Chapter 3
Reasons and Values
We promised an account of enjoyment that combines and explains both the felt
and reason-for-action aspects of enjoyment. We develop the connection to
enjoyment as a feeling by building on the fact that the belief/desire pairs are
occurrent belief/felt desire pairs. We explain the reasons-for-action aspect of
enjoyment by focusing on the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pairs involved in
enjoyment; such pairs are typically reasons to have or do φ. The “typically” matters:
you can enjoy φ when the relevant belief/desire pair does not constitute such a
reason. Canvassing the distinction between the two cases is the key to an account of
the reasons for action dimension of enjoyment. This may appear to conflict with
the approach we took in the last chapter, in which we illustrated the explanatoryjustificatory role of enjoyment by appeal to the fact that the prospect of enjoyment
is a reason for action. The initial order of exposition, however, is not the optimal
order of explanation. We explain the reason-providing role of the prospect of
enjoyment by appeal to the role of the belief/desire pairs as reasons. We do all this
in the next chapter. We devote this chapter to an essential preliminary: clarifying
the notion of a reason for action, which in turn requires a consideration of valuing.
We begin with reasons.
Reasons
It may seem we have already gone wrong. Isn’t focusing on reasons for
action a misstep? In some cases of enjoying φ, φ is indeed an activity, but in
others it is an experience. Reasons for action guide our voluntary choices, but—so
1
the objection goes—we do not choose our experiences, we just have them. It is of
course just false that we do not choose our experiences. Having an experience is
typically under your voluntary control in two ways: you may be able to determine
both whether it occurs and how long it endures. You can control whether you have
the experience of tasting the wine by taking or not taking a sip, and you can control
the duration of your taste experience by how deeply you drink. By “a reason to
have an experience,” we mean a reason to exercise control in one of the above
ways.
Reasons for Action
An initial and essential point is that talk of “reasons for action” is equivocal in
least two ways. Reasons may be belief/desire pairs that motivate a particular
person to act in a certain way, and that the person takes to justify, at least to some
degree, acting in that way. We label such reasons first-person reasons. Firstperson reasons are reasons for a particular person. They contrast with reasons
that—even if they do not do so—should motivate a person to perform an action,
and that the person should regard as providing at least some degree of justification
for doing so. We will call such reasons third-person reasons. Third-person reasons
may be reasons for a particular person, or group of persons, or all persons. We
focus primarily on first-person reasons. We will return briefly to third-person
reasons.
A first-person reason for one to perform some action A is a belief/desire pair
that plays, or in appropriate circumstances would play, a certain motivational-
2
justificatory role to do A.1 Suppose, for example, that Victor devotes considerable
time to chess; he studies the game, analyzes his past games, seeks out chess
partners, browses in the chess section of bookstores, and so on. When asked why
he engages in these activities, he explains that a well-played game displays the
beauty of forces in dynamic tension and reveals creativity, courage, and practical
judgment in an exercise of intuition and calculation akin to both mathematics and
art. This belief combines with various desires to motivate him to engage in a
variety of actions, and the belief/desire pairs serve as at least part of the
justification for performing the actions, a justification that he offers to himself and,
if fully truthful, to others.
The example involves the explicit articulation of reasons, and this may
suggest the implausibly rationalistic view that a reason always plays its
motivational-justificatory role through explicit reasoning. Worse yet, it may
associate reasons with dispassionate reflection. Reasons do course sometimes
operate explicitly and dispassionately. Reflecting on his need to improve his ability
to blend strategy and tactics, Victor may explicitly and dispassionately reason his
way to the conclusion that he should study former world champion Mikhail Tal’s
games. The same reasons, however, could operate implicitly and in the presence of
passion. Imagine that Victor, without prior reasoning, accidentally happens on a
collection of Tal’s games while wandering around a bookstore to kill time. The
collection catches his eye; the conviction, “I need this!” takes hold of him, and
straightaway he decides to buy the book. The conviction and the decision occur
against the background of an emotion-laden memory of a recent bitter defeat
1
Comparison to agent-relative reasons.
