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11 REFCL management of harmonics
All electricity distribution networks suffer from distortion of the pure 50Hz sinusoidal voltage
waveform caused by non-linear customer loads. These distortions are described in terms of
mathematically equivalent harmonic voltages and currents. Network harmonic voltages can cause
harmonic currents to flow in earth faults, so they are therefore relevant to powerline fire risk.
One REFCL technology, the GFN, has the capability to inject a synthesised voltage waveform to
cancel network harmonic voltages and reduce harmonic currents flowing in faults. This capability
was explored in Kilmore Tranche 4 tests. The tests confirmed the capability was effective but
revealed that further GFN development would be required to realise the potential benefits of this
feature in addressing fire risk from network earth faults.
11.1 Summary of findings and recommendations
The effects of network harmonics on fire risk in a REFCL-protected network were explored in the
KMS test program. The following conclusions were drawn:
1. In some circumstances, harmonic currents generated by customer loads can flow in a
network earth fault and they may have the potential to increase fire risk.
2. It is likely the contribution of harmonic currents to fire risk is second order.
3. Tests demonstrated that:
a. Harmonics do not significantly increase fire risk from GFN diagnostic tests to confirm
the presence of a fault and identify the faulted powerline.
b. GFN measurement of low-order network voltage harmonics is consistent with that
performed by other network voltage monitoring devices;
c. The GFN has the capability to effectively reduce low-order harmonic components of
earth fault current;
d. Further product development would be required for the GFN harmonic
compensation capability to provide its full potential fire risk benefits; and
e. The GFN can itself produce some harmonic fault current when it displaces network
voltages – this is likely to be a property inherent in all ASC-based REFCLs.
It is recommended that industry work with the GFN manufacturer to further develop the GFN
harmonic compensation capability to reduce fire risk in network earth faults.
11.2 Fire risk from harmonics in network earth faults
Many electrical devices have non-linear voltage-current characteristics. When 50Hz network
voltages supply customer loads that include such devices, the network load current contains
harmonics, i.e. components at frequencies that are multiples of 50Hz. When harmonic currents flow
in the series impedances of powerlines, they create harmonics in network voltages. A typical
frequency spectrum of a KMS21 test network voltage is shown in Figure 1 – harmonic voltages of
between one and 30 volts extend in frequency up to 1600Hz.
In a single phase to earth fault, harmonic network voltages produce harmonic components of fault
current that increase the total rms fault current. If a REFCL is used to cancel the 50Hz component of
fault current, the harmonic currents will remain largely unaffected and their presence can
significantly increase the magnitude of residual fault current and thereby potentially increase fire
risk from ground ignition.
This is illustrated by Figure 2 which shows the 50Hz voltage on the faulted conductor has been
reduced by the GFN from its pre-fault value of 12,700 volts to about 65 volts. However, the postfault harmonic voltage magnitudes remain of the same order as before the fault, i.e. between one 1
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volt and 30 volts1. The harmonic components of fault current are of a similar magnitude to the 50Hz
component of fault current.
Figure 1: KMS Test 651 frequency spectrum of pre-fault White phase voltage
1
The marked increase in the third harmonic voltage from 6 volts to 60 volts is due to the GFN itself – see Section 11.8.
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Figure 2: KMS Test 651 (400Ω fault) frequency spectrum of White voltage and fault current immediately post-fault
Ignition tests indicate that total rms of fault current is likely to be the most meaningful measure of
the environmental energy release that drives fire risk. Harmonic components increase the total rms
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value of fault current in accordance with a root-sum-of-squares formula:
𝑛=∞
𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 = √ ∑ (𝑖𝑛 )2
𝑛=0
This means that an additional harmonic component equal in size to the 50Hz component would
increase the total rms fault current by 40%, not 100%.
The fire risk contribution of harmonic components of fault current is therefore only likely to be
significant if the harmonics are of a similar order of magnitude to the 50Hz component.
11.3 Increased ground ignition fire risk from harmonics
High impedance faults are realistic representations of known fire causes, e.g. a live high voltage wire
falling into dry grass on dry ground. When the fault impedance is high, the ignition mechanism is
ground ignition rather than bounce ignition.
In a high impedance fault, both the 50Hz and harmonic components of fault current are reduced to
low levels by the fault impedance. The 50Hz component is reduced more because of the high
impedance presented by the resonant neutral-earth connection (the parallel combination of the ASC
coil and the combined capacitance of the network and the ASC tuning capacitors), as well as by the
RCC compensation to cancel the 50Hz component of voltage on the faulted phase. This is illustrated
by Figure 3 for a 40,000 Ohm earth fault. The fifth harmonic of the fault current is 1.2mA which is
consistent with the pre-fault value of fifth harmonic voltage (49 volts) divided by the fault resistance
(40kΩ). The 50Hz component of fault current is 2.5mA which less than one-hundredth of the 320mA
that the 40kΩ fault resistance alone would produce with an applied 50Hz voltage of 12,700 volts.
Figure 3: KMS Test 634 (40,000Ω fault) fault current with RCC compensation
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In ‘wire on ground’ ignition tests with the GFN in service, once the GFN detected and compensated
for the fault, no ground ignitions occurred. The tests outlined in Section Ошибка! Источник ссылки
не найден. above confirm that fault current of 0.5 amps is required for ground ignition in a worstcase earth fault. For a relatively high total harmonic voltage of, say, 500 volts to generate this level
of harmonic current the fault impedance would have to be not more than 1,000 Ohms.
Even in this worst-case situation, there are two considerations that indicate the fire risk from
harmonics would at most be second order:
1. It is difficult to postulate realistic circumstances in which just three metres of conductor on
the ground would have a fault resistance as low as 1000 Ohms without assuming higher
levels of soil and fuel moisture content than would be consistent with worst-case fire
weather and fuel conditions.
2. Detection of such a fault would be relatively fast, both in the initial instance and in the GFN
fault-confirmation test, so the harmonic current flow would last at most about five seconds the period between the fault and the first steps of the fault-confirmation test. A fault current
of 0.5 amps generally takes longer than this to produce ground ignition – often tens of
seconds.
Whilst there is no guarantee that a particular combination of factors capable of starting a fire from
harmonic currents can never occur, the probability of this combination is considered to be relatively
low, i.e. fire risk from harmonic currents is likely to be a second order risk.
11.4 Fire risk from harmonics in diagnostic tests
In high-impedance faults, the key factor in fire risk is the current produced in diagnostic tests such as
the fault-confirmation test. The GFN performs such tests by injecting a 50Hz voltage. This leaves
harmonic components of fault current largely unaltered as can be seen from Figure 4 - the faultconfirmation test increased the 50Hz current by twenty-five times from 2.5mA to around 65mA
(shortly afterwards the FCT re-detected the fault at a current of 132mA), but the fifth harmonic
current remained unchanged at 1.2mA. It can be concluded that harmonic currents do not
significantly increase fire risk in diagnostic tests.
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Figure 4: KMS Test 634 (40,000Ω fault) fault current during GFN fault confirmation test (Stage 1, Step2)
This leads to the conclusion that in high impedance faults, harmonics are unlikely to contribute
significant fire risk from ground ignition.
11.5 Increased bounce ignition fire risk from harmonics
The ignition mechanism in low impedance faults tends to be bounce ignition. The REFCL response
required to prevent fires from this cause is fast reduction in the voltage on the faulted conductor to
less than 1,900 volts in 85 milliseconds. For a relatively high level of network harmonics of perhaps
500 volts, the root-sum-of-squares addition means the total voltage at 85 milliseconds would only be
increased by 3.4% to 1,960 volts compared to the 1,900 volts 50Hz component. The effect of this
increase on bounce ignition fire risk would likely be immaterial.
11.6 Measurement of harmonics by the GFN
The GFN samples the network voltage waveforms with 16-bit precision at a rate of 100 samples per
50Hz cycle. To measure harmonics the GFN applies a discrete Fourier transform to groups of 100
samples. GFN documentation does not identify the window function (if any) applied prior to the
transform calculation to minimise spectral leakage.
Theory predicts this arrangement should be capable of measuring harmonics up to about 2 kHz, i.e.
to the 40th harmonic of the 50Hz fundamental. However, the voltage waveforms seen by the GFN
are produced by an electromagnetic voltage transformer on the substation’s 22kV busbars. The
limited bandwidth of this type of transformer may affect measurement accuracy at higher harmonic
frequencies.
A manually synchronised spot check was performed to compare measurements on two selected loworder harmonics supplied by three devices:
1. The GFN supplied by the substation 22kV bus voltage transformer;
2. An Elspec supply quality meter in the zone substation also supplied by the substation 22kV
bus voltage transformer; and
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3. The Gen3i data acquisition system at the test site supplied by a wide-band capacitive voltage
divider.
The three sets of readings are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: comparison of harmonic measurements - red phase voltage 8th October 2015 at about 1:20pm
Harmonic
Time
GFN2
Gen3i
Elspec
5th (250Hz)
1:23:45 pm
0.2 (30-50 volts)
48 volts
48 volts
7th (350Hz)
1:18:30 pm
0.1 (10-30 volts)
25.2 volts
27.1 volts
Within the limitation imposed by the single significant figure display of the GFN, its displayed
readings were consistent with the measurements taken by the other two devices. This spot check
also indicated that the limited bandwidth of the busbar voltage transformer was not a material
factor in accurate measurement of harmonics up to 350Hz3.
11.7 Compensation of harmonics by the GFN
The GFN has the capability to include low-order harmonic components into its RCC-injected
compensation voltage to cancel corresponding harmonic components of fault current. This capability
was tested in the Kilmore test program. Test 723 best illustrated its effectiveness as shown in the
three fault current frequency spectra set out in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 together with the
fault current waveforms associated with each.
With no harmonic compensation, Figure 5 shows that the third harmonic and fifth harmonic
components of the fault current are of the same order of size as the 50Hz component. Those two
components increased the total rms fault current by 94% above the 50Hz value.
After manipulation of the GFN harmonic compensation settings, Figure 6 shows the third harmonic
component of fault current has been reduced by 90%. However in the 23 second period since the
first record, the fifth harmonic component of fault current has increased by 37% to 0.14 amps.
After further manipulation of the GFN harmonic compensation settings, Figure 7 shows the fifth
harmonic component of fault current has been reduced by 70%. At this point, the third and fifth
harmonic components of fault current were increasing the total rms fault current by just 6% above
the 0.117 amps 50Hz value.
Though Test 723 demonstrates an effective capability to compensate low-order harmonic
components of fault current, this was done by manual manipulation of GFN settings. To reduce fire
risk by minimising fault current caused by network harmonics, the GFN must include a dynamic
capability to measure and cancel the ever-changing levels of low-order harmonics on the network.
It is recommended that industry work with the GFN manufacturer to enhance the harmonic
compensation capability of the GFN to minimise fire risk from network harmonics.
2
The GFN readings shown are those available on the front panel and only had one significant figure displayed. The GFN
only displays the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th harmonics though its measurement system is theoretically capable of measuring
harmonics up to the 40th.
3
The Gen3i readings used a wide-band capacitive transducer, whereas the Elspec readings used the substation busbar
electromagnetic voltage transformer.
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Figure 5: KMS Test 723 (400Ω fault) fault current with 50Hz compensation only
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Figure 6: KMS Test 723 fault current with third harmonic compensation
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Figure 7: KMS Test 723 fault current with both third and fifth harmonic compensation
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11.8 Generation of harmonics by the GFN
The response of a GFN to an earth fault, i.e. voltage injection by the RCC to cancel the voltage on the
faulted phase, can itself produce harmonic components of fault current.
11.8.1 How a non-linear ASC coil generates harmonic earth fault currents
The mechanism is as follows:
1.
