Business Case
Summary Sheet
Title: ‘Ligada’: DFID Mozambique Support to Adolescent Girls and Women
(N.B. Ligada means ‘Connected’ in Portuguese)
Project Purpose: Identify, test and ensure uptake of sustainable solutions for urban female economic
empowerment (FEE); generate, disseminate evidence and build capacity on gender to drive
improvements in policy, programming and budgets.
Programme Value: £14 million
Project Code: 204497
Country/ Region: Mozambique
Start Date: 2015
Quest Number: 204497
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End Date: 2021
Intervention Summary
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide up to £14 million to implement a flagship programme on adolescent girls and women
(AGW) in Mozambique. The programme will increase urban AGW economic empowerment, providing
funds to identify, test and support the uptake of solutions to barriers that exclude them from decent work.
The programme will also act as a ‘go-to’ programme on broader priority gender issues. It will do this by
supporting the development of credible data and relevant evidence, increasing gender expertise,
capacity and action among government, donors and private sector, and catalysing attitude change on
social norms in communities and the market.
DFID Mozambique will contract a single Managing Agent to operate the programme. UK support will also
cover the costs of a full time DFID Programme Manager post, from programme costs, to lead specific
elements of the programme.
What are the main programme activities?
Programme activities fall into four main workstreams:
Innovate: will identify, fund and build the capacity of local organisations to deliver and test economic
empowerment solutions, especially for lower-income and vulnerable adolescent girls and young women.
Activities within this workstream are likely to be project interventions on female economic empowerment
which have been tried elsewhere but for which there is limited action and evidence in Mozambique (e.g.
increasing access to markets for women in low value supply chains; or innovative literacy solutions
combining market relevant skills with sexual and reproductive health rights learning).
Broker: will focus on older girls and women currently in or with potential to be in the formal sector. It will
scope and then facilitate relationships between a range of stakeholders, including private sector
companies, to tackle barriers to the recruitment and retention of women in formal work and to test and
adopt concrete solutions (e.g. developing incentives such as sustainable childcare solutions).
Learn: will strategically generate and disseminate strategic research and evidence on gender (both
from other workstreams, but also by commissioning additional research, including a cohort study on girls’
and women’s pathways to decent work); on using that evidence to influence stakeholders, and build their
gender expertise; and monitoring and evaluating the programme model itself.
Brand: will target urban communities, including girls, boys, men and women, and traditiona and political
leaders. It will create attitudinal changes among girls and boys, women and men through innovative and
dynamic media and communications, developing and rolling out an urban-relevant communications
brand on social norms, gender, work and sexual and reproductive health rights. This will include
designing and developing materials, and community-based activities to work with those materials.
Why is UK support required?
Including girls and women in growth is essential for kick-starting poverty reduction.
Mozambique’s economy is one of the most dynamic in Africa, but poverty reduction has stagnated and, it
remains one of the least developed countries in the world. Women and girls in are particularly locked out
of economic opportunities and there is an increasing feminisation of poverty. Without reversing this
trend, inclusive growth will not be achieved.
Urban poverty is stark, girls and women are locked out of decent work – yet there is room for
change on which DFID can capitalise. Urban women and girls are faced with specific issues, with
urban poverty stark and more pressing reality, with two thirds of Mozambique’s growth between now and
2030 set to take place in these urban centres. Urban 19-24 year old females suffer the highest
unemployment rates in the country, and are mainly confined to the informal sector. High rates of
HIV/AIDS and early pregnancy compound for adolescent girls and women the everyday challenges of
accessing and retaining decent work for youth in urban areas. At the same time, urban areas are
spaces for challenges to social norms which discriminate against girls and women, and offer
opportunities for change.
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An implementation deficit and lack of evidence, capacity and innovation is stymieing action, but
there is a leadership gap DFID can fill. A yawning implementation gap between government policy,
strategy and action on gender has not been helped by a recent donor malaise on gender. Lack of policyrelevant evidence and practical suggestions for action as well as a lack of coordination and failure to
prioritise compound the problem. Yet there is appetite from a range of actors to take more action on this
issue, and a gap for DFID to fill with its high levels of gender expertise and experience, and
complementary bilateral and Headquarter (HQ) programming.
What are the expected results?
 Greater evidence and capacity on gender driving improvements in policy, programming and budgets
(including among donors, government of Mozambique and private sector)
 Sustainable solutions to urban female economic empowerment (FEE), identified, tested and adopted.
These solutions will take account of critical issues of sexual and reproductive health rights, and girls’
and women’s access to and use of resources
Exact numbers of beneficiaries will be defined during the programme’s inception phase, but results
across the four workstreams are expected to be:
 Innovate: Ligada projects demonstrating and delivering credible and replicable pathways to
economic empowerment for low income AG&W (estimated to reach 20,000 beneficiaries); up to six
implementer partners’ capacity built;
 Broker: Private sector stakeholders supported to increase capacity to tackle gender and decent
work, and develop and adopt solutions, resulting in successfully filled quotas for women in work and
concrete changes in incentives and policies
 Learn: Increased evidence and gender expertise, including focus on adolescent girls resulting in
improved policy implementation
 Brand: Attitudinal changes among girls and boys, women and men in urban communities through
innovative and dynamic media and communications
How does the project fit with the country programme’s strategic objectives set out in the
Operational Plan?
The programme fits clearly with DFID Mozambique’s strategic objectives, as laid out in its recently
refreshed Operational Plan (October 2014). The programme particularly addresses the second of three
themes, Economic Development and Growth Transmission, fulfilling our commitment to increasing
access to economic information and opportunities amongst urban girls and women. With its emphasis on
learning and capacity building, including internally, the programme is a major part of the Operational
Plan’s commitment to the need for a strong gender focus throughout DFID Mozambique’s work.
What are the key risks to the success of the programme?
The main risks can be summarised as follows:
Political: this concerns DFID’s ability to operate in the slightly unstable and non-consensual postelection political climate. This is under constant review in the office, and our choice of cities for Ligada is
important to show balance across political parties and to manage this risk. A broader political risk
concerns perceptions of DFID support (i.e. too urban focused, too focussed on adolescent girls and
women). These risks can be mitigated through clear communications about DFID’s wider portfolio.
Operational: this includes practical factors, more within our direct control. For example, not having
sufficient time to pass through ethics procedures for major research; difficulties in tracking participants in
cohort research; timeframes for procurement and recruitment of the DFID Programme Manager. Detailed
work-planning and quality assurance of these plans will mitigate this type of risk.
Organisational: this mainly refers to whether the market of potential bidders will offer the right mix and
sufficient quality in order to execute this wide-ranging programme; but also the wider stakeholder
capacity, which we know to be weak (government, NGO and private sector). As such, capacity building
is heavily built into the programme.
A cross-cutting risk is the programme model. It is premised on the idea that the smart use of evidence
and testing of solutions will enable DFID and others to make concrete changes which have a direct
impact on the economic and broader empowerment of women and adolescent girls. The model has been
designed to ‘test itself’, with learning built in from the outset to mitigate this risk.
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Strategic Case
A.
Context
Mozambique Poverty and Economy Overview1
1. Mozambique’s economy is one of the most dynamic in Africa, with a 7% rate of real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth between 2010 and 2013. The main drivers of growth have been
private investment in physical capital through foreign direct investment (FDI), focused mostly on the
extractive sector, and high levels of public spending. Despite growth, Mozambique remains one of
the least developed countries in the world. It remains in the last 10 in the world in terms of the
Human Development Indicator (HDI, despite having moved up from 185th place to 178th in 2013.2
And although Mozambique reduced the proportion of the population in absolute poverty3 from 69% in
1997 to 55% in 2002 since then poverty rates have remained largely unchanged.4 Mega-projects do
not and will not generate sufficient jobs or poverty reduction: the majority of the population, especially
women, remain in low productivity agriculture. Public investment, including in basic service delivery,
is growing but concerns exist about targeting, cost efficiency and decision-making processes5.
Urban/rural differences
2. Within this general picture, there are sharp differences between urban and rural contexts.
Urban poverty is a stark reality in Mozambique, exhibiting specific features and characteristics that
urgently need to be understood and addressed6. It is estimated that of the nearly 9 million people
living in Mozambique’s urban areas7, more than 50% live on less than 1.25 USD a day8. This urban
need is becoming more rapidly more pressing: by 2025 half of the country’s population is expected to
live in urban areas, with two thirds of Mozambique’s growth between now and 2030 set to take place
in these urban centres9. Inequality in urban areas is also high and increasing, with the Gini coefficient estimated at 0.502 in 2010, indicating that there is considerable depth of poverty in cities.
Although per capita monthly income is higher in urban than in rural areas, so is expenditure, which in
cities and towns exceeds earnings10. In sum, it appears that improved access to services in urban
areas is not translating into the employment, income and consumption necessary to escape
poverty.11
3. Peri-urban areas - which are likely to be fully urbanized as cities sprawl - are particularly hard-hit.
People living in peri-urban areas in Mozambique are often among the poorest and most vulnerable in
society, as they do not have stable incomes, or arable land to provide for their own food
consumption. Population density is high and often municipal authorities have limited funds to provide
services for peri-urban areas. Cholera epidemics and malaria are more common in peri-urban
informal settlements than in any other areas of Mozambique. Estimates for water and sanitation
coverage in some peri-urban areas in Mozambique are as low as 10 per cent12.
4. Particular features of urban poverty, summarized from Tvedten’s 2011 study of urban poverty in
Maputo, are:
 Extremely high transport costs, and unreliable transport: impacts on access to services,
employment searches, job retention and decent work
 High expenditure on non-food items (this is usually viewed as an increase in welfare but is not
necessarily the case in urban areas where people may be going hungry to finance other
needs): points towards the widespread importance of employment and income
 Smaller households, but higher dependency rate, especially where access to education is
higher (resulting in extended dependency). Higher proportion of female-headed households –
possibly increasing autonomy which it may be possible to exploit and build on (e.g. in terms of
social norms) but also possible implying more poverty (we know that more female-headed
households are living in poverty)
 Fewer social networks (though possibility that women are better able to create and exploit
them) meaning social exclusion may be higher, and some traditional coping mechanisms are
not available – this may have a particular impact on work (e.g. in relation to childcare)
Gender
5. In general, Mozambique is viewed as a ‘star performer’ in the region. With impressive statistics
and positions in international indices, Mozambique has the laws and strategies in place which put it
in an ideal position to push ahead on gender equality. Yet just as we see a paradox of high growth
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and stagnation of poverty rates, we also see a paradox in gender issues. Mozambique has a
parliament with 39% female representation; yet the majority of women are trapped in low income
employment and the country has the 11th highest rates of Child, Early and Forced Marriage in the
world13. Trends between 1997 and 2003 show that men moved out of agriculture (a move which is
linked to an increase in incomes and resilience) and into the private sector and self-employment in
non-agricultural sectors to a higher degree than women14. Women’s earnings are significantly lower
than men’s in all economic sectors15. Again, any national figures tend to mask here important
geographical differences. The North/South divide is particularly pertinent in terms local economies
and women’s roles within them, with the North generally seen as more conservative though this too
hides further nuance16.
6. Overall, women and girls also fare worse on a range of indicators, including education outcomes
(esepcially secondary enrolment and completion and literacy rates); in access to land; lower level
decision-making positions (e.g. district and provincial levels, at 5% and 18% respectively).
Mozambique also has some of the worst maternal mortality rates in the region, high unmet need for
contraceptives, and 1 in 3 women say they have suffered from gender-based violence (and social
acceptance of this high, and highest in the poorest quintiles). All of these factors have implications
for women’s ability to work, to choose decent work, and to have control over their incomes when they
