FP7-ICT-20011-EU-Brazil
STREP proposal
SecFuNet
Small or medium-scale focused research projects STREP proposal
ICT – EU Brazil Coordinated Call
FP7-ICT-2011-EU-Brazil
Security for Future Networks
SecFuNet
Work programme topics addressed
Objective ICT2011.10.1 EU-Brazil Future Internet - security
Research and Development cooperation: Future Internet - security
Name of the coordinating person: Michel Betirac
e-mail: Michel.Betirac@ethertrust.com
Participant no.
*
Participant organisation name
Part. short
name
Country
1 (Coordinator)
EtherTrust
ET
France
2
ST Microelectronics
STM
France
3
Université Pierre et Marie Curie -LIP6
LIP6
France
4
Telecom ParisTech
TPT
France
5
Ecole Normale Supérieure
ENS
France
6
Implementa
IMP
Germany
7
Technische Universität München
TUM
Germany
8
University of Lisboa
UL
Portugal
9 (Coordinator)
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
UFPE
Brazil
10
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
UFRJ
Brazil
11
Universidade Estadual do Ceará
UECE
Brazil
12
Universidade Federal do Amazonas
UFAM
Brazil
13
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
UFSC
Brazil
14
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul UFRGS
Brazil
15
DWA
Brazil
DWA
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Proposal abstract
The future Internet will rely heavily on virtualization and cloud networking. Therefore, one of
the main challenges for the future Internet is to provide such virtual networks and cloud
accesses with a high degree of security. This project proposes the design of a framework
providing secure identification and authentication, secure data transfer, secure virtualized
infrastructure, and privacy in virtual network and clouds, exploring techniques such as
microcontrollers, resource management, intrusion tolerant algorithms, and cryptographic
protocols. The goal of the SecFuNet project is to design and develop a coherent security
architecture for virtual networks and cloud accesses. The proposed architecture will provide
solutions allowing the management of the security of communications for all machines
connected to a public cloud using virtual networks. Hence, we need a coherent and robust
identification scheme as well as a strong authentication system. Algorithms robust to
intrusions are also needed for creating a secure environment. Besides, the proposed
architecture must guarantee security in the virtualized infrastructure, through isolation of
virtual networks and access control for users and managers. The identification of authorized
users, however, must not compromise their privacy. Moreover, it is necessary to bring an
ergonomic security scheme that is acceptable for all users, even those unknowledgeable in
computer science. And finally, the proposed scheme must take into account the
heterogeneity of equipment (wireless and wired) to preserve interoperability.
The proposed architecture will address every one of these challenges by using among other
tools, secure “island” of computation (secure microcontrollers like those used on TPM and
smart cards) for identification, authentication and privacy. Another important tool that will
be used to address the mentioned challenges is virtualization. The secure virtualized
infrastructure and the algorithms robust to intrusions will guarantee the basis for creating a
secure environment. A secure environment and a strong access control are the main pillars
for building the proposed security architecture. The proposed security architecture is split
into at least two virtual networks: the legacy Internet we know today and a new premium
Internet based on strong identification, maintaining privacy of the clients. Eventually a new
Post-IP network could be introduced. The proposed architecture will allow these virtual
networks to share the same substrate using virtualization, as shown in Figure 1. The
architecture will enforce the isolation between the two (or three) networks. Moreover, the
secure microcontrollers may allow the introduction of new security schemes to the legacy
Internet, avoiding some attacks against customers who are identified using a secure
procedure.
Figure 1 - The future virtualized network.
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The challenges addressed by this project can be organized in the following work packages:
1- WP1 - New general security architecture based on secure microcontrollers. Different
security schemes can make use of the secure “islands” for their deployment, such as
EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security), and coexist
with legacy scheme such as EAP-SIM (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Subscriber
Identity Module). The increase on security is derived from the execution of the
algorithms within the boundaries of the secure microcontroller instead of running on
the unsafe PC. The microcontrollers could be used to access every one of the virtual
networks (legacy, premium, and Post-IP), helping encryption and other algorithms,
beyond what is proposed by the Trusted Platform Modules (TPM).
2- WP2 - Highly secure authentication server with an array of secure microcontrollers
allowing user privacy for legacy, premium, and Post-IP networks.
3- WP3 - Highly secure identification scheme, using the secure microcontrollers, based
on Open-ID and Shibboleth.
4- WP4 – Secure scheme for guaranteeing isolation among the virtual networks so that
one network cannot reduce other virtual network performance through an attack.
Also, provide a secure management and control of virtual network resources using
the developed identification scheme, guaranteeing isolation and privacy of the virtual
network allocated resources.
5- WP5 – Infrastructure resilience against attacks or accidents.
6- WP6 - Cryptographic schemes for the legacy and premium Internet.
7- WP7 – Testbed for the evaluation of the devised schemes, as well as the publication
of website, documents and scientific papers.
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Table of contents
Section 1: Scientific and/or technical quality, relevant to the topics addressed by the call ............... 5
1.1
Concept and objectives ............................................................................................................ 5
1.1.1.
Relevance to the FP7-ICT-2011 –EU-Brazil Objectives ............................................ 10
1.2
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art ...................................................................................... 11
1.2.1.
Virtualization............................................................................................................... 12
1.2.2.
EAP-TLS ..................................................................................................................... 14
1.2.3.
Authentication server .................................................................................................. 17
1.2.4.
Identification Scheme .................................................................................................. 21
1.2.5.
Intrusion tolerant algorithms ....................................................................................... 21
1.2.6.
Cryptographic schemes ............................................................................................... 23
1.3
S/T methodology and associated work plan .......................................................................... 27
1.3.1.
Overall strategy of the work plan ................................................................................ 27
1.3.2.
Work-packages and components timing ..................................................................... 29
1.3.3.
Work-packages and components interdependencies ................................................... 30
1.3.4.
Overall approach to risk management ......................................................................... 33
1.3.5.
List of Work-packages ................................................................................................ 37
1.3.6.
List of Deliverables ..................................................................................................... 38
1.3.7.
Work-packages descriptions........................................................................................ 40
1.3.8.
Summary of staff effort ............................................................................................... 59
1.3.9.
Template - List of milestones ...................................................................................... 60
Section 2. Implementation ................................................................................................................ 61
2.1
Management structure and procedures .................................................................................. 61
2.2.1.
Integrated Project Consortium Agreement Governance.............................................. 61
2.2
Individual participants ........................................................................................................... 64
2.3
Consortium as a whole .......................................................................................................... 82
2.4
Resources to be committed .................................................................................................... 83
Section 3. Impact .............................................................................................................................. 84
3.1
Expected impacts listed in the work programme................................................................... 84
3.2
Dissemination and/or exploitation of project results, and management of intellectual
property ............................................................................................................................................. 84
3.2.2.
Contribution to standards ............................................................................................ 86
3.2.3.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) management.......................................................... 87
Section 4.
Ethical Issues ................................................................................................................... 89
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Section 1: Scientific and/or technical quality, relevant to the topics
addressed by the call
1.1
Concept and objectives
The future Internet will rely on virtualization and cloud networking, and one of the main
challenges is to achieve highly secure virtual networks and cloud accesses. The main
problems addressed by this project are secure identification, secure authentication, secure
data transfer, secure virtualized infrastructure, and privacy in virtual networks and clouds,
exploring techniques such as the usage of microcontrollers, the resource management,
intrusion tolerant algorithms, and cryptographic protocols. The goal of the SecFuNet project
is to design and develop a coherent security architecture for virtual networks and cloud
accesses. Such an architecture must propose solutions allowing to manage security of the
communications for all machines connected to a public cloud using virtual networks. Hence,
we need a coherent and robust identification scheme as well as a strong authentication
system. Algorithms robust to intrusions are also needed for creating a secure environment.
Besides, the proposed architecture must guarantee security in the virtualized infrastructure,
through isolation of virtual networks and access control for users and managers. These
aspects must not compromise user privacy. Moreover, it is necessary to bring an ergonomic
security scheme that is acceptable for all users, even those unknowledgeable in computer
science. Finally, the proposed scheme must take into account the heterogeneity of
equipment (wireless and wired) to preserve interoperability.
Virtualization will bring additional complexity to networks. The risk is that security
becomes a limiting factor to the evolution of networks into the future, and to the roll-out
of the enriched services they are expected to deliver.
In future networks all resources will be virtualized. This is a new challenge for security.
Instead of providing a specific algorithm for each security scheme, we would like to propose
a unified secure architecture mainly based on a secure microcontroller for identifying and
authenticating users and nodes and on a strong security on virtualized networks. The secure
microcontroller can be a smartcard, for example, but could be a specific token built for
future Internet networks. Security of virtual networks is based on isolation among the
different virtual networks and we would like to study this security in the Xen platform.
Secure microcontroller
The smart card technology has been used recently for deploying and managing security
applications inside tiny microprocessors. These tiny microprocessors are part of secure
microcontrollers, which are small tamper-resistant devices that store some secret
information and perform operations such authentication using cryptography. The dimension
of a smartcard with a microcontroller is in the order of millimetres and it is ideal for security
applications, because it has a secure crypto processor, a secure file system and protects inmemory information. In this project, the secure microcontroller is used for identifying and
authentication users to grant access to the network, which could be the premium Internet,
the legacy Internet, and any post-IP network. Because microcontrollers can be easily
programmed, it can be used with any security scheme, such as the EAP-TLS or the EAP-SIM.
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EAP-TLS and EAP-SIM
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a flexible framework standardized by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). EAP-TLS is recognized by all manufacturers, software
editors, and operators as the solution for strong and global authentication scheme for all
terminals. So, this project aims at designing an open framework, free of proprietary
technologies, that addresses the following items,
- Specifications of smartcard services and associated binary encoding rules (ISO 7816
APDUs) in the IETF organization, which sets up the Internet protocols for twenty years.
- Release of open software (OpenEapSmartcard) for java cards [11] and dotnet
smart cards. The codes of EAP smart cards may be freely downloaded through the WEB.
- Design of architectures based on EAP clients and EAP servers, in order to enhance
the global network security.
The goal of the SecFuNet project is to develop a highly secure authentication server
In recent months, some major players have had serious problems with the theft of hundreds
of thousands of passwords, putting in danger some of their corporate customers who are
vulnerable to hackers. Highly secured access control is a mandatory prerequisite for
organizations offering services distributed over the Internet.
Radius SIM array provides cloud-computing providers with a unique strong authentication
solution protecting them against these new attacks. A single SIM Array stores up to 416 EAPTLS SIMs and SIM Arrays can be clustered to provide storage for any number of SIMs as
needed.
This solution brings:
- The end of Phishing: customers do not enter anymore logins and passwords, this critical
information cannot thus be stolen.
- Faster Connections: the end of headache to remember which login and which password are
needed for each WEB site.
- Easy user management: adding a new user would only require the insertion of a new SIM
card.
- Privacy: a couple of associated smartcards guarantees that nobody can detect who is
connected to the network.
Highly secure identification scheme (using the secure microcontroller) based on Open-ID
and Shibboleth.
Virtual networks isolation and testbed
SecFuNet aims to develop a secure infrastructure for the virtualized networks and clouds.
This infrastructure must provide both high availability and reliability for users.
A secure infrastructure for virtual networks demands a strong isolation among virtual
networks. This means that one virtual network cannot interfere with others. Moreover, a
secure infrastructure must be able to assign different physical resources to each virtual
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network, guaranteeing QoS and assuring that QoS parameters will be respected regardless
of the number of virtual networks hosted in a node and even attacks to virtual/physical
networks.
Hence, this project addresses the following:
- Development of schemes for guaranteeing an isolated infrastructure for virtualized
networks.
- Development of a scheme for sharing physical resources among virtual networks,
guaranteeing a robust management interface as well as the Quality of Service of each virtual
network, according to the service level agreements of each network.
- Development of management tools for controlling resource usage, to prevent networks or
clouds under attack from damaging the performance of other virtual environments located
at the same physical infrastructure.
Infrastructure resilience
The infrastructure can be made resilient by technical means that protect against challenges
that may arise from technical faults or from malicious attackers.
SecFuNet aims to implement mechanisms for robust provisioning of IP services that ensure
the availability of IP services in the presence of link failures, or node failures. These
mechanisms thereby provide resilience of the network, and of higher layer services that are
built on top of network services. Among these mechanisms, proactive and reactive
approaches can be distinguished. SecFuNet aims to address specific threats originating from
malicious users or groups of users, and methods that either (proactively) may prevent
specific attacks, or (reactively) allow to restore functioning of the network, and of higherlevel services, after detecting and diagnosing specific attacks.
Cryptographic schemes for the future generation
Even though cloud computing and virtual networks provide cheap access to a variety of
services such as private remote storage or secure outsourcing of computation, the user no
longer has control over the platform on which these services are run. For instance, in the
case of private remote storage, users are at the mercy of their storage providers with
respect to the continued availability of their data. In the case of secure outsourcing of
computation, users may not have any guarantees that the computation has been performed
correctly or that it has not leaked important private information about the data. Hence, a
secure infrastructure should provide strong guarantees of the users’ privacy and the
integrity of their data and computation.
The goal of this project is to develop cryptographic schemes that are especially adapted to
virtual network and cloud environments. In particular, we plan to develop cryptographic
schemes to address issues identified in other work packages, such as secure user
identification and the isolation of virtual networks and their protection from cross-virtualnetwork attacks. In addition to these, we also plan to design cryptographic protocols that
can improve the security and verifiability of the outsourced computation, the integrity of
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remote storage, the resilience against side-channel attacks, and overall security of virtual
networks and clouds.
The specific objectives of SecFuNet are briefly summarized in the following:
Objective 1: Design SecFuNet as an extensible context framework for the security of the
future networks based on a secure microcontroller.
The security is a central requirement for future networks. The goal of the project is to bring
this framework for virtual networking and cloud access that will be the basis of future
networking. The project will choose a secure microcontroller adapted for the future that
will be able to support execution of several secure algorithms concerning authentication,
identity, encryption, intrusion tolerant algorithms, and ability to provide solutions for
isolation among virtual networks.
The objective will be achieved within WP1 which specifies a detailed list of research
challenges and approaches, and related deliverables.
Objective 2: Authentication with EAP-TLS and legacy solutions
The authentication is mandatory for future network environment and for accessing the
clouds. EAP-TLS is recognized as a strong solution adapted for fixed or mobile open
terminals. The project will push a solution using the secure microcontroller permitting to
have a simple solution avoiding any attacks and very easy to use (no password, no phishing,
etc.)
The objective will be achieved within WP1 which specifies a detailed list of research
challenges and approaches, and related deliverables.
Objective 3: Develop a highly secure authentication server based on an array of secure
microcontrollers
Authentication servers are quite often a point of weakness inside the chain of security in a
network. We propose in this project an original solution of an authentication server based on
an array of secure microcontrollers. A user is introduced in the network by using a couple of
associated microcontrollers, one for the user and the second one to be connected inside the
authentication server. The EAP-TLS or legacy solution is performed end to end, from one
microcontroller to the other microcontroller. So the authentication process is encrypted all
along the communication process. Moreover, this solution provides a strong privacy since the
authentication process can never deliver identity.
The objective will be achieved within WP2 which defines a list of deliverables.
Objective 4: Develop a highly secure identification scheme based on Open-ID and Shibboleth
A particularly innovative aspect of the SecFuNet project is related to the secure
identification process. This is central to the secure framework. The secure process will be
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based on the secure microcontroller and two schemes will be developed for the sake of
comparison one using the open-ID scheme and the other one the Shibboleth scheme.
SecFuNet has the ambitious goal to demonstrate and to experiment these two previous
solutions and to reach a standard solution for identifying users and nodes which participate
in the security architecture.
The objective will be pursued within WP3.
Objective 5: Design a secure network infrastructure for SecFuNet that provides a reliable
and secure environment for the virtual networks and the clouds.
A secure infrastructure is the basis for any application running over a virtual network or
cloud. The goal is to develop schemes to create secure, isolated, and highly reliable virtual
environments that can also provide QoS according to their requirements. Security solutions
for the virtualization technology will be developed relying on the proposed microcontrollerbased identification and authentication schemes.
This objective will be developed within WP4.
Objective 6: Provide an intrusion tolerant algorithm within the virtual networks.
This part of the project is focusing on intrusion tolerant algorithm. Indeed, even with the
authentication and identification schemes, it is clear enough that some couple of
microcontrollers could be in the hand of attackers. Even if these attackers will be identified
latter on, they could try to attack the network. In this project, we would like to develop
some intrusion tolerant algorithms that could work on a unique virtual network but also on
several virtual networks, protecting the security of the architecture even if attackers can
authenticate just as non-malicious users.
This objective will be achieved within WP5.
Objective 7: Provide cryptographic algorithms for future networks.
Current cryptographic schemes are generally designed for use in trusted terminals. We
propose in this project the development of new cryptographic protocols specially adapted to
virtual network and cloud environments that can guarantee users’ privacy and/or the
integrity and privacy of their data and computation. Some of these solutions will rely on the
use of secure microcontrollers, especially for achieving the goal of secure identification and
authentication.
This objective will be achieved within WP6.
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1.1.1. Relevance to the FP7-ICT-2011 –EU-Brazil Objectives
The SecFuNet project specifically covers
Topic 3: Future Internet - security
As a specific targeted project, SecFuNet particularly addresses the following target outcome
Objective ICT-2007.1.6: New Paradigms and Experimental Facilities
Targeted Outcomes of the Objective
The development of trusted
communications infrastructures providing
consistent user access to services
independent of cost, location, service type,
access device. Addressing control and
security of personal data, device
independent access, user profile
management, ensure same quality of
experience irrespective of chosen access
device, quality of service and accessibility
are important elements of this challenge.
SecFuNet Project S&T Objectives
SecFuNet proposal is based on the realization
and the experimentation of new highly secure
solutions based on a secure microcontroller.
The usage of secure microcontrollers is an easy
way to manage security in the Internet without
restricting the user access and simplifying the
password and identity management. Besides,
the use of a secure infrastructure that
guarantees isolation and quality of service
increases the quality of experience of the users.
The virtualization allows the creation of
different networks, simplifying the accessibility
to the network with different devices and
technologies. The first challenge is definitely
under the scope of the project.
The development of application service
environment(s) providing secure and
consistent access to functionality
irrespective of access device, access
network and service provider network.
Issues associated with citizen data
management and handling such as access,
storage, protection and accountability are
key elements of this challenge
SecFuNet provides a secure access to the
cloud and indeed any kind of service using
secure networks and strong secure
identification of the clients using any kind of
terminal (the secure microcontroller can use
USB connection but also NFC interface). The
proposed security architecture guarantees a
secure authentication as well as the privacy
of the user data, even in the presence of
attacks to the network or if some malicious
users have an identity to access the network.
Personalization, usability, and accessibility
regardless of educational and technical
background is key to citizen
empowerment. Addressing the issues of
trust and security up front are necessary
for the successful acceptance and uptake
of the digital inclusion environments.
Citizens will benefit from these
environments; however, in order to use
This challenge is one of the strong responses
of the SecFuNet project: indeed, the secure
microcontroller and the different schemes
developed by the project permit a user to
access the network just plugging the
microcontroller
or
even
with
the
microcontroller in his pocket. Phishing and
any known attacks is today possible with the
SecFuNet solutions. Simplicity and security
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them, they will need to trust them without
undue technical burdens and they must
satisfy citizens needs and circumstances.
1.2
are at the basis of the project.
Progress beyond the state-of-the-art
The vision for network security was the basis for several research activities in the past years
in both industry and academia. These activities spawn across the definition, design, and
deployment of different features in emerging communication systems and devices,
enhancing the standard functions of existing systems, thus posing new requirements
regarding their functionality.
Access to corporate network resources (email, VPN, Intranet, etc.) using the traditional
login/password method is a major threat to company security policy. Indeed, passwords can
be stolen or broken into or can give rise to difficulty in memorization by users or generate
the need for constant renewal. Due to their low cost, passwords are used in situations where
there is no need for a high level of security, but they fall short in an environment where a
high level of security is required.
The SecFuNet project will develop technologies that provide strong authentication based on
the use of a secure microcontroller working with different operating systems, but mainly
Microsoft operating systems associated with EAP-TLS technology. The user possesses a
microcontroller securely storing digital certificates and running with the SecFuNet software
and. The key independently handles the entire authentication operation. Mobility is
enhanced whilst identity theft by malicious programs is impossible.
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the world of information technologies
elected the IP protocol as a de facto standard for electronic data exchange. In a similar way,
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) appears as a new common framework for users’
identification and access control in IP networks. It is a flexible framework normalized by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [1] [2], which implies users’ authentication before any
IP address allocation. It applies to the following areas,
- Authentication for PPP (Point to Point Protocol [2]) accesses.
- Authentication (according to the IEEE 802.1x model [3]) in wired or wireless LANs such as
Ethernet or Wi-Fi networks.
- Authentication in WiMAX infrastructures (thanks to the PKM-EAP protocol defined in IEEE
802.16e [4]).
- Authentication in Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies, such as PPTP [5] L2TP [6],
and IKEv2 [7].
- Authentication in emerging Voice Over Wi-Fi services, such as the UMA [8] architecture that
supports the IKEv2 [7] protocol.
- Authentication in AAA servers, designed according to protocols such as RADIUS [9] or
DIAMETER [10].
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
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EAP-TLS and legacy SIM are executed in the EAP-TLS and legacy SIM are executed within
terminal.
the secure microcontroller.
Secure Authentication is obliged to use a SecFuNet brings very simple Authentication
large number of secure devices and servers with high privacy.
softwares.
Identity processes are unsecure and ask for SecFuNet solution is simple and high secure.
numerous software and hardware.
The system is scalable and security of
payment on a wide site is provided.
Intrusion tolerant algorithms are weak in SecFuNet proposes new solution that
virtual environment.
permits virtualization to be more secure
than before.
Most cryptographic schemes rely heavily on SecFuNet provides new cryptographic
the availability of trusted terminals for their solutions which are better adapted for
execution and on reliable data storages.
future networking based on virtual
networks and clouds.
The following sections are devoted to a review of the state of the art of some of
SecFuNet related technologies.
1.2.1. Virtualization
Virtual networks
The development of a proper future Internet requires security demands to be satisfied
[33, 34]. Regardless of the environment, location, and cost conditions, users must be offered
a friendly and trustable environment that takes the trad-off between convenience and
security into account. Besides, all the user data, information and behaviour must remain
secure and private. The SecFuNet project defines and develops a scheme for securely
managing and controlling the network infrastructure, supporting all security demands of
virtualized networks. This scheme takes into account the identification scheme and the
authentication control, both devised in this project, for controlling the access to the
management interface of each virtual network as well as for controlling the access to the
virtual networks by each user. Hence, access to each virtual network is always secure
independently of user location or type of device used. The scheme developed in this work
