Marbury v. Madison
Issue: (1) Did Marbury have a right to the commission? (2) Do the laws of the country
give Marbury a legal remedy? (3) Is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
the correct legal remedy?
Holding: (1) Marbury has a right to the commission because process of appointment was
complete, so withholding the commission violated his legal rights. (2) There is an
implicit notion in rule of law that a violation of rights provides some remedy. (3) A Writ
of Mandamus is the wrong remedy because the Supreme Court is the wrong court since
the Judiciary Act is unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act is unconstitutional because Art.
III does not allow SC to have original jurisdiction—Congress cannot give SC original
jurisdiction if Constitution itself does not allow.
Implications: Creation of Judicial Review. “It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”
 Textual argument (not strong): Article III allows federal courts to have SMJ to
cases that arise under the Constitution, creates inference of judicial review.
Article VI requires oath of offices for judges to support Constitution
 Historical argument: Judicial review originated in England (but was later
removed), but the practice remained known in the colonies. The Federalist Papers
discussed the power and some anti-federalists even agreed it existed but argued it
would give the Courts too much power.
 Structural: The structure of the government is for courts to interpret the law. If
there were no judicial review of Congress, it would abolish the notion of limited
power by letting them disregard the Constitution.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
Issue: Does the Supreme Court have authority over state courts in civil matters of federal
law? (Here, VA SC says they cannot)
Holding: All questions of federal law are within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
establishing its supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation.
Implications: Jurisdiction comes from the type of case not the court.
 Historical argument: History and the Preamble show that federal power was
given directly by the people, not the states giving the Supreme Court authority to
overrule a state’s interpretation of constitutional law.
 Textual argument: Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, “in all other cases before mentioned the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction” If the Supreme Court could not
review decisions from the highest state court, the state courts would be excluded
from ever hearing a case in any way involving a federal question because the
Supreme Court would then be denied appellate jurisdiction in those cases.
 Uniformity Concerns: Even if state judges were not biased (they also are bound to
uphold the Constitution), the legislative power to remove a case to federal court
would be inadequate for maintaining uniformity in federal law without this power.
Cooper v. Aaron
Issue: Do Supreme Court decisions bind all the states or just the state which they are
reviewing? (Here, Gov. of AK tried not to apply Brown v. Board of Education)
Holding: Everyone is bound by the constitutional interpretation if the case in question
clearly extends.
Implications: The Supremacy Clause of Article VI made the U.S. Const. the supreme
law of the land and Marbury v. Madison gave the Supreme Court the power of judicial
review, thus making the precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education is the
supreme law of the land is therefore binding on all the states, regardless of any state laws
contradicting it.
Baker v. Carr
Issue: Do redistricting issues present justiciable questions? (Here, a group of TN voters
argue that poorly redistricted boundaries violate 14th amendment)
Holding: The redistricting of legislative districts is not a political question.
Implications: Creates the 6-factor test for determining what is and is not a political
question.
 Textual commitment: Does the Constitution clearly allocate authority away from
the court?
o Must be explicitly stated in the Constitution that the Supreme Court has no
power to review the issue under any circumstances
 Judicially discoverable/ manageable standard: All Constitutional standards are
vague isn’t this then the same as judicial review?
 Policy determination: Is a policy question required that would be best determined
by other branches?
o What is Consitututional vs. What is the government allowed to do?--> By
accepting Marbury, must also accept a certain level of policy.
 Respect for other branches
 Unquestioning adherence: Is this case one where the Supreme Court should just
adhere to a decision by another branch?
o Opposite of Marbury, if the Court has too much unquestioning adherence
to Congress, then it could result in tyranny of the majority.
 Avoid international embarrassment: Don’t want multiple pronouncements by
various departments on one question lack of legitimacy
Dissent: The above factors are bad and the Court was not practicing judicial restraint thus
violating the Separation of Powers by allowing the court to decide what should have been
decided as a political question.
Nixon v. U.S.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate had properly tried an impeachment?
Holding: It is a political question that can not be determined by the courts.
Implications: The Baker factors don’t predicate outcome, allow for the court to argue
whatever they want.
Muskrat v. U.S.
Issue: Whether Muskrat was entitled to Indian tribal lands that had been previously
allocated to him?
Holding: Despite the U.S. being a named party, the case was not an actual controversy
because the statute was merely devised to test the constitutionality of a certain type of
legislation, and the Court’s ruling would be nothing more than an advisory opinion.
Ex Parte McCardle
Issue: Does the Court have jurisdiction to hear cases where the legislature has limited its
appellate jurisdiction?(Here, McCardle was being held illegally during the Civil War)
Holding: While the Constitution confers the Supreme Court’s appellate power, the
legislature is permitted to place limits on it.