do work, which in turn impact on their resilience and ability to get out and stay out of poverty.
7. Despite having a number of policies and strategies, there is a gaping implementation gap
(which haunts a number of sectors in the country). Analysis on gender policy and programming
in Mozambique suggests that a donor and government tendency to mainstream gender, as well as a
severe lack of capacity, prioritisation and focus have been particularly debilitating in terms of
implementation. In addition, the female political and civil society elite are not seen to be advocating
for action on issues that affect ordinary Mozambican women and girls.
Women, girls, work and poverty in urban areas
8. Gender and the urban environment interwtine to present specific needs. The pattern of
exclusion of women from decent work repeats itself at the urban level, with urban 19-24 year old
females apparently suffering the highest unemployment rates in the country17. However, as stated
earlier, labour market data is unreliable and lacks depth of analysis. We know relatively little about:
women and girls’ specific role within the informal economy; in which sectors they operate; or where
there is potential for more and better quality engagement and opportunities. However, it is clear that
girls and women predominate in the urban informal sector, with far fewer in wage employment and
with very little ‘cross-over’ by women into non-traditional roles or sectors18. In addition, Women,
Business and the law highilghts a number of remaining legal issues which may act as binding
constraints to women and girls19.
Adolescent girls and women face a number of bariers to decent work, many of them
stemming from the general issues outlined in relation to urban areas but exacerbated by
specific gender constraints.Two studies undertaken as part of the design process for this
programme20 highlighted a number of important points in relation to barriers and constraints to
Female Economic Empowerment (FEE) and poverty in urban areas. These include: a lack of
attention to specific needs of young mothers in schools, training institutes and work; lack of access to
markets for women in the informal economy and low potential to grow their businesses; lack of
transparency in the labour market; malaise among male and female youth, limited access to
information and pathways to decent work. Arranging transport and childcare are significant
constraints - this in a country where early parenthood is overwhelmingly a female phenomenon, with
35% bearing children before 18, compared to only 5% of males (of whom none reported becoming a
father before age 15). Girls from urban areas are significantly more likely than their rural
counterparts to get pregnant before the age of 15, whilst disaggregation by wealth quintile shows
little variation in the mean age of first pregnancy for the poorest four quintiles21. This highlights the
particular importance of the issue of adolescence, underlined by work which suggests reaching girls
before and during adolescence is crucial for preventing the inter-generational transmission of
poverty22.
9. Recent small scale qualitative research in cities in Mozambique also shows that girls’ and women’s
poverty and their poor bargaining power within society exposes them to greater risk of unsafe
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sex23, often with Multi Concurrent Partners (MCP). This appears to be driven by a combination of
social norms/lack of access to or power to use contraceptives/lack of awareness and information/
lack of economic alternatives, with adolescent girls particularly at risk. HIV/AIDS rates in
Mozambique are highest among urban women, with an estimated 26% infection rate24. The more
education women have, the more likely they are to be infected – again, indicating that higher rates of
education for girls and women is not translating into improved life chances. Women’s care burden is
also likely to be higher as a result of overall higher rates of HIV/AIDS in urban areas – with yet more
implications for their time poverty, which may be connected to decent work25.
10. However, cities are also fertile grounds for change: for example, early (still draft) research
findings from Maputo indicate that cities are also places where there are opportunities to change
entrenched gender roles, where women are diversifying income and employment streams, and able
to capitalize on social networks. This echoes a large body of wider evidence which suggests that
change in location (e.g. refugee camps, migration, displacement) often disrupts traditional gender
norms, opening a space for women to take advantage of this change and developing critical social
networks faster and more effectively than men26. It is less well understood how long-lasting this
change is, whether it is true regardless of age, and what the impact is on gender relations (i.e. what
does it do to men’s perceptions of themselves, and therefore to relations between men and women?)
though some research e.g. suggests that backlash can occur, or that male self-esteem can drop
significantly.
B
Rationale for intervention
11. In summary, there are five main reasons for intervention: need (as outlined above); robust evidence
of returns of intervening; lack of existing quality initiatives; fit with UK priorities; DFID’s credibility and
expertise in this area; and an appetite from other stakeholders. These are detailed below.
12. The arguments for and benefits of FEE are well-rehearsed, and well-evidenced.27 As such we
will not go into detail here and simply offer a summary of benefits:
 Increasing incomes and reducing their risk of being in poverty
 Improved human development outcomes, e.g. reduced vulnerability to HIV and domestic
violence; knock-on benefits for family planning28
 Higher female earnings and decision-making power often translate into greater investment in
children’s health and education, meaning that an investment in this generation of women and
girls is also an investment in future generations
 Increasing women’s economic participation and productivity can have a positive impact on GDP
per capita through increasing the labour supply and human capital, increased savings rates and
more competitive markets
 FEE is widely recognised as good for growth. It has also proved an excellent entry point for
working on girls and women precisely because it is explicitly ‘instrumental’ and therefore
‘sellable/workable’ for a range of decision-makers, from girls, to parents, to Ministries of Finance,
to private sector and donors. All of these actors are needed to make change. In addition, FEE
can itself change norms and perceptions of women, including ‘sticky (hard to change) norms.29’
 Investing in adolescent girls is a particularly effective way of preventing the intergenerational
transmission of poverty
13. Recent assessments of donor and GoM work on gender in general are damning, noting that
gender mainstreaming has all but paralysed progress30. The Gender Working Group is weak,
though recent efforts from a range of donors and government on Child, Early and Forced Marriage
are more encouraging. On FEE specifically, a number of initiatives are underway on support for
training institutions. The DFID Mozambique Skills for Employment draft Business Case offers a good
summary of this field. However, as tends to be the case in youth targeted programmes they are not
particularly successful at taking into account the specific needs of adolescent girls and women,31
though this will be a major priority for the DFID S4E programme. Skills programmes also appear to
be missing out the large urban informal sector in which many girls and women currently work, and
tend to be more focused on formal jobs for which 10+ years of education might be expected32. As
previously mentioned, the private sector is engaged in this field, and has attempted to address the
gender imbalance in formal work through the use of gender quotas. But neither this nor the
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Government’s efforts appear to have had an impact on the underlying structural barriers preventing
women from exploiting economic opportunities. Large scale initiatives aimed at tackling sexual
health, safety and education (e.g. Gerecao Biz) are not joined up with economic empowerment. The
two major donors (AfDB and USAID) have programmes on FEE but these focus on rural areas, and
on older women – who have different constraints to younger women and adolescent girls. ActionAid
and a number of small NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBO) also have women’s
economic empowerment programmes, but without the scale or strategic focus that might be possible
from substantial donor support.
14. As highlighted by the feasibility study undertaken for this design process existing initiatives tend to
do/be one or more of the below:
 rural-focussed
 either small scale/boutique in nature, lacking potential or vision for reach, scale and
transformational change; OR ‘blanket/mass’ or ‘blueprint’ programmes which tended to be poorly
monitored and evaluated, with little learning involved and with little attention to context-specific
binding constraints
 look at women and girls as one group, failing to distinguish between specific barriers and needs
related to age, or socio-economic status and how these mediates access to and impact of decent
work;
 address either issues around Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) or economic
empowerment, rather than seeing them as deeply connected – with the latter affecting the
capacity/agency of women and girls to access and retain opportunities;
 somewhat neglect the informal economy which will make up the country’s economy for the
foreseeable future
 where they include learning, these interventions do not have a common ‘space’ or target for their
learning, thus missing an opportunity for sustainable change as a result of their learning, and for
bringing together partners with a potential shared interest in tackling the constraints to FEE
Fit with UK policy and space to act
15. This area of work clearly fits with UK Aid policy priorities. The economic empowerment of
girls and women is a central component of two of DFID’s strategic priorities: promoting
economic development, and the empowerment of girls and women. DFID’s economic development
strategic framework seeks better economic development outcomes for women and girls through
programmes focused on supporting inclusive growth in pillar 5 and ensuring mainstreaming of
gender perspectives throughout all the pillars of the strategic framework. The Strategic Vision for
Girls and Women has four pillars, one of which is economic empowerment. The programme
compliant with the Gender Equality Act 2014, having considered gender fully in its design (including
men and boys).
16. There is a clear fit with DFID Mozambique’s strategies. The 2013 Country Poverty Reduction
Diagnostic (CPRD) identified a compelling need for the office to increase its work on gender, and
highlighted a space for DFID to increase its work on the urban agenda. The CPRD noted that for
Mozambican growth to be inclusive a particular focus on adolescent girls and women and
urbanisation will be needed. The DFID Mozambique light touch gender audit in 2013, and the
Growth, Resilience and Rural Development (GRRD) Team’s Gender Strategy Study (2012) outlined
that a concerted effort would be needed to both mainstream gender and create a standalone
programme on gender. Gender mainstreaming work is underway in DFID Mozambique with existing
and new programmes integrating gender better than before. However, there is much more to be
done both within DFID but also among other stakeholders (donors, government at all levels, and
other stakeholders) to ensure that this agenda, so critical to inclusive growth, is not ignored. As
discussed, recent assessments of donors’ tendency for mainstreaming are extremely negative,
arguing this has all but paralysed work on gender. DFID has credibility and ability to influence on
gender and the technical skills and expertise to engage in this area, centrally and in country.
17. There is an appetite from the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and others to address
gender and economic inclusion. DFID is working with the GoM on its strategy for Child, Early and
Forced Marriage, hosted a high level event on this in 2014, and supported the GoM to attend the Girl
Summit in London. Mozambique is likely to be a focus country for central funding on Child, Early and
7
Forced Marriage (CEFM) which can complement and bolster support from this programme. The
Government has a SADC commitment on attaining 50% representation of women in the public and
private sector to meet but has been unable to make headway alone. As previously mentioned,
Mozambique’s legal and policy framework is conducive to working in this area. The private sector
has already shown an appetite to be involved – the feasibility study interviewed a number of
international and national companies on the relevance of this programme, and met with strong
support. This raises the possibility for sustainable change, and for the chance of DFID funds
leveraging in-kind support from the Private Sector. Mozambique has been selected as a focus
country for the push from the AfDB to do more and better on gender (as such, this programme will
complement a central programme currently under design which will support the AfDB special envoy
on gender).
18. As such it is a good time for DFID to act: here is a chance to ‘ride a wave’ in terms of demographics
and social change, especially in relation to urbanisation which is an important emerging agenda for
the Department. This programme’s focus will also complement proposed HQ funding on Child, Early
and Forced Marriage, which will work through UN agencies to support the GoM develop and
implement their strategy to reduce rates. It also backs up existing Girls’ Education Challenge Fund
support in Mozambique (two small-scale programmes focussed in keeping girls in school and
learning, with an emphasis on rural areas). This ‘double push’ will demonstrate an important effort
across critical agendas.
19. Spend beyond current CSR. It is important to note that this programme’s spend goes beyond the
CSR 15/16 and 16/17. As such, DFID Mozambique has included Ligada funds as a key part of its
budgeting and strategic planning. This extension beyond the current CSR is because the programme
relies on a long term commitment. Many elements (e.g. social norm change) are ‘hard to measure’
and require a long timeframe, and long-term learning and capacity building are core to the
programme’s success.
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Appraisal Case
A. Feasible options and appraisal of evidence
The Strategic Case has clearly laid out the rationale for an intervention to address urban women’s and
adolescent girls’ economic opportunities as a critical part of inclusive growth. But how should we do it?
There is broad consensus in conceptual framings of female economic empowerment that it is necessary
to focus on all of the following:

Access to resources, this includes economic assets, services, and capabilities (abilities/capacity).

Power and agency, or personal empowerment and self-efficacy, which clearly mediate access to and
use of those resources for maximum impact.

Formal and informal institutions (i.e. social norms and rules). Again, these mediate girls and women’s
ability to make decisions and capitalise on opportunities on issues of assets, work or income. They
also mediate control over their bodies – if, when and how many children to have, for example –
which then in turn impact on their ability to access and retain assets and decent work. Notably men
and boys are an important part of both the formal and informal institutions, and as such are not
absent from the FEE agenda.
These aspects clearly echo DFID’s ‘Voice, Choice, Control’ approach to gender, which emphasises the
need for girls and women to have control over their incomes and bodies, choice over if, when and how
many children to have, and the need for them to have the capacity to make and take decisions which
affect their lives33. The following diagram, adapted from Markets for the Poor Gender Guidance, and
ODI’s work on economic empowerment and social norms, offers the conceptual framework for the
intervention we will carry out34.
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for Female/Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE)
Formal Institutions
Informal Institutions
21. What are the feasible interventions through which DFID Mozambique might work on FEE in cities? A
number of interventions have been tried across the world to develop FEE, and the table below offers
a summary of evidence from two of the recent ‘what works in FEE interventions’ documents.
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Table 1: Promising interventions for youth FEE (adapted from Women’s Economic Empowerment: A Roadmap and
Guiding Youth Employment Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Typology and Experience35)
Intervention/lesson
Adding an economic empowerment aspect to
interventions with other empowerment
agendas – e.g. Safe Space Programmes
which include asset transfers or
comprehensive entrepreneurship training with
attention to gender
Micro-franchsing – (i.e. copying a successful
business and replicating it at another location
by following a consistent set of well-defined
processes and procedures)36
Going the extra mile in labour market support provding additional labour market and support
services e.g. additional counseling,
mentoring/coaching, providing market
information, and linkages or referral to other
social services
Second chance education programmes
Job centres
Wage subsidies
Interventions aimed at creating flexibility in the
workplace (location and hours) - for women in
both waged but also informal work
Communications for social norm change
(including on work and household expenditure
versus business expenditure )
Examples, strength of evidence and challenges
Emerging body of Randomised Control Trials (RCT) showing
increased income, and decrease in risky behaviours (e.g.
Blattman et al on BRAC’s Uganda programme).
Comprehensive entrepreneurship training showing promising
results, including for young women (on income and self-esteem)
when gender is given a strong emphasis (and may include
sector cross over into non-traditional work). Must be holistic:
tackle finance and BSD needs, and market-relevant (often fail in
one of these areas).
Sustainability, scale and Value for Money (VFM) are challenges,
as are recruitment and retention of mentors and time demands
for trainees.
Early testing showing some positive results (e.g. IRC in Sierra
Leone), but market needs to be big enough to support roll out
for scale to be sufficiently significant. However gender-specific
evidence is weak, especially around ‘do no harm’
Some good evidence from Latin America. As yet little emerging
in Africa.
Evidence is slim and inconclusive, but some general key
success factors: careful targeting taking into account the
heterogeneity of youth, facilitating program participation in a
context of young people’s limited resources and competing
responsibilities (e.g. by targeting non-work hours and providing
childcare for women), sufficient instruction time, teacher quality,
an integrated curriculum linked to labour market needs (for
example combined with job training, life skills training, etc.), as
well as the importance of some kind of certification upon
completion.37 These are exactly the same lessons that school
should take into account.
Little evidence in Africa (and none from a gender perspective)
about their effectiveness in connecting labour demand and
supply. However, the international experience suggests that
well-managed employment services can be effective and
inexpensive. High quality staff training would be important from
an inclusion perspective.
Some evidence from middle income countries, with some
success in supporting younger women’s and poorer youth’s
entry into formal work (.g. Argentina). No evidence for Africa.
Possible issues with political economy (e.g. trade unions) and
may be unfeasible given potential for “deadweight loss” or
“substitution effects” (see footnote)38
Little evidence on this, or understanding of how location and
schedule effect decision-making and ambition around work in
urban areas
Emerging evidence that most successful interventions combine
mass media with community level interventions. Gap in
understanding cost effectiveness of these models, and on those
trying to affect change on economic sphere (most tend to be on
issues such as Female Genital Mutillation or HIV/AIDS).
22. The table illustrates that for certain individual interventions there is some reasonable evidence of
success, but overall the evidence remains fairly thin and inconclusive. Evidence is still
emerging, with much scope for more testing and building the evidence base. Specifically, very little
evidence is Mozambique, or urban-specific. Indeed, two of the most frequent issues cited by
10
Mozambican adolescent girls and women in our studies for this design work: high transport costs,
and unreliable transport; and labour market ‘corruption’ do not appear to be addressed in any of the
interventions above. There are also major gaps in terms of understanding sustainability, scale and
cost effectiveness of interventions of interventions. It is not clear, for example, if scale means ‘roll out’
of these individual interventions and what the cost would be. Nor is it clear if to what extent these are
sustainable ways of effecting change, through, for example, creating sustainable solutions which
address the current market failures around women’s exclusion from decent work, and that may be
picked up by a wide range of partners (including state and private sector). Nor does there appear to
be much innovation going on, despite evidence that ‘clever programme designs’ or innovations are
often promising and cost effective (see below).
23. The evidence also suggests that certain general lessons tend to hold in terms of economic
empowerment interventions, though again even in these cases there are evidence gaps on cost
effectiveness of different interventions and approaches, and on sustainability and scale.
Table 2: Important lessons for youth FEE (adapted from ‘Women’s Economic Empowerment: A Roadmap’ and
‘Guiding Youth Employment Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Typology and Experience’39)
General lessons
Very poor need more – and best examples
come from financial inclusion and training
‘packages’ for ultra-poor (savings, micro-credit,
training in business and life skills, and a
mentoring program facilitated by experienced
community members.
Additional efforts are needed to convince
guardians, family members, and even the girls
themselves that it is worth participating.
Important for hard to reach, such as married
girls, domestic workers, and girls with
disabilities.
Alleviating the time demands of household
labour to allow more time for job
search/business etc.
Clever programme designs offer cheap and
VFM solutions (e.g. mobile phones to traders)
Evidence
Range of evidence from low income countries, though gaps in
evidence on sustainability and VFM of these interventions, and
how they may be taken to policy level.
Reasonable evidence this ‘extra mile’ is needed – but not how it
varies between interventions (are there some which require less
of the extra mile because they are more appealing?)
Very little evidence on interventions which aim to or achieve
this. Little known about gendered division of household labour
and time poverty in urban areas
Little evidence, but considered promising given potential
benefits of scale and sustainability
24. As two recent ‘what works’ documents40 on economic empowerment and employment note, the
range of programme interventions the authors assess should be taken only as a guide, not as a
prescription. Rather, the authors recommend policy-makers focus on identifying the binding
constraints in a given context. A recent DFID-commissioned paper on ‘politically smart, locally led
development’ also highlights the pros of working in an adaptive and context-specific way. It
underlines the need for iterative programmes, which enable implementers and donors to ‘plan,
do, check, and act’ rather than to operate a ‘blueprint model’41.
25. With all this in mind, it is clear that any DFID intervention needs to be more than a single,
straightforward stream of programme funding. It needs to:
 address the underlying causes which lead to women and girls’ low access to, retention of, and
impact of economic opportunities and resources (rather than focussing on supplying
assets/resources alone), with a good understanding of difference between women (e.g. age,
location, socio-economic status)
 bring in new actors for sustainable change
 fill important evidence gaps on scale and cost effectiveness, and build a ‘business case’ for and
with a range of stakeholders for FEE
 test new approaches whilst building weak local capacity in FEE and gender more broadly
 bring coherence to the fragmented and weak donor picture, and build and drive capacity and
learning among key stakeholders;
 achieve scale through targeted evidence and influencing, led by DFID and directed at both DFID
and a broad range of partners and stakeholders (including State and Non-State)
11
The Ligada Programme
26. Our assessment is that these aims require an adaptive programme model working along a number of
workstreams. The proposed Ligada Programme will test and facilitate the adoption of sustainable
solutions to identified barriers to adolescent girls’ and women’s economic empowerment in
urban Mozambique. It will also act as a learning, evidence and capacity building model on
gender. We propose four workstreams to enable us to achieve the breadth and depth required:
I.
INNOVATE: Bring new, locally-led solutions to the table, especially for poorer women and girls,
and with an emphasis on the holistic approach outlined in the conceptual framework. This
workstream will identify, fund and build the capacity of local organisations to deliver and
test economic empowerment solutions, especially for lower-income or more vulnerable
adolescent girls and young women. Given the informal economy is where their work tends to
be, it is highly likely these projects will operate in this space.
Examples of activities within this workstream are likely to be interventions such as those in Table
1 which have been tried elsewhere: e.g. supply chain development and marketing training; wrap
around asset transfers for adolescent girls and young women in micro-enterprises; the
development and implementation of relevant literacy/training for young women, using new
technologies; market-based niche product development for and with younger women. Initiatives
which address the specific needs of adolescent girls and economic empowerment will be an
important part of this workstream. For example, research for this programme design showed
existing ‘spaces’ where (in and out of school girls) attend thriving private lessons (known as dar
explicacao – or explanation giving. These spaces may provide a building block for developing an
urban ‘safe-space’ project for marginalised adolescent girls, addressing both SRHR and
economic empowerment.
Crucially, the conceptual framework of FEE, linking self-esteem, SRHR aspects and decent work
will underpin each project and innovations will be selected for their potential to trigger sustainable
change at scale. This does not have to mean through roll out of a particular project or product,
but could be through an identified policy change with an ‘adoption mechanism’ built into the
innovation, or through pre-identified lesson-learning applicable to stakeholder-relevant agendas.
It is anticipated that, based on the feasibility study’s assessment of existing initiatives and
organizations operating in this space, substantial input may be needed in order to develop and
then implement some of these projects. Therefore, the INNOVATE workstream will not be a
challenge fund, but will operate through detailed groundwork on potential partners, and soliciting
interest in the funding. It may create a capacity building relationship between an international and
local organization. The Ligada Programme Team may be involved in the development of the
project. A set of critical success criteria and potential projects and organizations will be drawn up,
and assessed transparently by the Ligada Programme Team and its Decision Unit (Management
Committee). Each project will develop the usual set of project documents, including logframe,
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) strategy, VFM metrics, as well as clearly indicating how it is
contributing to the wider Ligada programme. The Ligada Innovate Fund will have approximately£
4million to spend over the programme lifetime, and it is anticipated there will not be more than six
Ligada projects, though this may be increased subject to funding streams and other donor
interest as Ligada develops.
II.
BROKER: this workstream is likely to focus on older girls and women currently in or with
potential to be in the formal sector. It will scope and then facilitate relationships between a range
of stakeholders and offer technical and financial support to the activities of resulting partnerships.
The focus will be on sustainable interventions that stakeholders will later adopt, in part supported
by cost benefit analysis of the activity, and provided by this workstream. Examples of activity
under this workstream may include supporting Private Sector CSR activities to develop – e.g.
Coke’s 5 by 20 initiative; bairro (neighbourhood) and school-based careers centres or events with
service industry and retail sectors and municipalities; working with stakeholders to develop a
Ligada Network of role models in formal work; support stakeholders to analyse and then finding
ways to incentivise the female workforce to ensure their quotas are filled (e.g. childcare solutions,
transport solutions, adapting their commission or training structures). Private Sector
stakeholders will be encouraged to make in-kind contributions to costs of activities, and could be
12
encouraged to commit to the Women's Empowerment Principles which provide guidance to
business on empowering women in the workplace, marketplace and community.
III.
LEARN: this workstream will ensure Ligada operates as a flagship, ‘go-to’ gender programme in
Mozambique, resulting in a more gendered approach to development across the board. It will:
 Act as the learning hub across the Ligada programme, bringing together lessons and filling
evidence gaps (including on cost effectiveness of the various interventions) from the various
workstreams, ensuring they inform each other. This workstream will involve developing and
managing a Knowledge/Learn Strategy, and the M&E strategy (including the evaluation of the
programme model itself) and the creation and running of a virtual Ligada Learning Site.