package efficiently manages virtual network data, guaranteeing secure access to the
network, accountability in the management actions, a high quality of service to each virtual
network, and also a high quality of experience to each user.
The SecFuNet project focuses on the management and control of virtual networks. In this
context, virtualization mechanisms will be used to virtualize entire networks. A single
physical network is virtualized to a number of concurrent virtual networks, sharing the same
physical resources. Each virtual network consists of virtual routers and virtual links and has
its own protocol stack. Xen[35] is an example of virtualization platform enabling such
features and will be used as base in this project. The virtualization software (hypervisor) of
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XEN runs as OS directly on the hardware. Error! Reference source not found. shows how a
physical machine can be shared by multiple virtual machines, also called Domain, with Xen.
The Xen hypervisor schedulers the physical resource accesses and handles the I/O
operations performed by the domains. Dom0 is a privileged domain that directly accesses
the hardware. Since Dom0 is a driver domain, it stores all physical device drivers and creates
an interface between the virtual drivers placed in the unprivileged domains and the physical
devices. In addition, Dom0 is also the management interface between the administrator and
the hypervisor to create virtual machines, modify Xen parameters, and manage Xen
operation.
The virtualization enables a physical network to support several different network
architectures simultaneously. Each virtual machine works as a virtual router running over the
same physical router, which is computer running Xen. Virtual routers may be created,
destroyed, moved, cloned, started, and stopped on the underlying hardware.
Figure 1 - Example of two virtual networks running over the same physical substrate, assuming the use of the
Xen virtualization platform.
Different virtual networks must be separated from each other and must be unaware of
their virtualization, of the underlying physical network, and of their concurrency to other
virtual networks. Isolation in the Input/Output operations, which are required in packet
forwarding, however, is a known issue in the Xen platform [36 - 39].
Different communities can benefit from virtualization: network managers would reduce
their operational costs; researchers should be able to conduct experiments that are flexible,
realistic and controlled, and to easily deploy new protocols and architectures; users (maybe
running virtual machines) would choose and connect to different virtual networks, possibly
run by different service providers, over a physical connection to one infrastructure provider
[40, 41].
SecFuNet Project creates mechanisms to manage the usage of resources by each virtual
network, guaranteeing isolation through a secure physical resource usage control and
management. Hence, relying on a secure identification and authentication, the project will
develop a management interface for configuring the virtual network resources according to
the available physical ones in each network node and link. This interface protects the privacy
of each virtual network, guaranteeing that neither the control nor the data of a virtual
network are available to the other networks. A controller is also designed to control the
usage of the physical resources by each virtual network, assuring that one virtual network
will not be able to interfere with other networks. This situation can occur in three situations:
if a virtual network is under attack that increases the demand on the virtual network; if the
network is malicious and attempts to prejudice other networks; or if the network demand
increases and the service level agreements of that network were not properly defined to
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deal with demand variations. Hence, the controller isolates virtual networks, securing the
physical infrastructure.
Other mechanisms are also developed to control the usage of the physical resources,
avoiding an overload that could break the isolation among virtual networks. A mechanism to
obtain the virtual network profile is developed to establish Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
in a trustful way. Further, an intelligent manager monitors the profile and the usage of each
network, managing the mapping of the virtual networks over the physical network, ensuring
a reliable environment for all networks. This manager is able to detect anomalous situations
and migrate virtual networks that could disturb the other virtual networks.
The scheme for a secure infrastructure developed in this project isolates virtual networks
and secures the physical infrastructure, which is essential for virtualization and cloud
computing usage.
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
Xen-based networks have isolation problems SecFuNet
provides
mechanisms
for
that compromise the security of the virtual guaranteeing a high isolation and QoS among
network environments.
virtual networks.
Instantiation and management of virtual
networks require an entity that can directly
access physical nodes and has the capability
to verify if the physical node is able to host
more virtual networks.
SecFuNet provides an interface for
configuring physical nodes according to
requirements of each virtual network and for
evaluating whether a virtual node can be
hosted by a physical node according to the
virtual network profile.
1.2.2. EAP-TLS
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a flexible framework standardized by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). According to RFC 3748, EAP implementations
conceptually consist (see Figure 3) of the four following components:
EAP method
EAP method 4
EAP-Peer Layer
4 EAP method
EAP-Layer
3
1
2
3
1
2
Lower-Layer
1
1
EAP method
EAP-Auth. Layer
EAP-Layer
RADIUS Server
Peer
Ordinateur central
Authentication Server
Figure 2 - EAP implementation.
1- The lower layer is responsible for transmitting and receiving EAP frames between the peer
and authenticator.
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2- The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via the lower layer; it implements
duplicate detection and retransmission, and delivers and receives EAP messages to and from
EAP methods.
3- EAP peer and authenticator layers. Based on the Code field, the EAP layer de-multiplexes
incoming EAP packets to the EAP peer and authenticator layers.
4- EAP methods implement the authentication algorithms, and receive and transmit EAP
messages. EAP methods can be implemented in smart cards. EAP packets (see figure 4) are
made with a four byte mandatory prefix, and an optional payload. The prefix includes the
three following attributes:
EAP Module
Client
4
EAP Module
Server
4
EAP Methods
EAP-Peer Layer
EAP-Layer
3
1
2
3
1
2
Lower-Layer
1
1
EAP-Auth. Layer
EAP-Layer
RADIUS Server
Peer
Ordinateur central
Authentication Server
Figure 3 - EAP packet.
- Code (one byte), the type of the EAP message, a choice between request, response, success
and failure.
- Identifier (one byte), a label associated to every EAP packet. A response includes an
identifier identical to a previous request.
- Length (two bytes) gives the total size of an EAP message.
An optional fifth byte indicates the type of an EAP packet e.g. the class of authentication
method able to deal with remaining data (labeled Type-Data in figure 4). The identity type
(01) is a special case that is not associated to any authentication method, but which is used
to collect an EAP-ID, whose meaning is either the user’s identity or the domain of the
authentication server. Success or failure packets comprise only four bytes, with an identifier
set to the value found in the last response.
An EAP session (see figure 4) begins with a couple of EAP-Request.Identity and EAPIdentity.
Response that transport either the user’s identity or the authentication server address.
Afterwards a set of EAP-Request and EAP-Response are exchanged between client and
server entities. At the end of a successful dialog, the server produces an EAP-Success packet.
A master session key (MSK) is then computed by client and server, which is used as a root
shared secret, for the computation of all remaining keys dealing with information privacy
and integrity.
The main achievement of EAP smart cards [20][21] is to confine EAP methods in a tamper
resistant devices (see figure 5). The device has not direct access to a communication
resource, which is provided by the Lower-Layer. Packets recovery and identity issues are
managed by the EAP-Peer or EAP-Auth entities.
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EapEngine.class
1
4 Method.class
Identity
Management
Methods
Credentials
Credential.class
Init
Object
Personalization
E2PROM
Auth.class
Network
Interface
Security
Management
2
Authentication
Interface
PIN codes
EAP-AKA
3
EAP-TLS
Init(Object
Credential)
ProcessEap()
Cryptographic API
RNG - MD5 – SHA1 - RSA
Javacard
Framework JC.2x
JC 2.x
Java Virtual Machine
draft-eap-smartcard
ISO 7816 Interface
Figure 4 - Tamper resistant device.
The EAP smart card was born in 2003, and is described by an internet draft, whose
thirteenth version was issued in august 2007 [22]. Schematically it processes EAP messages;
EAP clients process requests or notifications and returns responses; EAP servers analyses
responses and delivers requests. Its logical interface is a set of APDUs that call embedded
services, classified in four categories (see figure 6):
Authentication Methods
Identity List
EAP
AKA
Identity
My-Office
Get-Next-Identity()
Get-Current-Identity()
Get-Preferred-Identity()
Set-Identity()
Set-Multiple-Identity()
Get-Session-Key()
Get-Profile-Data()
Select-AID()
Add-Identity()
Delete-Identity()
Airport
EAP
TLS
EAP-ID
dot.com
EAP
???
EAP
TYPE
Credentials
EAP
TLS
Certificates
RSA Keys
EAP
imsi@airport.com AKA
IMSI
Symmetric Key
Identity
Service
Network
Service
Personalization
Service
Security
Service
Process-EAP()
Get-Session-Key
Reset()
Verify-PIN()
Change-PIN()
Enable-PIN()
Disable-PIN()
Unblock-PIN()
Figure 5 - Embedded services.
- The Identity Service. A smart card manages several network accounts; the terminal
operating systems performs an identity discovery process in order to browse its contents.
- The Network Service. EAP messages are processed by the smart card. At the end of a
successful authentication method, a session key is computed.
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- The Security Service. This service essentially manages PIN codes (Personal Identification
Number) needed for security purposes. There are two kinds of PIN code, first is used by the
smart card issuer and protects data dealing with identities, second establishes the link with
the card bearer and unlocks the EAP device.
- The Personalization Service. This service updates information stored in the smart card, such
as RSA private keys, certificates, symmetric secrets.
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
Authentication service is quite often limited The authentication is realized by a
by the implementation in the terminal.
microcontroller and does not depend on the
terminal.
SIM technology is not well adapted to future SecFuNet solution is perfectly adapted to
4G (LTE-A): terminal will be pure IP terminal. future 4G technologies.
1.2.3. Authentication server
Trust in authentication servers is a very critical topic that will be tackled the SecFuNet
project. The main challenge is to deploy authentication infrastructures, whose credentials
(private keys...) are still controlled by their legitimate owners are not exposed to hijacking
attacks.
From a technical point of view this target will be achieved by grids of secure microcontrollers
(such as smart cards), each of them embedding a server software, and the global
infrastructure being monitored and managed by a dedicated operating system.
The first grid was designed in [42] and was working with a cluster of java cards. A
Mandelbrot set was generated thanks to the combined calculation of smart cards.
Figure 6 - Scheme of the first experiments (2005) in smart cards grid.
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Figure 7 - First experiments (2005) in smart cards grid.
A second contribution ("smartcard enabled RADIUS server") dealing with grids of smart cards
[43,44] was published in 2006. This server is made of two parts:
- A RADIUS authentication server, running in a docking host. It offers the Ethernet
connectivity and IP services. It receives and sends RADIUS packets over UDP sockets. It builds
or parses RADIUS messages, handles the RADIUS secret, checks or generates authentication
attributes. EAP messages, transported by RADIUS payloads are forwarded to smartcards,
running EAP-Servers.
- EAP servers. Each smartcard runs an EAP-server, and fully handles an EAP-TLS
authentication procedure. Each component stores a unique X509 certificate and its
associated RSA private key. It computes EAP responses and produces EAP requests. At the
end of a successful authentication session, a MSK is calculated and delivered to the RADIUS
entity
USB smartcard readers
NAS
4
Java
Card
RADIUS packets
RADIUS
Server
2
3
1
AS.exe
Docking
HOST
EAP
Messages
Figure 8 - first generation (2006) of "smartcard enabled RADIUS server".
An EAP session is a set of messages associated to an unique Session-Id value, which is
obtained by the concatenation of two values, the NAS-Identifier (RADIUS attribute n°32) and
the Calling-Station-Id (the client’s MAC address, corresponding to RADIUS attribute n°31) as
follows:
Session-Id = NAS-Identifier | Calling-Station-Id
A session begins with an EAP-Identity response and ends with an EAP notification (either
Success or Failure). It is associated to a unique smartcard. When no devices are available, the
incoming RADIUS packet (starting a session) is silently discarded.
Due to smartcard slowness, each EAP message is handled by a thread that forwards EAP
response to the appropriate smartcard, waits for its response, builds a RADIUS packet and
finally transmits it towards the NAS.
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An EAP server processes only once a particular message. The associated RADIUS packet is
recorded, and sent again when an incoming duplicated RADIUS packet is detected.
AS is also in charge of session retries. If no activity is detected during a given timeout, a
retransmission occurs. After a few retries the session is released, and its associated
smartcard is ready for new allocations.
Figure 8 shows a plug and play realization of a smartcard enabled RADIUS server. Several
USB smartcard readers, equipped with EAP servers, are plugged to an USB hub. A mass
storage device stores the AS code. The system works in a standalone way, and is used by the
docking host without any previous set-up.
A third generation of smart card grids was discussed in [45]. This new architecture splits the
RADIUS server into two main components: a RADIUS authentication server and distributed
EAP servers.
Figure 9xx:- third
third generation
generation (2010)
(2010) of
ofsmart
smart card
card grids.
grids
Figure
The RADIUS authentication server is located on a distant host and is in charge of the
following tasks:
- It sends and receives RADIUS datagrams from and to the NAS, thanks to UDP sockets.
- It builds or analyses RADIUS messages and more specifically encapsulates EAP messages
from the smartcard into RADIUS datagrams forwarded to the NAS, and reciprocally extracts
RADIUS datagrams from the NAS into EAP messages forwarded to the appropriate server
smartcard.
- It parses and builds APDUs which are communication units used to interact with the
smartcards as explained below.
- It handles the RADIUS secret and computes or checks the associated authentication digest
and attributes.
- It opens stream sockets with the smartcards grid and associates an incoming session with a
single smartcard and its related connection.
If t1 is the computing time for a process an authentication with a single computer, and tp for
a grid of p smart cards, the acceleration factor (Sp) is defined as
Sp = t1/tp, with 1 ≤ Sp ≤ p
The acceleration factor ideal grid of p smart cards should be around p. However in [44] it
was observed that the acceleration factor was limited to 5, due to hardware, software and
networking issues.
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The SecFuNet project will define a new and innovative architecture, based on software,
hardware, and enhanced networking protocols, which could deliver high speed trusted
authentication services.
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
Authentication server need to be installed in SecFuNet provide a new generation of
secure environment.
Authentication servers that can be deployed
easily.
Privacy is difficult to provide with current The SecFuNet solution provides a strong
authentication servers.
privacy: closed privacy.
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1.2.4. Identification Scheme
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
Identification schemes are not well secured.
SecFuNet provides a simple and highly secure
identification process.
Current schemes are mainly based on The SecFuNet scheme is based on the secure
passwords and so on. If not the solutions are microcontroller and is simple. Login and
expensive and can be attacked.
password are avoided that remove phishing
and other attacks.
1.2.5. Intrusion tolerant algorithms
Communication mechanisms can only work in a secure and dependable way if supported by
a resilient management infrastructure. Security and dependability of the network
management itself remains a problem to address, because it must remain resilient enough
to perform its operations, often in situations of instability, overload or attack. This is
especially true when specialized, secure, management services are at stake, leading to the
known paradox of "who guards the guardian." Although the availability and integrity of such
services are often taken for granted, they remain single points of failure, either concerning
availability or attacks. This problem claims for a resilient infrastructure that protects both
the operation and its management. By incremental design, in a few necessary architectural
components and middleware, we may enable communication among the rest of the
system’s components, thus yielding secure and fault-tolerant network operation and
management.
Going further than recent research achievements on fault and intrusion tolerant
architecting, we will study in this project the entanglement of the network-level and
management-level realms. The objective is to build fault tolerance and security for an
infrastructure that will support network-level resilience-related operations (fault diagnosis,
root-cause analysis, recovery, etc). This interaction and entanglement breaks the
assumptions in which previous architectures were built, i.e., that the network is operational
and that network-level faults can only cause limited packet corruptions and losses. SecFuNet
will define the architecture of the management infrastructure, including the definition of
what will be its core components and how they will be interconnected and organized, taking
as input the set of on-line management-related functionalities that need to be secured.
By using replication techniques based on diversity, we will build a management
infrastructure on previous efforts on designing intrusion-tolerant architectures and
middleware for Internet applications and for critical information infrastructures like, for
example, the power grid. The changes in the payload architecture (be it legacy or
professional) must remain minimal. Applying more profound changes in the control-plane
components may have dramatic consequences when considering the risks incurred in
maintaining the current status quo. Because of that, although we intend to apply these
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results primarily to network management, it may be the case that some of them may be
applicable to the payload network, depending on the use-cases to be considered.
The components of the architecture have to communicate and, most especially, have to
cooperate in order to achieve tolerance to the remaining faults and intrusions (e.g., at
architectural components). The protocols needed for this purpose are part of the
infrastructure middleware, as a set of software services yielded between the low-level
communication protocols (e.g., IP, TCP, SSL) and the applications (e.g., the failure diagnosis
mechanisms). We will leverage on recent promising techniques for building protocols that
address the different levels of criticality in the foreseen architectures. The architecture and
middleware defined in this project aim to be generic enough to be useable in a wide range of
environments. However, the use-case scenarios to be defined will be a first target to
consider the applicability of these results and will be used to assess them, through proof-ofconcept prototypes.
Systems that deploy critical functions that must work correctly even if the remaining system
is facing instability, overload or is under attack normally provide properties which are
weaker than required, even if they maintain correct operation on average situations. To
tackle this problem, we propose to use a hybrid system model underlying the architectural
solutions and mechanisms proposed in the previous tasks. In such a hybrid system model, a
system is composed of components that have different properties and can rely on different
sets of assumptions (e.g., security- wise, timeliness-wise) [46].
In this project, we will consider that existing network operation and management systems
reside in a hostile environment where overload, instability and attacks can happen. As
required by our protocols, we will enhance some parts of the system with components
nicknamed wormholes which, by construction, are small and either more secure or more
timely than the remaining components. The Trusted Computing Group Trusted Platform
Module [47] philosophy can be seen as a special case of a wormhole [48]. The great virtue of
this approach is that wormholes can most of the times be plug-in modules, preserving legacy
existing infrastructure equipment, reducing its vulnerabilities and increasing its robustness.
The existence of wormholes enables execution of many new and more powerful distributed
services, such as critical functions required to the network management and operation. To
do this, we intend to evaluate and prototype general-purpose wormhole components, which
can be programmed with our protocols and software, and plugged into any existing system
(independently of its architecture).
A practical example concerns the authentication and authorization infrastructure proposed
in this project. Although decentralization seems to be a good approach to overcome the
vulnerability of centralized operation, the problem lies in the difficulty of handling
distribution in practice [49], even more in the presence of malicious faults. Here the idea is
to create a wormhole-based channel for critical communication, which, unlike the rest of the
network, is synchronous. This ensures bounds on communication delays and gives
unambiguous indications on node failures.
Another practical problem faced inside critical facilities is the lack of cryptographic services
to avoid certain kinds of attacks [50] or to avoid simple network sniffing. Unfortunately, the
large computational cost has been deterring widespread adoption of cryptography. This
problem is especially important in this project, because cryptography lies at the heart of
several of the techniques we intend to develop. To mitigate this inconvenience, we propose
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to use a wormhole serving key purposes in the protection of the management architecture,
ensure that it produces correct signatures even under the presence of intruders.
As we assume that network management systems will be under attack continuously
(independently of the time scale), the architectural components investigated can become
insufficient after some time. This is because (fault and intrusion) tolerance mechanisms are
necessarily based on pre-defined resource assumptions (e.g., maximum number of
intrusions) and such assumptions can be violated during system execution. Therefore, highly
critical systems of the core management infrastructure can be further enhanced through
self-healing monitors, based on reactive-proactive recovery techniques enhanced by
diversity, similar to those proposed in [51].
State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
1.2.6. Cryptographic schemes
Most of the existing cryptographic algorithms were designed to be run on machines which
are usually trusted and physically protected from adversaries. For instance, the security of
the majority of the existing encryption and signature schemes rely on the fact that the secret
keys used to sign messages or decrypt encrypted messages are safely stored and not
accessible to the adversary. Unfortunately, this assumption may no longer be true in future
networks based on virtual networks and clouds where the adversary may have partial
control over these networks or over the devices on which some of the cryptographic
operations are performed. In fact, as shown in [52], the use of virtualization by third-party
cloud providers can introduce new vulnerabilities in the system by allowing cross-virtualmachine side-channel attacks to extract information from a target virtual machine on the
same machine. As a result, one of the goals of the SecFuNet Project is to design new
cryptographic schemes which are better suited to virtual network and cloud environments
and that are more resilient to side-channel attacks. In order to achieve this goal, we intend
to use existing leakage-resilient cryptosystems, such as the one in [53] as the basis.
Another important issue to be considered in future networks based on virtual networks and
clouds is that of secure outsourcing of computation, where computationally weak devices
delegate their computations to more powerful computation systems. In such systems, there
are several aspects that need to be taken into consideration such as the correctness of the
computation since there may be financial incentive for the computation server to return
incorrect answers, if such answers require less work and are unlikely to be detected by the
client. As a result, it is important to ...
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State of the Art and Limitations
SecFuNet Innovation
The majority of the existing cryptographic SecFuNet will provide new cryptographic
protocols are susceptible to side-channel solutions which are provably resilient to
attacks.
side channel attacks.
Most cryptographic identification and
authentication schemes either rely on weak
passwords or were designed for trusted
environments.
SecFuNet will provide new cryptographic
solutions for the identification and
authentication problems based on secure
microcontrollers which are more adapted to
the virtual networks and clouds.
References
[1] Blunk, L., and Vollbrecht, J., Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF, RFC 2284, "PPP
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 1998.
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RFC 3748, "Extensible Authentication Protocol, (EAP)", 2004.
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issues in software virtual routers”, in PRESTO ’08, Proceedings of the ACM workshop on
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[39] Fernandes. N. C. and Duarte, O. C. M. B., “XNetMon: A Network Monitor for Securing
Virtual Networks”, to appear in IEEE ICC 2011 Next Generation Networking and Internet
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H. E. T., Campista, M. E. M., Costa, L. H. M. K., and Duarte, O. C. M. B,.”Virtual networks:
Isolation, performance, and trends”, to appear in the Annals of Telecommunication, 2010
[41] Pisa, P. S., Fernandes, N. C., Carvalho, H. E. T., Moreira, M. D. D., Campista, M. E. M.,
Costa, L. H. M. K., and Duarte, O. C. M. B., "OpenFlow and Xen-Based Virtual Network
Migration", in The World Computer Congress 2010 - Network of the Future Conference,
pages 170-181, Brisbane, Australia, 2010.
[42] Chaumette S. et. al., "Secure distributed computing on a Java Card grid". 19 th IEEE
International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05), 2005.
[43] Urien, P., Dandjinou, M., "Introducing Smartcard Enabled RADIUS Server", The 2006
International Symposium on Collaborative Technologies and Systems (CTS 2006), 2006.
[44] Urien, P., "Open two-factor authentication tokens, for emerging wireless LANs.", Fifth
Annual IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC’08), 2008.
[45] Urien, P, Marie, E., Kiennert, C.; "An Innovative Solution for Cloud Computing
Authentication: Grids of EAP-TLS Smart Cards" 2010 Fifth International Conference on Digital
Telecommunications (ICDT), 2010.
[46] Verissimo, P., ”Travelling through Wormholes: a new look at Distributed Systems
Models”, in SIGACT News, vol. 37, no. 1, pages 66-81, 2006.
[47] Trusted Computing Group, “TPM Main Part 1 Design Principles. Specification Version
1.2”, Revision 103, July 2007.
[48] Giuliana S. Veronese, Miguel Correia, Alysson N. Bessani, Lau C. Lung, Paulo Verissimo,
“Minimal Byzantine Fault Tolerance: Algorithm and Evaluation,” Technical Report DI/FCUL TR
2009-15, June 2009.
Proposal Part B: page 26 of 91
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[49] Michael J. Fischer , Nancy A. Lynch , Michael S. Paterson. “Impossibility of distributed
consensus with one faulty process”. Journal of the ACM (JACM). Volume 32, Issue 2, April
1985.
[50] Bernhard Ager Holger Dreger Anja Feldmann. Exploring the Overhead of DNSSEC.
(http://www.net.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/~anja/feldmann/papers/dnssec05.pdf). 2005.
[51] Paulo Sousa, Alysson Bessani, Miguel Correia, Nuno Ferreira Neves, Paulo Veríssimo.
Highly Available Intrusion-Tolerant Services with Proactive-Reactive Recovery. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, to appear, 2009.
[52] Thomas Ristenpart, Eran Tromer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. Hey, You, Get Off
of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds. Computer and
Communications Security - CCS 2009.
[53] Elette Boyle and Gil Segev and Daniel Wichs. Fully Leakage-Resilient Signatures.
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011, ©Springer, to appear.
[54] Thomas Ristenpart and Scott Yilek. When Good Randomness Goes Bad: Virtual Machine
Reset Vulnerabilities and Hedging Deployed Cryptography. Network and Distributed Systems
Security - NDSS 2010.
[55] Rosario Gennaro, Craig Gentry, and Bryan Parno. Non-Interactive Verifiable Computing:
Outsourcing Computation to Untrusted Workers. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2010,
LNCS 6223, ©Springer, Tal Rabin (Ed.), August 2010.
[56] Kai-Min Chung, Yael Kalai, and Salil Vadhan. Improved Delegation of Computation using
Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2010, LNCS 6223,
©Springer, Tal Rabin (Ed.), August 2010.
[57] Hovav Shacham and Brent Waters. Compact Proofs of Retrievability. Advances in
Cryptology -- ASIACRYPT 2008. LNCS 5350, ©Springer, Josef Pieprzyk (Ed.), December 2008
1.3
S/T methodology and associated work plan
1.3.1. Overall strategy of the work plan
The goal of the SecFuNet project is to provide solutions enabling to build a scalable and
robust secure environment with low complexity for large-scale, dynamic network
environments. The objective will be met relying on the use of microcontroller units, EAP-TLS
protocol, a simple and efficient Identification scheme, new encryption process, and a
strongly improved security of virtual networks. The project will investigate and identify
functions which partial or full decentralization that would contribute to the reduction of
network operation complexity.
In order to devise and implement the SecFuNet capabilities, a smart and well-structured
approach is required. This approach should be able to:



Build on the relevant pre-existing know-how so that the objectives are achieved
through continuity of the research.
Devise the network secure eco-system architecture, technology roadmaps, and selfsecurity capacities evolution.
Install a pre-SecFuNet testbed using a virtual network platform to experiment and
test the different algorithms that will be proposed by the project.
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

Identify and build a thorough understanding of the technological hurdles to be
overcome by research and development.
Bring the results of the research and development to the market by natural phased
proof of concepts, validation and benchmarking.
The approach adopted by the SecFuNet consortium is addressing six main objectives:





The analysis of system requirements and introduction of a generic system
architecture.
The implementation of a pre-SecFuNet platform for experimental purposes.
A well adapted microcontroller to support the different processes proposed in the
project.
The validation and experiment of the developed SecFuNet results.
The migration path from current technologies to future technologies provided by the
SecFuNet project.
In order to support the optimal organisation of the work, the project structure of
SecFuNet has been devised to fully satisfy the project objectives. The intention is to develop
a very tight integration of the various research tracks (WPs). Therefore, SecFuNet WPs are
built around first the experimental platform and second the main research tracks of the
project. There are 6 technical WPs (WP1, WP2, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6), one WP (WP0)
dealing with management aspects, and one WP (WP7) dealing with the orchestration of
dissemination and exploitation of results. The WP structures are depicted in figure below.
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1.3.2. Work-packages and components timing
(Deliverables are shown in blue, milestones in green.)
WP0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Project Management and reporting
Interactions with other project and community
WP1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Virtual network architecture and use cases
Microcontroller and security
EAP-TLS and legacy solution
Secure framework
WP2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Infrastructure
The array
The software
Deployment on the network
WP3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Define and specify the secure identification process
OpenID
Shibboleth
WP4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Virtual network platform definition
Isolation between virtual networks
Profiling and virtual network migration
WP5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Architecture components
Thrustworthy authentication
WP6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Encryption framework
Virtual networks
Cloud
WP7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Test
Dissemination
Standardization
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1.3.3. Work-packages and components interdependencies
The following figure shows the dependencies between the different work-packages of
the project.

