CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES
AND PRECURSORS
KEY POINTS

Despite a decrease in the number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally, the
757 laboratories detected in 2012–13 is the second highest number in the last decade.

The majority of clandestine laboratories continue to be detected in residential areas;
however detections in commercial/industrial locations increased in 2012–13.

The greatest proportion of laboratories continue to be addict-based; however, the
proportion attributed to laboratories of other sizes almost doubled in 2012–13.

While the weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) and MDMA precursor detections at the
Australian border decreased in 2012–13, the number of detections increased and is the
highest reported in the last decade.
MAIN FORMS
Clandestine laboratories produce illegal substances using a variety of chemicals and
manufacturing processes. Commonly referred to as ‘clan labs’, clandestine laboratories
range from crude, makeshift operations using simple processes to highly sophisticated
operations using technically advanced facilities and equipment. Regardless of their level of
sophistication or size, clandestine laboratories pose significant risks to the community as a
consequence of the corrosive and hazardous nature of the chemicals used (AFP 2012;
NCCEH 2012).
Drug manufacture carried out in clandestine laboratories may involve any or all of the
following processes:
 Extraction—Raw materials are extracted using chemical solvents to produce a finished
illicit drug. Examples of extraction include precursor chemicals extracted from
pharmaceutical preparations,1 cannabis oil extracted from cannabis or morphine
extracted from opium.
 Conversion—Raw or unrefined drug products are altered into a more sought-after
product by altering the chemical form. Examples include converting cocaine base into
cocaine hydrochloride or methylamphetamine base into crystalline methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.
 Synthesis—Raw materials are combined, and react under specific conditions to create
the finished product through various chemical processes. Examples include
methylamphetamine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, commonly known
as ‘ecstasy’) and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).
 Tableting—Final products are converted into dosage units. An example is pressing
MDMA powder into tablet form.
1
Such as pseudoephedrine from cold and flu products.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
148
There are three types of substances used in illicit drug manufacture:
 Precursors—Considered to be the starting materials for illicit drug manufacture. As a
result of chemical reactions, the precursor’s molecular structure is modified to produce a
specific illicit drug. For example, precursors such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
can be converted into methylamphetamine.
 Reagents—Substances used to cause a chemical reaction that modifies the precursor’s
molecular structure. For example, when hydriodic acid and red phosphorous are mixed
with the precursors ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, the resulting compound is
methylamphetamine.
 Solvents—Added to the chemical mixture to ensure effective mixing by dissolving
precursors and reagents, diluting the reaction mixtures, and separating and purifying
other chemicals. For example, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone and acetone are used in
cocaine production (APAIC 2012; INCB 2012).
Globally, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are the most common illicit drugs
manufactured in clandestine laboratories. In Australia, pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are
the most common precursors used in the manufacture of ATS. Safrole, isosafrole, piperonal
and 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MDP2P)2 are principal precursors used in the
manufacture of MDMA (EMCDDA 2011; UNODC 2013a).
Many legitimate industrial chemicals are used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. This creates
a challenge for government and law enforcement in preventing the diversion of these
chemicals from legitimate commerce to illicit drug manufacture. Precursor controls seek to
stop the diversion of precursors to illicit markets, while maintaing access to these chemicals
by legitimate industry.
In 2007, the Australian Government funded the national roll-out of Project STOP, an initiative
aimed at reducing the diversion of pharmaceutical products containing pseudoephedrine to
the illicit drug manufacturing market. As of 30 June 2013, 79.4 per cent of approved
community pharmacies were registered with Project STOP, compared with 79.2 per cent at
30 June 2012.
Internationally, cohesive chemical control strategies play a key role in controlling percursors
