Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence
Abstract
This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on
offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to
examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end
we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue
that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of
developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An entirely top-down methodology is largely
insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both
introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a
methodology that falls between these two extremes.
1 Introduction
Our experiences have a temporal aspect. Not only do our experiences represent that the world
has a temporal structure—the content of our experiences has a temporal dimension—but the
experiences themselves have, or seem to have, a temporal structure. Defenders of various
competing models have attempted to spell out the relationship between the representational and
phenomenological content of our experiences, on the one hand, and the temporal structure of
those experiences, on the other. Rather unfortunately the conceptual distinctions to which these
models appeal are often either developed in different ways, or, at best, use different terminology.
For example, Dainton (2008; 2010; 2011), Chuard (2011), Lee (2014; forthcoming), Phillips
(2010) and Grush (2007) each have differing catalogues of what they identify as the main models.
This proliferation of models renders the task of evaluating said models in the light of new
evidence difficult.
To add to the difficulty, there appears to be a shift in the methodology used in arguing
for and developing such positions.
More recent players in the debate, e.g., Watzl (2013),
advocate analysing in detail particular psychological experiences, and others, e.g., Lee (2014),
explicitly endorse a bottom-up approach to the task of modelling temporal experience, i.e., an
approach that relates claims about the manner in which temporal information is neurally coded
and processed to the manner in which experience itself is temporally structured. Before this shift
most of those participating in this debate practiced an approach that, while not strictly top-down,
in that the methodology attempts to accommodate some empirical findings, nevertheless
1
develops and critiques models largely on the basis of phenomenological considerations, and
tends to cherry pick empirical findings to suit.
Given the divergence of recent literature on temporal experience regarding its main
models and methodology, we have two interrelated aims.
First, we catalogue the models developed in this literature. In doing so we make clear the
relations between and among the components that different extant classifications rely on, make
salient the manner in which these proposed classifications of models diverge, and point out the
possibility of developing other models.
Second, we argue for the use of a particular methodology on the grounds that it can
facilitate a systematic incorporation of empirical findings as well as offer a fruitful starting point
for empirically-informed enquiry. Our proposed method slots between an introspective-based
top-down approach and a bottom-up approach, which seeks to expunge the ‘classic’ models of
the largely top-down approach. We argue that we should not completely abandon the classic
models yet we should incorporate empirical claims.
Additionally, we make use of our
classification in order to establish a rough division of labour between tasks that lend themselves
to a phenomenal-focused enquiry and those that should be informed by cognitive science.
Our paper is thus organized as follows. First, we catalogue the models that have been
proposed.
We subsequently examine the general sets of methodological practices in the
literature. We next turn to two cases in which empirical findings have potential impacts on
particular models. Then we explore the implications of these cases on methodology and, in turn,
argue for the need to incorporate and analyse empirical literature systematically. Nevertheless,
we think that existing models, often inspired, as they are, by top-down methodology, still have a
useful role to play in investigation. They have empirical consequences and can be used as a
fruitful starting point for empirical investigation. Thus, we argue for an integrated approach to
the analysis of temporal experience.
2 Cataloguing the Models
Our cataloguing of the main positions involves, first, elucidating three levels and, second,
explicating the relational properties between what it is that exists at those three levels during one
temporal interval and what it is that exists at those levels during another temporal interval. We
call the first of these a vertical characterisation, since it highlights the relationship that obtains
between phenomena that occur during the same instant or temporal interval, but at different
levels. We call the second of these a horizontal characterisation, since it highlights the
2
relationship that obtains between phenomena that occur during different instants or temporal
intervals and at the same or different levels.
We take temporal phenomenology to be the way things seem to the subject of an
experience: that it seems to subjects (at least some of the time) as though events occur in a
particular order, with a particular duration.
We assume that subjects have a temporal
phenomenology and that this temporal phenomenology is our target of investigation.
As
detailed in the next section, features of that temporal phenomenology may or may not appear in
the hierarchy—whether they do depends upon the type of realism or antirealism one adopts.
However, we make no further assumptions about the way things seem to subjects. For example,
we do not assume that it seems to subjects as though there is an experience of succession, as
opposed to merely a succession of experiences.
We also remain neutral regarding the relationship between the representational content
of experiences and their phenomenological content. We assume neither that phenomenal
content is simply a function of representational content (representationalism) nor that
phenomenal
content
fails
to
be
determined
by
representational
content
(non-
representationalism). In this respect, at least, we attempt to be ecumenical in terms of the various
positions one might have about the representational and phenomenological content of
experiences. Not everyone might accept even that. One could be an error theorist about such
phenomenology, suggesting that we do not even seem to experience events as having an order or
duration but, instead, some cognitive apparatus induces in us beliefs that we have such
experiences. As will be seen, however, our classification system makes room for a myriad ways in
which we can be wrong about our experiences of temporality.
2.1 Vertical Characterisation and Atomic Non-Extensionalism
In our classification the bottom level—level C—represents external time. That is, it represents
events and their temporal properties and relations measured independently of our perceiving
them.1 The top level—level A—represents the structure of a subject’s experience. Realists
suppose that our experiences include the sorts of temporal properties and relations that seem to
characterize this experience. That is, the realist supposes that the experience has some, or all, of
the temporal structure that is characterised by our temporal phenomenology. The antirealist
denies this. She holds that our experiences themselves lack temporal structure even though she
may agree that it seems to us as though they do. Realists seek to account for these relations in
1
We assume that level C is continuous—it is characterised by instants of zero duration.
3
their models while antirealists have the task of explaining why we, at the very least, believe that
we experience such relations.
Finally, level B represents the supervenience base of the temporal experience. We assume
that this consists in brain activity, e.g., a brain state at a time or temporally extended brain
processes.
Below is a generic vertical model that shows the different views one might have about
the three levels.
Figure 1: The Generic Model Map
In the vertical classification level C represents the length of time (an interval or instant) of the
supervenience base. Level A indicates whether the experience has experiences as proper parts or
not. If it does have proper parts then they could either be parts in virtue of the content of such
experience—as in Dainton’s characterization of retentionalism in which the set of retentions that
characterize a specious present appear to have ordering and a duration due to the different
degrees of presentness each retention has—or the parts might be related via temporal relations
and thus the whole experience be temporally extended along level C. Regardless of the manner
in which the top level exhibits parthood, if the resulting top-level experience does not have
experiences as proper parts we, following Lee’s (2014) terminology, refer to it as an atomic experience.
On the other hand, if this experience does have experiences as proper parts, then it is called a
non-atomic experience.
The middle level simply indicates whether the supervenience base of the experience is
itself temporally extended or instantaneous. We assume that if the supervenience base is
temporally extended then it has temporal parts, which we call neural parts, even if these parts do
not correspond to any experiential parts of the experience found at level A.