Harmonics in the magnetising current drawn by the ASC coil
When the GFN compensates the 50Hz component of earth fault current, it effectively applies a
synthesised pure 50Hz sinusoid voltage across an iron-cored inductor (the ASC coil) that is in
resonance with the capacitance of the network in parallel with the capacitors in the ASC unit itself.
The iron core of the coil is not linear and it will draw some harmonic currents from the pure 50Hz
source voltage applied by the RCC. The harmonic current components generated by the coil’s nonlinear characteristics will flow in both the coil and the RCC inverter.
2.
Harmonic voltage produced on the neutral of the transformer and on all network conductors
If the RCC were an ideal voltage source, the harmonic currents flowing between the RCC and the ASC
coil would not affect network voltages. However, the non-zero source impedance of the RCC4 means
they produce harmonic components of neutral voltage. The resonant combination of the coil and
the combined network plus ASC capacitance will have very high impedance at 50Hz but lower
impedance at frequencies other than 50Hz – the actual value will depend on the total system
(network plus ASC) damping. This impedance forms a voltage divider with the RCC source impedance
to produce a harmonic voltage across the ASC coil, i.e. at the neutral point of the transformer. For
lower harmonic frequencies, this harmonic voltage will appear between every powerline conductor
in the whole network and earth.
3.
Harmonic current flow in an earth fault
When a single phase earth fault is present, the harmonic voltage on the faulted conductor will
produce a harmonic current in the circuit loop comprising:




The substation transformer winding between the neutral-ASC coil connection and the
faulted phase of the substation 22kV busbars;
The faulted phase conductor from the substation 22kV busbars to the fault location;
Through the fault to earth; and
Through the earth back to the ASC coil-earth connection at the substation.
11.8.2 Factors that determine the magnitude of harmonic fault current
Two main factors will influence the magnitude of the harmonic component of fault current caused
by the GFN response to the fault:
1. Harmonic neutral voltage: The magnitude of the harmonic voltage across the ASC coil is
likely to be close to the magnitude of harmonic magnetising current necessary to support
the 50Hz voltage applied across the coil by the RCC multiplied by the effective source
impedance of the RCC. Other factors are likely to be second order.
4
This impedance is due to the length of 345 volt cables between the RCC inverter and the ASC coil as well as the leakage
flux between ASC windings. The 37:1 turns ratio of the ASC multiplies the impedances of these elements by 1350 times
when they are seen from the 22kV network.
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2. Earth fault loop impedance: two impedances will determine the magnitude of the harmonic
component of fault current produced by the harmonic voltage across the coil:
a. Transformer winding impedance: the substation transformer will offer some
impedance to the harmonic current flow. Transformers can have complex internal
magnetic configurations which may influence this impedance. For example, most
large substation transformers (such as the one at KMS) have three limbs to the
internal iron core. The internal distribution of magnetic flux this produces means
that lower impedance may be offered to the flow of triplen5 harmonic currents on
the network and higher impedance to harmonics at other frequencies. The detailed
modelling that would be required to confirm this was beyond the scope of this
project. However, the test results did indicate a qualitative difference between the
behaviour of triplen harmonics and that of other harmonics in the fault current.
b. Fault resistance: the fault resistance impedes current flow equally at all frequencies.
A high-impedance fault will greatly reduce harmonic current flow, whereas a lowimpedance fault can produce high harmonic currents.
In summary, the non-linearity of the ASC coil can create some harmonic fault current even if there
are no harmonics in pre-fault network voltages.
11.8.3 Confirmation in simulations
Simulations of the response of a GFN with a non-linear ASC iron core were used to confirm the
mechanism for generation of harmonic fault currents by a GFN. These were not exact simulations
but served to verify the concept. The model used is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: conceptual model of GFN response to an earth fault with non-linear ASC coil
The non-linearity is introduced by the Zener diodes D5 and D6 (±15,000 volts withstand) and D7 and
D8 (±10,000 volts withstand). The source impedance of the RCC is modelled by R14 and L4 (50Ω+j50Ω), equivalent to about 50 milliohms on the low voltage side of the ASC.
The concept simulation results are set out in Table 2.
5
Any odd harmonic number divisible by three: 3rd, 9th, 15th, 21st, etc.
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Table 2: simulation of non-linear ASC - effect on fault current
Simulation
ASC coil
RCC source
impedance
Fault current
(amps rms)
Fault current
harmonics
1
Linear
(50+j50) Ohms
0.10 Amps
50Hz only
2
Non-linear
(50+j50) Ohms
2.67 Amps
Mainly harmonics
3
Non-linear
Zero Ohms
0.002 Amps
50Hz only
The results in Table 2 confirm that ASC non-linearity combined with finite (i.e. non-zero) RCC source
impedance will produce harmonic fault currents. The fault current waveform produced in Simulation
2 (non-linear ASC with finite RCC source impedance) is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: fault current result in simulation of non-linear ASC with finite RCC source impedance
It was concluded that the conceptual mechanism described in Section 11.8.1 above is a probable
cause of some harmonic current components in network earth faults when a GFN is present.
11.8.4 Confirmation in test results
This phenomenon was observed in the KMS test results. Ten tests were analysed for harmonic
components of voltages before and after fault detection and RCC response. Pre- and post-fault
measurements were only a few seconds apart. However, harmonic levels vary continuously on the
network due to changes in customer loads so even this short interval may have involved changes
due to factors outside the experiment. To find underlying patterns, averaging over a group of tests
was used.
Seven of the tests had a 40,000 Ohm fault resistance and three had a 400 Ohm fault resistance. The
average harmonic levels across all ten tests are shown in Table 3 to Table 5.
Table 3: pre-fault voltage harmonics (volts rms)
Phase
Red
White
Blue
All
50Hz
12330.2
12208.9
12982.4
12507.2
150Hz
12.6
6.8
13.3
10.9
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250Hz
37.2
45.7
32.4
38.4
350Hz
26.8
26.3
21.9
25.0
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450Hz
4.0
1.6
3.3
3.0
550Hz
7.8
19.0
9.8
12.2
650Hz
11.4
19.4
16.2
15.7
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Table 4: post-fault voltage harmonics with full RCC compensation (volts rms) – un-faulted phases
Phase
Red
White
Blue
All
50Hz
21572.8
21580.0
21577.2
21576.7
150Hz
51.6
56.9
46.7
51.7
250Hz
28.9
39.1
24.7
30.9
350Hz
26.5
23.4
20.1
23.4
450Hz
5.3
4.5
7.2
5.7
550Hz
9.1
19.9
12.9
14.0
650Hz
13.6
20.7
17.4
17.2
550Hz
8.9
650Hz
15.3
Table 5: post-fault harmonics with full RCC compensation (volts rms) – faulted phase
Phase
Faulted
50Hz
85.2
150Hz
54.3
250Hz
39.3
350Hz
11.7
450Hz
7.8
The pattern detected in the test results was:
1. RCC action was associated with increases in triplen harmonic voltages: The triplen voltage
harmonics increase in the post-fault period when there is 12.7kV of 50Hz voltage across the
ASC coil. The increase in the third harmonic (150Hz) was particularly dramatic – in tests it
increased by a factor of five times. The ninth harmonic (450Hz) approximately doubled.
2. Non-triplen harmonic voltages seemed uncorrelated with RCC action: The effect of the
fault and its compensation on non-triplen voltage harmonics was mixed: the change in the
fifth was within the normal test-to-test variation, the seventh was approximately halved on
the faulted phase but remained unaltered on the un-faulted phases, the eleventh appeared
slightly diminished on the faulted phase but unchanged on the others, and the thirteenth
was affected hardly at all.
Because third harmonic currents are zero-sequence, they cannot be generated by customer loads
except in a network of unbalanced impedances – and even in that situation, they are usually small.
The large increase in the third harmonic seen in KMS tests when a fault is applied is almost certainly
due to the non-linearity of the magnetising curve of the ASC coil.
11.8.5 Relevance to fire risk
This phenomenon may tend to increase potential fire risk as it can drive a significant 150Hz
component of fault current. The ratio of fundamental to harmonic components of fault current in
the ten tests is shown in Table 6, grouped and averaged by fault resistance.
Table 6: harmonic components of residual fault current averaged over ten tests
Fault
40,000Ω
400Ω
50Hz
100%
100%
150Hz
80%
93%
250Hz
68%
43%
350Hz
20%
16%
450Hz
13%
10%
550Hz
12%
10%
650Hz
26%
11%
The third harmonic component of fault current was about 85% of the 50Hz current. This increased
the total rms value of fault current by about 30% above the 50Hz value. If the third harmonic
component of fault current was solely that driven by network voltages without the effect of the ASC
coil (i.e. five times less), the total rms value of fault current would only have been increased by 1-2%
above the 50Hz value.
It is recommended that the GFN manufacturer consider the addition of triplen harmonic
compensation to cancel the harmonic current generated by the ASC coil and minimise fire risk from
triplen harmonic fault currents. Section 11.7 above indicates the GFN has the capability to do this
with appropriate settings.
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12 REFCL management of two-phases-to-ground earth faults
Network faults that convey current from two phase conductors to earth arise most commonly from
two causes: fallen trees on powerlines and a fallen conductor which remains connected to the
powerline on the ‘downstream’ side of the break (called a back-fed fault). Both of these faults
involve potential fire risk. Tests were performed at the Kilmore South test site to better understand
the capability of a REFCL (specifically the GFN) to manage this risk.
12.1 Summary of findings and recommendations
The test results indicate that the current GFN design will significantly reduce fire risk in two-phasesto-ground earth faults. However, the test results confirmed that the GFN product is not yet
optimised for minimum fire risk in these types of faults, though there appears to be clear potential
to achieve this outcome.
It is recommended that the GFN manufacturer be encouraged to enhance the GFN design to apply
effective compensation to reduce fault current in all types of earth fault and to apply the same faultconfirmation test (proven to have low fire risk) to detect sustained faults and allow fast powerline
disconnection to reduce fire risk.
12.2 Relevance to fire risk
Back-fed and other two-phases-to-ground earth faults are relevant to fire risk:
12.2.1 Back-fed faults (wire down, ‘downstream’ end remains connected)
Back-fed faults are ‘wire down’ earth faults where the break in the conductor leaves the fallen wire
on the ground connected to the downstream side of the powerline, i.e. connected at the end
furthest from the source substation. It is not energised directly from the substation but can convey
customer load current (from customers downstream of the break) into the earth. This current can be
sufficient to start a fire. Back-fed faults are notoriously difficult to detect with traditional powerline
protection systems. They may remain undetected for some time which further increases the fire risk.
Though back-fed faults are not as common as normal earth faults, they are not rare. Their
occurrence is determined by the random location of conductor breakages under the stress of high
wind conditions.
The 2014 Theoretical Study investigated back-fed faults using the model shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: theoretical model of back-fed earth fault on a resonant earthed network
Break
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The Study concluded:



The response of a REFCL-protected network to a back-fed fault is the same as to a direct-fed
earth fault with some adjustment to the parameters: the effective fault resistance is the
actual fault resistance plus half the phase-to-phase resistance that represents the customer
load downstream of the conductor breakage.
The neutral voltage displacement may be as little as half that which would occur if the fault
was not back-fed. This means that detection of back-fed faults may only be half as sensitive
as normal faults having the same fault resistance.
Fault detection sensitivity will depend on the customer load downstream of the conductor
breakage. To detect a one amp back-fed earth fault, the customer load downstream of the
breakage would have to be at least 200kW and the REFCL fault detection threshold would
have to be a neutral voltage displacement equal to not more than 10% of nominal voltage.
