From doxa to practice: Should companies disclose financial
information to employees?
A case study of three works councils in the French steel industry from 1945
to 1982
Abstract
The consensus in human resource management (HRM) and industrial relations is that making
financial information available to employees is good practice and contributes to the
involvement of personnel. Yet an analysis of three major French steel companies between 1945
and 1982 would appear to suggest otherwise. Consequently, the assertion mentioned above
seems to be what Bourdieu calls a ‘doxa’: an assertion in keeping with common sense, and
which intends to become a prescriptive truth, saving the cost of a proof. Such a doxa continues
to be the dominant discourse. However, on the one hand managers see their interest in divulging
as little financial information as possible, while on the other hand many unions challenge the
neutrality and reliability of such information. We argue here that this doxa continues simply
because it is the only publicly acceptable discourse.
Keywords: disclosure, history, industrial relations, doxa.
1
Introduction
In an article about divulging financial information to the markets, Darrough (1993, p. 534)
writes: ‘Some firms benefit by hiding and others by sharing, information’. In the following
article, we use the example of three companies to show how they had to face the same type of
dilemma in relation to the potential advantage or disadvantage of providing employees with
financial information. This perspective may run counter to theories developed in the field of
human resource management (HRM), most of which only consider the beneficial aspects of
such divulgence.
Although nowadays, on the basis of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and
International Accounting Standards (IAS), authorities tend to privilege the information needs
of current and future investors1, this was not the case in post-war France: the programme of the
National Resistance Council2 was designed to lay the foundations of an industrial democracy
involving employees, trade unions and management, while the composition of the National
Accounting Council3 reflected this ambition. The Comités d’Entreprise (works councils),
established by an order dated 22 February 1945, were also a result of this policy. These bodies
were formed to represent staff, and play both a social and cultural role on the one hand, and an
economic role on the other. In order to achieve this, they had to be kept informed about company
affairs. This move was unprecedented in the history of French labour law and reflected a desire
to break away from the culture of secrecy.
Since then, the power enjoyed by works councils has had its ups and downs: strictly in terms of
legislation, it has been increased and developed, with the creation of the group committee
(comité de groupe) under the so-called Auroux statutes of 1982, in an effort to monitor changes
in company structures. Similarly, in 1994, the European Works Council (Béthoux, 2004) was
enshrined in EU law, which therefore ensured the existence of such a body in transnational
companies. Locally, however, the role and power of the works council largely depends on the
highly variable balance of power from one company to another, to such an extent that one might
argue that information provided by management is in most cases more of a voluntary disclosure
than the result of any legal constraint.
In terms of the information to be provided to employees generally, and to the work council in
particular, company directors face a dilemma: in some circumstances the divulgence of
information can help generate a climate of trust and staff involvement, but it can also play into
the hands of employee opposition to the powers of management. In each situation, managers
must decide precisely where to draw the line between far-reaching divulgence and secrecy.
There appears to be a consensus in the literature on HRM and industrial relations about the
effects of providing employees with information: in terms of industrial relations, disclosure
should lead to more effective negotiations (Foley & Maunders, 1977; Maunders & Foley, 1974),
more streamlined negotiations (Palmer, 1977) or the avoidance of forecasting errors made by
trade unions (Pope & Peel, 1981); in the case of human resources, it is considered ‘best
management practice’ when both levels of commitment by employees, and ultimately
performance, increase (Delery & Doty, 1996).
Although the academic literature and the manuals favour the disclosure of economic
information to employees, two major questions remain. First, empirical studies have shown that
the effect of disclosure on a company's performance is considerably more complex than
expected (Kleiner & Bouillon, 1988; Peccei, Bewley, Gospel, Willman, & Street, 2005).
Second, the history of this practice does not reveal a trend towards ever-increasing levels of
information being provided to employees. In fact, the opposite appears to be true, as managers
must at all times arbitrate between silence and disclosure. Debates on the question of disclosure
of information to employees were identified at the beginning of the 20th century in both
2
English-language (Lewis, Parker, & Sutcliffe, 1984) and French business periodicals (Floquet,
2012). In both cases, the debate topics were dependent on the context.
Having chosen to concentrate on works councils, we set out to explain the disclosure (or nondisclosure) of accounting and financial information to works councils between 1945 (i.e. the
date of their creation) and 1982 (the year of the Auroux statutes, which increased their powers)
in three French steel companies. Without seeking to identify a specific line of progress, we set
out to study instances of significant disclosure or refusal to disclose by management, as well as
the reactions to this information from elected works council members. Therefore, the aim of
our research is to understand the reasons behind the decision whether or not to disclose
information. Works councils during this period played a role in labour relations in France as
the primary vehicle for information intended for employees. The disclosures made to works
councils therefore reflect the disclosures made to employees. Although works councils are a
specific feature of French industrial relations, this study could easily be applied to other
contexts. The same questions are raised in other industrial relations systems: in the United
Kingdom, information is disclosed to Joint Consultative Committees, and the economic crisis
has brought this issue to the fore as questions are raised about new forms of governance between
employers and employees in the form of partnerships; in Germany, the Betriebsrat and
Gesamtbetriebsrat systems are enforced by law; furthermore, in 2002, EU legislation extended
employee rights to information and consultation4. From this perspective, our research sets out
to better understand the role attributed to the disclosure of accounting information as part of
industrial relations by drawing on qualitative data over a long period, whereas most studies
focusing on this issue use quantitative data taken from labour relations surveys.
This study contributes to literature in two ways. First of all, the disclosure of information to
employees, in some respects, can be seen as an ideological move to strengthen managerial
discourse. To back up this suggestion, we draw on the sociological research of Pierre Bourdieu
(1982). Secondly, we show that the ‘doxa’ (according to which divulging financial information
to employees is good practice) continues, despite being contradicted by the study of practices.
The strategy of divulging financial information to employees amounts to a strategic move as
defined by Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986), one that seeks to influence the balance of
power in industrial relations. Instances of heavy disclosure are followed by periods of silence,
a situation that can be explained by the desire among senior management to influence power
structures to their advantage.
Our research material for the purposes of this study is comprised of minutes from works council
meetings held in three French steel companies: Société des Forges et Aciéries du Creusot
(SFAC) (Schneider & Co.); De Wendel & Co.; and Usinor. We analysed on average two to
three meetings each year: one in June during which the accounts for the previous financial year
are presented; and one or two others during which management tries to outline company affairs.
Added to these ordinary meetings are extraordinary meetings, which tend to increase in number
as time goes by and various crises emerge. The format of these minutes can vary:
 Some (a majority of cases) provide a detailed summary of the debate, outlining
the main discussions verbatim;
 Where the minutes were unavailable, we were able to consult succinct accounts
generally handed out to elected members of the reporting committee who are not
members of the works council.
 Where available, we prioritised an analysis of comprehensive minutes which
provide a record of discussions in the form of a dialogue.
All of these documents were retrieved from the archives at the Académie François Bourdon
(AFB) in the case of SFAC, and the Arcelor-Mittal archives in Florange (AAMF) in the case
of Usinor and De Wendel & Co. A total of 250 minutes were retrieved and coded.5
3
This article is organized as follows. Having addressed the theoretical implications of disclosing
information to employees in terms of industrial relations and accounting, we outline the specific
features of the history of industrial democracy in France. We go on to describe the main
characteristics of information disclosed to the works councils for each of the three companies:
the difficulty in breaking away from a culture of secrecy; calls from the trade unions to include
accounting information in the disclosure; and the challenge raised by the trade unions as to the
neutrality of the accounting information provided. The final section will discuss these various
findings.
Disclosing information to employees: The study of a doxa
In this part, we seek to show that disclosure information to employees fits with a doxa in the
field of business administration. In other words, there is an almost general acceptance of the
principle that a company must disclose information to employees. This imperative was born in
the mid-20th century: it is reinforced by the legitimacy provided by research trends in HRM in
the mid-1980s although some studies challenge the validity of this doxa.
The notion of doxa remains to be specified. It appears in the verses of Parmenides’ poem (5th
century BC) as a confused opinion of someone or as an aspect of reality by opposite to the true
way of access to understanding. (Couloubaritsis, 1987).
In this study, doxa is used in light of Bourdieu’s sociology,6 particularly his Meditations
pascaliennes (1997, translated into English in 2000 as Pascalian Meditations): it is grounded
in the work of the sociologist and must be understood as a broader set – the field.7 Indeed, each
field has a specific doxa. This is ‘a set of inseparably cognitive and evaluative presuppositions
whose acceptance is implied by membership’8 to the field (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 144).
Specifically, engaging in a field implies tacit acceptance of the same doxa.
Thus doxa opposes knowledge that is rigorously established: ‘Doxa is the relationship of
immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it
is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted vision of the world that flows from practical sense’
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68).
Emergence of a doxa
Management theorists in the second half of the 20th century, with the support of the Human
Relations movement (Mayo, 1933), have been interested in alternative form of control to
coercion (Ogden & Bougen, 1985). There was consensus in the business administration field
that considering the disclosure of information to employees was a good practice. Therefore,
handbooks on personnel management actively promoted it.9 For example, in 1949, an
anonymous book entitled Human Relations in Modern Business: A guide for action, which was
sponsored by the American Business Leaders, indicated that ‘Patience, care, and intelligence
are required to explain company policies effectively, particularly when they involve a change’
(p. 23). It added ‘men wish to be consulted about the policies they must execute’. This practice
was used to create a climate of mutual trust (Finlay, Sartay, & Tate, 1954, p. 104) and to calm
industrial relations (Northcott, 1960, pp. 62-63), and was so effective that as soon as 1948, 91%
of American companies indicated that they provided a bulletin board (Survey of National
Industrial Conference Board quoted by Bellows, 1954, p. 115). The question of the type of
information disclosure is not forgotten. Thus, the fear of disclosing useful information to
4
competitors tends to explain the non-disclosure of certain financial information (McFarland,
1968).
