Conceptualizing, preparing for, and
executing topicality arguments
I
Interpretation: “Exploration” and “development” limit the aff to
resource extraction
US Code ‘14 (43 USC 1331: Definitions, current as of 2014, From Title 43-PUBLIC
LANDS CHAPTER 29-SUBMERGED LANDS SUBCHAPTER III-OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:43%20section:1331%20edition:prelim))
The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals,
including (1) geophysical surveys where magnetic, gravity, seismic, or other systems are used to
detect or imply the presence of such minerals, and (2) any drilling, whether on or off known geological
structures, including the drilling of a well in which a discovery of oil or natural gas in paying quantities is
(k)
made and the drilling of any additional delineation well after such discovery which is needed to delineate any reservoir
and to enable the lessee to determine whether to proceed with development and production; (l) The term
“development” means those activities which take place following discovery
of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical activity, drilling, platform
construction, and operation of all onshore support facilities, and which are
for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals discovered; (m) The term
“production” means those activities which take place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of
minerals, including such removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and
work-over drilling;
Violation: []
They unlimit – opens up development mechanisms of the week.
Adding small science affs precludes effective preparation.
Energy encloses a finite, predictable body of literature with
stable plan mechanisms that guarantee competitive CP and DA
ground – key to clash.
2
Interpretation: “Exploration” and “development” limit the aff to
resource extraction
US Code ‘14 (43 USC 1331: Definitions, current as of 2014, From Title 43-PUBLIC
LANDS CHAPTER 29-SUBMERGED LANDS SUBCHAPTER III-OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS,
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:43%20section:1331%20edition:prelim))
The term “exploration” means the process of searching for minerals,
including (1) geophysical surveys where magnetic, gravity, seismic, or other systems are used to
detect or imply the presence of such minerals, and (2) any drilling, whether on or off known geological
structures, including the drilling of a well in which a discovery of oil or natural gas in paying quantities is
(k)
made and the drilling of any additional delineation well after such discovery which is needed to delineate any reservoir
and to enable the lessee to determine whether to proceed with development and production; (l) The term
“development” means those activities which take place following discovery
of minerals in paying quantities, including geophysical activity, drilling, platform
construction, and operation of all onshore support facilities, and which are for the
purpose of ultimately producing the minerals discovered; (m) The term “production” means those activities which take
place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of minerals, including such removal, field operations,
transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and work-over drilling;
Topical affirmatives can only develop by issuing leases or
permits or directly building infrastructure – their management
strategy isn’t topical
Coast Guard 2K (Commandant Instruction Manual ID 16475, United States Coast
Guard, November 29, 2000, “COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION M16475.1D,”
http://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/16000-16999/CIM_16475_1D.pdf, alp)
3. Distribution of Environmental Documents. a. Provide a written notification to state,
area-wide, regional, and local officials through the state process or otherwise, of any plan
or project proposed in the state or locality. Direct Federal development includes
the planning and construction of public works, physical facilities, and
installations or land and real property development (including the
acquisition, use and disposal of real property and the issuance of permits
and licenses) undertaken by and for the use of the Federal government.
Note that notification is not required for permits issued for the construction of bridges
over navigable waters on Federal-aid or direct Federal highway projects, providing the
project has complied with the provision of 49 CFR Part 17. Notification shall take place at
the earliest practicable time in project planning. The notification shall contain: (1) Name
of the organization proposing the project; (2) Geographic location of the project; (3)
Brief description of the project that will ensure appropriate distribution; (4) Program to
be supported by the project; and (5) Date on which the actual development,
construction, or other activities involved in the physical implementation of the project
are scheduled to begin.
Violation: the aff regulates existing ocean development but
doesn’t directly increase federal development; that violates the
core meaning of “its development.”
This card explains all the non-topical things they do—at
minimum the plan is massively extra topical
SHAPIRO 13 their 1ac solvency advocate.
(May 2013. Stuart Shapiro is a Ph.D. and Associate Professor and Director for the Public
Policy Program at Rutgers University. “Analysis of the Federal Oil and Gas Regulatory
Landscape: A Report Prepared for the Occupational Safety And Health Administration”
http://policy.rutgers.edu/academics/projects/practicums/OSHA-Final-2013.pdf, twm)
We feel that each agency we examined could do more to move towards performance or risk-based safety regulations.
Doing so would reflect internationally accepted best practices, allow more cost-effective measures to be utilized, and allow
innovative use of new technologies. However we also recognize that moving in this direction, in many cases requires a
If agencies were to move in a more performance
based direction, here is where we suggest they begin.
significant effort and large upfront costs.
BSEE:
BSEE’s recent adoption of SEMS II is a move towards a more performance-based approach to compliance and inspection.
While it may reflect more of a management based approach than a performance based one, it is certainly closer to
performance based than the previous regulatory regime. Oil and gas drilling is a dynamic practice and new information is
needed every step of the well, particularly with innovation and the development of new technology, such as different
systems with blowout preventers. According to agency staff, regulatory programs are still geared towards process safety
rather than production and BSEE has yet to become more focused on goal setting despite recent enhancements to SEMS.
To conduct the
frequency of necessary investigations related to a performance-based
system with SEMS as the centerpiece, more specialized inspectors are needed. This will
ensure the health and safety requirements are met and up-to-date with rapidly changing technology. BSEE should
focus on retraining their inspectors for enforcement of the new regulations
and changing the culture of the agency from prescription to performance.
Existing regulators are still trained to ensure compliance with prescriptive-based approaches.
PHMSA:
PHMSA’s Integrity Management Program is an effective and efficient risk-based process. The IMP institutes a risk
assessment framework and guides priorities to ensure high-consequence pipeline segments are inspected more frequency.
