Beijing Normal University
Foundations of Educational Research:
Methodology, Epistemology and Ontology
Topic 4
Methodological & Epistemological Foundations of
the Critical Social Science
A. Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief Account
1. Immanuel Kant’s critical theories in transcendental idealism
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) may be considered as the first critical theorist of the
modern philosophy
a. In his famous essay on “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Kant celebrates the
human capacities of liberating from dogmatism and tutelage and to reason
independently and self-reflectively.
"Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is
man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another.
Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack
of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude
(Dare to know)! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that is the motto of
enlightenment." (Kant, 1996/1784)
b. Accordingly, Kant had produced a series of books to apply his formulation of
critical reasoning to different domains of human intellectualities, namely
theoretical reasons seeking truth, practical reasons seeking ethical-moral
goods, and aesthetic-teleological reasons seeking judgment on beauty and
substantive ends. Accordingly, he published three books respectively entitled
i. Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
ii. Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and
iii. Critique of Judgment (1790)
c. Taking together the three critiques, Kant attempts to elevate human reasons to
the transcendental and universal level. That is to seek the transcendental
principles guiding human reasons in epistemological enquiries, in ethic-moral
practices, and aesthetic-teleological judgments. Kant’s critical project has been
characterized in philosophy as transcendental idealism. That is because he
has built his three critical projects on separate sets of transcendental ideas,
which will not be explicated in details in this course.
2. Karl Marx’s critical theory in historical materialism
Karl Marx (1818-1883) is one of the prominent critical theorists of the nineteenth
century. He directs his reflective and critical reason on one specific aspect of
human society in the nineteenth century’s Europe, namely the capitalistic-industrial
mode of production. As a result, Marx has produced a series of strong critique of
the political-economy of capitalism in the nineteenth–century’s Western Europe.
Most notably, his critiques on
a. The exploitative nature of the class relationship of capitalism
b. The alienating and reifying effects of the commodification process on human
existence in the capitalistic mode of production
c. The ideological and hegemonic distortions on cultural context of capitalism
3. Max Weber’s critical theory on Rationalism:
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Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the founding father of sociology and a critical
theorist of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His critical theory is
mostly built on his critique of the rationalization of Western European societies. For
example, (To be expounded in details in Topic 6)
a. The domination or even hegemony of the instrumental rationality; and
b. The reified iron cage upon the existence of the modern man.
B. The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School
1. Critical Theory of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt School:
Critical Theory (in capital letter) is commonly designated to the theoretical and
methodological orientations initiated by a group of scholars in the Institute of Social
Research in the University of Frankfurt. The Institute was founded in 1923. As the
Nazi assumed power in Germany in January 1933, the institute was forced to leave
Germany and finally settled in New York and affiliated with Columbia University in
1934. Work produced by the leading scholars of the Institute, such as Max
Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse focused mainly on critical
examination of human reason and its potentiality as well as fallibility.
For examples
a. Max Horkheimer’s distinction between Traditional Theory and Critical Theory:
Horkheimer, as the founding director of the Institute for Social Research, has
explicitly laid down the methodological and epistemological differences
between Critical Theory, the research orientation of which the Institute of Social
Research has identified with, and what Horkheimer labelled Traditional Theory,
which dominates the intellectual scenery of Western Europe in the twentieth
century. (Horkheimer, 1982, Pp. 188-252)
i. Traditional Theory: Horkheimer points out that according to the
epistemological orientation of Traditional Theory, theory is a configuration of
interconnected propositions stipulating a specific aspect of the world. The
validity of the theory depends on whether the contents of its propositions
finds correspondence and consonance with the actual facts in the external
world. The methodological assumption of the Traditional Theory presuppose
that the nomological regularities verified in empirical-analytical science are
objectively existed and given. At the same time it is assumed that the
interpretations and meanings revealed from historical-hermeneutic studies
are necessary and authentic representations of the lifeworld. Hence, in
Traditional Theory, knowledge is taken as ahistorical, decontextual and
interest-neutral products of human reasons.
