
aware of the current status of the Local Council
Law (i.e. that it is still with the lower house),
while 69% were aware of its intent (i.e. to clarify
the roles and responsibilities of sub-national
entities).
3. IDLG is more capable of
supporting local
administration and local
councils to be efficient and
accountable
Average scoring of satisfaction
with management of IDLG
programmes in Provincial
Governors’ Offices and
Provincial Councils of 40% (at
least 17 provinces measured)
Met expectations. 88% of PGOs polled (sample
of 16 provinces) reported that they were very
satisfied, satisfied or moderately satisfied with
IDLG’s management of its programmes (though
just 38% reported that they were more than
moderately satisfied).
Overall we expect the programme to achieve the expected outcome target by the end of the programme.
The programme should look to update and approve the programme workplan for the final year on IDLG
organisational development, and upward and downward accountability work streams. Evidence was not
collected regularly to verify the outcome indicators 2 and 3. However, evidence gathered through polling
a sample of Provincial Council’s and Provincial Governor’s Offices in March 2015 indicated that these
indicators are moving in the right direction.
Indicator 1: Due to the elections and period of political transition, the Local Administration Law has not
yet been enacted and disseminated to sub-national governance entities. This was caused by delays
surrounding the Presidential Election, the time taken to form a unity-government and then the delay in
appointing a new Cabinet, which have been outside of the programme’s control. However, IDLG is
hopeful that the Local Administration Law will be progressed this year once the Cabinet has been
formed.
During this uncertain period, the programme has worked to clarify the role of IDLG through a Strategic
Review. The programme supported IDLG to produce a policy paper on ‘Clarifying the Relationship
between Governors and Security Sector Agencies’ and began scoping work on the interactions between
governors and health, education and agriculture directorates. This demonstrates that progress has been
made towards clarifying governor interactions with service delivery agencies.
During the review period, IDLG conducted an email and phone survey, at the request of the
implementing partner, of 16 Provincial Governor’s Offices to assess performance against outcome
indicators 2 and 3.
Indicator 2: The data shows that 69% of those polled in March 2015 have awareness of what the Local
Council Law intends to do. However, the sample size (16 provinces) is limited, sampling less than half of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Some progress has been made towards improving the ability of councils to
play an effective accountability role. This includes Parliament’s approval of Provincial Council Law in
October 2014. However, it was subsequently returned to Parliament for revisions and was amended by
Parliament to remove important references to Provincial Councils’ role in monitoring local
5
administrations. A period of intense negotiation is currently underway and the programme is looking at
how a compromise can be reached which retains this important function.
Simultaneously, the programme’s Downward Accountability Adviser has started to support IDLG to
gather citizens’ views on governance. This is supported by a methodological note and consultations
within the General Directorate for Local Council Administration (GDLCA). Consultations to develop
supporting guidance are due to start with the Ministries of Health, Education and Agriculture, Irrigation
and Livestock, and with Councillors.
The programme also helped clarify the relationship between Governors and Security Agencies. IDLG
drafted a policy paper on governor-security sector agency interactions which was used as the basis for a
draft presidential decree submitted to the National Security Shura in December 2014.
Progress has been made against the overall indicator “Provincial Councils playing accountability role
within a clarified legal and regulatory framework”. Evidence includes work undertaken by IDLG to resolve
the dispute between Councils and Parliament on the Local Councils Law, the clarity provided by the
IDLG Strategic Review on its role in relation to councils, and the work to produce practical guidance and
instruments for councillors. This will clarify how they should fulfil their role in monitoring service delivery.
Indicator 3: Of the 16 provinces that were polled in March 2015, 88% of Provincial Governors’ Offices
reported they were very satisfied, satisfied or moderately satisfied with IDLG’s performance. This data,
although from just 16 provinces, shows that progress has been made through the IDLG Strategic
Review. This led to downward and upward accountability being adopted as the core business of the
IDLG.
Evidence for outcome indicators 2 and 3 was not collected routinely by IDLG due to staff shortages to
assess their progress or IDLG performance at the sub-national level. It is recommended that this
information is collected regular by the IDLG Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate in the future. If there
are any issues collating this data then new indicators will have to be agreed or an outcome assessment
measure developed for the Programme Completion Review.
Overall output score and description
The programme has met most of its output level milestones and has been re-orientated to support IDLG
to develop a clear strategy and clarify its functions during a period of political uncertainty. The
programme has a clear focus going forward based on the inception report and IDLG Strategic Review.