This model program implements a robust and systemic approach to assessing the risks of transporting oil, gas, and
hazardous materials across the United States. While the IMP program is a model for risk-based assessment of the oil and
gas industry, a 2010 audit by the Office of the Inspector General revealed a number of areas of issues with the program.
These problems include: accumulated backlog of IM inspections,
insufficient onsite visits to facilities, less stringent IM requirements for
non-line pipe facilities, data management and quality deficiencies, lack of
systemic data analysis to identify pipeline safety and accident trends, lack
of capability to identify high-risk pipelines by linking data to geographic
location, and lack of performance based metrics to monitor the IM
program’s effectiveness. We suggest creating solutions to the Inspector General audit
fulfill the essential components of a performance-based regulation
program.
in order to
OSHA:
OSHA’s PSM standard sets an example of using performance and management-based approaches in regulating oil and gas
production process safety. It has been widely adopted and acknowledged by the industry and allows for cost effective ways
to achieve the policy goal. OSHA does not need to further shift towards a performance-based approach for its PSM
standard, but there are two areas where OSHA could move more toward a performance or risk based regime. OSHA
already uses a risk-based approach toward inspections. The agency bases this approach on injury rates at facilities (OSHA
to use
violations of regulations by other agencies to target its inspections. A sector
that is subject to so many different agency requirements, such as the oil
and gas industry, would be an ideal one on which to test this approach. Other
must also inspect whenever there is a fatality or a worker complains). There have been proposals for OSHA
OSHA standards that pertain to industry in general also impact the oil and gas industry are more prescriptive based,
Examples include Hazard
Communication (29 CFR 1910.1200) and Hazardous Waste Operations (29 CFR 1910.120).
mainly in the form of requiring the use of certain protective measures.
While there are certainly circumstances where prescriptive regulations are appropriate, OSHA has considered moving
toward a "safety and health program" model, which could reduce the prescriptive nature of these regulations.
EPA:
The EPA has implemented its oil pollution prevention program with a performance-based approach where appropriate to reduce the
regulatory burden without increasing risk to public safety or the environment. Although EPA has successfully incorporated performancebased principles in its implementation of the SPCC rule, there are areas where EPA could further reduce its regulatory burden without
jeopardizing its mandate to protect the environment. Facilities that are covered under EPA’s SPCC and FRP regulations are also covered by
should work with
these other agencies to identify areas that may be streamlined to eliminate
regulatory overlaps. Increasing the frequency of joint inspections in such areas is also an effective and feasible way to
other similar regulations by agencies such as PHMSA (including the overlap described above). The EPA
reduce the regulatory burden without substantial changes to agency jurisdictions. According to its website, in 1995 EPA conducted a survey
of oil storage facilities that were covered by the SPCC regulation.79 The survey results provide valuable insight into the types of facilities
covered, the effectiveness of SPCC regulation, and identifies high-risk facilities. Subsequently, a review of EPA publications in the Federal
Register indicates that there have been several amendments and revisions to the SPCC regulations over the past few years.80 Given these
EPA should conduct another survey to get an updated perspective
of the SPCC regulations in the oil and gas industry. The survey would help
identify areas where performance-based approach would help facilitate
compliance and improve overall effectiveness of the SPCC regulations.
recent changes,
Although EPA has successfully incorporated performance-based principles in its implementation of the SPCC rule, there are areas where
EPA could further reduce its regulatory burden without jeopardizing its mandate to protect the environment. In particular, there are several
prescriptive elements to the SPCC requirements in 40 CFR 112.8-11 pertaining to the oil and gas industry that may be improved by adopting
a more performance-based approach. Currently, there are prescriptive requirements for facility drainage, bulk storage containers, and
The EPA could adopt a performance-based approach in these
areas by requiring facilities to conduct a risk assessment based on a
common set of criteria. The risk assessment could be used to formulate and implement spill prevention measures that
facility processes.
are specifically tailored to the facility. The EPA could also introduce a performance-based approach to the RMP regulations. Currently, the
RMP rule applies to facilities that meet specifications outlined in 40 CFR 68.10. As such, the RMP applicability is based on whether facilities
contain more than a threshold quantity of regulated substance and the facility’s accident history. These criteria are intended to identify
facilities that are prone to accidental release of hazardous substances that would be particularly harmful to the environment. Although
recent studies have shown that the RMP effectively reduces accident releases, they also demonstrate characteristics beyond the current
criteria that may indicate environmental risk.81 Research suggests that as facilities grow in the number of employees the risk of an
accidental release increases substantially. Using the total number of employees to determine RMP applicability may help to focus the
regulation on facilities with a greater risk of chemical accidents. Likewise, such criteria may also reduce the regulatory burden and
compliance cost for smaller facilities that are less accident prone.
USCG:
may have the greatest
challenge implementing performance-based regulations. Due to the nature of the
The United States Coast Guard’s response, rescue, and security-oriented mission
agency and its regulations, we understand why the USCG’s regulations are primarily prescriptive. However, to the extent
hould, after solving the issues with OSHA and BSEE, described earlier in
the report, audit its regulations to search for opportunities to move to a more
performance based regime.
feasible, USCG s
Topicality is a voting issue:
a) Limits and ground – there are hundreds of ways to make
minor modifications to existing regulatory frameworks or to
overhaul status quo regulations. The aff gets new ground in the
form of courts affs and tons of internal agencies which all crush
the link to core generics like politics and spending.