4
Thus different models of temporal phenomenology take different stands on the duration
of, and relations among, levels A, B and C. As detailed below, we can map onto our three-tier
structure various models of temporal phenomenology and see how each differs. We use this
vertical characterisation to identify four main structural options: Atomic Non-Extensionalism,
Atomic Extensionalism, Non-Atomic Non-Extensionalism and Non-Atomic Extensionalism.2
The top level in the diagrams is level A, the middle level is level B, and the bottom level is level
C. We term the first option ‘Atomic Non-Extensionalism’, which is depicted in Fig 2.
Figure 2: Atomic Non-Extensionalism
Atomic non-extensionalism is the view that experiences are atomic—they have no experiential
proper parts—and they are instantaneous as are their supervenience bases. On this view no
atomic experience represents the world as changing, nor represents that events occur in
succession. That is, no atomic experience itself provides an experience of temporal succession.
Thus atomic non-extensionalism is a kind of antirealism in the following sense: it denies that
atomic experiences have a certain temporal structure. That leaves the atomic non-extensionalist
with two options. She can simply embrace antirealism and maintain that although it seems to us
as though our experiences have a certain character, in fact this is a mistake: they do not.
Alternatively, she can embrace realism and try to explain how it is that experiences, plural, have
the relevant content when each individual experience lacks that content. The second option can
only be considered once we move from considering a vertical characterisation to a horizontal
characterisation.
Note that our use of ‘extensionalism’ differs from Dainton’s use. He uses it to delineate a specific model
with a temporally extended non-atomic level A, which we fit into our framework below. In contrast, we
use this term to refer to a model that has a temporally extended supervenience base.
2
5
2.2 Horizontal Characterisation
A horizontal characterisation takes the three levels represented in the vertical characterisation—
call it a vertical slab—and asks: how can the vertical slabs be put side-by-side to create a depiction
of a succession of experiences across time? There are two possible answers to that question.
Either the succession of vertical slabs share parts at some level or other —they overlap—or they
are disjoint—they do not overlap and simply take place in succession. Below we use atomic nonextensionalism to depict a case in which vertical slabs are disjoint.
Figure 3: Disjoint Horizontal Characterisation
Contrast Fig.3 with the following diagram, Fig 4, in which there is a horizontal overlap:
Figure 4: Horizontal Overlap of Experiential Parts
The portion in the middle represents the overlap of two temporally extended vertical slabs which
overlap by having a particular instantaneous experience—Experiential Part 3, and a particular
instantaneous neural part—Neural Part 3—in common. The two slabs also overlap at level C
since there is some temporal instant they share—the instant at which Experiential Part 3 and
Neural Part 3 exist.
6
Fig. 4 is not the only way in which there can be overlap. Two instantaneous slabs also
overlap if each slab has a non-atomic experience at level A that has parts in virtue of its content
and if these non-atomic experiences share experiential content. We distinguish this kind of
overlap from that depicted in Fig. 4. We call this latter kind of overlap content overlap because what
is in common between two instantaneous non-atomic experiences is not an experience that is
part of both, but rather, there is some experiential content that features in both experiences.
Content overlap is depicted in Fig. 5. There we see that although non-atomic experiences E and
E* are disjoint, they nevertheless share content: each includes representations with content C2
and C3.
Figure 5: Horizontal Overlap of Content
In sum, we distinguish horizontal characterisations that are disjoint as per Fig. 3, experientially
overlapping as per Fig. 4 or content overlapping as per Fig. 5.
Let us return to atomic non-extensionalism. This model is inconsistent with any form of
overlap—experiential or content—since the experience is atomic. Hence it is relatively
straightforward to see how, and why, the atomic non-extensionalist might embrace antirealism.
This is, indeed, the view that Dainton calls Reidian cinematic antirealism.3 Reid’s cinematic
antirealist accepts that it is a mistake to suppose that change, persistence and succession feature
in our experience. Instantaneous atomic experiences cannot furnish us with experiences as of
temporal properties. Instead, according to Reid, we mistakenly come to believe that we have
experiences of temporal properties. Reid’s particular way of explaining this is by recourse to
memory—we remember earlier experiences and erroneously come to believe we have nonatomic experiences—although one could in principle appeal to other cognitive mechanisms to
do so.
Other antirealist examples of this mapping are the Humean version of Chuard’s (2011) temporal perceptual
atomism and Watzl’s (2013) simple cinematic view.
3
7
Some forms of this position are versions of what Dainton identifies as cinematic
antirealism.4 Unlike Reid’s cinematic antirealist these cinematic antirealists seek out mechanisms
that may give some account as to why we seem to perceive temporal properties. For instance
Crick and Koch (2003) claim that an instantaneous experience has a vector-like feature that
suggests that there is movement when there is none.
The atomic non-extensionalist realist, on the other hand, has only one option: she must
explain temporal phenomenology in terms of a sequence of non-overlapping vertical slabs, no
one of which is an experience with temporal structure. An example of such a view is what
Dainton dubs ‘the moving beam model’.5 On this view one has experience as of change and
succession across atomic experiences due to the continual advance of one’s punctual awareness.6
2.3 Atomic Extensionalism, Non-Atomic Non-Extensionalism and Non-Atomic
Extensionalism
We are now well placed to consider further models of temporal phenomenology. The second of
these is depicted below in Fig. 6.
Another form is an antirealist version of retentionalism. Assuming they have non-extended supervenience
bases, examples of this form are Kelly’s (2005a; 2005b) retentionalism and antirealist versions of the following:
Chaurd’s (2011) Husserlian temporal perceptual atomism, Watzl’s (2013) retentional view, a version of Lee’s
(2014) atomistic view and Phillips’ (2010) memory theory.
4
Another example of the realist version of this mapping is the top left model depicted in Grush (2007) with a
punctuate supervenience base. It is also possible that a version of this falls under Lee’s (forthcoming) ‘atomistic
views’. Although he doesn’t give a cinematic example, his characterization allows for this possibility.
5
Another example of the realist version of this mapping is the top left model depicted in Grush (2007) with a
punctuate supervenience base. It is also possible that a version of this falls under Lee’s (forthcoming) ‘atomistic
views’. Although he doesn’t give a cinematic example, his characterization allows for this possibility: they have
a resulting experience that doesn’t have a C level temporal structure, yet may (or may not) have a contentderived temporal structure, and has a supervenience base that may or (may not) have temporal structure.
6
For this view to be classified as atomic non-extensionalism, however, the motion of the beam of awareness is
not to be considered part of the model. Rather, the moving beam is only invoked to provide temporal relations
among such momentary experiences.
4
8
Figure 6: Atomic Extensionalism
Fig. 6 differs from Fig. 2 in only one respect: the atomic experience’s supervenience base is
temporally extended. We call this view ‘atomic extensionalism’. Examples of this view are rare:
there is only a single realist version suggested by a formulation of Lee’s (2014) atomistic view.
Although it’s possible that an antirealist version of Lee’s model may be developed we only sketch
the realist version here.