The programme is on track to deliver output targets based on the interviews conducted and output data
collected.
Key lessons
The strong ownership of the programme from IDLG counterparts has supported the programme to
deliver most of its output milestones. This has been supported by the alignment of UK and IDLG
priorities.
The ability to change the contract from output to input-based, helped the programme to respond to
emerging policy issues and maintain a strong relationship with government counterparts.
The combination of national and international technical assistance is welcomed by IDLG because it
provides a deeper understanding of the local context and allows the programme to engage more
productively with non-English speaking counterparts, particularly at the sub-national level.
Key Actions
1. DFID should coordinate revisions to the logframe, specifically outcome indicators 2 and 3 to take
account of evidence available to evaluate indicators.
2. The implementing partner should review available monitoring information to support outcome
indicators. If no information is available, DFID will need to agree new outcome indicators with IDLG.
6
3. The implementing partner should assign responsibility for collecting monitoring data to a specific
team member. They should include updates on logframe indicators in their reporting to DFID on a
quarterly basis at both an outcome and output level.
Has the logframe been updated since the last review?
Yes. The logframe has been updated and agreed with IDLG to reflect an agreed ‘slow down’ period
during Afghanistan’s elections. Outputs 1 and 3 have been amended to adapt to the changing political
environment. They now have a greater focus on strategic activities that will increase impact on
governance at the local level. Under these outputs, DFID decided to discontinue some work streams
including support to the Finance Directorate, Communications, Provincial Governors’ Offices and
Provincial Councils.
7
C: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING
Output Title
Improved IDLG Core Functions
Output number per LF
1
Output Score
A
Risk:
High
Impact weighting (%):
40%
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
1.1 IDLG has a clear vision
regarding subnational
governance reform, and its
strategy and structure - and
is able to perform its core
functions effectively.
Milestones (end March 2015)
Strategic review of IDLG
structure and functions
conducted and submitted to
IDLG's senior management
board for consideration.
Progress
Met expectations - Strategic review of IDLG
conducted between July - September 2014 and
signed off by IDLG’s Senior Management Board.
1.2 Finance Directorate of
IDLG pays out or transfers
budgeted funds to the
provincial level in a timely
manner
Time taken to complete
allotments reduced by 2 days,
to 18 days, and time taken to
complete payments is reduced
by 2 days, to 12 days;
Transfers include funds under
the development budget.
Met expectations for period of work stream. Work
stream discontinued in July 2014.
1.3 Communication of
subnational governance
messages between IDLG
and its stakeholders,
including international
partners, Provincial and
District Governors, and
Provincial and District
Councils
Communications unit is
carrying out its functions in line
with IDLG's communications
strategy
Met expectations for period of work stream.
Work stream discontinued in August 2014.
Time taken to process allotments reduced to 4
days through introduction of electronic transfers.
The communications strategy is being
implemented including:
i. The alignment of IDLG and government
communications
ii. IDLG website and online media support
contract
iii. The elevation of the communications unit to
directorate level by IDLG leadership
iv. Delivery of first communications campaigns
v. Guidelines produced by the programme have
been rolled out for use by all Provincial
Governors Office Communicators
Key Points
Indicator 1.1: The IDLG Strategic Review articulates IDLG’s role as the body responsible for
coordinating sub-national governance and aligns with President Ghani’s priorities on deconcentration. It
outlines IDLG’s priorities, objectives and role in supervising local administrations and supporting local
councils to hold Government to account. It also provides recommendations on the organisational
changes required in IDLG to deliver this new focus. The programme worked closely with IDLG staff,
which resulted in good ownership and consensus around priorities.
8
IDLG is now clearly focused on its main responsibilities of:



Upward Accountability4 – ensuring that there is adequate supervision of Provincial Governors,
District Governors and Mayors and guidance on their roles and responsibilities.
Downward Accountability5 – ensuring Local Councils are empowered to represent the needs of
citizens and hold the administrative arms of Government to account for governance and service
delivery.
Representing citizens’ needs at the national level and ensuring the necessary Government agencies
respond.
There is still work to be done on clarifying sub-national roles and responsibilities within Government
including with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Line Ministries. IDLG supported a
subnational governance and provincial budgeting forum in March 2015, which should further this
objective.
