M. Philp, The definition of corruption 22.11.2011 The key elements of a definition of corruption are: A conception of public office with rules and norms for the conduct of that office – the office being defined partly in terms of a broader public interest that it serves, which may run against the personal interests of the office-holder or against interests that are deemed illegitimate but are not strictly personal. A view that corruption involves the distortion or subversion of the exercise of public office so that it meets private, partisan or sectional rather than public interests - so that some people gain who should not and some lose who should not. The idea that three actors are normally involved in or affected by corrupt activity: the occupant of the public office (A), the intended beneficiary of that office (B); and the actual (ie., newly intended) beneficiary of the particular exercise of that office (C).1 This triadic relation does not always hold (in a kleptocracy, for example, A and C are the same; whereas with administrative payments B and C may be identical, although A also gains) but the identification of three distinct roles – the occupant of public office, the intended beneficiary, and the actual beneficiary encourages us to distinguish common theft or fraud from corruption, and helps capture how corruption distorts the exercise of public office and power. Combining these elements we can arrive at a suitably tentative definition: Corruption in politics occurs where a public official (A), acting in ways that violate the rules and norms of office and that involve personal, partisan or sectional gain, to the (intended) detriment of the interests of the public (B)2 (or some sub-section thereof) who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/or a third party (C) who rewards or otherwise incentivises A to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise obtain. Recent discussions and publications relating to political corruption include: Political Conduct, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 2007 ‘Delimiting Political Accountability’ Political Studies (2009), 54, 1, pp. 28-53 ‘Peacebuilding and Corruption’ in International Peacekeeping 15(3) June 2008, pp. 310-27 ‘Corruption, definition and Measurement –in Measuring Corruption ed C Sampford, A Shacklock, C. Connors and F Galtung (Ashgate, 2006) pp. 45-56. ‘Modelling Political Corruption in Transition’ in Political Corruption ed., Von Allerman (Verlag, 2005) 'Political Corruption, Democratization and Reform' in S. Kotkin and A Sajo eds., Political Corruption (Budapest, Central European University Press, 2003). 'Access, Accountability, and Authority: Corruption and the Democratic Process' Crime, Law and Social Change 36 (4) 357-77 (2001) 'Defining Political Corruption' Political Studies (1997), XLV, 436-62. Section 2 reprinted in the 3rd edition of Political Corruption ed., Heidenheimer and Johnson, (New York, Transaction Press, 2003) Since a misfiring of a corrupt intent still has the character of a corrupt act – so if A tries to ensure that C rather than B benefits, that creates the corruption of the process, even if A fails. 2 Corrupt acts may not always harm, or directly harm, B. Moreover, the point is not that we define corruption solely by its consequences, so much as that we define it by a combination of intention and the distortion of political processes. So if by accident, A’s corrupt relation with C benefits B but it is still corrupt. Moreover, even if A does not intend to harm B (or withhold a benefit from B), B’s interests are taken to include a procedural interest in the rules of the political system being upheld. 1 1