Wayzata’s nuclear shipping insurance aff, Westminster’s
binding aquaculture standards aff, Blake’s LOST aff etc. prove
allowing regulations explodes the topic. More limited topics are
good – they’re key to clash because they encourage case-specific
research, which results in in-depth competitive debates that
foster advocacy and research skills. Regulatory changes should
be negative ground as a PIC out of “development” or “increase.”
b) Extra and effects T – there are infinite ways the aff could
result in or contain a topical action. They get more ground to
weigh as offense against counterplans or to link turn DAs like
politics, at the expense of negative preparation, because it’s
impossible to research every single non-topical trick the aff
could deploy. That crushes competitive equity which comes first
because debate is a game. 75% of what their plan does is a
regulatory change which may or may not result in more drilling
– they could defend drilling in this debate and defend restricting
it in other debates. It’s entirely likely that the first effect of the
plan is to create a moratorium on drilling so that the USFG can
begin a new regulatory regime which is anti-topical.
Topical version of the aff – they can substantially issue leases
and permits for offshore drilling which solves 90% of their core
offense without sacrificing neg ground. Their core ground is the
Japan advantage and prices but they shouldn’t get to read the
environment advantage with a drilling aff. We can read
regulations CPs against their aff which solves their education
claims which means the only impact that matters is topic size –
that’s a reason competing interpretations come first.
3
Our interpretation is that topical affirmatives can only search for and
extract seabed resources.
They violate by [].
That allows anything in the oceans – search for downed planes, fund the
Aquarius base, space elevators, Makah whaling, nuclear shipping insurance
and SMRs, iron fertilization regulations, sub-seabed disposal, overturn the
Odyssey shipping lawsuit etc.
These were all affs cut at UMich and SDI which proves the tangible link to
our limits arguments AND disproves all their “functional limits” defense.
The impact is predictable limits –
Our interpretation ties the aff to materially interacting with the oceans and
outlines clearly delineated categories of affirmatives with diverse,
contentious, and balanced ground.
Overly broad topics unfairly burden the neg which causes a shift to generics
and undermines research skills by disincentivizing case research – harms
topic education and critical thinking.
A decrease in specificity also cost-benefit analysis which turns their impacts.
Clash fosters advocacy defense skills which are uniquely portable –
outweighs their offense.
We allow reasonable aff ground – methane hydrates, rare earth mining,
OCS, bathymetry, seismic scans for oil and gas, desalination. Solves
overlimiting.
4
Independently, the aff is effects and extra-topical –
The non-topical components of the plan might result in “development” in
the future, but that ground is fluid and unpredictable which crushes the
negative’s ability to prepare. This is an independent internal link to our
limits offense. 1NC Shapiro indicates the direct mandate of the plan calls for
OSHA to increase site inspections and retrain its employees in addition to a
ton of other non-development initiatives which proves they’re extra-topical.
They could defend an increase in drilling in this debate and a decrease in
another debate – this is especially abusive given that the first step in the
plan would be to decrease drilling to ensure that existing sites comply with
new regulations.
They mix burdens by making topicality a question of the efficacy of their
regulations which makes the aff undebatable since in order to get back to
square one, we have to have researched their affirmative to prove it reduces
development. That’s also a reason you should find a clear brightline which
means competing interpretations is better than reasonability in this context.
5
Prefer competing interpretations:
Prevents a race to the fringes – you can always be reasonably topical – no
brightline ensures topic explosion. They need to win impact framing which
means they need to isolate offense and explain why it outweighs ours before
reasonability makes sense – <lack of 2AC link defense to limits makes that
impossible>.
Overview proves they’re not reasonable.
IV. Topicality activity
Speech times:
2AC: 1 minute.
2NC: 3 minutes.
1AR: 1:30.
2NR: 5 minutes.
2AR: 5 minutes.
The neg should construct their own 1NC shell using the interpretation evidence below,
and the aff should construct a 2AC and select appropriate pieces of evidence (if any) for
the 1AR.
1AC
Plan: In the absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific
selector term, federal intelligence agencies should cease collection of domestic phone,
internet, email, and-or associated electronic records.
Neg
A narrow definition of surveillance requires coercive intent –
they curtail “information gathering” or they unlimit the topic
Fuchs 11 – Christian Fuchs, Professor of Social Media at the University of
Westminster's Centre for Social Media Research, “New Media, Web 2.0 and
Surveillance”, Sociology Compass, 5(2), p. 135-137
Theoretical foundations of surveillance studies
‘Living in ‘‘surveillance societies’’ may throw up challenges of a fundamental –
ontological – kind’ (Lyon 1994, 19). Social theory is a way of clarifying such ontological
questions that concern the basic nature and reality of surveillance. An important
ontological question is how to define surveillance. One can distinguish
neutral concepts and
negative concepts.
For Max Horkheimer, neutral theories ‘define universal concepts under which all facts in
the field in question are to be subsumed’ (Horkheimer 1937 ⁄ 2002, 224). Neutral
surveillance approaches define surveillance as the systematic collection of data about humans or
non-humans. They argue that surveillance is a characteristic of all societies. An example
for a well-known neutral concept of surveillance is the one of Anthony Giddens. For
Giddens, surveillance is ‘the coding of information relevant to the administration of
subject populations, plus their direct supervision by officials and administrators of all
sorts’ (Giddens 1984, 183f). Surveillance means ‘the collation and integration of
information put to administrative purposes’ (Giddens 1985, 46). For Giddens, all forms
of organization are in need of surveillance in order to work. ‘Who says surveillance says
organisation’ (Giddens 1981, xvii). As a consequence of his general surveillance concept,
Giddens says that all modern societies are information societies (Giddens 1987, 27; see
also: Lyon 1994, 27).
Basic assumptions of neutral surveillance concepts are:
• There are positive aspects of surveillance.
• Surveillance has two faces, it is enabling and constrainig.
• Surveillance is a fundamental aspect of all societies.
• Surveillance is necessary for organization.
• Any kind of systematic information gathering is surveillance.
