Workshop titles and abstracts
Diagrams in Newton’s Principia: Pedagogical Aid or Mathematical Reasoning?
Pierre Boulos
In reasoning out the mathematical principles of natural philosophy Newton makes abundant use of
geometric diagrams. It is not historical fiction to think that Newton might have used a tool developed for
his own use in the publication of the Principia, namely the calculus. Had he used the calculus in the
Principia it would have simplified the mathematical reasoning in it, and likely would have rendered the use
of diagrams to pedagogical aid. Newton, a descendent of a long tradition, held that the most certain way of
reasoning mathematically is diagrammatically. His added flourish to diagrammatic reasoning is to
conceive the diagrams as capturing the “momentary” in motion. This departure was crucial in the
establishment of his three laws of motion and, indeed, the argument for universal gravitation. For Newton,
diagrams are essential to analysis and thus are essential to his deductions from phenomena.
Evidence in a Digital Age
Alan Gross
The arrival of the internet has made possible for the first time the extensive use of visual and audible
evidence in support of scholarly claims. We see this exemplified in music criticism, in archives, such as
those of Walt Whitman and William Blake, in the urban history of Los Angeles and Rome, and in film
criticism. But while this new frontier is real enough, ready to be exploited in the interest of scholarship,
there is often an obstacle to overcome: copyright law. Take film criticism. On November 18 th Mickey
Mouse will be eighty-four. You can wish him happy birthday, of course, but if in doing so you reproduce
his image without permission, Disney will threaten to sue. Technically, yours is fair use; technically, this
use is transformative, that is, the image has been seriously repurposed. Technically, all scholarship on
Mickey Mouse is transformative; permission need not be asked. But we are right to be intimidated by
pockets far deeper than our own.
What One Picture Is Worth in Science
Joseph E. Harmon
In no intellectual endeavor other than scientific argument has the visual played such a vital role for such
long a time. With few exceptions, the emphasis in the scholarly literature on scientific communication has
been squarely on the verbal text. The inclusion of scientific images has been minimal, and the discussion of
any reproduced scientific images rather thin. In Science from Sight to Insight, Alan Gross and I propose a
theoretical model of the diverse ways the verbal and the visual work together in creating scientific
arguments. This talk will summarize the model and present several examples of its application to images
drawn from the history of science. Our hope is that this model will spur science studies scholars to more
frequent and nuanced analyses of scientific visuals.
Against the verbal-visual divide: Peirce’s concept of diagrammatic reasoning and the representational,
epistemic, and cognitive function of argument visualization systems
Michael Hoffmann
Gross and Harmon’s project of developing “a general theory of verbal-visual interaction in the
communication of science” (p. 2) presupposes that “the verbal” and “the visual” are two different worlds
that “interact.” If we consider the role of illustrations in books, for example, this approach makes perfect
sense. But it runs into problems, I think, when we consider things like tables, diagrams, charts, and
argument maps because in these representations the “verbal” and the “visual” simply cannot be separated,
they are one thing: a visually—or better: two-dimensionally—structured representation of words, numbers,
or sentences. For this reason, I want to present, in the first part of my talk, a different approach that starts
from Peirce’s notion of “diagrammatic reasoning.” I will show that Peirce’s concept of “diagram”
overcomes the dichotomy between the visual and verbal in the notion of a “representational system.”
Representational systems can be defined by a certain ontology (which determines what can be represented),
rules, and conventions. They can fulfill their representational function only if both the creator and the
interpreter of a representation share knowledge about the ontology, rules, and conventions of the systems of
representations that are used in a certain situation.
The concept of representational systems has several advantages: (1.) It is more general than any dichotomy
that might turn out to be insufficient or too restrictive. For example, computer simulations are an essential
tool in modern science to generate evidence. They can be conceptualized as representational systems, but
hardly as “verbal” or “visual.” (2.) The notion of representational system is open to as many
differentiations as we want, and it allows for the possibility that we might use any number of different
systems in one act of scientific communication. (3.) In contrast to static dichotomies, the notion of
representational systems allows us to take into account that an essential part of science is the creation of
new or improved systems of representation. And finally (4.), while dichotomies such as the one between
the verbal and the visual tend to direct the analyst’s attention primarily to the question of how these are
cognitively processed, representational systems as artifacts invite primarily reflections on their quality and
how they could be improved.
In the second part of my presentation I will show how the notion of representational system can be used to
design computer-supported collaborative argument visualization (CSCAV) tools. Since any design of a
representational system requires a reflection on its intended functions, I distinguish first a representational,
an epistemic, and a cognitive function of CSCAV tools. In Peircean terminology, a sign fulfills its
representational function if it determines an “interpretant” so that this interpretant is determined, mediated
both by this sign and “collateral knowledge” of its meaning, by the sign’s object. A sign fulfills an
epistemic function when it is used to refer to, to structure, or to hypostasize (reify) an object. And a sign
fulfills a cognitive function if it directs attention or reflection in specific ways. Then I will argue that
representational systems that are supposed to fulfill all three functions in the area of scientific reasoning
should allow us, first of all, to represent structures and relations clearly, in particular evidential relations.