Within our framework Lee’s temporal atomism can be characterized as follows. Lee
argues that all supervenience bases have temporal structure that corresponds to the physical
correlates of consciousness. He argues that even instantaneous experiences are underpinned by
temporally extended physical processes. If Lee’s conclusion is correct, then level B spans a
temporal interval. Additionally, Lee’s temporal atomism allows for the possibility that the
resultant experience itself does not have any experiential parts. Thus a version of temporal
atomism could be developed such that it exemplifies atomic extensionalism. Notice that unlike
atomic non-extensionalism, atomic extensionalism may be developed as either a disjoint or
overlapping view. Although at level A the experience itself is atomic, the supervenience base at
level B will have temporal structure. Thus a realist version of atomic extensionalism may involve
the overlap of the temporal parts of each of their supervenience bases.
That brings us to our third broad category of view: non-atomic non-extensionalism.
9
Figure 7: Non-Atomic Non-Extensionalism
Fig. 7 differs from Fig. 2 and Fig. 6 in that the top level depicts an experience that has
experiences as proper parts. But, as with Fig. 1, the bottom box indicates that the supervenience
base of that experience is instantaneous.
Plausibly, non-atomic non-extensionalist views
embrace the specious present. For our purposes, the specious present is the doctrine that we
have an apparently temporally extended experience at an instant of time. 7 A notable example of
non-atomic non-extensional realism is Dainton’s realist retentionalism.8
According to
retentionalism one’s experience has experiential parts and temporal structure despite being
instantaneous: each experience represents not just a single moment, but also re-represents the
experiences of previous moments. The resulting experience has a temporal structure in virtue of
its content. If there is any overlap between sequences of such experiences, then it is content
overlap, not experiential overlap. Additionally, a model that has a non-atomic level A posits
experiences whose contents are structured so that they represent temporal relations even if the
experiential parts of that experience do not themselves stand in those temporal relations. Thus
we assume that such models, i.e., those falling under this and the final schema, will be amenable
to the realist, but not the anti-realist.
Finally, our fourth category is non-atomic extensionalism.
7
For further discussion as to the nature and status of the specious present, see, e.g., Le Poidevin (2007, Ch5)
and (2009), Dainton (2010), Kelly (2005a; 2005b), Chuard (2012), Power (2012). Following, e.g., Le Poidevin
(2007, 81-2) and Dainton (2010) who both criticise reject Kelly’s and Chuard’s usage of this terminology as
referring to a particular model, we assume that the specious present is simply the doctrine defined above and,
according to one’s stance, may or may not need to be account for by one’s model.
8
Other examples of the realist version of this mapping are the content version of Chuard’s (2011) extensional
model (AKA ‘the specious present view’), Watzl’s (2013) specious present view, a version of Lee’s (2014)
atomistic view, Phillips’ (2010) retentionalist version of specious present theory and his memory theory and,
depending on the status of the B level, the bottom left model depicted in Grush (2007).
10
Figure 8: Non-Atomic Extensionalism
Fig. 8 differs from Fig. 7 only in that level C depicts a temporal interval rather than a temporal
instant. Thus non-atomic extensionalism holds that each supervenience base is itself temporally
extended and that our experiences are composed of further experiences.
A notable example of non-atomic extensional realism is Dainton’s extensionalism.9 This
account posits that experiential acts are temporally extended, rather than being instantaneous.
Dainton assumes that these acts are of about 500ms in length.
In turn, one’s resulting
experience itself has a temporal structure; the experiences that compose such an experience
occur over a duration and feature succession and ordering relations. Although a non-atomic
extensionalist could embrace a non-overlapping characterisation at the horizontal level, e.g., that
of Sprigge (1983), extant versions of the view typically do not. Dainton’s extensionalism, for
instance, involves experiential overlap between extended non-atomic experiences.
This concludes our taxonomy of existing models of temporal experience. With this
framework in hand we are now in a better position to assess the ways in which empirical findings
may impact existent models and offer a means of developing other models.
3 The Levels and Methodology
Lee (2014) is a notable exception to the general rule that there is little discussion of methodology
in the literature of temporal phenomenology. However, given the roles that empirical findings
may play, we think it important to take a step back and examine how we should go about
analysing and developing positions in this debate.
Other examples of the realist version of this mapping are Lee’s (2014) experiential process view, and, if they
have extended supervenience bases, Kelly’s (2005a; 2005b) specious present theory, Chuard’s (2011) structural
version of the extensional model, a version of Watzl’s specious present view, the top right and bottom right
models depicted in Grush (2007) and the version of Phillips’ (2010) Foster/Dainton specious present theory.
9
11
To do so, we first discuss the methodology that Lee advocates and examine his
characterization of the current shared methodology he wishes to purge.
After a caveat
concerning how these methods relate to that which is usually practiced, we suggest a third
methodological option. Our proposed method slots between the bottom-up approach of Lee
and the largely top-down approach that Lee claims is practiced. We argue that although we
should more systematically incorporate empirical claims, we should not completely abandon the
classic models of the top-down approach. Then using two empirical cases we argue that this
third option can better incorporate empirical findings than that presupposed in much of the
literature. Finally we make recourse to the levels above to illustrate where empirical findings and
armchair analysis are best applied.
3.1 Existing Methodological Options
Although Lee (2014, 2) does not discuss methodological issues in detail, he characterizes his
preferred method and contrasts it with one he takes to be assumed in the literature:
My view is that the most powerful considerations in this area have to do with the
ways in which temporal information is processed in the brain, so that ultimately what
is at stake depends on empirical considerations of a quite general kind. My
methodology involves linking together claims about how temporal information is
neurally coded and processed with claims about how experience itself is temporally
structured, a methodology which requires assumptions about how the timing of
neural
and experiential events are connected [...]. It is worth noting at the offset
that because I adopt this “bottom-up” methodology, my approach contrasts quite
strongly with certain other authors such as Dainton (2000) who argues for views in
this area more on the basis of phenomenological than empirical considerations.
Here Lee contrasts his bottom-up methodology, which involves drawing more from empirical
considerations, with a ‘Daintonian’ methodology, which draws more from phenomenological
considerations. For the sake of convenience, we term the Daintonian methodology the ‘classic
methodology’ and the models that are associated with it, e.g., retentionalism, extensionalism, and
cinematic, ‘classic models’. Before further spelling out the contrast, note that Lee’s (2014, 2-3)
method motivates him to reject classic models on the grounds that they do not capture
distinctions that he identifies as fundamental to the debate. Thus we add this feature to the
bottom-up package: classic models may be expunged and replaced by alternative models pending
empirical findings and distinctions.
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To get a better grip on the methodological contrast, let’s consider the models that
correspond to Dainton’s extensionalism and a Lee-inspired form of non-atomic extensionalism
in terms of our levels. Even though Lee does not explicitly advocate such a model, we consider
it here in order to compare two forms of non-atomic extensionalism and, thus, to highlight the
relevant methodological distinctions.
Recall that non-atomic extensionalism’s A level involves a temporally extended
experience of, according to Dainton, about 500ms in length. One’s experience has a temporal
structure since the experiences that compose it occur over a duration and feature succession and
ordering relations. In good conditions, e.g., conditions under which one is not hallucinating or
experiencing an illusion, such structure is assumed to mirror that of the actual temporal structure
of experienced events, i.e., the temporal structure of events at C level. Moreover, as we have
seen, Dainton’s version of non-atomic extensionalism embraces horizontal experiential overlap.