Implication: Structural argument that if the exceptions clause is read in a way that takes
away Supreme Court’s essential function (to review other branches), then it could destroy
the separation of power.
McCulloch v. Maryland
Issue: Could the State of Maryland use a tax to impede the operation of a branch of the
U.S. bank?
Holding: No, because the Constitution grants Congress implied powers for implementing
the Constitutions express powers via the N&P clause in order to create a functional
national government. Second, state action may not impede valid constitutional exercises
of power by the Federal Gov’t.
Implication:
 Non-originalist argument: “We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding” The Constitution is merely an outline that allows to be read
broadly so the government can support the ends it needs to serve
 Structural argument: Allowing states to tax would interfere the Constitutional
‘scheme’- inconsistent with the supreme power of the federal government in
concurrent area of authority.
U.S. v. Comstock
Issue: Does Congress have the authority to require the civil commitment of individuals
already in Federal custody introduced by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act?
Holding: Yes, under the N&P clause.
Implication: “[B]ase[d] on five considerations taken together.”
 The N&P Clause grants Congress broad power to enact laws that are “rationally
related” and “reasonably adapted” to executing the other enumerated powers.
 The statute at issue “constitutes a modest addition” to related statutes that have
existed for many decades.
 The statute in question reasonably extends longstanding policy.
 The statute properly accounts for state interests, by ending the federal
government’s role “with respect to an individual covered by the statute” whenever
a state requests.
 The statute is narrowly tailored to only address the legitimate federal interest.
Textual Arguments for a Broad N&P clause: “Necessary” does not mean by the only
means available rather than convenient, useful or essential. A narrower textual reading
would cripple the Constitution because the Framers could not think of every power the
future would require. N&P Clause is phrased in the affirmative, granting power rather
than limiting it.
Textual Arguments for a Narrow N&P clause: Necessary means necessary, just
because it is a means to an end doesn’t mean that it’s the only means and therefore not
necessary. Text should be interpreted to say that Congress is to use the least invasive way
of exercising its powers.
Structural Arguments for a Broad N&P clause: It’s located in the § of the Constitution
that confers power rather than limits and as an outline the Constitution should be flexible.
Structural Arguments for a Narrow N&P clause: Narrower federal power increases
democracy. Greater State power and rights prevents corruption. Allowing different states
to have different laws reflects their different communities and they know what laws do
and don’t work for them.
Gibbons v. Ogden
Issue: Should NY law which granted Ogden a monopoly hold over federal law which
gave Gibbons the right to compete?
Holding: The power to regulate interstate commerce was granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause.
Implications:
 Textual arguments: Provides broad definitions for commerce related terms.
U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. [BAD LAW]
Issue: Could the Sherman Antitrust Act suppress a monopoly in the manufacture of a
good, as well as its distribution?
Holding: Manufacturing is a local activity not subject to congressional regulation of
interstate commerce.
Implications: Made any action against manufacturing monopolies extremely difficult
because they would have to be taken by individual states, making such regulation
extremely difficult with regards to out-of-state monopolies because states are prohibited
from discriminating against out-of-state monopolies under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Although the decision was never expressly overturned, the Court later retreated
from this position limiting it to its precise facts.
Shreveport Rate Case
Issue: Did the discriminatory pricing of Texas Railway company that also served
Louisiana violate pricing regulations valid under the Commerce Clause?
Holding: The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce also allows it
to regulate purely intrastate commerce in cases where control of the former was not
possible without control of the latter.
Implications: Creates the first iteration of the effects test.
Champion v. Ames
Issue: Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the power to regulate the transport of
lottery tickets across state lines?
Holding: Trafficking lottery tickets constitutes interstate commerce and can thus be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Implications: Congress’ power to regulate interstate traffic is plenary and thus Congress
has the power to regulate traffic as it sees fit within Constitutional limits, EVEN to the
extent of prohibiting goods.
Hammer v. Dagenhart [BAD LAW OVERTURNED]
Issue: Is the prohibition of interstate commerce of any merchandise that has been made
by children within Congress’ Commerce Clause powers?
Holding: No, because the actual manufacturing of cotton, the good at issue here, did not
in itself constitute interstate commerce.
Implications: Distinguishes between the manufacture of goods and the regulation of
certain goods themselves inherently evil (lottery tickets in Champion v. Ames)
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., (limited by Darby)
Issue: Does Congress have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the production
of coal?