ii. Critical Theory: In opposite to the epistemological orientation of the
Traditional Theory, Critical Theory views theory and its propositions as
intellectual products embedded in particular historical and socio-economic
contexts. “The critical theory of society…has for its object men as producers
of their own historical way of life in its totality. The real situations which are
the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to be verified
and to be predicted according to the law of probability. Every datum
depends not on nature alone but also on the power man has over it. Objects,
the kind of perception, the questions asked, and the meaning of the answers
all bear witness to human activities and the degree of man’s power.”
(Horkheimer, 1982, P. 244) Accordingly, the social world to be studied is no
longer assumed as given or fixed. “The critical theory in its concept
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formation and in all phases of its development very consciously makes its
own that concern for the rational organization of human activities which it is
its task to illumine and legitimate. For this theory is not concerned only with
goals already imposed by the existent way of life, but with men and all their
potentialities.” (Horkheimer, 1982, P. 245) Therefore, critical theory “never
aims simply at an increase of knowledge. Its goal is man’s emancipation
from slavery.” (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 246)
b. Max Horkheimer’s critique on pure reason and formal logic: Taking the
assumption that human reasons are embedded in particular historical-social
contexts and at the same time embodied in specific subjectivities, Horkheim
accordingly wages his critiques on pure reason and formal logic
i. Max Horkheimer critique on Immanuel Kant's famous theses on “critique of
reason” by asserting that the assumptions on " transcendental ego",
“decontextualized self” and "pure reason" are spurious in the light of Critical
Theory. He emphasizes that "it is the human being who thinks, not the Ego
or Reason…. [And that] is not something abstract, such as the human
essence, but always human beings living in a particular historical epoch."
(Horkheimer, 1968, p.145; quoted in Hoy and McCarthy, 1995, p.9)
Accordingly, critical theorists must strive to guard against the “impure reason”
that may be spawned from particular historical and social contexts in which
thinkers and researchers embedded
ii. By the same taken, Horkheimer also waged his critique on formal logic. He
argued that human reason should not merely rely on formal logic but must
include the part on substantive logic. “Horkhiemer wrote: ‘Logic is not
independent of content.’ (Horkhiemer, 1934)…Formalism characteristic
of …bourgeois logic, had once been progressive, but it is now served only to
perpetuate the status quo. True logic, as well as true rationalism, must go
beyond form to include substantive element as well.” (Jay, 1973, p. 55)
c. Dialectic of Enlightenment: One of the exemplar research of the Critical Theory
is the study conducted by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno is to
analyze how human reason has fallen into the Nazi rule. The research project
commenced at the end of the WWII with its objective as follows:
“The dilemma that faced us in our work proves to be the first phenomenon for
investigation: the self-destruction of the Enlightenment. ...The fallen nature of
modern man cannot be separate from social progress. On the one hand the
growth of economic productivity furnishes the conditions for greater justice; on
the other hand it allows the technical apparatus and the social groups which
administer it a disproportionate superiority to the rest of the population. The
individual is wholly devalued in relation to the economic powers, which at the
same time press the control of society over nature to hitherto unsuspected
heights.” (Horkhiemer and Adorno, 1986/44, p.xiii-xv)
d. The project of “Studies in Prejudice”: Fronted by the “facts” produced by the
Nazi’s project of Anti-Semitism, members of the Frankfurt School migrated to
the US launched a large scale empirical project “Studies in Prejudice” to
investigate how individual as well as social reasons are distorted and biased.
The project had produced five publications.
i. Adorno, Theodor W., E. Frenkel-Burnswick, D.J. Levinson and R.N. Sanford
(1950) The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & brothers.
ii. Bettelheim, Bruno and M. Janowitz (1950) Dynamics of Prejudice. New York:
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Harper & brothers.
iii. Ackerman and M. Jahoda (1950) Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder.