Finally, I will show how the CSCAV tool AGORA-net can be used (1.) to represent complex evidential
structures, (2.) to hypostasize causal or explanatory structures, and (3.) to stimulate creativity and the
discovery of weaknesses and gaps in evidential, causal or explanatory structures both in individual
scientists and in large and spatially dispersed communities (collaborative cognition).
Diagrams for Amplificative Reasonings
Bruno Leclerq
Even though Charles Sanders Peirce provided major contributions to formal (deductive and probabilistic)
logic by developing Boole’s algebra, he was always been interested in Logic in a far more general sense,
one that does not consider deductive reasonings as the only, or even the most important, reasonings. As his
published works and his manuscripts show, his claim has always been that there are a lot of different and
irreducible leading principles for valid reasoning, the study of which requires semiotics as the general
theory of the way signs can refer (speculative grammar), tell the truth (logic in a strict sense) and be
efficient in both previous tasks (rhetoric). Now, according to Peirce, many reasonings cannot be analyzed
using the (conventional) symbols of linear languages, including linear formal languages; in order to exhibit
the relations between the objects of concern as well as to infer new relations between them, diagrams are
required. This of course is related to their “iconicity.” I will however show that the iconicity of diagrams
does not only mean a likeness to the object referred to but also a more efficient expressivity, and that
diagrams can be manipulated more ways than the signs of a linear language, thus leading to new
discoveries of the properties of objects they refer to (which is all amplificative reasoning is about).
An Understanding of Feynman Diagrams (To Understand Understanding)
Letitia Meynell
In “Why Feynman Diagrams Represent” (WFDR) I argued that Feynman diagrams (FD) have two distinct
functions: they are both calculational devices, developed to keep track of the long mathematical
expressions of quantum electrodynamics (QED), and they are pictorial representations. As representations,
understood as figures rendered on a surface, they act as props for imagining the subatomic world. However,
not all of the objects represented in Feynman diagrams denote extant things and not all of the states of
affairs represented are thought to happen as depicted. While distinguishing representation from denotation
makes it possible to explain how Feynman diagrams represent, it also raises a puzzle about what their
epistemic value might be.
In this paper I will argue that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in
part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of QED and particle physics
more generally. Importantly, this depends on clearly distinguishing understanding from knowledge.
Drawing on the distinction above and Feynman’s own remarks on the subject (Wuthrich 2011; Kaiser
2005), I argue that, unlike knowledge, understanding is not straightforwardly factive and accepting the
literally false can, in some circumstances, be characterized as an epistemically successful strategy.
Importantly, this tells us something not only about the epistemology of FDs but also about the role of
understanding and pictures in scientific epistemology more generally.
Bodies that Argue: NWP’s Prison Special, Vulnerable Bodies, and Appeals
to Civic Obligation
Catherine H. Palczewski
In 1919, the National Woman’s Party planned the Prison Special, a cross-country train tour stopping in 16
cities in 24 days under the slogan “from prison to people.” On board the special were 26 White women, all
of whom had served time in prison for their suffrage activism, many of whom had been forcibly fed. Clad
in replica prison uniforms, armed with issues of the Suffragist and a pamphlet titled “Jailed for Freedom,”
and ready to show a magic lantern slideshow of images of suffrage protest, these women spoke in packed
halls, from the backs of convertibles, and to whomever would listen. The Prison Special offers a complex
example of body argument.
The NWP’s verbal and visual arguments represent an interesting mix of empowerment and
vulnerability. At the same time the suffragists are depicted as heroes courageously fighting the
Administration, the NWP also heightens their vulnerability. This could be read as a callous and strategic
appeal to dominant discourses of femininity or as an alternate vision of citizenship, based not on shared
rights but on the shared human condition of vulnerability. The Prison Special makes clear the centrality of
bodies that argue. The women’s words, alone, would not carry the same valence or weight. Their bodies,
imprisoned, starved, forcibly fed, arguing in public were both proof for their arguments and
enactment of their advocacy.
The Argument Mapping Tool of the Carneades Argumentation System
Douglas Walton
The Carneades Argumentation System (CAS) is a formal and computational system that also has a
visualization tool downloadable at http://carneades.github.com. CAS formally models an argument
as a graph, a structure representing premises or conclusions leading by inferences to conclusions.
CAS can be used to identify, analyze and evaluate arguments, and to construct arguments to support
or attack a claim. An audience determines whether a premise has been accepted or not, and
argumentation schemes support evaluation. This paper has three aims. (1) It explains how the
visualization tool works by applying it to a few examples. (2) It briefly compares CAS to some other
comparable tools. (3) It reports on some developments in my current research project on improving
the visualization interface of CAS in collaboration with Tom Gordon (http://www.tfgordon.de/) and
some other computer scientists.
There are three innovations of the method we have been using to visualize argument graphs,
compared to the more conventional Beardsley/Freeman method popular in argumentation books,
including my own textbook, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation.
 The graphs are bipartite, with statement nodes and argument nodes (rather than having only
statement nodes).
 There is a single statement node in the graph for each pair of complementary propositions, P and
not-P, rather than using refutation links between two nodes for P and not-P.
 Pro and con arguments and negated premises are visualized explicitly, to overcome the lack of
negated statement nodes.
These innovations facilitate more compact argument graphs, with up to 50% fewer statement nodes.
Currently we are working on a new, higher-level (more abstract) view of argument graphs.