In identifying and delivering the work streams, identified by the Government as priorities, the
implementing partner has worked closely with Government counterparts. This trusted relationship with
IDLG’s leadership means that the implementing partner is sometimes undertaking core work of IDLG
e.g. reviewing other donors’ programme proposals. The supplier should remain focused on capacity
building, in order to deliver outputs around upward and downward accountability. The supplier should not
take on work that should ordinarily be done by Government officials; this will ensure sustainability of
work streams as IDLG takes on ownership.
Indicator 1.2: Support to the Finance Directorate was productive during the time this work stream was
implemented in 2014. The programme has achieved its milestone for reducing time taken to process
allotments and payment. This included support to design operational systems and procedures and
building the capacity of Finance Staff. This work was halted during the ‘slow down’ period, and not
included in the new workplan. DFID initiated the programme ‘slow down’ to prioritise work on IDLG’s
core functions based on recommendations from the last annual review. Data provided in support of 1.2
(on processing time for allotments), in February 2015, indicates that improvements have been sustained
beyond the end of the programme’s support.
Indicator 1.3: The programme moved forward with implementation of IDLG’s communications strategy
until August 2014. It supported the production of communications materials and provided capacity
building support. This enabled IDLG to conduct its first communications campaign at the provincial,
district and village levels on IDLG’s role and functions and on good governance. This output was
discontinued at DFID’s request as the last annual review expressed concerns that increased
communications capacity was being used mainly to promote IDLG within the central government, rather
than to improve communication with subnational actors. Implementation of the communications strategy
produced with the support of the programme, has continued.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)
Output 1 has been re-orientated based on the recommendations from the last Annual Review to focus on
the core functions of IDLG. This aligns with the programme’s Theory of Change to strengthen subnational governance.
The recommendation to increase support to communications was not taken forward due to the political
impasse during the election period. The last Annual Review also recommended a focus on improving
information flows from local councils to national Government, which is reflected in the new workplan to
support downward accountability.
4
Upward accountability entails the requirement for one party to give an account of his/her actions to another party that is above
him/her in the organisational hierarchy or chain of command.
5 Downward accountability implies that government agencies should be accountable to the citizens that they are meant to serve
and should be responsive to their needs.
9
Recommendations
4. The programme should continue to support IDLG’s strategy development including revision of the
Local Governance National Priority Programme. This will provide a clear framework through which
the President’s vision for sub-national governance can be articulated.
5. The institutional position or structure of IDLG may change due to the political context in the coming
year, or sub-national governance may move to another institution.. If this happens, the programme
could move to support sub-national governance functions in another institution. This could include
work on local governance outcomes, upward accountability for provincial and district administrations,
and support to councils to play their downward accountability function.
6. The logframe should be updated to reflect planned programme activities and to consider other
indicators that could be used to assess output 1, given that work streams on Finance (1.2) and
Communications (1.3) have been discontinued. The output assumptions regarding monitoring should
be reviewed by the implementing partner as there is evidence that resources and systems may not
provide adequate information to support monitoring and evaluation of this programme or provide
feedback on the impact of reforms at the sub-national level.
7. Counterparts appreciate the support from the implementing partner; and so, during this period of
political transition, it is important the supplier supports IDLG in delivering its agenda, ensuring they
focus on capacity building and do not substitute capacity in IDLG. The latter is recognised as a risk
for the programme, for example, the reliance of IDLG on the implementing partner for the production
of policy papers rather than building staff capacity to lead these processes.
10
Output Title
IDLG is enabling governors' offices to play an effective leadership and coordination
function
Output Score
A
Output number per LF
2
Risk:
Medium
Impact weighting (%):
35
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
Y
Indicator(s)
2.1 Provincial Governors'
Offices awareness of and
implementation of clarified
responsibilities for regular
operational leadership and
coordination
2.2 Provincial Governors'
Offices awareness of and
implementation of clarified
responsibilities for local
strategic and annual
planning.
2.3 Number of PGOs that
are implementing their own
budget planning process (as
opposed to IDLG conducting
budgeting on their behalf)
Milestones (end March 2015)
Existing leadership formally
adopts a strategy that
emphasises upward
accountability.
Scoping work on the role and
functions of governors in
relation to selected service
delivery agencies completed or
well advanced.
Provincial Governors’ Offices
in 2 pilot provinces are leading
annual and strategic planning
processes in accordance with
IDLG guidelines, to at least
adequate quality.
Work stream discontinued in
May 2014.
IDLG 1394 budget submitted
on time and incorporating
needs identified at provincial
level, piloting the Provincial
Budget Circular 1 in at least
two provinces.