Beyond handbooks of personnel management, surveys by Lewis et al. (1984) on Anglo-Saxon
cases and Floquet (2012) on French cases show that disclosure information to employees was
promoted by business newspapers. More precisely, Lewis et al.’s survey shows that history of
disclosure information to employees in business periodicals is explained by some socioeconomic factors (economic situation, introduction of new technology, etc.). Moreover, it is
characterised by a misreading of authors of prior research, so much so that ‘lack of prior-period
bibliographic referencing and inconsistent interdisciplinary interest over time appeared to
encourage repetitive issue development’ (Lewis et al., 1984, p. 285).
On the French case, Floquet (2012) shows that from 1950, professional accounting newspapers
seized upon the debate on disclosure information to employees and promote this practice by
breaking with a culture of trade secrets. They relay how good practices (like disclosure
information to employees) are highlighted by productivity missions.10 While in the first part of
the 20th century the organization consultancy saw in this practice the risk of a loss of freedom
and authority for the management (Rumpf, 1926), after the Second World War the legitimacy
of this practice was no longer discussed. It becomes part of good management practices and
can be regarded as a doxa in the light of Bourdieu (1997). Like a doxa (Golsorkhi & Huault,
2006), the legitimacy of disclosure information is no longer a topic of discussion, but rather
becomes ‘a set of shared opinions and unquestioned beliefs’ (Wacquant, 2006, p. 270).
In the mid-1980s, handbooks on personnel management became handbooks on HRM and
provide an apparent rational justification to the disclosure information, thus enhancing the
discourse on the pertinence of such a practice: information increases involvement to company
goals, job satisfaction and ultimately the performance of the organization (Armstrong, 2009;
Beardwell, Holden, & Claydon, 2003; Bratton & Gold, 2003; Dessier, 2003). It is therefore
classified – as with other practices (extensive job rotation, self-managing teams, team
production, etc.) under the catchphrase ‘high-commitment human resources management’
(Baron & Kreps, 1999, pp. 189-190).
HRM academic discourse assesses (reinforces) the doxa
Before it became a best HRM practice in the mid-1980s, the disclosure of information to
employees was initially an issue that was addressed by researchers working on industrial
relations. By adopting an approach that weighed the costs and advantages associated with
disclosure (Foley & Maunders, 1977) or by drawing on game theory (Elias, 1990), researchers
outlined the type of disclosure that would allow collective negotiations to be carried out more
efficiently and on a rational basis ( Elias, 1990; Foley & Maunders, 1977; Palmer, 1977; Pope
& Peel, 1981).
From the 1980s onwards, HR-based approaches seem to have eclipsed the work done on
industrial relations. So much so that Guest (1995) questioned the future of the trade union both
in academic research and in labour relations:
The trade union is in danger of joining the Royal Family as a popular and largely
historic relic; and like royalty it lives in a somewhat anachronistic role, on the margins
of the lives of most workers. (p. 136)
Under the influence of the human relations movement, the human resource management (HRM)
approach emerged as a conceptual framework that connected political HR decisions to
anticipated outcomes and long-term consequences (Guest, 1987). HR-based policies were
designed to increase levels of commitment among employees, thus leading to improvements in
performance. Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills, and Walton (1985) identified this dimension as
central to the management of human resources: a more committed employee would be more
satisfied, and therefore more productive and versatile. From this perspective, the disclosure of
5
information to employees and employee representatives was seen as good management
practice.
The studies carried out by Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) in the US, and by Pope and Peel (2005)
in the UK provided empirical verifications of the strong link between disclosure and
productivity. But the most striking findings were obtained when each practice was considered
not independently but in terms of complementarity. This revealed the existence of an incentivebased system which favoured high levels of productivity (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994). The
objective was therefore to combine communicative practices with salary incentives, teamwork,
training, etc. (Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997). Additionally, information sharing is
frequently correlated with worker well-being (Böckerman, Bryson, & Ilmakunnas 2011; Kalmi
& Kauhanen, 2008; Mohr & Zoghi, 2008; Wood & Menezes, 1998). However, in the French
case, results are more mixed and information sharing is only partially correlated with greater
employee satisfaction (Perraudin, Petit, & Rebérioux, 2013).
In light of challenges made against the precepts of the HRM approach by critical research in
the field of HR (Legge, 1995), the strength of this framework would appear to be debatable.
Beneath the ‘false modernity’11 of these practices lies a rhetoric that seeks to promote a
managerial vision of labour relations in which each employee becomes a manager, although
without the benefits, privileges and relative power enjoyed by those officially appointed.
Unlike studies based on quantitative data, we investigate the practice of the disclosure (and not
the result). More precisely, by using qualitative and longitudinal date, we try to understand the
mechanisms of information disclosure to employee representatives. This is not a question of
linkages between this practice, performance or worker well-being, but a question about nature
of information-sharing, its truthfulness, its receipt, and finally a question of demonstrating that
information disclosure is a matter of strategic managerial decision. We will now see the ways
in which, in terms of disclosing information to employees, accounting researchers appear to be
more circumspect in relation to the role of financial information in labour relations.
Challenging the doxa
If HRM literature studies the impact of disclosure information on worker well-being and
performance, positive accounting theory investigates the impact of industrial relations on net
income. This surveys postulate a tropism for methods to reduce net income when companies
have to deal with a high union density, before collective bargaining on wages or before
restructuring (Boutant & Verdier, 2013; Bova, 2013; Bowen, Ducharme & Schores, 1995;
Cullinan & Bline, 2003; Cullinan & Knoblett, 1994; D’Souza, Jacob & Ramesh, 2001;
DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1991; Hall, Stammerjohan & Cermignano, 2005; Liberty &
Zimmerman, 1986; Mautz & Richardson, 1992; Mora & Sabater, 2008; Osma, Enguídanos &
Marcos, 2010; Yamaji, 1986).
Beyond these quantitative studies, according to Bougen (1989, p. 205) or Brown (2000a), the
disclosure of information to employees suffers from a lack of research. However, it is shown
that financial information plays a role in collective bargaining (Amernic, 1985) and it also
seems that financial information is unchallengeable by the shop steward (Knights & Collinson,
1987). Craft (1981, p. 101) shows that ‘the extent of information disclosed to the union
theoretically can range from nothing to all’; it depends on a large set of factors (nature of
collective bargaining, political stability of the union, etc). Owen and Lloyd (1985) underline
the importance of industrial relations configurations on the use of corporate information by
trade union negotiators in collective bargaining. It is therefore not surprising that Amernic and
Craig (2005), in an article published in the Journal of Industrial Relations, lament the fact that
in too many industrial relations studies, accounting is considered both by practitioners and
6
researchers to provide objective data that can measure wealth, profits, cash flow and costs.
Amernic and Craig are aware that accounting is no more than a subjective representation of a
company, but they cite several authors who claim that accounting figures can inform the
arbitration process during collective negotiations. Trumble and Tudor (1996) argue that the
‘true’ situation of a company could be understood by its employee representatives if they were
taught to read financial reports, strategic plans and annual reports.
Following the publication of studies from the Accounting in Action movement, the decisions by
companies whether or not to disclose information to – and about – employees were seen as a
reflection of society, with the founding article of Burchell, Clubb, and Hopwood (1985) tracing
the history of value added in the United Kingdom from this perspective. The authors
demonstrate that the emergence and subsequent disappearance of the debate on value added in
the UK was largely influenced by the economic and social environment.
For their part, Lewis et al. (1984) identified four factors to explain the level of interest in the
disclosure of information to employees that was apparent in the managerial debate taking place
in the English-speaking world: the introduction of new technologies in the workplace; company
mergers; anti-trade unionist sentiment (which allowed management to circumvent the unions
and address employees directly); and recession (or fears thereof). In a case study research,
Jackson-Cox, Thirkell and McQueeney (1984, p. 260) show that ‘management provision of
information to trade union representatives was initiated in response to pressures arising out of
constraints imposed by the environment in which forms operated, rather than in response to
trade union pressures or requests’.
Following the work of Tinker (1985), Labour Process Theory sought to explain the choice of
accounting techniques in terms of the conflicts related to production and the distribution of
economic surplus (Cooper & Hopper 2006).
By drawing on the concept of class struggle, Ogden and Bougen (1985) sought to demonstrate
that accounting reinforces and propagates the values and proposals of corporate management.
Accounting is perceived as a language, the reflection of an ideology. From this perspective, the
promotion of information disclosure can be reinterpreted. The divulgence of accounting
information makes it possible to teach trade unions how to tackle managerial problems, and
also lays the foundations of managerial power. While the source of this authority has
traditionally been associated with the right to property, this legitimacy has been challenged by
the trade unions, whose influence allowed them to resist certain decisions that went against
employee interests. By creating new justifications for the authority of senior management,
information disclosure can be used to demonstrate the technical nature of the problems facing
organisations, and to justify the role of management in providing technical expertise and
offering technical solutions. Lastly, the disclosure of accounting information allows
management to dictate the agenda in meetings and avoid certain discussions.
The study by Ogden and Bougen (1985) focuses on this debate from the perspective of trade
unions, demonstrating that ‘indeed, it poses a dilemma for unions’ (p. 222). On the one hand,
having access to information can reduce the advantage enjoyed by senior managers who have
most of the data. On the other, this drags the unions into an ideology that is propagated by the
perception of financial documents. This study stands out from earlier work because of its
authors' vision of accounting, which is not seen as a mere technique, but rather as an ideological
object. This understanding of accounting aligns the authors with the work of Amernic and Craig
(2005). By extending the studies of Ogden and Bougen (1985), Amernic (1988) and Fox (1973,
1985), Brown (2000b) interprets the relationship between accounting and industrial relations in
three categories. Unitarist assumption tries to promote goal alignment by sharing information.