Though not common, back-fed faults present a clear fire risk when they occur in high fire risk
conditions, so the response of a REFCL to this type of fault is of relevance to fire risk reduction.
A back-fed fault is simply a special case of a two-phases-to-ground earth fault where the fault
current flows from the two unbroken phase conductors through the customer loads to the fallen
wire and thence to earth. Analysis of back-fed faults often relies on an assumption that customer
load located downstream of the fault location is balanced (equal load on each of the three phases).
However whilst load balance is an objective of network planners, it is not always achieved in
practice. With unbalanced load, a back-fed earth fault is equivalent to the more general case of a
two-phases-to-ground earth fault – which may be balanced or unbalanced depending on
circumstances.
12.2.2 Two-phases-to-ground earth faults (‘tree in powerline’ faults)
One of the most common causes of a two-phases-to-ground earth fault is trees near powerlines.
When a tree falls across or into a powerline, there are a number of possible outcomes, each of which
can present a different form of earth fault to the high-voltage network:
1. Fallen tree branch resting on one powerline conductor: this is an instance of a ‘branch
touching wire’ earth fault. The fire risk from such faults can be greatly reduced by a REFCL as
outlined in Section 13 below.
2. Fallen tree resting on two or more powerline conductors: this can present as a combination
of a ‘branch touching wire’ earth fault plus a ‘branch across wires’ fault or even a direct
phase-to-phase fault if the two phase conductors are brought into contact with each other
by the weight of a tree branch.
3. Fallen tree entangled in powerline conductors with multiple current paths to earth: a
common example of this is when a fallen tree brings the conductors low (though still not
touching ground) and tree branches come to rest on the ground on the far side of the
powerline. It can present as a two-phases-to-ground earth fault or a three-phases-to-ground
earth fault. Again, if any two conductors touch, a direct phase-to-phase fault will occur.
4. Fallen tree and powerline conductors on ground: This usually occurs if poles break or fall or
conductors break under the weight of a tree. Again, it can present as a ‘wire down’ earth
fault, a two-phases-to-ground earth fault or a three-phases-to-ground earth fault and if two
conductors touch, a direct phase-to-phase fault.
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A REFCL can manage many of the fire risks in this complex set of scenarios while some others may
remain relatively unaffected by its presence. For example, direct phase-to-phase faults (conductor
clash or flashover) will normally be addressed by fast overcurrent protection systems6 - the REFCL
cannot respond to them. Phase-to-phase vegetation faults (‘branch across wires’) will also be
undetected by a REFCL. However, unless the branch concerned is fully detached from the tree and
suspended above ground, this type of fault may be accompanied by an earth fault that is detectable
by a REFCL. Both two-phases-to-ground and three-phases-to-ground earth faults create earth
current that is detectable by a REFCL, either as neutral current (by an SSFCL) or as neutral voltage
displacement (by a GFN or ASC).
Whilst the set of tree fault scenarios listed above is complex, it presents only a limited range of fault
types that create earth current: they are single-phase-to-ground earth faults or two-phases-toground earth faults, combined with various permutations of phase-to-phase faults. For example, a
three-phases-to-ground earth fault can be accurately modelled as a two-phases-to-ground earth
fault plus a set of three phase-to-phase faults. Hence the way in which a REFCL responds to twophases-to-ground earth faults has an important bearing on fire risk from all fault types involving
trees, as well as from back-fed faults whether balanced or unbalanced.
If a REFCL detects a two-phases-to-ground earth fault and responds by quickly disconnecting the
powerline7, fire risk from many complex tree faults as well as back-fed earth faults may be reduced.
The Kilmore South test program included a series of tests of resistive two-phases-to-ground earth
faults with the GFN in service, including balanced faults equivalent to back-fed earth faults with
balanced downstream customer load. The other two REFCL configurations were not tested with
these types of faults as they were not yet compliant with the draft REFCL performance standard.
12.3 GFN treatment of two-phases-to-ground earth faults
The GFN (and other fault detection schemes in resonant earthed systems) detects the presence of a
fault by the magnitude of the neutral voltage and deduces the type of fault from the phase angle of
the neutral voltage:
1. If the neutral voltage closely aligns with one of the network phase voltages, this indicates
the fault is a single-phase-to-ground earth fault on that phase.
2. If the neutral voltage does not align with any single network phase voltage, this indicates
that the fault is a two-phases-to-ground earth fault involving the two phases that have
voltages ‘to either side’ of the neutral voltage.
To allow for measurement errors and various factors that can disturb the measured phase of the
neutral voltage, ‘phase angle zones’ are defined. The GFN has six zones, each of approximately8 60
degrees width: three centred on the three phase voltages; and three centred on the mid-points
between each pair of phase voltages. Depending on which zone the neutral voltage falls within, the
two associated GFN responses are:
1. Phase zone: the GFN treats the fault as a standard single-phase-to-ground earth fault, i.e. it
uses RCC compensation to reduce the voltage on that phase close to zero; uses the FCT to
6
Disconnection times, potential ignition outcomes and fire risks of such events are beyond the scope of this report.
7
The 2015 Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program found that interruption of supply within five to ten seconds might
substantially reduce fire risk from ‘branch across wires’ faults. (Refer Vegetation Conduction Ignition project report Section
8.6, page 62). This speed of response is within REFCL capability.
8
With standard GFN settings, the phase zones are 66 degrees wide and the inter-phase zones 54 degrees wide. The
relative widths of the two classes of zones can readily be modified by changing a setting.
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test for the fault after a few seconds; and then either disconnects the powerline9 if the fault
is still present, or removes the compensation if the fault has disappeared.
2. Inter-phase zone: the GFN treats the fault as a back-fed fault; it applies no compensation
and immediately disconnects the powerline (once it has been identified – this can take some
seconds).
The ‘inter-phase zone’ response has been developed to suit conditions in other countries that use
the GFN product. The rationale of the immediate disconnection response is that such a fault will
always involve a live wire on the ground with unacceptable public safety risk.
12.4 GFN test results: two-phases-to-ground earth faults
The GFN was tested using bolted resistive fault tests with different combinations of available highvoltage resistors to simulate a two-phases-to-ground earth fault. The configuration is shown in
Figure 11 and the resistance values in each test configuration are listed in Table 7.
The test conditions included two relatively unrealistic features:
1. The fault impedances were relatively high compared to many real earth faults of this type.
This was partly compensated by increased fault detection sensitivity in Test 728 and later
tests; and
2. To protect the high-voltage resistors from thermal overload, fault current duration was
limited to less than one second in tests with the 15,200 Ohm common resistor and less than
700 milliseconds in tests without it, i.e. fault duration was too short for the GFN to find a
sustained fault using its FCT.
Figure 11: two-phases-to-ground earth fault configuration
Table 7: resistance values in KMS two-phases-to-ground earth fault tests
Test
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
Phase 1
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
Red
Red
Red
Blue
Blue
White
R1 (Ω)
8,350
8,350
8,350
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
Phase 2
White
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
Blue
R2 (Ω)
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
16,700
8,350
8,350
R_common (Ω)
15,200
15,200
15,200
15,200
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
This is subject to the operating policy of the network owner that applies at the time of fault occurrence. Disconnection is
the appropriate policy at times of extreme fire risk.
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Eleven tests were performed and the GFN response recorded. These are listed in Table 8.
Table 8: GFN responses to two-phases-to-ground earth faults
Test
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
GFN response
Fault not detected (threshold 0.5A)
White phase compensated, no FCT (threshold set to 0.2A)
Blue phase compensated, feeder not identified, FCT
White phase compensated, feeder not identified, FCT
White phase compensated, feeder identified, FCT
Blue phase compensated, feeder not identified, FCT
Detected, no compensation, feeder not identified, no FCT
Late compensation of White phase, no FCT
Late compensation of Blue phase, FCT
Reverse earth fault detected, no compensation
Blue phase compensated, FCT
Max fault current
0.34A
0.35A
0.37A
0.27A
0.75A
0.76A
0.76A
0.69A
0.74A
>0.92A
1.33A
The conclusions drawn from the test results were:
1. The GFN detected the two-phases-to-ground earth faults in all tests where the earth current
exceeded the fault detection sensitivity setting.
2. In those tests where the GFN applied voltage compensation using the RCC, it was always
applied to reduce the voltage on one of the two phases involved in the fault.
3. ASC tuning mismatch and network capacitive imbalance can cause the phase of the neutral
displacement produced in low-current two-phases-to-ground earth faults to vary somewhat
from that expected from theory and this can influence determination of fault type.
4. The GFN response was not always consistent, with different responses recorded in tests
having identical conditions. The observed response was not always as expected based on
existing knowledge of the GFN design.
5. The GFN response to two-phases-to-ground earth faults is complex and somewhat uncertain
due to multiple internal processes running in parallel within the GFN firmware.
6. The demonstrated GFN performance in two-phases-to-ground earth faults is not optimised
for lowest fire risk, though the GFN appears to have the capability to deliver this.
The result of each test was discussed and analysed in some detail with the GFN manufacturer on
site. It was recognised that the GFN design had not yet been optimised for low fire risk in this class of
earth faults. These discussions tended to confirm the potential for this to be done.
12.5 Fire risk reduction with the current GFN design
Although the test results demonstrated the GFN is not yet optimised to reduce fire risk in this class
of faults, it is clear that its current design would nevertheless achieve some reduction in fire risk.
12.5.1 Back-fed faults
There are reasonable grounds to believe that a REFCL-protected network will not have fires resulting
from back-fed faults:

For a conductor breakage to create a back-fed earth fault without creating a simultaneous
direct-fed earth fault, the break must be at the end of the span closer to the source
substation, so in the worst case the length of conductor on the ground would be not less
than 16 metres by the logic of Section Ошибка! Источник ссылки не найден. on page
Ошибка! Закладка не определена.. The current into the earth required to start a fire
would be 2.4 amps based on the ignition threshold of 0.15 amps per metre.
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



A REFCL set to detect a 0.5 amp direct-fed earth fault would detect a back-fed earth fault
involving one amp of current into the earth provided the downstream customer load was
high enough – more than about 200 kilowatts.
At times of high fire risk, ‘downstream’ customer load is likely to be higher (due to air
conditioning, refrigeration and water pumping) rather than lower. Most faults on a 22kV
powerline would have more than 200 kilowatts of downstream load at these times.
Simulations of a back-fed fault on the larger Frankston South network demonstrate that
there is no combination of downstream load and fault resistance that results in an
undetectable back-fed fault capable of causing a fire with 16 metres of conductor on the
ground10. Lower levels of downstream load make the fault hard to detect, but they also
reduce the fault current below the 2.4 amp ignition threshold.
The simulations also indicate that downstream load balance does not materially alter this
conclusion: severely imbalanced load makes the fault detection faster while producing a
higher current to earth for only the first few tens of milliseconds – insufficient time for a
ground ignition.
The GFN with its FCT could enable disconnection of a powerline on which a back-fed fault has
occurred before a fire could start. Disconnection as soon as the fault is confirmed by the FCT to be
still present is likely to be required for public safety as well as fire risk reduction.
12.5.2 Tree faults
There are reasonable grounds to believe that a REFCL protected network will have 50% to 90% less
fire risk from tree faults compared to a non-REFCL network:





All tree faults involve some earth fault current that is potentially detectable by a REFCL11.
Trees that fall on powerlines usually have a trunk diameter greater than 100mm at the point
of contact with the powerline.
The 2015 Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program demonstrated that larger (80-90mm)
diameter branches generate an initial earth fault current of more than one amp and that this
initial current will increase as the square of the diameter. This implies that tree faults that
involve more than one phase of the powerline will normally produce earth fault current in
excess of one amp, i.e. in excess of the REFCL fault detection sensitivity, so they will be
detected.