3
caused by his lack of skill in blending strategy and tactics. Despite the passion and
lack of explicit reasoning, the same belief/desire pair that figures in the explicit
reasoning may also operate in this case. If Victor were later asked why he bought
the book, it would hardly be odd for him to say, “I wanted to improve my ability to
blend strategy and tactics, and I realize that realized I needed to study Tal’s games
to do so.” In offering this answer, he would both justify his choice and identify a
motive. 0ne may on occasion treat such after the fact rationalizations skeptically,
as the likely products of self-deception or fabrication, on the whole, however, they
are part and parcel of the routine conduct of everyday life, and one generally
accepts them unless one has specific grounds for doubt.2 We take it to be clear
that belief/desire pairs can play a distinctive motivational-justificatory role in
guiding and evaluating thought and action. Neither the motive nor the justification
need be decisive. All that is required is that the belief/desire pair provide some,
possibly overridden, motivation and justification.
For our purposes, it is enough to note that a distinctive motivationaljustificatory role exists. We take the role to be sufficiently clear that, for our
purposes, we need not describe it in detail, and we also take it to be clear that a
first-person reason plays that role at least in part through the belief that the
relevant belief/desire pair justifies action. One is not blindly driven along by one’s
first-person reasons; rather, one guides one’s conduct by the light of the
justifications one takes them to provide. Recall Victor. He desires to improve his
See the excellent account of after-the-fact attribution of reasons in Paul Grice, Aspects of
Reason (Oxford University Press, 2001); see also the related discussion of “deeming” in the
attribution of intentions in Paul Grice, “Meaning Revisited,” in Paul Grice, Studies in the
Ways of Words (Harvard University Press, 1969).
2
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ability to bend strategy and tactics, and he believes that he can do so by studying
Tal’s games. To see this belief/desire pair as first-person reason for Victor to buy
the collection of Tal’s games is, in part, to see Victor as prepared, to the extent he
has sufficient self-knowledge and is truthful with himself and others, to offer the
pair as a justification for buying the book. One cannot be prepared, at the time one
acts, to truthfully identify the belief/desire pair as a reason unless one believes, at
that time, that it is. The belief need not, of course, be present to one’s mind;
Victor may buy the book with little or no self-conscious thought at all. We assume
therefore that the following necessary condition holds: a belief/desire pair is a firstperson reason for one to perform an action φ only if one believes it provides (at
least some degree of) justification for doing φ.
Justification, Third-Person Reasons, and Valuing—first another issue.
“Humeans” Versus “Kantians”
Some may object that, in assuming first-person reasons are belief/desires
pairs, we taking sides in the long-standing debate about what sort of psychological
state is required to account for the motivational dimension of reasons?
“Humeans”—crudely—insist that beliefs alone cannot motivate; a motivational
factor—a desire, hope, aspiration, an allegiance to an ideal, or some such thing—is
required. “Kantians”—equally crudely—insist that beliefs may motivate on their
5
own. Our answer is that these crude extremes are untenable. Plausible Humeans
must interpret “desire” broadly to include such diverse sources of motivation as
values, ideals, needs, commitments, persona loyalties, and patterns of emotional
reaction. Plausible Kantians must refer to such sources of motivation to explain
why the same belief may motivate one person but not another. We use “desire” to
refer to the items in the broad and variegated range of motivating factors that both
Humeans and Kantians must recognize.
Desires so construed are particularly responsive to beliefs, which
can play a central role in creating, eliminating, and modifying desires. We complete
our gloss on our use of “desire” by offering examples of creation, elimination, and
modification. Take elimination first. Suppose that, by the time your hosts take you
to dinner after your arrival in Beijing, you are utterly famished; the first dish that
arrives looks appealing, and you immediately form the desire to eat some; as you
serve yourself, you ask what it is. The answer, “Stomach lining,” eliminates your
desire to eat. Two more examples: In Cyrano de Bergerac, Roxane is in love with
the author of the love letters, whom she mistakenly believes to be Christian; when
she finally realizes that Cyrano is the author, she ceases to desire Christian. When
Charles discovers that Jim thinks him a buffoon, Charles is unable to put the
disrespect aside, and his desire to vote in Jim’s favor for tenure disappears.
