Title Page with Subtitle
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction: Individual inputs on the context that inspired the selection of the topic
By Marianne Evangelista
By Germaine Teh
By Shirley Rocafor
Presentation of Alternatives
Research Input: Review of Literature
Arguments Supporting the Feministic View of the Self
Text 1: Simoune de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (As reviewed by Marianne Evangelista)
Text 2: Germaine Greer(As reviewed by Germaine Teh)
Counterarguments to the feministic view of the self
Text(s) 3: (As reviewed by Shirley Rocafor)
Reflection: Choosing of Alternatives and Individual Application
By Marianne Evangelista
By Germaine Teh
By Shirley Rocafor
References
INTRODUCTION
By Marianne Evangelista
Since time immemorial the subjugation or oppression of women has always been an unfortunate social
fact. Whether in politics/government, in business, in the various sciences, or even the basic level of human
rights, women have always been marginalized. In the earlier days, only men were given the right t o be
educated while women were forced to stay at home to perform duties expected of women. Even those
fortunate women who were able to attain some form of education and some minute form of recognition in
this male-dominated world were outnumbered and treated as second class citizens. We (and by ‘we’ I am
referring to the whole of womankind) have lived and continue to live by the rules and teachings set out by
men. It is in this light that this research pays tribute to the intellectual female philosophers who do not
quite get enough exposure to the students of today. We have heard a lot about Sartre, Heidegger, Johann
and Kat. But has the average college student ever heard about de Beauvoir? What about Greer? Especially
as the current course of our class is enrolled in, Philosophy of the Person, is centered on personal identity
– or knowing oneself and learning about the ways each one can be a true human or person – it is important
therefore to consider all world views in defining and learning about the self.
Poulain de la Barre, a feminist of the seventeenth century once said, put it this way: “All that has been
written about women by men should be suspect, for the men are at once judge and party to the lawsuit.
Being men, those who have made and compiled the laws have favored their own sex, and jurists have
elevated these laws into principles.”
Count on a woman to really understand herself. It is like the common saying, “It takes one to know one.”
Not at all to belittle or to negate the input of all the great philosophers, it is just that our group is the of the
opinion that the offering of these men generalize the view of men for all mankind. Further, there is an
unwritten understanding that men have somehow caused this oppression of women. Considering the
delicate history of women, whose successes and failures are polar opposites of those of men, the woman’s
identity or self should likewise be approached differently.
By Germaine Teh
By Shirley Rocafor
PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES
Our individual reasons for pursuing this topic on the woman’s definition of her ‘self’ has led us to come
up with two (2) alternatives which we will make a stand on after exploration of the literature on the topic:
The first alternative: The Feminist Philosophers’ stand
There is a sound foundation of feminist philosophers’ claim that women’s view of her
self is different from man.
This stand will be supported by the inputs of known feminist philosophers, Simoune de Beauvoir and
Germaine Greer.
The second alternative: The Critics of Feminist Philosophy
There is no difference between how the self is defined for men and women.
This stand will be supported by the inputs of known critics of feminist philosophy:
RESEARCH INPUT
Arguments Supporting the Feministic View of the Self
Article 1: Simoune de Beauvoir’s The Second
Evangelista)
Sex (As reviewed and explained by Marianne
Simoune de Beauvoir, in her book, The Second Sex (1949), posed several arguments that contended that a
woman’s identity must be defined by woman herself. In other words, the true and accurate view of the
woman’s ‘self’ or identity should be gleaned from the lenses of women.
Masculinity as Normalcy, Woman as Peculiarity
De Beauvoir (1949) begins her book by asking “what is a woman?”. She then gave the response “To
state the question is, to me, to suggest, at once, a preliminary answer. The fact that I ask it is in itself
significant”. The feminist philosopher states that men would never question their existence in view of their
sex. The fact that women do so, and with this, the existence of feminist works, proves that there is a
certain peculiarity of the female sex. She claims that “A man would never set out to write a book on the
peculiar situation of the human male… A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a
certain sex; it goes without saying that he is a man.” “But if I wish to define myself, I must first of all say:
‘I am a woman’.” De Beauvoir (1949). In other words, a man does not have to assert his sex in order to be
recognized; the default setting for mankind, or being a human being, is masculinity. It is the general and
more recognizable sex. Womankind, therefore, is viewed as an oddity or peculiarity. The philosopher
expounds: “Man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to
designate human beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting
criteria, without reciprocity”. De Beauvoir (1949) states that the world we live in recognizes an absolute
human type, the masculine. She adds that even in the physiological sense, men view themselves as more
empowered and absolute than do women. “Woman has ovaries, a uterus: these peculiarities imprison her
in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks
with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles,
and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world,
which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a
prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it.” De Beauvoir (1949).