Holding: Congress doesn’t have this power just because a commodity is manufactured or
produced within a state and is intended for interstate commerce does not mean it has met
the requirements to at that time fall under the category of interstate commerce. The court
further used the direct effects test to find that because this intrastate activity did not have
a direct effect on interstate commerce it could not be regulated. Also, as a local not
national evil, coal production couldn’t be regulated.
Implications:
NLRB v. Jones & Lauglin Steel Corp.
Issue: Can Congress regulate companies from discriminating against and firing workers
who choose to unionize?
Holding: Congress has the power to regulate intrastate activities that have a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Implications: Marks the first case following the “switch in time that saved nine” which
effectively ended the Court’s striking down New Deal economic legislation and greatly
increased Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
U.S. v. Darby
Issue: Does Congress have the power to regulate employment conditions of a lumber
company in GA?
Holding: In prohibiting interstate shipment of goods produced under the forbidden
substandard labor conditions, the Act is within the authority of Congress, if no
Constitutional provision forbids. Congress may exercise power over intrastate activities
as a means to exercising its legitimate power to regulate interstate commerce.
Implications: Overruled Hamer and limited Carter.
Wickard v. Filburn
Issue: Do limits on wheat production apply to farmers growing excess for their own
consumption and not for sale?
Holding: Yes, because his wheat growing activities reduced the amount of wheat he
would buy for chicken feed on the open market and because wheat was traded
nationally, his production of more wheat affected interstate commerce (in the
aggregate).
Implications: Created the aggregate effect tests.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.// Katzenbach v. McClung
Regulation of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act is within Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause.
U.S. v. Lopez
Issue: Does Congress have the power to regulate the carrying of handguns (at
schools)?
Holding: No, there was no evidence that carrying handguns affected the economy
on a massive scale.
Implications: Creates the modern test (see outline) and is the first case since the
New Deal to set limits to Congress’ power under the Commerce clause.
U.S. v. Morrison
Issue: Is the Violence Against Women Act that gave victims of gender-motivated
violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court within Congress’ Commerce
Power?
Holding: No, based primarily on the fact that the acts of violence VAWA intended to
remedy had only an “attenuated” effect, not a substantial one, on interstate
commerce.
Implications: If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it’s hard to think of
anything it couldn’t.
Gonzalez v. Raich
Issue: Can Congress under the Commerce Clause criminalize the production and use
of home-grown cannabis even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes?
Holding: Yes, banning the growing of marijuana for medical use was a permissible
way of preventing or limiting access to marijuana for other uses because any
exception to the Controlled Substances Act would make it unenforceable in practice.
Implications: If Congress can regulate a class of activities, it may regulate each
member of that class, no matter how local.
New York v. U.S.
Issue: Is the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 which
provided states incentives for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within
their borders constitutional?
Holding: Congress has the power to encourage the States to do something but that
does not conger upon Congress the ability to compel the States to do so.
Printz v. U.S.
Issue: Are provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which require
state officials to adhere to a federal scheme governing the distribution of firearms
legal?
Holding: No, because of a historical and structural argument (see Printz v US)
Child Labor Tax Case (bad law, overruled by Kahringer)
Issue: Is it improper for Congress to tax employers using child labor?
Holding: Yes, because such a tax amounts to a penalty.
U.S. v. Kahriger
The Congressional purpose of penalizing intrastate gambling under the guise of
imposing a tax did not violate the Constitution by infringing the police power
reserved to the states.
Implications: Overruling the penalty doctrine of the Child Labor Tax Case
U.S. v. Butler
The processing taxes under the Agricultural Adjustment Act were unconstitutional
because the so-called tax was not a true tax but a means to an unconstitutional end
which violates the reserved rights of the states.
South Dakota v. Dole
The Court found it Constitutional for a federal statute to withhold federal highway
funds from states whose legal drinking age did not conform to federal policy.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisc.
A municipal ordinance requiring all milk sold in Madison to be pasteurized at an
approved plant within 5 miles of the city, unconstitutionally discriminated against
interstate commerce.
Hughes v. Oklahoma
Oklahoma’s ban on selling OK minnows outside of the state of Oklahoma for the
purpose of wildlife conservation violated the DCC because it discriminated the flow
of interstate commerce without being the least discriminatory alternative.
City of PA v. NJ
The New Jersey Waste Control Act violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
“[W]hatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by
discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”
Southern Pacific Co. v. State of AZ
AZ’s Train Limit Law made it illegal for any person or corporation to use the state
railroad that has more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars and was thus found
illegal under the DCC.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware
An Iowa state statute restricting the length of tractor-trailers violated the DCC.