Beliefs can also create desires. Hungry only for steak, you do not desire to
eat the meat before you, which you have mistakenly identified as pork; when I
point out that it is steak, you immediately form the desire to eat it. To take a more
elaborate example, imagine a lawyer’s client, a victim of years of spousal abuse,
killed her husband with a shotgun blast as he walked in the door of their home.
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The lawyer argues for acquittal not merely by arguing that, as legally required for
self-defense, the husband posed an immediate threat of grievous bodily harm, but
also by portraying the woman as an innocent, long-suffering victim, trying for the
sake of the children to hold the marriage together despite ever-increasing brutal
physical and psychological domination until, finally, the shotgun blast was the only
real route to save, not only herself, but also to salvage any reasonable life for the
children. If the picture works as the lawyer hopes, it generates a desire to acquit.
Finally, changes in belief can work changes in desire. Suppose you desire to
be kind to your spouse, grow roses, and teach philosophy effectively. Over time,
you acquire a variety of interrelated beliefs about what counts as being kind, about
the pros and cons of rose-growing strategies, and about what philosophy is and
how you can most effectively teach it. Your beliefs about what counts as kind
focuses your original desires on the types of activities those beliefs pick out; your
beliefs about the pros and cons of rose-growing strategies lead you to desire to
grow roses in this way or that; your insights into the nature of philosophy and how
to teach it lead you to desire to teach in particular ways.
In sum, we mean by “desire” any of a wide range of motivational states,
states are typically inextricably tied to beliefs, which may create, eliminate, and
modify them.
Justification, Third-Person Reasons, and Valuing
First-Person Reasons and Values
7
We have assumed a belief/desire pair is a first-person reason for one to
perform an action φ only if one believes it provides (at least some degree of)
justification for doing φ. The assumption will play a key role in the next chapter,
and our discussion so far lays an inadequate foundation for that role. To do so,
need to note and elucidate the fact that we explain and justify such beliefs by
appeal to what we value.
The second point is that, typically at least, we explain the causal power of the
experience or activity in part by appeal to what you value. For example, when you
wonder what prompted my outburst of protest at a faculty meeting, I explain that it
was a passionate defense of a moral principle against the siren call of expediency
made me think, and that fact made me think there was at least some justification
for it. I add that we are all too easily seduced by expediency, and that I place a
high value on defending against such seductions. My addition explains why my
regarding my speaking out as the defense of a moral principle lead me to regard
that fact about it as providing a justification for doings so—indeed, in this case, a
sufficient justification. The explanation is causal on our everyday, pragmatic notion
of causation. I understand my speaking out a defense of morality against the
seduction of expediency, and that understanding combines with what I value
produce in me the belief that my action’ having certain features justifies performing
the action. On our everyday, pragmatic understanding of causation, the
explanation is causal even if you reason your way to the belief; reasoning is one
way to produce a belief. The links between one’s values and one’s beliefs about
justification may be far from obvious. Suppose that Victoria has long held the
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following view on self-defense: when a safe retreat is available, one should retreat
instead of defend when attacked with unlawful force. However, when a mugger
threatens here with a knife, attitudes inculcated through years of self-defense
classes take hold, and, confident she can repel the attack, she stands her ground
even though she has a safe retreat. With the clarity that can occur in times of
stress, she thinks, “Self-defense, in this situation, is justified.” Afterwards, Victoria
remains convinced that she defense was justified, but it is only after considerable
reflection and some reinterpretation of her values that she can give herself an
adequate explanation of why.