due to the global nature of illicit drug precursor manufacture. The Asian Collaborative Group
on Local Precursor Control (ACoG), the South Pacific Precursor Control Forum (SPPCF)
and other regional precursor-control capability forums are regional forums which provide
Australia with an opportunity to inform and respond to illicit drug trafficking and precursor
diversion (AFP 2013a).
In March 2012, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) launched the Precursors
Incident Communication System (PICS), aimed at stemming the flow of precursor chemicals
diverted from domestic distribution channels. In response to precursor controls, producers of
ATS may move to the use of ‘pre-precursors’ or ‘masked precursors’—essential noncontrolled chemicals that can be converted into precursor chemicals3 (EMCDDA 2013;
INCB 2012; UNODC 2013a).
2
Also known as PMK.
For example, alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN) can be converted into phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) to
manufacture ATS.
3
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149
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
Globally, ATS manufacture has increased and expanded. The 2013 World Drug Report
indicates increased manufacture in Europe, Asia, Central America and Africa. During 2012,
ATS manufacture continued to expand in Europe, with first-time clandestine laboratory
detections in regions of Poland and the Russian Federation (BINLEA 2013; UNODC 2013b).
The 2013 World Drug Report indicates that East and South-East Asia are the largest ATS
markets internationally, with the ‘Golden Triangle’4 remaining a major ATS production and
trafficking hub (UNODC 2013b). According to media reporting, Thai authorities estimate at
least 1.4 billion ATS tablets are being produced in the Golden Triangle each year, mainly in
the Shan State of Burma (Daily Times 2013). Media sources also report in August 2012 that
347 kilograms of methylamphetamine was seized at an illicit drug production plant in Burma,
on the Chinese-Burma border (Xinhua 2012).
While the Golden Triangle is the primary region for global ATS production, during 2012–13
the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (BINLEA) reported large
scale ATS manufacture in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. BINLEA also
reported the 2012 detection of a dual methylamphetamine/MDMA clandestine laboratory in
Phnom Penh, along with more than 3 000 litres of safrole oil allegedly smuggled from
Thailand and pseudoephedrine-based medication from Vietnam (BINLEA 2013).
According to BINLEA reporting, clandestine laboratories in Burma’s Shan State are
producing large quantities of ATS using precursors sourced from Bangladesh, China, Laos,
India, and Thailand. Since 2010, seizures of pseudoephedrine have increased in Burma,
with almost 3 tonnes seized in the first nine months of 2012. Additionally, two operations
seized 1.8 million and 8.7 million methylamphetamine tablets respectively (BINLEA 2013).
China and India remain the world’s largest licit producers and exporters of precursor
chemicals. China and India are targeted as primary source countries for precursor chemicals
due to the domestic regulatory framework and proximity to illicit drug manufacturing regions.
While China has made legislative and administrative changes to prevent the diversion of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—the two most common chemicals used to produce
methylamphetamine—it remains a major source of these precursors (BINLEA 2013).
The BINLEA report indicates that in Mexico, importations of precursor chemicals are
increasing, along with methylamphetamine production. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,
which is illegally transported to Mexico, is primarily sourced from China, India and
Bangladesh. Following tightened legislative controls on methylamphetamine precursor
chemicals, authorities now believe that Mexican producers are importing non-scheduled
precursor chemicals to manufacture methylamphetamine using alternative methods
(BINLEA 2013).
According to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, attempted large
importations of precursors into Mexico included methylamine, monomethylamine and
phenyl acetic acid (PAA). The majority of these precursors were sourced from China, and to
a lesser degree, Eastern European and Asian countries. Examples include the Mexican
Government’s seizure of 96 237 litres and 34.7 tonnes of PAA, as well as 47.5 tonnes of
methylamine in September 2012. Furthermore, in 2012 three major shipments of Chinese
origin totalling 262 tonnes of the pre-precursor monomethylamine—used to manufacture
ephedrine—were seized in Mexican ports (BINLEA 2013).
4
The ‘Golden Triangle’ comprises the border regions of Burma, Thailand and Laos.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