South Central Timber Devp’t Inc. v. Wunnicke
Alaska’s inclusion requirement that purchasers of state-owned timber process it
within the state before it was shipped out of the state did not fall within the marketparticipant doctrine because “allowing a State to impose burdens on commerce
within the market in which it is a participant, but to go no further.”
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin
SC placed a tax on insurance co.’s thus placing a substantial burden on interstate
commerce, but still constitutional because Congress authorized it by authorizing
state regulation of insurance
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
Decision that limited the power of the President to seize private property in the
absence of either specifically enumerated authority under Art. II or statutory
authority conferred on him by Congress.
Separation of Powers Domestically (Youngstown)
Cat. 1: Pres. acting
Cat. 2: Congress is
under authority of
silent & Pres. has
Congress
chosen to act
Black (majority)
(Youngstown as
Cat.3)
FF/Jackson
(concurrences)
(Youngstown Cat.3)
Pres. can only act
here
No
Yes
Vinson (dissent)
(Youngstown as
Yes
Maybe [skeptical]
F- turns on history &
custom
J- functionality &
necessity
Yes: Pres. has
authority to act, then
Cat. 3: Cong. has
spoken and
precluded Pres.
action
no
No
No
Cat.2)
Other (Reagan)
Yes
Congress can
overrule which
precludes further
action
Yes: inherent,
implicit powers that
Cong. cannot
overcome
Yes
Dames and Moore v. Regan
Case upholding Reagan’s agreements to terminate legal proceedings in U.S. Courts
involving claims by U.S. nationals against Iran to nullify attachments against Iranian
property as a response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis.
Implications: The Court also “substantially refined the applicable test” and
cemented Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in that case as “canonical.”
Analysis: Does the Const. or Congress expressly grant the executive branch the
power? Yes: Pres. may act because his power is at a maximum. No: First apply
Black’s majority THEN apply Jackson’s concurrence as a result of Dames & Moore,
but still considered a sliding scale rather than rigid categories
Separation of Powers Internationally (War on Terror—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld)
Bush: doesn’t matter
what category bc
Cong. has no power
to act)
Thomas
Yes, even if Cong.
says no because
inherent executive
authority
Yes: text of Const.
Souter
Yes: if Congress had
made a
determination, unless
President can’t strike
a fair balance [i.e.
between security and
democracy]
Scalia
No: even with
Congressional
authority, Const. is
clear that procedural
protections are
available unless
Suspension clause is
in effect
Yes
Yes
Yes: inherent
authority
Yes: minimal
temporary power,
but then no inherent
authority under
Const. once Congress
does act. Pres cannot
always strike the
right balance
No
Unclear but suggests
yes
No.
No inherent
authority
Whitman v. American Trucking Association
The Court found the Clean Air Act in compliance with the intelligible principles
doctrine (extremely broad public, interest, public welfare, safety, security) to set
air quality standards at the level that is ‘requisite’ that is not lower or higher than
is necessary to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
A case where the Court ruled Congress could not have a one-house legislative veto
of the Attorney General’s decision in a deportation case because such action is
unconstitutional under the bicameralism and presentment clause (bicameralism=
goes through both houses/ presentment= signed by prez) since it cannot can’t itself
a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch.
Clinton v. New York
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution
because it impermissibly gave the President the power to unilaterally amend or
repeal parts of statutes that had been duly passed by Congress.
Myers v. U.S. (limited by Humphrey’s)
A Postmaster from Oregon challenged his removal from office by the President, but
the President has the exclusive power to remove executive branch officials and does
not need the approval of the Senate or any other legislative body.
Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.
President Roosevelt fired William Humphrey a member of the FTC for political
reasons. The Court found he did not have the power to remove certain executive
officials that were “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” for purely political reasons
and without the consent of Congress.
Morrison v. Olson
The Independent Counsel to investigate a government official from the EPA did not
constitute a hybrid “fourth branch” of government because even though the
President could not directly fire an Independent Counsel, the person holding that
office was still an officer of the Executive branch, and not under the control of either
the U.S. Congress or the courts.
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Oversight Board
The dual layers of “for cause” protection against Presidential removal of members of
the Public Company Oversight board where PCAOB officers could be removed only
“for good cause” by officers of the SEC who in turn could only be removed by the
President for “inefficiency, neglect or malfeasance” violated the Constitution’s
separation of powers.
U.S. v. Nixon
Watergate Scandal case that allowed for in-camera review of executive tapes
because there must be balancing in a criminal case.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
A contractor is suing parties including the President for losing a position as a
contractor for the US Air Force because of testimony made pre-Congress in the
1970s.
Clinton v. Jones
A sitting President of the US has no immunity from civil law litigation against him
for acts done before taking office and unrelated to the office.