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DEFUSING THE COMMONSENSE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Chris Tweedt
Abstract:
The probabilistic problem of evil contains the premise that there is gratuitous evil.
According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an
inference—a “noseeum” inference—from the proposition that we don’t see a good reason
for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil.
Skeptical theists aim to block this inference. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a
principle—CORNEA—to block the inference. Recently, however, the commonsense
problem of evil threatens the relevance of the skeptical theist’s project. Proponents of the
commonsense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief
that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, the atheologian has non-inferential prima facie
justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this
paper, I argue that the commonsense problem of evil doesn’t avoid CORNEA and that
CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, prevents the commonsense atheologian from
having any justification for her belief that there is gratuitous evil.
Introduction
The probabilistic problem of evil contains the premise that there is gratuitous evil.
According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an
inference—a “noseeum” inference—from the proposition that we don’t see a good reason
for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil.
Skeptical theists aim to block this inference. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a
principle—CORNEA—to block the inference. Recently, however, the commonsense
problem of evil threatens the relevance of the skeptical theist’s project. Proponents of the
commonsense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief
that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, the atheologian has non-inferential prima facie
justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this
paper, I argue that the commonsense problem of evil doesn’t avoid CORNEA and that
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CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, prevents the commonsense atheologian from
having any justification for her belief that there is gratuitous evil.
To do this, I will first give a summary of the skeptical theist’s project, specifically of
those who advocate CORNEA, and I will show how the commonsense problem of evil
threatens the relevance of this project. Second, I will expose an area of attack for skeptical
theists. Third, I will show how skeptical theists can use CORNEA against even the
commonsense problem of evil. If I’m successful, I will have shown that CORNEA, or a
reformulated version of it—and thus skeptical theism—is relevant to the commonsense
problem of evil and that the atheologian doesn’t have any more justification for her belief
that there is gratuitous evil in the newer, commonsense version of the problem of evil as
she does in the older, inferential version.
1 CORNEA and the commonsense problem of evil
The probabilistic argument from evil relies on our justifiably believing that there are
gratuitous evils. An evil is something bad,1 like an instance of intense suffering, the
magnitude of suffering in the world, or the disproportionate distribution of suffering in the
world.2 An evil is gratuitous if preventing it would require losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. The argument concludes that, probably, there is
no god. If a being is a god, then that being is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
Here’s the argument:
1. Probably, there are gratuitous evils.
2. If there were a god, there would be no gratuitous evils.
1van
2van
Inwagen (2006), 4.
Inwagen (1988).
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3. So, probably, there is no god.3
The skeptical theist has traditionally challenged the argument for 1. Suppose there is some
evil e. Here’s the argument:
a. We don’t know of any good that justifies God in permitting e.
b. So, it appears that there is no good that justifies God in permitting e.
1’. So, probably, there is no good that justifies God in permitting e.
To affirm 1’ is just to affirm 1. The move from b to 1’ is justified by the principle of
credulity, which is the principle that if it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of further
considerations, probably p.4 Skeptical theists challenge the move from a to b, which is the
move from the absence of evidence to the evidence of absence. Some skeptical theists
challenge this move by endorsing CORNEA. The exact formulations of the principle have
changed,5 but on every version of it, the idea behind CORNEA is to provide a necessary
condition on whether some evidence E can strongly support some hypothesis H.6 Initially,
the formulation was meant to prevent the atheologian from claiming b. Here’s the initial
formulation:
(Initial CORNEA) On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim
“it appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive
faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be
different that it is in some way discernible by her.7
3This
problem was initially formulated in Rowe (1979), but the version here better matches Rowe (2006), 80.
(1996). The principle of credulity: Swinburne (2004), 303. Similar principles can also be used, such
as Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism (2001), 99, or weaker views like Conee’s seeming evidentialism
(2004), 15, Chisholm’s commonsensism (1989), 63, or Dougherty’s reasons commonsensism (ms).
5For a review of these formulations, see Dougherty (forthcoming).
6Wykstra says this in Wykstra (2007), 88, and Wykstra and Perrine (forthcoming).
7Wykstra (1984), 85.
4Wykstra
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Wykstra, the most prominent of CORNEA advocates, gives the following analogy: suppose a
doctor looks at a syringe needle and doesn’t see HIV on the needle. Is she entitled to claim
that it appears that there is no HIV on the needle? She isn’t, because if there were HIV on
the needle, her situation would be the same—she wouldn’t see the virus on the needle.