150
According to open source reporting, while organised crime groups have traditionally used
West Africa as a transit route for cocaine and heroin, they are increasingly trafficking
methylamphetamine—which is cheaper, easier and more profitable to produce and transport
(Africa Report 2013). The 2013 Threat Assessment of Transnational Organised Crime in
West Africa reported that methylamphetamine manufactured in West Africa is primarily
trafficked into East Asia, and to a lesser extent South Africa. While the current income from
trafficking methylamphetamine to East Asia is high, competition from producers located in
the destination markets could limit any long-term market for West-African manufactured
methylamphetamine (UNODC 2013c).
In April 2013, the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian National Narcotic Control
Board initiated a joint agency operation to target an organised crime syndicate with the
potential to import commercial quantities of safrole. As a result of the operation, authorities
seized 300 litres of pure safrole in Indonesia. It is alleged that the Indonesian national
arrested was responsible for the distribution of an estimated 200 litres of safrole oil per
month to persons in Australia, Canada, United States, Holland and New Zealand
(AFP 2013b).
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
151
DOMESTIC TRENDS
AUSTRALIAN BORDER SITUATION
In recognition of ATS being the dominant illicit drug manufactured in Australian clandestine
laboratories, border detection data will focus on ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor and
MDMA precursor detections. In 2012–13, ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor border
detections included ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. MDMA precursor border detections
included safrole, piperonal, and 3,4-MDP2P.
In the last decade, both the number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor border
detections have fluctuated. In 2012–13, the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor
detections increased by 11.3 per cent, from 937 in 2011–12 to 1 043 in 2012–13, the highest
number of detections in the last decade. While the total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA)
detections decreased by 2.5 per cent, from 1 744.6 kilograms in 2011–12 to
1 700.4 kilograms in 2012–13, it is the third highest detection weight in the last decade
(see Figure 72).
FIGURE 72: Number and weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border,
2003–04 to 2012–13 (Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
Weight
2100
Number
1200
1800
1000
800
1200
600
900
Number
Weight (kg)
1500
400
600
200
300
2012–13
2011–12
2010–11
2009–10
2008–09
2007–08
2006–07
2005–06
2004–05
0
2003–04
0
In 2012–13, there were 471 ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections weighing more
than 1 kilogram each. These detections accounted for 96.7 per cent of the total weight of
ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor chemical detections, totalling 1 644.5 kilograms.
Since 2003–04, the number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border has
remained low. The number of MDMA precursor detections increased from 9 in 2011–12 to
12 in 2012–13, the highest number of detections in the last decade. Over the last decade,
the quantity of MDMA precursor detections has fluctuated, with the total weight of detections
exceeding 1 kilogram in only five reporting periods. In 2012–13, 7.98 kilograms of MDMA
precursors were detected at the border. In 2011–12, 240 litres of safrole was detected
(see Figure 73).
In 2012–13, there were 7 detections of safrole, which accounted for almost 100 per cent of
the total weight of MDMA precursor detections. In addition to these 7 detections, there was
1 detection of piperonal and 4 detections of 3,4-MDP2P.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
152
FIGURE 73: Number and weight/litresa of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border,
2003–04 to 2012–13 (Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
14
4
500
2
0
0
2012–13
1000
2011–12
6
2010–11
1500
2009–10
8
2008–09
2000
2007–08
10
2006–07
2500
2005–06
12
2004–05
3000
2003–04
Weight (kg) / Litres
Number
Number
Weight (kg) / Litres
3500
a. Significant detections of MDMA precursors occur in both litres and kilograms. As this figure reflects two units of
measurement, it is necessary to refer to comment on ‘Significant Border Detections’ for individual reporting periods to
determine the related unit of measurement.
SIGNIFICANT BORDER DETECTIONS
Significant border detections of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors in 2012–13 include:
 33 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected in June 2013, in metal hammock frames, via
sea cargo from Vietnam to Sydney