Thus, he claims, we achieve a resulting non-atomic continuous experience.
Hypotheses about the content and structure of an experience, about the function of its
supervenience base and of the relation between contiguous experiences, arise, on Dainton’s view,
largely as a matter of introspection and a priori reasoning. For example, he (2000, 171, 236) holds
that non-atomic experiences are of about 500ms in length either on the basis of introspection or
as a primitive assumption. Moreover, partially as a means of responding to the problem of
accounting for apparently continuous experience that lasts longer than 500ms, Dainton claims
that the acts overlap. In turn, the content and structure that we attribute to experiences at level
A is supplied by introspection. If we only consider these aspects of Dainton’s approach then his
methodology is clearly top-down in that it is largely constructed without reference to empirical
considerations. Further, Dainton assumes that we can read off the temporal structure of one
level—level A—from that of another—the temporal structure of events at level C. Dainton is,
therefore, largely silent as to the structure of the supervenience base. The base need only
function in a manner such that one’s temporal experience generally mirrors that of the events
experienced in the world.
While, given a classic methodology, the exact details of the nature of the supervenience
base can remain open, it seems clear that if the experience at level A is to mirror the structure of
events at level C, then that is highly suggestive regarding some features of the supervenience
base. Namely, one would expect that each of the experiential parts of a non-atomic experience,
E, at level A, has a unique supervenience base that is itself a proper temporal part (a neural part)
of the supervenience base of E. That is, one would expect a one-to-one mapping of E’s
experiential parts onto the (possibly extended) proper temporal parts of E’s supervenience base.
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One expects this because if the temporal relations that obtain between the experiential parts of E
are to mirror the temporal relations between the events at level C then it is natural to suppose
that a sequence of events corresponds to a sequence of brain states, such that each brain state is
a temporal part of the supervenience base of E. And it is in virtue of the order in which those
brain states occur that each of the experiential parts is temporally related to the others in the
manner it is. Thus we have a 1:1:1 mapping between an event, at level C, a temporal part of a
supervenience base, at level B, and an experiential part, at level A.
Thus although Dainton’s methodology is perhaps not entirely top-down, it is
nevertheless based on considerations that hold fixed a target—our temporal phenomenology,
which it is taken that we have access to through introspection—combined with a priori reasoning
about the role of brain processes in giving rise to that phenomenology.
That methodology, however, is inconsistent with the Lee-inspired non-atomic
extensionalism discussed. On Lee’s view the structure of experience need not match the
structure of the supervenience base. Rather, the methodology that sits most naturally10 with his
view is one according to which what is important is the supervenience base: it includes the
correlates of consciousness as a temporally extended physical process. The supervenience base
gives rise to an experience—but it is an empirical matter what structure that experience has.
Thus although Lee’s methodology is consistent with us discovering that there is a nonatomic experience, E, composed of experiential parts, and discovering that these parts neatly
map onto the proper temporal parts of E’s supervenience base, it is equally compatible with us
discovering neither of these things. It could be, for instance, that although there is, at level A, a
non-atomic extended experience, E, composed of experiential parts, these parts do not map
cleanly onto the proper temporal parts of E’s supervenience base. That will be the case if the
supervenience base, S, of E, holistically determines the features of E, but does not do so in such
a way that there are proper experiential parts of E which supervene on proper temporal parts of
S. Or it will be the case if the temporal parts of S match up with the experiential parts of E, but
not in a clear 1:1 manner that preserves the ordering of those parts across time. This
methodology also leaves open the possibility that at level A there is no non-atomic experience
His approach, however, is more complicated than characterized here. For example, he assumes a
central principle that relates the B level and A level. This is what he terms the Temporal Identity
Principle: Experiences have the same timing as their realizers (2014, 3). However, he uses empirical
illusions, experiments and the like in order argue against various strengths of mirroring relations
amongst level C external events and level A. Further, he quickly claims that his principle is “very
plausible, but won’t argue for it” in his (2014). So, although he assumes a particular principle regarding
the relation between level B and level A, it’s not clear exactly what the status of this principle is, i.e.,
whether it has empirical support or is a mere presupposition.
10
14
that is itself composed of further experiences: whether that is so or not will be a matter for
empirical investigation, determined by the structure of the supervenience base.
In sum, Lee’s method relies heavily on empirical findings while the classic method relies
more on phenomenological considerations. The bottom-up approach emphasises level B brain
states or processes, while the classic approach focuses on armchair analysis and introspection to
construct level A. These two extremes, however, suggest a third methodological option
according to which one jointly utilizes the following to inform and develop a model of level A:
introspection and empirical data about B level brain events and about C level external events. It
is this third methodological option we aim to promote; we hold that introspection can be used as
input into the modelling of the structure of level A. That is consistent with holding that data
about level B ought to be appropriately incorporated into one’s model of level A and thus that
empirical findings should be systematically examined.
It is important to note, however, that this distinction between bottom-up and classic
methodologies is not as clear cut in practice as we, following Lee, are drawing it. For example,
Grush (2007) and Crick and Koch (2003) approach the modelling of temporal phenomenology
largely via considerations arising from cognitive psychology. Yet Grush makes recourse to the
models found in the more phenomenologically-informed literature on temporal experience in
philosophy. Moreover, most philosophers contributing to this topic do inform their arguments
with empirical findings, e.g., Le Poidevin (2007) refers to Gregory’s (1966) stance on the
waterfall illusion and Phillips (forthcoming) discusses at length how his model may account for
Eagleman and Sejnowski’s (2000) work on postdictive effects. So we do not deny that the
literature is mixed in its methodological approach.
Our methodological option seeks to accommodate the importance of both empirical and
phenomenological considerations by illustrating how they can be mutually informative and play
important roles in model development. There is, however, a division of labour to which we must
be sensitive between the empirical and the introspective. The features of the model at level B are
best investigated primarily via empirical investigation while, as we illustrate below, an account of
Level A and of the relations amongst the three levels should be investigated using introspection
and empirical investigation in a systematic fashion.
Finally, the question of whether a model is realist or antirealist can, in the end, only be
determined via good old fashioned armchair reasoning. We think that the issue of whether
antirealism or realism is true can neither be prejudged (as does Lee, in favour of realism) nor
resolved entirely by the empirical. Rather, the issue of whether antirealism is true about the
structure of certain experiences depends, at least on part, on introspective evidence about the
15
apparent structure of those experiences. One can, after all, only be shown to be wrong that our
experiences have a certain feature (and thus it be shown that we ought to be antirealists about
such a feature) if we are, in fact, inclined to say that they have such a feature. Moreover, since
antirealist views need to explain away the appearances—after first ascertaining that there are such
appearances—evaluation of their position requires evaluating whether or not they offer a
plausible account of our beliefs about our experiences in the absence of our experiences having
the features to which we, introspectively, attribute them.
So, we think, though these methodological caricatures are just that, caricatures, they
provide some extremes between which we can slot a third methodological option. Contra Lee’s
option, ours utilizes phenomenological considerations, and it uses classic models as at least
starting points for empirical investigation and development. Contra the classic option, it actively
and systematically utilizes empirical investigation to develop and critique classic models.