Work-package 0: Project technical management and coordination

Work-package 1: Requirement and functional architecture

Work-package 2: Authentication server

Work-package 3: Identity process

Work-package 4: Virtual networks isolation and testbed

Work-package 5: Infrastructure resilience

Work-package 6: Cryptographic schemes

Work-package 7: Test, Dissemination and Standardisation
Work-package 0 is responsible for the overall technical project management and
coordination. Work-package 7 is responsible for the testbed, and driving and coordinating
the dissemination, standardisation and exploitation of results as well as proposing unified
communication initiatives promoting both the SecFuNet project and the technologies it
covers and defines. These two work-packages thus have a transversal action scope.
WP1
WP3
WP4
WP7
WP0
WP2
WP5
WP6
Figure 7- Overall project structure and components dependency.
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Work-package 1 is organized around four different tasks. The following picture shows
the dependency of these tasks amongst themselves and with the other work-packages.
T1.1
Scenario &
Use Cases
T1.2
Reference
Platform
WP2, WP3, WP4, WP5, WP6
T1.3
Limitations &
Requirements
T1.4
Architecture
Framework
WP3, WP4
WP4
Figure 8- Work-package 1 detailed view.
The prime objective of Task 1.1 is to propose network scenarios standing as concrete
use-cases enabling the specification of the SecFuNet platform. The outputs of these tasks
will also serve as inputs to WP3 and WP4 to specialise the generic components these workpackages will define.
The objective of Task 1.2 is to specify the reference platform serving as an experimental
basis for the whole SecFuNet project.
The main goal of Task 1.3, based on the previously described network study cases,
management/control architecture and management/control related operations, is to
identify and list the shortcomings based on which a set of requirements will be then derived.
Finally, the objective of Task 1.4 is the derivation of the high level SecFuNet system
behavioural specification and main functional building blocks. This high level architecture
will be refined by two work-packages: WP3 defining the Identity process and WP4 defining
the Virtual networks and isolation in between.
Work-package 2 is devoted to the highly secure authentication server. We want to
define and develop an authentication server based on the microcontroller defined in the
previous task. The server will be built around an array of microcontrollers. Microcontrollers
will be the token associated to the user token so that the pair of token can communication
in a totally save environment.
Tasks T2.1 and T2.2 will define the structure and the components of the authentication
server.
Task 2.1 consists in the definition of the architecture of the server.
Task 2.2 will define the bus and communications within the server to guaranty a
response time to an EAP-TLS authentication of few seconds.
Task 2.3 will define and develop the software of the server to permit scalability of the
environment.
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To finalize this work package, Task 2.4 will test the server on the SecFuNet virtual
network environment that will be available through WP7.
T.2.3
Software
WP1
T.2.1
Architecture of the
Server
T.2.2
The Array
T.2.4
Test on the
Platform
WP7
Figure 9- Work-package 2 detailed view.
Work-package 3 is responsible for specifying a secure identification process for Open-ID
and Shibboleth environment. This work-package is divided into three tasks:
T3.1 will define and specify the secure identification process.
T3.2 will establish the previous process in the Open-ID environment.
T3.3 will establish the previous process in the Shibboleth environment.
Work-package 4 develops a secure scheme for guaranteeing the isolation between
virtual networks so that one network cannot negatively affect the performance of other
virtual networks through an attack. Also, it provides the secure management and control of
virtual network resources using the proposed identification scheme, guaranteeing isolation
and privacy about the allocated virtual network resources. This package is divided into three
tasks:
Task 4.1: State-of-the-art in isolation and profiling of virtual networks
Task 4.2: A mechanism to secure physical resource usage by virtual networks and to
ensure privacy, isolation, and reliability in the virtual network environment.
Task 4.3: A mechanism to create virtual network profiles, evaluate resource usage
and remap virtual networks under attack.
The objective of work-package 5 is to provide a new generation for infrastructure
resilience. This work-package will develop mechanisms to achieve resilience against attacks
or accidents which may affect the communications and authentication/authorization
infrastructure. The two main vectors of work are: achieving resilient communications and
management; providing trustworthy operation of the authentication service.
The work-package 5 is divided into 2 tasks:
Task 5.1 Architecture components for resilient network communications and
management. The idea is taking the secure comm's substrate to be developed in other WPs,
and solve several remaining problems:
- Maintaining interconnection resilience of each layer, under attack, e.g., through
intrusion tolerant reconfiguration mechanisms. Possibly providing different levels of
resilience to different layers (e.g., legacy vs. premium).
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- Ensuring trustworthy inter-layer communication, such that no layer contaminates
another, through intrusion tolerant gateways.
Task 5.2 Trustworthy authentication service architecture. The idea is taking the
secure authentication server architecture developed in another WP and provide it with
additional resilience mechanisms based on intrusion tolerance and self-healing mechanisms,
making it able to survive very severe attacks. Hybrid distributed systems models based on
trusted-trustworthy components will be followed, leveraging for example the existence of
the secure microcontroller specified in another WP.
Work-package 6 will bring new extensions to cryptographic techniques adapted to future
network architectures and mainly virtualized systems. How to use the secure
microcontrollers in virtualized networks?
In Task 6.1 is devoted to new encryption schemes taking into account the secure
microcontroller.
In Task 6.2 the idea is to define a specific encryption scheme depending on the virtual
network: the same token is used for the access to the different Cloud through the different
virtual networks.
Task 6.3 will define a solution to access a cloud in an encrypted solution.
Finally, work-package 7 describes the tests using the developed mechanism over the
developed secure testbed. This work package also deals with the dissemination of the
proposals and the standardization.
In Task 7.1, we prepare the testbed, integrating and evaluating all the proposed
solutions.
Task 7.2 is focused in disseminating the obtained results in the main conferences of this
area.
Task 7.2 is devoted to the standardization of the main obtained results.
1.3.4. Overall approach to risk management
The Project Management Team proactively manages the risks. Following the agenda
items will be put in board meetings agendas:





Identification of any risk on the project success.
Evaluation the probability, cause, effect of the risks.
Management of the risks: revision of relevance.
Recovery plan: maximizing positive outcomes and minimising negative outcomes
of each risk.
Report to upper management if needed.
The main sources of risks currently identified are the following:






Objectives and project deliverables are “research tasks” that may not progress as
forecasted.
Missing technical data.
Multiple alternatives.
Non-realistic performance standard.
Errors in design phases.
Lack of contingency plans.
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
Lack of skills in consortium.
The Project Manager will manage the risks and maintain the risk management process
and policies. A risk management table is capturing the overall risks and their associated
status
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The following table will be systematically reviewed and eventually augmented during
each PMT and Board meetings.
Risk description
Level
Related
WP
Monitoring &
Decision
Contingency plan
Inability to find
proper network
scenarios to
serve as
concrete usecases
Low
WP1
Monitor the progress
of the team and verify
milestones inside
tasks.
Deeper research on the
area and use scenarios
from previous works,
which are proven to be
adequate to project.
Face secure
hardware
limitations and/or
restrictions
Low
WP2
Monitor the existing
hardware and keep
contact with hardware
developers.
Use standardized
EAP_TLS compatible
hardware with known
working drivers.
Instability issues
on virtualization
platform
Medium
WP4
Monitor the use of the
virtualization platform
and annotate all bugs
and misbehaviours.
Use previous and stable
versions of the
virtualization platform,
that has fewer features
but higher reliability.
Incapacity of
employing the
encryption
scheme in the
existent hardware
due to hardware
limitations
Low
WP6
Keep track of
Develop simpler
compatibility issues of cryptographic algorithms
the used hardware,
Buy hardware with higher
monitor and test the
compatibility/capacity.
development stages of
the scheme into the
hardware.
Difficulty to
integrate all
proposed
solutions
Medium
All WPs
Monitor the software
development and
make integration
tests. Also, monitor
and refine the module
diagram of all
solutions of the
project.
Review integration
modules.
Delays in the
chronogram
Medium
All WPs
Keep monitoring the
progress of tasks and
compare the progress
of the team with
previous works. Also,
use functional metrics
to monitor tasks.
Add more members to
the team and reduce
some of the software
capabilities. Leave minor
functionalities for further
development.
Lower
productivity of
Low
All WPs
Monitor progress of
tasks and milestones
Meeting with managers
and WP leaders to resolve
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teams
and promote weekly
meetings to check
progress.
issues, allocate members
in other tasks, and hire
new members.
Development of
unreliable
software
functionalities
Medium
All WPs
Employ software
engineering
techniques to avoid
misunderstanding of
requisites. Establish
solid bug tracking
mechanisms.
Refactor software to fix
errors and improve
reliability.
Team member
leaves the project
Low
All WPs
Monitor if all
members are working
and how their tasks
are performing.
Readjust chronogram,
transfer tasks to other
groups, and hire new
members.
Changes in the
chronogram of
tasks
Medium
All WPs
Monitor the execution
of the chronogram.
Readjust the chronogram
and maintain its
coherence.
Underestimate
the time needed
to perform a
given task
Low
All WPs
Monitor the execution
of the chronogram.
Increase the working
hours of the team, hire
more people and
postpone tasks that are
out of the critical path.
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1.3.5. List of Work-packages
Workpackage
No1
Work-package title
Type of
activity2
0
Project Management
Coordination
and MGT
1
Requirements and Functional RTD
Architecture
2
Authentication server
3
Lead
partic
no.3
1
Lead partic.
short name
Personmonths4
ET
25
Start
month5
End
month
1
30
UPMC
1
7
RTD
IMP
4
14
Identity process
RTD
TPT
8
26
4
Virtual network isolation
RTD
UFRJ
8
26
5
Infrastructure resilience
RTD
UL
6
30
6
Cryptographic schemes
RTD
ENS
9
30
7
Evaluation testbed, results
dissemination and
standardisation
DEM
?
1
30
TOTAL
1
Work-package number: WP 1 – WP n.
2
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the
dissemination and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM =
Demonstration; MGT = Management of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable
in this call.
3
Number of the participant leading the work in this work-package.
4
The total number of person-months allocated to each work-package.
5
Measured in months from the project start date (month 1).
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1.3.6. List of Deliverables
Del. no. 6
Deliverable name
WP
no.
Nature7
Dissemination
level
Delivery date9
8
(proj.month)
D0.1
Project Handbook
0
R
PU
3
D0.2
SecFuNet Annual Report Year
1
0
R
PU
10
D0.3
SecFuNet Annual Report Year
2
0
R
PU
20
D0.4
SecFuNet Annual Report Year
3
0
R
PU
30
D0.5
Interactions
with
Other
Projects
and
Technology
Evolution Monitoring
0
R
PU
30
D1.1
Virtual network architecture &
Use Cases
1
R
PU
2
D1.2
Microcontroller and security
1
R
PU
3
D1.3
Limitations and requirements
1
R
PU
5
D1.4
Secure framework
1
R
PU
7
D2.1
Infrastructure
2
R
PU
8
D2.2
Array
2
R
PU
10
D2.3
Software
2
P
PU
11
D2.4
Deployment on the network
2
R
PU
12
D3.1
Secure Identification process
3
R
PU
10
D3.2
Open-ID
3
R
PU
12
6
Deliverable numbers in order of delivery dates. Please use the numbering convention <WP
number>.<number of deliverable within that WP>. For example, deliverable 4.2 would be the second
deliverable from work-package 4.
7
Please indicate the nature of the deliverable using one of the following codes:
R = Report, P = Prototype, D = Demonstrator, O = Other
8
Please indicate the dissemination level using one of the following codes:
PU = Public
PP = Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services).
RE = Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services).
CO = Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services).
9
Measured in months from the project start date (month 1).
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D3.3
Shibboleth
3
R
PU
18
D4.1
Virtual Network
definition
platform
4
R
PU
9
D4.2
Isolation
networks
virtual
4
R
PU
12
D4.3
Profiling and virtual network
migration
4
R
PU
15
D5.1
Architecture components
5
R
PU
12
D5.2
Thrustworthy authentication
5
R
PU
18
D6.1
Encryption framework
6
R
PU
15
D6.2
Encryption for Virtual
networks
6
P
PU
26
D6.3
Encryption for Cloud access
6
D
PU
30
D7.1
Testbed conception and
deployment
7
O
PU
18
D7.2
Test and Evaluation Report
7
O
PU
30
D7.3
Results Dissemination and
Standardization Proposals
7
O
PU
30
between
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1.3.7. Work-packages descriptions
Work-package 0 description
Work-package
number
WP0
Start date or starting
event:
T0
Work-package title
Project Management and Coordination
Activity type10
RTD
Participant
number
2
3
STM
Person-months per 6
participant
Participant
number
Participant
name
Participant
name
1
short ET
9
short UFPE
Person-months per
participant
5
6
7
8
UPMC TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
UFRJ UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS
DWA
6
1
1
1
1
1
4
Objectives
In accordance with the project management structure identified in section 2.1, work-package
0 is chartered to ensure a global technical coordination of the actions undertaken throughout
the SecFuNet project ensuring timeliness delivery of outputs, to deal with risk management
and possibly supporting WP leaders in their tasks. WP0 will also address the management of
legal and administrative issues (the overall legal, contractual, financial and administrative
management of the consortium, preparation, update and management of the consortium
agreement)
The main objectives of WP0 are:

Management of the Project and coordination of WPs activities.

Coordination with other Projects (within and possibly outside FP7).

Organization of Project reporting and administrative issues (Periodic Reports, audits,
etc.).
10
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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Description of work
The role of this work-package will be focused on the delivery of global project reports (annual
reports, meeting minutes, etc.) and to interface with other European Project dealing with topics of
interest for SecFuNet.
The work is therefore organized in two Tasks:
Task 0.1 – Project management and reporting

Project activities follow-up per work-packages through regular bottom reporting (Partners
→ WP leaders → Project Coordinator). Project reporting must be done at least every
quarter, and if required every month (to be discussed for the project consortium
agreement

Meeting minutes to report meeting discussions and action points

Annual Reports compilation for the EC
Task 0.2 – Interactions with other projects and the research community

Follow-up of other related European projects based on information received from WP
and/or direct communication channels.

Identification and Triggering of dedicated Cross-Project workshop when required

Technology monitoring and surveillance ensuring continued synchronization of the
SecFuNet project objectives with evolving technologies.
Deliverables
D01: Project Handbook defining quality plan (M3)
D02: SecFuNet Annual Report Year 1 (M10)
D03: SecFuNet Annual Report Year 2 (M20)
D04: SecFuNet Annual Report Year 3 (M30)
D05: Interactions with Other Projects and Technology Evolution Monitoring (M18, M36)
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Work-package 1 description
Work-package
number
WP1
Start date or starting
event:
T0
Work-package title
Requirements and Functional Architecture
Activity type11
RTD
Participant number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Participant
name
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 6
participant
10
12
6
2
1
6
2
Participant number 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS
DWA
?
?
?
?
?
Participant
name
short ET
short UFPE UFRJ
Person-months per
participant
?
Objectives

Develop a common understanding of the principles governing the operation of virtual
networks.

Draw up an inventory of all the actions undertaken from the security operations of a
virtual network to the cloud deployment one.

Identify the limits and the barriers these operational principles constitute towards the
security of virtual networks.

Propose a framework overcoming these limitations and enabling the specification of a
set of algorithms to provide security schemes for the future networks based on
virtualization and access to the cloud.
Description of work
WP1 is organized according a stepwise approach from an in depth review of the state of
the art to the specification of the framework within which subsequent WPs will define the
building blocks and mechanisms of the solution targeted by SecFuNet project.
The key steps of the work-package are the following:

Define the virtual network architecture of the future networks and some case
11
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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studies.