Vegetation faults take seconds or tens of seconds to produce a ground-level fire. The 2015
Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program indicated that interruption of supply to the
fault within ten seconds would reduce fire risk by the order of 50%. Interruption within five
seconds would cut fire risk by perhaps 90%.
The GFN’s FCT normally detects a sustained one amp fault in the first few steps, i.e. about
five or six seconds after initial fault detection.
The GFN with its FCT could enable disconnection within five to ten seconds of a powerline on which
a tree fault has occurred, making a 50% to 90%12 reduction of fire risk possible.
10
There are combinations that create other public safety risks, e.g. electrocution if someone approaches or touches the
fallen wire.
11
The only vegetation fault type that cannot be detected by a REFCL is a pure ‘branch across wires’ fault, i.e. where the
branch is completely detached from the tree and suspended wholly above the ground.
12
The FCT starts about four seconds after the fault is detected and is complete about six seconds later.
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12.6 Approaches for lower fire risk in two-phases-to-ground earth faults
Although the current GFN design is likely to provide fire risk reduction in two-phases-to-ground
earth faults, the tests revealed that under extreme conditions (high fault impedances) it is not
optimised for consistent delivery of maximum fire risk benefits. Further product development could
achieve this.
Provided the magnitude and phase angle of RCC compensation is carefully chosen, fault current to
earth in any type of earth fault can be cancelled, whether it is a single-phase-to-ground fault or a
two-phases-to-ground fault, balanced or unbalanced.
In two-phases-to-ground earth faults the optimum response may be:
1. Use the RCC to apply the compensation required to bring the earth fault current to a very
low value. The measurements required to correctly calculate the magnitude and angle of the
required compensation are already gathered by the GFN but the calculation of the
compensation appears constrained somewhat by the currently imposed dichotomy in the
GFN’s internal logic processes between normal earth faults and reverse (back-fed) earth
faults.
2. Once the correct compensation has been applied to reduce the earth fault current to a level
close to zero, use the FCT to test for a sustained fault and identify the faulted powerline. The
Kilmore South tests have confirmed the FCT can be performed with minimal additional fire
risk.
3. If the fault is confirmed to be a sustained fault, apply the network owner’s policy for such
faults (in high fire risk conditions, immediately disconnect the powerline).
It is recommended that the GFN response to two-phases-to-ground earth faults be re-engineered to
provide this response without reliance on any assumptions about whether such faults are balanced
or not. This will reduce fire risk in both back-fed faults (usually but not always reasonably balanced)
and tree faults (often grossly unbalanced). It will also enhance public safety in ‘wire down’ faults.
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13 REFCL management of vegetation earth faults
This section describes ‘branch touching wire’ vegetation earth fault tests staged at Kilmore South
with a REFCL in service. The tests at Kilmore South validated the simulation of REFCL action used in
the Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program completed earlier in 2015 at Springvale13 and
hence confirmed the Springvale test results can be applied to REFCL-protected networks.
This rigorous confirmation allows the conclusion to be reliably drawn that REFCLs can cut fire risk
from ‘branch touching wire’ earth faults by a factor of twelve, from 100% to 8%, when averaged
across all of the eleven species tested at Springvale. The Kilmore tests also demonstrated that this
benefit will be delivered even when a ‘soft’ fault-confirmation test is used to confirm the fault is
sustained and identify the 22kV powerline upon which it is located.
13.1 Summary of findings
A total of 61 valid vegetation ignition tests carried out at Kilmore South showed that:
1. The Kilmore South test results, when combined with those from the Springvale tests, show
REFCL network protection can cut fire risk from ‘branch touching wire’ earth faults averaged
over a wide range of species, from 100% to 8%.
1. A GFN can detect current in a ‘branch touching wire’ earth fault at a level of 0.5 amps and
upon detection, reduce current through the vegetation to a level close to zero.
2. Vegetation earth fault fire probability is not materially affected by diagnostic tests that
comply with the REFCL performance standard.
13.2 The Kilmore vegetation earth fault t ests
The 2015 REFCL Technologies test program tests at Kilmore included 61 valid ignition tests on
sample branches of Willow (Salix Sp.). The 61 valid tests included 19 that produced fires. The fire
probability from statistical analysis of the Kilmore tests is shown in comparison with 0.5 amp
artificially current-limited tests of Willow at Springvale in Figure 12.
Figure 12: comparison of Kilmore and Springvale tests of Willow branches
100
Fire probability (%)
80
60
40
20
0
Kilmore
Springvale
13
Over 1,000 tests carried out at Springvale earlier in 2015 on a wide range of vegetation species showed that: if it could
be confirmed that a REFCL can detect current in ‘branch touching wire’ earth faults at a level of 0.5 amps and upon
detection interrupt that current, then the probability of fire from such faults would be reduced by a factor of around ten to
8% (less than 13% with 95% confidence); and secondly, for tests limited to 0.5 amps current, Willow was the worst case
species with a fire probability of 36%. The 31% fire probability of Willow in ‘branch touching wire’ earth fault tests done at
Kilmore with a GFN in service is, within the limits of statistical certainty, the same as the 36% Springvale result with an NER
in service and test current artificially limited to 0.5 amps.
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The Kilmore ‘branch touching wire’ tests drew extensively on concepts and designs developed in the
2015 Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program, including:




Defined worst case conditions for ignition (45°C air, turbulent 10-15 kph airflow, samples
conditioned for approximately 8-24 hours at 45°C and kept in 2°C storage at all other times)
Test rig (two parallel 19/3.25AAC conductors 1.5m apart: an earthed one supporting the
thicker end of the sample and the other energised at 12.7kV supporting the thin end)
Fire start criteria (prior to any flashover, small embers must reach the floor of the rig at
350°C or higher, or larger ones at 250°C or higher)
Sample diameter (thick end) around 25-30mm and sample length about 2.5 metres.
The Kilmore experiments varied from those at Springvale in some minor respects:



There was 400 Ohm series resistance in the high voltage supply, instead of 200 Ohms. Given
this was only a 1.5% variation in total current path resistance, it was considered to have
negligible influence on the results
Only Willow (Salix Sp.) tests were analysed as it was not possible to obtain enough suitable
samples of the other identified worst-case species, Desert Ash (Fraxinus Angustifolia)
The vegetation samples were harvested in October, i.e. mid-spring, rather than February and
March (late in a relatively cool summer).
The small size of the KMS network meant the GFN was extremely sensitive. To mimic the 0.5 amp
fault detection sensitivity typical of larger networks, it was desensitised - the fault detection
threshold was increased from 23 volts (2,650 volts neutral displacement) to 40 volts (4,620 volts
neutral displacement).
The current immediately prior to detection of vegetation faults by the GFN was recorded and is
shown in Figure 13. The average fault detection sensitivity demonstrated in the 59 valid tests in
which fault detection took place was 0.40 amps.
Figure 13: fault current immediately prior to fault detection by the GFN
14
12
Count (n = 59)
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Current at which fault was detected (Arms)
The moisture content and diameter (thicker end) of samples were also recorded. The values are
shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Salix Sp. vegetation sample moisture content and diameter
70
35
Sample moisture
30
50
Count (n = 84)
Count (n = 84)
60
40
30
20
Sample diameter
25
20
15
10
5
10
0
0
20
25
30
35
40
10
45
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Diameter (mm)
Moisture (%)
The sample moisture levels and diameters were close to the recorded average values for Salix
samples in the Springvale tests (39% moisture and 26mm diameter). It was concluded that the
Kilmore tests were an adequate replication of the Springvale tests to allow direct application of fire
probability results from the Springvale tests to REFCL protected networks.
13.3 The ‘flarc’ – a qualitative difference with REFCL protection ?
The Springvale tests revealed all vegetation faults progress through four stages. The Kilmore tests
showed the first three stages were unchanged by the presence of the GFN. However, the fourth was
qualitatively different for reasons not yet understood. At Springvale, the fourth stage was a flashover
– flame being an excellent conductor, once a continuous line of flame was established from one wire
to the other, an arc instantly formed and the current immediately increased to the 64 amp limit set
by the series resistor in the rig’s high-voltage supply. The test ended in a flash of light.
In the Kilmore tests, nearly every time a continuous line of flame formed between the two wires
supporting the branch, the test sample settled into a relatively steady state condition that became
known among the test team as a ‘flarc’- a combined flame and arc but not a flashover. In a flarc, the
current was rich in harmonics and remained relatively steady for many seconds at a level generally
below 0.5 amps. Some data recorded during a typical flarc event is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: KMS Test 749 Salix sample - extended flarc from 122 seconds14
14
The same chart processing tools were used in both ‘wire down’ and vegetation ignition tests. The vertical axis labelled
‘Soil Current’ here shows the vegetation current in the latter tests.
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It can be seen from Figure 15 that during the 12 second period of the flarc, the voltage across the
burning branch was around 9,000 volts (the voltage waveform was an almost pure 50Hz sinusoid)
but the current remained between 0.4 and 0.5 amps with a very non-sinusoidal waveform suggestive
of a bi-directional voltage limiting mechanism (thresholds at plus/minus some kilovolts) in series
with a high source impedance (of the order of ten kilo-ohms).
In only a few tests did a flarc result in a form of flashover, e.g. Test 772, but the flashover current
was well below the level allowed by the 400 Ohm current-limiting resistor in the high-voltage supply
to the test rig15.
Identification of the physical mechanism behind the flarc phenomenon was beyond the scope of this
project. The relevance of flarcs for fire risk was also not clear. Flashovers are unrealistic features of
‘branch touching wire’ faults. If they are realistic for other types of earth faults (e.g. wire into low
vegetation), the production of flarcs in a REFCL-protected network may have some bearing on fire
risk. Ignition tests on such fault types were beyond the scope of this project.
The flarc phenomenon is recorded here for possible future reference as a strikingly different and
unexplained outcome of the KMS vegetation ignition tests.
15
The current limit was 32 amps, but the few flashovers that did occur appeared to only reach 5-10 amps.
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14 REFCL technologies test program design
The 2015 REFCL Technologies test program used a custom-built test facility located at Kilmore South
about 50 kilometres north of Melbourne. Site commissioning, proof-of-concept tests and the first
three tranches of the main test program comprised 538 tests done over 26 test days in May and
June. A further 297 tests were done in Tranche 4 over 20 test days in September and October. The
design elements of the test facility and test program are described in the following sections.
14.1 Use of 2014 REFCL Trial design
A detailed description of the experiment design and test site concept is set out in the 2014 REFCL
Trial report. The key elements carried over into the KMS tests included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The underlying principles of realism, direct comparison, and worst case conditions
Selection of conductor type, conductor impact speed and bounce height
Selection of soil, fuel and soil-fuel bed geometry
Selection of worst case fire weather conditions and fuel moisture content
Overall site concept including safety architecture
Test procedures and site operating procedures
The ‘wire down’ test rig
The data acquisition system and transducers
Changes made to the Frankston design were primarily matters of detail. They included:
1. Use of insulated shipping containers for the test rig and soil-bed conditioning spaces – this
reduced heater load and allowed removal of the air diffuser around the ignition test space.
2. Use of isolated LV supply to the Control Hut instead of a separate generator
3. Use of normal LV supply to the test rig and HV yard equipment instead of a generator
4. Overhead HV supply to the test rig instead of short lengths of underground cable
5. Omission of the ‘sandpit’ parallel current path in the test rig container
6. Use of a GoPro camera in the test ignition space as the recorder of fire results
7. Use of a wideband 200.0mΩ coaxial shunt to measure soil current.
The test site is shown in Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18.
Figure 16: Kilmore South test site prior to construction
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Figure 17: the Kilmore South test facility under construction
The test facility was commissioned on 11th May 2015. Figure 18 shows its condition during test days.