Man as Absolute, Woman as Other: Male Philosophers on Femininity
De Beauvoir (1949) noted some quotations of male philosophers which confirms man’s view of himself
as the absolute self. One philosopher is Artistotle who said ‘The female is a female by virtue of a certain
lack of qualities, we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural defectiveness.’. Another is
St. Thomas who pronounced woman to be an ‘imperfect man’, an ‘incidental’ being. He claims that this is
symbolised in Genesis where Eve is depicted as made from what Bossuet called ‘a supernumerary bone’
of Adam. De Beauvoir (1949) claims that (a) humanity is male and (b) man defines woman not in herself
but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being. Two other male philosophers confirm
this shauvinistic view: “Michelet writes: ‘Woman, the relative being ...’ And Benda is most positive in his
Rapport d’Uriel: ‘The body of man makes sense in itself quite apart from that of woman, whereas the
latter seems wanting in significance by itself ... Man can think of himself without woman. She cannot
think of herself without man.’ And she is simply what man decrees; thus she is called ‘the sex’, by which
is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex – absolute sex, no
less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the
incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the
Other.’” De Beauvoir (1949).
The above inputs of male philosophers confirm that masculinity is indeed viewed as the normal or
default setting in viewing the self. Another philosophical explanation for this phenomenon is proposed by
Hegel: “These phenomena would be incomprehensible if in fact human society were simply a Mitsein or
fellowship based on solidarity and friendliness. Things become clear, on the contrary, if, following Hegel,
we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the subject can
be posed only in being opposed – he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the
inessential, the object.” If one assumes that the Subject is male, then according to Hegel, it is natural for
him to be hostile against those who are different from him—in this light, women is the most different
from him.
Master – Slave Relation: Why the Woman does Nothing
Given that women are aware of this oppression in the recognition of their existence by men, the next
question would be, “why is it that women do not dispute male sovereignty? Why does she continue to be
submissive to men?” De Beauvoir (1949) states that “No subject will readily volunteer to become the
object, the inessential; it is not the Other who, in defining himself as the Other, establishes the One. The
Other is posed as such by the One in defining himself as the One. But if the Other is not to regain the
status of being the One, he must be submissive enough to accept this alien point of view”. De Beauvoir
(1949) says that the reason for this conscious yet continued submission of women is that woman herself
fails to bring about the necessary change.
De Beauvoir (1949) says that the reason for this is that women lack concrete means for organizing
themselves into a unit which can stand face to face with men, the correlative unit. Unlike the Blacks
versus the Whites, and the Jews versus the Germans, they have no past, no history, no religion of their
own; and they have no such solidarity of work and interest as that of the proletariat. Woman’s existence
has been equally dependent on the existence of man. De Beauvoir (1949) says that “woman cannot even
dream of exterminating the males. The bond that unites her to her oppressors is not comparable to any
other.”
To expound the Absolute – Other contention further, De Beauvoir (1949) states that this relationship is
likened to that of the Master and his slave, where men are masters and women are their slaves. This
relationship is united by a reciprocal need, mostly an economic one, which does not liberate the slave. “In
the relation of master to slave the master does not make a point of the need that he has for the other; he has
in his grasp the power of satisfying this need through his own action; whereas the slave, in his dependent
condition, his hope and fear, is quite conscious of the need he has for his master. Even if the need is at
bottom equally urgent for both, it always works in favor of the oppressor and against the oppressed”.
Aside from this economic oppression as can be seen in better jobs and opportunities for men, one sees that
even in her legal status, as well as the realm of industry and politics, women are marginalized. Even at
present where women are slowly beginning to take part in the affairs of the world, it is still a world that
belongs to men. For women to renounce their submission to the Absolute male is for her to decline to be
the Other, to refuse to be a party to the deal. However, due to the economic advantages conferred by men,
the superior caste, to women in lieu of this allegiance, women are reluctant to renounce being the Other.
De Beauvoir (1949) presents now a struggle within every woman in asserting her existence and
maintaining such advantages and liberties: “Indeed, along with the ethical urge of each individual to
affirm his subjective existence, there is also the temptation to forgo liberty and become a thing. This is an
inauspicious road, for he who takes it – passive, lost, ruined – becomes henceforth the creature of
another’s will, frustrated in his transcendence and deprived of every value. But it is an easy road; on it one
avoids the strain involved in undertaking an authentic existence. When man makes of woman the Other,
he may, then, expect to manifest deep-seated tendencies towards complicity. Thus, woman may fail to lay
claim to the status of subject because she lacks definite resources, because she feels the necessary bond
that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity, and because she is often very well pleased with her role as
the Other”.