Determine the microcontroller to be used in the project and the security items
associated.

Define the EAP-TLS and legacy solution to be developed.

Define the global security framework.
As the starting point of the project, WP1 will be responsible for the detailed specification
of the virtual network to be used for the testbed as well as of precise study and use cases to
which the novel secure architecture will be applied.
Task 1.1 – Virtual network architecture and use cases
The prime objective of this task is to propose virtual network scenarios based on XEN
and Open Flow and security concrete use-cases enabling the specification of the SecFuNet
solution. These scenarios are based on virtual network environments such as the one
depicted on the following picture.
Figure 14- A virtualized network.
Each case study refers to different kind of security and virtual networks.
Case study 1 (Authentication)
The first study case will address authentication in different kind of virtual networks.
Case study 2 (Identification)
The second study case will target the identification process with different types of virtual
networks. Different solutions will be studied: a common authentication server for the
substrate network, virtual authentication servers for different types of virtual networks, and
physical authentication servers associated to each virtual network.
Case study 3 (Resilient networks)
This third study case will be based on different virtual networks.
Case study 4 (Encryption schemes)
As in the previous case study, we will define some study case associated with different
kind of virtual networks.
It will be the role of the Task 1.1 to refine the virtual network topologies under study and
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the corresponding use-case.
Task 1.2 – Microcontroller and security
This task has to define the secure microcontroller to be used for the project, and to
define how secure algorithms will work inside the microcontroller.
Task 1.3 –EAP-TLS and legacy solution
The first goal of this task is to define a very general solution based on EAP-TLS and
eventually on legacy solutions where secure algorithms (authentication, encryption,
identification, etc.) could be deployed inside the microcontroller. The idea is to avoid the use
of the processor and the memory of the terminal.
Task 1.4 – Secure framework
This task is dedicated to the microcontroller and the algorithms to be implemented inside to
form the secure framework: what algorithms, how to implement them, what power for the
CPU and the memory, etc.
Task of the different participants of this work-package.
Deliverables (brief description) and month of delivery
D11: Virtual network architecture & Use Cases (M2)
D12: Microcontroller and security (M3)
D13: Limitations and Requirements (M5)
D14: Secure framework (M7)
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Work-package 2 description
Work-package
number
WP2
Start date or starting
event:
Work-package title
Authentication server
Activity type12
RTD
Participant
number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 2
participant
2
4
10
0
10
?
?
Participant
number
10
11
12
13
14
15
UFRJ
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS DWA
?
?
?
?
?
Participant
name
Participant
name
1
T0+4
short ET
9
short UFPE
Person-months per ?
participant
?
Objectives
Define and develop a highly secure authentication server. We want to define and develop
an authentication server based on the microcontroller defined in the previous task. The
server will be built around an array of microcontrollers. Microcontrollers will be the token
associated to the user token so that the pair of token can communication in a totally save
environment.
Description of work
The work will be to define the architecture of the array server built with several
hundreds of microcontrollers. The server will have to satisfy some security constraints and
reach a performance acceptable in classical authentication (few second for each
authentication).
Task 2.1- Infrastructure
The objective of this task is to define the infrastructure of the server to get the
performance necessary in a classical usage.
Task 2.2 – Array
12
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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This task will define the array architecture necessary to have a scalable server and
permitting the authentication server to act quickly when necessary.
Task 2.3 - Software
This task is the next step in the definition of the secure authentication server: the
software has to be distributed on the different microcontroller and to define the associated
server (RADIUS but some more)
Task 2.4 – Deployment on the network
This last task in this work-package will be devoted to the deployment of the server on
the virtual environment to test performance, privacy, etc.
As the leader of this WP, TPT associated with IMP will conceive and test the server on the
Internet as soon as possible.
Deliverables

D21: Infrastructure (M8)

D22: Array (M10)

D23: Software (M11)

D24: Deployment on the network (M12)
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Work-package 3 description
Work-package
number
WP3
Start date or starting
event:
T0+8
Work-package title
Identity process
Activity type13
RTD
Participant number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Participant
name
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 10
participant
2
4
4
?
0
?
?
Participant number 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Participant
name
UFRJ
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS
DWA
?
?
?
?
?
?
short ET
short UFPE
Person-months per ?
participant
Objectives
This work-package is responsible for specifying a secure identification process for
Open-ID and Shibboleth environment. This work-package is divided into three tasks:
T3.1 will define and specify the secure identification process.
T3.2 will establish the previous process in the Open-ID environment.
T3.3 will establish the previous process in the Shibboleth environment.
Description of work
The overall work of the work-package can be divided into three related activities, hereby
referenced to as Tasks. The elaboration of the SecFuNet architecture, applying identification
process will be developed in this work-package to provide a very secure ID definition.

Task 3.1- Limitations and requirements
This task will define and specify the secure identification process using the
microcontroller and allowing a customer to access a web site in total security. In
the same way as before the solution will use the EAP-TLS developed in WP1 to
avoid the use of login/password.
13
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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Task 3.2 – Open-ID
This task will provide an implementation of the previous solution in an Open-ID
environment.

Task 3.3 – Shibboleth
This task will provide an implementation of the previous solution in a Shibboleth
environment.
Who is doing what??

Deliverables

D31: Secure identification process(M6)

D32: Open-ID (M12)

D33: Shibboleth (M18)
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Work-package 4 description
Work-package
number
WP4
Start date or starting
event:
Work-package title
Virtual network isolation
Activity type14
RTD
Participant
number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 1
participant
0
10
0
0
0
?
?
Participant
number
10
11
12
13
14
15
UFRJ
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS
20
?
?
?
?
Participant
name
Participant
name
1
T0+8
short ET
9
short UFPE
Person-months per ?
participant
?
Objectives
This work package is responsible for defining schemes for securing the virtual network
platform, improving existent weak isolation schemes among different virtual networks. This
work package is divided into three tasks.
Description of work
Task 4.1: State-of-the-art in isolation and profiling of virtual networks
This task is responsible for evaluating the main isolation techniques used for the Xen
platform and for profiling virtual routers.
Task 4.2: A mechanism to secure physical resource usage by virtual networks and to ensure
privacy, isolation, and reliability in the virtual network environment.
In this task, an interface is developed for specifying the virtual network resources required by
each virtual network. In addition, we design a monitor and a controller for verifying the resource
usage by each virtual network and for checking whether the usage respects the service level
14
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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agreements specified for each virtual network. If some virtual network exceeds its resource
reservation, it is punished to avoid the performance degradation of other virtual networks. Hence,
we enforce network isolation and prevent malicious virtual networks from damaging other virtual
networks by exhausting shared resources. This controller also verifies the access control to the
management interface, guaranteeing that only users with the correct identification who are able to
authenticate themselves using the microcontrollers can access the management interface to change
parameters of the specified virtual network.
Task 4.3: A mechanism to create virtual network profiles, evaluate resource usage and
remap virtual networks under attack.
This task is responsible for generating virtual router profiles for identifying a pattern that
describes the normal router usage. When a difference between the profile and the resource usage
occurs, the proposed mechanism evaluates whether this change indicates an attack or some other
undesired behaviour. If so, the virtual network is migrated to a non-critical area to avoid that the
attack/undesired behaviour exhausts the shared resources such as the input link damaging the virtual
network.
Deliverables
D41: Virtual Network platform definition (M9)
D42: Isolation among virtual networks (M12)
D43: Profiling and virtual network migration (M15)
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Work-package 5 description
Work-package
number
WP5
Start date or starting
event:
Work-package title
Infrastructure resilience
Activity type15
RTD
T0+6
Participant
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Participant short
name
ET
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 1
participant
0
0
2
?
0
?
16
Participant
number
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Participant short
name
UFPE
UFRJ
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS DWA
?
?
?
?
?
Person-months per ?
participant
?
Objectives
This work-package will develop mechanisms to achieve resilience against attacks or accidents
which may affect the communications and authentication/authorization infrastructure. The
two main vectors of work are: achieving resilient communications and management;
providing trustworthy operation of the authentication service.
15
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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Description of work
The work-package 5 aims to investigate architectures and communication protocols that
endow the infrastructure with the capacity to automatically resist attacks on the control
plane. This work package includes the investigation of components and architectures able to
resist hacker attacks aiming at neutralizing or corrupting the information gathered from
metrology and sent to the decision centers (network and systems management) and the
development of resilient communication protocols and middleware that allow the
infrastructure management components to continue to interact reliably under attack.
Task 5.1 – Architecture components for resilient network communications and
management
This task will investigate architectures to support monitoring, diagnostic and prediction of
faults at both network-level and application-level. The architectures proposed will be able to
resist hacker attacks that neutralize or corrupt the information sent to the decision centers.
Based on the secure communication substrate developed in WP4, we will maintain the
interconnection resilience of each layer under attack, through intrusion tolerant
reconfiguration mechanisms, possibly providing different levels of resilience to different
layers (e.g., legacy vs. premium). Through intrusion tolerant gateways, we will ensure
trustworthy inter-layer communication, such that no layer contaminates another.
Task 5.2 – Trustworthy authentication service architecture
This task will take the secure authentication server architecture developed in WP3 and
provide it with additional resilience mechanisms based on intrusion tolerance and selfhealing mechanisms, making it able to survive very severe attacks. Hybrid distributed
systems models based on trusted-trustworthy components will be followed, leveraging the
secure microcontroller specified in WP1.
Deliverables
D51: Methods Architecture components for resilient network communications and
management (M12)
D52: Trustworthy authentication service architecture (M18)
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Work-package 6 description
Work-package
number
WP6
Start date or starting
event:
T0+9
Work-package title
Encryption schemes
Activity type16
RTD
Participant number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Participant
name
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 2
participant
2
0
2
16
0
?
?
Participant number 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Participant
name
UFRJ
UECE
UFMA
UFSC
UFRGS
DWA
?
?
?
?
?
?
short ET
short UFPE
Person-months per ?
participant
Objectives
The work-package 6 aims to develop cryptographic schemes to address issues identified in
other work packages, such as secure identification and authentication, and to improve the
security and verifiability of the outsourced computation, the integrity of remote storage, the
resilience against side-channel attacks, and the overall security of virtual networks and
clouds.
16
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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Description of work
The work-package 6 aims to develop cryptographic schemes that are better suited for future
networking environments based on virtual networks and clouds. In particular, it aims to
develop cryptographic schemes to address issues that were identified in other work
packages, such as secure user identification and authentication. In addition to these, it also
aims to design cryptographic protocols that can improve the security and verifiability of the
outsourced computation, the integrity of remote storage, the resilience against side-channel
attacks, and overall security of virtual networks and clouds.
The work will consist of three main tasks. The first one is to setup a framework for specifying
the different use cases and security requirements for future networking environments based
on virtual networks and clouds. The second main task is to develop cryptographic solutions
to address these problems in virtual networks. Finally, the third main task is to develop
cryptographic solutions to address these problems in cloud computing.
Task 6.1 – Cryptographic framework
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Task 6.2 – Cryptographic schemes for virtual networks
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Task 6.3: Cryptographic schemes for Cloud
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Deliverables

D6.1: Cryptographic framework (M15)

D6.2: Cryptographic schemes for virtual networks (M26)

D6.3: Cryptographic schemes for Cloud accesses (M30)
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Work-package 7 description
Work-package
number
WP7
Start date or starting
event:
T0
Work-package title
Test, Dissemination, and Standardisation
Activity type17
RTD
Participant number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Participant
name
STM
UPMC
TPT
ENS
IMP
TUM
UL
Person-months per 6
participant
2
2
2
?
?
?
?
Participant number 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Participant
name
UFRJ
UECE
UFAM
UFSC
UFRGS
?
?
?
?
?
short ET
short UFPE
Person-months per ?
participant
17
?
Please indicate one activity per work-package:
RTD = Research and technological development (including any activities to prepare for the dissemination
and/or exploitation of project results, and coordination activities); DEM = Demonstration; MGT = Management
of the consortium; OTHER = Other specific activities, if applicable in this call.
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Objectives
Work package WP7 has two main objectives: the creation of a testbed to allow the
evaluation of the proposed algorithms, and the dissemination of information about
the project. Regarding the testbed, it is necessary to conceive and deploy an
infrastructure that allows the evaluation of the various algorithms being proposed.
More specifically, we envisage that this testbed will comprise at least one node in each
participating institution, allowing both preliminary local tests and more complex
experiments involving multiple participants to be carried out. The list of experiments
that will be conducted in the testbed includes the evaluation of virtual networks
isolation as well as the scalability/security of the microcontroller-based authentication
service.
As for the second objective, it is comprised of the dissemination of results and
contribution to standards, effectively promoting and making available the project's
research findings and achievements within the world of Industry and Research. To
realize this particular objective, SecFuNet will organize events on a national as well as
an international scale such as conferences, workshops and fora, where the project
objectives and achieved results will be presented and discussed. In addition, SecFuNet
will publish articles in scientific journals and produce multimedia and printed
promotional material to assure and increase the awareness of the industry and the
academia with SecFuNet and its technological impact. These activities will meet the
following goals:

To ensure wider use of the project results and achievements especially within
the European Community and Brazil.

To provide continuous Systems Engineering for security algorithms.

To establish a focal point for the European community and Brazil concerning
security algorithms in virtual networks, fostering the collaboration between
members of Academy and of Industry to track the important developments.

To promote information exchange among relevant projects, assuring synergy
effects.

To keep the community informed of current and possible future developments
as well as of preliminary achievements.

To identify exploitation opportunities, including appropriate IPR protection,
patent creation, open source software production and other licensing issues.

To identify and support contributions to standards.
Description of work
Considering the proposed activities and the SiFuNet consortium “ecosystem”, we envisage
that SiFuNet will lead to a set of new business opportunities, as well as a potential paradigm
transformation in the current security business model. Subsequently, it is expected to have a
positive impact on the global communication market.
Task 7.1 – Testbed creation
This task is comprised of requirements elicitation for the testbed, its design and deployment.
The idea is to use the testbed as an environment to conduct a set of evaluation experiments
aimed at proving concept and technical feasibility of the proposed algorithms.
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Task 7.2 – Test and Evaluation Experiments
The first part of this work package is to test the different solutions coming along the SiFuNet
project. Results of the test will be used for external communications and for pushing
standardization.
Task 7.3 – External Communication
In order to achieve optimal dissemination and publicity results, during early stages of the
project, a SiFuNet Primer will be produced and released through a smart brochure and a
website (see below). The Primer will present a high-level concept description, which will
emphasize the technological and economic importance of the current project.
SiFuNet Website
Public appearance at the web is the most efficient method to promote and publish the
status, progress and success achieved in the project. The domain “SiFuNet” will be used.
SiFuNet Marketing Package: Brochure, Flyer, and Poster
These marketing materials will present the SiFuNet in an easy-to-understand way, including
an overview and a high-level architecture of the project. They will also present a short
description of the consortium members, organization, logo and country. In addition, the flyer
and brochure will present SiFuNet in a compact description of motivation, objectives and
goals. The advanced issues by the end phase of the project will show an outline of the
achieved results so far.
This material will be updated during the Project’s lifecycle, every 6 months, or as often as it is
necessary.
SiFuNet Multimedia Video Clip
In order to raise the visibility of SiFuNet, a Multimedia video-clip totally dedicated to the
innovations beyond state-of-the-art technologies of SiFuNet, as well as its business impact,
will be produced. The video clip will illustrate the SiFuNet project context, main goals and
expected achievements. Starting with a description of the current business and visualizing
every current scenario and the corresponding one after SiFuNet, illustrating the progress into
the future telecom business after providing secure networks, and its impact on the ICT
industry and consequently on the global communication market. Four releases of the video
clip are planned, at the beginning, and every ten months, and a final closing one at month
30.
SiFuNet Newsletters
We intend to release a periodical newsletter (at least 4 times yearly). These newsletters will
contain reports on the SiFuNet progress, forthcoming activities/events and achievements as
well as fact sheets. The newsletter will address decision makers on local, international (both
European and Brazilian) levels, according to the target groups identified.
Task 7.4 – Dissemination of results
Conferences & Workshops
SiFuNet Project Board identified a number of strategic and “semi”-strategic events to
present its achievements.
Strategic Events:


IEEE Globecom: IEEE Global Communications Conference
IEE ICC: IEEE International Conference on Communications
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 IEEE Infocom, Annual IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
Semi-Strategic Events
All partners will contribute to WP7 by disseminating project results and visions in scientific
papers, contributions to exhibitions and workshops. In each participating country, various
“SiFuNet marketing strategies” will be studied, corresponding to specific national
environments. Subsequently, all results will be synthesized into an overall dissemination and
exploitation plan.
Task 7.5 – Standardization
Contribution to Standards
The topics treated in “SiFuNet” are expected to have an impact on multiple
standardization bodies and industry fora. The standardization bodies that might be of
relevance are:
 IETF: Recommendations for different working groups on security.
3GPP: Standards for secure networking.
Who is doing what.
Deliverables
D7.1 : Testbed conception and deployment (M18)
D7.2 : Test and Evaluation Report (M30)
D7.3 : Results Dissemination and Standardization Proposals (M30)
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1.3.8. Summary of staff effort
Partic.
no.
Partic.
short name
WP0
1
ET
6
2
STM
1
3
UPMC
1
4
TPT
1
5
ENS
1
6
IMP
1
7
TUM
1
8
UL
1
9
UFPE
10
UFRJ
6
11
UECE
1
12
UFAM
1
13
UFSC
1
14
UFRGS
1
Total
WP1
WP2
WP3
WP4
23
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WP6
WP7
Total
person
months
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1.3.9. Template - List of milestones
Milestone
number
Milestone name
Workpackage(s)
involved
Expected
date 18
Means of verification19
M0.1
M0.2
M0.3
M0.4
M0.5.1
M0.5.2
M1.1
M1.2
M1.3
M1.4
M2.1
M2.2
M2.3
M2.4
M3.1
M3.2
M3.3
M3.4
M4.1
M4.2
M4.3
M5.1
M5.2
M5.3
M5.4
M5.5
M6.1
M6.2
M6.3
18
Measured in months from the project start date (month 1).
19
Show how both the participants and the Commission can check that the milestone has been attained. Refer
to indicators if appropriate.
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Section 2. Implementation
2.1
Management structure and procedures
2.2.1. Integrated Project Consortium Agreement Governance
With respect to the size of the project, a hierarchical management structure with clear
responsibilities has been defined: the project management of SecFuNet is compliant with
the 3-layers structure of Integrated Project Consortium Agreement (IPCA) Governance (see
figure below).
Strategic
Level
Operational
Level
Technical
Level
General Assembly
Chairman: Project Coordinator
Members:all Parners' representatives
Project Board
WP1
Mana
WP2
WP3
European
Commission
Project
Coordinator
Chairman: Project Coordinator
Members: WPLeaders
WP4
WP5
WP6
WP7
Figure 20- Layer structure of SecFuNet as an integrated project.
The IPCA for the project will be negotiated for the project by the Partners before being
provided to European Commission.
Governing Bodies and Management Functions
The project management of SecFuNet is based on following decision-making bodies and
management functions:
 General Assembly, as the ultimate strategic decision-making body for the
consortium, responsible for the overall direction of the project.
 Project Board, as the executive decision-making and supervisory body for the
execution and monitoring of the project.
 Project Coordinator, the legal entity among the members of the consortium acting as
the intermediary between the partners and the Commission, having specific
additional contractual, legal, financial and administrative obligations for the
consortium coordination, and responsible at a operational level of the day-to-day
management of the project.
 Work-package management teams, responsible for the planning, coordinating and
day-to-day management of the technical work of the work-packages.
The detailed compositions of these decision-making bodies, management functions and
all needed specific additional roles, will be formally defined in the IPCA_SecFuNet.
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General Assembly (GA) is the body responsible for the overall direction of the project at a
strategic level. The Partners shall establish, within thirty days after the date of the IPCA, the
GA composed of one duly authorized representative of each of them.
Competence: decision upon any proposal made by the Project Board for the allocation of the
project's budget, reviewing and proposing budget reallocations to the Parties; review and
amendment of grant agreement (but Partners have to sign the amendment); serve notice to
Defaulting Partner; decision upon any proposal of the Project Board for the launching of
competitive calls if required by the terms of the grant agreement, and the entering of new
Contractors for the participation in the project; decision upon change and exchange of workpackages between the Parties and proposing corresponding amendments to the grant
agreement; giving certain approvals (for ex related to use of Background); deciding upon
procedures and tools for the marking and handling of the information exchanged between
Parties in performance of the project, decisions related to conflict resolution.
Decision-making at the General Assembly:
 The GA shall be chaired by the Project Coordinator's representative and it shall meet
at least once a year, or at any other time when necessary on request of a Partner.
 Decisions may be taken in a physical meeting, a meeting via teleconference, e-mail,
or without meeting under certain conditions (consent in writing delivered for
signature to all Partners' representatives)
 Quorum: 2/3 to be present or represented (except for unanimous decision, quorum =
100%)
 Decisions:
- Unanimity for amendment of the grant agreement
- Otherwise 75%
- Veto right for Party on a reasonable ground (if work is affected, if information is
to be disclosed, if name would be in press release…)
Project Board is the body responsible for the management of the project. The composition
of the Board shall reflect the Partners' share and respective responsibilities in the Project, or
an appropriate mixture in respect of balance of competencies and activity areas. Chairman:
Project Coordinator. Other members: in practice representative of each Work-package
Leader.
The Project Board is composed of Michel Betirac, Guy Pujolle, Djamel Sadok, Otto Duarte,
etc.
The Project Board will be responsible for management of the project and in particular for:
 Proposing to General Assembly budget allocation.
 Proposing to General Assembly notice to defaulting party.
 Agreeing plan for using and disseminating knowledge (Foreground), press releases
and joint publications, without prejudice to IPR.
 Deciding upon the technical roadmaps with regard to the project.
 Deciding upon designation of a third party in charge of part of management.
 Deciding upon measures in the framework of control and audits procedures to
ensure the effective day-to-day coordination and monitoring of the progress of the
technical work affecting the project as a whole.
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proposing to General Assembly procedures and tools for marking and handling of
information exchanged between Partners in the performance of the project.
Decisions making in the Project Board:
 The Project Board will meet at least quarterly at the request of its chairperson or at
any other time when necessary at the request of one partner.
 Decisions may be taken in a physical meeting, a meeting via teleconference, e-mail,
or without meeting under certain conditions (consent in writing delivered for
signature to all Partners' representatives).
 The Project Board shall not decide validity unless a majority of 2/3 ("quorum") of its
members are present or represented (except for unanimous decision , quorum =
100%). Each Project Board member shall have one vote.
 Decisions
- Unanimity for notice to Defaulting Partner.
- Otherwise 75% or simple majority.
- Veto right for ¨Project Board member on reasonable ground (if work is affected, if
information is to be disclosed, if name would be in press release…).