Figure 18: the Kilmore South test facility as commissioned
14.2 Use of 2015 Vegetation Conduction Ignition test program design
A detailed description of the experiment design and test site concept is set out in the 2015
Vegetation Conduction Ignition Test Program report. The key elements carried over into the KMS
tests included:
1. Test procedures and site operating procedures for vegetation earth fault simulation
2. The vegetation conduction ignition test rig
Significant changes made to the Springvale design included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Use of 400 Ohm resistor in the test rig high-voltage supply instead of 200 Ohms
Omission of the automated system to terminate a test when a set current limit was reached
Omission of custom-designed transducers to capture high frequency fault signatures
Modified test procedure to include real-time monitoring of infrared camera vision and to
manually terminate a test if fire start criteria were met.
14.3 The test network – feeder KMS21
High voltage supply to the test site was from feeder KMS21 which comprised the total test network.
Prior to commencement of the test program the following works were carried out on the test
network:
1. Network hardening: all surge diverters were disconnected. As part of GFN commissioning,
each phase of the network was ‘soaked’ for 20-40 minutes at 22kV using the RCC to control
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neutral displacement voltage. This approach appeared to be successful as there were no
cross-country faults experienced during the test program.
2. Network balancing: the residual current (with NER in service) was reduced from 0.5 amps to
0.19 amps by re-phasing two-wire spur take-off points. For Tranche 4, further changes
reduced this to 0.12 amps.
14.3.1 Network capacitive balance
With the NER in service, the residual voltage16 at the test facility was typically less than fifteen volts
as shown in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Residual voltage and phase voltages at the test facility with NER in service (Tests 58 and 362)
100.000
100.000
Test 362: 17 June 4:20pm
Residual Voltage (V)
Residual Voltage (V)
Test 58: 19 May 12:53pm
10.000
7.619
2.469
1.000
0.831
1.102
0.959
0.851
0.653
0.961
0.930
0.776
0.633
0.477
0.407
0.330
2.340
1.540
1.000
0.735
0.524
0.522
0.383
0.381
13.043
10.000
0.245
0.187
0.165
0.123
0.100
0
200
0.977
0.952
0.865
0.837
0.749
0.717 0.750
0.674
0.585
0.465
0.345
0.257
0.245
0.243
0.680
0.479
0.100
400
600
800
1000
0
1200
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Frequency (Hz)
Frequency (Hz)
The neutral voltage measured at the zone substation was 1.6 volts, consistent with the measured
neutral current of 0.19 amps and the nominal 8Ω value of the NER, so the 7-13 volt residual voltage
recorded at the test facility was mainly due to unbalanced powerline voltage drop caused by
customer load current flowing in the series impedance of the phase conductors between the zone
substation and the test facility. This could have caused unbalanced capacitive currents from each
phase conductor to ground. Measurement error may have made a small (perhaps one volt)
contribution to the recorded residual.
With the GFN in service, the recorded phase to earth voltages and calculated residual voltage at the
test facility (Test 45 pre-fault, Monday 18th May 2015, 3:46pm) are shown in Table 9.
Table 9: test network phase and residual voltages early in the test program
Test and date
Red
White
Blue
Residual
Test 45 18/5/2015
15,327 Vrms
11,918 Vrms
12,162 Vrms
2,309 Vrms
The large residual voltage was caused by network capacitive imbalance. It equalled the product of
the imbalance current and the network damping resistance. The value shown in Table 9 indicates the
damping resistance of the test network was about 12 kilo-Ohms since the capacitive imbalance
current was 0.190 amps. This quantity can only be measured once some form of high-impedance
16
The residual voltage at the test facility is the instantaneous average of the three phase-to-earth voltages. It is a notional
neutral displacement (there is no 22kV network neutral available except at the zone substation).
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earthing, such as the GFN, has been established. The residual was closely aligned with Blue phase
volts17 as shown in Figure 20.
Later in the test program, the GFN’s U0 Injector was used to reduce standing neutral displacement.
This device comprises a capacitor connected to the 240 volts supply to the RCC cubicle and the lowvoltage winding of the GFN’s ASC. The capacitor can be any combination of two 84µF capacitors, i.e.
one half (with the two in series), one capacitor, or twice that value (the two capacitors in parallel).
With one capacitor, the U0 Injector adds 6.3 amps of current into the low-voltage ASC winding which
is equivalent to 0.22 amps on the high-voltage network.
The phase of the injection is set by the phase of the 240 volts supply, i.e. there are three options
separated by 120 degrees. A second U0 injector provided more options for the Tranche 4 tests.
Figure 20: Test facility voltages 18th May 2015 (Test 45 pre-fault)
25000
6000
20000
4000
10000
2000
Residaul Voltage (V)
Phase-to-earth voltages (V)
15000
5000
0
0
-5000
-2000
-10000
-15000
-4000
-20000
-25000
-6000
0
0.004
0.008
0.012
0.016
0.02
Time (seconds)
Red V
White V
Blue V
Residual
The U0 Injector can only be used to improve fault detection sensitivity. It may not improve faultlocation or fault-confirmation sensitivity as the measured powerline currents still remain
unbalanced. After the U0 Injector was connected and adjusted, the residual voltage at the test
facility was reduced as shown in Table 10. Further reductions were achieved for Tranche 4 by
additional network balancing and adjustment of dual U0 injectors.
Table 10: test network phase and residual voltages after application of U0 injector
Test and date
Red
White
Blue
Residual
Test 101 27/5/2015
13,397 Vrms
12,593 Vrms
13,626 Vrms
893 Vrms
Test 518 24/6/2015
12,711 Vrms
13,269 Vrms
13,826 Vrms
843 Vrms
Test 658 5/10/2015
12,051 Vrms
11,900 Vrms
12,720 Vrms
494 Vrms
17
On the HMI screen of the GFN, neutral displacement is indicated by a dot indicating the voltage of the earth with respect
to the centre of the three-phase set of voltages, i.e. it is the opposite of the calculated residual voltage which is the voltage
of the centre of the three-phase voltage set with respect to earth.
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
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Friday, 4 December 2015
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Different U0 injector settings were used in the course of the test program, producing different phase
on the residual voltage as shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: phase and residual voltages in Tests 101 and 518
25000
6000
25000
6000
Test 101
Test 518
20000
20000
4000
4000
15000
0
0
-5000
-2000
-10000
-15000
Residaul Voltage (V)
2000
5000
10000
2000
5000
0
0
-5000
Residaul Voltage (V)
10000
Phase-to-earth voltages (V)
Phase-to-earth voltages (V)
15000
-2000
-10000
-15000
-4000
-20000
-4000
-20000
-25000
-6000
0
0.004
0.008
0.012
0.016
-25000
0.02
-6000
0
0.004
0.008
Time (seconds)
Red V
White V
Blue V
0.012
0.016
0.02
Time (seconds)
Residual
Red V
White V
Blue V
Residual
The use of the U0 Injector was sufficient to allow fault detection sensitivity of better than 0.5 amps,
though the residual imbalance meant detection sensitivity was different on the different phases of
the network. It also limited the sensitivity threshold that could be applied in tests of the faultconfirmation/powerline-identification test of the GFN.
14.3.2 Network voltage harmonics
Harmonic levels on the KMS21 network were low compared to levels on other rural networks in
Victoria. The values shown are compared with spot check readings on other Victorian substations in
Table 11. The KMS measurements were taken late afternoon on Mondays in May and October,
whereas the measurements at the four other substations were taken at 5:30 pm on a Tuesday in late
June.
Table 11: spot check comparison of network voltage harmonics
Harmonic
KMS
Test16
KMS
Test658
BAN
BAS
WND
WBE
KMS as %
of others
3rd
5th
7th
9.3
28.1
11.9
4.0
14.9
17.5
16.7
45.5
68.1
19.8
157.1
93.1
16.7
82.5
93.3
19.6
188.8
66.5
36%
18%
19%
The harmonics in test facility phase voltages and residual voltage are shown in Figure 22.
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Friday, 4 December 2015
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
2400
2500
2600
2700
2800
2900
3000
3100
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
4100
4200
4300
4400
4500
Volts (rms)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
2400
2500
2600
2700
2800
2900
3000
3100
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
4100
4200
4300
4400
4500
Volts (rms)
P a g e | 110
Figure 22: KMS Test 16 pre-fault voltage harmonics 11th May 2015 6:01 pm
100000.00
10000.00
Phase voltages at test facility
1000.00
100.00
10.00
1.00
0.10
0.01
Frequency (Hz)
Red
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
White
Документ1
Blue
1000.00
Residual volts at test facility
100.00
10.00
1.00
0.10
0.01
Frequency (Hz)
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 111
14.3.3 Network load
The KMS21 feeder load current profile is shown in Figure 23. The 2014 Theoretical modelling study
identified average peak powerline load in Victorian rural networks as 160-240 amps. The KMS21
peak load was only 5-10% of this.
Figure 23: KMS21 feeder phase currents prior to start of test program
8.0
KMS21 phase currents 22 April to 1 May 2015
160
7.0
140
6.0
100
4.0
Count (N = 460)
Current (amps)
120
5.0
3.0
80
60
2.0
40
1.0
20
0.0
1
49
97
145
193
241
289
337
0
385
0
1
2
3
4
Time (30 minute intervals)
Red
White
5
6
7
8
9
10
Phase current (A)
Blue
Red
White
Blue
Figure 24: KMS21 load current in last week of Tranche 3 tests
16
KMS21 phase currents 0600 22nd - 1830 25th June 2015
14
140
12
100
8
Count (n = 652)
KMS21 phase current (A)
120
10
6
80
60
4
40
2
20
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91
101
111
121
131
141
151
161
171
181
191
201
211
221
231
241
251
261
271
281
291
301
311
321
331
341
351
361
371
381
391
401
411
421
431
441
451
461
471
481
491
501
511
521
531
0
Red
White
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
0
0.0
Time (intervals of 10 Minutes)
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
Phase current (Arms)
Blue
Red
Документ1
White
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 112
15 Appendices
Appendix A: Test records
113
Appendix B: HRL Technology REFCL Trial report
130
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Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 113
15.1 Appendix A: Test records
The following tables summarise the tests and results, except for lo-sag covered conductor tests. An
audited spreadsheet of all tests (Test log BAS edit 26-10-15.xlsx) is the master record for this data.
15.1.1 Valid ignition tests
All ignition tests were audited against a number of criteria to verify the result could reliably be
regarded as valid.