Valuing
We describe ourselves as valuing a diverse collection of things, with different
people valuing different things—among them: humor, playfulness, innocence,
justice, political know-how, mercy, and the ability to dunk a basketball. In ordinary
life, people describe what they value in a variety of ways. In discussing playing
chess, sailing, or rock climbing, one might say, “Playing chess is a good thing,”
“Sailing is worth doing,” and “Rock climbing puts you in touch with important
things.” Exactly what one means will vary with the circumstances, but we assume
that, in an important range of cases, we can represent at least part of what is
meant by, “I value playing chess/sailing/rock climbing.” There is no need for our
purposes to claim that our characterization fits it all. We offer a characterization of
an important subset of our valuings, and we only claim to characterize one good
9
sense of ‘value.’ We do not dispute the existence of other senses. We should also
note that we could say all we want to say using the concept of regarding something
as good instead of the concept of valuing something. We have opted for valuing
since, as loaded with philosophical preconceptions as it is, good and regarding as
good are even more burdened.
Valuing is intimately related to justifications for action. Suppose, for
example, I value philosophical discussion. I could then offer participating in
philosophical discussion as a justification to, for example, participate in a
symposium; moreover, I could offer it as a justification that is final, as needing no
further justificatory backing. If you were to ask, “Why participate in philosophical
discussion?”, I could answer, “Because it is philosophical discussion.” Or could I?
Justification comes in degrees, and you might be asking me to explain why I think
there is, in the circumstances, an adequate degree of justification for engaging in
philosophical discussion and opposed to pursuing other available options. You want
to know why the justifications for engaging in philosophical discussion are better
than, or at least equally as good as, the justifications weighing in favor of the other
pursuits. I may still answer, “Because it is philosophical discussion,” but I cannot
plausible offer the answer as a final justification. Charitably construed, it identifies
a salient feature of the collection of considerations that comprise an adequate
justification for selecting philosophical discussion from among the available options.
There is, however, a sense in which “Because it is philosophical discussion” can
stand on its own as a final justification.
I may offer it as providing some degree of justification for engaging in
philosophical discussion. Indeed, I may think that, in all possible circumstances,
10
there is some degree of justification for engaging in philosophical discussion. Or,
more cumbersomely, but in a way that lends itself to generalization, I may think:
in all possible circumstances, if an action realizes property of engaging in
philosophical discussion, then there is some degree of justification for performing
that action. Equivalently: I may think necessarily, if an action realizes property of
engaging in philosophical discussion, then there is some degree of justification for
performing that action. We do think this in regard to various properties. Various
people at various times have thought so of the properties in the following list, for
example.
Ambition
Benevolence
Bravery
Caring
Charity
Chastity
Cleanliness
Commitment
Compassion
Consideration
Contentment
Cooperation
Courage
Courtesy
Creativity
Curiosity
Dependability
Detachment
Determination
Devotion
Diligence
Discernment
Discretion
Faithfulness
Forbearance
Forgiveness
Fortitude
Friendliness
Generosity
Gentleness
Grace
Gratitude
Helpfulness
Honesty
Honor
Hope
Humbleness
Humility
Humor
Idealism
Integrity
Impartiality
Innocence
Joyfulness
Kindness
Knowledge
Liberality
Love
Loyalty
Magnanimity
Majesty
Meekness
Moderation
Modesty
Openness
Patience
Piety
Prudence
Purity
Resoluteness
Resourcefulness
Respect
Responsibility
Reverence
Righteousness
Selflessness
Self-sacrifice
Sensitivity
Simplicity
Sincerity
Spontaneity
Steadfastness
Strength of character
Temperance
Thankfulness
Tolerance
Toughness
Tranquility
Trust
Trustworthiness
Truthfulness
Understanding
Wisdom
Wonder
This list would be a good response to a request for examples of the kinds of
things people value. Why not then do as Joseph Raz has indeed done, and define
valuing this way? X values a property P if and only if x thinks that necessarily, if an
action realizes P, then there is some justification for performing that action.3 To
see the idea, consider that to act in a way that realizes a property is to make the
world a certain way. The idea is that to value is to see making the world that way
“Any property which (necessarily) makes anything which possesses it good (or bad) at
least to a degree is an evaluative property, standing for some value.” Raz (2001-09-17).
Value, Respect, and Attachment (p. 44). Cambridge University Press - A. Kindle Edition.