New York: Harper & brothers.
iv. Massing, Paul (1949) Rehearsal for Destruction. New York: Harper &
brothers.
v. Lowenthal, Leo and N. Guterman (1949) Prophets of Deceit. New York:
Harper & brothers.
2. Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: As a prominent member of second
generation of Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas in his
Frankfurt inaugural address in 1965 summarized the development of research
projects of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, which he renamed as the
“critical social science” as follows.
“Critical social science …is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine
when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such
and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in
principle be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the critique of ideology,
as well, moreover, as psychoanalysis, take into account that information about
lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those
whom the law are about. Thus the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one
of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transform. Of course, to this end a
critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render a law
itself inoperative, but it can render it inapplicable.
“The methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of
critical propositions of this category is established by concept of self-reflection. The
latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers.
Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest.” (Habermas,
1971, P. 310)
3. The distinctiveness of the critical social science: With references of precedent
discussion, we may conclude that the critical social science has developed into
an independent methodological approach and epistemological perspective distinct
itself from the analytical empirical science and historical hermeneutic traditions in
numbers of significant ways.
a. In contrast with the analytical-empirical science on the research outcomes of
finding nomological or probabilistic regularities of the social world, critical social
scientists will not settle with these regularities as they are but will strive to
reveal the possible power hypostatized within these regularities and social
structure. Furthermore, they will try to reveal the possible social inequality, bias,
distortion, and oppression, which have been institutionalized and legitimatized
by these social regularities and structures.
b. Critical social science agree with historical-hermeneutic tradition on the
research outcomes of retrieving the meanings encoded in different
representations. Critical social scientists would even accept the existence of
meaning configurations constituted in the forms of institutions, traditions, and
cultures, which perpetuate resiliently and continuously. However, they will not
settle within interpretations at this level, but will try to reveal the possible
ideology and false consciousness underlying these meaning configurations.
Furthermore, they will attempt to reveal the possible distortion, alienation and
reification, which have been frozen and legitimatized in these meaning
configurations.
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c. Accordingly, critical social scientists will not satisfied with providing correct
predictions about social regularities or rendering understanding about social
practices, they will try to develop human potentialities, to emancipate them
from slavery, and to seek possibility for social betterments.
4. The paradigm of the critical social science: Given the above explications of the
methodological approach to critical social science, we may summarize the
approach into the following research questions.
a. Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason: One of the primary research
questions confronting the critical social scientists is to go beyond the
self-confident or even self-complacent belief in human’s own reason and
rationality, and reflectively confront the fallibility or even detrimental effects of
reason on humanity and the lifeworld.
Habermas has summarized the efforts of critical theorists’ reflections on
human‘s own reason and rationality and especially its fallible and detrimental
efforts as “rationalization as reificaion” (Habermas, 1987/1981, P. 379) They
include
i. Karl Marx’s critique on rationalization of mode of production by the
bourgeoisie, which led to the rise of capitalism and its reification of human
labor and alienation of human production.
ii. Max Weber’s extended the critique on Occidental rationalization by not only
examining its effects on production but reflecting on modern society at large.
This is especially significant in Weber’s examine the reifying effects of
bureaucratization of human organization in general, which Weber has
characterized as the constitution of the “iron cage”.
iii. The first-generation critical theorists of the Frankfurt School have further
developed this line of critique on rationalization in modern society by
empirically inquiring into the detrimental effects of rationalization manifested
during the two World Wars.
iv. Jurgen Haberma, in his two-volume work The Theory of Communicative
Action (1984 & 1987) has summarized the general effects of Occidental
rationalization into the constitutions of the capitalist market and the modern
state. He has further underlined the two imperatives that both the market
and the state have imposed upon human existence and their communal
lives (the Lifeworld), namely the money steering and power-steering
imperatives. Habermas finally stipulates that these two systemic imperatives
have not only colonized the Lifeowrld but have also reified the very
communicative rationality that men possess.