Rowe (2006, 88) reformulated the argument for 1’ so that it does not include any
appearance claim. Rather, the argument for 1 is from c to 1’:
c. No good we know of justifies God in permitting e.
1’. So, probably, there is no good that justifies God in permitting e.
CORNEA was modified to block the inference from c to 1’:
(CORNEA modified) For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, P is entitled to
claim that new evidence E is levering8 evidence for H only if it is reasonable for P to
believe that: if H were false, E would, in S, likely be different. 9
In both cases, CORNEA is meant prevent the subject from being entitled to some claim, and
in both cases, it does so by blocking an inference to 1’ by imposing a restriction on when
some evidence supports a hypothesis.
The Commonsense Problem of Evil threatens the relevance of CORNEA (and
skeptical theism in general).10 According to the Commonsense Problem of Evil, there is no
inference from a to b or from c to 1’. Instead, it appears to the subject that there is
I’ll say more about what levering evidence is in section 3.
2007, 88, called “CORNEA-2” in Wykstra and Perrine, forthcoming). There are two objections
raised against this principle in the literature. First, there are counterexamples to the principle if it is taken to
be expressing a subjunctive conditional. McBrayer (2009) In reply, the grammatical subjunctive is taken by
Wykstra to be a conditional probability rather than a subjunctive conditional. Wykstra and Perrine
(forthcoming). Second, some take CORNEA to provide counterexamples to epistemic closure or transmission
principles. Graham and Maitzen (2007) In reply, Wykstra has made a distinction between static and dynamic
support. Wykstra (2007) I’ll set aside these debates in this paper.
10For recent defenses of the view, see Dougherty (2008), Dougherty (ms). For predecessors see Draper
(1991) and Gellman (1992).
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9(Wykstra
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gratuitous evil, and on that basis the subject noninferentially believes that there is
gratuitous evil. The subject’s belief that there is gratuitous evil is not based on any other
beliefs, so it’s noninferential, and there’s no epistemic basis for it appearing to the subject
that there is gratuitous evil. There is, it seems, no inference for CORNEA to block. Without
an inference, and without a basis for the appearance state, CORNEA seems impotent.
In the rest of this paper, I’ll argue that it is not impotent: CORNEA, or a reformulated
version of it, can still prevent a subject from being prima facie justified, or even have a pro
tanto reason, for believing that there are gratuitous evils. First, though, I will expose an
area of attack for the skeptical theist, in particular for the advocate of CORNEA-like
principles.
2 Noninferential justification and support facts
Suppose it seems to you that it’s raining. Suppose you also believe that it’s raining.
What is the relation between the two? Intuitively, one supports the other. The factors that
contribute to your justification that it’s raining are not only that it seems to you that it’s
raining but also the fact that its seeming to you that it’s raining supports the proposition
that it’s raining. Support facts are of the following form: p supports q just in case p is a good
reason to believe q.11There need to be support facts for there to be epistemic support
relations between reasons (including a seeming or an appearance) and beliefs.
These support facts are not mental states. Lewis Carroll’s Tortoise will help show
why.12 The Tortoise accepts A and B but rejects Z in the following:
11See
Comesana (2005), 60-61. I rely heavily on the first part of Comesana (2005) throughout this entire
section.
12Carroll (1895). Comesana (2005) also uses this example on pp. 62-63.
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A. Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
B. The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same.
Z. The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other.
The Tortoise challenges Achilles to get him to accept Z. Achilles gets the Tortoise to accept
C. If A and B are true, then Z is true.
However, the Tortoise accepts A, B, and C but not Z. The Tortoise then again challenges
Achilles to get him to accept Z. The process will continue as long as rules of inferences are
premises. But the challenge needs to stop somewhere. So there is a difference between
rules of inferences and premises. Similarly, there is a difference between support facts and
the things that provide the support. If the things that provide the support are mental events
like appearances, there is, in addition, a support relation between those appearances and
the belief they justify, and this support relation is not itself an appearance. So, even if a
subject is justified in believing a proposition noninferentially on the basis of an appearance,
there is needed, in addition, a support fact linking the appearance and the belief.
Since the idea behind CORNEA is to provide a necessary condition on whether some
evidence E can strongly support some hypothesis H, perhaps there is an area of attack for
CORNEA even when a belief is noninferentially justified. This area of attack is the support
relation between the appearance and the belief.