The Project Coordinator is from the European Commission's point of view the member of
the consortium who acts as the point of contact with the Commission. The Project
Coordinator has the responsibility of coordinating and managing the progress of the total
project, and of ensuring the proper implementation of the decisions taken by the General
Assembly. He shall have the main following functions:
 To monitor compliance of Partners with their obligations under the grant agreement
and the IPCA (grant agreement: the contract with the Commission for the carrying
out of the project).
 To verify completion of formalities for acceding grant agreement.
 To receive Community funding and distribute it:
- within 30 days from receipt.
- suspend for Defaulting Partner and inform Project Board.
 To keep records and financial accounts for funding and inform Commission of
distribution.
 To be the intermediary for efficient and correct communication between the
Partners and the Commission on the progress of the project
 Administration, preparation of minutes, chairmanship of General Assembly and
Board, follow-up of their decisions,
 On request, transmission of any documents and information connected with the
project between the Partners concerned
 To monitor procedures regarding Use of Open Source Software
 To represent the project for external contacts
Work-package management teams: these teams will be composed of one representative
per involved Partner and chaired by the Work-package Leaders. They provide technical
management of the Work-package.
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Work-package leaders have important roles with respect to the project organization:
- Drive, coordinate and monitor the technical activities within their work-package,
to assure good progress and avoid deviations with respect to the work-package
activity time plans.
- Assure the communication flow within the work-package.
- Assure the quality of the produced deliverables (documentation, software, etc.).
- Assign activity/editor leadership if felt necessary.
- Assure the communication flow externally to the work-package, towards the
project coordinator and other work-package leaders to report regularly on workpackage activities and on achieved documented milestones.
European Commission
The European Commission will be involved in the project strategic decisions for defending its
own interests in the project outcome as well as in the appropriate use of its financial
contribution. The rules set in the EC Contract as well as the guidelines for project
coordination will design the official frame of project reporting.
Regular exchanges between the European Commission and the coordinator are expected, to
review project objectives as well as project progress (project technical reviews).
Project management and quality assurance procedures, risk management
At project start the Project Coordinator will establish project management guidelines in the
form of a Handbook that will describe the project management and quality assurance
procedures. This will be contained in Deliverable D0.1. The quality assurance will include
management of the documentation, and also qualitative and quantitative (e.g. measures)
assessment procedures for milestones and deliverables that will be key elements in
measuring the project progress.
To complete the quality assurance, a Risk Register will be set-up at project start and then
updated at least every 3 months to monitor the major scientific, industrial and
organisational risks of the SecFuNet project.
2.2
Individual participants
EtherTrust
Michel Betirac
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ST Microelectronic
STM provides
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University Pierre et Marie Curie – Paris 6
LIP6 is one of the most important Computer Science laboratories in France. With more than
400 people, LIP6 covers a large number of research areas contributing to the structure a
communication system such as micro-electronic, networking, distributed systems, robotic,
artificial intelligence, programming language and software engineering.
The PHARE team of LIP6 participating in this project have leading expertise in the research
on architectures, protocols and algorithms for the next generation communication networks.
New technologies for network control, in particular in wireless networks, are studied in
depth from different aspects: integration of different technologies, vertical handover, QoS
and security management in heterogeneous networks. Past and current national and
European projects that this group has been involved include ITEA projects (AMBIENCE,
ADANETS, SUMO); Celtic project (Authone, GENIO, etc.), FP7 project (4WARD, AUTOI,
GOLDFISH, etc.), and national projects @IRS++, GITAN, RADIC-SF, Safari, SUN, I2TIT, BBnet,
Sarah, Horizon.
Guy Pujolle received the Ph.D. and "Thèse d'Etat" degrees in Computer Science from the
University of Paris IX and Paris XI on 1975 and 1978 respectively. He is currently a Professor
at the Pierre et Marie Curie University (Paris 6), a member of the Institut Universitaire de
Frabnce, and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of Orange/France Telecom Group.
He spent the period 1994-2000 as Professor and Head of the computer science department
of Versailles University. He was also Professor and Head of the MASI Laboratory (Pierre et
Marie Curie University), 1981-1993, Professor at ENST (Ecole Nationale Supérieure des
Télécommunications), 1979-1981, and member of the scientific staff of INRIA, 1974-1979. He
is currently an editor for International Journal of Network Management, WINET, Annals of
Telecommunications, and IEEE Surveys & Tutorials. He was in charge of a large number of
European and French projects.
Thi-Mai-Trang Nguyen received her Engineer degree in Telecommunications from
HoChiMinh city University of Technology, Vietnam, in 1999, M.S. degree in Computer
Science from University of Versailles, France, in 2000, and Ph.D degree in Computer Science
from University of Paris 6, France, in 2003. She is currently associate professor at University
of Paris VI. Dr. Nguyen is a member of the IEEE. She has involved in many national and
European projects related to the development of the next generation of the Internet. She
also has publications in international journals and has one French patent on mobile
networking. Her main research interest is the design of new architecture, protocols and
algorithms related to the quality of service, security and mobility management.
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Telecom ParisTech
Telecom ParisTech houses over a thousand students, and over 140 research professor staff.
ENST, renamed Telecom Paris then Telecom ParisTech, has also expanded to
Sophia‐Antipolis. It receives students from all over the world, and constitutes a centre of
excellence for teaching and research in the fields Information and Communication Sciences.
Telecom ParisTech has gained international recognition in the technical domain. In addition
to working on basic science developments, research at Telecom ParisTech also aims at
broadening its field of study, particularly towards system integrations, innovative services on
the Internet and in other media, and analysis of users' communication practices and their
social impact. Telecom ParisTech thus covers all aspects of Information Technologies.
Telecom ParisTech is committed to maintaining an optimal balance between scientific
research, where themes remain fairly stable, and applied research, which evolves more
rapidly. Research projects are organized principally in collaboration with universities and
major research groups, like the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique). Applied
research is pursued through contractual agreements between Telecom ParisTech and its
corporate partners.
Pascal Urien (www.enst.fr/~urien) is full professor at Telecom ParisTech; he graduated from
Ecole Centrale de Lyon, holds a PHD in computer science. His main research interests include
security and smart cards, especially for networks and distributed computing architectures.
He holds fifteen patents and about one hundred publications in these domains. Pascal
collaborates in several industrial committees like the IETF. He participated in various French
and European research projects. He is the father of the internet smart card technology,
which won two industrial awards, Best Technological Innovation at cartes'2000 (Paris) and
Most Innovative Product of Year at the Advanced Card Award 2001 (London). He invented
the EAP smart card, that won two industrial awards, Best Technological Innovation at
cartes'2003 (Paris), and Breakthrough Innovation Award at CardTech/SecureTech 2004
(Washington DC). In 2006 he won a bronze award at the SecureTheWeb Developer Contest,
organized by Gemalto and Microsoft. Pascal was one of the winners of French 9 th (2007) and
11th (2009) national contest, for the support of innovative start‐ups.
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Ecole Normale Supérieure
The École Normale Supérieure (ENS) was founded in 1794 and has had a research group
(Crypto Team) in cryptology since 1988. Since its foundation, the Crypto Team at ENS has
played a major role in the diffusion of cryptology in France and is one of the leading research
groups in cryptology in the world. The team, which is currently led by Dr. David Pointcheval,
has 23 members including 2 professors, 2 assistant professors, 4 senior researchers, 2 junior
researchers, and 2 postdoctoral researchers. The research of the Crypto Team considers
cryptology in a broad sense, from its most theoretical and mathematical aspects to its
applications. Its main areas of expertise include all aspects of asymmetric cryptography, the
design and implementation of symmetric algorithms, interactive cryptography, and
cryptanalysis (both symmetric and asymmetric). Over its lifetime, the ENS Crypto Team has
been involved in several European research projects (e.g., ECRYPT, STORK, and NESSIE) and
French research projects.
Michel Abdalla is currently a CNRS researcher and a member of the Crypto Team at ENS. He
holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California, San Diego. His research
focus on design of efficient and provably-secure cryptographic protocols. He has authored or
co-authored more than 40 articles in international journals and conferences. He has served
on the program committee of several international conferences, including Crypto, Eurocrypt,
and PKC, and was program chair for LATINCRYPT 2010 and ACNS 2009.
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Implementa
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Technische Universität München
Technische Universiät München (TUM) is one of the leading German universities in
Engineering and Science with long standing reputation for scientific excellence. In 2006, with
its concept "The Entrepreneurial University" TUM was awarded, in 2006, by the "Excellence
Initiative" of the German Research Foundation and Federal Government. TUM scientists
have been repeatedly singled out for the award of the Nobel Prize. Today, nine holders of
the Leibniz Prize awarded by the German Research Council – Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) – give lectures and pursue research at the Technische
Universität München. In many international and national rankings, TUM ranks first among all
German universities.
The department of computer science at TUM has a long tradition, starting lectures in
computer science in 1967. Today it is one of the largest computer science departments in
Germany and is regularly evaluated being among the top computer science departments in
Germany.
The chair for Network Architectures and Services is one of 20 research units of the
department of computer science at Technische Universität München. Research activities
include innovative Internet technologies, with special focus on network security, network
monitoring, attack detection and defense, secure peer-to-peer and overlay networking, and
negotiation of security policies over fixed and mobile network technologies.
Relevant projects are the EU FP7 project ResumeNet, with contributions towards the
resilient Internet: service layer resilience, testbed and experiments; the EU Celtic project
AutHoNe, with contributions on Autonomic Home Networking, in particular architecture,
components for automated management and monitoring, testbed and experiments, and the
German national science foundation (DFG) project LUPUS, with contributions on load
transformations and their usage for traffic prediction and understanding in networks with
security requirements.
The chair for network architectures and services at TUM operates a Future Internet
laboratory. As part of this laboratory, TUM operates one Future Internet Instance, which is a
result of the US-based GENI project GpENI. TUM operates another Future Internet Instance
which supports decentralized, user-controlled networks and knowledge plane mechanisms.
Georg Carle is full professor at the faculty of computer science at Technische Universität
München, where he holds the chair on Network Architectures and Services. He conducts
research on autonomic, self-organized and peer-to-peer networks, network security,
monitoring of IP networks, mobile communications, voice and video services over IP,
charging and accounting. He received a M.Sc. degree from Brunel University London in 1989,
a diploma degree in electrical engineering from the University Stuttgart in 1992 and a
doctoral degree from the faculty of computer science of University Karlsruhe in 1996. From
1992 to 1996 he worked at the Institute of Telematics at the University Karlsruhe, being
supported by a "Graduiertenkolleg" scholarship. In 1997, he worked as postdoctoral
researcher at Institut Eurécom, Sophia Antipolis, France, supported by a TMR (Training and
Mobility for Researchers in Europe) scholarship from the European Commission. In October
1997 he joined GMD FOKUS in Berlin, where he has been the leader of numerous projects
funded by the European R&D program, national research programs and industry (service
providers and manufacturers). In January 2003, he joined University of Tübingen as a full
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professor, founding the newly established chair on computer networks and internet. From
there, he joined Technische Universität München in April 2008.
Heiko Niedermayer is a senior research staff member at the Chair for Network Architectures
and Services at the Technische Universität München. He has a strong background in security
and protocols. His overall research spans from network security to overlay networks as well
as cloud computing and autonomy in networks. He worked on the projects Semobis
(Semantically-oriented Software Engineering for mobile information systems, 2004-2006),
SpoVNet (Spontaneous Virtual Networks, 2006-2009), and AutHoNe (Autonomic Home
Networks, 2007 - ) as well as for smaller industrial projects. He also worked on the proposals
of many more projects of the Chair. He studied Informatics at the University of Würzburg
with emphasis on machine learning, optimization, theory, and networking. His diploma
thesis was about optimization of processes in semiconductor manufacturing. He received his
diploma degree in 2003 and subsequently joined the group of Prof. Georg Carle in the same
year as researcher at the University of Tübingen and later 2008 at Technische Universität
München. He submitted his doctoral thesis about the architecture and components of
secure and anonymous Peer-to-Peer systems in 2009 and received his doctoral degree from
Technische Univesität München in 2010.
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Foundation of the University of Lisbon Faculty of Sciences - FFCUL
The University of Lisboa, whose origins date back to 1288, has presently an estimated
number of 20000 students, and a teaching staff of about 1600 highly qualified teachers. The
University of Lisbon Faculty of Sciences is currently organized in 9 Departments, among
which the Department of Informatics (DI), and has approximately 5000 students. With more
than 200 ongoing projects, R&D activities at the Faculty of Sciences are carried out in 26
different research units, many of which developed together with international teams,
funded both at national and European levels. These units are run under the umbrella of
Foundation of the University of Lisbon Faculty of Sciences (Fundação da Faculdade de
Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa), a private non-profit organization totally held by the
Faculty of Sciences, created in 1993, whose main purposes are to promote research and
technological development activities, provide qualified human resources training and offer
consulting expertise and knowledge dissemination. The Large-Scale Informatics Systems
Laboratory (LASIGE) is a laboratory of the DI whose core personnel is formed by professors
and researchers belonging to two areas: Computing Systems Organization and Information
Systems. Its mission is to organize the intervention of the department in research, teaching
and training, and technology transfer, on the domains pertaining to the core activity of the
laboratory.
Navigators is a group within LASIGE that addresses architecture and infrastructure issues of
distributed systems (middleware), namely the aspects of large-scale, dependability, security
and real-time, both of system support and applications. The core people of the Navigators
group originated from the Distributed Systems and Automation Group at INESC, and have
been very active in international research for almost 20 years now, mainly in the areas of
distributed systems, fault-tolerance and real-time (http://www.navigators.di.fc.ul.pt). The
group has produced several PhD and MSc theses, and hosted a few foreign post-doctorates.
It took part in several international research projects, namely ESPRIT: DELTA-4; BANK'92;
BROADCAST; DINAS-DQS, CORTEX, MAFTIA, some of which as the coordinating partner. The
group has recently been involved in several European projects, including IST-FP6-26979
HIDENETS and IST-FP6-27513 CRUTIAL, and the IST-FP6-26764 RESIST NoE, and currently
participates in two IPs: FP7-ICT-257475 MASSIF and FP7-ICT-257243 TCLOUDS.
FCUL (Faculty of Sciences of the University of Lisbon) will act as a third party of FFCUL based
on the cooperation agreement on R&D projects signed between these two institutions. The
core team of FFCUL involved in SecFuNet are faculty from FCUL and they will be involved in
all activities of FFCUL within this project.
Paulo Veríssimo is a full professor of the DI of the University of Lisbon Faculty of Sciences
and former Director of LASIGE. He belongs to the European Security & Dependability
Advisory Board, and is associate editor of the IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing. He is past Chair of the IEEE Technical Committee on Fault Tolerant Computing
and of the Steering Committee of the DSN conference, and belonged to the Executive Board
of the CaberNet European Network of Excellence. He was coordinator of the CORTEX IST/FET
project (http://cortex.di.fc.ul.pt). He is a senior member of the IEEE. Paulo Veríssimo leads
the Navigators group and is currently interested in: architecture, middleware and protocols
for distributed, pervasive and embedded systems, in the facets of real-time adaptability, and
fault- and intrusion-tolerance. He is author of more than 130 refereed publications in
international scientific conferences and journals in the area, and co-author of five books.
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Marcelo Pasin is an assistant professor of the DI of the University of Lisbon Faculty of
Sciences and member of the Navigators team within the LASIGE laboratory. After working
for the Brazilian computer industry, he joined the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM,
Brazil), being tenured as assistant and later as associate professor. During a sabbatical leave
from UFSM, he worked as a Coregrid (IST FP6 NoE) fellow for the Engineering and
Architecture School of Fribourg (Switzerland) and the University of Pisa (Italy). Leaving
UFSM, he worked at INRIA in Lyon (France), where he was in charge of most aspects of the
EC-GIN project (IST FP6 STREP). His research interests are resource virtualization, scheduling
and allocation, high performance computing and networking (data transfer performance and
synchronisation), and large-scale distributed systems as grids and clouds. He has published in
conferences and journals more than twenty refereed articles, and is the editor of two
conference proceedings. He is member of IEEE, ACM and SBC (Brazil).Key People:
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Universidade Federal de Pernambuco - UFPE
Djamel Fawzi Hadj Sadok
possui graduação em Engenharia Eletrônica pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
(UFRJ-1976), mestrado em Engenharia Elétrica pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
(COPPE/UFRJ-1981) e doutorado em Téléinformatique - Ecole Nationale Supérieure des
Télécommunications (ENST-1985-França). Atualmente é professor titular da Universidade
Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Entre 1992 e 1993, fez pós-doutorado no laboratório MASI da
Universidade de Paris VI. Em 1995, fez um outro pós-doutorado no International Computer
Science Institute (ICSI) associado à Universidade da Califórnia em Berkeley. Em 1999, e 2001
e 2006, foi Professor Convidado da Université Pierre et Marie Curie. Tem experiência na área
de redes de computadores, atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: protocolos de
comunicação, Internet, segurança, qualidade de serviço, protocolos multidestinatário e
avaliação de desempenho.
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Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ
The Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ ‐ Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) is
the oldest and most important federal university of Brazil. In UFRJ. COPPE (Coordenação dos
Programas de Pós‐Graduação em Engenharia) is the first and biggest post-engineering
research institute of South America. COPPE’s defining characteristic is the overriding priority
assigned to teaching and basic engineering research, graduating highly qualified engineers,
as well as to the generation of advanced state‐of‐the art concepts in the service of social,
technical, and economic development of Brazil. The major emphasis of the teaching and
research faculty is on research as well as on training of master’s and doctoral degree
students.
COPPE’s interface with industry is COPPETEC Foundation. Applied industrial research, expert
technical opinion and consultancy, extension courses and technical workshops as well as
related activities are all carried out by means of contracts between the Foundation and
clients requiring consultancy or technical services.
The Grupo de Teleinformática e Automação (GTA – Computer Network Research Group)
began its activities on March 1986. GTA belongs to the Program of Eletric Enginnering (PEE COPPE), which recently maintained the maximum grade (7 out of 7) in CAPES. CAPES grade is
a Brazilian standard for evaluating the best post-graduation programs in Brazil. GTA is
currently participating of international projects such as the CAPES/COFECUB Project. This
project is an international cooperation agreement where GTA participates since 1994. The
project involves LIP6 (Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris 6) from Université Pierre et Marie
Curie (France), LAAS (Laboratoire d’Analyse et d’Architecture des Systèmes) associated to
Université de Toulouse (France), and three Brazilian universities. The main activities are in
Quality of Service, Mobility, and Multimedia. In addition, GTA also participates several
Brazilian projects funded by CNPq and Faperj .
CNPq is the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development. CNPq is linked to
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT), which supports Brazilian research. Faperj, on
the other hand, is a public foundation to support research in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Otto Carlos Muniz Bandeira Duarte was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on October 23, 1953.
He. is a Full Professor at Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he works since
1978. He received his B.E. degree in Electronic Engineer and M.Sc. in Electrical Engineering
also from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro in 1976 and 1981, respectively, and his Dr.
Ing. from ENST/Paris, France, in 1985. Otto has strong international ties, which he reinforces
during his sabbaticals: between January 1992 and June 1993 he worked as a researcher at
the MASI laboratory at the University of Paris 6; in 1995, he spent three months at
International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) in Berkeley; and in 1999 and 2001, he worked
as invited professor at the University of Paris 6. His research interests include mobile
communications, security, multicast, and QoS guarantees.
He has advised 45 doctoral and masters students, and published 150 articles in international
and national conferences and 40 articles in international and national journals. He has given
numerous invited talks and tutorials, and serves as a consultant to companies in the area of
Internet technologies. He is also the head the computer networks group (Grupo de
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Teleinformtica e Automao - GTA). Otto has recently received the "Scientist of Our State"
award (granted to the 200 most outstanding researchers of the state of Rio de Janeiro) and
is one of 250 researchers in computer science from all over Brazil selected to be CNPq
researchers (CNPq is the technology research branch of the Brazilian government). Otto is
currently involved in a number of research projects. He is the coordinator of TAQUARA
(Technology, Applications and Quality of Service in Advanced Networks), a project funded by
the National Research Network (RNP) through the GIGA Project. He is also the head of the ad
hoc research group of the project CISBTVD (Interactivity Channel for the Brazilian System of
Digital Television) and the coordinator of RARA (Advanced Networks and Autonomic
Networks), both funded by the Brazilian government. Finally, he leads the RAT (Packet
traceback) project, one of the 14 selected from 430 submissions to the UOL (a major
Internet provider of Brazil) open call.
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Universidade Estadual do Ceará - UECE
The State University of Ceará (UECE) is one of the main Universities located on the Northeast
of Brazil, with almost 17,000 students enrolled. The Computer Sciences Department, with
about 400 graduate and undergraduate students is engaged in leading edge research
andteaching with an emphasis in applied computing. The proposed work will be performed
by members of the Information Security Research Team (INSERT), housed in the Computer
Science Department of UECE. INSERT started in 2000, housed at the Georgia Institute of
Technology, migrating later to Brazil. INSERT has an extensive experience in cooperation
with industry, academia and public sectors having worked on successful research projects
with Raytheon, Infineon, Microsoft, and US Department of Defense among others.
Andre Luiz Moura dos Santos has graduated in Electronics Engineering from the Instituto
Tecnológico de Aeronáutica (1988), received a Master degree in Atmospheric Science from
University of Washington (1994) and a PhD in Computer Sciences from University of
California, Santa Barbara (2000). Dr. dos Santos is the director of the Information Security
Research Team (INSERT), research team dedicated to study security of digital data.
Currently, he is a full professor at the Computer Sciences Department of the State University
of Ceará (UECE). Dr. dos Santos has more than 20 years working on information security and
before working at UECE has worked as Assistant Professor of the College of Compunting at
Georgia Institute of Technology (200-2005). Dr. dos Santos has worked as consultant to
Banco Bradesco, government of the State of Ceará, Netscape, and Wargo & French LLP. Dr.
dos Santos has worked on succesfull research projects with Raytheon, Infineon, Microsoft,
IBM, National Security Agency, National Science Foundation, US Army and Department of
Defense. Dr. dos Santos has patents with Georgia Tech and Infineon Technologies in
Germany, France, US, Japan and China on systems, methods and computer program
products using partitioning (used by operating systems on secure microcontrollers).
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Universidade Federal do Amazonas - UFAM
Emerging Technologies & System Security Research Group (ETSS) is a research group from
the Federal University of Amazonas in Brazil. Our research focus is to identify emerging
technologies and conceive of new security solutions that will have a high impact on
innovation with industrial relevance. ETSS performs research and development on behalf of
government and industry. To keep pace with the rate of change in emerging technologies, we
conduct a large amount of research in existing and emerging technology areas including
wireless sensor network, delay-tolerant network, emergency network architectures, mobile
system and security system.
We collaborate extensively with government, academia and private sector entities including
Ministry of Science and Technology, National Council of Scientific and Technological
Development, Federal University of Pernambuco, Federal University of Minas Gerais,
University of Campinas, Nokia Institute, and Ericsson Research in Kista Sweden. Currently,
ETSS holds around 20 researchers including 04 PhDs, PhD and MSc students, and
undergraduate students.
Eduardo Feitosa received Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Federal University of
Pernambuco in Brazil (2010). Currently, Dr. Eduardo Luzeiro Feitosa is an Associate
Professor at the Department of Computer Science of the Federal University of Amazonas. He
is researcher in the Emerging Technologies & System Security (SSET) research group and
holds a position as a research fellow in the Networking and Telecommunications Research
Group at Federal University of Pernambuco since February 2006.
He has been involved in different research projects such as Secure Fieldwork Networks
(SEFIN), supported by Ericsson Sweden and access control for automation in power system
(SIRCAM), supported by Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco (CHESF). His broad
areas of interest are Computer Networks and System Security, including security
architectures, unwanted and malicious traffic, traffic analysis and mobile networks.
Eduardo Souto received his Ph.D. degree in Computer Science in 2007 from the Federal
University of Pernambuco in Brazil. Currently, Dr. Eduardo Souto is an Associate Professor
at the Department of Computer Science of the Federal University of Amazonas, where he
coordinates the undergraduate course in information systems. Besides, he is ETSS group
leader and holds a position as a Research Fellow in the Networking and Telecommunications
Research Group at Federal University of Pernambuco, which he has visited on a regular basis
since 2007.
He has been involved in research projects financed through Brazilian research agencies, such
as Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and
State of Amazonas Research Foundation (FAPEAM). He has also been in the program
committee and organizing committee of national and international conferences in Computer
Science. His research interests are in the areas of Wireless Sensor Network, Network
Security, Internet Traffic Measurement, and Distributed Systems.
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina - UFSC
Joni da Silva Fraga
possui graduação em Engenharia Eletrica pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
(1974), mestrado em Engenharia Elétrica pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (1979)
e doutorado em Informatique/ Automatique - Institute National Polytechnique de Toulouse
(1985). Atualmente é professor titular da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Tem
experiência na área de Sistemas de Computação, com ênfase em Sistemas Distribuídos,
atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: Segurança, Tolerância a Falhas, Tolerância a
Intrusões, Algoritmos Distribuídos e Middleware.
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Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul - UFRGS
The Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul,
UFRGS) is one of the 5 top Brazilian universities in scientific and technologic activities and,
with more than 30,000 students, one of the largest public ones. The Institute of Informatics,
where part of the project will be carried out, is a world-class center of excellence in
Computer Science and Computer Engineering engaged in leading research, teaching, and
technology transfer to Industry. It was founded in 1989 as one of the faculties at UFRGS. The
Institute has 71 faculty members, which makes it one of the largest Computer Science and
Computer Engineering groups in the country. One of its main characteristics is a strong
connection between research on software and hardware. The Institute also includes a team
of 36 administration staff to provide support for a community of over 700 undergraduate
and 250 graduate students.
Antonio Marinho Pilla Barcellos holds BSc and MSc degrees in Computer Science from
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (1989 and 1993, respectively) and a Ph.D. in
Computer Science from University of Newcastle Upon Tyne (1998). Between 2000 and 2007
he worked for Unisinos University, heading the research group on Computer Networks and
supervising postgraduate students. he has been a Principal Investigator of projects on the
fields of High-Performance Computing, Computer Networks, Fault Tolerance and Distributed
Systems. He has received financial support from research agencies including ACM, IEEE,
CNPq, CAPES, RNP and FAPERGS. Prof. Barcellos is currently the chair of the Special Interest
Group on Security of the Brazilian Computing Society (SBC). His broad areas of interest are
Computer Networks and Systems Security, in which he is authored dozens of papers. He
heads a research project on P2P security (P2P-SeC) and a Working Group on BitTorrent
network monitoring, called GT-UniT and supported by Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa
(RNP). He is an Associate Professor at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).
Luciano Paschoal Gaspary holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science (UFRGS, 2002) and serves as
associate professor at the Institute of Informatics, UFRGS. He is managing director of the
Brazilian Computer Society (SBC) and director of the National Laboratory on Computer
Networks (LARC). Prof. Gaspary has been involved in various research areas, mainly
computer networks, network management and computer system security, and has been
publishing his work in reputable journals and conferences. Prof. Gaspary is author of more
than 100 full papers published in leading peer-reviewed publications. He has a history of
dedication to research activities such as participation in Technical Program Committees of
relevant symposia, organization of scientific events and review of journal papers. Currently,
he serves as editorial board member for the Brazilian Journal on Computer Networks and
Distributed Systems (RESD). Gaspary has been supervising doctoral thesis, a dozen masters
dissertations and undergraduate students, as well as participating of projects funded by both
agencies such as CNPq, CAPES and FAPERGS and companies such as HP, Digistar and RNP.
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2.3
Consortium as a whole
The consortium is the result of a rigorous search and identification of key partners together
forging a diverse and well balanced group of individuals backed by organizations dedicated
to the success of the SecFuNet project.
R&D in Europe involves three main types of institutional actor: enterprises, universities, and
public research organisations. They complement one another and all contribute importantly
to the European Research Area (ERA). Public research organisations are entities "which as
their predominant activity provide research and development, technology and innovation
services to enterprises, governments and other clients…". This definition distinguishes public
research organisations from universities, which have education at the core of their activities,
and from enterprises, which primarily produce goods and services for commercial purposes.
The SecFuNet consortium is organized around these three main types of institutions each
standing a pillar for the project.
As strong part of the consortium comes from the Small and Medium Enterprises. Small
enterprises are the backbone of the European economy. They are a key source of jobs and a
breeding ground for business ideas. Europe’s efforts to usher in the new economy will
succeed only if small business is brought to the top of the agenda. Small enterprises are the
most sensitive of all to changes in the business environment. They are the first to suffer if
weighed down with excessive bureaucracy, and are the first to flourish from initiatives to cut
red tape and reward success. At Lisbon was set the goal for the European Union to become
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of
sustainable economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. Small
enterprises must be considered as a main driver for innovation, employment as well as social
and local integration in Europe. The SecFuNet project paid specific attention to the
involvement of SMEs bringing together EtherTrust, Implementa and also Virtuor as a subcontractor, to join forces and bring added value to the scientific and technical objectives.
Specific focus on SMEs involvement is identified below.
Universities are key actors in both the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and in Brazil.
The essential mission of academia is producing new knowledge answering societal needs
(including needs of business and industry) and disseminating this new knowledge to all
stakeholders or users. Universities are at the leading edge of research. SecFuNet targeting
advanced networking principles highly relies on the key competencies and open minded
academic partners. Universities account for 33% of the overall consortium partners.
The SecFuNet project brings together scientific communities, companies and researchers
with varying approaches. This is an essential value towards the objectives.
SMEs specific involvement
The contribution of EtherTrust to the SecFuNet project should be highly valuable for a
number of reasons:
The goals of SecFuNet and EtherTrust are fully aligned
The goal of the SecFuNet project, namely finding practical ways for step by step introduction
of building blocks dealing with increasing network complexity towards full automated secure
networks, is fully in line with objective of EtherTrust.
The SME EtherTrust is strongly focused
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As an SME, EtherTrust ought to be highly focused on its mission. Since there is full alignment
of goals between the SecFuNet project and EtherTrust, one can expect that the company will
be do whatever it takes to make the SecFuNet project highly successful and reap its share of
this success.
The SME EtherTrust brings shorter time to market
As an SME, EtherTrust is able to shorten the cycle between R&D and commercialization,
compared to what big companies can do. This means that some elements of solution
developed in the SecFuNet project will reach the market earlier through EtherTrust,
benefiting not only users, but also larger industrial partners in the project because this will
help the market to move faster to SecFuNet-like solutions, therefore opening the way to
those more complete solutions they will offer soon after.
Note that such early commercialization of elements of SecFuNet solution by EtherTrust is
fully aligned with the "practical approach of step-by-step introduction of building blocks"
chosen by the SecFuNet project.
The SME EtherTrust is dedicated to exploit results
As an SME, EtherTrust has an obligation and a high degree motivation to turn the results of
the SecFuNet project into a business success. This "business obligation" shall benefit the
SecFuNet project in the sense that it will help the whole project to keep a business focus.
The respective strengths of SME's like EtherTrust and larger industrial players like STM are
very complementary
The combination of strengths of SMEs like EtherTrust (focus, flexibility, nimbleness,
reactivity, etc.) with the complementary strengths of larger industrial players (market
understanding, customer trust, reliability, investment capacity, resilience, etc.) is very
powerful, provided they work well together to add their strong points. EtherTrust founders
have a track record of successfully working with large telecom industry players, providing a
great starting point for setting up and driving the cooperation in the SecFuNet project to a
successful outcome.
2.4
Resources to be committed
No major equipment costs are considered within the project. Planned demonstrations will
be based on material today belonging to the different organisations.
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Section 3. Impact
3.1
Expected impacts listed in the work programme
The evolution or revolution expected in support of the future networked society imposes to
solve major issues. The security is clearly one of them and a pre-requisite that will strongly
impact the success of networks and clouds deployments.
It is widely understood, that the ever growing complexity need a change in paradigm,
migrating from quasi-static human operations with all constraints in terms of scalability,
intelligence, errors, towards integrated environment encapsulated into a microcontroller. It
is just a matter of fact that service delivery is limited today by the current lack of network
security. As such, the foreseen infrastructure solutions will not only solve the problem from
a theoretical point of view, but also will surely consider practical and migration path
constraints enabling a realistic impact.
This class of issues is obviously a worldwide problem that is starting to be addressed in other
regional initiatives related to the future of Internet (US: GENI, u-Japan, u—Korea, etc..).
Beyond the legitimate interest, there is an unambiguous requirement to contribute to the
European and Brazilian industrial competitiveness through effective solutions and means to
make it a reality. The selection of the consortium was carefully done along this result
objective. We consider the mix defined as close to the optimum for high quality outputs as
well as reactivity in dissemination leading to confidence in the industrial impact. Moreover
based on the intrinsic holistic approach encompassing services and networks architectures,
we do believe that conditions ensuring synergies exist.
Solving security issues means enabling and acceleration of Internet migration towards the
networked society. Europe and Brazil should be the region of excellence initiating the new
era, demonstrating its capabilities of innovation and transfer into actual deployments. The
solution expected here is a strategic building block allowing recovery of a legitimate
worldwide position.
Expected impacts:
Strengthened European and Brazilian position in the development of the Future Internet.
The trend towards security will push beyond the limit the current virtual networks, and
clouds evolution. Starting from an already difficult situation due to the heterogeneity of the
systems and services, the introduction of a strong unified framework for security becomes
mandatory. Providing solutions and the means to make it reality, convenient theory of
operation will allow solving the problem. The highly valuable propositions will not only deal
with very complex problems but will take care of the migration and practical deployment
constraints. As such a great impact is expected giving easy-to-use and optimized tools but as
simple as possible and hiding the complexity in order to facilitate the adoption in the field.
The SecFuNet project will tentatively interact and benefit from ongoing Security initiatives
Description of some projects on security
3.2 Dissemination and/or exploitation of project results, and management
of intellectual property
Even before the project has really begun, the consortium has started already a set of
preparations e.g. the preliminary structure of the project site was defined. Thus assuring one
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of the important ways that all the achieved results will be continuously disseminated to the
research community and relevant standardisation bodies to ensure immediate relevance of
the SecFuNet research and to obtain an early feedback.
3.2.1. Dissemination and Exploitation of Results
Throughout the proposal preparation phase, a team spirit was achieved, which was shaped,
helping to easy define the way, goals and future cooperation. However, concerning
dissemination and exploitation of the results, every category of the consortium may set its
individual strategy.
Large Telecommunications Vendors & Industrials
The general strategy is establishing a strong action of direct and immediate transfer of
knowledge between the consortium, local systems engineering and subsequently to the R&D
departments to achieve a head start and gain a competitive edge. Thus SecFuNet will give
the opportunity for innovative sustainable network security solutions to meet a larger
market. In addition, it is intended to organize dissemination events through IEEE, ACM, and
IFIP events.
Universities & Research Institutes
A carefully targeted strategy will be followed to maximise the impact of the project, both
within the project period and following its completion. The principal activities and routes are
summarised below:
To publish the achieved research results extensively at the highest quality conferences like
IEEE Globecom, IFIP/IEEE International Conference on security, specialized workshops , and
journals including the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (J-SAC), the
Computer Communications Journal, and the Annals of Telecommunications.
Moreover, dissemination within the corresponding teaching courses will be done e.g.
Computer Networks and Communication System, Performance Evaluation of Distributed
Systems, as well as in seminars and practical courses.
Generally, Universities and research institutes will benefit from the project through their
participation in a leading edge research and will achieve competencies, which are needed to
support SMEs.
SMEs
Through the experience achieved from SecFuNet, and through the insights and technology
developed in the project, SMEs will be able to develop new services and applications that
take advantage of the project achievements. Moreover, SME`s will benefit from involvement
in SecFuNet common research areas and increased know how. This will facilitate future
contracts with potential partners and provide a pool of skilled personnel to enable expansion
into the growing market for telecommunication management networks.
Remark: Exploitation activities shall be done with respect to exploitation rights within the
consortium defined in compliance with the Grant Agreement and the consortium
agreement.
Remark: In compliance with the Rules of participation , the Grant Agreement (Ref. FP7Grant Agreement document http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/calls-grant-agreement_en.html) and the
consortium agreement,
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

