2014 NDI 6WS – Fitzmier,
Lundberg, Abelkop
STATES COUNTERPLAN
***Solvency – States ***
Generic
States can coordinate over ocean policy – they’ve been doing it for 40
years
CSO 14 (Coastal State Organization, an organization that represents and coordinates the interests of the coastal
governors and their states, “FY 2015 Coastal Zone Management Program,” Coastal State Organization,
http://www.coastalstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CSO_CZM_FY15_Appropriations_FS.pdf)
National issues—Local solutions For more than 40 years, the Coastal Zone Management
Program
offered an effective mechanism for federal and state managers to address
important national coastal objectives. This innovative partnership has resulted
(CZM) has
in the establishment of coastal management programs in 34 states and
territories,
including the Great Lakes. CZM Programs in the Iower 48 states Programs not shown include:
American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, N. Mariana lsland, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands These
programs
have: • Reduced environmental impacts of coastal development • Resolved significant
conflicts between competing coastal uses Provided critical assistance to local
governments in coastal planning & resource protection The success of the CZM Program
is a result of states working with communities to design coastal management programs
that address specific issues and priorities affecting local areas.
States solves – they at least three miles of exclusive jurisdiction and
CZMA allows states to shape federal waters
OCRM ’11 (Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, “STATE JURISDICTION AND
FEDERAL WATERS STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, OCEAN MANAGEMENT AND
COASTAL AND MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING, April 18, 2011.
http://static2.docstoccdn.com/docs/156149733/state_fed-waters-ag)
HOW
THE CZMA ENABLES STATES TO ADDRESS ACTIVITES IN FEDERAL
WATERS THROUGH STATE COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND
OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLANS a. Brief Summary of the CZMA: Congress enacted the CZMA in 1972 to
protect, restore, and enhance natural coastal resources of the United States. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466. The CZMA
authorizes NOAA-approved state coastal management programs and the state National Estuarine Research Reserve
System (NERRS) (the NERRS is a network of 28 protected estuarine areas managed by the states which promote coastal
stewardship, education and research). There are 34 federally approved state coastal management programs (the one
remaining state, Illinois, is developing a coastal management program). State coastal management
programs manage the uses and resources of a state’s coastal zone, including
a state’s marine waters, energy facilities, development , public access, coastal hazard
mitigation, fishing , etc. The program is voluntary and incentives are CZMA implementation funding and “federal
consistency.” State coastal zones include state marine waters, bays, estuaries, rivers, etc., and state inland coastal zone
boundaries vary from a few hundred feet to entire coastal counties or even the whole state. b. State CZMA Enforceable
Policies: State CZMA enforceable policies are applied to federal actions that
have effects on state coastal uses or resources through the CZMA federal
consistency provision. An enforceable policy is a state policy that is legally binding under state law (e.g.,
through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions),
by which a state exerts control over private and public coastal uses and resources, and that is incorporated in a state’s
NOAA-approved coastal management program. See 16 U.S.C. § 1453(6a) and 15 C.F.R. § 930.11(h); see also OCRM’s
Federal Consistency Overview, pages 5-7:
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/consistency/media/FC_overview_022009.pdf. OCRM has informed states that
enforceable policies are given legal effect by state law and that the CZMA does not authorize states to establish regulatory
standards/enforceable policies for federal agencies or federal waters. A state policy that would establish standards for
federal agencies or federal lands or waters would not meet the CZMA’s definition of “enforceable policy” (i.e., legally
binding under state law). States apply their federally approved enforceable policies to
federal actions in federal waters through CZMA federal consistency reviews.
Enforceable policies must also contain standards of sufficient specificity to guide public and private uses. 15 C.F.R. §
930.11(h). c. The CZMA Federal Consistency Provision: The
Federal consistency provision (16 U.S.C.
that federal actions that have
reasonably foreseeable effects on any land or water use or natural resource
of the coastal zone (also referred to as coastal uses or resources, or coastal effects) be consistent with
the enforceable policies of a state’s federally approved coastal management
program. Federal consistency provides states with an important tool to
§ 1456 and NOAA’s regulations at 15 C.F.R. part 930) requires
manage coastal uses and resources and to facilitate cooperation and
coordination with Federal agencies . Under the CZMA Federal agency
activities that have coastal effects must be consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with the enforceable policies of a state’s federally approved
coastal management program. In addition, the statute requires non-federal
applicants for federal authorizations and funding to be consistent with
enforceable policies of state coastal management programs. There are four
types of federal actions under the CZMA: 1. Federal agency activities — activities and development
projects
performed by a Federal agency, or a contractor for the benefit of a Federal agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) –
(2) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart C. 2. Federal license or permit activities — activities performed
by a non-Federal entity requiring federal permits, licenses or other form of federal authorization. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A)
and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart D. 3. OCS plans — Department of the Interior/Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement approvals for OCS plans, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart E. 4. Federal assistance to state and local
governments. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) and 15 C.F.R. part 930, subpart F.
Aquaculture
States solve aquaculture – they have jurisdiction
Buck 12 (Lisa E, internally citing David Fluharty, Associate Professor [WOT] at the School of Marine and
Environmental Affairs at University of Washington, Beth Bryant, chair professor at the School of marine and
Environmental Affairs at U of W, Thomas Leschine, professor at same place, “U.S. Development of Offshore Aquaculture:
Regulatory, Economic, and Political Factors,” student thesis for School of Marine and Environmental Affairs,
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/21752/Buck_washington_0250O_10741.pdf.tx
t?sequence=2)
While this project focused on federal regulation, many interviewees
stressed the importance of
state governments in the development of offshore aquaculture. At the state level,
government attitudes toward the development of offshore aquaculture tend
to reflect the priorities of the state?s elected officials and their constituencies, and will be
reflected in the state?s CZM Plan. These priorities reflect in turn the economic, social and political
situation of the state. States can develop their own aquaculture policies , which may
outline specific goals and objectives unique to the priorities of their
residents. As regulations currently stand, it is wise for any action taken by a party
interested in developing an offshore aquaculture project to not only be
consistent with federal laws and regulations, but also with the policy of the state whose coast they
will be developing. As is discussed in Section 5.1.3 of this thesis, states can invoke the Federal
Consistency clause of the CZMA and appeal any federally permitted action
that will have an impact on their state?s coastal zone. In this way, the coastal
states of the United States have a distinct political stake in the development of a domestic
offshore aquaculture industry.
Conservation
Congress should establish a national ocean management regime –
allows state offshore management and avoids the link to politics
Fitzgerald 02 [Edward A., Professor at Wright State University, Ph.D. from Boston University, M.A. from
Northeastern University, J.D. from Boston College Law School, and B.A. from Holy Cross College, “THE SEAWEED
REBELLION: FLORIDA’S EXPERIENCE WITH OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT,” Florida State University Law
Review, Fall 2002, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/vol18_1/fitzgerald.pdf, 07/14/14]
Florida, like the other coastal states in the Seaweed Rebellion,¶ was not successful in its litigation. The
courts narrowly interpreted¶ the statutes and deferred to the Secretary of the Interior's
decisions,¶ which were contrary to the coastal states’ concerns. Florida, like the¶ other coastal
states, was more successful in Congress preventing energy development off its coast
through the establishment of OCS moratoria. Much of Florida's success can be attributed
to consistent bipartisan opposition by governors and the entire congressional delegation.
Florida’s continued importance in presidential politics¶ also guarantees that the state’s
OCS concerns will be seriously¶ considered. Congress should take steps to
strengthen the role of coastal states in the OCS process. Florida's proposal to
strengthen the role¶ of state governors in the development of the five-year OCS leasing¶
program pursuant to section 18 of the OCSLA and regarding OCS¶ lease sales pursuant to section 19 of the OCSLA
should be¶ enacted.591 Coastal state decisions regarding consistency¶ determinations
under the CZMA should be given greater weight.¶ Many of these changes can be accomplished by
shifting the burden¶ of proof regarding state determinations.592 After a state makes a¶ decision,
the burden should shift to the Secretary of the Interior or¶ Secretary of Commerce to
demonstrate why the state's position is¶ incorrect. In addition, the OCS revenue sharing
program should be¶ institutionalized.593 ¶ Congress should establish a national
ocean management regime, which encourages state offshore management.