This approach assumes that ‘what is good for capital is good for everyone else’. Pluralist
assumption does not deny conflicting interests, but disclosure information to employees may
be a means to introduce a more cooperative approach. Finally, radical assumption explains the
7
refusal of sharing information by employers (managerial prerogative, confidentiality,
misinterpretation by employees etc.), and unions may also refuse to consider this information
(information is not truthful or fair, there is some risk of incorporation, etc.).
McBarnet, Weston and Whelan (1993) try to understand strategic uses of financial information
by capital and labour through the concept of adversary accounting. According to them, financial
information may be used both by managers and unions in conflicts between capital and labour.
Critical theory was also used in the works of Habermas, Bourdieu, Latour and Foucault
(Berland & Pezet, 2009). The work of Foucault enabled Bougen (1994) to interpret the ‘regime
of truth’ put in place by Renold in the 1920s as part of its profit-sharing scheme. Accounting
figures, and their disclosure to employees, were used in this factory to increase productivity;
they also allowed the management to justify changes in working conditions. This new system
of rewards and information was welcomed with open arms by employees. Bougen shows that
a constructive system seems to have been established. However, following urgent requests for
further justification from the workers regarding the accounting choices made by management
(especially in relation to depreciation), the system subsequently ‘disintegrated’, as the
credibility of the calculation methods used in the redistribution scheme and the fragility of
certain management policies were denounced by employees.
Accounting-based approaches therefore recommend that accounting practices should be
understood in terms of the environment. In the case of France, we will now look at the difficulty
of establishing representative staff bodies under labour laws and the specific features of the
positions adopted by trade unions.
The atypical history of industrial democracy in France
The difficulty in establishing representative staff bodies
During the interwar period, Europe's major democracies created the first representative staff
bodies, giving rise to references to workers’ control (Hordern, 1988). These bodies took on
various forms and titles: in the UK they were called ‘works committees’ (1921) while in
Germany they were known as Betriebsträte (1920).12 Representative bodies were also created
in Luxembourg (1919), Austria (where the law was promulgated in 1919)13, Czechoslovakia
(1920), Norway (1920)14 and Italy in 1921, following a long dispute which began in the steel
industry in 1919 (Assan, 1922; Fagnot, 1921). The same was true of the inter-war period in
Belgium, Switzerland, Estonia, Mexico (Le Crom, 2003) and Russia.15
France would have to wait for the emergence of the Popular Front in 1936 before the inclusion
in labour legislation of the principles of industrial democracy in the form of staff
representatives. However, the role of these representatives was limited and there was no
provision for them to be provided with economic information about company affairs (Le Crom,
2003). With the beginning of the war in France, these representatives disappeared.
Following the Second World War, a new shift towards industrial democracy was instigated as
much by the programme of the Conseil National de la Résistance, as well as by the Declaration
of Philadelphia.16 The works council emerged from this fresh momentum. It was mandatory in
all companies with more than 50 employees, with members being elected from lists put forward
by the trade unions. As well as playing a social and cultural role, the works councils were
expected to play an economic role, and they had to be consulted about the organisation,
management and general affairs of the company. As part of this mission, they were allowed to
receive assistance from a chartered accountant remunerated by the company. The law provided
for certain mandatory information that was to be transmitted to the works council. This involved
the creation of documents that were identical to those submitted to the general meeting of
8
shareholders17: balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and a report on company activities. On
top of these documents, other optional information not provided for in the legislation could also
be provided (e.g. details of management accounting or forecasts).
From the end of the 1940s onwards, the legislation remained largely unchanged (Cohen, 1984).
It was only in 1982, following the election of a socialist president and parliament, that
significant legislative changes (Auroux statutes) on industrial democracy were introduced (Le
Goff, 2008). It is precisely at that time that our study ends. It therefore focuses on a period
marked by legislative stability.
Added to the lack of legislative change was a sentiment among trade unionists that was hostile
to any form of industrial democracy. Although these two factors appear to be independent of
one another, Lipset (1983) has explained the radicalism in French trade unions on the basis of
three concomitant phenomena: precocious political democracy; delayed economic democracy;
and a rigid class structure. By contrast, the same author suggests that economic democracy
enabled British trade unions to adopt a position of reformism.
Radical orientation of French trade unionists18
The major trade unions have adopted divergent positions on the role that they should play (or
not) in managing company affairs.19 To participate or not to participate, that is the question. In
the early years of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)20 in France (late 19th/early 20th
century), three positions emerged (Lojkine, 1996); these were to prove long-lasting, taking on
different forms as they developed over time.
First, radicals encouraged training that would enable trade unionists to address economic issues,
not in order ‘to participate in management, but rather to impose from the outside an alternative
economic orientation that would favour employee interests’ (Lojkine, 1996, p.27). This could
be done via labour exchanges or journals such as La Vie Ouvrière. In the case of trade unionists
affiliated to a political party, training took place within schools that were run by that party.
Fernand Pelloutier (Julliard, 1971) and Alphonse Merrheim can be seen to represent this
movement within the CGT.
Second, the reformists borrowed from the American models for production and industrial
relations. They sought to organise a system of ‘collaboration between labour and capital’
(Lojkine, 1996, p. 26). From this perspective, training trade unionists to address economic
issues was essential if they were to participate in the management of company affairs.
Hyacinthe Dubreuil (Fine, 1979) emerged as a defender of this model, notably through an
account of his experience as a worker in American companies entitled Standards : Le travail
américain vu par un ouvrier français (Dubreuil, 1929). Minister Albert Thomas, the first
director of the International Labour Organisation, was seen as a ‘fulcrum of French reformism’
(Reberioux & Fridenson, 1974) who, through his political activities, sought to reconcile the
interests of labour and capital through the creation of representative staff bodies (Cayet, 2007;
Fine, 1977; Walter-Busch, 2006).
Lastly, the position defended by Victor Griffuelhes21 was to reject the study of any economic
information, and instead encourage employees to focus on the workers’ struggle alone.
These three founding positions established at the beginning of the 20th century would later
clash in debates and internal splits from the end of World War II onwards. At that time, the
position of each trade union in relation to the works council illustrates the relevance of the
debate just highlighted.
Beginning in 1947, at the start of the Cold War, the role of the works council as seen by the
CGT22 was a far cry from that originally anticipated in the 1945 order. Le Crom (2003)
summarised the position of the CGT, arguing that works councils should act as a vector for:
 the class struggle;
9
 the work of trade unions; and
 the political propaganda.
However, the CGT did not intend to use the ideology of class struggle to avoid taking an interest
in economic and financial issues. It trained its members how to read accounts and gave them
tips on how to construct a critique, including how to draw up a financial statement. Nonetheless,
although it expressed an interest in economic and financial issues, the CGT expressed very little
interest in works councils: Benoît Frachon, then Secretary General, described the
representatives of other trade unions within the works council as ‘porte-serviettes du patron’.23
As revealed by Le Crom (2003), the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
(CFTC)24 adopted a position that privileged company reforms. It sought to implement a genuine
form of industrial democracy, and in this regard was closely aligned with the initial programme
of the Conseil National de la Résistance. The CFTC felt that the works council should
participate in these reforms. This implied a shift from employee labour contracts to associative
contracts. By the 1953 congress, this union wanted to build a society ‘in which all workers will
progressively gain access to responsibility and to the management of all company departments’
(cited in Griveau, 1964, p. 321; own translation). Profit-sharing, the organisation of
autonomous team workshops and the disclosure of information to employees formed part of its
programme. When the works council first emerged, the debate within the CFTC was marked
by a desire to increase productivity so as to achieve economic recovery (Battais, 1996).
The CFTC split up in 1964. A small minority preserved this acronym, while a majority founded
the CFDT. Following the events of May ’68, self-management became the CFDT's major theme
for reform in society. Its leaders had understood that the 1968 crisis related not only to salaries.
While the CGT focused its energy on securing salary increases, the CFDT decried the
‘industrial and administrative monarchy’, calling for the implementation of ‘democratic
structures based on self-management’ (cited by Karila-Cohen and Wilfert, 1998, p. 368; own
translation). The CFDT saw self-management as ‘the management of companies by the
workers, but also the management by the people of the nation and the economy as a whole. [It]
meets the fundamental need for responsibility, justice and liberty among the workers; it is
capable of creating a new type of social relationship based on effective equality and solidarity’
(CFDT, 1974, p. 39; own translation). In such a company that is run on a self-management
basis, the works council must be the organisation's cornerstone, and must constantly endeavour
to obtain information.
We can see that the trade unions adopted divergent positions concerning the appeal of disclosing
information to employees and how best to use this information. This explains why the CGT and
the CFDT each launched their own accounting firms25 with responsibility for assisting any
works council looking for assistance (Capron, 2001). A works council in which the CGT (or
CFDT) represents a majority of members will therefore tend to call on the services of the
accounting firm associated with that union so as to produce its own figures and offer its own
interpretations.
Having outlined the specific features of industrial democracy in France, we now propose a study
of the disclosure and reception of economic information in the works councils of three French
steel companies.
Between silence and communication: 40 years of disclosure in French works councils
The difficulty of breaking away from a culture of secrecy
After the law to create works councils was adopted, the first meetings held by these committees
should have marked the end of absolute secrecy in relation to employee access to business
10
information, as the law compelled companies to provide elected works council members with
accounting information. From 1947 onwards, a large proportion of works council meetings held
in the company F. de Wendel Grandsons & Co. was devoted to the study of increasing
production levels, investments and staff numbers. Although the management provided precise
figures on the number of tonnes produced, no information was provided in relation to sales. The
only financial information provided was the 1946 figure for the company's operating loss of 33
million francs.26 The company achieved a profit in 1947, but the works council meeting held in
July 1948 did not release this figure:
The company's Board of Directors has not yet convened to examine the accounts for
the 1947 financial year, so the relevant information will be communicated to the
committee during its next meeting.27
The elected works council members therefore had to wait until February 1949 before being
informed about the turnover and operating profit achieved in 1947.