Dissemination activities shall be compatible with the protection of intellectual
property rights, confidentiality obligations, and the legitimate interests of the owner
of the foreground.
Prior notice of any dissemination activity shall be given to the other participants
concerned.
3.2.2. Contribution to standards
Security of heterogeneous networks is still considered as a green field for standardization.
Currently, there are much more proprietary protocols rather than standardized ones.
According to the fact that most standardisation bodies have a 2-3 year life-cycle, from first
consideration of a work item to finalised specification, the SecFuNet consortium is in
conscious to follow up, identify and propose all necessary standardization proposals from
the very beginning on. These activities are supported by the fact that a number of
consortium members are also members in international standard bodies (i.e. IETF, ITU, ETSI,
etc.).
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3.2.3. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) management
SecFuNet with its innovative topics is expected to result in a number of patents and
intellectual properties. The appropriate handling of IPR is critical to the success of the
Project. IPR management will be clearly defined in the Integrated Project Consortium
Agreement (IPCA).
Below, the key principles of IPR management to be inserted in the Consortium Agreement.
KEY PRINCIPLES TO BE INSERTED IN THE CONSORTIUM AGREEMENT FOR FP 7 PROJECTS
Words with capital letters refer to defined terms in the Rules for Participation for the
Seventh Framework Programme or the Model of Grant Agreement for the FP 7 Projects.
Confidentiality:
A clause providing for a protection period that will be (a) the longer of (i) the period of the
Grant Agreement plus 2 years or (ii) 5 years from the effective date of the Grant
Agreement, or, (b) if no Grant Agreement is signed, 5 years from the effective date of the
consortium agreement, should be integrated.
Intellectual Property:
Foreground, which is generated by more than one party such that it is impossible to
separate them for the purpose of IPR protection, shall, unless otherwise agreed, be owned
jointly by the parties generating such Foreground. Each joint owner may Use such
Foreground and grant non-exclusive licences to third parties to do so without being obliged
to account to the other joint owners or to demand their consent.
Specific Background may be excluded by a party by agreement prior to signature of the
Grant Agreement.
Foreground may be assigned, without prior written notice, by a party to any of its Affiliates
(as further defined) or to the assignee of that party’s relevant business or to a pre-identified
third party, provided that party ensures that the other parties’ rights to use that Foreground
in accordance with the provisions of the Grant Agreement and consortium agreement are
preserved. The other parties may not object to such an assignment.
Access Rights needed for the execution of the Project or for Use shall be granted on a nonexclusive, worldwide basis.
Where needed for the execution of the Project, Access Rights shall be granted royalty-free,
as of the date of the Grant Agreement entering into force.
Each party shall grant Access Rights to any Affiliate of any other party (so long as such
Affiliate remains an Affiliate of that other party) as if such Affiliate were another party
provided that such Affiliate undertakes to grant licences under its IPR needed to Use
Foreground to all parties and their Affiliates in accordance with the consortium agreement
and to fulfil all obligations under the Grant Agreement and consortium agreement as if it
were a party. “Affiliate” of a party shall mean an Affiliated Entity of that party (as defined in
the Rules for Participation for FP7) together with any legal entity directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with that party, for so long as such
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control lasts. Other legal entities may be specifically listed in an Annex to the consortium
agreement as being “Affiliates” under certain conditions.
Access Rights by a party to the Foreground of another party for Use shall be deemed granted
by that other party on a royalty-free basis.
Access Rights by a party to the Background or sideground of another party needed for the
Use of Foreground shall be granted by that other party on Fair and reasonable conditions to
be contained in specific written agreements between the relevant parties.
All of the provisions of the Grant Agreement and consortium agreement concerning Access
Rights shall apply equally to software. Access Rights to the source code of such software will
only be required to be granted to the extent expressly so provided in the consortium
agreement. Further, specific licence rights and specific sub-licensing rights shall be specified
in relation to software that is Background, sideground or Foreground.
Each party shall abstain from using in the Project or introducing into the Project any
Background or sideground or other work that would or might require Foreground,
Background, sideground or any other work to be licensed under conditions commonly
known as “Open source software” or “Controlled License terms” unless approved in writing
by the all the other parties.
No party will have the right to publish or allow the publishing of any data which constitutes
Foreground, sideground, Background or confidential information of another party, even
where such data is amalgamated with such first party’s Foreground, sideground, Background
or other information, document or material. A copy of any proposed publication in
connection with or relating to the Project shall be sent to the Co-ordinator and by the Coordinator to the Commission and to the parties at the earliest time possible, and the
Commission and the parties may object to the publication within a stated period on the basis
that that it adversely affects the objecting party’s Foreground or commercial interests or
includes its Confidential Information.
Liabilities:
Parties should agree on an appropriate limitation of liabilities under the consortium
agreement. For certain cases of breach the normal limits will be increased or will not be
applicable at all, such as the case where the liability involves the use of any party’s IPR
outside the scope of the relevant Access Rights.
Amendments to the Grant Agreement or the consortium agreement:
Amendments to the Grant Agreement or the consortium agreement may only be made with
the specific written agreement of the parties.
Standards-Related Activities:
No party is obligated to make any contribution to any European or other standard, unless
made under a separate written agreement signed by that party.
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Section 4. Ethical Issues
None of the ethical issues presented in the table below apply to the SecFuNet project
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ETHICAL ISSUES TABLE
YES
Informed Consent

Does the proposal involve children?

Does the proposal involve patients or persons not able
to give consent?

Does the proposal involve adult healthy volunteers?

Does the proposal involve Human Genetic Material?

Does the proposal involve Human biological samples?

Does the proposal involve Human data collection?
Research on Human embryo/foetus

Does the proposal involve Human Embryos?

Does the proposal involve Human Foetal Tissue / Cells?

Does the proposal involve Human Embryonic Stem
Cells?
Privacy

Does the proposal involve processing of genetic
information or personal data (eg. health, sexual lifestyle,
ethnicity, political opinion, religious or philosophical
conviction)

Does the proposal involve tracking the location or
observation of people?
Research on Animals

Does the proposal involve research on animals?

Are those animals transgenic small laboratory animals?

Are those animals transgenic farm animals?

Are those animals cloned farm animals?

Are those animals non-human primates?
Research Involving Developing Countries

Use of local resources (genetic, animal, plant etc)

Benefit to local community (capacity building i.e. access
to healthcare, education etc)
Dual Use
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
Research having direct military application

Research having the potential for terrorist abuse
ICT Implants

Does the proposal involve clinical trials of ICT implants?
I CONFIRM THAT NONE OF THE ABOVE ISSUES APPLY TO MY
PROPOSAL
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