3 Defusing the commonsense problem of evil
According to the Commonsense Problem of Evil, it appears to the subject that there
is gratuitous evil, and on that basis the subject noninferentially believes that there is
gratuitous evil. But, as was said in the last section, in order for the subject to believe that
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there is gratuitous evil on the basis of an appearance, there needs to be a support fact that
obtains between the appearance and the belief. The idea behind CORNEA is to provide a
necessary condition on support relations that obtain between some evidence (such as an
appearance) and a hypothesis (such as the proposition that there is gratuitous evil).
There is a potential problem: (Initial CORNEA) (minus the metalinguistic
consideration) is meant to provide a restriction on the kind of support a cognized situation
can provide for a subject’s appearances, not whether the appearances justify a subject in
believing a proposition. However, (CORNEA modified) seems not to do this. In fact,
(CORNEA modified) seems precisely to be a restriction on whether an appearance justifies
a subject in believing a proposition. Here’s why. The idea behind (CORNEA modified) is to
provide a necessary condition on whether some new evidence E is levering evidence for
H.13 Wykstra and Perrine list three necessary conditions for evidence to be levering. One of
these conditions is that the evidence “is sufficient enough to shift the rational credibility of
a hypothesis from one square state to another.”14 Square states are doxastic attitudes:
belief, non-belief, and disbelief. That is, (CORNEA modified) is a necessary condition on
whether some evidence supports belief, non-belief, or disbelief in the target proposition.
So, although (Initial CORNEA) is specifically aimed at restricting whether or not the subject
has the right to make a claim to an appearance, (CORNEA modified) is aimed at whether
some evidence (e.g. an appearance state) supports an agent’s doxastic attitude toward a
proposition. Further, (CORNEA modified) doesn’t say anything about an inference. So, it
seems that (CORNEA modified) is well-suited to apply to the Commonsense Problem of
Evil.
13Or
whether some new evidence strongly supports H. For our purposes here, these are equivalent.
and Perrine (forthcoming), sec. 1.2.
14Wykstra
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Here is (CORNEA modified) again:
(CORNEA modified) For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, P is entitled to
claim that new evidence E is levering evidence for H only if it is reasonable for P to
believe that: if H were false, E would, in the situation S, likely be different.
Suppose the proponent of the Commonsense Problem of Evil wants to claim that her new
evidence
E The appearance that there is gratuitous evil
brings her from a state of nonbelief to a state of (prima facie) justified belief that
H There is gratuitous evil.
According to (CORNEA modified), she can make this claim only if it is reasonable for her to
believe that if there weren’t any gratuitous evil, then it wouldn’t appear to her that there
isn’t any gratuitous evil. But to skeptical theists, we are “in the dark”15 about God’s reasons,
so even if God had very different reasons, it’s reasonable to believe that we would be
appeared to in the same way. So, the alleged justification for premise 1 in the
Commonsense Problem of Evil doesn’t pass (CORNEA modified)’s test. The appearance of
gratuitous evil does not support belief that there is gratuitous evil.16
Perhaps the proponent of the Commonsense Problem of Evil will object: “That’s fine,
but that I’m not claiming that the appearance that there is gratuitous evil is levering
evidence but only that it provides a pro tanto reason to believe that there is gratuitous
15Bergmann
16Or
(2001), 289, 291, and throughout Bergmann (2008).
at least the subject isn’t entitled to claim that it does.
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evil.17 In this case, the proponent of skeptical theism can reply by adopting a reformulated
version of CORNEA:18
(Reformulated CORNEA) Evidence E that is new to S supports hypothesis H only if it
is the case that if H were false, E would likely be different.
This is an externalist condition, but support facts are external,19 and Wykstra endorses
external parts to his original CORNEA.20 The support relation between E and H doesn’t
obtain according to (Reformulated CORNEA), because it is (according to skeptical theists)
not the case that if there were no gratuitous evil, then our appearances would be different.
So, even though the Commonsense Problem of evil avoids both inferences to
premise 1 and the move from the absence of evidence to the evidence of absence, there is
still an apparent support relation that, according to CORNEA, or a reformulated version of
it, does not obtain. I conclude, then, that the proponent of CORNEA still has a way to defuse
the Commonsense Problem of Evil.
17Dougherty
makes this move in his (2011) and (ms).
call this “a reformulated version of CORNEA” because it at least gets to what is behind CORNEA-like
principles. It may be missing some conditions that some people take to be necessary for a principle to be
CORNEA-like, but given how CORNEA has varied over the years, it’s hard to tell exactly what those conditions
are. In any case, I’m not set on the name.
19This is the thesis of Comesana (2005).
20See Wykstra and Perrine (forthcoming).
18I
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