Furthermore, our option captures the mixed methodology that is actually practiced; however, our
option more systematically incorporates empirical results and provides means for further
empirical investigation. Thus, we do not wish to suggest that our option is completely new and
divorced from actual practice. Rather, we claim that current practice could benefit from more
systematic incorporation of empirical findings, and we make clear how armchair analysis and
introspective data can be supplemented and informed by such findings.
3.2 Case Studies
To illustrate some failings of the second methodological option as well as, contra Lee, to show
the usefulness of classic models, we present two cases from experimental psychology.
The first case concerns our experience of duration. We begin by presenting a model,
drawn from psychology, that attempts to account for the experience of duration. Since most
classic models share features with that model, it suggests that if there is evidence against the
psychological model then it is ipso facto evidence against these classic models. We agree that if
recent experiments are correct then this suggests that the classic models are too crude.
Nevertheless, we think that by making reference to our three levels we can show how the classic
models can be informed by such studies, modified and salvaged. Thus, contra Lee, we show
how classic models need not be completely jettisoned, but instead, can be modified in the light
of empirical findings. Moreover, we suggest, these models offer a starting point for empirical
enquiry as well as a framework into which a number of empirically-informed positions may be
slotted and tested.
16
The second case involves the wagon wheel effect. In the philosophical literature on
temporal experience this effect is mentioned in Crick and Koch (2003) and Lee (forthcoming,
10). Although the former presents it as supporting a particular model, Lee briefly uses it as an
example to support his claim that we need to make recourse to the temporal structure of neural
states, rather than to introspection, in order to discover whether experience is discretely gappy.
Before outlining Lee’s brief argument for this conclusion, we look at two of the main positions
in experimental psychology on this debate. In turn, we use this case to argue, contra Lee, that
introspection can still play a role here.
Thus, the main upshot of the first case is that classic models should and can be informed
by empirical considerations. The main upshot of the second case is that introspection can play
an important role in developing models of temporal phenomenology.
3.2.1 Case 1: Psychological Models of Duration Judgements
As generally characterized in psychology,11 the internal clock or stopwatch model is considered
central to discussions on timing. For example, Buonomano and Karmarkar (2002, 44) call it “by
far the most influential model” in psychological literature on timing, and Mauk and Buonomano
(2004, 314) refer to the centralized internal clock model as the “predominate working hypothesis
in the psychological literature.” Generally, an internal clock model involves a neural pacemaker
or oscillator ‘ticking’ at some fixed frequency. Its inputs are the beginning (the stimulus onset)
and end (the stimulus offset) of the interval to be judged. The ticks are detected by a counter or
accumulator; this is used to judge the duration of perceived events.12 Further, the state of the
pacemaker, which Treisman calls ‘specific arousal’, may by modulated by external influences; for
instance, increased arousal generated from nearly being hit by a bus increases the pacemaker rate
while reduced arousal slows it. According to this model raised arousal and, thus, an increased
pacemaker rate corresponds to judging an interval as longer since there would be more ticks
counted, while lowered arousal and a corresponding decreased pacemaker rate induces one to
judge an interval as shorter.
As presented by the preceding two papers, it’s presupposed that there is one internal
clock with which one estimates the durations for timing tasks of all modalities. This feature is
shared by classic models, which, for the most part do not take into account differences in
For an overview of this model and its role in the literature, see Buonomano and Karmarkar (2002),
Mauk and Buonomano (2004), Johnston (2010) amongst others. Creelman (1962) and Treisman (1963)
are standardly cited as schematizing this model. However, there are several alternative models of
duration timing proposed: Grondin (2010) for some such models.
12 Although this presentation is greatly generalized, it is all that is needed for present purposes. See
Treisman (1963; 1984; 1999) for more detail. Also, for discussion of this model in philosophical
literature on temporal experience, see Le Poidevin (2007) and Phillips (2012).
11
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modalities: they generally assume13 that there is a single model of temporal experience which
accurately models temporal phenomenology across every modality. These models’ foil is one
according to which there are several distributed regions of the brain that process time with the
location of the process dependent upon the modality being judged.14
If a model is meant to account for experiences arising from all modalities it should also
account for all experiences that arise from each modality. Consider, then, a visual stimulus that
appears in a specific location in one’s visual field and disappears after 600ms of level C time. On
the stopwatch model, level C features of external events serve as the input; it is assumed that a
stimulus onset begins the relevant counting and the offset ends it. So, in the visual case, there’s
something in the visual field that is perceived. The central stopwatch simply starts accumulating
ticks when given this visual onset and ends at the offset. It doesn’t (or ought not) matter where
the visual percept is located in one’s visual field. The classic extensionalist, retentionalist and
cinematic models also may assume that under favourable conditions there is a C level external
event which straightforwardly corresponds with the content and, for realist versions generally,
temporal features of our experience of the event. So, if one is presented with the 600ms
stimulus, one is assumed to simply have a visual experience of the stimulus and to associate some
apparent duration with the experienced event. However, if recent research by Johnston et al.
(2006) is right, this assumed relation between C level events and what we see is problematically
simple: as explicated shortly, a duration judgement can depend on where exactly the event occurs
in one’s visual field, e.g., whether it is in a specific area of the right hemifield.
To make clear exactly what’s at issue here it is useful to extract another feature at play
which is already highlighted by Lee (2014). Following Lee’s terminology, there is also, to some
extent, the feature of metrical mirroring. If one accepts metrical mirroring then one claims that the
level C ordering and duration relations between the temporal parts of some external event match
those of the level A experience. Under good conditions, the stopwatch model assumes that
there is metrical mirroring at least at the beginning and end of a timed event: the onset and offset
of the internal stopwatch corresponds to the level C beginning and end of the event. And, as
indicated above, many classic models also seem to presuppose metrical mirroring. We, however,
Yet, some, e.g., Dainton (2004; 2010), do point out that they are at least aware that different modalities
may generate further complexities in their models. However, seldom do they spell out how exactly such
differences in modalities may be accommodated. Further, even supposing that such models could be ‘decentralized’ in this sense, Johnston’s critique of the stopwatch model, as we explicate below, affects
another shared feature of these psychological and philosophical models.
14 It’s a separate question as to whether the same neurons time all intervals or whether, e.g., one set of
neurons time 100ms intervals and another set time 200ms intervals; these positions are regarded as
compatible with both models. In turn, what distinguishes the two models presented above is whether the
model is used to time durations experienced by all modalities, or whether the neural pacemaker
employed is modality-dependent.
13
18
are interested in a different feature of these cases: namely, whether one’s judgment of duration is
sensitive to the location of the percept in the visual field. Stopwatch models do not take the
location of a percept in this timing task to be relevant to a subject’s duration judgment: the
internal clock just starts ticking regardless of the location the stimulus. The classic models, too,
seem not to take into account the location of a percept. The assumption is that the location of a
particular perceived in one’s visual field does not alter one’s experience as of duration.
