Intervention Summary
Bangladesh Humanitarian preparedness and response
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide up to £20 million over 5 years to strengthen planning and preparedness
for natural disasters and humanitarian needs in Bangladesh.
Our support will focus on three areas:
(i)
Rapid response to disasters – up to £15 million
(ii)
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for response and
recovery in remote and vulnerable areas – up to £4.5 million
(iii)
Building the evidence base for a more effective response – up to £0.5m
The £15m for rapid response will allow the UK to mobilise humanitarian support immediately
when a disaster occurs, with decision on whether and how to respond being made against
agreed criteria.
Why is UK support required?
Bangladesh is one of the countries most at risk of natural disasters. Evidence of need is
strong. Earmarking resources in advance of need demonstrates DFID’s commitment to an
anticipatory approach. It streamlines programme management processes for DFID and
partners. It ensures that the maximum amount of information collection and dialogue is
completed in advance of a rapid response, rather than in its midst.
There have been strong recommendations following previous responses globally and in
Bangladesh that highlight the importance of strong coordination and better preparedness.
DFID can help to fill an important niche in supporting this institutional preparedness, and this is
included in DFID’s Operational Plan for Bangladesh.
The UK will also invest in strengthening logistical preparedness. We will not attempt to
duplicate or substitute for the logistical services already available. However, we will continue
to provide niche support to the Mission Aviation Fellowship seaplane to ensure a regular,
effective transport mechanism for agencies (national and international) to reach the most
remote and vulnerable areas of Bangladesh.
Finally, there is a clear and direct benefit to DFID and other partners in investing in a better
understanding of response in Bangladesh, focusing particularly on improving effectiveness
and accountability. Again, an emphasis on filling gaps, not duplicating or undermining other
initiatives.
What are the expected results?
We cannot identify the exact numbers of people that we aspire to assist, as the scale of need
is not predictable. But UK support will deliver the following results:
1. Lives and livelihoods saved, and recovery and resilience enhanced through:

A faster, more flexible model for response

A better prepared system

Easier access to remote, inaccessible areas
2. A more effective response, including a specific focus on :

Long term resilience and recovery

Accountability to those affected by the disaster

More efficient funding channels (speed, quality, capacity)

Taking greater account of the needs of the most vulnerable - particularly women and
girls, the elderly, sick and disabled – and of socially excluded communities and
individuals

Nutrition

Quality of support (internationally agreed standards such as ‘Sphere’1)
3. An enhanced evidence base and better analysis for an effective disaster management
response in Bangladesh, and globally.
1
Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
BANGLADESH
HUMANITARIAN PREPAREDNESS and RESPONSE
BUSINESS CASE
DFID Bangladesh
22 June 2011
Contents
1
Abbreviations and acronyms
3
STRATEGIC CASE
4
A. Context and need for DFID intervention