Table 12: Valid ‘wire down’ ignition tests – GFN (GFN3 firmware, 100 Ohm, White phase)
Test No. Date
298
16/06/2015
304
16/06/2015
305
16/06/2015
306
16/06/2015
307
16/06/2015
308
16/06/2015
309
16/06/2015
310
16/06/2015
311
16/06/2015
312
16/06/2015
313
16/06/2015
314
16/06/2015
315
16/06/2015
316
16/06/2015
318
16/06/2015
319
16/06/2015
320
17/06/2015
321
17/06/2015
322
17/06/2015
323
17/06/2015
324
17/06/2015
325
17/06/2015
326
17/06/2015
327
17/06/2015
328
17/06/2015
329
17/06/2015
330
17/06/2015
331
17/06/2015
332
17/06/2015
333
17/06/2015
334
17/06/2015
335
17/06/2015
336
17/06/2015
337
17/06/2015
338
17/06/2015
340
17/06/2015
341
17/06/2015
342
17/06/2015
343
17/06/2015
344
17/06/2015
345
17/06/2015
Time
8:50:16
13:22:10
13:36:45
13:50:42
15:26:07
15:47:30
16:02:00
16:08:56
16:16:00
16:23:12
16:29:53
16:39:00
16:47:00
16:59:24
17:12:52
17:19:13
8:56:15
9:08:53
9:18:55
9:26:38
9:43:33
9:50:36
10:04:21
10:09:43
10:24:35
10:32:53
10:40:07
10:46:02
10:53:26
11:01:00
11:08:37
11:16:37
11:22:31
11:28:27
11:35:50
12:56:08
13:04:47
13:14:49
13:23:55
13:32:13
13:38:40
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Peak
Bounce
Current
2.0
2.4
2.5
6.8
0.1
4.5
6.3
7.2
5.5
7.7
6.4
5.8
6.3
7.2
5.7
6.2
8.1
7.6
6.9
4.3
3.9
4.5
5.6
4.1
4.7
4.1
6.0
5.5
6.2
6.3
5.4
5.7
7.5
12.1
6.8
5.2
5.9
4.9
5.4
10.1
6.6
Bounce
Current Peak FCT Peak FCT Residual
Duration current voltage Volts
I2t (A2s) Fire
38
0.16
3282
300
0.008
N
49
0.32
2792
95
0.05
N
54
0.87
3485
95
0.28
Y
49
1.86
5541
95
2.06
Y
18
0.5
11000
100
0.33
Y
68
1.07
4690
90
0.57
N
37
0.21
1617
95
0.02
N
66
0.37
2135
110
0.06
N
64
0.49
2767
90
0.19
N
62
0.44
2092
90
0.09
N
65
0.62
3609
90
0.13
Y
63
0.45
2542
790
0.13
N
65
0.28
1726
890
0.18
N
63
0.45
1905
1030
0.22
N
66
0.18
1505
1000
0.1
N
58
0.27
1803
950
0.05
N
57
0.24
1447
930
0.16
N
44
0.21
1447
1090
0.52
N
61
0.38
2205
1100
0.47
N
59
0.57
2835
1030
0.27
N
57
0.16
1652
1020
0.07
N
58
0.39
2770
990
0.13
N
56
0.25
1867
1030
0.14
N
40
0.22
2862
1020
0.02
N
55
0.62
2926
1060
0.38
N
58
0.21
1774
1050
0.19
N
64
0.21
1722
1030
0.09
N
47
0.28
1761
1060
0.05
N
65
0.16
1459
1090
0.08
N
61
0.29
1826
1090
0.06
N
72
0.29
2577
2250
1.03
N
73
0.34
2584
2220
2.29
Y
40
0.61
2374
2200
10.92
Y
35
1.37
2175
2000
49.29
Y
38
0.71
2335
2200
9.13
Y
45
0.33
2659
2320
2.19
N
66
0.39
2900
2300
1.79
Y
74
0.37
2942
2250
4.03
Y
57
0.31
2538
2280
1.93
N
57
0.96
2167
2050
31.86
Y
64
0.37
2315
2100
3.65
N
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Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 114
Test No. Date
346
17/06/2015
347
17/06/2015
348
17/06/2015
349
17/06/2015
350
17/06/2015
351
17/06/2015
352
17/06/2015
353
17/06/2015
354
17/06/2015
355
17/06/2015
356
17/06/2015
357
17/06/2015
358
17/06/2015
359
17/06/2015
360
17/06/2015
361
17/06/2015
363
18/06/2015
364
18/06/2015
365
18/06/2015
366
18/06/2015
367
18/06/2015
368
18/06/2015
369
18/06/2015
370
18/06/2015
371
18/06/2015
372
18/06/2015
390
19/06/2015
429
22/06/2015
430
22/06/2015
431
22/06/2015
432
22/06/2015
433
22/06/2015
434
22/06/2015
435
22/06/2015
436
22/06/2015
437
22/06/2015
438
22/06/2015
439
23/06/2015
440
23/06/2015
441
23/06/2015
442
23/06/2015
444
23/06/2015
445
23/06/2015
446
23/06/2015
447
23/06/2015
448
23/06/2015
450
23/06/2015
Time
13:48:05
14:06:02
14:14:12
14:21:12
14:27:15
14:35:59
14:41:19
14:48:50
14:54:54
15:09:19
15:15:33
15:21:53
15:30:30
15:37:52
15:44:20
15:52:07
10:21:00
10:29:21
10:36:28
10:43:00
10:50:06
11:01:30
11:09:50
11:16:50
11:23:16
11:31:13
10:52:44
16:18:16
16:25:02
16:30:56
16:39:30
16:47:44
16:55:33
17:01:59
17:07:25
17:15:24
17:22:11
8:55:20
9:02:34
9:21:12
9:29:31
9:49:15
9:58:21
10:09:58
10:27:41
10:46:55
11:14:16
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Peak
Bounce
Current
10.7
8.3
6.3
6.6
7.3
8.4
7.9
8.4
9.4
8.3
7.8
9.4
9.6
10.3
9.2
8.2
9.9
9.5
10.4
9.2
10.1
9.1
9.5
9.7
10.8
10.3
8.0
10.8
11.4
9.9
9.6
11.2
10.9
10.5
10.4
8.2
11.1
9.7
9.6
9.3
9.3
9.2
10.0
10.7
9.8
8.2
13.2
Bounce
Current Peak FCT Peak FCT Residual
Duration current voltage Volts
I2t (A2s) Fire
62
1.19
2064
1860
43.1
Y
38
0.75
2408
2060
10.42
Y
55
0.39
2233
2150
6.25
Y
59
0.27
1701
1680
1.61
N
64
0.42
1734
1620
3.38
N
56
0.51
1722
1620
3.66
Y
66
0.53
1727
1550
3.75
N
63
0.5
1719
1600
4.74
N
64
0.37
1736
1600
2.51
N
70
0.29
1922
1600
0.79
N
55
0.56
1637
1620
7.61
Y
53
0.49
1743
1610
3.19
Y
38
0.59
1705
1600
7.05
Y
59
0.49
2012
1640
1.37
N
58
0.56
1600
1640
6.85
N
61
0.37
1953
1600
1.17
N
64
0.56
2120
95
0.15
N
48
0.42
2016
180
0.08
N
48
0.71
2549
200
0.22
N
43
0.51
1994
220
0.1
N
49
0.64
1965
220
0.25
N
53
0.63
1949
230
0.27
N
52
0.57
1989
190
0.18
N
47
0.37
1975
210
0.18
N
58
0.62
2010
190
0.14
N
55
0.61
1972
210
0.39
N
48
0.41
1631
165
0.07
N
56
1.44
2913
1300
1.23
Y
49
0.43
1466
1300
1.98
Y
52
0.4
1720
1300
1.39
N
52
1.31
2946
1330
2.87
Y
53
0.45
2243
1300
0.64
N
60
0.53
2270
1300
0.75
N
47
0.44
1696
1350
1.2
N
48
0.3
2293
1320
0.03
N
57
0.43
1618
1270
1.2
N
54
0.37
1780
1350
0.67
N
53
0.6
2334
1400
0.85
Y
47
0.37
1705
1330
0.4
N
57
0.33
1420
1315
0.64
N
48
0.42
1411
1300
1.33
N
55
0.33
1537
1380
1
N
57
0.42
1696
630
0.08
N
54
0.33
1659
500
0.04
N
48
0.36
1992
290
0.07
N
55
0.23
2104
430
0.02
N
49
0.75
1977
360
0.25
Y
Документ1
Friday, 4 December 2015
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Test No. Date
451
23/06/2015
452
23/06/2015
453
23/06/2015
454
23/06/2015
455
23/06/2015
456
23/06/2015
457
23/06/2015
458
23/06/2015
459
23/06/2015
460
23/06/2015
466
23/06/2015
467
23/06/2015
468
23/06/2015
469
23/06/2015
470
23/06/2015
471
23/06/2015
472
23/06/2015
473
23/06/2015
474
23/06/2015
475
23/06/2015
476
23/06/2015
486
24/06/2015
487
24/06/2015
488
24/06/2015
493
24/06/2015
494
24/06/2015
495
24/06/2015
496
24/06/2015
497
24/06/2015
498
24/06/2015
499
24/06/2015
500
24/06/2015
501
24/06/2015
502
24/06/2015
503
24/06/2015
504
24/06/2015
505
24/06/2015
506
24/06/2015
507
24/06/2015
510
24/06/2015
511
24/06/2015
512
24/06/2015
513
24/06/2015
514
24/06/2015
515
24/06/2015
517
24/06/2015
518
24/06/2015
Time
11:23:22
11:32:46
11:38:14
11:43:58
11:50:10
11:55:46
12:06:05
12:13:10
12:20:22
12:26:11
15:54:55
16:00:25
16:06:18
16:12:55
16:31:02
16:37:46
16:45:10
16:50:58
16:59:11
17:05:03
17:11:33
13:05:00
13:12:39
13:35:08
14:07:11
14:16:15
14:24:17
14:33:10
14:40:16
14:47:32
14:54:57
15:03:03
15:10:22
15:17:22
15:25:30
15:30:54
15:38:02
15:44:30
15:51:33
16:10:40
16:17:34
16:23:30
16:29:34
16:36:45
16:43:35
17:01:42
17:09:29
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Peak
Bounce
Current
13.5
12.9
13.5
12.9
12.2
13.5
12.1
13.5
13.4
12.4
14.1
12.9
13.3
13.6
13.1
13.0
12.6
13.1
13.5
13.1
13.7
9.4
9.7
10.1
9.8
10.2
10.8
11.4
13.0
13.6
10.7
11.3
12.5
12.1
11.8
11.3
13.0
13.0
12.3
11.0
10.5
12.9
13.5
9.8
12.5
13.3
11.7
Bounce
Current Peak FCT Peak FCT Residual
Duration current voltage Volts
I2t (A2s) Fire
46
0.31
1628
480
0.02
N
46
0.28
1248
500
0.03
N
49
0.61
2041
520
0.05
N
45
0.24
1684
520
0.02
N
56
0.9
2016
540
0.25
N
40
0.82
2503
550
0.19
N
47
0.67
2430
600
0.55
N
49
0.74
2445
620
0.3
Y
49
0.56
2318
500
0.2
Y
47
0.45
2074
440
0.08
N
41
0.78
2845
175
0.2
N
44
1.34
2298
190
0.75
Y
48
0.61
1898
220
0.18
N
48
0.59
1926
230
0.11
N
42
0.71
1995
1900
5.82
Y
53
1.68
3434
1920
3.25
Y
48
0.75
1950
1900
7.9
N
53
0.99
1867
1800
21.22
Y
50
1.03
2014
1800
16.69
Y
54
1.03
1915
1700
30.02
Y
48
0.8
1903
1800
10.85
Y
53
0.49
1991
130
0.09
N
51
0.38
2039
140
0.06
N
0.22
2167
100
0.02
N
47
0.33
2039
480
0.02
N
48
0.29
2047
480
0.03
N
48
0.46
2084
490
0.08
N
49
0.53
2840
500
0.11
Y
46
0.48
3744
500
0.06
N
46
0.76
2273
515
0.25
N
63
1.82
4501
530
1.75
N
48
1.02
3688
530
0.39
Y
56
0.75
3737
530
0.22
N
54
1.02
3038
540
0.21
N
50
0.89
3744
550
0.2
N
40
1.57
3421
550
0.84
Y
51
0.46
2564
560
0.13
N
42
1.59
3725
560
0.56
Y
48
0.91
3578
580
0.24
N
49
0.72
2844
1030
0.17
Y
49
0.39
2946
1020
0.14
Y
42
1.18
3896
1000
0.43
Y
51
0.56
2757
960
0.1
N
48
0.56
3294
970
0.13
Y
47
0.74
2773
940
0.35
N
49
0.19
1895
1040
0.05
N
40
2.33
5683
990
1.66
N
Документ1
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 116
Test No. Date
519
24/06/2015
520
25/06/2015
521
25/06/2015
522
25/06/2015
523
25/06/2015
524
25/06/2015
525
25/06/2015
526
25/06/2015
527
25/06/2015
528
25/06/2015
529
25/06/2015
530
25/06/2015
531
25/06/2015
Time
17:15:36
8:53:44
9:04:40
9:11:58
9:19:29
9:24:16
9:31:14
9:38:12
9:44:26
9:51:10
9:58:26
10:03:40
10:32:15
Peak
Bounce
Current
13.0
10.3
9.2
9.6
10.3
11.1
10.2
10.7
12.2
12.3
11.1
5.3
6.7
Bounce
Current Peak FCT Peak FCT Residual
Duration current voltage Volts
I2t (A2s) Fire
50
1.01
2634
980
0.93
Y
50
0.54
3238
830
0.12
N
51
0.78
3879
1000
0.26
Y
40
0.5
2998
1000
0.19
N
54
0.58
2798
1030
0.19
N
49
0.55
2781
1030
0.19
N
45
0.3
1988
1090
0.03
N
42
0.32
2298
1130
0.04
N
48
0.47
2259
1090
0.09
N
46
1.56
4603
880
0.47
N
55
0.29
3429
950
0.04
N
73
1.35
8637
1000
1.8
Y
38
0.36
3190
100
0.11
N
Table 13: Valid ‘wire down’ ignition tests – GFN (GFN4 firmware)
Test No.