3
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as a necessary source of justification. This is essentially the account we offer, but
our conditions are more restrictive than Raz’s. We do not intend this as a criticism
of Raz. He notes that he is offering a vague, initial characterization of ‘value’ that is
“inflationary” . . . [and] to be judged by linguistic propriety, but by its theoretical
purpose.”4
The following example motivates our more restrictive definition. Suppose
Smith values being devout; then, according definition, he thinks that necessarily, if
an action realizes being devout, there is some justification for performing that
action. He sees prayer as necessary component of being devout, so he thinks that
necessarily if an action realizes the property engaging in prayer, there is some
justification for performing that action. Should we count Smith as valuing prayer?
The reason not to is that the property of being prayer gets its justificationconferring power entirely from the fact that it is a necessary component of being
devout. We would, however, understand Smith if he objected on that ground when
we described him as valuing prayer. There are many such examples. Suppose Lilly
values love—both romantic love and love as in the commandment to love one’s
neighbor. She believes that loving oneself is a necessary component of loving
others. As she says, “You can’t love others unless you love yourself,” and she does
not mean this as an empirical generalization, but as a requirement on counting as
standing in a loving relationship to others. Lilly dissents, however, when she is
described as valuing self-love. She insists that she values love, not self-love. Her
reason is that, in her eyes, the justification-conferring power of the property of
being self-love derives entirely from its being a necessary component of love. Such
Raz (2001-09-17). Value, Respect, and Attachment (pp. 44-45). Cambridge University
Press - A. Kindle Edition.
4
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cases may arise whenever someone values a property P and regards realizing a
property Q as a necessary component of realizing P. We understand the distinction
the person is marking when he or she denies valuing Q.
The following definition of valuing incorporates this distinction.
x values P if and only if x thinks that (1) necessarily, if an action realizes P,
then there is some justification for performing that action, and (2) that an
action’s realizing P is—by itself—a sufficient justification for thinking (1).
The idea is to value is not just to view making the world that way as a necessary
source of justification, it is also to see in the very fact that one makes the world
that way as on its own a sufficient justification for that view. Valuing is a view
about justification that sufficiently justifies itself. The claim that the property has
necessary justification-conferring power stands in no need of justification beyond
the fact that it is the property that it is. This is not to say that there no other
justifications. One might, for example, value friendship, and think that pursuing
friendship is also justified as an essential component of a happy life.
Smith illustrates the idea. Similar remarks hold for Lilly and love. Smith
satisfies the second condition with respect to being devout. Suppose we were to
ask him why he thinks that necessarily if an action realizes being devout, then
there is some degree of justification for performing that action. More colloquially,
the conversation might go something like this.
Us: Do you really believe that, no matter what the circumstances, there is
some justification for acting in ways that are devout?
Smith: Yes.
Us: Why do you believe that?
Smith: Precisely because it is the action of being devout.
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Smith acknowledges that he thinks that (1) necessarily, if an action realizes being
devout, then there is some justification for performing that action, and (2) that an
action’s realizing being devout is—by itself—a sufficient justification for thinking (1).
The definition still needs emendation, however. To see why, suppose Sally
values integrity. Then, according to the definition, she thinks that, necessarily if an
action realizes integrity, there is some justification for performing that action.
Sally, who is logically quite astute, realizes that if there is some justification for
performing an action that realizes the property of having integrity, then there is
some justification for performing an action that realizes the property of having
integrity and being self-identical. Should we therefore see Sally as valuing having
integrity and being self-identical? The argument against doing so is similar to the
argument in the Smith and Lilly examples: namely, the property of being selfidentical plays no justification-conferring role. That role falls entirely to the
property of having integrity. The justification-conferring power of being having
integrity and being self-identical derives entirely from the justification-conferring
power of being having integrity. We rule these cases out with the following revised
definition.
x values P if and only only if x thinks that (1) necessarily, if an action realizes
P, then there is some justification for performing that action, and (2) that an
action’s realizing P is—by itself—a sufficient, non-derivative justification for
thinking (1).
Valuing, Causation, and Justification
14
Some may be requirements of being rational. Many are not. Must have
some.