Based on a neutral surveillance concept, all forms of online information storage,
processing and usage in organizations are types of Internet surveillance. Examples
include: the storage of company information on a company website, e-mail communication
between employees in a governmental department, the storage of entries on Wikipedia, the online
submission and storage of appointments in an e-health system run by a hospital or a general
practitioner’s office. The example shows that based on a neutral concept of surveillance, the
notion of Internet surveillance is
fairly broad .
Negative approaches see surveillance as a form of systematic information gathering that is
connected to domination, coercion , the threat of using violence or the actual use
of violence in order to attain certain goals and accumulate power, in many cases against
the will of those who are under surveillance. Max Horkheimer (1947 ⁄ 1974) says that the
‘method of negation’ means ‘the denunciation of everything that mutilates mankind and
impedes its free development’ (Horkheimer 1947 ⁄ 1974, 126). For Herbert Marcuse,
negative concepts ‘are an indictment of the totality of the existing order’ (Marcuse 1941,
258).
The best-known negative concept of surveillance is the one of Michel Foucault. For
Foucault, surveillance is a form of disciplinary power. Disciplines are ‘general formulas
of domination’ (Foucault 1977, 137). They enclose, normalize, punish, hierarchize,
homogenize, differentiate and exclude (Foucault 1977, 183f). The ‘means of coercion
make those on whom they are applied clearly visible’ (Foucault 1977, 171). A person that
is under surveillance ‘is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a
subject in communication’ (Foucault 1977, 200). The surveillant panopticon is a
‘machine of power’ (Foucault 2007, 93f).
In my opinion, there are important arguments speaking against defining
surveillance in a neutral way:
1. Etymology: The French word surveiller means to oversee, to watch over. It implies a
hierarchy and is therefore connected to notions, such as watcher, watchmen, overseer and
officer. Surveillance should therefore be conceived as technique of coercion (Foucault 1977,
222), as ‘power exercised over him [an individual] through supervision’ (Foucault 1994,
84).
2. Theoretical conflationism: Neutral concepts of surveillance put certain phenomena, such as
taking care of a baby or the electrocardiogram of a myocardial infarction patient, on one
analytical level with very different phenomena, such as preemptive state-surveillance of personal
data of citizens for fighting terrorism or the economic surveillance of private data or
online behaviour by Internet companies (Facebook, Google, etc.) for accumulating
capital with the help of targeted advertising. Neutral concepts might therefore be used for
legitimatizing coercive forms of surveillance by arguing that surveillance is ubiquitous and
therefore unproblematic.
3. Difference between information gathering and surveillance: If surveillance is conceived as
systematic information gathering, then no difference can be drawn between surveillance studies
and information society studies and between a surveillance society and an information society .
Therefore, given these circumstances, there are no grounds for claiming the existence of
surveillance studies as discipline or transdiscipline (as argued, for example, by Lyon 2007)
4. The normalization of surveillance: If everything is surveillance, it becomes difficult to criticize
coercive surveillance politically.
Given these drawbacks of neutral surveillance concepts, I prefer to define surveillance as a
negative concept: surveillance is the collection of data on individuals or groups that are used so
control and discipline of behaviour can be exercised by the threat of being targeted
by violence. A negative concept of surveillance allows drawing a clear distinction of what
that
is and what is not Internet surveillance. Here are, based on a negative surveillance concept,
some examples for Internet surveillance processes (connected to: harm, coercion, violence,
power, control, manipulation, domination, disciplinary power, involuntary observation):
• Teachers watching private activities of pupils via webcams at Harriton High School,
Pennsylvania.
• The scanning of Internet and phone data by secret services with the help of the Echelon system
and the Carnivore software.
• Usage of full body scanners at airports.
• The employment of the DoubleClick advertising system by Internet corporations for
collecting data about users’ online browsing behaviour and providing them with targeted
advertising.
• Assessment of personal images and videos of applicants on Facebook by employers
prior to a job interview.
• Watching the watchers: corporate watch systems, filming of the police beating of
Rodney King (LA 1992), YouTube video of the police killing of Neda Soltan (Iran 2009).
There are other examples of information gathering that are oriented on care, benefits,
solidarity, aid and co-operation. I term such processes monitoring. Some examples are:
• Consensual online video sex chat of adults.
• Parents observing their sleeping ill baby with a webcam that is connected to their PC in
order to be alarmed when the baby needs their help.
• The voluntary sharing of personal videos and pictures from a trip undertaken with real life
friends who participated in the trip by a user.
• A Skype video chat of two friends, who live in different countries and make use of this
communication technology for staying in touch.
“Surveillance” is monitoring with preventive intent
Lemos 10 – André Lemos, Associate Professor at Faculty of Communication at
Federal University of Bahia, Brazil, “Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries
of Informational Territories”, ICTs for Mobile and Ubiquitous Urban Infrastructures:
Surveillance, Locative Media and Global Networks, Ed. Firmino, p. 130-132
important to distinguish between
informational control , monitoring and surveillance so that the problem
can be better understood . We consider control to be the supervision of activities, or
Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is
actions normally associated with government and authority over people, actions and processes.
Monitoring can be considered a form of observation to gather information with a view to making
projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the action of following up and
intended to avoid
something , as an observation whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that
evaluating data. Surveillance, however, can be defined as an act
is attentive, cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in English and French the two
words “vigilant” and “surveillance”, each of which is spelt the same way and has the same
meaning in both languages, are applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to
acts associated with legal action or action by the police intended to provide protection
against crime, respectively. We shall define surveillance as actions that imply control and
monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies something quite
specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering
of personal information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow, 2005, p.
8).