Progress
Met expectations – IDLG undertook a Strategic
Review in October 2014 which produced a
strategy on IDLG priorities and how they should
deliver these. This was approved by the IDLG
Senior Management Committee.
The scoping study on downward accountability
has been delayed until April 2015 due to staff
availability of the implementing partner.
Met expectations for period of work stream. Work
stream discontinued in May 2014
A policy note, ‘Policy on Planning for Provincial
and District Level Entities’ was produced in April
2014. It set out local and strategic planning roles
and responsibilities for sub-national agencies.
Met expectations for period of work stream.
Work stream discontinued in August 2014.
Budget Preparation Report 1394 Report
published August 2014. Budget Circulat 1 was
incorporated in: Balkh, Ghazni, Khost, Kunar and
Zabul.
Key Points
Indicator 2.1: The programme supported work to clarify the constitutional and legislative mandate for
Governors, which was ambiguous and failed to provide meaningful guidance on the mandate of a
Governor. This was particularly regarding their interactions with the security sector. The programme did
this through the IDLG Strategic Review which produced a strategy that was approved by the IDLG
Senior Management Committee and the production of a paper on Governor-security sector relations in
summer 2014.
The paper on Governor-security sector relations, which was approved by IDLG , has subsequently been
used as the basis for a draft presidential decree (submitted to the National Security Shura in December
2014). The programme will work with the Policy Directorate to begin clarifying governor interactions with
two key line departments (health and education). Deployment of the International Upward Accountability
Adviser has seen the timeline of this work slip but work has been done by the team in-country to ensure
the adviser is able to engage immediately once he deploys ( planned for April 2015).
The IDLG Strategic Review gave prominence to IDLG’s role in ensuring that Governors work within a
framework of guidance and regulations set centrally, that clear limits on their authority are set, and that
IDLG plays an active role in providing oversight and controls.
11
Indicator 2.2: Although the work stream for indicator 2.2 was discontinued, the programme supported
IDLG to produce a document entitled ‘Policy on Planning for Provincial and District Level Entities’ in April
2014. This document detailed local and strategic planning roles and responsibilities for sub-national
agencies. This work was halted during the slowdown period at DFID’s request and was not included in
the workplan by the programme team. This was due to the fact that the Provincial Budgeting Policy,
which is a prerequisite for further progress on this output, has not yet been passed. This output could be
reopened if progress is seen on the Provincial Budgeting.
Indicator 2.3: Until August 2014, the programme worked with IDLG’s Administration and Finance
Directorate to implement an extended budget preparation calendar for IDLG, which provided greater
opportunity for provincial inputs. The programme developed a ‘Provincial Budget Circular 1 form’ to
assess needs at the provincial level for inclusion in the IDLG Budget Circular 1. It also supported IDLG to
conduct a budget preparation workshop at which the majority of Provincial Governors’ Offices submitted
assessments of their budget needs to IDLG. This work was halted during the ‘slow down’ period at
DFID’s request, and was not included in the new workplan as the programme prioritised work on IDLG’s
core functions as per the last Annual Review recommendations. IDLG is planning a budget workshop,
building on the work that DFID instigated. This will convene finance directors from the provinces to
develop Provincial Budget Circular 1s.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)
The last Annual Review recommended that the programme prioritise work according to areas of traction
with IDLG leadership and what could be implemented in year two. It also recommended a focus on
building government-wide clarity, consensus and approval on the roles and responsibilities of Governors,
especially in relation to provincial planning and budgeting. The IDLG Strategic Review and the new
workplan allow work undertaken as part of this output to adapt and align with IDLG priorities, namely
building clarity on the role of Governors. However, planning, budgeting and standard costing were
designated as low priority areas due to the political environment and the finance work stream was
discontinued in August 2014.
Recommendations
8. The programme should improve monitoring in the provinces to review and gauge the impact of
engagement with Provincial Governors’ Offices and Provincial Councils.
9. The logframe should be updated to reflect planned programme activities and to consider other
indicators that could be used to assess output 2, as the work streams on Provincial Governors
Offices (2.2) and budget planning with Provincial Governors Offices (2.3) have been discontinued.
12
Output Title
IDLG is enabling local representative bodies to play an improved downward
accountability function
Output Score
A
Output number per LF
3
Risk:
Medium
Impact weighting (%):
25
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
Y
Indicator(s)
3.1 Number of provincial
councils implementing
revised and formalised
representational functions
effectively
Milestones (end March 2015)
Existing leadership formally
adopts a strategy that includes
downward accountability.