Johnston’s work, however, implies that this shared presupposition of the stopwatch and
classic models may be false. In one version of Johnston’s experiment the stimulus is a drifting
sine wave grating at some frequency. It is located to the left or right of a central fixation spot for
15s. After this adaption period, a drifting grating at 10Hz is shown on the adapted and nonadapted sides sequentially for some subsecond duration. The subject is then asked which of the
10Hz patterns appeared to last longer. When the adaption stimulus is 20Hz, the apparent
duration of the 10Hz pattern in the adapted field is reduced. But when the adaption stimulus is
5Hz the apparent duration of the pattern in the adapted field is either slightly reduced or
unaffected. In effect it seems that the apparent duration of a visual stimulus can be manipulated
through adaptation such that it varies depending on where it is located in the visual field. In
other words, it seems that there can be an object that appears for a specific C level time whose A
level experienced duration can vary across one’s visual field.
Johnston regards this as evidence against the stopwatch model for a number of reasons,
one of which is that the model assumes that there is a single neural timing mechanism: “the
spatially specificity of the duration effect implicates localized temporal mechanisms rather than a
single neural timing mechanism” (2006, 475).15 Johnston concludes that there are spatially
localized temporal mechanisms involved in judgements of duration, and the stopwatch model is
unable to incorporate such mechanisms. If we assume that Johnston is correct then the classic
models face problems since they share these features with the stopwatch model.
Should classic models, then, be abandoned in view of such results? We think not. Clearly
empirical evidence is relevant to classic models: such data can and should inform these models.
But, contra Lee, classic models need not be completely jettisoned if they can be appropriately
modified in light of empirical evidence.
Can they be modified? In this case there is a link between the assumption that the model
should account for experiences of all modalities and the model’s lack of sensitivity to a percept’s
He (2006, 475) also claims to rule out the possibility that, perhaps, there’s a neural timing mechanism
corresponding to each hemifield. He does so by rerunning the experiment with the 10Hz grating being in
different regions of the hemifield in which the adaption occurred. The gratings that appear in regions in
which the 20Hz adaptation grating did not occur do not exhibit a marked reduced apparent duration.
15
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location.
This is the presupposition highlighted above that a model that accounts for
experiences of all modalities should also account for all experiences within a modality. Due to
this link one can offer a response by either dropping the assumption that there is a single model
that accounts for experience across and within all modalities, or by attempting to account for the
experiment by making the model sensitive to location, or amending the model so that it no
longer presupposes that there is a centralised stopwatch the measures time across different
modalities. We will consider only the latter two options.
Consider, first, the option in which the defender of the classic model jettisons the idea
that there is a centralised stopwatch that “measures” time across and within all modalities.
Instead, she could hold that there are many localised stopwatches, at least one for each modality,
and perhaps even different stopwatches for different hemifields. The classic models presuppose
that level A percepts from different sensory modalities are unified in the sense that they are
integrated to form a single experience. In other words, these models assume that at level A we
find unified experiences whose cross-modal features are bound together. For illustration,
suppose that there are two experiences at level A. The first of a tone and a flash: these are
experienced synchronically. The second experience, some moments later, is qualitatively
identical.
We might say, then, that there is a single, unified experience we can call
TONEFLASH1, and, later, another experience we can call TONEFLASH2. Thus it seems
plausible indeed that any classic model will hold that judgements about the duration between the
two tones, on the one hand, and the two flashes, on the other hand, will be the same: for the
temporal structure of the experiences on any classic model will have it that there is a single
duration between TONEFLASH1 and TONEFLASH2.
If, however, there are different stopwatches that measure the duration between the tones,
on the one hand, and the flashes, on the other, then the possibility emerges that the two
judgements will come apart: one might judge that the flashes are separated by duration D, and
the tones by duration D*. That, in turn, would seem to be inconsistent with the idea that there is
a single experience TONEFLASH1 and another, TONEFLASH2, and some determinate
duration between the experiences. But, at least at this stage of investigation, there seem to be a
number of options open to the defender of a classic model. She might suggest a hypothesis that
is open to further investigation. Namely, they might suggest that in cases where cross-modal
signals have been bound together into a single experience such as TONEFLASH1 duration
judgements about the duration between the two tones and the two flashes will be the same: the
binding process will override any conflicting data about duration coming in from the different
stopwatches, if there is any such conflicting data. Thus, the thought would be, there might be
20
different stopwatches that generate different duration judgements. But it will never be the case
that these judgements conflict where cross-modal binding has occurred because either the
different duration judgements will prevent the signals from being bound together in the first
place, or some further mechanism will allow the binding and thus trump the different duration
judgements generated by the different stopwatches. Thus a classic model developed in this way
may imply specific relations between bound unified experiences and duration judgments that
give rise to testable predictions and explanations.
If, however, defenders of the classic models find the above sketch to be too strong with
its claim that duration judgements of such cross-modal and bound percepts never conflict, can
they adopt the weaker position that subjects sometimes judge that the duration between the two
tones is different to that between the two flashes? Indeed, they can. Here’s one way in which
they can spell out this position.
Although subjects experience TONEFLASH1 and then
TONEFLASH2, there is no fact of the matter about the duration between the two experiences.
When asked to attend to the tones, subjects make one set of judgements, and when asked to
attend to the flashes, they make different judgements. That is, again, not something that any
classic model would have predicted given that the tone and flash are experienced synchronically
in TONEFLASH1 and then again in TONEFLASH2. Nevertheless, on the view we are
countenancing although there are temporal relations built into the experiences at level A, it may
sometimes be indeterminate the exact nature of those relations: it is determinate that
TONEFLASH1 comes before TONEFLASH2, and determinate that the duration is no more
than n and no less than n-, but the structure of level A does not afford a determinate duration
between the experiences. In other words, they appear to lack a precise metrical relation. That,
again, is an interesting finding the classic models can incorporate. Moreover, it is a testable
prediction that falls out of consideration of classic models in the light of new empirical data.
This discussion of the first option has been presented primarily in terms of modalities;
we presented ways in which the classic models may account for our running example of auditory
and visual percepts. However, the Johnston experiment indicates that there’s not just a problem
accounting for a difference in experiences across modalities or across visual hemifields. It shows
that in some cases the exact location of a visual percept is relevant to duration judgement. The
first alternative outlined seems extendable to the locations of such visual percepts and thus offers
a possible way to account for Johnston’s data. For example, one could hold that each potential
location in the visual field may be associated with a stopwatch and that there is usually some sort
of spatial and temporal binding that links together particular features of visual percepts.
However, even assuming that the binding aspect may be coherently spelled out, this general
21
strategy seems problematic: it suffers from a potential proliferation of stopwatches—there may
need to be one for every potential location of a percept in one’s visual field. Plus, the second
alternative sketch requires development at the A and B levels concerning how exactly we
demarcate cases in which determinate metric relations are experienced from those in which
indeterminate metric relations are experienced. Although much more could be said regarding
whether this proliferation is problematic and about the details of how to develop these
alternatives, we neither assess this general strategy nor further develop the outlines above.
Instead we only intend to show here how empirical results may impact classic models and that
it’s possible to modify classic models in light of such results.