21 kilograms of ephedrine detected in March 2013, in a metal cabinet, via sea cargo
from India to Sydney

20.8 kilograms of pseudoephedrine detected in October 2012, concealed in 30 imported
cartons of rubber tubing, via sea cargo from China to Sydney

20 kilograms of pseudoephedrine crystals detected in March 2013, concealed within
tiles, via air cargo from Hong Kong to Sydney

19.0 kilograms of ephedrine detected in October 2012, concealed in packets of
breadcrumbs and coffee, via the air passenger stream from Vietnam to Sydney.
The 5 detections listed above have a combined weight of 113.8 kilograms and account for
6.7 per cent of the total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursors detected at the
Australian border in 2012–13.
Significant border detections of MDMA precursors in 2012–13 include:
 2 kilograms of safrole detected in March 2013, concealed in bottles of patchouli oil, via
air cargo from Indonesia to Perth

2 kilograms of safrole detected in April 2013, concealed in bottles of patchouli oil, via air
cargo from Indonesia to Brisbane

1.07 kilograms of safrole detected in June 2013, concealed in patchouli oil, via air cargo
from Indonesia to Brisbane.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
153
The 3 detections listed above have a combined weight of 5.07 kilograms and account for
63.5 per cent of the total weight of MDMA precursors detected at the Australian border in
2012–13.
IMPORTATION METHODS
In 2012–13, parcel post accounted for 51.1 per cent of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor
detections by number. This was followed by air cargo, which accounted for 30.8 per cent
(see Figure 74).
FIGURE 74: Number of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, as a
proportion of total detections, by method of importation, 2012–13
(Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
Air cargo (30.8%)
Air passenger/crew (16.0%)
Parcel post (51.1%)
Sea cargo (2.1%)
In terms of weight, the air cargo stream accounted for 53.4 per cent of the total weight of
ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections during 2012–13, while parcel post accounted
for 28.4 per cent (see Figure 75). The largest single ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor
detection in 2012–13 was a 33 kilogram sea cargo detection.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
154
FIGURE 75: Weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections at the Australian border, as a
proportion of total weight, by method of importation, 2012–13
(Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
Air cargo (53.4%)
Air passenger/crew (12.7%)
Parcel post (28.4%)
Sea cargo (5.5%)
In 2012–13, parcel post accounted for 50.0 per cent of MDMA precursor detections by
number. This was followed by air cargo, which accounted for 41.7 per cent (see Figures 76).
FIGURE 76: Number of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total
detections, by method of importation, 2012–13
(Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
Air cargo (41.7%)
Air passenger/crew (8.3%)
Parcel post (50.0%)
In terms of weight, the air cargo stream accounted for 86.1 per cent of the total weight of
MDMA precursor detections in 2012–13, while parcel post accounted for 12.6 per cent
(see Figure 77).
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
155
FIGURE 77: Weight of MDMA precursor detections at the Australian border, as a proportion of total
weight, by method of importation, 2012–13 (Source: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service)
Air cargo (86.1%)
Air passenger/crew (1.3%)
Parcel post (12.6%)
EMBARKATION POINTS
In 2012–13, 38 embarkation points were identified for ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor
detections at the Australian border, an increase from 36 countries in 2011–12. China was
the prominent embarkation point, accounting for 25.1 per cent of the total number and
41.2 per cent of the total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) precursor detections.
In 2012–13, Indonesia was the prominent embarkation point for MDMA precursor detections,
accounting for 5 of the 12 detections by number, and the top 3 detections by weight.
TABLET PRESS DETECTIONS
On 1 March 2010, tablet presses became a prohibited import in accordance with the
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (AGD 2010, AG 2012). In 2012–13, there
were 28 detections at the Australian border, an increase from the 20 detections in 2011–12.
In 2012–13, China was the prominent embarkation point for tablet press detections at the
Australian border, followed by Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. Of the 28 detections,
19 were tablet press parts and 9 were whole machines. Of these, 17 were detected in sea
cargo, 8 in air cargo and 3 in parcel post. The 17 sea cargo detections consisted of 1 whole
tablet press and 16 separate parts detections.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
156
DOMESTIC MARKET INDICATORS
The number of clandestine laboratory detections is not indicative of production output, which
is calculated using a number of variables including size of reaction vessels, amount and type