Case for DFID intervention

Rapid response to disasters

Institutional preparedness and planning; logistical support

Building the evidence base for an effective response
B. Impact and outcomes
2
APPRAISAL CASE
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
3
8
Determining critical success criteria
Feasible options
Appraisal of Options
Comparison of Options
Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money
COMMERCIAL CASE
13
Indirect procurement
4
FINANCIAL CASE –
14
How much will it cost
How will it be funded
How funds will be paid out
How expenditure will be monitored, reported and accounted for
5
MANAGEMENT CASE
Oversight
Management
Conditionality
Monitoring and Evaluation
Risk Assessment
Results and Benefits Management
15
Abbreviations and Acronyms
CDMP
Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
HERR
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
MAF
Mission Aviation Fellowship
OCHA
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNRC
United Nations Resident Coordinator
1.
STRATEGIC CASE
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
Natural disasters in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is one of the countries most at risk of natural disasters2. It is a low lying
deltaic country, densely populated, with high levels of poverty and malnutrition. It is at
risk of cyclones, flooding, drought and earthquake. Climate change is predicted to
worsen the extent and frequency of climate related disasters, and bring other slow
onset problems like increased salinity of water and chronic food insecurity.
Disasters such as cyclones or floods strike almost every year, affecting hundreds,
thousands, or even millions of people, but receiving little international attention.
Disasters that affect millions happen, on average, every few years. A degree of
annual flooding is normal and people have strategies to cope and adapt.
Natural Disasters in Bangladesh from 1980 – 2008
No. of events
No. of people killed
Average killed per year
Number of people affected
Average numbers affected per year
Economic Damage
Economic Damage per year
Source: EM-DAT, CRED
219
191,344
6,600
317 million
11 million
US$ 16.8 billion
US$ 579 million
The Government of Bangladesh has expressed its commitment to shift focus and
investment towards disaster risk reduction, but it also emphasises that an effective
emergency response system is essential and will continue to save lives.3
The Case for DFID intervention: Building a comprehensive approach
This business case proposes an approach that puts anticipation and preparation at its
heart. It would focus on three ‘windows’:
(iv)
Rapid response to disasters
(v)
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for
response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
(vi)
Building the evidence base for a more effective response.
Rapid response to disasters
Disasters are, to some extent, predictable in Bangladesh – flooding, a cyclone or a
storm is likely to happen almost every year, and immediate priority needs will include
shelter, water, sanitation, food, health, and livelihoods recovery. We cannot,
however, predict the exact location or scale. Cyclone Aila in 2009, for example, hit
the south-west coast of Bangladesh which had last had a major cyclone in 1965.
Evidence of need is strong.
The Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) identified ‘anticipation’ as
one of five key areas for DFID to focus on: ‘It is in the nature of disasters and conflict
2
http://www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/9/1149/2009/nhess-9-1149-2009.html
Foreword, Standing Orders on Disaster, Government of Bangladesh Disaster Management
Bureau
3
that they cannot be precisely predicted. But we can be more anticipatory in our
approach.’4
To this end, we recommend earmarking resources ready for rapid onset response.
This business case will set out the criteria against which funding decisions should
then be made. The results in this business case will not identify exact numbers of
people that we aspire to assist, as the scale of need is not predictable. However, we
are confident that a rigorous case is made based on the greater efficiency of an
anticipatory approach, for both DFID and partners.
Over the last two years, DFID has explicitly earmarked a proportion of its annual
country spend to respond to disasters in exactly this way. In 2009, 24,000 families
received tarpaulins, buckets, blankets, mosquito nets, food and water purification tabs
after Cyclone Aila. In 2010, a further 14,000 families received basic hygiene kits
(bathing and laundry soap, tooth powder and sanitary cloths); rice, pulses and oil; and
tarpaulins to meet ongoing needs in the same region. 10,000 children aged from 6-23
months received micronutrient supplements.
Previous evaluations have concluded that past DFID responses in Bangladesh have
been “important, timely, and largely appropriate”.5 The HERR notes that the UK is
highly respected for its role in humanitarian response.6 The evidence is strong
globally and from Bangladesh that established methods of response can save lives
and reduce suffering.7 There are also areas where lessons have been learned and
responses can be improved. We will work with partners to incorporate and build on
these lessons in all our responses. And there is scope for new and innovative
approaches.
Earmarking resources in advance of need demonstrates DFID’s commitment to an
anticipatory approach. It streamlines programme management processes for DFID
and partners. It ensures that the maximum amount of information collection and
dialogue is completed in advance of a rapid response, rather than in its midst.