 Strategically influence and build the capacity of stakeholders on adolescent girls, FEE and
gender, as per the conceptual framework and drawing on pragmatic approaches and
concrete evidence on gender. These stakeholders include DFID-M, GoM (from Central to
municipal level), other donors, private sector. Particular areas for focus already identified are
highlighting the opportunity costs of not investing in economic inclusion, the importance of
gathering and use of sex and age disaggregated data; evidence, advocacy and capacity
building on adolescent girls programming and policy; gender and corporate social
responsibility; and links between economic inclusion and service delivery, especially in health
and education outcomes.
 Commission, manage and disseminate key pieces of FEE research, including a five year
cohort study of urban adolescent girls’ and women’s pathways to work, as well as shorter
policy and stakeholder-relevant research or learning products/events, in line with the
Knowledge Strategy. Examples of issues that may be covered are: best practice on filling
quotas; case studies of ‘cross-overs’ (women working on non-traditional sectors); the
existence and impact of sexual harassment in the workforce (formal and informal); what non
state education provision in urban areas means for women and work.
IV.
BRAND: this will focus on the importance of informal and formal institutions that perpetuate or
disrupt gendered social norms and behaviors. It will create a Ligada ‘brand platform’- that is, it
will develop and roll out an urban-relevant brand on social norms, gender, work and sexual and
reproductive health rights, with a view to behavior and policy change among key Ligada
stakeholders. It will target urban communities, including girls, boys, men and women, and
traditiona and political leaders. Issues addressed may include attitudes in the work place, sexual
harassment in the workplace, on the way to work, norms around childcare and its impact on
work, including recruitment and retention in the formal sector, but also success in the informal
economy. Issue for adolescent girls should also be addressed in particular. There are links with
the other workstreams, with potential contributions from private sector, depending on the means
and modes of communication (e.g. telecoms, TV and radio). The ‘Brand’ could run through
training/materials or products in use in the broader Ligada programme. The aim will be to have a
recognized brand platform raising awareness of and driving change around gender inequality in
urban areas and its relevance for the Mozambican economy.
The programme will have a physical and virtual Ligada Hub, to house the Ligada Programme team and
to act as a learning hub.
27. Ligada means ‘connected’ in Portuguese, and here refers to connecting in a number of ways:
connecting girls and women to growth; connecting issues across economic empowerment, social
norms and SRHR; connecting between the ‘workstreams’ the programme will run; and connecting
the learning to DFID and other stakeholder actions. The programme has been designed with all
these connections in mind, and the appraisal and management case is built on the necessity of
linking parts of the programme to the others, and to other DFID programmes. It is also built with the
idea of sustainability in mind, in part through addressing the market failures (which include social
norms) that keep girls and women out of decent work.
Design decisions: We have made a number of design decisions to narrow Ligada’s focus on the basis
of the evidence and context:
28. Age: we have decided to ensure Ligada can work with adolescent girls, for whom the issue of
family formation and economic empowerment is particularly important, and for whom evidence shows
13
there is a need for an extra push and specific programming. This focus will complement our family
planning and maternal health work, which will also be developing a focus on analysis and
programming which takes into account the specific needs of adolescent girls; as well as HQsupported work (likely to have a rural focus) on Child,. Early and Forced Marriage. All workstream
strategies and annual plans will therefore consider adolescent girls as a key target group.
However, since the legal age of work in Mozambique is 16, the BROKER workstream will focus on
16-29 year olds (again, given the importance of early intervention in family formation). This does not
mean we will entirely exclude older women, who are clearly important household members, role
models and transmitters of social norms and will be indirect beneficiaries and actors in the
programme.
29. Wage and non-wage; skilled and unskilled: Mozambique’s urban areas feature both skilled and
non-skilled workers, and potentially offer girls and young women both wage and non-wage
opportunities. This programme deliberately intends to work with adolescent girls and women in both
these groups. This is partly because with a tight geographical focus we feel we are able to exploit the
opportunities for reaching both groups whilst not diluting our approach. Based on analysis of urban
poverty we believe looking across these categories may give us a broad proxy for poverty, with for
example, unwaged, non-skilled AG&W representing the poorest segment of the population. Given we
are also interested in learning about the effect of role models and shifts in labour force participation’s
effect on social norms, we think it is also important to look at both waged and unwaged and any
interaction between the two.
30. This focus across waged and non-waged allows us to engage with a variety of stakeholders –
including the private sector engaged in formal, waged employment, who we believe are important
advocates and potential ‘learners’ in this programme. It also may open the way to working with
business associations or collectives. Up until now, the field of female empowerment in Mozambique
has been limited to the ‘usual suspects’ (mostly NGOs and donors) and we believe it is important to
bring other actors to the table.
31. Working with men and boys: ‘doing gender’ means working with men and boys as well as
girls and women – otherwise we will have ‘girded David but not dealt with Goliath’. It is clear
from the studies done for this design process that young men are facing some of the same problems
as young women. It is also clear that men and boys are as much involved in the perpetuation of
social norms, and are crucial ‘change agents’ in this arena. Further, it is likely that disrupting social
norms (either through urbanisation or through directly targeting adolescent girls and women) can
have a backlash effect at worst, or at least have an effect worth understanding. All workstreams in
this programme will include men and boys to a varying degree. The extent and way in which this will
happen is partly left to the bidders. The TOR will request the development of a strategy and plan for
engaging men and boys across the workstreams). But the over-arching principle is that the
programme will find appropriate levels of engagement with men and boys and understand the impact
of changing gender relations as a core part of its learning.
32. Location: within the urban focus we want a stretch across the country to test solutions in a range of
contexts. The cities of Maputo, Beira and Nampula offer this stretch. The city of Tete should also be
considered given the extractives boom and the potential social and economic impact. These cities
straddle the political party divide, (Maputo is a Frelimo-led Municipality, whilst Nampula and Beira are
MDM – the addition of Tete would even it out to two of each). DFID-M’s urban governance
programme, Dialogo, highlights the difficulty of working with MDM-run Municipalities in Frelimo-led
provinces. However, given this is not a government programme, Ligada should be less affected by
this dynamic, though we will need to keep it under tight review (see risk table). The stretch of
locations will be critical to ensure Ligada learns and implements a nuanced approach to gender in
Mozambique, given the differences (particularly between north and south) in position and roles of
women.
33. Stakeholders: the main stakeholders for the Ligada programme will be DFID-M, private sector, the
wider donor community, international and national NGOs, and GoM (including Ministries and
Parliament, which has a women’s caucus). It is important to note that this is not a government
programme; however, Ligada may work with GoM in a range of ways at different times. For example,
in an INNOVATE project, the municipal government may be a key stakeholder for advocacy (as an
14
audience but also possibly as a partner in advocating on urban issues to other parts of government).
It may also be a recipient of capacity building. At a central level, the GoM may be supported in areas
within the LEARN workstream, and would be an important partner in terms of defining agendas and
opportunities for action. It will be important this is not only with the Ministry for Women and Social
Action (MMAS). Ligada will also seek out champions in other Ministries (e.g. Work; Finance) and
target certain influencing agendas towards relevant Ministries/bodies. The development of the
LEARN strategy and annual plans will define strategically and operationally how and when
engagement with these stakeholders will take place, and in what ways Ligada will use these
relationships to advance its agenda.
Theory of Change and expected impact and results
34. The Theory of Change (ToC) below outlines the expected impact, outcomes and outputs. Detailed
results will be confirmed during the inception phase and annual planning meetings will review the
logframe and strategy. A number of assumptions underpin the ToC, some of which may be
addressed in the risk section, and other which are either beyond our control or which are broader
macro-economic or supporting environment issues which are being addressed by other economic
development or health programming.
Theory of Change Assumptions
35. There is a significant assumption that policy-making, or stakeholder decisions can be influenced by
the evidence and work that Ligada carries out. It is for this reason that a robust influencing
mechanism has been built into the programme. However there remains an assumption that there will
be local/national champions out there with whom Ligada can build relationships. This may be at the
level of any of the stakeholders, and at a range of levels. The programme is actively seeking to
create and engage champions in range of places, including government ministries which can
influence longer term and greater change on gender, as well as among private sector and
communities. This will reply on quality, well-disseminated evidence and relationship building, as well
as regular ‘horizon-scanning’ for opportunities and champions to make inroads and adapt
programming. For this reason the programme is built to be flexible in budget lines and emphasis
across workstreams.
36. The ToC also is an assumes that employment in urban areas will continue to be an issue of high
priority for the government and for private sector, and that increases in decent work equal increases
in incomes. It also assumes urbanisation will continue. Neither of these are particularly wild
assumptions. And should urban growth come to a halt, there will be an even greater need to ensure
that there is equality of economic opportunities in the urban setting.
37. There is an implicit assumption in the ToC that this programme will ‘do no harm’, in that FEE is
assumed to be widely positive. Although this is a fair assumption this will need to be monitored,
including by using a participatory monitoring and evaluation approach. Any research carried out
under the programme will need to explicitly address ethical issues. There are risks of adverse effects,
such as adding to the already large time burden, for example, especially of poorer women. As such
Ligada will seek to support interventions to reduce the adverse shifts in gender roles that can occur
with work (e.g. time poverty and domestic care burdens). The approach to working with men and
boys will explicitly seek to understand the power relations between men and women, the possibility
of backlash and adverse shifts in gender relations due to work.
38. Finally, there is a general assumption made about appetite – of women, communities and other
stakeholders, including municipal governments and private sector, to engage on this issue. The
instrumental nature of the programme, which to some extent sells the benefits of investing in FEE
leads us to believe this assumption, will not be a problematic one. The feasibility study has also
highlighted considerable appetite among a wide range of stakeholders.
15
16
B.
Appraisal of evidence: outputs to outcomes, outcomes to impact and impact to metaimpact
39. Impact to meta-impact evidence: As outlined earlier, there is a large body of conclusive evidence
that indicates that increased access to economic opportunities and capacity to take up these
opportunities will in turn deliver the expected direct and indirect benefits of more inclusive growth,
wider social and economic benefits etc. As the economic appraisal below will show, at the highest
level, intervening in the area of FEE is considered to be good value for money.
40. Outcomes to Impact evidence: As discussed, there is some good evidence that identifying, testing
and building uptake of solutions to barriers will indeed lead to increased access to economic
opportunities and women’s ability to respond to these opportunities. But as discussed, major
evidence gaps exist, however, particularly on the cost effectiveness and sustainability of
interventions42. The evidence also highlighted the need for a better understanding of how to reach
different women, and the varying impacts of interventions on them. It is clear that not all young
women are excluded to the same degree, or for the same reasons. Ligada is deliberately set up to
understand and tackle the barriers for different young women, to understand how the urban labour
market and economy works, and who, at the micro level, are the mediators who have the power and
the voice to limit young women’s ability to engage in decent work. This may be the police who
engage in petty corruption or harassment, it may be municipalities who restrict trader licenses. These
issues are among the barriers that Ligada intends to understand and address, aiming to ‘level the
playing field’ of work in urban areas. Ligada will explicitly build in learning and influencing for wider
change on the differences between women.
41. Some evidence also suggests that it is not only along gender lines that economic exclusion or
inequality takes place. Research in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) also suggests that in some cases
strong ethnic identity in labour market searches is reflected in employers’ preferences for hiring. This
preference may reflect labour market efficiencies (the additional “information” one’s ethnic identity
reveals about one’s skills, the clan’s role of enforcing honest work from one of their own); employers’
desire for insurance should they need to turn to the clan in hard times; or social pressures from
others in the clan. The Ligada programme research focus will from the start be alert to the possibility
that ethnicity is a possible line of exclusion/inclusion in work in urban Mozambique, and build this in
as appropriate. Social capital is likely to be a particular vector of exclusion which may be manifest in
both formal and informal sectors, and will be an important part of the research work in particular.
Understanding how disability features in the work landscape of urban Mozambique is also something
that the Ligada Programme multi-workstream approach will allow us to consider in a range of ways
(e.g. possible innovation project; possible inclusion of people living with disability in research cohort;
possible incentives around disability and work as part of brokering role).
42. Output to outcome evidence. There is limited evidence that the Ligada model we are proposing will