According to this definition, surveillance actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not
all forms of control and/or monitoring can be called
surveillance . It could be said that all forms of surveillance require two elements:
intent with a view to avoiding causing something and identification of individuals or
groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is
surveillance if there is no identification of the person under observation
(anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding something) . To my
mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example, that the system run by my cell phone
operator that controls and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is
identification but no intent . However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal
Police can request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls.
The same can be said about the control and monitoring of users by public transport operators.
part of the administrative routine of the companies involved. Once
again, however, the system can be used for surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept
under surveillance by the companies’ and/or police’s safety systems). Note the example
further below of the recently implemented "Navigo" card in France. It seems to me that
the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and countless
different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor
and offer a real possibility of surveillance.
This is
“Surveillance” requires an intentional purpose to shape future
action---“monitoring” without objective isn’t T
Santaella 10 – Lucia Santaella, Full Professor at São Paulo Catholic University,
Director of the Center of Research in Digital Media, One of the Honorary Presidents of
the Latin-American Federation of Semiotics, and Member of the Argentinian Academy of
Arts, ICTs for Mobile and Ubiquitous Urban Infrastructures: Surveillance, Locative
Media and Global Networks, Ed. Firmino, p. 297
THREE REGIMES OF SURVEILLANCE: PANOPTIC, SCOPIC AND TRACKING
The word surveillance and its concept are widely used. Even one seems to intuitively know
what surveillance means. In a research context, however, we must follow an ethics of
terminology , by defining our sources and the meaning implied in the terms being used. A
simple definition is given by Bennet & Regan (2004: 452): "surveillance is a way of
determining who is where and what s/he is doing in the physical or virtual world, on a
given moment in time." Bruno (2008b) mentions a functional definition of surveillance
given by Wood et al. (2006:9): "Wherever we may find purposeful, routine oriented, systematic
and focused attention given to personal details, with the
objective of control, authorization,
management, influence or protection, we are facing surveillance." For Lyon (2004: 129).
serious and systemic attention to personal details for purposes of influence,
administration and control is defined as surveillance. More recently Lyon (2010:6)
added to the definition that "in part due to its reliance on electronic technologies,
surveillance is generalized across populations, for numerous, overlapping purposes and
in virtual and fluid spaces."
Lemos (2010:8) cites Gow (2005a), according to whom surveillance "implies something
very specific such as the observation of someone's actions or the gathering of personal
information in order to monitor actions taken in the past or in the future." Lemos
questions this definition by pointing out that "not every form of control and
or monitoring might be called surveillance" , since surveillance
requires the presence of two elements : " intentionality , aimed at
avoiding or causing something , and a nominal identification of individuals and
groups". Lemos finds anonymous surveillance a difficult concept to grasp without
preventive intention, which aims to avoid something, and the identification of the one
being surveilled.
Data collection that could have coercive potential isn’t
“surveillance” until it has actually been analyzed by human
agents who monitor to make decisions about individuals---they
collapse routine collection into the category, which trivializes
the concept and makes specific analysis impossible
Bennett 13 – Colin J. Bennett, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University' of Victoria, British Columbia, Global Surveillance and Policing, Ed. Zureik
and Salter, p. 132-133
Have I been the subject of surveillance or, more precisely, 'dataveillance' [Clarke 1989].
Again, the literature would suggest that any capture of personal information (however benign)
constitutes a surveillance process. Surveillance, Lyon contends, is 'any collection and
processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing
or managing those whose data have been garnered.' It is simply the outcome of the
'complex ways in which we structure our political and economic relationships' (2001: 2).
Marx (1938) It has also argued that there is a 'new surveillance' - routine, everyday,
invisible and pre-emptive. Linked to this broad definition is the power of classification
and sorting. It is a powerful means of creating and reinforcing social identities and
divisions [[Candy 1993H I.yon 20031.
Without dissenting from these judgements, two insights suggest themselves as a result of
the case studies above. First, my personal data (so far as I know) has not been processed for
any purpose beyond that of ensuring that I am a valid passenger on the days and flights
reserved. It has not been analysed , subjected to any investigation ,
manipulated or used to make any judgement about me . No doubt, a
certain amount of data mining of de-identified information occurs within the industry to
analyse general travel patterns and demands. No doubt, had I not opted out under the
Aero-plan privacy policy, my data might have ended up with a variety of Aeroplan's
partners, and I might have received related, and unrelated, promotional materials.
It seems, however, that there is a fundamental difference between the routine
capture, collection and storage of this kind of personal information, and any
subsequent
analysis of that information from which decisions (benign or otherwise) might be made
about me. The new process for API/PNR analysis serves to highlight the distinction. As a
passenger, when I return to Canada, that information is automatically transferred ahead
of my arrival to the CCRA's Passenger Assessment Unit at the Canadian airport, and it is
systematically analysed. Anybody within a 'high-risk' category is then subject to further
investigation. The crucial process , therefore, is not the capture and transmission of the
information, but the prior procedures , and the assumptions that underpin them,
about who is or is not a high-risk traveler. Surveillance might be 'any collection and processing of
personal data, whether identifiable or not.' If we are to use such a broad definition, however, we
active intervention of human
agents who then monitor that data to make decisions about individuals.
'Surveillance' conflates a number of distinct processes. To describe what has happened to me
as surveillance perhaps serves to trivialize the real surveillance to which some
need to find another concept to describe the
individuals, perhaps with 'risky' surnames and meal preferences, can be subjected during
air travel.
Surveillance is, therefore, highly contingent. If social scientists are to get beyond
totalizing
metaphors and broad abstractions , it is absolutely necessary to understand these
contingencies. Social and individual risk is governed by a complicated set of
organizational, cultural, technological, political and legal factors. The crucial questions
are therefore distributional ones: Why do some people get more 'surveillance' than
others |[ Bennett nd Raab 1997 2003)? But to address those questions, it is crucial to
conduct the kind of finely tuned empirical studies such as the one attempted above.