That was the last time the profit would be communicated to elected members. The company
became a holding company in 1951 following the legal restructuring of the group. Between
1950 and 1951, no financial information was provided to the works council. Only information
relating to production and investments was made available. In order to avoid disclosure, senior
management relied on a lack of clarity in the legislation, which initially appeared to apply only
to limited companies.28 This practice was identical in the case of De Wendel & Co, which
belonged to the group.
In the case of Schneider & Co., the presiding works council expert indicated in 1951 and in
1952 that certain information29 had not been made available to him despite his requests.
In our three case studies, only Usinor decided (from 1949) to disclose comprehensive
accounting and financial data to the works council expert, who specifically pointed this out.30
From the mid-1950s onwards, the practice of disclosing accounting information to works
councils became the norm, with mandatory information (balance sheet and income statement)
regularly made available.
Beyond this accounting information, elected works council members failed to obtain
information from cost accounting. This information becomes crucial because it is used by
management to justify plant closures. Elected works council members notice thus:
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – May 1968.31
The accounting information provided does not allow more members as shareholders to
make an accurate appreciation of the opportunity to closures or plant shutdowns [...].
There is no accounting information by workplace.
Cost accounting is very seldom disclosed, as in the case of the SFAC, which management uses
as a first step the non-availability of information.
Minutes from SFAC central works council meeting – June 196332
Mr. Loiseau [members, turner at the factory of Creusot] recalls that the employee
representatives had asked to know the operating account and pointed out that this year
they have not been communicated to the expert.
Mr. Forgeot [General Manager] answered that accounting reform is underway and
should help if it continues in good condition, to know the operating accounts by Plant
and even by department.
This reform was actually carried out. Since 1964, operating accounts per plant have been
identified in the archives of the SFAC, and are seen as part of the documents sent to the directors
of plants. However, this information remains to be provided to elected works council members.
A decade later, in 1976, this request for information was again expressed by those elected by
Creusot-Loire, but was again turned down. Management justified its decision by the
indivisibility of the company.
Minutes from Creusot-Loire central works council meeting – June 197633
11
Mr. Porrain [Fitter and turner at the Factory of Creusot] asked whether, for years to
come, there would be opportunity to know the plant by plant accounting information.
Mr. Boulin [General Manager] replied that there is only one balance sheet in terms of
society. If some decomposition is performed by operating unit for management issues,
this division is very arbitrary, and has no legal value.
The imprecision of the data related to transfer pricing is also used by the management of Usinor
to justify non-disclosure of data by workplaces.
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – May197034
Mr. Borgeaud [CEO] indicates that there are documents on this subject, but all this
remains artificial because the conventions it is necessary to establish the transfer of
semi-finished products of a producing plant to another company plant.
Overall, and as a result of the work of Combe (1969), we identify three types of justification
used by management to avoid disclosure information on cost accounting: the first is to answer
evasively elected members; a second is to indicate that the requested information is too complex
to obtain; and a third takes the form of a simple refusal, sometimes argued with a reminder of
the legislation (which is also unclear).
If members have difficulty obtaining cost accounting to conduct an analysis that focuses on the
work unit, they face the same difficulties in obtaining information at the group level based on
consolidated financial statements. Indeed, with the restructuring of the steel industry in the
1970s, members now understand that the decision-making level is no longer with the company,
and therefore only data at a higher level (the group) should be considered. The group becomes
the real strategic level: industrial policies are made at this level and the decision centre seems
to have moved. The group and the parent company are also suspicious of their members. They
fear that the profits of the company may be underestimated for the benefit of the profits of the
parent company.
Minutes from SFAC central works council meeting – June 196835
Mr. Halloion [Member] thinks the profit of SFAC is inseparable from those of
Schneider [the parent company]. He believes that the favourable profit of the parent
company should directly benefit to SFAC. The CEO replied that these are distinct
entities. Schneider dividend is the same as 1966 that the profit of Schneider comes from
its equity portfolio including dividends paid by companies where the holding is not
majority. SFAC has, however, made a very small contribution to the profit of Schneider.
One can also observe a return to the culture of secrecy during periods of crisis and restructuring:
in 1981, an accountant working for the Usinor works council tried to find the source of operating
losses by analysing company earnings product by product, but was faced with a refusal to
communicate on the part of senior management.36 Similarly, before Creusot-Loire went into
receivership in 1984, the elected committee members requested to see the forecasts for each
establishment. Management refused, citing two arguments to justify its position. First, the
indivisibility of Creusot-Loire was presented as an obstacle to the disclosure of ‘sector-specific’
information for each establishment. This is a difficult position to maintain, as during the same
meeting the CEO challenged the works council expert's presentation of the group's activities,
pointing out that its governance principle was based on the decentralisation of the decisionmaking process. Second, it sought to justify its decision on the basis that the information was
confidential and could be exploited by competitors.
The silence observed during periods of crisis was also apparent in the context of takeovers. In
1977, management at Usinor were preparing for a merger absorption by Chatillon NeuvesMaisons that would allow them to re-evaluate their assets. During an extraordinary meeting,
the works council was called upon to offer its opinion of this transaction. The proposed move
12
had already been analysed by the press, which meant that the committee members had been
informed through the media. The first press release by the two companies was issued in July
1978; the works council would have to wait until November 1978, just a few days before the
meeting of the Board of Directors, to receive official notification of the project. During the
consultation meeting, the information was played down and the project was not addressed on
the basis that ‘the analysis is not yet complete’. 37 Only the financial project was outlined: this
confirmed that the state would take a share in Usinor's capital, although the term
‘nationalisation’ was carefully avoided. When the elected members asked for a copy of the
financial statements of Chatillon Neuves-Maisons, they were told that ‘the Chairman considers
that such information does not relate to Usinor’.38 A large majority of the committee members
voted against the merger, although the vote had no impact on the transaction going ahead.
Some cases of unsolicited and intensive disclosure
If the management at De Wendel & Co. and SFAC appeared to be disinclined to disclose
information, practices changed with the establishment of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel
Community). With this, senior management was willing to divulge information about the new
challenges and opportunities that came with this economic community. The criticisms made by
management at each of the three companies with regard to the ECSC are related to the high
costs incurred by French industry through higher salaries and fiscal and social charges than in
Germany, which left French companies at a competitive disadvantage. How then can we explain
the disclosure of information about the ECSC to employees?
Our analysis of the archives has produced two additional reasons for this. First, when
management at Schneider realised that the trade unions were also opposed to the ECSC
(Dereymez, 2005), they endeavoured to form a joint opposition by providing a great deal of
information, and asking the unions to put pressure on their confederations (at a national level)
in order to raise their concerns with parliament in such a way that reflected the interests of the
company. Charles Schneider advised elected works council members to send a motion to their
member of parliament through the confederation. This method avoided the direct involvement
of company management.
Second, the divulgence of information about the ECSC seems to have been part of a
communications strategy to reveal the threats facing the company. A two-tier argument allowed
management to depict the ECSC as a threat to the future of their companies, thus implying that
in the near future they would most likely be forced to call on employees to work harder. This
was a way of laying the groundwork for future pay negotiations.
These two reasons behind the extensive disclosure of information around the time that the
ECSC was being created (1952) were also evident at other stages in the lives of these
companies.
For example, the strategy of seeking support from the unions and using them to exert political
pressure was deployed by management in the Marine-Firminy affair, which involved all three
of the companies under analysis. Usinor made a takeover bid in 1974 on Marine-Firminy, a
Creusot-Loire shareholder, which could have resulted in Usinor being implanted in certain
companies from the Sacilor Group (De Wendel), its historic competitor. Sacilor, whose
independence was at stake, provided its employees with extensive information about this affair,
with the director criticising the public authorities for their laissez-faire attitude. The elected
works council members, particularly those from the CFDT, lamented the government's waitand-see approach. In the other companies affected by this transaction (Creusot-Loire and
Usinor), the works councils found it much more difficult to obtain information and
communication was minimal. Usinor argued that the takeover bid concerned its holding
13
company, DNEL, and therefore that its employees were not affected. The case presented to
employees at Creusot-Loire was more or less identical.
It would appear therefore that in exceptional circumstances, employees could be mobilised by
management as a support network. Such circumstances arise when a company is placed in a
difficult situation by an external organisation or when, because of unfavourable changes to its
environment, it expects the public authorities to intervene. In such cases, information is
disclosed to a larger extent than under the habitual practices of the company.
To use or challenge the information provided by management?
Within Usinor – the company most inclined to disclose information – the initial claims made
by elected committee members related to profit sharing.
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – May 1949:
Mr Lauwers, pointing out that 480 million [francs] are due to be distributed to
shareholders, asked whether it would not have been possible to distribute just 90% of
the sum and give the remaining 10% to company personnel. 39
Throughout the period under analysis, accounting information fed into the debates about the
redistribution of value-added.
Other challenges emerged in the 1960s. The analysis of balance sheets and the sources of
financing used for investment gave rise to a series of critiques from the trade unions. In each of
the three case studies, union members felt that company equity was inadequate and that the
companies over-relied on borrowing to finance investments. Some trade unionists argued that
self-financing and borrowing ‘depend on the work done by staff’40, while the only effort made
by shareholders was to increase the company's capital. They felt that these roles should be
defined as follows: shareholders should be responsible for providing the necessary capital for
company growth, while employees should be responsible for carrying out the work required.