This is¶ particularly important in light of the establishment of the 200-mile¶ Exclusive Economic Zone595 and extension
of the United States¶ territorial sea to twelve miles.596 Florida has been actively engaged¶ in managing
its coastal and ocean resources,597 which are important¶ components of its economy. Florida believes
that OCS energy¶ development poses too great a risk. 598 The establishment of an¶
ocean management program and enactment of the suggested¶ statutory changes will help
Florida protect its coast.
Deficit Spending
States should be able to deficit spend – creates state uniformity and
promotes economic growth
Attewells 09 [Steve, Graduate Student with a B.A. from Columbia University and a M.A in History from UCSB,
“Fifty-State Keynesianism - Part Deux,” 07/31/09, http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/fifty-state-keynesianismpart-deux, 07/14/14]
Background: Why is it the case that America's state governments have become so
strongly pro-cyclical? The basic reason is that all but one state in the Union (Vermont
being the exception) have some form of a balanced budget or debt limitation
requirement, which makes it impossible to deficit spend during recessions.
Many of these requirements date back over a hundred years, following the Panic of 1837, which caused nine states to
default on their "internal improvement" (i.e, transportation infrastructure) related debts in 1842, which prompted a wave
of anti-debt measures. The state of New York, for example, adopted a new constitution in 1846, which required a 2/3rds
vote for appropriations bills and a 3/5ths vote for any bill that would raise taxes or incur debts. Illinois' 1848 constitution
required a 2/3 vote for appropriations, a balanced budget requirement, and a $50,000 cap on state debts. Similar waves of
constitutional redrafting tended to follow other major recessions in which states suddenly were unable to finance their
debts, such as the Panics of 1857 and 1873 (triggered by the failure of banks that had over-speculated on railroads). The
question is why we allow a "hobgoblin of little minds" over a hundred and seventy years old to continue to rule over us?
Why, when even a total economics amateur like myself can pick up Keynes
and learn about the "paradox of thrift," do we continue to allow the political
cliche that "well, families have to balance their budgets, so the government
should too" to be the conventional wisdom of the stump speech? (Incidentally, given
the fact that most American families are horribly in debt and are relying on their credit cards to make ends meet, this
couldn't be less accurate). A 50-State Solution: One of the things that's often puzzled me about the progressive movement
is our lack of willingness to use the initiative process to our advantage in both achieving policy ends and mobilizing the
electorate - consider the way in which the Republican Party used anti-gay marriage propositions in 2002 and 2004 to gin
up their right-wing base, change the political debate from economic issues to their wedge issues, and attack the civil rights
and civil liberties of queer Americans. In 2006, we saw a little bit of this strategy on the progressive side, using minimum
wage initiatives to increase working class turnout in states like Ohio, but to the best of my knowledge it hasn't become a
standard part of the Democratic Party political toolkit. Hence, the first step in establishing "50-state
Keynesianism" is to promote, state-by-state an " Anti-Recession Budget
Reform Initiative ." (if anyone has a better name for it, I'm open to suggestions). This initiative
should amend the state constitution's balanced budget requirement to allow
the state, when the economy is in recession (i.e, two quarters of negative economic growth) to
run a limited deficit (two years maximum) for the purposes of funding
counter-cyclical stimulus programs (limited to say, 5-10% of state GDP). We should begin
our push in those areas which are deep blue states and which tend to have
weaker balanced budget requirements - New England would be a good
starting place, especially with Vermont as the lone non-balanced budget
state sitting there as a model for how deficit spending won't destroy western
civilization. The Rust Belt states that have been especially hit hard, like
Michigan or Ohio, would probably be receptive to a message that it's better
to spend money to create jobs than to balance a budget by throwing teachers
and other state workers out of their jobs. As usual, the major prizes would
be New York and California, given their size and political weight. Second, in
order to build state capacity for Keynesian economic policy, we should also
push for the creation of State Reserve Banks. Here, I really have to credit Ellen Brown over at
the Huffington Post for promoting this idea and bringing it to my attention. This amazingly simple yet powerful idea takes
its example from, of all places, the state of North Dakota, which has operated the Bank of North Dakota since 1919. It
works like this - the state charters a public bank, and instead of placing its
reserves, tax revenues, deeds for public lands, and so forth in a variety of
state banks (as most states do), it puts all of them in the public bank to act as the
bank's capital base. (Note: as long as the bank only circulates U.S dollars, it's
perfectly constitutional , avoiding the Article I, Section 10 bar against states
issuing coin or bills of credit) The bank then acts like a reserve bank, using
the power of "fractional reserve lending" (i.e, that a bank can generate much
more money in loans than it keeps in its vaults, thus multiplying many times
over its actual reserves, as long as it keeps back a portion to redeem
deposits) to generate loans, act as a local "lender of last resort" (thus buttressing the
work of the Federal Reserve and FDIC during credit crises), and (this is the key bit) allowing the State to borrow money in
order to deficit spend in a recession without relying on the ideologically-biased bond market and the credit agencies
who've taken a hammer to state bond ratings while maintaining A ratings for AIG and Lehman Brothers. The State
could then use these loans (which would be much cheaper than ordinary bonds,
given that its essentially paying interest to itself) to maintain public services and fund public
works and other stimulus measures in a recession.
Drilling – Natural Gas
Congress should empower state governments to control permitting
and environmental review – solves inefficiency and delay –
consultation with the FERC solves tech
Loris 13 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at
the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports: Lift Restrictions and Empower the States,” The Heritage Foundation,
02/11/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-thestates, 07/14/14]
Reforms Needed to Increase Access to Markets¶ The current system is too onerous to allow American
LNG exports to reach the market in a timely manner. The DOE's role in permit
authorization is completely unnecessary and U.S. producers should be allowed to export LNG to any
country they see fit. Further,
Congress should return jurisdiction to the state
governors by allocating authority to state regulators to conduct the
environmental review and provide the permit to construct an LNG facility .
only could this take some of the burden off
FERC, it could also spawn an efficient review process that allows these projects to come
online more efficiently. In that vein, Congress should:¶ Lift restrictions on LNG-recipient countries. The
Given the large volume of LNG export applications, not
distinction that exports to FTA countries are in the "public interest" while others are not is on the whole an arbitrary one.
There are numerous non-FTA nations with which the U.S. trades regularly. Natural gas should be no different and should
be treated as any other good traded around the world.¶
Remove all decision rights from the
Department of Energy and prohibit any federal agency from determining
natural gas exports based on public interest. It should not be up to the
Department of Energy, FERC, or any federal agency, to determine what amount of
natural gas to export is in the public's interest. Energy producers should be able to capture
economic opportunities from LNG-recipient nations if they believe it is in their interest. If the DOE
was sincere in its role to protect the public interest, it would have accepted its own analysis that exporting as much LNG as
possible is an overall benefit to economic welfare. The DOE's authorization requirement is a pointless obstacle and should
be removed immediately.¶
Empower state regulators to manage the environmental
review and permitting process of the export facility while allowing FERC to stay involved. States
already have the authority to veto LNG terminals. Rather than take an advisory role to FERC, states
should play a more predominant role in authorizing the construction of the terminal. A
state's environmental review and permit approval would satisfy the federal permits
necessary to build an LNG terminal.[30] The state permit approval would satisfy all other
necessary approvals required under the National Environmental Policy Act. A state
regulator can pull in FERC technical or safety expertise as necessary. Export applicants would
also need to meet Coast Guard security standards and the requirements under the MTSA, as well as the Department of
Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety requirements.[31]¶ However, if the state in which the facility is built deems it in
the state's and the facility's best interest to move forward with the FERC review because it is already in process, or even
start the FERC review, the state should be permitted to grant that authority to FERC. All new LNG export applicants
would fall under the state's jurisdiction.