of precursor chemicals used, the skill of people involved and the method of manufacture.
Regardless of their size, the residual contamination arising from illicit drugs manufacture
presents a serious risk to humans and the environment. In 2011, the Australian Government
launched the Clandestine Drug Laboratory Remediation Guidelines in recognition of the
hazardous nature of clandestine laboratories (AGD 2011).
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY DETECTIONS
The number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally has more than doubled over the
last decade, increasing from 358 in 2003–04 to 757 in 2012–13. The 6.4 per cent decrease
in the number of clandestine laboratories detected in Australia, from 809 in 2011–12 to
757 in 2012–13, is the first decrease since 2006–07. Despite this decrease, it is still the
second highest number of detections on record (see Figure 78).
FIGURE 78: National clandestine laboratory detections, 2003–04 to 2012–13
900
800
700
Number
600
500
400
300
200
100
2012–13
2011–12
2010–11
2009–10
2008–09
2007–08
2006–07
2005–06
2004–05
2003–04
0
New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory were the only states and territory to
report an increase in the number of clandestine laboratories detected in 2012–13 (see
Table 36). Although the number of clandestine laboratories detected in Queensland
decreased by 12.9 per cent from 379 in 2011–12 to 330 in 2012–13, it continues to account
for the highest proportion of national clandestine laboratory detections.
New South Wales reported the greatest percentage increase in clandestine laboratory
detections, with the 105 detections in 2012–13 the highest number of detections for that
state in the last decade. Clandestine laboratory detections in Victoria increased from 99 in
2011–12 to 113 in 2012–13, the highest number of detections for that state, which also
reported 113 detections in 2009–10. While the number of clandestine laboratories detected
in Western Australia has continued to decrease since 2010–11, it accounted for the second
highest proportion of national clandestine laboratory detections in 2012–13 (see Table 36).
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
157
TABLE 36: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by state and territory, 2003–04 to 2012–13
Year
NSW
Vic
Qld
SA
WA
Tas
NT
ACT
Total
2003–04
61
20
189
48
33
1
6
0
358
2004–05
45
31
209
25
44
3
21
3
381
2005–06
55
47
161
50
58
5
12
2
390
2006–07
49
72
132
51
37
9
1
5
356
2007–08
51
76
121
69
30
2
1
6
356
2008–09
67
84
148
65
78
0
7
0
449
2009–10
82
113
297
71
118
1
12
0
694
2010–11
87
63
293
75
171
11
2
1
703
2011–12
90
99
379
58
160
15
7
1
809
2012–13
105
113
330
56
136
9
8
0
757
SIZE AND PRODUCTION CAPACITY
There is currently no recognised standard, either in Australia or internationally, for measuring
the size or production capacity of clandestine laboratories. In 2012–13, state and territory
police services were asked to provide an indication of size and production capacity of
detected laboratories using categories provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime for the World Drug Report. Full definitions for the four categories—addict-based, other
small-scale, medium sized and industrial scale—are provided in the Statistics chapter.
In 2012–13, clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based
laboratories, which typically use only basic equipment and simple procedures to
manufacture less than 50 grams per production cycle, through to industrial scale
laboratories, using oversized equipment and which typically manufacture 50 kilograms or
more per production cycle.
During this reporting period, for those able to be categorised, the majority of detected
clandestine laboratories were addict-based laboratories.5 However, the proportion of
laboratories attributed to other small-scale, medium sized and industrial scale laboratories
increased, reflecting increases in the sophistication and/or size of detected laboratories. The
proportion of industrial scale laboratories detected nationally increased from 2.7 per cent in
2011–12 to 8.0 per cent in 2012–13 (see Figure 79).
5
This is the second time jurisdictions have provided an indication of the size and production capacity of detected
laboratories. Figures were not available for all clandestine laboratories detected.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
158
FIGURE 79: Category of detected clandestine laboratories, by size and production capacity, 2012–13
Addict-based labs (58.8%)
Other small-scale labs (23.5%)
Medium sized labs (9.7%)
Industrial scale labs (8.0%)
DRUG TYPES AND METHODS OF PRODUCTION
Clandestine laboratories manufacturing ATS (excluding MDMA) continue to be the most
common type of laboratory detected in Australia. In 2012–13, of the laboratories where the
drug produced was identified, 68.8 per cent were producing ATS (excluding MDMA). In
2012–13, methylamphetamine was the main drug produced in detected laboratories
(see Table 37).
TABLE 37: Number of clandestine laboratory detections, by drug production type and state and territory,
2012–13
GHB/
GBL
Chemicals/
Glassware/
Equipment
onlyb
Otherc
Unknownd
Totale
0
0
0
5
3
105
0
1
1
0
3
24
113
0
0
4
1
2
4
137
333
2
0
1
3
2
21
0
19
82
135