Progress
Met expectations - IDLG approved a Strategic
Review that includes downward accountability
and includes IDLG’s support to local councils.
Scoping work on the
representational roles and
functions of councillors in
relation to service delivery is
completed or close to
completion.
Scoping work was completed during Feb- Mar
2015.
3.2 Number of provincial
councils that are
implementing their own
budget planning process (as
opposed to IDLG Finance
Directorate or Provincial
Governors Office conducting
budgeting on their behalf)
Provincial councils in 2
provinces formulate their own
budgets, within ceiling provided
by IDLG, to at least adequate
quality.
N/A
Work stream discontinued in
March 2014.
Key Points
The IDLG Strategic Review gives increased priority to IDLG’s work with Provincial Councils. The review
recommended the creation of a new Deputy Minister for Local Councils and argued that IDLG should
devote more attention to supporting to councils, and to acting as a link between councils and central
government. Work to produce practical tools for councillors began in February 2015 and is well
advanced.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)
Indicator 3.1: The programme has responded to recommendations from the last Annual Review that this
output should focus on work which is resilient to the political situation. The parallel development of the
IDLG Strategic Review and programme workplan has ensured that the programme is well-aligned with
IDLG priorities. A six- week scoping study took place in February-March 2015 on downward
accountability which includes the representational roles and functions of councillors in relation to service
delivery. In addition, practical guidance and tools for councillors began at the beginning of February
2015.
Indicator 3.2: The recommendation to consider support to Provincial Councils was not taken forward
during 2014 due to the political situation. It will not be taken forward in 2015 under this programme as
USAID is preparing to implement a nationwide provincial programme, which will include support to
provincial councillors. This work was halted during the ‘slow down’ period at DFID’s request, and not
included in the new workplan as the programme prioritised work on IDLG’s core functions as per the last
Annual Review.
Recommendations
10. The programme should retain flexibility to respond to the political environment and upcoming policy
developments and provide the appropriate support to IDLG. This includes both the finalisation of the
Provincial Councils Law and a final decision on the reform agenda for District Councils (i.e. whether
elections will occur in the near future or the District Coordination Council concept will be rolled out as
an interim solution).
13
11. The logframe should be updated to reflect planned programme activities and to consider other
indicators that could be used to assess output 3 as the work stream on Provincial Council budget
planning (3.2) has been discontinued.
12. The logframe update should ensure that the milestone for output 3.1 is a measure of the indicator.
D: VALUE FOR MONEY & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Key cost drivers and performance
As detailed in the Business Case, the main key cost driver for this programme is the size of the team of
consultants deployed in Afghanistan. These costs vary according to the security context and, as the
Business Case points out, there is a limited number of high calibre experienced consultants willing to
deploy to Afghanistan’s, largely due to security concerns. High quality consultants are required to ensure
that the programme gains traction with the IDLG and is able to support meaningful reforms.
The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, starting in 2014 has resulted in increased pressure on
consultancy costs, through higher fee rates and more expensive supplier security and duty of care
arrangements. The implementing partner’s premises undertook a security upgrade in the second half of
the reporting year, but these costs have not been passed on to the UK.
VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case
The Business Case did not set out a testable VfM proposition. Instead it set out the benefits of three
options largely in terms of vague outcomes and impacts, which are difficult to either assess or value. A
VfM framework was produced, which ranks the feasible options against the metrics set out below but it
does not set out any benchmarks against which VfM can be measured, nor have any previous Annual
Reviews. It is inherently difficult to measure some of the metrics (such as spillovers and leveraging) and
it is inherently difficult to set SMART benchmarks for many of the other metrics. This Annual Review
therefore tests the VfM of the programme against these metrics as far as possible. DFID will explore
amending the delivery plan with a set of metrics and benchmarks that will allow VfM to be assessed
more robustly.
The framework assesses the programme’s VfM against three broad indicators (i) economy: cost and
quality of inputs; (ii) efficiency: measure of productivity and risk of programme failure (iii) effectiveness:
relevance and robustness of logframe indicators, the Theory of Change and leverage, replication and
influencing.
The programme responded to VFM recommendations in the last Annual Review to implement a slowdown period (May to December 2014) during a period of political transition and uncertainty. This
ensured that the programme focused on inputs that contributed to programme outputs and core IDLG
functions and dropped inputs that were unlikely to contribute to outputs. This resulted in costs being kept
to a minimum and ensured that the programme achieved maximum VfM. Maintaining a presence within
IDLG has proven to have a positive impact on the UK’s continued engagement with IDLG. The presence
of one full-time Adviser has strengthened the UK’s relationship with the leadership and has delivered a
number of significant outputs, notably the IDLG-Implementing Partner workplan, the stated priority for
2014.