work, as programmes of its kind are not common. To date, interventions have tended to be single
workstreams/projects with less of a focus on learning, new partners, or influencing through multiple
workstreams and stakeholders. We are as such testing this multi-workstream and adaptive, iterative
programme design. However, a recent paper on politically smart, locally led development highlights
some very encouraging evidence on programmes which build in mechanisms for learning and
influencing policy agendas. This includes the importance of building in ‘learning hubs’ or platforms,
and of explicitly identifying and building relationships to work iteratively with multiple relevant
stakeholders to identify and solve binding constraints to locally identified and mutually shared
problems43. DFID DRC is currently testing a multi-workstream model on a similar programme (La
Pepiniere).Like Ligada this has an emphasis on using DFID credibility to influence the wider gender
agenda- but is at a similar stage of development and asset has little to offer in terms of evidence.
The Voices For Change Programme in DFID Nigeria offers some good evidence of using DFID
influence based on concrete evidence for gender equality to influence key stakeholders, including
major players such as the Ministry of Finance. Given the lack of evidence on the model, Ligada will
test a number of the assumptions e.g. is this multi workstream approach better for scale, for reach,
for innovation, filling critical evidence gaps and for influencing than a single programme intervention
etc.?
17
C Economic Appraisal
43. Due to the nature of the programme, we do not yet know exactly what the activities will be, or
therefore what the specific outputs or output level indicators might be. As such, we cannot attempt to
quantify and value these benefits, and in any case, we would probably come up against data
constraints in trying to do that. However, there is some evidence on high level impact indicators of
the rates of return to FEE. The quality of analysis on these figures is often debated, and the data is
not Mozambique specific, however, it is enough to provide some sense of ‘order of magnitude’. So
for example, it is estimated that: (quote figures on increases in GDP etc. from Chatham House
paper).
44. The table below presents an overview of the benefit streams – direct and indirect – of the
programme.
Table 3: Direct and indirect benefits
Direct
Benefits
Indirect
20,000 16 – 29 year old women access
innovative products/projects/work after 5
years resulting in increase in incomes
Range of wider economic, social, political and other
empowerment outcomes for girls and their families
Improved access to services and
information e.g. job opportunities, careers
information, salary structure between
sectors/enterprises, between professions
Stakeholder capacity built in FEE and
responding to related market failures
Likely increased decision-making among young women
Increase in income for X beneficiaries
Decrease in unmet contraceptive need, with
accompanying reduced expenditure for example on
healthcare if early marriage and pregnancies are
reduced, and HIV/AIDS rates decreased.
Decline in fertility rates with accompanying impact on
economic choices and poverty
Iimproved social norms, HIV and
pregnancy related knowledge, as well as
decrease in corresponding risky
behaviors (men and women)
Filling strategic evidence and data gaps,
and building a business case for FEE
Tested theory of change for young
women’s economic empowerment in
urban areas, with focus on sustainability
and scale and ‘typology’ for poor and
poorest
‘Successful’ new partnerships
developed44 , shifting Private Sector from
CSR to core business
DFID Mozambique gender programming
capacity strengthened
Young women’s and children’s future health and
education outcomes will contribute to economic growth
through enhanced human capital.
Demonstration effect/markets development: new
investment in girls’ economic empowerment by other
organisations, new market entrants/existing organisations
reaching girls
Indirect job creation in supply chains
Enhanced outcomes of complementary and future DFID,
programmes.
Improved enabling environment: legal/regulatory reform,
community engagement/attitudinal change, reduced time
poverty for girls etc.
X existing quotas filled
45. Very few of these benefits can be accurately monetised, especially given data limitations. In order
not to offer calculations which are in fact too tenuous to confirm, we have chosen to limit the
quantitative economic appraisal to the highest level indicator relating to assumed impact on increase
in income/earnings accrued by the target group to perform some form of break-even analysis. This
can be presented in two ways: (1) For a given uplift, how long would it take to break even; and (2) for
a given number of years, what average % uplift would be required to break even?
18
Assumptions
46. In doing this some fairly explicit assumptions are needed. For example, what measure of income to
use? Since the programme’s LEARN workstream intends to invest in monitoring to understand
income increases, we suggest using an estimate of the current median income of the target group. In
the absence of other data on income by individual (rather than household, which is what national
household survey data measures), we suggest using the current minimum wage of 3,000 meticais
per month – though this can be updated once the LEARN workstream research cohort begins.
47. We also have to make an assumption on the overall target population. Based on census data, we
estimate that women in the 16-29 age group living in cities represent approximately X. Of these, we
assume around 10,000 will be reached directly by Ligada INNOVATE projects where beneficiaries
will be supported in a way that will actively improve their earnings potential (though not permanently),
but that an additional 10,000 may be reached by the brokering streams of work. The BRAND
workstream is harder to be clear on at this stage in terms of direct impact in beneficiary incomes.
48. We assume a period of 20 years for the benefit streams. Taking the life expectancy of 50 years we
would expect beneficiaries to work for additional 21-34 years. Therefore, 20 years is a conservative
estimate for the duration of the benefit streams.
49. One should note that this analysis do not take into account non-paid activities (e.g. child care) that
are likely to be more relevant in the counterfactual. Also, by assuming that beneficiaries will
permanently raise their incomes we are assuming that the project will provide them with permanent
skills that they will be able to sell in the labour market – these are the only two progressive
assumptions in a quite conservative analysis of benefits.
Counterfactual
50. In this scenario the counterfactual we use is a median income that stays constant in NPV terms over
the period. This is equivalent to say that without the intervention beneficiaries will be able to raise
their income annually by 12%. Twelve percent is also aligned with the nominal increase in nominal
per capita GDP over the last 10 years. In other words it means that without the intervention
beneficiaries would keep their average income share of the national average – growth would be
trickling down to the target group. Given that available data shows that economic growth generates a
very weak response in poverty reduction, this is another conservative assumption.
Returns
51. With the intervention we expect beneficiaries to increase their income at a higher rate than the rate of
increase of the national average income. We assume that this increase would come after the
intervention with a one year lag. After one year increase above the national average rate, for the
remaining life of benefits incomes would raise at the same rate as the national average.
52. We adopt a break even analysis and ask what would be the % uplift required to break even during
the lifetime of benefit streams? Assuming that the intervention will reach 20,000 people at a total
cost of £14,000,000 (the annex contains more detailed assumptions about the distribution of costs
and people reached through the intervention period) it would take an uplift of 5.25% so that total
costs equal total benefits in NPV terms. In order words, if without the intervention beneficiaries are
able to increase their income by 12%, the intervention should increase the income of beneficiaries by
at least 17.25% (in the first year after being reached) so that total benefits surpass total costs in NPV
terms.
53. If we assume that the project will be able to generate an uplift of 10% - that is beneficiaries would be
able to increase their monthly income by 660MZN (£13) then the intervention would break even after
11 years. This would generate a cost-benefit ratio of 1.9 after 20 years.
54. Although the literature does not provide benchmarks for these returns, our general perceptions about
the cost of living and potential to increase incomes suggest that aiming at an additional income
increase of less than 300MZN (£6) per month (the difference between the increase from the
intervention and from the counterfactual) would not appear as very relevant at the individual level.
However, given that all the other potential benefits are not factored in, due to difficulties to monetise
them, this seems to offer a reasonable rate of return.
19
55. It is important that the project closely monitors the evolution of income of the target group and gets a
better estimate of the counterfactual in order to conduct a more accurate CBA during
implementation.
Follow up
56. There are some clear recommendations emerging from this about the type of monitoring activities
that will need to be built in order to test the assumptions made in the high level economic analysis
and in the VfM analysis, and get a much richer data set on what works, what the benefits are, and
how much the different activities cost. This will be the basis for monitoring the VfM indicators in the
commercial case and are critical to the programme’s LEARN workstream. For example, data or
analysis we looked for but could not find included: assets by sex; analysis which layers data by
location and sex and wealth quintile; private sector vacancy data (which would have enabled us to do
an economic appraisal based on the costs of ongoing vacancies for private sector and to the
economy); robust labour market data and dynamics of labour market; cost benefit analysis of
incentives for young women in work. This underlines again the need for more and better sexdisaggregated labour market data, which is something this programme will contribute towards
building, as will other DFID programmes such as our work on the next country level Household
Survey. Using Ligada to focus this push on and collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated data will
be one obvious task for the Ligada Hub we aim to create. We will also work with Private Sector
stakeholders to generate data and analysis which highlights the costs of not working on FEE, and
use this to build a business case for incentivising young women in decent work.
57. We will also investigate whether we can isolate direct, monetisable results in other areas, such as
risky behaviours (connected to HIV/AIDS rates) and fertility. If strong evidence of a workstream or
intervention under a given workstream emerges, we will consider integrating this into the economic
appraisal.
D
Delivery options
58. Having established what Ligada is and aims to do, we now move on to appraise feasible delivery
mechanisms, in terms of capability and capacity, costs and benefits, risks and likelihood of success.
We have narrowed this down to two feasible options, having discounted the option of an Accountable
Grant to a single NGO or Multilateral on the basis that it would not be possible to find a single
organisation to deliver across the quite different workstreams, further none have offered a proposal
which we feel meets the needs as laid out in this Business Case. In addition, given the need for
strong Private sector liaison, we feel the delivery mechanism needs to allow for organisations with
more private sector experience. The two remaining options are as follows:
a) Direct competition to identify multiple service providers for four separate workstreams,
managed separately by DFID. In line with EU Directives, this would involve undertaking a direct
procurement tender process likely to be a Restricted Procedure advertised through the Official
Journal of the European Union (OJEU). From a DFID resource perspective, a DFID Lead Adviser
and Programme Manager/Officer (one of whom would be the Senior Responsible Owner, SRO)
would be engaged across workstreams with technical advice, and a DFID Project Officer would
manage the contracts with the multiple services providers. In addition, a full time DFID member of
staff (e.g. A2 Programme Manager) is built into the programme budget as core team member.
This individual would sit with the Ligada office 4 days a week, and in the DFID office 1 day/week.
DFID would also have a Lead Adviser and Programme support as usual (one of whom would act
as the SRO for Ligada). The rationale for this suggestion is due to the credibility DFID lends to
this influencing agenda, and the inside knowledge and contacts required for this scope of work.
As part of the core team, s/he would have responsibility for specific tasks within the LEARN
workstream (bringing in lesson learning from Ligada to other DFID programmes; initiating and
running dissemination and influencing with other stakeholders).
b) Direct competition to identify a single service provider – i.e. a Managing Agent bringing
together a team, based on a new consortium which brings together relevant expertise and with
the option of sub-contracting on specific deliverables. In line with EU Directives, this would
involve an EU Restricted Procedure through the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU).
20
The DFID resources would remain the same as in option A, though this option would require less
Project Officer support given it is a single contract to manage.
Critical Success Criteria for appraisal
59. We identify the following critical success criteria which will determine a delivery mechanism to
operate effectively along the four workstreams: Innovate, Broker, Learn, and Brand. The table which
follows appraises the options against critical success criteria which span the '4 Es' of DFID’s VFM
agenda: economy (which includes management. costs, economies of scale), efficiency (ability to flex
across workstreams, and potential for learning), and effectiveness (ability to achieve the outcome).
 Cost efficiency, in terms of % of total budget cost spent on programme management and
operating costs (these are based on figures from a cross-office average of overheads)
 Ability to maximise links between the workstreams and DFID programmes
 Ability to influence and level of credibility and visibility among range of stakeholders (including
private sector and government) and to drive change in order to deliver new partnerships, scale
and sustainability
 Likelihood of scoping and delivering high levels of innovation
 Potential for delivering high quality technical expertise across diverse workstreams
 Acceptable levels of due diligence and ability to carry out due diligence if necessary
In addition, an ability to cover at least three cities in Mozambique will be crucial for cross-city comparison
(across the South, Centre and North). We consider all options could deliver this geographical scope.
Table 4: comparison of delivery options
Option
Benefits/Pros
A – Separate
 High chance of quality, diverse
contracts to
technical skills through range of
implementers by
providers
workstream, with
 We may have the opportunity to work
DFID Programme
with providers who are specialised in
Manager built-in
either one of the components or one
of the areas of the programme
B – single
managing agent,
with DFID
Programme
Manager built-in