Let’s turn to the other option according to which the classic models hangs onto the idea
that there is a centralised stopwatch that times all inputs from every modality and is sensitive to
features such as, in the case of visual signals, where the percept appears. To be sure, the fact that
location sensitivity is required turns out to be an interesting empirical finding, and one not
predicted by the classic models themselves. Nevertheless, that such features matter is not, in
itself, inconsistent with the classic models. The defender of a classic model will, presumably, say
that empirical evidence has shown that the relationship between the duration of events as they
occur at level C, and as they are experienced at level A, comes apart in an unpredicted way. In
turn, because the experience of duration between events at level A is not always accurate with
respect to the actual duration between those events due to some function of particular features
(such as the location of the percept), the classic models need to account for this difference by
incorporating such features.
This strategy is compatible with classic models; defenders of any classic model can point
out that it has never been part of their model that experiences at level A at all times and under all
conditions veridically track the events that occur at level C. Classic models have always allowed
that, in principle, there could be disparities between what is experienced, at level A, and what
occurs, at level C. Indeed, the defender of any classic model might well always have thought that
some features of experiences would turn out to be surprising given that she thought that some
aspects of experience cannot be determined entirely by introspection and a priori reasoning. It is
just that she could not, in advance, know which features would in fact be surprising.
A defender of classic models could provide an account in line with this second strategy
as follows. In view of Johnston’s empirical findings, the second strategy requires that we
suppose there to be a single stopwatch that is sensitive to the location of visual percepts. The
stopwatch can be generically sensitive to such features by regarding its ticking as contextdependent, where this ‘context-dependency’ is refined and spelled out via empirical
22
considerations. In effect, the defender of a classic model can attempt to supplement his model
with aspects of particular context-dependent clocks proposed in psychology. For example,
Johnston (2010, 194ff) himself develops a particular content-dependent clock. The rate at which it
ticks is dependent on contrast variation in the visual field. The classic model advocate could
incorporate Johnston’s positive account by considering this dependency on contrast in variation
to be a way in which the single clock’s ticking is context-dependent.
Through such
supplementation he can provide an account of the A level experience of subjects in Johnston’s
experiments as well as develop level B. So while we haven’t provided the details of Johnston’s
content-dependent clock here, it’s clear that it is at least prima facie compatible with classic
models.
Thus, we think, classic models are of use. Instead of abandoning them, they should be
modified, if possible, in light of experimental data. As we argue in the context of the next case
study, introspection is useful in providing an account of temporal experience. And, these models
can be regarded as offering general programmes that amalgamate the results of introspection.16
3.2.2 Case 2: The Wagon Wheel Effect
Lee (forthcoming) suggests that the question of whether experience is continuous or not is an
empirical one and is not to be answered via introspection. In what follows we present two
different views about the wagon wheel effect and examine their implications for Lee’s
suggestion.
The wagon wheel effect can be experienced when watching a movie that involves a
stagecoach speeding up or even a commercial with a car that has spokey hubcaps. As the vehicle
accelerates, its wheels appear to slow down and then rotate backwards. An explanation for this
effect appeals to the sequential presentation of discrete snapshots, e.g., the intermittent light
pulses of a projector. Each of these snapshots may not perfectly line up with the subsequent
image. To see why, consider a particular spoke on one of its wheels wheel, and call the end of
this spoke ‘A’. The first snapshot may depict this spoke as horizontal, the second snapshot as
vertical, and the third horizontal. As the wheel speeds up, the spoke will occupy other positions
in the sequence of snapshots.
Consider the following series in which A moves 85° from its position in the previous
snapshot.
For an example of how classic models may offer a general programme for empirical study, see recent
work in neurophenomenology. Some of it, e.g., van Gelder (1996), Valera (1996) uses cognitive science to
investigate and develop a Husserlian retentionist model. For overviews of this programme, see Grush
(2006) and Gallagher (2012).
16
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Figure 9: The Wagon Wheel Effect
Suppose that our wagon is moving such that the wheels turn in a clockwise direction, which is
depicted by the series labelled ‘Actual Motion’ in Fig. 9. We interpret the wheel as moving
counter-clockwise in this case because the displacement of the spoke in the clockwise direction is
much larger than in the opposite direction. In other words, there is only a 5° difference between
the position of spoke end labelled B at t2 and that of A at t1, yet there is an 85° difference
between A’s positions at t1 and t2. So given the shorter displacement of the particular spokes in
the counter-clockwise direction, we identify the top spoke end at t2 with A, rather than with B,
and thus interpret the wheel’s motion as reversed. Of course, focusing on two snapshots at
indeterminate intervals is not enough to generate this effect: a longer sequence is needed at a
rapid pace. However, we hope this makes clear how such discrete spokes may be interpreted
such as to have a reverse motion. See Purves et al. (1996, 3694) for a more detailed explanation.
Nevertheless, as Purves et al. (1996) demonstrated, this effect can be generated without
periodically presented images on a theatre’s screen or video monitor: they used an aluminium
disk to generate the effect. As in the psychological literature, we refer to this effect as being
generated under continuous illumination.
There are two main views taken in recent psychological literature concerning how the
effect is generated under continuous illumination. One stance, which is advocated by Purves et
al. (1996), Andrews et al. (2005) and VanRullen et al. (2005), claims that our visual system
mirrors that of a movie projector: the visual system processes sensory information in discrete
snapshots. Thus, this position can appeal to the explanation of the movie-version of the wagon
wheel effect in giving an account of the effect under continuous illumination.
The other view is advocated by Kline et al. (2004) who hold that we process sensory
information in continuous, rather than discrete, samples. To support this claim they make
24
reference to four differences, which are highlighted by Purves et al. (1996), between the theatre
version of the effect and the continuous illumination version. They experimentally support three
of these differences and argue that the two effects are not deeply analogous: “the two effects
represent vastly different aspects of visual perception” (2004, 2654). However, in adopting this
position, they must offer a different account of the continuous illumination version of the wagon
wheel effect. They do so by appealing to Reichardt-based motion detectors, which, they claim,
are spuriously activated: these motion detectors can signal motion in one direction even though
they were stimulated by a periodic pattern with motion in the opposite direction. Thus, the
continuously illuminated wagon wheel effect is reasoned to be the result of such spuriously
activated detectors.
We do not aim to summarize the arguments and experiments used to support these two
positions. Instead, we present the two sides in this debate to make a point about the sort of
methodology that needs to be used in formulating models of temporal phenomenology.
In
particular, we take this case to highlight the need to incorporate armchair analysis and to use
empirical data systematically such that the cherry-picking of particular empirical accounts is
avoided.
Let’s return to Lee. In a quick paragraph Lee argues that in order to discover whether
experience is discrete or continuous we need to empirically determine the temporal structure of
neural states rather than search for gaps introspectively, where a gappy experience is taken to be
an experience that comes in discrete bursts that are separated in time from each other.17 Lee
claims that it is not clear that a gappy structure would be apparent through introspection. He
reasons that to introspectively determine this, we would require some sort of higher-order
monitoring of our first order experiences. And this higher-order monitoring needs to be
sensitive to gaps. He conjectures that we may lack such a capacity. From this consideration, he
draws this ‘moral’: “[T]o discover whether experience is discretely gappy, we need to figure out
empirically what the temporal structure of neural states underwriting experience is, not search for
gaps introspectively” (forthcoming, 10).