States regulations solve offshore drilling and the environment – and
fed fails – problems with status quo drilling are a result of the federal
government
Loris 13 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at
the Heritage Foundation, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports: Lift Restrictions and Empower the States,” The Heritage Foundation,
02/11/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/us-natural-gas-exports-lift-restrictions-and-empower-thestates, 07/14/14]
Onerous Regulations, Not Exports, Are the Problem¶ A much more realistic threat to affordable
domestic natural gas is the federal government's intervention in natural gas extraction,
specifically the hydraulic fracturing process. One
of the reasons why hydraulic fracturing in the U.S.
has been successful in promoting oil and gas development for decades, while
maintaining a strong environmental record, is the state regulatory regime. States in which
fracturing takes place each have comprehensive regulation that ensures that oil and
gas companies operate safely and in an environmentally responsible
manner , and administer fines and implement punitive measures to correct
wrongdoing.¶ In November 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Lisa Jackson acknowledged the
states' role: " States are stepping up and doing a good job . It doesn't have to be EPA
that regulates the 10,000 wells that might go in."[11] But states are not just now stepping up-states
have effectively regulated oil and gas production and hydraulic fracturing for decades. In
Pennsylvania, fracking has been taking place since the 1960s, with nearly 100,000 oil and gas wells fracked and no
instances of contamination of groundwater. The same clean record is true for Ohio, where over 70,000 oil and gas wells
have been fracked since the 1960s. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission has compiled statistics for all 50
states, each of which has a flawless record when it comes to fracking and groundwater protection.[12]¶ Despite the
states' regulatory effectiveness, the federal government is pursuing costly and
duplicative regulations. In April 2012, the EPA announced its first air-emission rules for hydraulic
fracturing. The EPA contends that the regulations are necessary to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds and
hazardous air pollutants. However, the EPA quantifies only environmental benefits from regulating methane, clearly
indicating this rule was more about regulating a greenhouse gas. The EPA's rule miserably fails the cost-benefit test-the
agency's own analysis projects $745 million in annual costs and just $11 million to $19 million in environmental benefits.
Moreover, the EPA has grossly overestimated methane emissions from the wells.[13]¶ Further, the Department of the
Interior released a draft rule on public disclosure of chemicals on federal lands despite the fact that states have
successfully managed chemical disclosure.[14] Congress has also introduced legislation that would regulate fracking fluids
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) despite the fact that the 2005 Energy Policy Act codified that Congress never
intended to regulate fracking (except when using diesel oil in the fracking process under SDWA).[15] Hydraulic fracturing
had been safely regulated for a quarter century before Congress enacted SDWA in 1974.¶ The EPA is conducting a study on
the effect of fracking on drinking water and groundwater; the agency expects to release a draft report in 2014.[16] While
the study itself does not pose a threat, the EPA's guilty-until-proven innocent approach is cause for concern. The EPA
accused companies of contaminating water supplies in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming, and thus far the EPA has
found no evidence of drinking water contamination; in the case of Wyoming, however, the EPA published faulty data with
speculative and heavily contested conclusions. A legitimate fear is that the 2014 report will do the same.[17]¶ The facts
and history of hydraulic fracturing indicate that many of the fears associated with the
process are exaggerated or unsubstantiated. Entrepreneurs created an energy
boom and state regulators have been ensuring that energy production occurs in an
environmentally sensible way. In this manner, responsibility is allocated to land managers
who have local knowledge and the most to gain from proper management and the most
to lose from mismanagement.[18] Congress should keep it that way. [19]
Drilling – Oil
Congress should devolve energy production decisions to the state –
federal government fails to solve the environment and the economy
Loris 14 [Nicolas, Herbet and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at
the Heritage Foundation, “Federal Regulations and Federal Ownership Limit Oil and Production Potential,” The Heritage
Foundation, 05/07/14, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/federal-regulations-and-federal-ownershiplimit-oil-production-potential, 07/13/14]
Production of crude oil in the United States is up to 8.36 million barrels per day—the highest since January 1988.[1] The
increased supply of oil has widespread economic benefits, but a new Congressional Research Service report shows that
when the numbers are broken down by ownership it becomes clear that the situation could be even better. Although oil
production overall has almost doubled in less than six years, production continues to fall on federally owned land
areas.[2]¶ A more streamlined and efficient environmental review and permitting process
would be welcome, but the best solution would be for Congress to devolve
energy production decisions regarding federal lands to the states. ¶ Offshore
Drilling Discouraged¶ After oil production reached a peak in barrels produced offshore per day in 2010, the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in a blanket moratorium on all new offshore
projects and the cancellations of several existing leases. There may no longer be a literal
ban on offshore drilling, but government policies still in effect have the same consequences.¶ It
can take anywhere from five to 10 years for a company to move from approval to production,
with no guarantee that the permit obtained will lead to successful crude oil production.
Much of this is due to copious amounts of regulation and red tape.[3] The time and labor
needed to see this process through dwarfs the amount of time it takes other businesses to
expand and grow in almost any other industry. On top of the inefficient and onerous regulatory process, the oil industry
has access to just 15 percent of available offshore areas.[4]¶ Inaccessibility and unnecessary
regulations inhibit economic growth in various parts of the country off the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Gulf coasts. A study recently published by the American Petroleum Institute and the National Ocean Industries
Association shows that opening up offshore areas for drilling in the Atlantic Outer Continental
Shelf—just one region where offshore drilling is possible but not permitted—would create 280,000 jobs in
that region alone.[5]¶ Drilling on Federal Lands Faces Bureaucratic Hurdles¶ In addition to a continued decline in
offshore drilling, onshore drilling on federal land has increased at only a fraction of the rate
as on non-federal lands. Almost all of the benefits from fracking thus far have occurred on non-federal land.¶
While production on state and private lands has grown by almost 65 percent in the past seven
years, production on federal lands has increased by about 27 percent, less than half the rate.[6] In
total, federal lands now account for only 5 percent of oil production.[7] Daily federal onshore oil
production is equal to about one-third of what is produced every day at the Bakken formation alone.[8]¶ Part of the
discrepancy is that many of the big oil shale reserves lie on non-federal lands; however, a major
reason that production on federal land has lagged behind is not a matter of economic
viability or location but rather inefficiencies on the part of the federal
government .¶ As with offshore drilling, long processes resulting from government
inefficiencies create an unnecessary burden on industry. In some cases, waiting for a federal
permit can take 10 times longer than it does at the state level. In 2013, the average wait for the
federal government to approve a request was 194 days,[9] compared to 27 days in North Dakota, 11 days in Texas, and 45
in Pennsylvania.[10]¶
Federal ownership disincentivizes production on non-federal
lands located adjacent to or interspersed with federal lands. Since production on federal lands is much more difficult,
drilling may make economic sense only if a company has access to both the federal land and the non-federal land.¶ Open
Access and Grant States Control¶ Excessive regulations and bureaucratic inefficiencies have
stymied oil production and prevented the full effects of the energy boom. Opening up the rest of the
Outer Continental Shelf to exploration and oil production would allow this to occur .¶ As the
experience with federal lands that are technically open to exploration and drilling has indicated, having access is
only one of the changes that must be made. Another step the federal government needs to
take to allow for growth is to reduce time-consuming and costly regulations by
streamlining the process. The efficiency that has been demonstrated at the state level
shows that it is possible to quickly process a high volume of requests.¶ In fact, one of the primary
reasons shale oil and shale gas production has been so successful both economically and
environmentally is state management. State regulators and private land owners have
decentralized knowledge and the proper incentives to promote economic growth while
protecting their environment. They are the ones who have the most to gain when the
management of natural resources and economic activity is handled properly, and they
also have the most to lose if those are mismanaged.¶ The federal government owns nearly one-third of
U.S. territory. Congress should consider privatizing some of that land, but in the meantime,
transferring the management of federal lands to state regulators would
encourage energy resource development on the federal estate while
maintaining strong environmental protections. The Federal Land Freedom Act of 2013 (S.
1233 and H.R. 2511), introduced by Senator James Inhofe (R–OK) and Representative Diane Black (R–TN), would do just
that by allocating more authority to the states to control their energy future.[11]¶ Increasing Energy Opportunities¶ Due to
a lack of access and excessive federal regulation, the full effects and potential of America’s energy boom have yet to be felt.
Streamlining and simplifying the approval process by devolving decisions
to the states, along with opening up more regions for development, would
allow the U.S. to harness its full energy potential.
States solve the aff best – better at managing the economy and the
environment – federal government fails
Spakovsky and Loris 12 [Hans A. and Nicolas D., Hans is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal
and Judicial Studies, Nicolas is the Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy
Studies, “Offshore Drilling: Increase Access, Reduce the Risk, and Stop Hurting American Companies”, The Heritage
Foundation, 08/13/12, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/offshore-drilling-increase-access-reduce-therisk-and-stop-hurting-american-companies, 07/14/14]
Congress should require the Department of the Interior to honor the permit deadlines (as required by law) unless the
Interior finds specific and significant faults with the application. If Interior concludes that the permit application is not
complete, it should outline specific steps the applicant could take to complete it. If Interior does not find fault with the
application before the deadline expires, the permit application should be considered accepted upon expiration of the
deadline so that companies can proceed with exploration and drilling.¶ Congress should reform liability caps for oil spills.