They curtail detection, not “surveillance”, because the primary
purpose of the data is not to enable intervention to suppress
behavior
Langlois 13 – Stephane Leman-Langlois, Professor of Criminology at the School of
Social Work, Laval University, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: A Political
Economy of Surveillance, Ed. Ball and Snider, Google Books
Though they are not synonyms, security and surveillance cover vastly overlapping fields of
activity and can easily be amalgamated. It does not help that many of those fields are
identified as 'security' instead of surveillance' for political and/or marketing reasons
because it is safer to speak of security, a universal good, than surveillance, which may
raise suspicion. The positive and non-political appearance of 'security' is one of its most
important characteristics to those in the field of science and engineering, who sec their
work as isolated from politics. At any rate, it is not within the goals of this chapter to
clarify the boundaries and functions of this vocabulary. Consequently, I shall concentrate on
security technologies whose main function is clearly to enable surveillance, rather than those that
peripheral surveillance role, avoiding the fuzzy edges of the concepts. To
that end, I define surveillance as any form of information-gathering that is meant to
enable intervention . In the context of security, this intervention usually involves the
prevention or repression of behaviours identified as unwanted conduct
(Leman-Langlois 2007; Lcman-Langlois and Dupuis 2007). This excludes surveillance
devices meant to detect natural disasters , accidents , fires , electrical
power supply problems or other system malfunction, command-andcontrol appliances (such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition [SCADA]
play a
computers) as well as those forms of surveillance that bear on social relationships, consumer
behaviour or markets. It also excludes all security technologies that do not primarily serve
surveillance objectives (though they may peripherally), such as physical locks, weapons,
armour and protection technologies, etc.
They blow the lid off the topic---without preventive intent,
dozens of Affs and entirely new categories of policy become
topical because any information gathering, including benign
forms like weather monitoring and disaster warning, would
meet
Fuchs 11 – Christian Fuchs, Chair in Media and Communication Studies Uppsala
University, Department of Informatics and Media Studies. Sweden, “How Can
Surveillance Be Defined?”, Matrizes, July/December,
http://www.matrizes.usp.br/index.php/matrizes/article/viewFile/203/347
Normalization of surveillance
If everything is surveillance, it becomes difficult to criticize repressive forms of surveillance
politically because surveillance is then a term that is used in everyday language for
all sorts
of harmless information processes that do not inflict damage on humans. The
post 9/11 world has seen an intensification and extension of repressive surveillance. Therefore I consider it important to
have categories available that allow scholars, activists, and citizens to criticize these developments. If surveillance is a
normalized concept of everyday language use that characterizes all forms of information
gathering, storage, and processing and not only a critical concept, then this normative task
becomes more difficult. If everything is surveillance, then there is no outside of surveillance left,
no transcendental humanistic sphere, idea, or subject that allows to express discontent coercive information gathering and
the connected human rights violations. Repressive surveillance has slowly, but steadily, crept into our lives and it
therefore becomes easier that policy makers and other powerful actors present its implementation as necessary and
inevitable. The normalization of the concept of surveillance may ideologically support such developments. It is therefore in
my opinion a better strategy to make surveillance a strange concept that is connected to feelings of alienation and
domination. For doing so, it is necessary to alienate the notion of surveillance from its normalized neutral usage.
CONCLUSION
The task of this paper was to argue that it
is important to deal with the theoretical question of how
surveillance can be defined. My view is that it will be impossible to find one universal, generally accepted definition
of surveillance and that it is rather importance to stress different approaches of how surveillance can
be defined, to work out the commonalities and differences of these concepts, and to foster constructive dialogue about
these questions. A homogenous state of the art of defining surveillance is nowhere in sight and maybe is not even
desirable. Constructive controversy about theoretical foundations is in my opinion not a characteristic of the weakness or
of a field, but an indication that it is developing and in a good state. It is not my goal to establish one specific definition of
surveillance, although I of course have my own view of what is surveillance and what is not surveillance, which I try to
ground by finding and communicating arguments. Theorizing surveillance has to take into account the
boundary between surveillance and information and it has to reflect the desirability or undesirability of
normative and critical meanings of the term. No matter how one defines surveillance, each surveillance concept positions
itself towards theoretical questions such as the relation of abstractness and concreteness, generality and specificity,
normative philosophy and analytical theorizing, etc.
My personal view is that information is a
more general concept than surveillance and that
surveillance is a specific kind of information gathering, storage, processing, assessment,
and use that involves potential or actual harm, coercion, violence, asymmetric power relations, control,
manipulation, domination, disciplinary power. It is instrumental and a means for trying to derive and accumulate benefits
for certain groups or individuals at the expense of other groups or individuals. Surveillance is based on a logic of
competition. It tries to bring about or prevent certain behaviours of groups or individuals by gathering, storing,
processing, diffusing, assessing, and using data about humans so that potential or actual physical, ideological, or
structural violence can be directed against humans in order to influence their behaviour. This influence is brought about
by coercive means and brings benefits to certain groups at the expense of others. Surveillance is in my view therefore
never co-operative and solidary – it never benefits all. Nonetheless, there are certainly information processes
that aim at benefiting all humans. I term such information processes monitoring , it
involves information processing that aims at care, benefits, solidarity, aid, and co-operation,
benefits all, and is
opposed to surveillance .