Date
Time
Resistance
Supply
Phase
779
781
782
783
784
787
793
795
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
818
819
820
821
822
823
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
10:01:00
10:23:00
10:32:03
10:45:00
10:52:12
11:47:50
15:07:23
15:42:30
16:13:22
16:22:09
16:37:27
16:46:05
16:59:29
17:06:59
17:14:14
17:21:32
9:09:00
9:20:04
9:33:18
12:12:46
12:21:02
12:31:18
12:39:05
12:50:15
12:56:12
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
100
100
100
100
100
100
Blue
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Bounce
Bounce
Current Current
(manual) Duration
Документ1
0.17
0.09
0.09
0.11
0.09
1.23
0.07
0.08
0.24
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.05
46
46
39
51
39
103
38
36
56
39
44
43
37
46
45
46
45
37
39
37
45
37
44
36
35
Ground
Current
Ground
Current
Duration
Fire
0.32
0.11
0.14
0.09
0.09
0.15
0.23
0.12
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.34
0.11
0.15
0.11
0.03
0.27
0.06
0.11
0.1
0.1
0.16
0.09
0.11
19800
8470
49790
2000
2640
49770
35340
620
38050
59610
109770
38460
43790
16430
19560
40180
92070
33960
108110
7000
20500
16600
21350
14800
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 117
Table 14: Valid ‘wire down’ ignition tests - ASC+FPE (100 Ohms Blue phase)
Test No.
214
215
Date
3/06/2015
3/06/2015
Time
16:54
17:09
Peak
Bounce
Bounce Current
Current Duration
10.08
136
11.01
58
Fire
N
N
Table 15: valid NER vegetation conduction ignition tests (blue phase, 400 Ohms, species: Salix)
Test No.
Date
Time
Fire
Valid
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
764
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
12/10/2015
9:25:50
9:34:29
9:42:10
9:50:35
9:57:55
10:06:24
10:13:22
10:19:53
10:27:55
13:25:53
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Current
Initial
Final
Flow
Current Current
Duration
135910
130980
119480
90380
105870
76240
96030
44520
117860
134350
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.57
0.32
0.53
0.6
0.74
0.77
0.54
0.5
0.64
0.52
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 118
Table 16: valid ‘wire down’ ignition tests – SSFCL+FPE (100 Ohms)
Test No.
132
133
143
384
385
386
387
388
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
Date
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
19/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
22/06/2015
Time
13:44
14:00
16:20
9:28:00
9:34:56
9:39:57
9:47:10
9:52:59
11:10:39
11:39:59
11:43:06
11:48:31
11:56:44
12:52:39
12:57:51
13:03:51
13:08:10
13:12:13
13:22:17
13:28:04
13:33:01
13:38:02
13:43:24
13:48:21
13:56:12
14:02:10
14:07:52
14:12:15
14:18:13
14:23:23
12:39:18
14:06:00
14:15:41
14:22:19
14:28:02
14:44:12
14:52:16
14:58:56
15:07:50
15:14:58
15:25:24
15:34:51
15:42:29
15:47:30
15:54:21
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Peak
Bounce
Bounce Current
Current Duration I2t (A2s)
7.2
80
6.4
73
5.3
82
6.2
77
2.5
6.1
159
4.9
5.7
161
4.5
6.4
159
6.0
6.7
156
7.0
7.0
141
6.1
7.2
132
6.1
7.1
135
4.8
6.9
135
6.0
7.3
139
6.3
7.3
120
5.6
7.6
116
5.4
7.1
121
5.4
7.2
120
5.5
7.0
124
5.6
7.3
95
4.5
7.2
97
4.7
7.8
97
5.6
7.6
91
4.9
7.6
98
5.3
7.6
102
5.6
7.1
89
4.2
7.6
91
5.0
7.3
89
4.5
7.4
89
4.2
7.5
93
4.8
7.4
82
3.9
7.0
73
3.1
6.7
80
3.0
6.9
83
3.8
6.8
84
3.6
6.8
74
3.2
6.8
78
3.4
7.2
77
3.5
7.3
77
3.7
7.0
85
3.6
7.3
77
3.6
6.8
93
3.5
7.0
88
3.8
7.6
86
4.1
7.1
90
3.6
7.2
92
4.2
Документ1
Fire
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
FPE
Delay
(ms)
0
0
0
0
80
80
80
80
60
60
60
60
60
40
40
40
40
40
20
20
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
10
10
10
10
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 119
Table 17: valid GFN vegetation conduction ignition tests (GFN4 firmware, 400 Ohms, species: Salix)
Test No.
Date
Time
Supply
Phase
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
688
689
690
691
693
694
705
706
707
708
709
711
712
713
714
715
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
9:58:16
10:09:10
10:20:30
10:39:28
10:54:35
11:09:00
11:42:00
11:54:22
12:06:04
12:18:20
13:38:59
13:47:52
14:02:28
14:11:24
14:25:46
14:34:58
14:49:35
15:00:57
15:10:52
15:22:02
15:31:19
15:47:12
15:55:52
16:02:42
16:17:59
16:37:25
16:47:13
16:54:15
17:03:35
17:22:37
17:28:23
11:13:51
11:21:37
11:34:16
11:43:25
11:51:12
13:29:39
13:41:23
13:52:53
14:01:22
14:14:22
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Red
Red
Red
Red
Red
Red
Red
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Blue
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Fire
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
Документ1
Current
Initial
Final
Flow
Current Current
Duration
39430
109930
38240
100470
40360
130320
40920
139060
161190
137980
114640
106200
140700
113580
39500
32460
170810
158460
149620
137470
24410
26980
55790
136990
107430
134240
32230
26640
185430
22500
40390
138290
200000
125950
154810
123530
210850
217240
123990
116100
134750
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.07
0.09
0.07
0.1
0.09
0.09
0.21
0.14
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.13
0.1
0.14
0.13
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.45
0.37
0.22
0.27
0.29
0.54
0.3
0.34
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.42
0.39
0.51
0.3
0.33
0.48
0.4
0.44
0.39
0.39
0.34
0.32
0.48
0.39
0.41
0.34
0.38
0.45
0.39
0.41
0.33
0.3
0.46
0.33
0.13
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.31
0.51
Species
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 120
Test No.
Date
Time
Supply
Phase
Fire
716
718
719
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
759
761
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
788
790
791
792
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
14:25:16
14:45:31
14:55:22
11:53:06
12:00:53
12:06:29
12:16:51
12:35:18
12:43:10
12:50:49
13:00:40
13:10:28
12:16:59
12:36:15
14:50:05
14:57:37
15:05:28
15:13:52
15:22:12
15:29:37
15:37:48
12:20:20
12:57:02
13:05:11
14:19:49
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
White
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Current
Initial
Final
Flow
Current Current
Duration
136520
118180
169070
157200
40270
130640
161120
130960
120400
160140
133490
128780
160570
52890
111830
53320
47370
128340
121080
117110
105450
64740
127970
214170
60510
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.08
0.02
0.07
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.11
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.37
0.46
0.57
0.44
0.34
0.47
0.51
0.49
0.58
0.48
0.58
0.4
0.48
0.4
0.45
0.36
0.36
0.44
0.48
0.53
0.35
0.36
0.31
0.47
0.28
Species
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Salix
Table 18: valid GFN vegetation conduction ignition tests (GFN4 firmware, 400 Ohms, species: F. Angustifolia)
Test No.
Date
Time
Supply
Phase
Fire
751
752
753
754
755
756
760
762
765
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
9/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
13:49:47
13:56:02
14:03:24
14:10:23
14:17:27
14:23:45
12:27:48
12:49:49
14:53:54
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Current
Initial
Final
Flow
Current Current
Duration
51030
29810
19870
21470
23180
48710
44350
59480
47820
0.09
0.15
0.24
0.14
0.15
0.06
0.11
0.09
0.12
0.43
0.43
0.4
0.41
0.4
0.37
0.41
0.39
0.41
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 121
15.1.2 Bolted resistive fault tests
The following tests were performed with the test rig shorted out by a length of flexible welding
cable. They were performed to for setup purposes and to explore and measure the performance of
each REFCL type.
Table 19: Bolted resistive fault tests
Test No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
96
97
98
99
100
209
Date
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
21/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
2/06/2015
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Time
14:50
15:05
15:08
15:09
15:12
15:33
15:37
15:53
15:56
16:28
16:45
16:48
17:10
17:18
17:40
18:01
15:01
16:51
17:18
13:44
14:06
14:15
14:55
14:59
15:59
16:13
16:19
16:33
16:55
17:00
17:14
17:57
18:24
18:31
19:05
9:16
9:38
9:49
9:52
10:33
10:38
14:49
15:05
15:12
15:25
15:34
13:16
Protection Compensation
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
SSFCL
SSFCL
SSFCL
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
ASC
FPE
ASC
FPE
ASC
FPE
ASC
FPE
ASC
FPE
ASC
-
Документ1
Resistance
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
6400
6400
6400
1600
400
200
100
15600
15600
6400
6400
6400
6400
3200
3200
3200
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
400
400
1600
400
200
100
100
0
0
1600
400
400
100
0
100
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
Red
Red
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 122
Test No.