According to union representatives, resorting to borrowing amounts to asking the employees to
finance company investments, since debt repayments are made by drawing on the operating
cash flows that are generated by the work of staff members. The debate became even fiercer as
public financial resources were used to fund the steel industry:
Minutes from Wendel-Sidelor central works council meeting – October 1972
Mr Pegoraro [elected CFDT member] stated that since 1945, out of a total of 30 billion
francs invested in the French steel industry, only 2 billion were financed by capital
increases in the steel companies concerned. In conclusion, he argued that the steel
bosses were prospering on the back of taxpayers' money. 41
The steel crisis and the increasing number of recovery plans in the industry resulted in works
councils with affiliations to all trade unions (with the exception of the Confédération Générale
des Cadres [CGC], a traditionally ‘moderate’ and reformist white-collar trade union) adopting
a radical and critical position. They saw the accounting losses in their sector as a crisis that was
afflicting the capitalist system as a whole, and in 1975 began to call for nationalisation. This
radical critique was based on the information provided to works councils. By voicing concerns
about the use of public money and calling for a shift towards nationalisation, the discourse used
by these committees became politicised. This is what the CGT had hoped for from the early
days of the works council, but it had not yet been overtly manifested in the three companies
under analysis. The politicisation of works councils came about as the state began to take a
significant financial share in the steel industry, since opposition to company policy also became
a form of opposition to government policy. As the companies' accounts worsened, this desire
for ‘politicisation’ became stronger, and dissent within the works councils was now voiced by
other union members.
The finance commission within the Usinor works council issued an opinion that challenged the
company's financial policy, and more generally criticised the capitalist system in opposition to
socialism. Only the CGC members disapproved of the statement:
14
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – 20 June 1978
The commission members highlighted the steel crisis inherent in the capitalist system.
There has been a regression in the production of European steel, with the exception
of socialist countries, which increased their production by around 4%. Usinor's
production has dropped by around 14%, while this figure is 4.8% for the French steel
industry as a whole compared to 1976. […] The policy of austerity being pursued
under the ‘Barre plan’, which is built on inflation, a fall in purchasing power,
unemployment and a reduction in social welfare benefits, has been a crucial factor in
the fall in domestic consumption.42
The CFDT members asked for the loans and funds received from the state to be used as part of
a worker shareholding scheme, thus implicitly calling for the company to be nationalised:
The CFDT suggests that the State transform the public funds used to support the steel
industry into a financial shareholding scheme. 43
If accounting information can be included in trade unions claims, we observe that its neutrality
is also challenged. Accusations that accounting figures had been manipulated were made by the
CGT as early as 1948 in the Revue du Comité d’Entreprise. Yet during the early years of the
works council, there was not much debate surrounding accounting techniques, such as how to
calculate depreciation expenses. In each of our three case studies, it was not until the 1960s that
remarks began to be made about the accounting techniques chosen by the companies. From
1967 onwards, attention was systematically paid by committee members to questions relating
to the depreciation of fixed assets. Should this keen interest in accounting techniques be seen
as the result of the profit sharing schemes that had been adopted? Around that time, an order
relating to profit sharing was issued by the legislature so as to set the legal method (which was
never to change) for the calculation of bonuses. One of the decisive factors in determining the
sums allocated was of course the amount of profits made. This meant that by observing the way
in which depreciation was calculated, and therefore the manipulation of the accounting income,
they were effectively contesting the way in which bonuses were calculated.
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – September 196744
Mr Detti announced that he did not agree with the depreciation figures provided (173
million for 150 million in investment). He felt this was the easiest way to reject staff
claims.
Minutes from Sacilor central works council meeting – December 197345
The Chairman also noted that Mr Vicini [elected CGT member] reminded attendees
of the profit of 400 million provided for 1973. There must be agreement on what we
call profits. An industrial company with significant levels of investment cannot
survive without maintaining its production capital and operating sites. The upkeep of
operating sites involved in production requires depreciation, and it is essential that
each year, before we assess profits and before we identify surplus with which to
increase production and service our capital, we must first maintain at production value
the assets we currently possess. The depreciation expenses for a multi-operation
company like Sacilor are close to 400 million. It is well known that if we were to stop
investing such large sums in our factories, staff representatives would be among the
first to say: "be careful, our production tools are in a state of decline".
Finally, there was more radical criticism of the choices that made it impossible to project a
‘faithful image’ of the company from the union's perspective:
Minutes from Wendel-Sidelor central works council meeting – May 197246
The company's ten highest salaries should not be included with the rest because, in his opinion, they
are not necessarily real salaries.
Discussion: interpreting the disclosure of information to employees
15
Disclosure: A means to reinforce management ideology?
Some unionists argue that the disclosure of information from company accounts amounts to
propagating managerial ideology that runs counter to employee interests. If they agree to
negotiate on the basis of the accounts provided by management, works council members are
then obliged to accept the same economic concerns as management. This means that the
analysis of accounting information steers trade unionism towards a reformist position.
With the creation of the works council, disclosure legitimised a discourse based on a company's
accounting data. This new state of affairs called for a reappraisal of the way in which discourse
is used. In this respect, the sociological writings of Pierre Bourdieu provide certain insights into
the role that accounting is considered to play. In his essay ‘Ce que parler veut dire’ (‘What it
means to speak’), Bourdieu (1982) sees in the mastery of official language (which in this case
could be the technical language of accounting and financial information) the increasing
domination of those who create and use this language, i.e. company directors. Language is not
a neutral vehicle for thought, and our choice of terms and expressions helps shape the mind of
those who use them. This official language is that which was imposed on works council
members as the only official language (Bourdieu, 1982). If we extend this metaphor of an
official state language, we see that the language of accounting displays ‘the condition for the
establishment of relations of linguistic domination’ (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 28; own translation)
within a company.
Without wishing to draw excessively on the sociology of Bourdieu, we can look at critical
studies in accounting which have shown that the choice of accounting terms contributes to the
spread of a managerial mindset within a company. In France, Mangenot (1976) invites readers
to see accounting as a tool of capital that serves capital. Tinker (1985) sees accounting
information as a justification for the appropriation by one class of the wealth produced by
another (Chabrak, 2005).
Tinker does not see accountants (and accounting) as innocuous bookkeepers, but rather ‘as
arbiters in social conflict, as architects of unequal exchanges, as instruments of alienation, and
as accomplices in the expropriation of the life experiences of others’ (Tinker, 1985, p. xvi).
These studies suggest that the disclosure of accounting and financial information to employees
and their representatives is a way of reinforcing managerial ideology, i.e. a company's vision.
There are several indications that allow us to validate the view that a managerial discourse is
being reinforced in works councils in which union representatives with various ideological
backgrounds come into contact with one another. The reliability of accounting and financial
data is not systematically denigrated by works council members. Beyond the claims made in
relation to accounting information, it can be observed that they raise questions as much about
technical details (e.g. the issue of depreciation and provisions) as about the analysis of company
activities (e.g. the reasons for a fall in profits during a period of growth in sales). Even when
they are criticising the closure of factories and rationalisation plans, works council members
draw on the management's lexical (and therefore ideological) discourse. At the end of the 1960s,
they remarked that because of a lack of accounting information for each establishment, it was
impossible for both employee representatives and shareholders to adopt a position on the
decision to close factories or shut down operations.
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – May 1968
Mr Biecq [incumbent member] remarked that the accounting information provided
does not allow committee members any more than shareholders to make an accurate
assessment of the decision to close factories or shut down operations.
Mr Masson [works council expert] pointed out that there is no accounting information
available for each establishment.47
Analysis of the minutes from works council meetings also suggests a weakening of the
ideology, which most often brought about by disclosure. From the 1960s onwards, the members'
16
growing understanding of finance and accounting allowed them to use the information made
available in order to challenge the way in which the company was being managed. They
lamented the low level of contributions made by shareholders to fund investments. They
criticised what they felt was an unequal distribution of wealth and they challenged the ostensible
veracity of the information given to them. From the 1970s onwards, their criticisms became
more radical as they called for nationalisation on the basis of the accounting and financial
information provided.
As such, it appears that the disclosure of information to employee representatives was initially
a way of ensuring the acceptance of the discourse produced by the accounting data, but that
subsequently it was the reason for this data being challenged. Between these two phases lies
the great social upheaval of 1968.
Why does the doxical discourse continue?
We have seen that a doxical discourse concerning the dissemination of information to
employees developed in the second half of the 20th century in textbooks and practitioners’
materials, and has continued ever since. This doxa is based on the 'commonplace' belief that the
DIS is part of ‘good practices’ and justified by the fact that it is supposed to be necessarily
accompanied by an improvement in productivity by implementing a working incentive system.
The same ideas are also present in models created by academics: in Dunlop’s (1958) model, for
example, the ideology of sincere cooperation without ulterior motives is a shared basis between
employers and employees, enabling consistent industrial relations system. Specifically, the
dissemination of accounting information to employees must allow negotiation to sit on an
objective basis. However, this model includes the possibility of a conflict of interest between
employees and employers. As proposed by mainstream HRM, which appeared a quarter century
later when it was established in the 1980s (Guest, 1995), the conflict of interest is considered
outdated, as are HRM ambitions to make organizations become cooperative systems (Godard
& Delaney, 2000). These systems encourage employees to greater flexibility, greater
participation in decision-making, and ultimately lower the motivation to unionize (Da Costa,
1990).