Here are some examples of what I consider to be forms of surveillance:
* teachers watching private activities of pupils via webcams at Harriton High School, Pennsylvania;
* the scanning of the fingerprints of visitors entering the United States;
* the use of speed cameras for identifying speeders (involves state power);
* electronic monitoring bracelets for prisoners in an open prison system;
* the scanning of Internet and phone data by secret services with the help of the Echelon system and the Carnivore
software;
* the usage of full body scanners at airports;
* biometrical passports containing digital fingerprints;
* the use of the DoubleClick advertising system by Internet corporations for collecting data about users’ online browsing
behaviour and providing them with targeted advertising;
* CCTV cameras in public means of transportation for the prevention of terrorism;
* the assessment of customer shopping behaviour with the help of loyalty cards;
* the data collection in marketing research;
* the publication of sexual paparazzi photos of celebrities in a tabloid;
* the assessment of personal images and videos of applicants on Facebook by employers prior to a job interview;
* the collection of data about potential or actual terrorists in the TIDE database (Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment) by the US National Counterterrorism Center;
* Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer from Europe to the United States in aviation;
* Telekomgate: spying on employees, trade unionists, journalists, and members of the board of directors by the German
Telekom;
* the video filming of employees in Lidl supermarkets and assessment of the data by managers in Germany;
* watching the watchers: corporate watch systems, filming of the police beating of Rodney King (LA 1992), YouTube video
of the police killing of Neda Soltan (Iran, 2009).
The point about these examples is that they all involve asymmetrical power relations, some form of violence, and that
systematic information processing inflicts some form of harm.
We live in heteronomous societies, therefore surveillance processes can be encountered very frequently. Nonetheless, it
would be a mistake to argue that domination is a universal characteristic of all societies and all social systems. Just think
of the situations in our lives that involve altruism, love, friendship, and mutual care. These are examples that show that
nondominative spheres are possible and actual. My argument is that it is possible to think about alternative modes of
society, where co-operation, solidarity, and care are the guiding principles (Fuchs, 2008). If information processes are
central in such a society, then I would not want to term it surveillance society, but solidary information society or
participatory, co-operative, sustainable information society (Fuchs, 2008, 2010).
examples of monitoring that are not forms of
surveillance :
Here are some
* consensual
online video sex chat of adults;
* parents observing their
sleeping sick baby with a camera or babyphone in order to see if it needs their
help;
* the permanent
electrocardiogram of a cardiac infarction patient;
* the seismographic
* the employment
early detection of earthquakes;
of the DART system (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis) in the Pacific
Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea for detecting tsunamis;
* the usage of a
GPS-based car navigation system for driving to an unknown destination ;
* the usage of a
fire detector and alarm system and a fire sprinkling system in a public school ;
* drinking
water quality measurement systems;
* the usage of smog and
air pollution warning systems;
* the activities of radioactivity measuring stations for detecting nuclear
* systems for detecting and
power plant disasters ;
measuring temperature, humidity, and smoke in forest areas that are
prone to wildfires;
* measurement
of meteorological data for weather forecasts.
The point about these examples is that there are systematic
information processes in our societies that do not
involve systematic violence, competition, and domination, but aim at benefits for all. One can certainly discuss
if these are particularly good examples and if the boundaries between the first and the second list can be clearly drawn, but
the central point I want to make is that there are political choices between advancing and regulating systematic
information processing that has repressive or solidary effects and that this difference counts normatively. Certainly, forms
of monitoring can easily turn into forms of surveillance, and surveillance technologies might be refined in ways that serve
solidary purposes. The more crucial point that I want to make is that normative theories, critical thinking, and critical
political practices matter in our society and that they need a clear understanding of concepts. I question postmodern and
constructivist approaches that want to tell us that it has become completely impossible to distinguish what is desirable and
undesirable or that all normative ideas and political projects are inherently prone to producing new forms of violence and
domination. I am convinced that a non-violent, dominationless society is possible and that it is especially in times of
global crisis important to have clearly defined concepts at hand that help criticizing violence and domination and points
towards a different world. I therefore see a need for a realist, critical concept of surveillance.
Aff
“Surveillance” is gathering data---it doesn’t require preventive
intent
Rule 12 – James B. Rule, Distinguished Affiliated Scholar at the Center for the Study
of Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley, Routledge Handbook of
Surveillance Studies, Ed. Lyon, Ball, and Iaggerty, p. 64-65
For many people, the term “surveillance” conjures up images of the
systematic tracking of individuals’ lives by distant and powerful agencies.
These pop-up cartoon images are not entirely misleading. To be sure, surveillance takes
many different forms. But since the middle of the twentieth century, the
monitoring of ordinary people’s affairs by large institutions has grown
precipitously. Such direct intakes of detailed information on literally
millions of people at a time—and their use by organizations to shape their dealings
with the people concerned—represent one of the most far-reaching social
changes of the last 50 years. These strictly bureaucratic forms of
surveillance, and their tensions with values of privacy, are the subject of this
chapter.
Surveillance
Surveillance is a ubiquitous ingredient of social life. In virtually every
enduring social relationship, parties note the actions of others and seek to influence
future actions in light of information thus collected. This holds as much for intimate
dyads—mutually preoccupied lovers, for example, or mothers and infants—as for
relations among sovereign states. Surveillance and concomitant processes of social
control are as basic to the life of neighborhoods, churches, industries and professions as
they are to relations between government or corporate organizations and individuals.
But whereas the ability of communities, families, and local associations to track the
affairs of individuals has widely declined in the world's "advanced" societies,
institutional surveillance has lately made vast strides. Throughout the
world's prosperous liberal societies, people have come to expect their dealings
with all sorts of large organizations to be mediated by their "records." These
records are ongoing products of past interactions between institutions and individuals—
and of active and resourceful efforts by the institutions to gather data on
individuals. The result is that all sorts of corporate and state performances that
individuals expect—from allocation of consumer credit and social security benefits to the
control of crime and terrorism—turn on one or another form of institutional surveillance.