Local capacity for response is generally quite high. People have strategies to cope
and adapt to annual flooding. Government and other local actors are sometimes able
to meet more severe response and recovery needs. DFID will not respond where
needs are being met. We note that response is sometimes undertaken by local
actors but is insufficient to fully meet relief or long term recovery needs, in which case
additional support may be appropriate. We will ensure that DFID is ready to make
swift and informed decisions on the level and nature of response, and the appropriate
partners, based on the best available information in a given emergency.
‘Mega disasters’ that affect many millions of people continue to provoke large scale
international responses. The most recent was Cyclone Sidr in 2007. It cannot be
predicted in which year these disasters will fall or on what scale, so DFID will continue
4
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), 28 March 2011, chaired by Lord Paddy
Ashdown, Executive Summary
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Get-Involved/Disasters-and-emergencies/Humanitarian-EmergencyResponse-Review/
5 Hugh Goyder evaluation of 2007 Flood and Cyclone responses, p19.
6 HERR Report, 28 March 2011, chaired by Lord Paddy Ashdown, Executive Summary
7 ALNAP, The State of the Humanitarian System: Assessing Performance and Progress 2010
to respond with additional resources as needed, beyond the scope of this project.
The principles and processes laid out in this business case, however, can and should
inform all responses.
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for response and
recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
DFID’s operational plan for Bangladesh includes an objective to build institutional
readiness to respond when disasters hit. Evidence for the value of investing in
institutional preparedness is medium: there is emerging evidence globally that
establishing better coordination systems or building standing capacity helps improve
response. But there to date are relatively few case studies that can demonstrate real
impact8. There have, however, been strong recommendations following previous
responses globally and in Bangladesh that highlight the importance of strong
coordination. For example, a DFID-commissioned study in 2008 recommended that
DFID provide targeted support to strengthen UN leadership and the cluster system in
Bangladesh. A UN review of recovery after Cyclone Sidr (2007) highlighted the
tension between international and national response mechanisms, and recommended
that this needed to be resolved before the next disaster hits.9 The HERR report
makes similar recommendations (not targeted solely at Bangladesh); these have been
accepted in the UK Government’s formal response (June 2011).
This project will help strengthen capacity in the international system for coordination
and leadership, working with the UN and NGOs. This will complement support
already provided for Government of Bangladesh institutional preparedness through
the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) which DFID funds
through UNDP.
The UK will also invest in strengthening logistical preparedness. Many other actors
are working in this field, with Government responsible for the greatest logistical
operations in the case of a major response. Within the international community, the
World Food Programme has the global mandate to coordinate logistical support in a
humanitarian crisis. We will not attempt to duplicate or substitute for these services.
However, we will continue to provide niche support to the Mission Aviation Fellowship
seaplane to ensure a regular, effective transport mechanism for agencies (national
and international) to reach the most remote and vulnerable areas of Bangladesh.
Building the evidence base for an effective response
This case has already outlined the strong evidence of need and the growing body of
global evidence that can inform a more effective response. This includes global
studies on accountability, effective leadership, coordination and needs assessment.
There are many evaluations and reviews that highlight strengths and weaknesses of
past responses in Bangladesh. But there remain some specific gaps in evidence on
how to deliver the most effective response here, in this country context. We therefore
propose including a small ‘window’ in this project to help build the evidence base and
strengthen analysis on how to manage responses to natural disasters more effectively
in Bangladesh. This will focus on some key issues and questions, avoiding
duplication with other research initiatives. DFID supports analysis and research
8
9
For example, IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, Phase 2
Sidr Early Recovery Review, Sandie Walton-Ellery, 2009
globally, through a range of partners, on how to strengthen disaster management and
response. Some of this is country specific, including useful recent case studies by the
Global Humanitarian Assistance Report.10 Research on broader disaster
management issues in Bangladesh is already supported through CDMP. Other
actors, including cluster leads, should be driving research on specific technical issues
relevant to the country context.
Themes for this analysis may include:
1. Strengthening accountability
2. Effective partnerships
3. Understanding and supporting domestic response
4. Needs assessment and analysis
This work will focus exclusively on Bangladesh but we hope that lessons learned will
feed into and influence global policy and programming.
B. Impact and Outcome
2. Lives and livelihoods saved, recovery and resilience enhanced through:

A faster, more flexible model for response

A better prepared system

Logistical access to remote, inaccessible areas
2. A more effective response will include a specific focus on :

Do no harm, with a focus on long term resilience and recovery throughout

Accountability to those affected by the disaster

Efficient funding channels (speed, quality, capacity)

Needs of the most vulnerable, particularly women and girls, the elderly, sick
and disabled.

Socially excluded communities and individuals

Nutrition

Quality of support (internationally agreed standards such as ‘Sphere’11)
3. An enhanced evidence base and better analysis for an effective disaster
management response in Bangladesh, and globally.
10
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Bangladesh-domesticresponse-report.doc.pdf
11
Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
2.
APPRAISAL CASE
A. Determining Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
Each CSC is weighted 1 to 5, where 1 is least important and 5 is most important based on the
relative importance of each criterion to the success of the intervention.
CSC
1
Description
Disaster response in Bangladesh is enhanced by stronger
leadership, better coordination and effective management.
2
DFID partners deliver high quality humanitarian
assistance, manage fiduciary risk and achieve maximum
value for money.
3
Government, donors and implementing partners use an
improved evidence base about how best to respond and
build resilience
4
Disaster management, (risk reduction, resilience,
response and recovery) is strengthened through access to
remote and inaccessible areas
B. Feasible options
Weighting (1-5)
5
5
4
4
Option 1: Three ‘windows’ focusing on:
(i)
Rapid response to disasters
(ii)
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for
response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
(iii)
Building the evidence base for an effective response.
Option 2: Two ‘windows’ supporting
(i)
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for
response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
(ii)
Building the evidence base.
No earmarked resources for rapid response. Decisions would be made on an ad hoc
basis on the basis of needs and results, and funding would be newly approved each
time.
Option 3: “Do nothing”. No earmarked resources for rapid response, nor additional
investment in preparation and logistics. DFID would support disaster risk reduction,
and would stand ready to respond to disasters on an ad hoc basis. This option is
included for completeness and is a more traditional approach to response, but it
would be a regressive step from recent practice. This would not allow DFID to
increase its focus on preparedness. This option has therefore not been fully
appraised.
In the table below:
 the quality of evidence for each option as is rated either Strong, Medium or Limited,
 the likely impact on climate change and environment is categorised as A, high
potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C,
low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
1
2
Evidence rating
Medium
Medium
Climate change and environment category
B
B
C. Appraisal of options
The key questions to be appraised are: 1. whether to include the ringfenced resources
for rapid response; and 2. the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed
approaches included within both options.
Option 1: A Comprehensive Approach: Response and Preparedness
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Rapid response to disasters
Institutional preparedness and planning, and logistical support for
response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
Building the evidence base for an effective response
Rapid response to disasters:
The case for pre-agreeing funding criteria in advance of any disaster occurring:

Prepositioning funding will save time

Pre-agreed decision making criteria will promote quick and fair decision making

Investment in more rigorous assessment of agency capacity in advance of a
response will ensure a more effective response and better value for money.