Given the fact that uncapped tort liability yields frivolous lawsuits, removing the cap entirely without implementing a new
system would subject covered industries to artificially high costs. Congress should reform liability caps in a way that
accurately assigns risk and liability to those companies engaged in covered activities.[10]¶ Congress should
ultimately transition the permitting process to state regulators, who are best able to
balance economic growth and environmental protection. The permitting process needs to
be taken out of the hands of Washington bureaucrats who report to a President hostile to
oil and gas production—a Chief Executive who can arbitrarily stop such energy
development across the nation by executive fiat.
OCS Development
Devolution of OCS authority solves best – local expertise and less
bureaucracy
Dunlop 08 (Becky Norton, Heritage’s vp for external relations, served under Ronald “The Gipper” Reagan in the
Department of Justice, and Department of the Interior and under George “The Dubya” Bush, “Offshore Drilling: An
Alternative to Funding Terrorism,” Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/about/speeches/offshore-drilling-analternative-to-funding-terrorism)
Conservatives believe that policy and politics work best at the local level. We believe that
individuals know what is best for them and they should be allowed to pursue their interest with limited constraints from
the government. In the realm of environmental policy, conservatives believe that individuals, local
communities and states are best equipped to handle the environmental
issues that affect them. Conservatives believe that big government and environmental stewardship are not
one-in-the same. People in the coastal regions of our country, where offshore drilling is
now a hot topic should make the decision whether to progress forward based on sound scientific
argument with the most up to date data on potential oil reserves and the technology to remove it. It should not
be the decision of those in other states miles away, and especially not those
in Washington, D.C. What this issue comes down to is Constitutional federalism. It needs to be accepted that
the states can responsibly control and maintain their own waters instead of
being micromanaged from above. Increasing energy supply is a necessary step that the United States
must take to be ensured of continued and new economic growth. It is ridiculous to think that with America’s current
mobile workforce infrastructure we can simply turn off all the gas pumps overnight and wake up the next morning on a
renewable energy source. We are working on renewable energy. And certainly even more needs to be done. But in the
interim, that transition can be made easier with the production of our own fuels to ease the burden on the average
American at the pump. In addition, producing more of our own energy means that we will not have to depend on imports
from country’s that do not have our interests in mind. It is a very serious matter the possibility that taxpayers and
consumers are putting dollars into the hands of those who support terrorism and seek to undermine the United States.
These include of course, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Becoming a nation in which America can be much more self reliant
for its energy needs prevents the potential funding of those who wish to destroy us. We can and should have trading
relationships for energy with other nations but they should be ones we deem to be friends and allies in the quest for
greater human liberty. When I worked with Governor George Allen in Virginia we realized early with the EPA that a onesize-fits-all blanket policy does not work. How could it? When you look over the landscape of our
nation, it should be apparent that what works for the beaches of Florida is most
likely not going to be appropriate for the Black Hills of South Dakota. The states
should decide what policies best work for their citizens and their environment. Under the policy I advocate,
states would have option of choosing how to deal with their Outer
Continental Shelf lands, and the benefits of permitting drilling would go to
the states . In a state like Florida, where there are objections to energy development, there would be the option of
not drilling but I would argue that by delegating these decisions to the local level, Florida’s citizens would have more of a
voice in how the drilling was conducted and how the revenues would be spent. By letting the state decide
how to go about developing OCS, citizens can hold their elected legislators
accountable. If Floridians disapprove of how a legislator stands on OCS development, they can vote him out in the
next election. Or conversely, if the drilling produces more revenue it can be used for something like the Everglades
Restoration of improving the stewardship of other state resources, or even reducing the tax burden on Floridians. Santa
Barbara County in California recently reversed their stand on offshore drilling and passed resolution supporting more
drilling. Even with the federal moratoria lifted on Oct 1st, current Washington policy dictates that a federal regulator
knows better. More importantly is the matter of revenue. Currently, the federal government
receives the revenue derived from OCS energy production. Bills like H.R.6899 would
continue this trend. In addition, it would strip the oil companies of $18 billion in tax
breaks leaving both the states and oil companies with little incentive to
allow or explore drilling, respectively. I purpose that the federal government would
no longer receive a cut of the money until the resources were developed and
then its “cut” would come in the form of tax revenue generated by increased
economic activity. The simple fact would be that if OCS has been removed from federal
jurisdiction, each state would receive 80 percent of the revenues generated
from production off its shore. It would share the remaining 20 percent with
other states. Obviously, a revenue-sharing structure of this sort would find critics in the federal government, which
would lose roughly $5 billion each year. Many big government environmentalists would object because the federal
government uses some of these funds for environmental purposes, like the Land and Water Conservation Fund and the
National Historic Preservation Fund. Without OCS revenues, they would argue, these programs would lose important
income. My response to these critics would be that I would rather have these revenues in the hands of the states and not
the federal government. When the states control the money, they would be free to use it for the purposes they see fit. In
many cases, this money could be used to fund environmental initiatives that are made to fit the specific needs of the states
as determined by their governors and state legislatures. And, if citizens are not pleased with the way these revenues are
being spent, they can simply elect new officials. It’s a much better system than when the policy is
centered in
Washington, D.C. with bureaucrats who neither knew nor frankly
care what states, localities and citizens want or need. Current OCS policy is
dictated by Washington and is a complex maze of bureaucratic regulations even without
the moratorium. In the case of OCS, a simple policy is the best policy. The federal
government should cede its authority to the states. Let’s allow the states to
decide what to do with their lands. Let’s stop the micromanagement, and
understand that those at the state level will without a shadow of a doubt responsibly
take care of their environment, their home. Let states use new tax revenues from
drilling to reduce taxes on entrepreneurs, so they can fund and develop all
matter of energy sources and infrastructure and increase the invention of
new and better technologies. Let’s take the opportunity to lower current fuel
costs to bridge the gap. Let’s finally increase development of our resources – grow our economy and trade
with allies of human liberty rather than funding those that support terrorism and deny freedom to their own people.
OTEC
The states can operate and adopt OTEC technology – Hawaii proves
Liu 07 [Theodore E., Director of the Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, “Ocean
Thermal Energy,” 3/20/07, http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/energy/renewable/otec, 07/14/14]
Almost all of the major U.S. OTEC experiments have taken place in Hawaii. The Natural
Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority (NELHA) has been recognized as the world's foremost
laboratory and test facility for OTEC and OTEC-related research. The facility has been
funded by the State of Hawaii with significant USDOE and private sector participation. On June 2, 2006,
plans for a 1-MW OTEC facility at NELHA were announced. Article: Star-Bulletin, June 3, 2006. Updates and
additional information may be available from the NELHA website and the OCEES website. There is no OTEC facility
currently producing electricity at Keahole Point. However, cold seawater is being used directly to air condition (cool)
the administration and laboratory buildings. The seawater provides about 50 tons of air conditioning, offsetting the
equivalent of 200 kW of peak electrical demand. Using the cold seawater for air conditioning saves NELHA nearly
$4000 per month in electricity cost - and the system requires much less maintenance than traditional compressor
system
State governments solve – they have the tech and can provide
companies access to federal waters
Webber 08 [Michael E., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Associate Director of the Center for
International Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Texas at Austin, B.A. in Liberal Arts, B.S. in Aerospace
Engineering, M.S. in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University,
05/04/08, “OTEC and wave energy technologies in Hawaii,” http://webberenergyblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/otec-andwave-energy-technologies-in.html, 07/14/14]
Considering the extremely high wave heights around the Hawaiian Islands, wave energy technologies are very
suitable. Since the state of Hawaii is an island, it has large coastline perimeter, allowing
for vast wave energy technology potential. The following is are the concluding remarks from my paper:
From environmental and economically standpoints, the feasibility of OTEC systems and wave energy technologies is
still unclear. As with any new technology that must be implemented on a large scale, this is to be expected. Producing
tens or hundreds of megawatts of power in the oceans is a daunting task that requires years of experimentation and
cost-benefit analysis. Yet, from a technical standpoint, OTEC systems and the discussed wave
energy technologies present themselves as technically feasible alternatives for
applications in the state of Hawaii. Hawaii’s large wave heights and underwater
temperature differences allow the state of Hawaii to utilize OTEC and wave energies
at their advantage, if state government so chooses. As large and overwhelming as the
ocean is, so too is the economic and engineering task of designing large offshore and
onshore ocean energy power plants. In order for Hawaii to meet its goals of 20%
renewable fuels by 2020 and 70% of its energy mix from renewable by 2030, the state
government should first provide for access to federal waters where companies like
Finavera Renewables and CETO can test their products year round. This is the first
and most crucial step towards launching any large scale ocean energy system within
the Hawaiian Islands.