b. Critique of human subjects and their subjectivity: Based on the assumption of
the embeddedness of human reasons in their historical and social context,
critical social scientists stipulate that one should turn their critical examinations
to the inquirers themselves. That is because “knowing and acting subjects are
social and embodied beings, and the products of their thought and action bear
ineradicable traces of their situations and interests.” (McCarthy, 1991, P. 44)
Accordingly, one line of inquiry within the critical-theory tradition is to reflect
and examine the reification of the subjectivity and consciousness of the
“modern man”. Follow the lead of Freund’s psychoanalysis, the first generation
of the critical theorists such as Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse have
produced a series of work on the reification of subjectivity of the modern man
i. Eric Fromm (1941) Escape from Freedom, and
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ii Herbert Marcuse (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of
Advanced Industrial Society
c. Critique of transcendental truth and the emphasis on the practical truth: Under
the epistemological assumption that both the knowers and their attained
knowledge are historically and socially embedded, critical social scientists
refute the concept of truth of transcendental idealism formulated by Kant. That
is truths are no longer conceived as essences in human knowledge which
universally, permanently and transcendentally exist. Instead, the reality of
social world is conceived as the outcomes of human practices which have
been vindicated, validated, accumulated and even legitimatized in daily social
interactions across time and space with a “Lifeworld”. As a result, the truth
claims of any knowledge about any aspects of a social world must be tested
against the practical validity, which is to be found in the correspondent social
interactions within the relevant aspects of a specific “Lifeworld”. Hence, truths
are no longer to be sought after as something universal and transcendental,
but must be revealed from social practices within particular historical and social
contexts. The traditional oppositions between theory and practice, theoretical
science and practical science, facts and values, and more specifically the
primacy of theory over practice, are therefore valid demarcations to critical
social scientists. (McCathy, 1991, Pp. 44-45)
d. Critique of prevailing social reality and emphasis on social possibilities and
potentialities: For critical social scientists, social world is configuration
produced by human efforts, therefore it is assumed that there may be “power
hypostatized” and “ideology frozen” within this seemly permanent social
structures and regularities. As a result, two of the major areas of inquiry of
critical social sciences are
i. Critical inquiry of social power
ii. Critical inquiry of ideology and hegemony
Along these two lines of inquiry, one the primary objectives of critical social
inquiries is to reveal the possible systemic distortions and biases prevailing in
existing social structures and representations. Subsequently, critical social
scientists are obliged to seek out possible way to emancipate human
potentialities that are trapped and suppressed by these systemic distortions.
C. The Epistemological Foundation of the Critical Social Science: The Concept of
Explanatory Critique
1. Models of explanation in social sciences: So far we have covered three
methodological approaches and epistemological perspectives, it is revealed that
each of them apply different modes of explanation to account for the social
phenomena under study.
a. Nomological causal explanation: It refers to the explanatory models, which aim to
provide law-like explanation in the form of antecedent cause and subsequent
effect causation to the social phenomena under study. To a less extent, it
substantiates at least probabilistic covariance connection between two variables
under study.
b. Teleological explanation: it refers to the explanatory models, which attempt to
provide intentional explanation to human actions. It intends not to trace
antecedent causes for human action but motives and intentions at work behind
given action aiming to the future. Under the working assumption that humans are
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rational actions, this explanatory models has been modified into what is now
commonly known as rational-choice model. Furthermore, there is also another
kind of explanatory model generally called quasi-teleological explanation in use in
social sciences, which render explanations for social actions in macroscopic
scale in the formats of functional and institutional accounts.
c. Explanatory critique: As critical social scientists, they have employed yet another
kind of explanatory model, which the critical realists named “explanatory critique”.