Economy
Unit costs
The key cost drivers for this programme continue to be staff consultancy fees and associated costs
(security and life support). Daily fees for consultants ranged between £300-£850 per day. This is
consistent with consultancy rates for programmes of this nature in Afghanistan. The ‘slow down’ period
has resulted in a reduced number of consultants being deployed to Afghanistan which has resulted in
14
savings being made across the programme. Unfortunately, due to contracting being changed from output
to input-based during this year, it is not possible to calculate exactly how much has been saved in this
way.
The implementing partner maintains an economical operational platform in Kabul. A shared services
model is used in which support costs are shared between multiple programmes they implement. This
delivers economies of scale on accommodation and security costs. Shared accommodation across a
number of programmes has resulted in savings of over £19,000 being made between June to December
2014. The implementing partner has also achieved savings by dividing flight, accommodation and
security expenses for the Programme Manager across two other long term programmes he manages in
Afghanistan.
The change to an input-based contracting model has also resulted in savings across the programme.
Under the old output-based payment system between September 2014 and January 2015, DFID would
have paid a total of £298,314 in six milestone payments. Under the input-based system, DFID has paid
just £158,739. This represents a saving of £139,575 over just five months. During this time the
programme has prioritised its work on IDLG’s core functions, as per recommendations in the last Annual
Review. Although the number of deliverables has reduced as five outputs have been discontinued the
programme remains on track to meet the overall programme objectives by the time it concludes in March
2016.
Quality of inputs
The quality of inputs has been good: feedback from IDLG has supported the quality of work being
delivered by the implementing partner. DFID is seen as a trusted partner with strong relationships being
built both at technical working levels and with the IDLG leadership. It is important that the implementing
partner continues to support IDLG in delivering its agenda, building capacity, not substituting it.
Efficiency
Productivity
The previous Annual Review measured productivity by reference to the number of outputs and their
perceived quality, without being able to establish whether performance against either measure was
strong or not. The move to input based payments and the ‘slow down’ implemented in May 2014 renders
this measure less useful and any comparison with the previous year of little value. Changing the contract
from output based to input-based payments has given the programme more flexibility in delivery,
evidenced by the ‘slow down’ period, which allowed the programme to adapt and continue delivering.
Risk
The risk of this programme has been downgraded, from high to medium risk. The discrete risks and
actions for their mitigation are discussed in the risk section below. DFID Afghanistan also recognises
higher than average levels of security and political risk for programmes and ensures mitigation measures
are in place.
A key risk that has impacted the way the programme delivers in IDLG is the political transition in
Afghanistan. This has the potential to disrupt delivery of the programme as the lack of clarity around
leadership and Government policy means the programme has to remain flexible. This risk was
addressed by the ‘slow down’ period. Another key risk is the lack of political will within IDLG or other
parts of Government to support and implement certain reforms. These risks require DFID and the
implementing partner to respond and adapt to Government priorities.
Effectiveness
Relevance and Robustness of logframe indicators
15
The logframe was updated in January 2015 to ensure indicators remained relevant and robust in the
‘slow down’ phase during the period of transition. The logframe will be further refined as a result of this
Annual Review.
Theory of Change
The assumptions of the original Theory of Change still hold and no new evidence challenges its
robustness or the rationale for the programme.
Significant potential to leverage further donor funding
It is very difficult to assess whether or not this programme has directly leveraged other donor funding.
However, other donors have recently decided to support sub-national governance, including working with
IDLG and other government agencies. DFID is working closely with these donors as they develop their
respective programmes.
Replication of a good example by other donors or government
The programme team has engaged with donors working in sub-national governance to ensure that there
is coherence and coordination across those working with IDLG on sub-national governance issues, but
also with those that are developing new programmes. The Government should improve donor
coordination which until now has been ad-hoc; this will strengthen this indicator further.
Extension of benefits to a wider group (spillovers)
It is too early to say whether the programme has performed against this measure. However, DFID has
ensured, through donor meetings that lessons learned are shared with the wider donor community.
