To: Dr. Stowers
From: Sasha Jetton
Subject: A Different Kind of Partnership
Date: February 23, 2013
Summary:
In the 1990’s the United Kingdom of Ministry of Defense (MOD) attempted to merge the
supporting human resources systems of its three branches of military: The Army, Royal Navy
(RN), and the Royal Air Force (RAF). The three HR systems commonly referred to as the
“legacy” systems were aging and lagged far behind the 21st Century. By combining the human
resource supporting services, MOD would have one HR supporting system that would
potentially be more efficient and cost effective. This early attempt failed, but MOD launched a
more successful campaign in 2007. The merger created the Joint Personnel Administration
(JPA) and utilized a commercial off-the-shelf software package (COTS) to run the joint system.
The consolidation was designed to launch communications between the three branches,
achieve a higher level of efficiency, and redirect the potential savings to military services. In the
development of this project, MOD established a public-private partnership with Electronic Data
Systems (EDS), an IT company, to oversee and organize the consolidation. In the process of
developing the HR supporting systems, MOD and EDS had a problem addressing the right
problem, developing a clear structure and strategy, and preparing all of the branches for the
sweeping organizational change.
Issue 1: Addressing the right problem
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004), argue that by utilizing a network approach to problem
solving the parties involved are mutually dependent for their goals and achievements. This
collaboration can establish an environment that is naturally strategic and allows partnerships to
address problems accordingly. Therefore, the resulting policy is developed deliberately and
with clear understanding of the existing or unforeseen problems.
In 1997, MOD attempted to consolidate the HR supporting services by forming the
Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA) led by Trevor Spires. The team consisted of
mainly civilians who had worked administrating individual HR service systems in the past. Most
of its members were IT specialists and software engineers. In which case, the team approached
the consolidation from an IT perspective and failed to address any other issues that may arise
during the process. Since there were many undefined problems in the first stage, the
consolidation failed. In 2001, MOD and EDS renegotiated, but the problem was still poorly
defined and the partnership found it difficult to harmonize the three systems.
In order for MOD to be more successful in future public-private partnerships, it should
be able to define the nature and the root of the problems. Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) argue
that a program’s success or failure often depends on whether or not challenges are met with a
clear understanding of the existing problems. While it is difficult to address all of the problems,
government needs to clearly communicate and work with those partnering to achieve the
outlined goals. Any conflict or miscommunication can jeopardize the goal of the partnership.
Issue 2: Lack of Strategy and Structure
MOD and EDS assumed that all three systems were very similar, which led them to
believe that a “generic pay engine” for all three services would be cost efficient. In 1997, they
decided that the generic engine should be completed in two years. Both MOD and EDS failed to
realize that each system varied significantly. There was not much knowledge about the
differences in the HR practices, but it became clear that a single generic system would not work
for the three branches. Therefore, EDS informed MOD that they could not fulfill their contract.
Structure provides the outline for the work of organizations (Hill & Lynn, 2009). By not
completely defining the problem, the public managers in this case did not adhere to the
structural dimensions of their environment. In the first attempt, MOD failed to set forth the
criteria by which the partnership would be deemed a success or failure. As a result, the
contract was mismanaged and the collaboration failed. Hill & Lynn (2009) argue that the public
manager should understand how much of the project will be handled by the contracted
partner. MOD leadership failed to communicate their needs appropriately and this led to
slowing of the process. In 2001, MOD and EDS put together several work groups to work on
harmonization across a number of areas and they agreed to renegotiate their contract.
In the second attempt, the plan was much more strategic and forthcoming. It is
important for public managers to think strategically and consistently (Hill & Lynn, 2009). MOD
and EDS began to be more concerned with the long-term goals of the project. Both EDS and
MOD began to feel committed to the project and trusted one another to move forward with
collaboration. While the project was not perfect, the relationship between MOD and EDS
formulated around a common theme –partnership.
Issue 3: Sweeping Organizational Change
Hill & Lynn (2009) argue that sweeping changes may affect culture, as the organization
adjusts to incorporate new ways of organizing work. MOD is introducing a major organizational
and cultural change that potentially could have created resistance. The employees were not
informed and given the opportunity to be active participants in the process. Organizational
theory places an emphasis on how the individuals within an organization interact, and defines
the division of labor based on capacities, skills, and expertise. Other than upper management,
MOD leadership did not attempt to utilize the expertise of its staff members. RAF received the
first rollout and the organization was not prepared for the sweeping change. The RAF problems
created hesitance within the RN and the Army, but MOD moved forward with JPA. It is
important to understand employees’ reactions to sweeping change.
Ott, Parkes, & Simpson (2008) argue that changing the organizational structure alters
the norms, realities, beliefs, and values of an organization. The transition to RN and the Army
went smoothly, but there were winners and losers. Prior to the consolidation, each branch had
separate systems for pay allowances. Once consolidated, one system was used to identify and
distribute the allowances to its staff. This led to some reduction in pay for a number of military
personnel and created resentment towards JPA. Employees were relatively comfortable with
the old system and the new system forced them to handle their personnel issues through an
online self-service application. This sweeping organizational change created challenges within
the ranks, but did lead to some cost saving outcomes. JPA was able to reduce the number of
unit-based HR specialists, which led to a reduction in duplicate costs. Overall, the new system
was successful, but not without sweeping organizational change and some resistance from
staff.
References
Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W.D. (2004). Governing by network: The new shape of the public sector.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
Hill, C.J., & Lynn Jr, L.E. (2009). Public management: A three-dimensional approach.
Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Ott, S.J., Parkes, S.J., & Simpson, R.B. (2008). Classic readings in organizational behavior.
(Fourth ed.). Belmont, California: Thomson Higher Education.