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
138
Tas
8
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9
NT
8
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
11
ACT
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
544
7
1
2
11
4
26
13
183
791
ATS
(excluding
MDMA)
Homebake
Heroin
Cannabis
oil
extraction
MDMA
PSE a
extraction
NSW
93
3
0
1
Vic
83
0
1
Qld
183
2
SA
34
WA
State/
Territory
Total
a. Pseudoephedrine.
b. The seizure of glassware or equipment only is not categorised as a laboratory detection in some jurisdictions.
c. ‘Other’ refers to the detection of other illicit drug manufacture.
d. ‘Unknown’ includes seized substances which were unable to be identified or are awaiting analysis.
e. Total may exceed the number of clandestine laboratory detections due to multiple drug production types being identified at
single laboratories.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
159
The number of ATS (excluding MDMA) laboratory detections decreased this reporting
period, from 552 in 2011–12 to 544 in 2012–13. Since 2000–01, Queensland has accounted
for the greatest proportion of ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory detections, with
Western Australia accounting for the second greatest proportion since 2008–09.
While the number of clandestine laboratories detected manufacturing MDMA remains low, it
increased 250 per cent, from 2 in 2011–12 to 7 in 2012–13. New South Wales has
accounted for the greatest proportion of MDMA clandestine laboratory detections since
2004–05. In 2012–13, New South Wales reported 3 MDMA laboratory detections, of which
1 was a dedicated tableting laboratory. Two MDMA laboratories were also detected in both
Queensland and South Australia.
Since 2009–10, the number of laboratories extracting pseudoephedrine has continued to
decrease. The number of laboratories extracting pseudoephedrine decreased from 17 in
2011–12 to 11 in 2012–13.
The number of homebake heroin laboratory detections decreased from 3 in 2011–12 to 1 in
2012–13. During this reporting period, 4 clandestine laboratories manufacturing GHB/GBL
were detected, a decrease from 6 laboratories in 2011–12.
While cannabis oil extraction laboratories continue to be detected in Australia, detection
numbers remain low. In 2012–13, 2 cannabis oil extraction laboratories were detected,
1 each in New South Wales and South Australia.
Clandestine laboratories detected in Australia also manufacture a range of precursors and
pre-precursors. In 2012–13, these include but are not limited to, ephedrine,
pseudoephedrine, hypophosphorous acid, P2P and ammonium chloride.
Although the number of clandestine laboratories detected this reporting period decreased,
the proportion of laboratories manufacturing ATS (excluding MDMA) attributed to each
method of production has remained relatively stable. The hypophosphorous method of
production remains the prominent production method identified in Australian clandestine
laboratories, followed by the Nazi/Birch method (see Table 38).
TABLE 38: Method of ATS (excluding MDMA) production in clandestine laboratory detections, by state
and territory, 2012–13
State/
Territory
Hypophosphorous
(Iodine)
Redphosphorus
Nazi/Birch
(Hydriotic)
Ammonia)
Phenyl-2Propanone
(P2P)
(Lithium/
Othera
Totalb
NSW
81
3
1
3
5
93
Vic
40
1
2
10
0
53
Qld
108
33
0
1
0
142
SA
26
3
1
1
1
32
WA
1
4
130
0
0
135
Tas
7
0
0
1
1
9
NT
1
0
0
0
0
1
ACT
0
0
0
0
0
0
264
44
134
16
7
465
Total
a. ‘Other’ includes the detection of other ATS (excluding MDMA) production methodologies.
b. Total may not equal the number of ATS (excluding MDMA) clandestine laboratory detections as the method of production
may not be identified.
Illicit Drug Data Report 2012–13
160
In 2012–13, the number of laboratories identified using the hypophosphorous method of
manufacture decreased by 25.4 per cent, from 354 in 2011–12 to 264 in 2012–13.
Queensland continues to account for the greatest proportion of detected hypophosphorous
clandestine laboratories, followed by New South Wales.
The number of clandestine laboratories using the Nazi/Birch method continued to decrease,
from 157 in 2011–12 and to 134 in 2012–13. These laboratories continue to be
predominantly detected in Western Australia.
Detections of the red phosphorous production method decreased from 57 in 2011–12 to 44
in 2012–13. While Queensland continues to account for the greatest proportion of detected
red phosphorous laboratories, the number decreased from 38 in 2011–12 to 33 in 2012–13.
The number of clandestine laboratories identified as using the P2P method of production has
remained stable in the last two reporting periods. This method was identified in
16 laboratories in both 2011–12 and 2012–13. In 2012–13, Victoria accounted for the
greatest proportion of P2P laboratories, with 10 detections.
SIGNIFICANT PRECURSOR SEIZURES
While the majority of detected clandestine laboratories in Australia are addict-based, the
proportion of laboratories classified as other small-scale, medium sized and industrial scale
increased in 2012–13. The following provides a snapshot of some significant national
precursor/reagent seizures that occurred in 2012–13:
 100 litres of benzaldehyde seized in Victoria