Not possible to outline specific results that will be achieved, but this information
would be established during the specific response.
This proposal builds on a recommendation by consultants after the Cyclone Sidr
response, that DFID should ring fence £20-25m over 5 years for rapid response.
Options 1 and 2: Preparedness, logistics and evidence for an effective response.
Institutional planning and preparedness
Specific interventions will include:
(1) The UN ‘Early Recovery Facility’ will support Government and/or the Resident
Coordinator (UNRC) and UN Country Team in the coordination of emergency relief
and early recovery, as required. In preparation for disasters, UNDP will work with all
partners to strengthen the architecture for international response including the
establishment of a national cluster system, and improved information management
and needs assessment. On behalf of the UN system, the facility will establish prior
agreements for response with partners; prepare a roster of pre-qualified NGOs;
maintain an updated list of emergency supplies and specifications; and undertake
advance tendering and pre-positioning of emergency supplies where possible.
This project addresses a number of key priorities for the humanitarian system in
Bangladesh, in line with DFID global policy priorities. UNDP is well placed to play this
role in support of a strong new UNRC. The key risks are i) overloading UNDP or
promoting too dominant a role for UNDP in the overall system, ii) lack of commitment
to key reforms from operational agencies or from GoB, and iii) failure by all
stakeholders to prioritise preparation and coordination in advance of a disaster.
Previous reviews have noted concern at UNDP fulfilling too many roles in a
response.12 A strong UNRC’s office will help mitigate this risk, by playing a proactive
leadership role and driving a more joined up approach from all agencies. A
representative of the UNRC’s office will sit on the steering committee for the ERF.
12
Hugh Goyder evaluation of DFID 2007 Flood and Cyclone responses, p15; Cyclone Sidr Early
Recovery Review, UNDP 2009. p11.
Getting all agencies engaged in the dialogue and process of strengthening the
international response will help mitigate this risk by generating a shared ‘ownership’ of
the reforms. Finally, we and other committed partners (donors, UN agencies, NGOs
and GoB) will promote a culture of preparedness. A reinvigorated Disaster
Emergency Response working group is the right forum to begin this dialogue.
(2) We will look at options for strengthening humanitarian capacity in the UNRC’s
office which could include supporting an OCHA presence.
(3) We should also retain the capacity for flexible, demand led funding to initiatives
from partners. These would have to be highly strategic and focused on strengthening
institutions and coordinated approaches in a systematic way.
Logistical support for response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
The Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) service has a unique role to play in
facilitating and supporting development activity in vulnerable areas. A recent review13
commissioned by DFID to assess the impact of the MAF service provides qualitative,
and some quantitative, evidence of the added-value of DFID’s support to MAF. The
review focuses primarily on the direct benefits to implementing partners. Positive
impacts include: reduced operational costs for development actors (time and money);
increased access to and communication with remote areas, particularly for early
needs assessment after a disaster; and improved partnership and stronger, more
regular programme management and monitoring. The indirect benefits to poor people
are therefore not proven, but the review advised that such impacts were a probable
outcome of increased monitoring and therefore improved programme quality. The
review is not a fully fledged impact assessment or comprehensive evaluation, but it
has provided a more systematic understanding of the impact of the MAF service. It
was a proportionate investment for the scale of the programme.
Building the evidence base for more effective response
There is a clear and direct benefit to DFID and other partners in investing in a better
understanding of response in Bangladesh, focusing particularly on improving
effectiveness and accountability.
D. Comparison of options
The same weighting is used as for CSC above. The score ranges from 1-5, where 1 is low
contribution and 5 is high contribution, based on the relative contribution to the success of the
intervention.
Analysis of options against Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
CSC
Weight Score Weighted Score Weighted Score Weighted
(1-5)
(1-5) Score
Score
Score
1
5
5
25
5
25
2
10
2
5
5
25
3
15
3
15
3
4
5
20
5
20
1
4
4
4
5
20
5
20
1
4
Totals
90
80
33
Option 1 fully meets the critical success criteria and is therefore preferred. Option 2
13
Quest doc 3019264
meets most of the criteria, but would be less effective and efficient in the case of a
rapid onset disaster.
E. Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money
Rapid response to disasters
The key factors that we will manage in a humanitarian response to ensure maximum
value for our money are cost, speed and quality of response.
Decision making will therefore be based on the best available needs assessment and
gap analysis to ensure support is targeted to those most in need. Partners will be
selected based on criteria that will ensure speed and quality of delivery, including:
- Presence and capacity in the affected areas
- Track record on management and delivery
- Speed and quality of procurement processes
- Commitment to coordinated and collaborative working.
To ensure this quality is being delivered in the most cost-effective way, there will be a
strong focus on: i) financial transparency, and clarity of proposed budgets, ii)
minimising unit costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes, and iii) minimising
administrative costs.
To save time during a disaster response, whilst ensuring rigorous analysis, DFID and
partners should prepare this information in advance of an actual emergency as far as
possible. We will encourage partners to anticipate responses, to be ready and able to
provide a rigorous value-for-money case in each proposal.
Institutional planning and preparedness
Relatively small investments in strengthening the institutions and structures of
response are expected to have a multiplier effect in terms of a more efficient overall
response in future. This will make DFID’s response money go further. But the big win
is also improving the effectiveness of the overall international response. In 2008, for
example, UK provided approximately US$20 million of a total US$138.9million
international response.14 Strengthening that system will allow more lives to be saved
and services to be delivered.
The principles applied to ensure cost-effectiveness in response will also apply to the
preparedness and planning work. Budgets will be scrutinised and cost savings
sought where possible.
Logistical support for response and recovery in remote and vulnerable areas
The DFID supported southern shuttle service has led to a reduction of operational
costs for the humanitarian and development actors using the service. A recent DFID