Strong on due diligence, project
management aspects
High chance of quality and diverse
technical skills across through
consortia and Programme Team
High chance of increased capacity
building, local knowledge and VFM
through consortia mix of local and
international expertise
High levels of DFID programme
learning through built-in DFID
member of staff, and across
workstreams through programme
management unit
Risks/Cons
 Far higher transaction costs for DFID
managing multiple contracts – high risk
given DFID-M staff capacity
 High operating costs (likely to be between
20 and 30%, based on existing contracts)
 Less scope for economies of scale or VFM
through a single contract
 Less - if any - scope for effective planning,
learning and action across workstream
 Control/influence/credibility – much higher
risk that the programme will not deliver on
influencing and learning
 Market may not respond - consortia can
tend to take time and be hard to build and
manage
 High operating costs (likely to be between
20 and 30%, based on existing contracts)–
but opportunities to drive down through
economies of scale, unlike option b
Programme cost drivers
60. The basic programme cost breakdown is presented below. The cost drivers for the programme are
the same. The major difference will be the level of transaction costs incurred by the DFID
Mozambique office. In option A, as discussed in the table above, transaction costs will be much
higher. It is estimated it would require a full time member of programme/project staff to manage these
multiple contracts, whereas a single contract would require 0.3 FTE. It is also possible that DFID may
be able to drive increased VFM through a single contract, due to economies of scale from one
service provider.
21
Table 5: programme cost drivers
A: Multiple
contracts
B: Single provider
Programme Management Cost45 (total for the Service
Provider)46
DFID Staff member on Programme budget
Workstreams
Innovate
Broker
Learn
Brand
£ 2,500,000
£2,500,000
£1.250,000
£1.250,000
£4,000,000
£1,500,000
£2,500,000
£2,000,000
£4,000,000
£1,500,000
£2,500,000
£2,000,000
DFID Managed ‘quick wins’
DFID-M staff input (contract admin)
£250,000
1.0 Full time
equivalent
£250,000
0.3 FTE
£14,000,000
£14,000,000
Total Programme Cost
61. On the basis of the appraisal above, we have selected option B. This is based a strongly qualitative
assessment (based on the Critical Success Criteria along the 4Es) that a single managing agent will
respond better to the full range of critical success criteria, and an assessment of the transaction
costs that would be saved by DFID Mozambique through handling a single contracting agent. In
particular, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, we assess that the core programme issue of
learning, influencing and capacity building within DFID and externally will be better delivered through
this mechanism. We believe this offers a more sustainable option for change on the FEE agenda in
Mozambique.
22
Commercial Case
62. This section provides more detail on the chosen option in terms of implementation and how value for
money will be achieved. It sets out the procurement approach and requirements, proposed funding
instrument and how the choice of instrument will be used to ensure VFM. It considers the market
place response to this intervention with an explanation of how supplier performance would be
managed. It sets out the procurement policies, capabilities and systems of the third party entity to
ensure we get VFM.
Value for Money in Procurement
63. Our rationale for having a single SP managing all four workstreams has been clearly outlined in the
appraisal case. However, it also raises the risk of the market response. Mozambique is a limited
market and previous experience shows us that competition can be limited. However, DFID
Mozambique is taking a number of steps to counter this, including expanding our key suppliers, and
working to bring in new players to the market. Early analysis during the feasibility study for this
programme indicated that a single NGO may struggle to bring all the necessary expertise to the
table, but it also highlighted that there are a number of interested parties with relevant skills and
experience that could be brought together. With these points in mind, we will undertake an Early
Market Engagement Event with a wide range of potential partners to both support the design of the
Terms of Reference for the appointment of the service provider and to engage with as many potential
partners as possible to improve the quantity, quality and competitiveness of bids to be received. We
will also use this opportunity to ‘match-make’ potential partners to increase our chances of a strong
consortium.
VFM through contracting
64. We are deliberately creating a flexible programme design. For example, if evidence begins to emerge
that certain components within or between workstreams are proving more cost-effective, the planning
and budgeting cycle will be able to respond to this and shift funds between workstreams. It is unlikely
that this programme would be suitable for 100% Output Based Payments (especially the stream
focused on social norms and attitudinal change, an area which still tends to be heavily input based
contracted). However, it will be a hybrid contract, using milestones and Output Based Payments
where appropriate and feasible, whilst ensuring that we get VFM by knowing the value of inputs.
Elements considered most eligible for output based contracting are those within the LEARN stream
(which makes up approximately 40% of the budget). The contracting mechanism will be developed in
detail during the procurement, selection and contracting process. Bidders will be specifically
requested to highlight elements suitable foroutput based contracting. The contract will be designed to
allow reviews and additions to the output based elements.
65. To support the management of the SP, we also intend to agree formal Contract Management Key
Performance Indicators (KPI) with the SP (in conjunction with an agreed Results Framework to be
developed during the inception phase) to ensure that we hold the SP accountable for the
performance of the programme. Furthermore, we will include a contract break clause at the end of
the inception phase in case we are not satisfied with either the progress of the programme or the
performance of the SP.
Value for Money in Implementation
66. The Programme is designed to maximise Value for Money (VfM) throughout its implementation,
including through the following action:

Avoiding duplication and ensuring complementarities with existing donor and government funded
Programmes by i) ensuring Ligada is part of existing co-ordination mechanisms aligned to the overall
GoM gender sector strategy; ii) openly publishing the Programme plans and progress; iii)
establishing a Programme Management Team and Committee (PIC) that includes key and
knowledgeable stakeholders in the sector; and iv) actively participating in the Gender Working Group
which consists of donors involved in the gender sector in Mozambique and GoM; deliberately
seeking synergy with existing DFID programmes and ‘adding gender value’ to them, as well as using
Ligada evidence and events to build capacity of DFID staff on gender
23

Drawing in in-kind contributions from Private Sector stakeholders on the brokering workstream

We will agree a VfM reporting mechanism with the new SP in line with the 4Es to ensure that we are
continually tracking the VfM performance for the programme that receive funding from the
Programme. Through these reports, the Programme management could verify if funds allocated are
being used in economic, efficient and effective ways. In addition, the Programme will attempt to
identify and capture the more qualitative benefits delivered to ensure a holistic picture of “value” is
analysed and understood.

Providing funding for Ligada Innovate projects with rigorous criteria including the development of
VFM metrics in line with the 4Es, cost/benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis of the project
financed. Local service providers should be the first choice but in the case that there is no local
capacity to execute the work, an international service provider should be selected. However, the
Programme management will promote partnerships with local service providers, and as such will be
contributing to the steps being taken by DFID Mozambique to increase and strengthen the capacity
of local service providers.
67. VFM will be embedded in the LEARN workstream, given its focus on cost effectiveness of various
interventions between and within programme activities. Detailed VfM indicators to be used as
management tools will be developed during the inception phase of the Programme but are likely to
include:
 Overall cost of management of the Programme as a % of total budget
 Cost efficiency and economy by workstream and activity (e.g. input costs, costs of personnel,
costs of travel)
 Cost per ‘solution’ supported by the Programme tracked over time (e.g. cost per person per
Innovation project; cost per vacancy/quota filled, cost per stakeholder activity supported).
 Measure estimated economic returns for specific activities
 Cost benefit analysis of the four workstreams, and in aggregate – both qualitative and
quantitative
 Qualitative assessment of use of DFID staff member and benefits to other DFID programmes
(as part of the evaluation of the Ligada model)
 Work on VFM of a range of empowerment results (including those direct benefits discussed
but not currently monetised in the economic appraisal e.g. risky behaviours, reduced fertility,
increased decision-making) and their reach in terms of the most vulnerable young women
 Levels of attribution of benefits to DFID inputs
24
Financial Case
68. The proposed total budget for the Programme is £14 million for six years life of the project. The broad
brush allocation per intervention is shown in the table below. Funding will come from DFID
Mozambique Programme (resource) budget. There are no contingent liabilities associated with this
funding.
Table 6: overview of budget
Cost over 6 years
Budget line
Programme Management Cost47 (total for the Service
Provider)48
DFID Staff member on Programme budget (costs is
maximum possible– based on accompanied post)
Workstreams
Innovate
Broker
Learn
Brand
£ 2,500,000
£1.250,000
£4,000,000
£1,500,000
£2,500,000
£2,000,000
DFID Managed ‘quick wins’
£250,000
Total Programme Cost
£14,000,000
Payment arrangements
69. As noted, there will be a number of ‘quick wins’ that will be managed by DFID whilst the procurement
is ongoing. These activities will be funded through Accountable Grants/Contracts. Payments will be
made in tranches in accordance with defined milestones and/or deliverables. For the Service
Provider, a contract with DFID will govern the payment arrangements. This will specify the use and
accountability of funds for the Programme. Programme funds will be disbursed based upon a
combination of agreed outputs and milestones during the inception stage.
Financial planning, reporting and monitoring
70. During the Inception Phase, the Service Provider will provide a detailed Business Plan for Year 1
along with a 5 year strategy, both with expenditure profiles. The business plan will be renewed each
year (and approved by the PIC prior to implementation) and will include a monthly forecast of
expenditure. This will be reported on monthly during the year as part of the management report as
well as formally reviewed every quarter.
71. Financial monitoring and reporting will be clearly outlined in the contract between DFID and the
Service Provider, and as noted, a detailed and costed business plan will be developed and signed off
by the PIC annually. It is envisaged that expenditure and forecasts will be monitored monthly through
management reports as well as formal quarterly updates. DFID will maintain supervision of the
Programme’s financial management through its participation in Programme Investment Committee.
Independent audits will be conducted annually although DFID may request an audit at any point in
time.
72. The Programme’s Senior Responsible Owner and DFID’s Programme Management Team in the
Growth, Resilience and Rural Development Team will closely monitor funding and ensure that funds
from previous payments have been spent and properly accounted for before a payment is made. The
team will also monitor and drive VfM.
Ensuring against misuse of funds
73. Bidders will be asked to prove their financial credibility including through a due diligence
questionnaire to ascertain the capacity of their systems (financial, human resources and
procurement). This requirement will be made a key selection criterion during evaluation of bids to
ensure that the risk is minimal. For any downstream recipients, a clause will be embedded in the
contract making it mandatory for the Service Provider to carry out due diligence checks on all sub
recipients before any agreements can be entered into and funds released.
25
74. The Programme will be required to demonstrate fiduciary risk management including prevention of
misuse of funds. DFID will demand safeguards and reporting on whether funds have been paid to the
intended beneficiaries; funds have been spent as intended; and value for money has been achieved
in line with set guidelines. Initial risk analysis will pay attention to the potential for petty corruption
through the programme. Where beneficiaries are vulnerable to petty corruption, DFID’s regular
review processes will ensure a ‘do no harm’ policy whereby the SP will be expected to show
sufficient safeguards are in place to alert DFID to any misuse of funds. Additionally, annual and midterm (after two years of the Programme implementation) reviews will verify the efficiency and
effectiveness of the financial management as an integral part of the Programme process evaluation.
26
Management Case
75. This section focuses on governance and management arrangements and the ability to deliver. It sets
out the management implications for the business unit/ level of effort with realistic timings for
mobilisation and start up. It outlines out the expected roles and responsibilities, including DFID’s own
resourcing strategies (SRO, project team etc.). It is important to note that this Programme does not
involve financial aid to the government, therefore the partnerships principles do not apply.
A
Delivery
76. The programme will be set up based on proven flexible and responsive approaches being employed
in DFID Mozambique. It will entail the following:
(a) Phase One: 6- 9 months, led by DFID, focusing on procurement and ‘quick wins’. Based on a tried
and tested approach in the DFID Mozambique office, DFID-M will lead on a number of quick win
activities whilst the procurement process is ongoing. These are focused on gaps highlighted in the
feasibility study and other questions that have arisen during this design process:
 Mapping of young women in formal work, including examples of employers or sectors in which
incentives are being used to attract young women

Mapping of young women’s access to services (quality and access) in two cities, working towards
the development of an ‘information bank’ on urban young women and work and capacity to take
up work- information, services (e.g. childcare, FP, night versus day school, job searches and
information, employers, trading sectors, very poor women and urban work programmes,
associations)

Increased understanding of up to two key areas/sectors in which women work or impact on their
ability to work – e.g. non-state school provision in urban areas
DFID-M will also use the inception period to hold a first influencing and advocacy event on gender, likely
to be in collaboration with the EU and other member states in March 2015. It will use this opportunity to
mark a step-change in its work (following the CEFM event led by DFID in May 2014) on gender, and to
bring in key stakeholders. DID-M will use this event as a strategic opportunity to launch the Ligada
programme, alongside HQ and Dutch funds for UNFPA and UNICEF to support GoM on CEFM. It will
also market the new EU Mozambique Gender Country Profile with key messages for donors,
government and private sector.
(b) Phase Two: 6-9 month Inception Phase, with a break clause. The inception phase will start with a
kick-off meeting: beginning with a programme kick-off meeting to establish expectations; will entail
firming up the key intervention areas for year 1, and will resulting in a full inception report on the basis of
which DFID will decide whether or not to move ahead into full implementation
(C) Phase three: up to 5 years implementation of the four workstreams. The main tasks of the service
provider will be to operate all four workstreams, as well as set up a physical Ligada Hub/office space.
The Service Provider will engage in an annual planning process to learn and change approach. A full
Terms of Reference for the Service Provider will be developed for the procurement process, based on
the information on the four workstreams outlined in paragraph 24 which details the workstreams’ aims
and activities.
77. It is not anticipated at this stage that Ligada will exist as an entity after DFID funding has ceased.
Success in Ligada will be the adoption of a number of sustainable solutions for FEE in Mozambique,
increased gender expertise and attitudinal change among stakeholders, a set of gender champions
at a range of levels, and a body of compelling evidence and programmes for FEE. However, during
the implementation of Ligada, possibilities for ‘institutionalising’ Ligada, and stakeholders’ potential
for absorbing some of all of its workstreams may be assessed.
B
Management and governance arrangements
78. A flexible approach to spending decisions and strategy and results setting will be built-in to enable
the programme to: respond quickly to changing circumstances and new opportunities; experiment
27
with new partnerships and approaches; invest seed money in small interventions (through the
Innovate and Broker workstreams), studies, workshops, training (under the Learn workstream); to
support emerging partnerships and networks; and contribute to public debate at critical moments.
79. This will be achieved first through the inception phase, and then an annual strategy setting workshop
as part of the Annual Review process, with the core programme team feeding this back to the
Programme Investment Committee. The Ligada Team will also build in regular cross-workstream
planning and strategy meetings to revise and recast activities and spending decisions and
timeframes. Having a hybrid output based contract with KPI – which may take time to develop at the
start – will ensure that this flexibility, but combined with accountability – is embedded in the
programme.
Governance structure
80. The governance structures to manage the Programme will build on the lessons learnt from other
similar projects. The diagram below illustrates the overall governance structure, including the
following members/bodies:

Ligada Programme Team: bidders will be asked to provide suggestions for the composition of a
team built to answer the programme demands, but we envisage this will include:

Team leader - an employee of the Service Provider responsible for identifying and managing the
Programme activities and advising the PIC. The TL and team will develop the Programme strategy,
annual plan and investment strategy

DFID full time member of staff (paid for out of programme funds). This person will be recruited by
DFID during the DFID-led Phase One. S/he will have management responsibility for specific
elements of the LEARN workstreams, given the importance noted earlier of using Ligada learning
to boost DFID’s broader gender work; and for Ligada to act as a flagship resource on gender for
other stakeholders, and the DFID label of credibility this requires. This will include designing and
delivering the feedback loop to DFID office, and portfolio, as well as coordinating and delivering the
influencing/dissemination activities with key stakeholders, including government and other donors.
This role would not be responsible for the M&E strategy, nor for the separate pieces of research
under the LEARN workstream, though they would have to work closely with those responsible for
them, and would be expected to contribute heavily to the programme as a core team member, and
would sit on the Management Committee and be involved in strategy discussions and key
programme cycle events (e.g. Annual Reviews). This structure is currently used in the DRC La
Pepiniere programme, where the DFID staff member sits in the DFID office one day a week and the
programme office four days/week. The job holder is line managed by the DFID DRC office, but has
clear deliverables and TOR agreed by the programme.

Workstream leaders – these may be built into the core team, or part of the workstreams themselves
–e.g. if a consortium is brought together, one partner is likely to take responsibility for a given
workstream, and play a role in regular Ligada Team meetings. Girl Hub (GH) has indicated it may be
able to be brought in on a capacity building basis for the BRAND workstream, and DFID
Mozambique will facilitate this relationship should the Ligada Team and Ligada Decision Unit see fit
(though funds to cover GH engagement would come from the BRAND workstream budget line).

Finance, Administrative, and Contracting Manager - administration functions, receiving and
accounting for donor funds, establishing contracts and grant agreements between the Programme
and financial institutions or service providers, making disbursements against these agreements,
managing the Programme own administrative expenditure, and keeping all financial records for the
Programme and service provider;

Additional staff may be identified as necessary on one-off bases, and may be called down on by the
SP who should demonstrate a depth of associates or core staff with relevant expertise across the
workstreams.
28
Ligada Programme’s DFID Senior Responsible Owner: will be accountable for programme
monitoring. The Core Team will report to the SRO on all aspects of programme management.
The Ligada Decision Unit (LDU) will be composed of key stakeholders (including the SRO and Core
team members) to oversee the Programme. They will be meeting quarterly to approve proposals as well
as assess progress based on reports submitted by the Service Provider. Adjustments to the Programme
based on emerging lessons, and corrective measures for any programme problems will be discussed
decided in this forum.
The Ligada Steering Committee will meet annually to review the strategic process of the programme,
to identify opportunities for further partnerships and strategic influencing opportunities. Members of this
committee will represent the range of stakeholders with whom Ligada will work (private sector,
government at national and local level etc.).
Figure 2: Ligada Governance Structure
Ligada Decision Unit
DFID PM; SP Members; SRO
Service Provider
Ligada
Advisory
Committee
Finance, admin,
contracting
Tech Team
Partners
Partners
Fund recipients
Key
stakeholders
Beneficiaries
Reporting
Contractual
Funding
C
Monitoring and Evaluation
81. The Ligada programme is investing heavily in learning. However, it is not anticipated that it will
undertake a full and formal evaluation. In order toensure learning is independent, an external midterm review will be commissioned, and Annual Reviews may also regularly include external
consultants on specific areas under review.
82. Learning will operate in a number of ways across the programme but housed under one broad
LEARN strategy which will be developed by the Ligada Team during the inception phase, and which
will include strategies and activities for dissemination of that learning. The learning strategy will be
reviewed regularly. The learning strategy will, of course, pay particular attention to the issue of
disaggregation of data and finding by sex, age (even within the 16-29 year old target group) and
income group. It will also take a participatory approach, involving young women in learning. At a
practical level, monitoring trips to project implementation sites to gather further contextual information
and interview staff members and other stakeholders also will also be required and must be built into
the LEARN budget line.
29
Lines of learning in Ligada
 Learning about the individual interventions funded under the BROKER, LEARN and BRAND.
Learning about their impact, scale, sustainability (i.e. potential for adoption, about their VFM
along the 4Es model (in which the issue of reaching the hard to reach and most vulnerable will be
of particular interest). Each of the interventions will have a mini M&E strategy (providing a
baseline and report against milestones and targets), and may have varying levels of effort to be
justified by the strategy. The indicators for what these interventions aim to achieve will be
developed as part of the learning strategy, and will be based in the conceptual framework of FEE
outlined earlier. Intervention partners will be responsible for the following minimum reporting
requirements: Quarterly Progress Reports, Quarterly Expenditure Reports, and Project
Completion Reports. The indicators to be tracked through these reports will be agreed with
project partners and included into the relevant memorandum of agreement/contracts.