210
211
212
213
293
294
295
296
300
301
302
303
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
413
461
462
463
464
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
Date
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
3/06/2015
3/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
16/06/2015
16/06/2015
16/06/2015
16/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
18/06/2015
22/06/2015
23/06/2015
23/06/2015
23/06/2015
23/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
Time
13:36
13:44
15:52
16:16
16:52:00
16:58:27
17:02:00
17:06:10
11:05:00
11:13:56
11:35:00
11:46:00
14:55:55
15:03:00
15:11:00
15:43:41
16:46:53
17:12:43
17:22:38
17:37:00
17:54:42
18:05:48
12:03:17
14:38:00
14:40:00
14:45:00
15:06:59
9:59:00
10:09:00
10:25:00
10:58:00
11:27:42
11:34:00
11:48:10
11:53:00
12:01:00
Protection Compensation Resistance
ASC
100
ASC
100
ASC
100
ASC
100
GFN3
RCC
15600
GFN3
RCC
15600
GFN3
RCC
15600
GFN3
RCC
15600
GFN3
RCC
25400
GFN3
RCC
25400
GFN3
RCC
25400
GFN3
RCC
25400
SSFCL
FPE
15300
SSFCL
FPE
100
SSFCL
FPE
100
SSFCL
FPE
100
GFN3
RCC
100
GFN3
RCC
12800
GFN3
RCC
12800
GFN3
RCC
6400
GFN3
RCC
3200
GFN3
RCC
100
GFN3
RCC
3300
GFN3
RCC
3300
GFN3
RCC
3300
GFN3
RCC
3300
GFN3
RCC
3300
GFN3
RCC
8.3/16.7+3.2
GFN3
RCC
8.3/16.7+3.2
GFN3
RCC
16.7/8.3+3.2
GFN3
RCC
8.3/8.3+3.2
GFN3
RCC
16.7/16.7+400
GFN3
RCC
16.7/16.7+400
GFN3
RCC
16.7/16.7+400
GFN3
RCC
16.7/16.7+400
GFN3
RCC
16.7/16.7+400
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Blue/White
Blue/White
Blue/White
Blue/White
Blue/White
Blue/White
Red/White
Red/White
Red/White
Table 20: Tranche 4 GFN bolted resistive fault tests with GFN4 firmware
Test No.
Date
Time
Resistance
Supply
Phase
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
621
622
623
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
30/09/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
14:33:00
14:50:39
15:18:20
15:31:30
15:55:35
16:07:00
16:15:30
12:22:12
12:28:05
12:38:19
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
White
White
White
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Current
Initial
Flow
Current
Duration
125
200
190
176
537
546
488
289
235
235
0.44
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.53
0.54
0.52
0.48
0.47
0.48
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 123
Test No.
Date
Time
Resistance
Supply
Phase
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
739
809
810
811
813
814
815
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
1/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
5/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
9/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
12:56:23
13:26:34
13:30:37
13:42:12
13:44:05
13:45:44
14:05:46
14:08:22
14:10:19
14:42:27
11:14:16
11:23:30
11:26:15
11:38:57
11:42:48
11:55:00
12:00:08
12:02:33
12:09:30
12:17:30
12:23:59
12:44:05
12:56:23
12:57:00
14:20:33
15:18:16
16:01:11
16:03:28
16:13:14
16:15:13
16:37:24
16:41:53
16:45:46
16:57:52
15:24:11
15:34:00
15:40:37
16:19:03
16:46:19
16:50:59
17:01:22
10:49:24
10:00:30
10:06:35
10:10:54
10:25:03
10:29:28
10:33:42
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
25050
400
400
400
400
40000
40000
40000
40000
40000
40000
40000
40000
25050
25050
25050
25450
25450
25450
400
400
400
400
400
400
25450
25450
25450
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
15600
15600
15600
Blue
Blue
Blue
Red
Red
Red
White
White
White
Blue
White
White
White
Blue
Blue
Red
Red
Red
Red
Blue
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
Red
Red
White
White
White
White
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
Blue
Red
Red
Blue
White
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Current
Initial
Flow
Current
Duration
350
350
350
270
270
230
50
58
55
65
350
350
350
530
550
400
420
395
235
325
240
340
350
350
60
60
60
50
55
55
240
250
2665
3038
63
112070
165040
180650
80
60
60
45
55
63
58
218
291
245
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.47
0.47
0.47
18.48
18.48
18.06
19.79
0.31
0.3
0.3
0.32
0.32
0.3
0.31
0.31
0.48
0.51
0.47
0.51
0.51
0.5
19.65
19.8
18.43
18.5
18.84
18.83
0.47
0.47
0.48
>2.6
20.09
0.4
20.1
>2.64
18.52
19.61
18.34
0.76
0.81
0.76
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 124
15.1.3 Setup and invalid tests
The following tests were performed for the purposes of setup or they were ruled invalid for some
reason and excluded from the sets of ignition results used in some analyses.
Table 21: Setup and invalid tests – earlier versions of GFN firmware (up to Test 292)
Test No.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Date
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
18/05/2015
Time
13:33
13:45
14:08
14:11
14:23
14:27
14:44
15:18
15:22
15:26
15:46
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Test Type
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Protection
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
Документ1
Compensation
RCC
Resistance
15600
15600
12800
12800
6400
6400
3200
3200
3200
3200
3200
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 125
Test No.
45
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Date
18/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
22/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
25/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
27/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
Time
15:46
12:01
12:09
12:23
13:22
13:47
13:54
14:19
14:24
12:06
12:25
12:51
13:10
9:16
10:04
10:34
10:36
10:42
11:14
12:11
13:58
14:11
15:11
15:23
15:36
15:52
15:58
16:21
16:41
16:53
17:05
17:17
17:35
17:49
9:09
10:01
10:13
10:31
10:44
11:03
11:17
11:32
11:48
9:05
9:33
9:41
9:51
10:00
10:16
10:26
10:34
10:43
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Test Type
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Protection
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN1
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
Документ1
Compensation
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
Resistance
3200
15600
15600
15600
6400
6400
6400
6400
6400
1600
400
100
0
100
100
15200
15200
15200
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 126
Test No.
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
217
218
219
220
Date
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
29/05/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
1/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
2/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
Time
10:51
11:02
11:12
11:22
11:29
11:36
11:48
12:04
13:26
13:34
13:40
13:47
13:53
14:02
14:09
14:17
14:25
14:32
12:00
12:15
12:25
12:33
13:34
13:45
14:23
14:38
14:51
15:23
15:32
16:23
16:31
16:40
16:48
16:57
17:04
17:13
17:22
17:59
9:31
9:47
9:53
10:03
10:17
10:25
10:40
10:52
11:03
11:15
11:47
12:04
12:34
12:36
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Test Type
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Protection
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
Документ1
Compensation
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
Resistance
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 127
Test No.
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
Date
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
4/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
Time
13:12
13:24
13:35
13:59
14:08
14:15
14:28
14:39
14:45
14:52
14:59
15:05
15:13
15:19
15:27
15:38
16:25
16:32
16:37
16:45
16:51
17:01
17:07
17:13
17:19
17:24
17:31
17:38
17:44
9:27
9:35
9:41
9:48
9:55
10:01
10:09
10:18
10:27
11:54
12:01
12:07
12:21
12:27
12:38
12:44
12:52
13:13
13:19
13:42
14:04
14:08
14:15
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Test Type
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Protection
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
Документ1
Compensation
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
Resistance
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 128
Test No.
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
Date
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
5/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
15/06/2015
Time
14:21
14:26
14:31
14:37
13:14
13:17:00
13:21:03
13:25:35
13:28:57
13:49:00
14:12:00
14:15:00
14:16:00
14:32:45
14:55:00
15:01:17
15:08:40
15:21:00
15:26:15
15:31:00
Test Type
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Bolted
Protection
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
GFN2
Compensation
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
Resistance
100
100
100
100
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
15600
Supply
Phase
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
Blue
White
White
White
White
Blue
White
White
White
White
White
White
Table 22: set-up and invalid tests - other reasons (all ignition tests on white phase)
Test No.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
32
49
50
51
52
56
57
58
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
Date
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
14/05/2015
14/05/2015
14/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
19/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
28/05/2015
Time
18:38
18:44
19:20
19:22
19:27
13:21
13:40
14:48
11:00
11:21
11:29
11:40
12:40
12:47
12:53
14:14
14:28
14:44
14:58
15:11
15:19
15:26
15:39
16:13
16:28
16:36
16:47
16:53
17:05
17:12
17:18
17:26
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Protection Compensation
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
NER
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
SSFCL
FPE
Документ1
Resistance
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Invalid reason
No grass
No grass
No grass
No G3i record
G3i noise trigger
Same bed
Short test
No G3i record
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Arm sitting high
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Conductor tilted
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 129
Test No.
216
297
299
317
339
383
443
465
489
490
491
492
508
509
516
532
536
537
538
Date
3/06/2015
15/06/2015
16/06/2015
16/06/2015
17/06/2015
19/06/2015
23/06/2015
23/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
24/06/2015
25/06/2015
25/06/2015
25/06/2015
25/06/2015
Time
17:16
17:28:40
8:59:44
17:06:30
12:41:39
9:19:00
9:36:58
15:47:26
13:40:00
13:50:57
13:56:35
14:00:20
16:00:48
16:04:53
16:51:08
10:38:43
12:51:53
13:34:23
13:52:49
Protection Compensation
ASC
FPE
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
SSFCL
FPE
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
GFN3
RCC
NER
NER
NER
-
Resistance
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
3300
100
100
Invalid reason
Tripped power no record
Not detected on bounce
Not detected in FCT
GFN malfunction
Not detected on bounce
No FPE operation
No RCC operation
Odd GFN behaviour
Same bed
Same bed
Same bed
Same bed
Same bed
Same bed
GFN malfunction
Arm sitting high
Duration too long
Arced to bow
Fulgurite
Table 23: Tranche 4 setup and invalid tests
Test No.
Date
Time
659
660
673
687
692
704
710
717
741
763
773
774
775
776
777
778
780
789
794
796
797
816
817
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
7/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
8/10/2015
9/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
12/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
13/10/2015
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
9:37:00
9:42:30
13:55:35
16:28:57
17:13:58
10:37:11
12:04:20
14:37:04
11:44:00
13:17:04
15:50:17
17:07:43
17:11:44
17:14:59
17:18:00
17:28:54
10:06:01
12:26:28
15:20:58
16:02:58
16:06:54
11:35:02
11:51:00
16:25:24
16:30:13
16:39:07
16:49:47
17:06:13
8:46:36
8:54:10
9:07:20
10:29:32
10:35:25
11:42:39
11:47:56
Test Type Protection
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Vegetation
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Vegetation
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Vegetation
Ignition
Ignition
Vegetation
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
Ignition
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
NER
NER
GFN4
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
GFN4
NER
GFN4
NER
GFN4
Compe
nsation
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
NIL
NIL
RCC
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
RCC
NIL
RCC
NIL
RCC
DAQ Notes
Willow branch. Phase to earth. Not valid test.
Not a valid test.
Branch fell off. Invalid test.
Sample was tied. Sample fell offf. Ivalid test.
Branch fell off. Invalid test.
Sample broke in half. Not a valid test.
ACR tripped. No GEN3i data. Not a valid test.
Sample fell off. Invalid test.
Willow sample. Invalid test because GFN detection sensitivity was 15V, instead of 40V.
Desert ash branch. Same branch as test 762. Not a valid test. Current span = 5A. Flashover.
GFN didn't perform FCT and released fault. GFN malfunction? 248° ember.
Not a valid test. Setting up ignition tests.
Not a valid test.
Not a valid test. Arm fall time = 12.579s.
Not a valid test. Arm fall time = 12.579s.
Not a valid test.
Same bed as 779. Invalid test. GFN didn't find fault.
GoPro video says 773. IR camera span was on <120°. Willow branch. Nearly flashover at ~1.14A.
Arm lifted at 62s mark. No fire untill that point.
RCC miscalibrated by 65V. GFN detection sensitivity set to 15V.
Same bed. Not a valid test. RCC miscalibrated by 130V.
Wet soil bed. Demo test. Not valid.
Used soil bed. Demo test. Not valid.
Arm timing test. Arm fall time =12579ms. Dry bed
New bed. 100A current span.
100A current span. GFN setting was still at elevated residual.
Rehearse vegetation test
Practice test 1
Practice test 2
Practice test 3
Test for media 1
Test for media 2
Repeat test 1 for media
Repeat test 2 for media
Документ1
Friday, 4 December 2015
P a g e | 130
15.2 Appendix B: HRL Technology REFCL Trial report
© Marxsen Consulting Pty Ltd
Документ1
Friday, 4 December 2015