2. What is explanatory critique?
a. As formulated by Critical Theorists, such as Horkheimer and Habermas, they are
not contented with verifying causality or/and revealing meanings, intentions and
values in accounting for social activities; they intends to go beyond the
regularities and persistence found in social structures and/or belief-systems and
look at the possible systemic biases, injustice, and false believes (i.e. ideologies)
at work behind these social regularities.
b. Having revealed the systemic biases and ideologies, critical social scientists
would feel obliged to criticize the “incorrectness”, injustice, and social ills found in
the phenomena under study.
c. Lastly, in order to justify their critique, critical social scientists must elevate their
explanatory tasks from empirical-causal explanations and/or
interpretive-intentional/functional explanations to the level of “explanatory
critique”, i.e. to provide explanations for their critiques.
3. In search of the evaluative ground for the critical social science:
a. In the last section of the concluding chapter of the two-volume work The Theory
of Communicative Theory, Jurgen Habermas underlines that “In this work I have
tried to introduce a theory of communicative action that clarifies the normative
foundation of the critical theory of society.” (Habermas, 1987, P. 396-7)
This quotation underlines that one of the essential “task of a critical theory” is to
provide “the normative foundation of the critical theory of society.” And the
normative foundation that Habermas renders for his own critical theory is exactly
the theory of communicative action, rationality and ethics. (Habermas, 1984 &
1987)
b. Accordingly, in reviewing any critical theories and the explanatory critiques they
provided, one must look for the normative foundation on which the explanatory
critiques and evaluations are based. For examples,
c. Marx’s normative foundation of explanatory critique: Karl Marx builds his
explanatory critique of capitalism on the normative foundation that the mode and
relation of production of capitalism has generated
i. the extreme inequality of economic distribution biased in favor of the
bourgeoisie against the proletarian, which is the causal result of the
exploitative nature of the relation of production;
ii. the ever accelerating process of commodification, which has not only
alienated and reified the process of production, but also the labor process as
well;
iii. the contradictions between the infrastructure and the superstructure of the
capitalism, most notably the hegemony of the ideology of the capitalists over
the culture of the whole society.
d. Weber’s normative foundation of explanatory critique: Max Weber builds his
explanatory critique on the normative foundation not only on the economic sphere
of capitalism but also on the bureaucratization of the modern state. Weber
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underlines that the expansion of the instrumental rationality into various human
organization has produced the “iron cage” in which humans have loss both the
meanings and freedom in lives.
e. Habermas’ normative foundation of explanatory critique: As cited above,
Habermas has indicated that the normative foundation of his critical theory of
society is the theory of communicative action. By the theory of communicative
action, it refers to “the theory…aims at the moment of unconditionality of
processes of consensus formation. As claims they transcend all limitations of
space and time, all the provincial limitations of the given contexts.” (Habermas,
1987, p. 399) However, Habermas argues that in modern society the money
steering apparatus of the market and the power-steering apparatus of the state
have proliferated to such a great extent that the primary operating ground of
communicative actions, i.e. the Lifeworld, has practically been colonized. (to be
explicated in details on Topic 6 & 8)
4. Critical Realists’ normative foundation of explanatory critique:
a. Critical realists, in particular Bhaskar and Collier, approach the issue of finding
the normative ground or in their terms “evaluative language” for their explanatory
critique from another perspective, namely from methodological an
epistemological perspectives rather than from the substantive theoretical
perspective as Marx, Weber and Habermas. They approach the issue by
addressing one of the fundamental debates in social research, namely the
entanglement between fact and value.
b. The fact and value aporia in social research: In natural-scientific research, fact
and value are two separate domains, which should not be conflated in any ways.