State incentives to producers solve barriers to OTEC development in
the status quo
Webber 08 [Michael E., Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Associate Director of the Center for
International Energy and Environmental Policy at the University of Texas at Austin, B.A. in Liberal Arts, B.S. in Aerospace
Engineering, M.S. in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University,
05/04/08, “OTEC and wave energy technologies in Hawaii,” http://webberenergyblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/otec-andwave-energy-technologies-in.html, 07/14/14]
Finally, the state of Hawaii should cut down, not punish its producers, on its electricity
generation from petroleum in order to create market incentives for other alternative
technologies. The truth of the matter is that ocean energy technologies are at least five to ten
years away from being cost effective, therefore, it is imperative to allow these
technologies to mature and then blossom when the time is apt. In the meantime, more cost-
effective technologies like solar and geothermal should be given incentives to grow. Heavy
incentives and tax
rebates should be given for installed solar capacity on homes and buildings so that Hawaii can reduce its
dependency on fossil fuels. By allowing different parts of the alternative energy industry to
grow with the newly revived OTEC and wave industries, the state of Hawaii can
economically make its way towards 70% renewable energy by 2030 and 100%
renewable in the future.
States solve—Hawaii proves
Friedman 14 [Becca, writer for the Harvard Political Review, “Examining the future of Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion: An Alternative Source Heats Up,” 03/26/14, http://www.oceanenergycouncil.com/examining-future-oceanthermal-energy-conversion/, 07/14/14]
OTEC is not completely off the government’s radar, however. This past year, for the
first time in a decade, Congress debated reviving the oceanic energy program in the
energy bill, although the proposal was ultimately defeated. OTEC even enjoys some
support on a state level. Hawaii ’s National Energy Laboratory, for example, conducts
OTEC research around the islands. For now, though, American interests in OTEC promise to remain
largely academic. The Naval Research Academy and Oregon State University are conducting research programs off the
coasts of Oahu and Oregon, respectively.
Hawaii solves the aff – limited alternative energy sources
Greenwire 04 [Greenwire, “Oceans: Pacific Islands Tap Seas for Water, Power,” 04/04/04, “Oceans: Pacific
Islands Tap Seas for Water, Power,” Lexis Nexis, 07/14/14]
Honolulu is among a number of Pacific island municipalities considering technology
that exploits the temperature difference between the ocean's warm surface water and
the cold water found 2,000 feet below to generate both electricity and drinking water.
Faced with potential water shortages in as little as 20 years, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply is considering among
its options for long-term water supply a deep-water ocean facility that would use ocean thermal energy conversion
(OTEC) for desalination and power generation. The water board is spending $2.5 million on a
feasibility study for an OTEC plant off Kalaeloa. The study is expected to be completed by April
2004, said Barry Usagawa, the board's water resources principal executive. Usagawa said Honolulu has
taken special interest in the technology because the island of Oahu has limited natural
water supply combined with a growing demand for energy. Both problems could be solved
through the island's abundant ocean resources. "We import so much oil and our economy is so tied in with outside
factors that we need to develop sustainable energy, water, these kinds of resources," Usagawa said.
Rare Earth Metals
Alaska already funds rare earth metal research – the counterplan just
increases exploration
Handwerger 13 (Jeb, Bachelor Degree in mathematics and a Masters in Education, “State Of Alaska Takes
Active Role In Developing Heavy Rare Earths In The U.S.,”http://www.selfdirectedinvestor.com/article/201203/state-ofalaska-takes-active-role-in-developing-heavy-rare-earths-in-the-u-s-stateofalaskata.htm/)
The CEO of Ucore (UCU.V or UURAF), Jim Mckenzie, recently released significant news of the progress on Bokan
Mountain as Ucore moves ahead in its development as the sole United States heavy rare earth provider. Alaskan
Governor Parnell has placed Ucore on the proposed budget for 2013. He
proposes to allocate $8.1 million into expediting Ucore's development as a
viable corporate entity. This is meat and potatoes stuff. The state government of Alaska
is sponsoring explicit support for Ucore's Bokan Mountain which contains
the strategically important heavy rare earth metals of dysprosium and
terbium. These metals have been highlighted by the U.S. Department of Energy as being at risk of a supply shortfall
in the near term. Jim McKenzie, President and CEO of Ucore states, “The State of Alaska continues to
take an active role in the development of its enormous rare earth and
critical minerals potential…The allocation of substantial funding specifically
targeting rare earth and strategic resource development at Bokan Mountain and
across the state is a tremendous advantage for a very young industry with
immense upside potential for employing Alaskans and adding to the state’s
export revenue. We applaud Governor Parnell’s initiatives and look forward
to working with the state to advance its critical metals revenue base.”
Resource Management
States can manage ocean resources – Hawaii proves
State of Hawaii Office of Planning 14 (“Ocean Resource Management Plan,”
http://planning.hawaii.gov/czm/ocean-resources-management-plan-ormp/)
The Hawaiʻ i Ocean Resources Management Plan (ORMP) is a statewide plan
that sets forth the State’s ocean and coastal resource management priorities.
The ORMP supports effective management, beneficial use, protection, and
development of the state’s coastal zone, which includes all lands of the state and the area
extending seaward from the shoreline to the limit of the State’s police power and management authority, including the
U.S. territorial sea. The ORMP is a requirement under Hawaii Revised Statutes §205A-3 and is a major
component of the State’s Coastal Zone Management (CZM) Program. A partnership
of State and county agencies has been collaborating since 1985 to improve the
management of Hawaii’s ocean and coastal resources. Today, through the
Hawaii Ocean Council, Directors of State and County agencies, with
unanimous support of federal and community partners, coordinate and
implement the State’s shared ocean and coastal resource management
priorities. The ORMP was updated in July of 2013, and continues a place-based approach to management of ocean
resources in the islands, based on recognition of the ecological connections between the land and sea, the link between
human activities and its impacts on the environment, and the need for improved collaboration and stewardship in natural
resources governance. The ORMP works by identifying eleven Management
Priorities for the next five-year planning period, by identifying responsible
agencies and resources, and by providing a method for performance
measures and reporting.