Social forms set for us the broad outlines of our evaluations. To be a lawyer,
doctor, teacher, factory worker, or janitor is to see oneself and to be seen by others
as conforming to certain socially recognized standards of behavior. We do not
define our evaluative positions on some abstract rationalist map drained of all the
contingent detail attendant to our particular time and place in society; the
particulars of our social setting provide the essential context in which we evaluate
ourselves and others.
Social forms give me my stock of values.
Whether one values Chinese landscape painting is optional. Suppose Jones
has always found Chinese landscape painting an uninteresting art form worth at
most a passing glance. He nonetheless finds himself valuing looking at Guo Xi’s
Snow Mountain. Jones says he values the unbroken flow created by the many
separate, orthogonal lines.
Jones may discover a fuller characterization of the properties in A and in the course
of doing so may have to discover what properties he values that caused him to
value the experience of looking at Guo Xi’s Snow Mountain.
When he sees it that way, he values it.
So causation put him in possession of a justification.
15
Us: Do you really believe that, no matter what the circumstances, there is
some justification for appreciating Chinese landscape painting?
Jones: Yes.
Us: Why do you believe that?
Smith: Precisely because it is the action of appreciating Chinese landscape
painting.
What if we respond, “We don’t see it.”
As a further illustration, imagine Gouge exploring his homoerotic side. A wide
range of experiences and activities will cause him—or fail to cause him—to value
those experiences and activities as having various properties. In this way, he
discovers what properties he values. There are many of possibilities. The
emerging pattern may, for example, reveal the types of men to whom he is
attracted, or, reflecting on the various properties, Gouge may come to the
conclusion that gender matters less than certain personality traits that, as he now
realizes, he conceptualized as “male.”
There are many such examples. Consider one more. Suppose a friend has
invited you to go sailing. You accepted the invitation only because you thought it
would be impolite to refuse. You have been sailing before and, while you did not
find it unendurable, you found it difficult to see what people find so attractive about
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wandering about a body of water at very slow speeds. Your expressing this opinion
of sailing to your friend is what prompted the invitation. The friend had insisted
that you give sailing another try on his boat; “you might,” he said, “change your
mind.” He was indeed correct. The boat, an ultralight racer, moves with an ease
and grace utterly lacking in your early experiences; it is all different—the feel of the
graceful motion of the boat and its easy speed, the sense of being not at odds with
the wind and waves but in harmony with them. You express your surprise and
enthusiasm to your friend by identifying the features of the experience for which
you find yourself filled with desire. You are, as you realize enjoying it. The belief
involved in this enjoyment is the belief, of the activity, under an array A that
captures your new found sense of sailing, that it is occurring; you desire, of the
activity, under A, that is should occur for its own sake.
Now as Gouge shows, belief/desire pair need not serve as a first-person reason. It
follows that you believe the pair provides some degree of justification for sailing.
But suppose it is. The belief/desire pair serves as a first-person reason to sail.
Your belief is explained by the fact that you value the activity under A. Did you,
like Jones in the Snow Mountain example, value the sailing-under-A?
If I value P, do I have a first-person reason to perform an action that realizes
P? Clearly not. Having a first person reason requires having an “of φ, under A”
belief/desire pair that plays an appropriate motivational-justificatory role. I can
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value listening to the Choral Finale of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony when I am not
listening to it, and hence when there is no appropriate φ and A such that I believe
of, φ, under A, that it occurs, and desire φ, under A, that it should occur. But
suppose I do listen to it, and that as a result, for an appropriate φ and A, I do
believe, of φ, under A, that it occurs. Will I also desire, of φ, under A, that it
should occur for its own sake, and will that belief/desire pair serve as a first person
reason?