Transfer of lesson learning to other programmes
DFID has two programmes working on sub-national governance, specifically in IDLG. As a result, there
are lessons learnt between programmes. This allows DFID to approach sub-national governance as one
portfolio of programmes. As discussed above, DFID has coordinated with other donors who are
developing sub-national governance programmes.
Summary
Despite a period of political transition, which limited the amount of reform implementation, the
programme has achieved notable successes. The policy discussion paper on Governor-security sector
relationship, produced in June 2014, was taken forward by IDLG who adapted it as the basis for the draft
Presidential Decree on the issue. This was submitted to the National Security Shura in December 2014.
The IDLG Strategic Review, instigated and supported by the programme, became IDLG policy in
October 2014 demonstrating that the programme’s technical work is impacting on IDLG’s
conceptualisation of its role and it prioritisation process. This was achieved with the support of just one
international Adviser.
Assessment of whether the programme continues to represent value for money
DFID’s view is that the programme does represent good value for money, despite a difficult operating
environment in Afghanistan both politically and due to security.
The programme effectively implemented a ‘slow down’ period, reducing the number of advisers to one
international consultant, who has continued delivery of the programme’s objectives. Since December
2014, the implementing partner started the process of scaling up again, with recruitment of another
international adviser to undertake scoping work. This will inform the final stage of the programme and will
allow effective delivery of the IDLG-implementing partner workplan.
16
The programme has also performed against the VfM framework. The quality of the inputs is good and
the management costs of the programme have been kept down by the implementing partner’s policy of
sharing costs among programmes. The risk rating of the programme has been downgraded, the
evidence underpinning the theory of change is still valid, additional donors have decided to support subnational governance and DFID is ensuring that the lessons learnt from this programme are shared with
its own and other donor programmes in the sector.
Quality of financial management
The programme has had a complex year regarding financial management. The implementing partner
has delivered the transition from an output-based contract to an input-based contract between May and
August 2014, which was delivered to schedule by September 2014. Reporting and forecasting has been
accurate and delivered with foresight and due consideration, assisting the DFID programme team in
planning for a scale-up once there is clarity around the political leadership in IDLG.
Date of last narrative financial report
Date of last audited annual statement
18 February 2015
28 July 2014
E: RISK
Overall risk rating: Medium
DFID Afghanistan recognises higher than average levels of security and political risk for programmes
and ensures mitigation measures are in place.
The key risks identified in the logframe’s output risk rating are at medium. The risks include: (a)
deteriorating security situation; (b) political uncertainty during transition and loss of high number of key
managers and directors within IDLG over the course of transition; (c) sub-national governance context
changes in the transition period (e.g. through conflict increasing, IDLG being subsumed into a
government ministry, political will for sub-national governance reforms diminishes, or the IDLG
leadership changes), making it difficult to deliver technical and administrative reforms in the provinces;
(d) lack of political will within IDLG or other parts of government to support and implement certain
reforms; and (e) fraud/misuse of DFID funds.
Of the risks identified above, the most significant concern is uncertainty about IDLG’s continued role
within the new Government during the political transition.
Score 1-5: 1 Very Low- 2 Low- 3 Medium- 4 High- 5 Very High
BEFORE mitigation
Description
Probability Impact on
of
Programme
Occurrence
AFTER mitigation
Mitigation
Probability
of
Occurrence
Impact on
Programme
2
4
Fraud and Fiduciary Risks
Fraud/misuse
of DFID funds
3
4
- Supplier selected through the Framework
Agreements set up by DFID’s PrG, they have
been pre-qualified (e.g. their financial standing
has been checked).
- Regular spot checks of suppliers’ receipts
and invoices, as stipulated in the contract.
- Regular meetings with the supplier to check
on progress against outputs and triangulation
on their performance with govt. counterparts.
Quarterly programme steering committee
meetings between supplier, DFID and IDLG.
- The programme contract is now input based
rather than output based billing.
- Clear separation of duties. Contract is
17
managed by DFID’s PrG in HQ. They are
required to approve and issue any
amendments to the contract.
- Ensure all contract variations are within the
scope of EU regulations.
Delivery Risks
Lack of
political will
within IDLG
or other parts
of Govt. to
support and
implement
certain
reforms
4
4
- Ensure reforms are within the purview of
legal frameworks and constitution.
- Focus on administrative reforms – rather
than those which are politically contentious.
- For reforms that may meet resistance,
design measures to incentivise support for
their implementation, in concert with other
donors.
- Engagement should be continued with
leadership particularly if there is a change
of leadership.