States solve resource management – Massachusetts, California,
Hawaii, New York, Florida prove
State of California 07 (“Joint Ocean Commission Initiative: U.S. Ocean Policy Report Card,” State of
California Ocean Protection Council,
http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/docs/Documents_Page/Reports/2007_reportcard.pdf)
Why is regional and state ocean governance reform important? Regional
governance mechanisms are needed to achieve a more coordinated, ecosystembased management approach for improving ocean and coastal health. Such mechanisms enable
governments at all levels to work together to identify regional goals and
priorities, improve responses to regional needs, and develop and
disseminate regionally significant research and information. While the
problems facing marine ecosystems must be addressed at the local level,
additional tools and support that the federal government can provide are also needed to truly resolve the most pressing
issues. Multi-state initiatives and efforts at the state level can strengthen the
voice of local stakeholders in communicating those needs to the federal
government. What was done in 2007 to address regional and state ocean governance reform? Over the last few
years, ocean governance efforts have emerged in a number of regions and
states. The Joint Initiative applauds these efforts and urges further state commitment and federal support for sustain
their progress. State ocean legislation: • Massachusetts - The State Senate and House have
both passed various versions of the Massachusetts Ocean Act, a landmark bill
that would create an integrated system for managing the state's coastal
waters. The Joint Initiative encourages the state's legislative bodies to maintain the bill's core strengths for more
comprehensive planning and authorize the Ocean Act in 2008. Similar leadership in the Northeast Regional Ocean
Council is encouraged. • New Jersey - The New Jersey Coastal and Ocean Protection Council
was established by state legislation and signed by the Governor in early
2008 to promote ecosystem-based management of the state's ocean and
coastal resources. The Joint Initiative urges the expeditious appointment of Council members and state
funding for Council activities. • New York - The
New York Ocean and Great Lakes Ecosystem
Conservation Council, which was established by law in 2006, is using ecosystem-based
management as the new approach for managing the state's ocean and
coastal resources. The Council moved forward on ecosystem-based management demonstration projects, an
ocean and coastal atlas, and agency guidelines for implementing an ecosystem-based approach. The Joint Initiative
encourages the state legislature and Governor to support and embrace the Council's groundbreaking work. State ocean
governance efforts: • California - The California Fish and Game Commission approved a
network of 29 marine protected areas off the state's central coast in 2007. The network covers 204
square miles of ocean, roughly 18 percent of state waters, with a portion set aside as no-take zones. The second phase of
the process to develop the nation's first statewide network of marine protected areas also began in the north central coast
region of the state. • Florida - The Governor's Action Team on Energy and Climate
Change is showing strong leadership by moving to address the impacts of
climate change on the state, including adaptation strategies to protect
coastal resources and communities. • Washington - The 2007 Washington State
legislature approved substantial funding for Puget Sound restoration and
recovery, including formation of a new agency, the Puget Sound Partnership. The Partnership works with
communities, agencies, and organizations to create an Action Agenda to identify priorities and serve as a roadmap for
restoration and protection efforts. The Joint Initiative applauds Washington's governor and legislature for embracing the
Puget Sound Partnership. • Other state initiatives that address important ocean issues include the
Alaska Ocean Policy Cabinet; Hawaii Ocean and Coastal Council; Louisiana
Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority; and Oregon Ocean Policy
Advisory Council. Regional ocean governance initiatives: • Gulf of Mexico - During
2007, the Gulf of Mexico Alliance continued making significant strides on implementing the commitments of the 2006
Governors' Action Plan. The five Gulf state governors also reaffirmed their commitment to the Gulf of Mexico Alliance and
its work to protect the waters and coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. The Joint Initiative commends the Gulf states'
leadership and achievements in regional ocean governance reform, as well as the active engagement by federal agencies to
support progress in the region. • West Coast - The West Coast Governors' Agreement on Ocean Health released its Draft
Action Plan in 2007 for public comment; the final version is scheduled for release in 2008. The Action Plan will set forth
priority actions for Washington, Oregon, and California in addressing shared challenges to ocean health and advancing an
ecosystem-based approach to ocean management. Momentum for ecosystem-based management continued to grow in the
region as six local ecosystem-based pilot projects that had progressed independently for years started to explore ways to
coordinate and share lessons learned on implementing ecosystem-based approaches. • Other multi-state
initiatives that are actively addressing regional ocean issues include:
Chesapeake Bay Program; Great Lakes Regional Collaboration; Gulf of
Maine Council on the Marine Environment; Long Island Sound Study; and
Northeast Regional Ocean Council.
AT: No Tech
California has tech and can manage its ocean resources
State of California 10 (“ROV-based Deep Water Monitoring of the Northern Channel Islands Marine
Protected Areas,” Ocean Protection Council of State of Calinfornia, http://www.opc.ca.gov/2010/07/rov-based-deepwater-monitoring-of-the-northern-channel-islands-marine-protected-areas/)
In 1998, California passed the Marine Life Management Act (MLMA), which calls
for an ecosystem approach to achieving sustainable fisheries and identifies
the acquisition of essential fishery information (EFI) as a critical component
in management decisions. EFI includes, among other things, fish population
status and trends, impacts of fishing, ecological relationships, habitat
information, and other environmental information. In 1999, the State went
further, passing the Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA), which mandated a
redesign of the state’s system of MPAs “to increase its coherence and its
effectiveness at protecting the state’s marine life, habitat, and ecosystems.”
The Channel Islands MPAs became the first of the new MPA networks to be implemented. Established in 2003, the
network includes eleven State Marine Reserves (SMRs) where no take of living, geological or cultural resources is allowed
and two State Marine Conservation Areas (SMCAs) where limited commercial and/or recreational take is allowed.
CIMPA_Figure_new Working together, the California Department of Fish and Game and
Marine Applied Research and Exploration (MARE) developed an ROV program
designed to collect data in the deepwater (20 to 100 meter) habitats in the newly established
Channel Islands MPAs—habitats beyond the reach of most SCUBA divers. The overarching goal of the
program was to provide fishery-independent data required by the MLMA
and MLPA—data to provide information on relative abundance, species
interactions and associations, habitat preference, fishing effects on habitat,
distribution, size composition of stocks, and human interactions with the
marine environment. When tracked over time, this kind of information may provide managers with an
indication of whether stocks are increasing or decreasing, and whether current management measures are achieving their
intended conservation objectives. These data are also are needed to improve
understanding of marine ecosystems and to enable adaptive management.
CIMPA2009_HC_small Key Findings and Successes A full report on the ROV program results to date is contained in
“ROV-based Deep Water Monitoring of the Northern Channel Islands Marine Protected Areas Annual Report – 2009,”
Marine Region Administrative Report No. 10-02, which will be posted on the California Department of Fish and Game
web page: http://www.dfg.ca.gov. The ROV data show that fish densities inside the MPAs have been consistently higher
than densities in sites with similar habitats outside the MPAs. These differences were also detected by SCUBA based
surveys in the shallow water areas adjacent to ROV study sites. While the causes for these differences are unknown, the
fact that two independent methods showed similar results validates the use of ROV-based surveys for fishery-independent
data collection. The data have shown only slight changes in density within the MPAs since 2005. Given that most species
of rockfish need very specific ocean conditions for successful reproduction, population changes are not expected to occur
at a steady pace, but rather as large recruitment events that occur every five to ten years. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that we have not yet seen large changes in MPA fish populations. In 2009, however, the team observed huge clouds of
young of the year rockfish. Scientists working with MARE do not yet know if this is a huge recruitment class, or simply
that the research cruise was conducted a month earlier than normal. The time series data collected
over the last five years has provided a cost effective baseline assessment of
finfish and invertebrate abundance inside the MPAs and in unprotected
comparison areas. Further, no animals were harmed by this video sampling. Detailed analysis of
data collected during this baseline sampling period is ongoing. The wealth of
information contained within the archival video record collected will provide marine scientists the opportunity to expand
our understanding of these highly productive marine ecosystems.
***Alaska Drilling CP***
1NC
Alaska solves the aff – amending the Alaska Coastal Management
Program increases Alaskan influence over drilling – solves the
environment
Kurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,”
University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]
The availability of consistency review provides Alaska with a unique opportunity to
exercise real influence over the development of the natural resources off its
shoreline. Although the state can never fully control these resources, it can ensure that oil and gas
production on the OCS does not run afoul of the standards which [*402] it has set for other
offshore activities by revising the ACMP. State control in this area is especially important to Alaska because
of the scope of potential problems and opportunities that could arise as a result of OCS petroleum development. Only
the states can fully understand the implications of offshore activities to local
environments and economies. Alaska, with its unique environment and natural wealth, is in a position
to steer OCS development toward a controlled growth that can help meet the energy
needs of the nation as a whole without undue risk to one of the nation's treasures--the Alaskan
landscape.¶ Alaska can accomplish this by taking a few necessary steps. First and foremost, it
must revise the ACMP to ensure that it applies to all stages of OCS development,
particularly the lease sale stage. An ACMP that does not apply at the critical early stages
is ineffective in light of considerations such as the inertia behind taking a leased area through to production. If any
given standard within the ACMP does not apply to the lease sale stage (such as transportation),
it must be revised so that it does. Furthermore, the phasing system n146 should be revised in
order to make it clear that it is not intended to allow phases of OCS activities to proceed
without examining the consequences of the activity as a whole. Phasing should grant
flexibility to an agency by allowing it to focus on a smaller time frame, not hamstring it by forcing it to
look only at presently available facts. This could easily be accomplished by amending the ACMP
regulatory definitions to include MMS projections and other possible outcomes of the activity among the
"reasonably foreseeable, significant effects" under Alaska Statutes section 46.40.094(b)(2)(C). A detailed ACMP
that applies to the early phases of offshore development can be used either to challenge a
federal consistency determination directly or as a negotiating tool, as was the case with the review
of Sale 124. The ACMP must become the primary means for Alaska to exert
power over OCS development.¶ Alaska should also continue to use some of the less reliable means of
influencing the process, such as the gubernatorial comment power under the OCSLA and its power to issue consistency
determinations. As previously discussed, these methods should not be relied upon to produce desired results, as the
Secretary of the Interior's determinations are subject to a very high [*403] level of deference. However, these methods
have been successful in the past as a means of incorporating limited concerns into a given lease, and they should continue
to be used as a kind of testing ground for future ACMP regulations.¶ There is enormous wealth off Alaska's coast. This
wealth includes not only petroleum, but also resources such as fish, tourism and natural beauty. The development of any
offshore resource also has substantial effects on the land. Regardless of whether these effects are negative (such as oil
spills or interference with subsistence lifestyles) or positive (such as more jobs and increased wealth), Alaska should have
a say in whether these effects will be allowed. It does. Consistency review under the CZMA gives the
state the means to play a role in regulating federal activities off its shore. Alaska must grasp
this opportunity to the greatest degree possible. Using the ACMP through CZMA consistency
review is Alaska's key to shaping its own future.