Typically, yes. Typically, φ will (a) cause you to value the individual φ and
(b) that will cause you to desire, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own
sake. We describe the typical causal ancestry; there are other possible causal
paths, but they do not matter for our purposes. To begin, recall that to value the
array A of properties is to think (1) necessarily, if an action realizes A, then there is
some justification for performing that action, and (2) that an action’s realizing A
is—by itself—a sufficient, non-derivative justification for thinking (1). The enjoyed
experience or activity causes—or causally sustains—x’s valuing A by causing
(causally sustaining) the conviction that (1) and (2) are true. An example is in
order. Suppose you value activity of playing a particular game of chess as having
an array of properties A. A includes the properties of the beauty of forces in
dynamic tension and the display of creativity, courage, and practical judgment in an
exercise of intuition and calculation akin to both mathematics and art.
You value the particular activity at least in part because it causes your
engaging in it causes you to believe it realizes A. You value the properties in A.
That is, you think (a) that if an activity has A, then its having A justifies (to some
18
degree) your engaging in that activity, and (b) that its having A is sufficient
justification for thinking (a). This belief combines with your belief your particular
activity has A to lead you to value it. Thus the activity is part of the causal
ancestry of the valuing.
In the chess example, it may be clear to you the causal path may be clear to
you. You may realize both that you value the properties in A and that your valuing
A caused your valuing of your chess playing activity. But causation need not
always be so transparent.
It is this conviction that underlies your enthusiastic specification the array of
features your sailing activity has revealed; the discovery of those features is the
initial cause of the belief, and their continued presence in your activity is a
sustaining cause.
Will my valuing the individual φ cause me to desire, of φ, under A, that it
should occur for its own sake? Not always. I can believe justified without
motivation. Only some degree of justification. But where I do desire, my valuing
will causally sustain the desire.
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To see what we have in mind, recall that the following is a necessary condition of
an “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair serving as a first-person reason under A for x
to φ: x must believe that the pair provides some degree of justification for x’s
φing. Our claim is that claim is that φ “causes the first-person reason” by creating
or causally sustaining the belief that the pair provides some degree of justification.
This is not to claim that φ is causally sufficient for the pair serving as a first-person
reason; it is just to claim that φ is a part of the causal ancestry the pair’s serving
as a first-person reason. Examples are in order, but first two points bear emphasis
to avoid misunderstanding. The first is that the “φ” in an “of φ, under A”
belief/desire pair is not a type of experience or activity but a non-repeatable
individual. It is the occurrence of that individual that causes one to believe the pair
provides a justification for φing.
The Enjoyment Hierarchy
We will distinguish three varieties of enjoyment. They are plain enjoyment
(as define in Chapter 1), first-person-reason enjoyment, and value-enjoyment.
Value-enjoyment is a subtype of first-person-reason enjoyment, which is a subtype
of plain enjoyment. The types form a hierarchy. Other things being equal, we
prefer value-enjoyment to first-person-reason enjoyment, which we prefer to plain
enjoyment. The enjoyment of beauty is a special case of value-enjoyment. The
next chapter defines first-person-reason enjoyment and value-enjoyment.
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So if, at t, I would at some future time value φ under A, can I correctly be
described at t as desiring, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own sake at
some future time under appropriate circumstances?
Alternatively, and probably
better: as desiring that an experience or activity of the φ-under-A type occur for
its own sake at some future time in appropriate circumstances?
I do not think
there is a clear answer to this question. It depends on how counterfactual an
attribution of a motivation can be for it to qualify as the attribution of a desire.
The thought can play a role in explaining the desire. Could the desire arise without
the thought playing such a role? Would think so if we thought “different parts of
the soul” generated different types of desires.
Our experience and activities can clearly cause or causally sustain the belief that a
particular “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair provides a justification for φing. In
doing so, they may, in various ways the examples illustrate, reveal and illuminate
what we value. This is an important aspect of our lives, but why is it one that
belongs in a definition of first-person-reason enjoyment? Because it provides an
explanation of the power enjoyment can exercise over us. It explains in part why
one eats another piece of chocolate or has another bottle of wine, why one goes
sailing for hours on end, and why, although the annoyance of one’s dinner
companion is visibly increasing, one cannot stop gazing at the attractive person at
the other table. It exercises this power by holding us in a feedback loop in which a
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first-person reason enjoyment gives rise to a first-person reason enjoyment, which
gives rise to . . . .
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