Learning about the model as an effective tool – assessing its impact in terms of scale,
sustainability and cost effectiveness

Learning and disseminating research activities from the programme

Learning in terms of capacity building – both of implementing partners or stakeholders, but also
of DFID staff in relation to our other programmes.
Risks
83. The table below outlines the risks foreseen for the programme, and highlights mitigation strategies.
These will be developed in more detail throughout the inception phase, and reviewed regularly.
30
Risk
Lack of potential partners or
implementers for one or
more workstreams
Lack of engagement from
private sector, and no in kind
contributions
Stretch in objectives and
locations dilutes impact
Difficulty in commissioning
quality ‘quick
wins/information fillers’
Political conditions are too
challenging to work with
certain stakeholders e.g.
municipalities, particularly in
post-election scenario
Programme perceived as
‘urban bias’ resulting in
neglect of rural poor
Perceived neglect of men or
older women due to youth
and adolescent focus
Research ethics approval
Probability Impact on
Comment and Mitigation
Programme
Low
High
The market in Mozambique is weak. It is highly unlikely one partner could deliver along all
workstreams, hence the need for a consortium. The feasibility study, however, shows
organisations both in and outside Mozambique are interested in these four workstreams and
have capacity to engage. The Early Market Engagement Event will explicitly seek to spread
the net wide. Capacity building is also an explicit agenda of the INNOVATE workstream with
a view to building local organisation’s ability to implement.
BRAND is a particularly new way of working here, but there are strong social communications
partners in the country, and other DFID countries from whom lessons can be learnt – as well
as the resource of Girl Hub, who are interested in exploring initial partnership
Low
High
The feasibility study highlighted very positive early interest from the private sector. The
BROKER workstream is designed in order to allow Ligada to invest in soliciting and building
interest from the Private Sector. Ligada will also be able to exploit Private Sector links from
existing DFID-M programmes.
Medium
Medium
The differences between cities and attitudes about and roles of adolescent girls and women
vary greatly along the length and breadth of Mozambique. Ligada has been set up to avoid a
blueprint model, to enable the analysis to inform local solutions. However, the nuance should
not complicate the message to the extent that practical messages and action is clouded. The
evidence and influencing strategy will ensure a suitable balance of
The feasibility study highlighted some key areas for information gathering and analysis, and
the top three have been selected meaning DFID is well-placed to move ahead. Contract
frameworks and supplier databases in country give DFID Mozambique good levels of rapid
access to high quality experts. Clear terms of reference and an appropriate lead-in and
procurement timeframe will mitigate the risks.
Low
Medium
DFID-M already has an urban programme (Dialogo) with good relations with municipalities in
a range of cities. Ligada will work with Dialogo to assess and revise programme sites where
necessary. By working in up to four cities Ligada has also built in some slack. Furthermore,
Ligada will specifically invest in relationship and contact building, and will map and assess
these risks regularly.
Low
Low
DFID Mozambique has a strong focus on rural areas, in a range of sectors. This programme
represents a chance for DFID Mozambique to position itself on an emerging poverty reduction
agenda in Mozambique as urbanisation increases. Communications on the programme will
stress this, and highlight our continued commitment to rural development.
Medium
Medium
Backlash against a programme focussed solely on adolescent girls and women is possible, at
government level and community level. To mitigate this risk, Ligada will articulate a clear
approach to working with men and boys in each of its workstreams, and include activities in
which they will be able to benefit.
Low
Medium
Ethical approval is necessary for any research, and can be time consuming to achieve.
31
delays LEARN workstream
activities
Cohort study fails to track its
participants
Weak capacity in
implementers to absorb
funds
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
DFID fails to recruit staff to
be core team member
leading on LEARN and
influencing
DFID involvement in the
Programme Team
Low
High
Medium
Medium
Lack of buy-in or interest
from other donors and
duplication with others
Medium
Low
Lack of buy-in from GoM
Medium
Medium
Sufficient time is built in to the programme for the research component to pursue the correct
channels. Relevant GoM support will be sought to ensure the procedures are followed.
The research proposal for the cohort study will ensure that the sample is sufficient to counter
any potential drop out, and to build in ways to track participants where necessary.
Local capacity is weak, but the way in which the programme has been designed will allow for
funding with capacity building to small organisations. The INNOVATE workstream will allow
for manageable sums of money for smaller organisations who still have a strength in this area
to receive funds and gradually build their track record and capacity to receive larger grants.
DFID DRC had trouble recruiting for a similar post, in part due to language constraints.
Language is an issue here as well, but DFID-M has learnt lessons around realistic planning
from the DRC case. Building recruitment of the post into the DFID-led procurement and quick
win phase will ensure the person is in post in good time.
The position of the Programme Manager in the Ligada Programme team may lead to
questions/disputes over accountability and lines of reporting. A clear job description, division
of roles and responsibilities and service Provider TOR will go some way towards mitigating
this. In addition, regular reviews of the way in which the role is working will be built in, with
scope for terminating the role (with sufficient checks) if it is not seen to be adding value.
There is some early interest from other donors (e.g. Denmark). However, funding does not
rely on other donors but could be developed at later stage to absorb funds if others want to
support. The current lack of leadership among donors means that DFID is well-positioned to
fill this role.
Until now, relatively little work is going on FEE so far. To avoid duplication, active funders e.g.
AfDB and USAID should be brought into Steering Committee and into learning activities;
Ligada will also be represented in the EU and GoM gender working group to ensure
coordination.
Overall there is a clear appetite; but Ligada will need to engage beyond MMAS and set its
sights on more influential Ministries. This will be explicit in the learning and influencing
strategy, and the DFID staff member paid for from programme costs will have a direct
mandate for developing relevant GoM buy-in, drawing on and expanding existing DFID
contacts across the office.
32
Endnotes
1
It is worth noting early on that poverty data for Mozambique is old (a new Household Survey is due in 2016), and that
labour market data is hard to come by and unreliable. When we use statistics here, it is with this in mind, and with a view to
building a better understanding particularly of urban labour markets into the learning element of this programme.
2
UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, explanatory note for Mozambique.
3
The population living below the national poverty line of about USD 0.65 (18 MZN) a day.
4
AfDB 2014, op cit.: 12.
5
Mozambique. Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic; DFID 2014.
6
Tvedten et al, 2011
7
2010 UN data.org
8 Institute of National Statistics, 3rd Poverty Assessment
9 UN habitat, 2007
10
“Hidden” expenditures for urban services, transportation and rents are particularly crippling for urban dwellers
11
ibid
12 UNICEF, 2010
13
UNICEF, 2014
14
World Bank, 2007. “Beating the Odds: Sustaining Inclusion in a Growing Economy. A Mozambique Poverty, Gender and
Social Assessment”.
15 Institute of National Statistics, 3rd Poverty Assessment
16
For a good overview of the North/South differences in gender rules and history in Mozambique, see Tvedten’s 2012 World
Development Report Gender case Study on Mozambique.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1322671773271/Tvedtenmozambiqu.pdf
17
At 35% according to INE’s 2005 data, with male rates at 25%
18
SPEED, 2014 http://www.speed-program.com/
19
Women, Business and the Law, 2014. http://wbl.worldbank.org/reports Remaining legal issues include: Non-pregnant and
non-nursing women cannot do the same jobs as men; the law does not mandate paid or unpaid parental leave; the law does
not mandate equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value; no laws mandating non-discrimination based
on gender in hiring; not illegal for an employer to ask about family status during a job interview; employers are not required
by law to give employees an equivalent position when they return from maternity leave; employees with minor children do
not have rights to a flexible/part-time schedule; payments for childcare are not tax deductible; no governmental office tasked
with addressing sexual harassment; no legislation on sexual harassment in education, public spaces, service provision; no
criminal sanctions for sexual harassment in employment
20
One feasibility study, undertaken by consultant Kerry Selvester; and one qualitative field study undertaken in bairros in
Maputo and Nampula by the DFID-M SDA with support from Lucy Earle as 10%
21
OPM UNICEF Child Early and Forced Marriage data
22
Levine, R., Lloyd, C., Greene, M., & Grown, C. (2009). Girls Count: A Global Investment & Action Agenda. A Girls Count
Report on Adolescent Girls. Washington, DC: The Center for Global Development.
23 Tvedten, 2011
24
UN Habitat Mozambique Urban Profile, 2012
25
This echoes research across the region which highlights that in addition to skills mismatches, a range of constraints exist for
girls and younger women in accessing and retaining decent work and that social norms, SRHR and issues such as job search
constraints and discrimination (in both formal and informal wage employment) are important, particularly among more
educated urban youth, and DFID-commissioned work by ODI in Rwanda and Burundi which also highlights that girls consider
the purchase of certain items (i.e. beauty and sanitary items and school materials) to be essential, and that the inability to
purchase them leads to poor self-image and potentially risky behaviours. This is exacerbated in cash-based urban
environments.
26
http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/go/bridge-publications/cutting-edge-packs/gender-and-migration/
27
For an excellent summary, see Evidence for Action: Gender Equality and Economic Growth. Chatham House
28
E.g. the recent WB study (Fox and Filmer, 2014) on youth employment identifies adolescent girls as a priority target for
employment related interventions in SSA, because of the particular issue of family formation.
29
e.g. Studies like Jensen 2010; Heath and Mobarak, 2011 which show communities perceptions of women change positively,
gender roles relaxing and access to education increasing when economic opportunities are available for women.
30
Tvedten, 2012; Kabeer, unpublished paper for DFID Mozambique
31
Levine, R., Lloyd, C., Greene, M., & Grown, C. (2009). Girls Count: A Global Investment & Action Agenda. A Girls Count
Report on Adolescent Girls. Washington, DC: The Center for Global Development.
32
Fox, 2014 Household Enterprises in Mozambique (World Bank)
33
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67582/strategic-vision-girls-women.pdf
34
http://www.enterprise-development.org/page/download?id=2433
35
http://www.womeneconroadmap.org/
33
36
For an example, see http://insights.careinternational.org.uk/development-blog/private-sector-engagement/microfranchising-for-development-the-example-of-krishi-utsho-in-bangladesh
37
Mattero (2010).
38
“Deadweight loss” refers to payments made to employers for something they may have done even without the payment.
“Substitution effects” refer to a situation where an employer replaces a regular worker to be able to hire a subsidized
worker.
39
http://www.womeneconroadmap.org/ and Guiding Youth Employment Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Typology and
Experience
40
ibid
41 Unsworth and Booth, 2014 http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9158.pdf
42
http://www.womeneconroadmap.org/
43
Unsworth and Booth, 2014 http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9158.pdf
44
Sustainable partnerships with shared objectives, complementary contributions and shared successes, could be described as
successes. Relevant examples from which to draw could include (i) Goldman Sachs and Care’s partnership for the 10,000
Women initiative, (ii) Unilever and Oxfam’s Shakti sales force partnership, and (iii) Care and Danone’s Rural Sales Programme
(RSP).
45
Based on an estimated 25% costs, which is typical of existing DFID-Mozambique programme management costs managed
in this way – e.g. Dialogo, ITC, FSD Mozambique, BAGC.
46
This includes set-up, management costs (including key staff members), office operations, travel and contingency
47
Based on an estimated 25% costs, which is typical of existing DFID-Mozambique programme management costs managed
in this way – e.g. Dialogo, ITC, FSD Mozambique, BAGC.
48
This includes set-up, management costs (including key staff members), office operations, travel and contingency
34