Beyond the HRM productivist rationale, the moral dimension of this doxa is present in a very
large number of textbooks, which explain the need for consideration of staff (the employee's
feeling that he is accepted by others); the need for management to be sensitive to the reactions
of its employees; man's desire for the esteem of others, the need for workers to be a respected
part of the company, etc. Sincere management attitudes, the public condemnation of humiliating
rebukes by supervisors, confidence, participation, goodwill and unity, sincere trust and integrity
on both sides, loyalty and honesty are all required as parts of a good human relationship
programme; as is the conclusion that ‘good human relationships really are the best form of
industrial relations' (American Business Leaders, 1949, pp. 22-29). On many occasions, the
Kantian imperative is reminded to managers: ‘Act so that you treat humanity, as well in your
own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely
as a means’ (Kant, 1985, p. 150). Craig and Hussey (1982, p. 8) confirm this moral obligation
when they say:
If any theory of financial reporting to employees exists, that theory is founded on the following
four principles, either individually or in some combination.
1. ‘Management has obligations’ to supply employees with information about the financial state
of the business.
2. Employees ‘demand’ information about the financial state of the business.
17
3. It is in management’s interests to supply information to employees in order ‘to bring about
an improvement in individual performance’.
4. It is management’s interests to supply information to employees in order ‘to create the
impression of a progressive management style. (p. 8)
Much of the existing literature discusses potential benefits to management, arguing that benefits
outweigh costs.48
However, this doxa does not correspond to practices, as we have seen for nearly 40 years in
three large French steel companies. Our findings also corroborate those made by Maurice
Combe (1969)49 during the same period in one of the three companies. Several observations
have shown that this doxa does not corroborate the study of managerial decisions as they appear
in the case of the three companies. Clearly, leaders of the three industrial companies for which
we have minutes of the works councils’ meetings do not seem convinced of the need and
benefits of a systematic disclosure of financial information to employees. No tendency to move
towards greater disclosure seems to emerge. On the contrary, we show that between the
beginning of the study (in 1945) and the end (in 1982), accounting information was not
transmitted any better or worse. More specifically, the information that was required to be
submitted to the works council from 1946 onwards (balance sheet and profit and loss account)
was indeed submitted in most cases. On the other hand, voluntary disclosure (forecasts, cost
accounting, consolidated financial statements) are very irregular and at the discretion of
management. Finally, to disclose or hide financial information is not, in fact, a matter decided
for good, as suggested by studies in HRM. Conversely, it is a question repeatedly raised by
managers, and which, according to the context, environment and issues, necessarily lead to a
particular response (Nikitin, 2006, 2011). We usually observe that managers have a high
propensity to discretion, added to a real but reluctant legal disclosure respect. The examples of
ECSC and Marine Firminy show that what triggers the need for disclosure is management’s
short-term interest. In both cases, managers disclose financial information in order to
manoeuvre the employees and their representatives against the state in the first case, and against
certain shareholders in the second.
It seems, therefore, that in exceptional circumstances, i.e. when employees can play a
supporting role, financial information may be widely disclosed. These situations occur when
the business is undermined by external entities or when adverse changes in the environment
lead to an intervention from the government. It may then be granted a greater disclosure of
information when compared to the usual practices of the company. We observe management’s
will to disclose information widely in situations where they feel the possibility for manoeuvring
labour, but employees are just treated instrumentally (Mäkelä 2013). To our knowledge, this
finding is hardly ever mentioned by HRM theorists. Such manipulation has nothing to do with
the realization of a shared long-term vision between management and employees.
Therefore such a conclusion makes us understand the disclosure of financial information to
employees as a practice for management to influence the industrial relations system and
increase their bargaining power. It becomes what Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) consider
(within the framework of industrial relations in the US in the first half of the 1980s) a strategic
decision to change the balance of power in industrial relations and, as such, reduce or
circumvent the union’s power: ‘The new communications efforts were frequently used to gain
acceptance for bargaining outcomes that more closely tied compensation and work practices to
the firm’s productivity and cash-flow requirements. The need to change expectations while at
the same time avoiding a strike challenged management and union officials alike to combine
their emphasis on stability with a new emphasis on modifying labor costs’ (p. 132) . This
18
theoretical explanation largely opposes the doxa, but it is limited to a particular context – that
of the US industry in the early 1980s.
We suspect that, the existence of a doxical discourse on the one hand, and the management’s
opportunistic attitude vis-à-vis the disclosure on the other hand, have deeper theoretical roots
and extend far beyond the context of a particular country in a particular decade. To understand
why the doxical discourse continues against convergent empirical evidence, we must consider
that managers face a dilemma. They can either consider human resources as ordinary
resources50 with men as means, and limit the disclosure of financial information to employees
to what is strictly necessary for the performance of their duties; in this case they are condemned,
at one time or another, to exhibit ‘immoral’ behaviour. Or they can adopt ‘moral’ behaviour,
and make their business transparent regardless of the impact on the company's finances. In this
case they may weaken it or possibly even endanger it.
We can therefore understand that the doxical discourse continues, as it is the only one which is
officially acceptable by the representatives of employees and their managers. On the other hand,
practices are those that managers deem appropriate to carry out the strategies of their
companies, even if they contradict the doxical discourse they learned when they were students.
We could transpose the words of Bourdieu (2001) concerning the way scientific statements are
made: ‘The official view of science [of disclosure] is a collective hypocrisy designed for
ensuring minimum common belief necessary for the functioning of a social order’ (p. 152).
However, a doxa is not necessarily a false statement. We do not deny, a priori, that the
disclosure of financial information to employees may have beneficial effects on their
involvement. We can even take for granted that this actually happens. We simply want to
question the fact that it can be taken for granted.
Conclusion
This study sets out to understand the strategy employed by management in disclosing
information to works councils, as well as the strategies employed by unions in receiving this
information. By focusing on disclosure over a period of almost 40 years in three large French
steel companies, we have shown that although mandatory information (the bottom line, for
example) was regularly provided from the mid-1950s onwards in each of the three case studies,
a culture of secrecy persisted in relation to other financial information (costs, consolidated
accounts, etc.). This suggests that the disclosure of information is an opportunistic decision on
the part of management designed to increase its negotiating powers. However, the effects of
such a decision are limited. Elected works council members adopt an attitude of mistrust with
regard to the accounting and financial information provided. This information does not serve
as a means to reinforce the ideological dimension of management within the industrial relations
system. The rule would appear to be the disclosure of as little information as possible, except
where management can exploit disclosure to use the unions to their advantage. In such cases,
their interests converge, but only circumstantially, and not in a way that reflects the dominant
HRM theories.
Ultimately, the managerial approach to information disclosure is far removed from any desire
to implement a form of industrial democracy, and is in contempt of the social conventions
widely recognised. The issue of disclosing voluntary information to employees closely
resembles that of disclosure to shareholders.
19
20
References
American Business Leaders. (1949). Human relations in modern business. New York: PrenticeHall, Inc.
Amernic, J. H. (1985). The roles of accounting in collective bargaining Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 10(2), 227–253.
Amernic, J. H. (1988). Accounting disclosure and industrial relations: A review article. British
Accounting Review, 20(2), 141–157.
Amernic, J. H., & Craig, R. (2005). Roles and social construction of accounting in industrial
relations. The Journal of Industrial Relations, 47(1), 77–92.
Andolfatto, D., & Labbé, D. (2006). Histoire des syndicats (1906-2006). Paris: Ed. du Seuil.
Armstrong, M. (2009). Armstrong’s handbook of human resource management practice.
London: Kogan Page Limited.
Assan, G. (1922). La question du contrôle ouvrier en Italie, avec un aperçu dans les autres
pays (Doctoral thesis). Paris: Université de Paris.
Baron, J. N., & Kreps, D. M. (1999). Strategic human resources: Framework for general
managers. New-York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Battais, C. (1996). La CFTC et les comités d’entreprise. In Colloque national au centre des
archives du monde du travail (Eds.) L’enfance des comités d’entreprise : de leur genèse dans
les conditions de la défaite de 1940 à leur enracinement dans les années 1950. (pp. 253–267).
Roubaix: Centre des Archives du Monde du Travail.
Beardwell, I., Holden, L., & Claydon T. (2003). Human resource management. A contemporary
approach (4th ed.). Harlow: Prentice-Hall Financial Times.
Beer, M., Spector, B., Lawrence, P. R., Mills, D. Q., & Walton, R. E. (1985). Human resource
management. New York: Free Press New York.
Bellows, R. M. (1954). Psychology of Personnel in Business and Industry (2nd ed.). New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Berland, N., & Pezet, A. (2009). Quand la comptabilité colonise l’économie et la société.
Perspectives critiques dans les recherches en comptabilité, contrôle, audit. In D. Golsorkhi, I.
Huault, & B. Leca, (Eds.), Les études critiques en management. Une perspective française
(pp.131–162). Laval: Les presses de l’Université de Laval.
Béthoux, É. (2004). Les comités d’entreprise européens en quête de légitimité. Travail et
emploi, 98, 21–35.
Bougen, P. D. (1989). The emergence, roles and consequences of an accounting-industrial
relations interaction. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 14(3), 203–234.
Bougen, P. D. (1994). Accounting and labour: Integrations and disintegrations. In A. Hopwood
& P. Miller (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional practice (pp. 138–167). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Böckerman, P., Bryson, A., & Ilmakunnas, P. (2012). Does high involvement management
improve worker wellbeing? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84, 660–680.
Bourdieu, P. (1982). Ce que parler veut dire - L’économie des échanges linguistiques. Paris:
Fayard.
21
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1997). Meditations pascaliennes. Paris: Seuil.
Bourdieu, P. (2001). Science de la science et réflexivité. Paris: Raisons d’agir éditions.
Boutant, J. & Verdier, M. A. (2013) Gestion des résultats et annonces de réductions d’effectifs
: le cas des sociétés françaises cotées. Montpellier: Paper presented at the 2nd Congress of
Center for Social and Environmental Accounting Research.
Bova F. (2013) Labor Unions and Management’s Incentive to Signal a Negative Outlook.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 14–41.