76 kilograms of ammonium chloride6 seized in Victoria

60 kilograms of sodium acetate seized in Victoria

34 kilograms of acetic anhydride seized in Victoria

30 kilograms of iodine seized in Victoria

21 kilograms of benzaldehyde seized in Queensland

15 kilograms of gamma-amino butyric acid (GABA) seized in Queensland

4.2 kilograms of pseudoephedrine seized in South Australia

24 litres of hypophosphorous acid seized in South Australia

2 litres of safrole seized in Western Australia.
LOCATION AND CATEGORY
While the proportion of clandestine laboratories detected in residential areas decreased in
2012–13, it remains the prominent location of clandestine laboratories in Australia. In
2012–13, 68.2 per cent of detected clandestine laboratories were located in residential
areas, followed by vehicles (9.0 per cent). The proportion of clandestine laboratories
detected in commercial/industrial locations increased from 2.8 per cent in 2011–12 to
8.9 per cent in 2012–13 (see Figure 80).
6
Awaiting analysis.
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FIGURE 80: Location of clandestine laboratory detections, 2012–13
Residential (68.2%)
Vehicle (9.0%)
Public place (3.8%)
Rural (2.2%)
Commercial/industrial (8.9%)
Other (7.9%)
There are four distinct categories of clandestine laboratories:
 Category A—active (chemicals and equipment in use)
 Category B—stored/used (equipment or chemicals)7
 Category C—stored/unused (equipment or chemicals)
 Category D—historical site.
Category C (stored/unused) remains the most common category for clandestine laboratories
detected in Australia, accounts for 50.5 per cent of detections in 2012–13, a decrease from
56.3 per cent in 2011–12. This was followed by Category B (stored/used), which accounted
for 32.4 per cent of detected laboratories. The proportion of Category A (active) detected
laboratories increased from 6.8 per cent in 2011–12 to 11.3 per cent in 2012–13 (see
Figure 81)
7
Laboratories which are fully assembled, but not active at the time of detection.
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FIGURE 81: Category of clandestine laboratory detections, 2012–13
Category A (11.3%)
Category B (32.4%)
Category C (50.5%)
Category D (5.8%)
NATIONAL TABLET PRESS SEIZURES
In 2012–13, there were 19 tablet presses8 seized nationally, compared with 17 seizures in
2011–12. The majority of seizures this reporting period occurred in New South Wales.
South Australia reported the detection of 1 encapsulator in 2012–13.
8
Simple and rotary presses.
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163
NATIONAL IMPACT
While the total weight of ATS (excluding MDMA) and MDMA precursor detections at the
Australian border decreased in 2012–13, the number of precursor detections increased and
is the highest reported in the last decade. The predominant precursors detected include
pseudoephedrine for ATS and safrole for MDMA.
In 2012–13, there were increases in the number of tablet presses detected at the border and
seized nationally. Detections of tablet presses and tablet press parts at the border increased
40.0 per cent this reporting period, with the number of tablet presses seized nationally
increasing 11.8 per cent.
Despite a decrease in the number of clandestine laboratories detected nationally in
2012–13, the 757 clandestine laboratories detected this reporting period is the second
highest number on record. The majority of these laboratories were manufacturing ATS
(excluding MDMA), using the hypophosphorous method of production. The number of
laboratories detected manufacturing MDMA increased from 2 in 2011–12 to 7 in 2012–13.
Clandestine laboratories detected in Australia ranged from addict-based through to industrial
scale laboratories. While the greatest proportion of laboratories able to be categorised
remained addict-based, the proportion attributed to other small-scale, medium sized and
industrial scale laboratories increased in 2012–13. Residential areas remain the most
common location for clandestine laboratory detections. Of note was the increase in the
proportion of laboratories attributed to commercial/industrial locations this reporting period,
which increased from 2.8 per cent in 2011–12 to 8.9 per cent in 2012–13.
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164
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