However, within the tradition of social research and sociological research in
particular, the relation between fact and value has been one of the most
controversial topics annoying its practitioners. On the one hand, social
researchers are supposed to observe the code of “value-free” in the investigation
as suggested by Max Weber, yet on the other hand, the same Weber has also
advocated that social actions are laden with subjective meanings and values. As
a result, bridging the gap between objective fact and subjective value has been
one of the aporia confronting social researchers for generations.
c. One of the manifestations of the fact-value aporia in social research is on the
issue whether the objects of study, i.e. social phenomena are embodied with
values or should they be treated as objective facts. Bhaskar approaches the issue
with an example from put forth by Isaiah Berlin, “that of the following four
statements about what happened in Nazi Germany: ‘the country was
depopulated’, ‘millions of people died’, ‘millions of people were killed’ were
massacred’, ‘millions of people were massacred’——the fourth is both the most
evaluative and the most precise and accurate; it gives more truth than the others.
That is so, but the evaluative force arises entirely out of the factual content. It is
not that by bringing values into the discourse one makes it a fuller statement of
the truth, but that that by making a fuller statement of the truth one implies more
value.” (Collier, 1994, P.178) This example in fact reveals that it is a common
feature in social phenomena to proceed from factual statements to value
statement and more importantly such a proceeding will practically bring out “more
truth” about the social phenomenon in point.
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d. This example has also revealed another issue involved in research in the critical
social science in general and explanatory critique in particular, that is what type of
truth has the explanatory critique brought out in their investigation?
i. First of all, the critique on Nazi’s act of massacred is built on the normative
foundation that it is morally wrong to kill people in large scale.
ii. Based on factual evidences generated from investigations, social researchers
may and even can infer from “depopulated” to “massacred”. As a result, the
argument has in fact elevated from factual statement to value
judgment/conclusion.
iii. With the normative foundation and the evidence-based inference, social
researchers can substantiate their critique on the social phenomenon under
study as structural biased, ideological false or simply morally wrong.
Taking together this line of criticism, we can see that the kind of truth that critical
social scientists is pursuing is quite different from the objective truth of the
analytical-empirical scientists and the practical truth of the hermeneutic
researchers, it can be characterized as the normative truth, which is based with a
strong normative foundation or even conviction and at the same time supported
with explanatory critiques.
5. Typology of explanatory critiques: Bhaskar has outlined different types of
explanatory critiques, but they are to be developed into substantive theories by
means of “realistic” social researches in various social domains.
a. Explanatory critique on “cognitive ills” (i.e. cognitive deceptions) and
“communicative ills” (i.e. communicative distortions) in social reality, i.e. ideology
b. Explanatory critique on “practical ills” in social reality, i.e. institutional injustice,
illegitimate power and systemic bias
c. Explanatory critique on “ethical ills” in social reality, i.e. psycho-pathological acts
and irrational agencies
6. Explanatory critique and normative truth in educational research
In light of the precedent discussions about the meanings of explanatory critique and
normative truth, we can see that educational research in general and studies of
educational administration and policy in particular are in essence a critical science.
a. The emancipatory and critical nature of education: Education as a human and
social science and practice aiming at developing the potentials of every members
of a given society to the full, it is therefore by definition an emancipatory project
working for the betterment of human possibilities and potentialities. On the
contrary, educators must be critical to any systemic biases and distortions which
may restraint or suppress the developments of human potentials. This is in fact
the very normative foundation of education.
b. Explanatory critique in educational research: In light of the above normative
foundation or even conviction, education researchers are obligated to render
explanatory critiques, which can provide evidences in criticizing any form of
restraints and suppression of the developments of human potentials. In more
positive sense, educational researchers should also provide explanatory critiques,
which can improve the current institutional structure and belief in educational
system, i.e. for the betterment of the status quo.
c. In defense of the normative truth of education: Based on the normative foundation
and conviction of helping every human to develop their potential to the full, and
built on the evidences substantiated from concrete educational research and the
substantive explanatory critiques concluded, educational researchers come to the
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position to defend the normative and educational truth they are obligated to
defend. They may be in the forms of educational inequality and injustice
institutionalized in particular educational organizations and/or policy institutions.
They may also appear in the forms of false believes and ideologies about
educational practices which in fact produce distorting, detrimental or even
suppressive effects to the development of school-children’s potentials.
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