Bowen, R. M., DuCharme, L., & Shores, D. (1995). Stakeholders’ implicit claims and
accounting method choice. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 20(3), 255–295.
Bratton, J., & Gold, J. (2003). Human resource management: Theory and practice (3rd ed.).
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brown, J. A. (2000a). Labor perspectives on accounting and industrial relations: A historical
and comparative review Labor studies journal, 25(2), 45-74.
Brown, J. A. (2000b). Competing ideologies in the accounting and industrial relations
environment. The British Accounting Review, 32(1), 43-75.
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., & Hopwood, A. G. (1985). Accounting in its social context: Towards
a history of value added in the United Kingdom. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10
(4), 381–413.
Capron, M. (2001). Accounting and management in the social dialogue: The experience of fifty
years of works councils in France. Accounting, Business & Financial History, 11(1), 29–42.
Cayet, T. (2007). Le Bureau international du travail et la modernisation économique dans les
années 1920 : Esquisse d’une dynamique institutionnelle. Travail et Emploi, 110, 15–25.
CFDT. (1974). Textes de base. Paris: Montholon.
Chabrak, N. (2005). Tony Tinker: Un comptable 'radical'. In B. Colasse (Ed.), Les grands
auteurs en comptabilité (pp. 292–305). Paris: EMS Management & Société.
Cohen, M. (1984). Le Droit des comités d’entreprise et des comités de groupe. Paris: L.G.D.J.
Colasse, B. (2009). Théories comptables. In B. Colasse (Ed.), Encyclopédie de comptabilité,
contrôle et audit (pp. 1403–1414). Paris: Economica.
Combe, M. (1969). L’alibi: Vingt ans d’un comité central d’entreprise. Paris: Gallimard.
Cooper, D. J., & Hopper, T. (2006). Critical theorizing in strategic management accounting
research. In Paper presented at the Eighth Interdisciplinary Perspectives On Accounting
Conference, Cardiff, UK.
Couloubaritsis, L. (1987). Les multiples chemins de Parménide. In P. Aubenque (Ed.), Etudes
sur Parménide Tome II Problèmes d'interprétation (pp. 25–43). Paris: Vrin
Craig, R. J., & Hussey, R. (1982). Keeping Employees Informed. Butterworths, Sydney.
Cullinan, C. P., & Bline, D. M. (2003). The Effects of Labour on Accounting Choice in
Canada. Canadian Accounting Perspectives, 2(2), 135–151.
Cullinan, C. P., & Knoblett, J. A. (1994). Unionization and accounting policy choices: An
empirical examination. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13(1), 49–78.
22
D’Souza, J., Jacob, J., & Ramesh, K. (2001). The use of accounting flexibility to reduce labor
renegotiation costs and manage earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(2), 187–
208.
Da Costa, I. (1990). La théorie des relations industrielles aux Etats-Unis. In J. D. Reynaud, F.
Eyraud, C. Paradeise, & J. Daglio (Eds.), Les systèmes de relations professionnelles (pp. 25–
42). Paris: Editions du CNRS.
Darrough, M. N. (1993). Disclosure policy and competition: Cournot vs. Bertrand. The
Accounting Review, 68(3), 534-561.
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (1991). Union negotiations and corporate policy. Journal of
Financial Economics, 30(1), 3–43.
Dessier, G. (2003). Human resource management (9th ed.). New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Delery, J. E., & Doty, D. H. (1996). Modes of theorizing in strategic human resource
management: Tests of universalistic, contingency, and configurational performance
predictions. The Academy of Management Journal, 39(4), 802–835.
Dereymez, J. W. (2005). La CGT et le plan Schuman (1950). In E. Bressol, M. Dreyfus, J.
Hedde, & M. Pigenet (Eds.), La CGT dans les années cinquante (pp. 331–342). Rennes: Presses
universitaires de Rennes.
Dubreuil, H. (1929). Standards : le travail américain vu par un ouvrier français. Paris: B.
Grasset.
Dunlop, J. T. (1958). Industrial relations systems. New York: Henry Holt.
Elias, N. (1990). The effects of financial information symmetry on conflict resolution: An
experiment in the context of labor negotiations. Accounting Review, 65(3), 606–623.
Fagnot, F. (1921). La part du travail dans la gestion des entreprises - Examen de la seconde
partie du projet. Paris: Association nationale française pour la protection légale des travailleurs.
Fine, M. (1977). Albert Thomas: A reformer’s vision of modernization, 1914–32. Journal of
Contemporary History, 12(3): 545–564.
Fine, M. (1979). Hyacinthe Dubreuil: le témoignage d’un ouvrier sur le syndicalisme, les
relations industrielles et l’évolution technologique de 1921 à 1940. Le Mouvement social, 106,
45–63.
Finlay, W. W., Sartay, A. Q, & Tate, W. M. (1954). Human behavior in industry. New York:
McGraw-Hill
Floquet, M. (2012). La diffusion d'information aux salariés vue par les revues professionnelles
comptables depuis 1880 : Analyse d'un débat récurrent. Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit, 18(1),
67–91.
Foley, B. J., & Maunders, K. T. (1977). Accounting information disclosure and collective
bargaining. London: Macmillan.
Fox, A. (1973). Industrial relations: a social critique of pluralist ideology. In J. Child (ed.),
Man and Organization (pp. 185-233). New-York: Routledge. (Edition consulted : 2011)
Fox, A. (1985). Man Mismanagement, London: Hutchinson.
Freléchoux, M. (1923). Le Contrôle ouvrier dans l’industrie (Doctoral thesis). Dijon: Université
de Dijon.
23
Godard, J., & Delaney, J. T. (2000) Reflections on the ‘High Performance’ paradigm’s
Implications for industrial relations as a field. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 53(3),
482–502.
Golsorkhi, D., & Huault, I. (2006). Pierre Bourdieu: Critique et réflexivité comme attitude
analytique, Revue française de gestion, 6(165), 15–34.
Griveau, J. (1964). La participation des travailleurs à la gestion de l’entreprise : Les comités
d’entreprise (Doctoral thesis). Paris: Université de Paris.
Guest, D. (1987). Human resource management and industrial relations. Journal of
Management Studies, 24(5), 503–521.
Guest, D. (1995). Human resource management, trade unions and industrial relations. In J.
Storey (Ed.), Human resource management: A critical text (pp.110–141). London: Routledge.
Hall, S.C., Stammerjohan, W.W. & Cermignano, G. (2005). Employee layoffs and earnings
management. Journal of Applied Business Research, 21(4), pp. 23-40.
Hessel, S. (2010). Indignez-vous! Montpellier: Indigène.
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1994). The firm as an incentive system. American Economic
Review, 84(4), 972–991.
Hordern, F. (1988). Naissance d’une institution: Du contrôle ouvrier aux délégués du
personnel, 1880-1939. Aix-en-Provence: Institut régional du travail.
Ichniowski, C., Shaw, K., & Prennushi, G. (1997). The effects of human resource management
practices on productivity: A study of steel finishing lines. American Economic Review, 87(3),
291–313.
Jackson-Cox, J., Thirkell, J. E., & McQueeney, J. (1984). The disclosure of company
information to trade unions: the relevance of the ACAS code of practice on disclosure.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9(3-4), 253–273.
Julliard, J. (1971). Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d’action directe. Le
Mouvement social, 75, 3–32.
Kalmi, P., & Kauhanen, A. (2008). Workplace innovations and employee outcomes: Evidence
from Finland. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 47(3), 430–459.
Kant, E. (1985). Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs. Paris: Delagrave.
Karila-Cohen, P., & Wilfert, B. (1998). Leçon d’histoire sur le syndicalisme en France. Paris:
Presses universitaires de France.
Kleiner, M. M., & Bouillon, M. L. (1988). Providing business information to production
workers: Correlates of compensation and profitability. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
41(4), 605-617.
Knights, D., & Collinson, D. (1987). Disciplining the shopfloor: A comparison of the
disciplinary effects of managerial psychology and financial accounting. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 12(5), 457–477.
Kochan, T. A., Katz, H. C., & McKersie, R. B. (1986). The transformation of American
industrial relations. New York: Basic Books.
Le Crom, J. P. (2003). L’introuvable démocratie salariale : le droit de la représentation du
personnel dans l’entreprise (1890–2002). Paris: Syllepse.
24
Le Goff, J. (2008). Introduction : 'Une aventure législative partagée' (Jean Auroux). In J. Le
Goff (Ed.), Les lois Auroux, 25 ans après (1982-2007). Où en est la démocratie participative ?
(pp. 17–33). Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.
Legge, K. (1995). Rhetoric, reality and hidden agendas. In J. Storey (Ed.), Human resource
management: A critical text (pp. 33–59). London: Routledge.
Lewis, N. R., Parker, L. D., & Sutcliffe, P. (1984). Financial reporting to employees: The
pattern of development 1919 to 1979. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 9(3–4), 275–289.
Liberty, S. E., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Labor union contract negotiations and accounting
choices. The Accounting Review, 61(4), 692–712.
Lipset, S. M. (1983). Radicalism or reformism: The sources of working-class politics. The
American Political Science Review, 77(1), 1–18.
Lojkine, J. (1996). Le tabou de la gestion: La culture syndicale entre contestation et
proposition. Paris: Les éditions de l’atelier.
Mäkelä, H. (2013). On the ideological role of employee reporting. Critical Perspectives on
accounting, 24 (4-5), 360-378.
Mangenot, M. (1976). La comptabilité au service du capital. Paris: Jean-Pierre Delarge éditeur.
Maunders, K. T., & Foley, B. J. (1974). Accounting information, employees and collective
bargaining. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 1(1), 109–127.
Mautz, R. D., & Richardson, F. (1992). Employer financial information and wage bargaining:
Issues and evidence. Labor Studies Journal, 17(3), 35–52.
