From Ordinatio I, d. 1, part 2, q. 1: “Is enjoyment an act elicited by the will or a passion
received in the will?”
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In this question the first topic to be examined is the concepts themselves; the second is
the significate of the name.
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Concerning the first topic I say that just as in the intellect there are two acts of assenting
to a complex—one in which we assent to something true in its own right, a principle, and
another in which we assent to a true complex not in its own right but on account of some other
truth, a conclusion—so too in the will there are two acts of assenting to something good—one in
which we assent to some good for its own sake, and another in which we assent to some good
on account of some other thing to which that good is referred, in the same way that we assent to
a conclusion on account of a principle, since a conclusion has its truth from a principle. This
comparison can be taken from the Philosopher in Ethics VI (1139a21–22), where he says that “in
the mind there is affirmation and negation, but what corresponds to this in appetite is pursuit
and avoidance.” And thus, further, just as in the mind there is a twofold affirmation, in its own
right and on account of something else, so too in appetite there is a twofold pursuit or
adherence, in its own right and on account of something else.
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But there is a twofold disanalogy between mind and appetite. First, the intellect’s two
assents are distinguished by the nature of the objects. For the two assents are different because
the evidentness of the two kinds of truths is different, and so they have distinct objects
corresponding to them and causing them. In appetite, by contrast, the two assents are
differentiated not by a distinction on the part of their objects but by distinct acts of a free power
that accepts its object in one way or the other. For, as I said earlier [n. 16], it is in the will’s
power to act this way or that by referring the object or not. And thus there are not distinct
proper objects corresponding to these acts; rather, the will can have any given willable object as
an object of either sort of act.
The second disanology is that these two assents on the part of the intellect sufficiently
divide the intellect’s assent in general, and there is no assent intermediate between them, since
there is no intermediate evidentness on the part of an object that would ground some truth
1
other than the truth of a principle and the truth of a conclusion. By contrast, there is on the part
of the will an intermediate assent other than these two assents, since a good apprehended
absolutely, neither as good in its own right nor as good on account of something else, can be
presented to the will. Now the will can have an act concerning something presented to it in this
way, and not necessarily an inordinate act. Therefore, it can have an act of willing that thing
absolutely, without referring it to anything else and without enjoying it for its own sake. And
furthermore, it can command the intellect to inquire as to what sort of good it is and how it
ought to be willed, and then it can assent to that object in that way. And the entire basis of this
disanalogy is the freedom of the will and the natural necessity on the part of the intellect.
68
Further, on the basis of these considerations: an act of assent to a good for its own sake is
a perfect act; and according to Ethics X (1174b14–23), pleasure follows from a perfect act.
Therefore, some pleasure follows from an act of willing a good for its own sake.
So concerning the present topic we have distinguished four things: (1) an imperfect act
of willing a good on account of something else, which is called use; (2) a perfect act of willing a
good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment; (3) an act [of willing] that is neither (1) nor (2);
and (4) the pleasure that follows from an act.
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An answer to the second main question, namely, for which of these the name
‘enjoyment’ is appropriate, can be gathered from the authorities that speak of this word
‘enjoyment.’ It is clear that (3), the act that is neither, is not an act of enjoyment, nor is (1), the
act of use. The dispute is only about (2) a perfect act and (4) the consequent pleasure.
I reply: some authorities evidently say that enjoyment is only (2) this perfect act; some
say that it is only (4) pleasure. Others say that it includes both, and in that case ‘enjoyment’
signifies a being that is not one per se, but only something that is one by way of an aggregation
of two beings, or a being per accidens. And there is nothing amiss in one name’s signifying
many things, since according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII (1030a6–10, 1030b4–10) ‘the
Iliad’ can signify the whole Trojan War.
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The authority of Augustine in De diversis quaestionibus 83 q. 30 evidently supports the
view that enjoyment is only the act. He says, “all perversity, which is called ‘vice,’ is to use
things that ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy things that ought to be used.” Perversity is
2
formally in an elicited act of the will, not in pleasure, since a pleasure is bad only because the act
is bad. Nor is pleasure in the power of the one who experiences the pleasure except because the
act is in his power, whereas sin as such is formally in the power of the one sinning. Augustine
also appears to say this explicitly in De doctrina christiana I.4.4: “To enjoy is to cleave to
something with love for its own sake.” This cleaving is evidently through a power that moves
the one who cleaves, just as in bodies (from which this name ‘cleave’ was transferred to this
context) cleaving is by the power of the thing that cleaves.
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By contrast, the authority of Augustine in De Trinitate I.8.18 appears to say that
enjoyment is just pleasure. He says, “To enjoy the Trinity is complete joy”: and if we are not to
twist the authority so that it indicates causality or some other meaning that the words
themselves do not suggest, joy is formally pleasure. This holds likewise for what Augustine
says in the question [De diversis quaestionibus 83 q. 30] quoted earlier [n. 70]: “We enjoy a thing
in which we take pleasure.” If this formula expresses identity or is a quasi-definition, then
‘taking pleasure’ is essentially enjoyment.
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But one can argue from the definition of ‘enjoy’ in De Trinitate X.10.13—“We enjoy
things known, in which the will comes to rest with pleasure for their own sake”—that
‘enjoyment’ signifies both the act and the pleasure together. “We enjoy things known” pertains
to the act, since a known object is presupposed by an act of will. But then come the words “in
which the will comes to rest with pleasure for their own sake”; if pleasure were accidental to
enjoyment, it should not be included in the definition of enjoyment.
Similarly, if one holds that both the act and the consequent pleasure belong essentially to
happiness,1 then all the authorities that say enjoyment is the supreme reward or our happiness
say that enjoyment includes both the act and pleasure. The authority of De doctrina christiana
I.22.35, “the supreme reward is that we enjoy God,” speaks in favor of this minor premise.
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But we should not fight over the significate of the word. As Augustine says in
Retractationes I.15.4, “when there is agreement about the thing, we should not indulge in
controversy over words.” There is agreement that the will has a threefold act, and a fourth
item, the consequent passion. It is also evident that the name ‘enjoyment’ is in no way
1
As Scotus holds in Reportatio IV d. 49 q. 7.
3
appropriate for two of the acts [(1) and (3)]. Some evidently use the name for one or the other of
the other two [(2) and (4)] and for both together, in which case ‘enjoyment’ is equivocal. Or, if it
is univocal, one should interpret certain authorities as speaking causally or concomitantly.
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