commissioned review15 of this service indicates that it is used by a number of NGOs
and international partners. This usage will be monitored by MAF and reported
quarterly to DFID.
14
Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UN CERF data:
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/bangladesh
15 Review of Mission Aviation Fellowship Bangladesh, April 2011
Our analysis indicates that the economic benefits of this service are significant in the
form of reduced travel costs, reduced travelling time, and ability to respond disasters
more quickly. The recent review included a simulation exercise demonstrated that a 3
person team can reach Barisal via MAF spending only BDT 8625 and in a time of 40
minutes while getting a vehicle would cost an estimated BDT 46,247 (including time
value) and total time of approximately 9-10 hours. A launch trip would cost BDT
28,500 (including time value). There is a significant saving in terms of the opportunity
costs of staff time spent travelling, though this will be monitored.
Importantly, the MAF runs a sensible operating model with discriminatory pricing for
charter flights. By charging more to corporate customers, they are able to subsidise
the cost of the flights to NGOs and donors. MAF will be further reviewing the fare
structure in 2011.
The DFID commissioned review also calculated a series of unit costs (cost of fuel,
cost of personnel) of this service, all of which compare favourably to feasible
alternatives. MAF are already taking forward a number of recommendations made in
the review.
3.
COMMERCIAL CASE
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one
for this intervention, with this development partner?
(i) Response: Implementing partners for response will be selected based on clear
value for money criteria, of which procurement capacity, overhead costs and unit
costs will be an important consideration.
(ii) Early Recovery Facility: An MOU is the required agreement with UNDP.
(iii) Mission Aviation Fellowship: An Accountable Grant mechanism is considered
an appropriate mechanism for sizeable NGOs to take receipt of support, whilst
retaining a level of flexibility to ensure the delivery of results.
(iv) The most appropriate funding mechanism for any additional support to
preparedness, or analysis and research, will be decided in line with the DFID Blue
Book and other standard guidance.
B. Value for money through procurement
(i) Cost of response is determined by:
- availability of supplies in local or international markets
- urgency of need and required speed of response
- procurement processes and expertise of partners.
(ii) The early recovery facility, by pre-positioning supplies, will allow agencies to use
international and local markets more strategically, purchasing at lower cost than is
often possible on the day of a disaster.
(iii) MAF costs are determined primarily by international markets for fuel and
maintenance. Value added is as outlined above in terms of facilitating access for a
range of development actors to remote areas otherwise impossible or costly to
access.
4.
FINANCIAL CASE
A. How much it will cost
Up to £20 million over 5 years.
(i) Rapid response to disasters: up to £15 million
(ii) Institutional planning and preparedness: £2-3 million
(iii) Logistical support for response and recovery: up to £1.5 million
(iv) Building the evidence base: estimated up to £0.5m
Rapid response amounts will be determined case by case, and the ceiling reviewed
in light of demand. The allocations for the other three elements are indicative; we
will seek to leverage other partner funding for items (ii) and (iii), and ensure (iv) does
not duplicate or displace other analysis or research.
B. How it will be funded: Programme
C. How funds will be paid out
(i)
For rapid response this will be context specific, as agreed via each draw
down submission.
(ii)
For the Early Recovery Facility: For preparedness, we propose to
contribute up to £2 million over 5 years. This would be a one-off
contribution payment.
MAF: to be paid quarterly in arrears, on receipt of previous quarters’
financial reports. The indicative disbursement schedule here assumes
some modest front-loading of DFID funding whilst MAF seek additional
financial support. We will review the amounts for years 4 and 5 in year 3:
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Total
Up to £200,000
£250,000 £220,000 £180,000 £150,000
£1,000,000
(iii)
(iv)
Analytical work and research will be commissioned and contracted by the
programme team.
D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
(i)
Rapid response interventions will be monitored and reported against as
agreed via each draw down submission. Partners will be expected to
provide at least quarterly reports, against an agreed logframe.
(ii)
Early Recovery Facility will report six monthly against an agreed logframe.
(iii)
MAF will provide financial and programme reporting each quarter.
5.
MANAGEMENT CASE
A. Oversight
The A2 Disaster Management Adviser (soon to be appointed) and DFID Programme
Manager will oversee the whole programme, with inputs from advisory colleagues
as needed.
Key stakeholders will be UN agencies, NGOs and other partners selected to
respond to specific disasters. For implementation of the preparedness support,
UNDP, the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office and all cluster lead agencies will be
key partners. In MAF, the project will be managed by 12 national and four
international staff based in Bangladesh, and staff based in the UK office, who are
qualified and experienced to undertake, monitor, evaluate and report on the
proposed project.
B. Management
This programme will be managed from DFID Bangladesh by an A2 Disaster
Management Adviser and a Programme Manager.
C. Conditionality
None
D. Monitoring and Evaluation
The programme as a whole will be monitored against the attached logframe. This
will remain a living document and will be updated when a response is undertaken,
and after each annual review as needed. Reporting for long term interventions will
be on a six monthly basis. For rapid onset response it will be on a quarterly or as
needed basis. The adviser will be proactive in engaging with agencies to regularly
monitor and track progress and address any obstacles. The Early Response
Facility includes a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation strategy and will
promote joint monitoring and evaluation wherever possible.
E. Risk Assessment
Risks include a weak government led or international response to any disaster,
which could include failure to acknowledge the disaster or scale of need; lack of a
collaborative approach to assessment and response; weak assessment and
analysis of needs; lack of a prioritised plan for response at sectoral or national level.
The second component of this programme aims to invest long term in minimising
these risks. The UK will maintain a principled approach to humanitarian response
and will lobby and work with partners to ensure that humanitarian needs and
acknowledged and met. Fiduciary risks are managed by partners; this
demonstrated financial management capacity is one reason international partners
are relied upon despite additional overhead or transaction costs.
F. Results and Benefits Management
Logframe attached.