Mayo, E. (1933). Human problems of an industrial civilization. New York: The Macmillian
Company.
McBarnet, D., Weston, S., & Whelan, C. J. (1993). Adversary accounting: Strategic uses of
financial information by capital and labour. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18(1),
81–100.
McFarland, D. E. (1968). Personnel management: Theory and practice. New York: The
Macmillian Company.
Mohr, R. D., & Zoghi, C. (2008). High-involvement work design and job satisfaction. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 61(3), 275–296.
Mora, A. and Sabater, A. (2008). Evidence of income-decreasing earnings management before
labour negotiations within firms. Investigaciones Economicas, 32(2), pp. 201-230.
Myles, J. F. (2004). From doxa to experience issues in Bourdieu’s adoption of Husserlian
phenomenology. Theory, Culture & Society, 21(2), 91–107.
Nikitin, M. (2006). Qu’est-ce qu’une problématique en science de gestion et comment
l’enseigner ? Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit, 12(ns), 87–100.
Nikitin, M. (2011). Can Aristotle help us specify the very nature of management problems?
Available at SSRN 1750971, papers.ssrn.com
Niox-Château, O. (1923). Étude sur les conseils d’entreprise et le contrôle ouvrier en Autriche
(loi du 15 mai 1919) (Doctoral thesis). Paris: Université de Paris.
Northcott, C. H. (1960). Personnel management principles and practice (4th ed.). London: Sir
Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd.
25
Ogden, S., & Bougen, P. D. (1985). A radical perspective on the disclosure of accounting
information to trade unions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(2), 211–224.
Osma, B. G., Enguídanos, A. and Marcos, A.M. (2010) Strategic Accounting Choice Around
Firm-Level Labor Negotiations. SSRN eLibrary.
Palmer, J. R. (1977). The use of accounting information in labor negotiations. New York:
National Association of Accountants.
Peccei, R., Bewley, H., Gospel, H., Willman, P., & Street, P. E. (2005). Is it good to talk?
Information disclosure and organizational performance in the UK. British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 43(1), 11–39.
Perraudin, C., Petit, H., & Rebérioux, A. (2013). Worker information and firm disclosure.
Analysis on French linked employer employee data. Industrial Relations, 52(1), 134–161.
Pope, P. F., & Peel, D. A. (1981). Information disclosure to employees and rational
expectations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 6(1), 97–107.
Reberioux, M., & Fridenson, P. (1974). Albert Thomas, pivot du réformisme français. Le
Mouvement social, 87, 85–97.
Reynaud, J. D. (1975). Trade unions and political parties in France: Some recent trends.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 28(2), 208-225.
Rumpf, H. (1926). La réalisation du travail dans la joie. Experta, 26, 17–21.
Supiot, A. (2010). L’esprit de Philadelphie : La justice sociale face au marché total. Paris:
Seuil.
Tinker, T. (1985). Paper prophets: A social critique of accounting. New York: Praeger
Publishers.
Trumble, R. R., & Tudor, T. T. (1996). Equitable collective bargaining through publicly
accessible financial data. Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, 25(2), 89–98.
Wacquant, L. (2006). Pierre Bourdieu. In R. Stones (Ed.) Key sociological thinkers (pp. 261277). New-York: Macmillan
Walter-Busch, E. (2006). Albert Thomas and scientific management in war and peace, 1914–
1932. Journal of Management History, 12(2), 212–231.
Wood, S., & De Menezes L. (1998). High commitment management in the U.K.: Evidence
from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, and Employers’ Manpower and Skills
Practices Survey, Human Relations, 51(4), 485–515.
Yamaji, H. (1986). Collective bargaining and accounting disclosure: an inquiry into the
changes in accounting policy. International Journal of Accounting Education and Research,
22(1), 11–23.
26
1
The 2010 conceptual framework tempers this position somewhat.
Conseil national de la résistance, a body suggested by General De Gaulle which, from 27 May 1943
onwards, coordinated the various actions of the Resistance. As well as organising military acts, the CNR developed
measures that were to be implemented as soon as liberation was secured as part of a programme which included
re-establishing universal suffrage, and nationalising certain companies and the social welfare system.
3
In 1946 (decree no. 46-619 dated 4 April 1946), an accounting standards commission (Commission de
Normalisation des Comptabilités) was created; this was succeeded in 1947 (decree no. 47-188 dated 16 January)
by a higher accounting council (Conseil Supérieur de la Comptabilité), which in 1957 (decree no. 57-129 dated 7
February) was replaced by the (first) national accounting council (Conseil National de la Comptabilité).
4
Directive 2002/14.
5
This was done using the software application N*Vivo. The list of nodes of coding is in appendix 1.
6
Bourdieu borrows this notion from Husserl’s phenomenology (Myles, 2004).
7
A field can be defined as a subset of the social world (e.g. political field, religious field, artistic field,
etc.). Each field has its own rules, logic and issues.
8
Our translation.
9
The term ‘human resources management’ appears in the mid-1980s (including France). Before this
period, the term ‘personnel management’ was widely used.
10
Productivity missions are study trips for representations of professional organizations to observe and
import the best American managerial practices.
11
Legge (1995) suggests that HRM practices may ultimately be no more than ‘old wine in new bottles’
(p.36).
12
The first works councils were freely created by industrialists prior to 1890, and in 1905 were made
mandatory in Prussian mines with more than 100 employees. They were subsequently extended to other German
states.
13
As in Germany, workers committees date back to the mid-19th century and the Habsburg monarchy
(Freléchoux, 1923). The thesis written by Niox-Château (1923) focused entirely on worker control in Austria.
14
Statute dated 23 July 1920, which created the factory committees.
15
A statute dated 23 April 1970 created factory committees with responsibility for monitoring all
management issues relating to the company. To this end, company directors were required to make the books and
balance sheets available to these committees, which had the authority to verify the accounting figures inter alia
(Freléchoux, 1923). It is nonetheless doubtful that such practices lasted very long, given the highly authoritarian
bureaucracy imposed by the regime after Lenin's death in 1924.
16
For further information on this programme and the Declaration of Philadelphia, see Hessel (2010) and
Supiot (2010) respectively.
17
After 1982, chartered accountants working for works councils were granted more far-reaching rights to
information, identical to those granted to statutory auditors.
18
In French the term ‘revolutionary’ is used instead of ‘radical’.
19
This is in line with the position adopted by trade unions in relation to political parties. For more on this,
see Reynaud (1975).
20
The Confédération Générale du Travail is France's foremost trade union (both chronologically and in
terms of size). It was created in 1895 (11 years after the Waldeck-Rousseau legislation which authorised the
formation of trade unions and professional associations, which had been prohibited since the Revolution).
21
Victor Griffuelhes (1874–1922) was Secretary General of the CGT from 1902 to 1909. It was under his
leadership that the CGT was transformed and became a key force within the French trade unionist movement.
22
This was France's primary trade union, including in the chosen case studies. For example, in the case
of Schneider: ‘In the main factory [Creusot], by far the largest was the CGT, which represented 72% to 75% of
union members, while the CFTC represented around 25% and the FO between 1% and 2%’ (Combe, 1969, p.20).
23
Literally ‘towel racks for the boss’, which is equivalent to the term ‘flunkeys’.
24
Founded in 1919, in order to combat the hegemony of the CGT among workers.
25
Syndex, which was linked to the CFDT, was founded in 1971. Secafi, which had close ties to the CGT,
was founded in 1983, but was in fact the transformation of an existing organisation run by Guy Maréchal, who
already served as the accountant for the CGT.
26
EAV5001, AAMF.
27
EAV5001, AAMF.
28
At the time, it was a limited stock partnership.
29
Particularly the operating account and stock inventory (0135Z0001, AFB).
2
27
30
EAV50014, AAMF.
EA122071, AAMF.
32
SS0988, AFB.
33
01MDL0075, AFB
34
EA122071, AAMF.
35
SS0988, AFB.
36
EAV122074, AAMF.
37
Minutes from the extraordinary meeting of the Usinor works council on 08/11/1978. EA122073,
31
AAMF.
38
Ibid.
EA122070, AAMF.
40
Minutes from the central works council of the SAC, June 1963, SS0988, AFB.
41
EAV50010, AAMF
42
EA122073, AAMF.
43
Minutes from Usinor central works council meeting – 20 June 1978, EA122073, AAMF.
44
EA122071, AAMF.
45
EAV192003, AAMF.
46
EAV50010, AAMF. This might be interpreted as echoing what Marx said about salaries: they represent
the sum needed to restore the labour power of the workers. Some managers therefore see salaries as having two
parts: one that is used to replenish the labour power, and another that corresponds to the manager's ability to get
his subordinates to produce added value.
47
EA122071, AAMF.
48
Amernic (1988) maintains a close but ambiguous discourse: ‘The modern literature in accounting is
disclosure oriented. The authoritative bodies in both the US and elsewhere have issued documents whose essential
message is that financial accounting should be user oriented, and the class of users identified in these documents
include employees and labour unions. The general theme of this literature is that information desired by legitimate
user groups should be disclosed, as long as the benefits exceed the costs’ (p. 148). However, the final proposal –
‘as long as benefits exceed the costs’ – looks contradictory: either disclosure is desirable because it is in the interest
of the company (and so this proposal is unnecessary), or disclosure is desirable because it is a moral value (and
thus contradicts what has been said before).
49
Combe was a priest who came to work in Le Creusot in 1949, and then moved between all levels of
union responsibilities. Hit by a collective dismissal in 1964 he went to university and wrote a thesis analysing the
deeds of works councils meeting. The book cited derives from his thesis.
50
Just as Darrough (1993), cited in the introduction of the present article, consider financial resources.
39
28