Perhaps needless to say. the outcomes of such surveillance make vast differences in what
Max Weber would have called the "life chances" of the people involved.
No twenty-first-century society, save perhaps the very poorest, is altogether without such
large-scale collection, processing and use of data on individuals' lives. Indeed, we might
arguably regard the extent of penetration of large-scale institutions into the details of
people's lives as one measure of modernity (if not post-modernity). The feet that these
activities are so consequential—for the institutions, and for the individuals concerned—
makes anxiety and opposition over their repercussions on privacy values inevitable.
Despite the slightly foreboding associations of the term, surveillance
need not be unfriendly in its effects on the individuals subjected to it.
In the intensive care ward at the hospital, most patients probably do not
resent the intrusive and constant surveillance directed at them. Seekers of
social security benefits or credit accounts will normally be quick to call
attention to their recorded eligibility for these things—in effect demanding
performances based on surveillance. Indeed, it is a measure of the pervasiveness
of surveillance in our world that we reflexively appeal to our "records" in seeking action
from large institutions.
But even relatively benevolent forms of surveillance require some
tough-minded measures of institutional enforcement vis-a-m individuals
who seek services. Allocating social security payments to those who deserve them—as
judged by the letter of the law—inevitably means hoi allocating such benefits to other
would-be claimants. Providing medical benefits, either through government or private
insurance, means distinguishing between those entitled to the benefits and others. When
the good things of life are passed around, unless everyone is held to be equally entitled,
the logic of surveillance demands distinctions between the deserving, and others. Ami
this in turn sets m motion requirements for positive identification, close record-keeping,
precise recording of each individual case history, and so on (see also Webster, this
volume).
“Surveillance” includes routine data collection---they exclude
the majority of contemporary activity and over-focus on
dramatic manifestations
Ball 3 – Kirstie Ball, Professor of Organization at The Open University, and Frank
Webster, Professor of Sociology at City University, London, The Intensification of
Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age, p. 1-2
Surveillance involves the observation, recording and categorization of
information about people, processes and institutions. It calls for the collection
of information, its storage, examination and - as a rule - its transmission. It is a
distinguishing feature of modernity, though until the 1980s the centrality of
surveillance to the making of our world had been underestimated in social analysis.
Over the years surveillance has become increasingly systematic and
embedded in everyday life, particularly as state (and, latterly, supra-state)
agencies and corporations have strengthened and consolidated their
positions. More and more we are surveilled in quite routine activities, as
we make telephone calls, pay by debit card, walk into a store and into the path of security
cameras, or enter a library through electronic turnstiles. It is important that this
routine character of much surveillance is registered, since
commentators so often focus exclusively on the dramatic
manifestations of surveillance such as communications interceptions
and spy satellites in pursuit of putative and deadly enemies.
In recent decades, aided by innovations in information and communications
technologies (ICTs), surveillance has expanded and deepened its reach
enormously. Indeed, it is now conducted at unprecedented intensive and extensive
levels while it is vastly more organized and technology-based than hitherto.
Surveillance is a matter of such routine that generally it escapes our notice who, for instance, reflects much on the traces they leave on the supermarkets' checkout,
and who worries about the tracking their credit card transactions allow? Most of the time
we do not even bother to notice the surveillance made possible by the generation of what
has been called transactional information (Burnham, 1983) - the records we create
incidentally in everyday activities such as using the telephone, logging on to the Internet,
or signing a debit card bill. Furthermore, different sorts of surveillance are
increasingly melded such that records collected for one purpose may be
accessed and analysed for quite another: the golf club's membership list may be
an attractive database for the insurance agent, address lists of subscribers to particular
magazines may be especially revealing when combined with other information on
consumer preferences. Such personal data are now routinely abstracted from individuals
through economic transactions, and our interaction with communications networks, and
the data are circulated, as data flows, between various databases via 'information
superhighways'. Categorizations of these data according to lifestyle, shopping habits,
viewing habits and travel preferences are made in what has been termed the 'phenetic
fix' (Phillips & Curry, 2002; Lyon, 2002b), which then informs how the economic risk
associated with these categories of people is managed. More generally, the globe is
increasingly engulfed in media which report, expose and inflect issues from around the
world, these surveillance activities having important yet paradoxical consequences on
actions and our states of mind. Visibility has become a social, economic and political
issue, and an indelible feature of advanced societies (Lyon, 2002b; Haggerty & Ericson,
2000).
Broad interpretations of “surveillance” are key to advance
discussion of the topic beyond a limited fixation on overt
monitoring---that’s critical to capture the essence of modern,
bureaucratic information gathering
Ericson 6 – Richard V. Ericson, Principal of Green College, University of British
Columbia, and Kevin D. Haggerty, Doctoral Candidate in sociology at the University of
British Columbia, The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility
p. 3-4
Surveillance involves the collection and analysis of information about
populations in order to govern their activities. This broad definition
advances discussion about surveillance beyond the usual fixation
on cameras and undercover operatives. While spies and cameras are
important, they are only two manifestations of a much larger
phenomenon.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) now inevitably shape any
discussion of surveillance (Lyon 2003). While those events intensified anti-terrorist
monitoring regimes, surveillance against terrorism is only one use of
monitoring systems. Surveillance is now a general tool used to
accomplish any number of institutional goals. The proliferation of
surveillance in myriad contexts of everyday life suggests the need to
examine the political consequences of such developments.
Rather than seek a single factor that is driving the expansion of surveillance, or detail
one overriding political implication of such developments, the volume is concerned
with demonstrating both the multiplicity of influences on surveillance
and the complexity of the political implications of these developments.
Contributors to this volume are concerned with the broad social remit of
surveillance - as a tool of governance in military conflict, health, commerce, security
and entertainment - and the new political responses it engenders.