Although we agree that empirical information needs to inform our modelling, we
disagree that, even in this case, introspection is useless. First, there clearly appears to be some sort
of phenomenal continuity to experience. And, unless one takes some sort of error theory stance
on this experienced continuity, one must offer some account of it.
It is only through
introspection that we know that people judge that their experiences are continuous. That leaves
open two possibilities: the experiences themselves really are continuous and that is why they are
17
This definition appears to parallel that of VanRullen.
25
judged to be so, or the experiences themselves are not continuous yet that the appearance as of
their continuity is somehow generated. If empirical data suggests that the former is not the case,
then introspection gives us reason to try and determine in virtue of what the appearance is
generated. Thus Lee’s moral does not follow from his speculative claim about the possibility of
higher-order monitoring. Although it offers a plausible story as to why, contra introspection, our
apparently continuous experience may actually be gappy, it does not show that introspective
enquiry should be abandoned in favour of empirical enquiry. At best it offers a means for
antirealists about continuity to account for our apparent non-gappy experiences. Indeed, in
general introspection will play an important role in making salient certain apparent features of
our experience, features that should be accounted for in any model of temporal phenomenology.
That said, we, along with Lee, hold that this enquiry would benefit from being
empirically informed in a systematic fashion. Given that there are two main positions, one might
regard Crick and Koch (2003) as cherry-picking a particular one of those positions from the
psychological literature—in this case the view that experiences are discrete—in order to make
their cinematic antirealism seem strongly supported by empirical evidence. However, since there
is a rival empirically supported position, an extensionalist or realist retentionalist could
supplement their view with the position defended by Kline et al. (2004) according to which our
experiences are continuous. In either case this would involve choosing some narrow range of
empirical studies and, as it were, hitching one’s philosophical wagon to those studies. We think,
however, that a more systematic survey of the literature would show that both views have some
empirical support. Moreover, it may point the way to either (a) further models that are consistent
with both sets of empirical data or (b) further studies that will, more decisively, determine which
of the models is correct.
To be sure, the relative paucity of empirical data on either side of the debate should warn
theorists of both stripes not to over-sell what small amounts of data there are by suggesting that
it strongly supports their own particular theory. More than that, however, the relative lack of
empirical data makes it difficult to see how an entirely bottom-up approach (even if this were in
principle desirable, which we doubt) could in practice succeed. The question as to whether we
process information in continuous or discrete samples remains unsettled even at the empirical
level. Thus if we were to build models from the bottom up such models would be built on
unsteady foundations: the empirical uncertainties to which we alluded, among them. That is why
we suggest combining the use of classic models with empirical data, the latter informing the
former, but the former providing both a framework within which to understand and evaluate
existing empirical data and to by which to frame further empirical research. .
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3.3 Implications for a Viable Methodology
The preceding discussions illustrate the inadequacies of the entirely top-down and bottom-up
approaches. The top-down approach primarily uses introspection and armchair analysis to
develop and critique its classic models. However, in view of our discussion of psychological
models of duration judgments, it seems that such models are problematically crude. If Johnston
is right then our duration judgements depend upon where exactly something is perceived. This
highlights the need to take empirical evidence into account and, if necessary, modify the model
to account for such evidence.
The bottom-up approach attempts to use cognitive science as its means for developing
models of our experience. In effectively abandoning classic models, however, it may create a
problematic gap between our phenomenal experience and some lower-level description of our
experience. Moreover, as highlighted with the continuous and discrete accounts of the wagon
wheel effect, certain key features at the empirical level remain unsettled. Without more stable
foundations, it’s unclear whether a strictly bottom-up approach is viable.
In view of these problems with the two extreme approaches, we advocate an approach
that falls between these extremes. Like the bottom-up approach, we consider it important to
incorporate empirical data systemically. However, this does not entail that we should abandon
the classic models and the use of introspection and armchair analysis. Empirical evidence can
and should inform classic models. If the implication of Johnston’s experiment is as we suggest,
then classic models, if they are to remain viable, need to offer some account along one of the
lines that we outline above. So this case exemplifies how empirical evidence offers a means of
critiquing and developing classic models. However, as highlighted by the use of Kline’s discrete
account of the effect to support a cinematic model, we must be careful to avoid cherry-picking
particular empirical accounts when incorporating empirical.
We propose the following methodology in terms of our schema’s levels. Features at level
B are to be primarily investigated empirically. The issue of whether realism or antirealism is true
should be investigated through armchair reasoning. Finally, a combination of introspection and
empirical investigation should be used to investigate Level A and the relations amongst levels.
However, in order to maintain the coherency of the model and to avoid cherry-picking, the
investigation of level A needs to be systematic.
More, of course, needs to be said about how such investigation should be carried out in a
systematic fashion. In addition to suggesting that one needs to do more thorough reviews of the
literature within and across sub-disciplines in psychology and related fields, we think that the
27
ways in which one might modify the classic models in response to empirical data, as suggested
above in our discussion of internal clock models, provides a nice example of the methodology at
work. As we saw in that case, attempts to modify any particular classic model in the light of
empirical data can generate novel testable hypotheses. Thus the use of classic models in the
investigation can facilitate a systematic enquiry that actively integrates empirical data; because the
classic models serve as general frameworks in which empirical models and data may be slotted,
they offer a source of systemization in the investigation.
4 Conclusion
The three-level classificatory schema provides the means for a comprehensive cataloguing of the
diverse extant models. More importantly, it provides a set of four distinct models. The mere
delineation of these models makes clear where there is room for development. For example,
versions of non-atomic extensionalism based on classic models could be further developed by
offering more details about level B—more in the sense of not merely giving B a functional role.
Additionally, with this schema we make salient a particular model, atomic extensionalism, that
has not been explored in the literature.
Furthermore, the schema allows us schematically to assess ways empirical data and
armchair analysis may be used to examine the levels and the relations among them. In turn, we
are in a better position to evaluate different methodologies used to develop models. Due to the
problems with Lee’s bottom-up approach, which tries to do without introspective enquiry, and a
pre-dominantly top-down approach, which is largely insensitive to empirical findings, an
approach that incorporates both empirical and introspective enquires should be used. We’ve
spelled out this approach above in terms of a division of labour between level B tasks, which
should be undertaken using cognitive science, and level A tasks, which should be undertaken by
appealing to phenomenal and empirical enquiry.
And, although we foresee that empirical evidence may significantly modify classic models
these models are still of use: they offer a starting point for empirical enquiry by placing key
features of our experience into coherent models. Plus, they offer general frameworks in which
particular empirical models may be slotted and that potentially have testable consequences. In
view of these considerations we find that a successful examination of temporal experience needs
to integrate systematically armchair analysis and empirical evidence.
Acknowledgements
28
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