4
4
Political
uncertainty
during
transition and
loss of high
number of
key
managers
and directors
within IDLG
over course
of transition.
4
3
- The programme team and supplier will
ensure continued engagement with
Government to ensure Government priorities
are understood and are being delivered.
- The programme team will ensure that it
continues to work largely at Director level,
which is unlikely to change significantly as a
result of political transition.
- Prioritise the strengthening of systems and
policies, rather than particular individuals.
- Focus on transferring capacity to civil
servants as well as national technical
assistants.
4
3
Deteriorating
security
situation.
4
4
Through continued supplier engagement,
DFID will ensure the programme continues to
deliver in accordance with the supplier’s duty
of care.
The high risk of deterioration in security
requires the supplier to continue
implementation and engagement with a
flexible approach, both in Kabul and in the
provinces.
4
3
Sub-national
Governance
context
changes in
the transition
period (e.g.
political will
for SNG
reforms
diminishes, or
the IDLG
leadership
changes),
making it
difficult to
deliver
technical and
administrative
4
4
-The ‘slow down’ phase during the transition
period reduced the scope of the programme.
The future shape and size of the programme
will be determined following this Annual
Review once there is greater clarity on the role
of IDLG in the new administration.
- Six monthly break clauses have been added
into the contract to allow DFID to terminate the
contract should the context change
significantly
- Prioritise buy-in from across Government for
the role of IDLG and the reforms of this
programme, e.g. through the communications
strategy.
3
4
18
reforms in the
provinces.
Partner Risk
Adam Smith
International
(ASI)
2
3
Ensure activities are monitored through
monthly progress reports, financial trackers,
quarterly – risks detailed above
2
2
F: COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Delivery against planned timeframe
The programme entered a ‘slow down’ period between May and December 2014 due to the political
transition in Afghanistan. The logframe was updated to reflect the revised outputs. The revised workplan
details a programme end-date of March 2016. However this is dependent on the political situation.
Political uncertainty around the leadership of IDLG may affect the programme delivering to this timeline.
Performance of partnership (s)
The principal counterpart of the programme is IDLG, with technical assistance from the implementing
partner. IDLG’s engagement with the implementing partner has improved significantly over the year. The
implementing partner achieved strong engagement with senior leadership including the Deputy Minister Administration and Finance and Deputy Minister -Policy. Both have been proactive in requesting support
from the programme and taking forward initiatives. This is evidenced by the IDLG Strategic Review and
the support the programme provided to turn a discussion paper on Governor-Security Sector relations
into a draft Presidential Decree. The implementing partner has maintained regular and positive
engagement with DFID, this regular engagement supported the change in contracting from output based
to input based. DFID should continue to meet with senior IDLG counterparts regularly to support
programme delivery.
Asset monitoring and control
The implementing partner maintains an adequate asset register. Following a DFID Internal Audit Review
recommendation (November 2014), DFID will now review this register every six months rather than
every twelve months.
G: CONDITIONALITY
Update on partnership principles (if relevant)
N/A
H: MONITORING & EVALUATION
Evidence and evaluation
The Theory of Change for the programme was developed after the approval of the original programme
design. Changes have since been made to programme outputs to orientate the programme to providing
strategic support to IDLG. The assumptions of the original Theory of Change still hold and no new
evidence challenges the robustness of the existing Theory of Change or rationale for the programme.
However, the Theory of Change could be updated to ensure it is a clear reflection of the current outputs.
19
Given President Ghani’s statements since coming to power, the next two years could see substantial
movement in terms of sub-national governance reform, which strengthens the case for intervention in
support of IDLG.
There are no plans to conduct an independent evaluation of the programme. The programme should
work with the IDLG monitoring and evaluation department to understand what data and information is
being collected that could support monitoring of the programme.
Monitoring progress throughout the review period
DFID undertook monitoring throughout the review period through programme meetings with the
implementing partner on a monthly basis as well as direct meetings with senior counterparts in IDLG.
Quarterly Programme Steering Committees were held with the implementing partner, senior IDLG
counterparts and DFID. Travel to the provincial level was not possible during the course of the year due
to restrictions on travel. The implementing partner has conducted its own activity monitoring in the
provinces, visiting Herat in February 2015.
The Annual Review was conducted by members of the Public Sector Reform Team, DFID Afghanistan in
February 2015. The review included interviews with senior counterparts from IDLG, the Ministry of
Finance and a visit to Mazar-i-Sharif which included meetings to gather feedback from the Governor’s
Office and Provincial Council.
20