2NC Solvency
The CP solves the aff – increasing state influence at the OCS lease sale
stage is key
Kurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,”
University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]
IV. ALASKA'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OCS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS¶ A. Significance of the Lease Sale Stage¶
If Alaska wishes to exert any real influence over the OCS development process ,
it should do so as early as possible, preferably at the lease sale stage . However, courts have
attempted to weaken the role of the states at this early stage, relying on five main propositions to achieve this goal:¶ (1) No
physical impacts of importance can follow the sale without first being approved by the Secretary of the Interior;¶ (2) The
successful lessees do not acquire any right to proceed to exploration and development but only a priority for submitting
plans of exploration and development and production plans;¶ (3) At the exploration, development, and production stages,
all environmental statutes apply, including [the National Environmental Policy Act];¶ (4) At the exploration, development,
and production stages, the Secretary retains the authority to suspend or cancel leases if the environmental impacts of
development are too great; and¶ (5) At exploration and development stages, the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone
Management Act allow states a substantial voice in what activities will occur. n132¶ However, the logic of the
various courts that have attempted to minimize the importance of the lease sale stage is
fundamentally flawed. The lease sale stage is absolutely critical to OCS
development. In Trustees II, the Alaska Supreme Court noted the importance of the lease sale:¶
Environmentally protective purposes require that at the time [the Department of Natural
Resources] reviews any . . . permit application it consider the probable cumulative impact
of all anticipated activities which will be a part of [the project in question], whether or not the
activities are part of the permit under review. If [the Department of Natural Resources]
determines that the cumulative impact is problematic, the problems must be resolved
before the initial permit is approved. n133¶ [*398] Moreover, the states are no longer powerless
to have an early effect on the process. When the 1990 Amendments to the CZMA were
passed, the states' power at the lease sale stage increased substantially because it became clear
that the lease sales are subject to state consistency review.¶ The paramount importance of the lease
sale stage emanates from the fact that it is the only opportunity to review the entire lease sale
area as a whole. Review at the exploration or development stages is limited to those individual lease sites within the
lease area which are part of the current exploration or development plan. Deferring consideration of
environmental issues until only individual lease sites are reviewed "may tend to mask
appreciation of any cumulative environmental threat that would otherwise be apparent if
[the Department of Natural Resources] began with a detailed and comprehensive identification
of those hazards." n134 Thus, individualized site review cannot effectively protect
the Alaskan coastal region as a whole.¶ Furthermore, the Secretary of Interior's power
to suspend or cancel a lease does not provide any real safeguards to the state's interests.
Once an OCS area has been leased, a certain amount of inertia tends to drive the area toward
development. First, the Department of the Interior has a financial interest in not
cancelling a lease--the OCSLA provides that in the event of a cancellation, a lessee is entitled to compensation equal
to the lesser of anticipated profits or the difference between the lessee's revenues to date and his expenditures. n135 More
importantly the Department of the Interior has never cancelled any lease for any reason. As
one commentator points out, "for
Interior the benefits associated with protecting the
environment have never been valuable enough to justify incurring the high cost of
cancelling a lease agreement." n136¶ Overall, the courts' reliance on the later stages of review is unwarranted.
In addition to the fact that issues such as cumulative effects cannot be adequately addressed beyond the lease sale stage,
the regulations applicable to the post-lease sale phases of OCS development only address
the question of what form exploration and production should take, as opposed to
whether they should occur at all. n137 Also, state consistency review at later stages is [*399]
severely limited by the Department of the Interior's position that environmental impact statements are not required
for exploration plans. n138 This
has the effect of denying the state the chance to examine all
possible environmental effects. Finally, state denials of exploration or development plans
will not be upheld unless the state provides to the lessee a "reasonable alternative." n139
This prevents a state from completely blocking undesirable exploration or development.
Therefore, if a state wishes to exercise any real control over the OCS
development process, it must do so at the lease sale stage.
2NC Fed Fails
Federal government fails – state control key to the environment,
protection of Native cultures, and the fishing industry
Kurtz 94 [David, “Managing Alaska's Coastal Development: State Review of Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales,”
University of Alaska Law Review, December 1994, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]
Preventing oil spills, however, is not the only reason Alaska
has an interest in regulating
OCS development. Resource production off the Alaska coast will put significant pressure
on the state's infrastructure as remote areas such as the North Slope Borough develop. Additionally, drilling
and oil transportation could pose other environmental problems. For example, construction
of undersea pipelines may disturb the migratory patterns of endangered bowhead
whales, while increased traffic near land-based facilities could alter the migration of
other animals such as caribou. Either of these possibilities would further disturb the
subsistence lifestyles of many Native Alaskan communities. Finally, oil drilling on the OCS
would interfere with the productivity of other offshore resources. For example, the fishing
industry could be affected by hazards resulting from sustained drilling activity, such as
gear loss n12 and seabed degradation.¶ The Alaska state government is better able
to address these state-related issues than the federal government. The state
legislature is likely to be better informed about the multitude of local issues that will
inevitably arise, and is better equipped to protect the rights of Alaskans against intrusions by
the federal government. Congress recognized as much with its inclusion of the state consistency doctrine in the Coastal
Zone Management Act. n13
***EBSCoR CP***
1NC
DOE EPSCoR program empirically funds fusion research at national
labs, including STEM students – states can contribute funds
April 05 [Gary C., PhD and Associate Director Alabama DOE EPSCoR, “Alabama DOE EPSCoR,”
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/05/EPSCoR/pdf/abstracts/powell-abstract.pdf, 07/14/14]
The Alabama DOE EPSCoR Program is made up of three integrated components including Program Coordination,
Human Resources Development, and Energy Research Clusters.
All programmatic elements are
coordinated through a statewide steering committee. The first Implementation Award for
the Alabama DOE EPSCoR Program (1994-2000) had three energy research
clusters: Fusion Energy , Novel Organic Semiconducting Materials, and Petroleum Reservoir
Characterization. Alabama’s second Implementation Award (2001- 2007) builds on the
success of these clusters and expands the interest and focus of energy
related research through Fuel Cell technology and manufacturing. Collectively, the
success of the first three energy research clusters can be measured against the record that they established during the sixyear tenure of their work. For an investment of $3.4 MM from DOE and $4.4MM from
institutional/ state
matching , these programs supported the research of: a) 21 research
professors, b) 32 post-doctoral associates, c) 40 doctoral-level graduate students,
and d) 41 undergraduate research students. Their research also brought in an
additional $18MM in non-DOE EPSCoR funding. Add to these numbers the $1.5MM from
DOE, state and institutional sources for Human Resources Development activities elevating energy
awareness among K – post doctoral participants, an additional $1.2MM from DOE Traineeship Awards and success in the
DOE State Laboratory Partnership Awards by six investigators at a total of nearly $2.1MM and the true impact
of the support base for energy-related programs in Alabama is quite evident. The
Fuel Cell energy research cluster is located at the University of Alabama and Alabama A&M University (HBCU). The
program is in its fourth year of the second Implementation Award. DOE awarded the Fuel Cell group a total of $1.2MM for
four years with matching support from institutional/state matching. To date, the program has
supported: a) 13 research faculty, b) 10 undergraduates, c) 15 graduates, and
d) three post-doctoral associates. Their research has thus far produced an
additional $5MM in non-DOE EPSCoR funding. The Human Resources Development Travel
and Enhancement Grant Programs are intended to help cover the costs incurred by young Alabama researchers seeking an
opportunity to visit a Federal Laboratory for the purpose of on-site research or developing collaborative research between
institutions. Since the programs were initiated, 12 research faculty from four EPSCoR
institutions, including one HBCU, one visiting scholar, one undergraduate
student, 10 graduate students, and one post-doctoral associate have
participated in research efforts at Argonne, Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratories .
2NC Solvency – STEM
EPSCoR allows state collaboration with national labs on energy
research – solves STEM
DOE 11 [Department of Energy, “Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research,” EPSCoR, 03/16/11,
http://science.energy.gov/bes/epscor/about/, 07/14/14]
Overview: DOE EPSCoR is located in the Office of Science and assists
the Office by supporting
basic and applied research and development across a wide range of
interdisciplinary program areas including but not limited to: Advanced
Scientific Computing Research, Basic Energy Sciences, Biological and
Environmental Research, Fusion Energy Sciences, High Energy Physics and
Nuclear Physics. It also supports research that is relevant to other DOE
Program Offices, including but not limited to: the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management; the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; the
Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy; the Office of
Environmental Management; the Office of Fossil Energy; the Office of
Legacy Management; and, the Office of Nuclear Energy. The participation of these other
programs is critical to the success of EPSCoR applications and developing understanding of these programs should be
long-term objective of all EPSCoR applicants.¶ Goals
of DOE EPSCoR: a) improve the
capability of designated states and territories to conduct sustainable and
nationally competitive energy-related research ; b ) jumpstart infrastructure
development in designated states and territories through increased human
and technical resources, training scientists and engineers in energy-related
areas; and c) build beneficial relationships between scientists and engineers
in the designated states and territories with the 10 world-class laboratories
managed by the Office of Science, leverage DOE national user facilities, and
take advantage of opportunities for intellectual collaboration across the
DOE system. Through broadened participation DOE EPSCoR seeks to provide
the most comprehensive network of energy-related research across the nation. DOE
EPSCoR requests an annual budget of approximately $8 million per year and posts Funding Opportunity Announcements
(FOAs) every one to two years.¶ Program Priorities: DOE EPSCoR is a science-driven, merit-
based program that supports basic and applied research activities spanning
the broad range of science and technology programs within DOE. In addition, the
program places high priority on increasing the number of scientists and
engineers in energy-related areas. The program places particular emphasis and importance of
collaboration with young faculty, postdoctoral associates, graduate and undergraduate students with scientists from the
DOE national laboratories where unique scientific and technical capabilities are present. The program supports the most
meritorious proposals based on merit and peer review. To maximize the effectiveness of the program, the
development of the science and engineering resources component is closely
coupled with the research part of the program.
EPSCoR solves R&D and STEM
Lawson 12 [Christopher, Physics Professor at the University of Alabama and Executive Director of Alabama
EPSCoR, CQ Testimony, 03/22/12, LexisNexis, 07/14/14]
EPSCoR provides a mechanism to address those geographical imbalances.
The program has been a huge success , investments have generated growth
in state economies, attracted students into STEM fields, and created a
broader base of high tech research expertise. NSF EPSCoR provides co planning meritorious
proposed research and EPSCoR states and by infrastructure improvement awards to support academic research
infrastructure and cyber infrastructure improvements in areas critical to the states' high tech economic development. NSF
EPSCoR infrastructure funding matched by the states to leverage the federal
investments. In my home state of Alabama, NSF EPSCoR funding is generated
revolutionary advancements in science and engineering that have led to
new business growth and high-paying jobs. NSF EPSCoR funding has been
vital for advancing students to STEM ideas and research and introduce more than 2,000 students
across Alabama to these science and technology and engineering concepts in one year alone. In a time when the President
and Congress are working to engage students in STEM fields, it only makes sense to build on this
success and continue to fund the NSF EPSCoR program at the Administration's budget
request of $158 million. This will ensure that states such as Alabama continue to develop a
robust research infrastructure so that they can compete for Federal
research grants and continue to prepare a skilled, high tech workforce
capable of delivering innovation in the future. Congress designed NASA EPSCoR to increase the
research capacity of states with limited NASA R&D funding in areas related to NASA's mission. NASA EPSCoR funds both
grants for Research Infrastructure Development and to seed research in critical research areas. Together, they
attract students into STEM fields, allow more states to participate in NASA
research enterprise, and provide opportunities for high tech economic
growth in local communities nationwide. Like the NSF EPSCoR program, states help
increase the Federal benefit by matching funds. Funding the NASA EPSCoR at the
congressionally authorized level of $25 million is truly a win-win program for the states and our nation. At a time of
economic challenges and tight budgets, programs like EPSCoR that seek a broader
distribution in research funding makes solid fiscal sense. Limiting these resources to a
few states and institutions is self defeating for our nation in the long run. NSF and NASA EPSCoR help all states to
benefit from taxpayer investments and federal research and development, and they generate long term
growth and a skilled workforce for the future. NSF and NASA EPSCoR stretch limited
federal dollars further through state matching. Not only do states benefit from increased
research capacity and growth, but our nation benefits from the rich and diverse pool of talent that our entire country can
provide. In a time that 33 percent of all bachelors degree in China are in engineering, compared to 4.5 percent in the US,
if we are going to remain globally competitive, instead of restricting
ourselves to a few states and institutions, we need to be training and
harnessing all of our nation's brainpower, and EPSCoR is working to
achieve this goal.
DOE EPSCoR boosts US leadership and STEM workers
New Mexico EPSCoR 09 [New Mexico EPSCoR, “DOE EPSCoR State and National Laboratory
Partnership Program,” 2009, http://nmepscor.org/content/doe-epscor-state-and-national-laboratory-partnershipprogram, 07/14/14]
The Department of Energy's Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DOE EPSCoR) is a
federal-state partnership program designed to help the Department lead the
world in meeting today's and tomorrow's energy needs through increased competition in
energy-related research and development across the entire nation. The
mission of DOE EPSCoR is to support basic research activities spanning the
broad range of science and technology programs within DOE, and to
increase the number of scientists and engineers in energy-related areas.
2NC Solvency – DOE Labs
States can empirically fund energy research at national labs – New
York proves
Corditz 10 [Kay, “State Grant to Fund Advanced Battery Materials Partnership,” Brookhaven National Lab,
03/15/10, http://www.bnl.gov/newsroom/news.php?a=21663, 07/14/14]
Funded by a $550,000 grant from the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority (NYSERDA), Brookhaven National Laboratory will partner with battery materials
researchers from leading New York State universities to explore new chemistries
and synthesize new materials for long-lasting batteries. The Laboratory will partner with
SUNY’s University at Buffalo and Binghamton University on three projects to develop improved batteries for use in
stationary grid-scale energy storage applications, including lithium-air, lithium-ion, and lithium-titanate batteries. The
Brookhaven effort, led by Brookhaven materials scientist Jason Graetz, will focus on the development and synthesis of
new materials, and application of advanced experimental techniques to characterize these materials using Brookhaven’s
National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS). The SUNY-Buffalo lead is Esther S. Takeuchi, and the Binghamton University
lead is M. Stanley Whittingham. “This partnership among Brookhaven and two leading SUNY schools will capitalize on
the research strengths of each, and our materials characterization capabilities will be a key element of the project,” said
James Misewich, Brookhaven’s Associate Laboratory Director for Basic Energy Sciences. The collaboration grew out of a
workshop sponsored by Brookhaven and Stony Brook University’s Joint Photon Sciences Institute (JPSI) last spring. ChiChang Kao, NSLS Chair and Founding Director of JPSI, coordinated the collaboration’s successful proposal. “It is an
excellent example of how universities, industries, and national laboratories
can work together to address an important scientific challenge with major
societal impact,” said Kao. Said Graetz: “NYSERDA’s funding of this program will give
us the opportunity to expand our energy storage research to large-scale
stationary energy storage systems, which are crucial for integrating
intermittent renewable generation sources such as wind and solar. In the past,
the vast majority of battery research investment has focused on the important problem of electrical energy storage for
transportation. However, a different set of criteria exist for stationary systems, and this project will allow us to explore
new electrode materials, like lithium titanate, that meet those criteria.”
DOE EPSCoR allows states to work with national labs
Fitzsimmons 12 [Timothy, PhD, “Department of Energy,” EPSCoR/IDEA Foundation, 2012,
http://www.epscorideafoundation.org/about/agency/doe/, 07/14/14]
The Department of Energy’s Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DOE EPSCoR) was established by
Section 2203 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). DOE EPSCoR enhances the capability
of 25 eligible states and Puerto Rico to conduct sustainable and nationally competitive
energy-related research, increase the number of competitive scientists and
engineers in energy-related areas, and build beneficial relationships
between designated states and territories and the 10 world-class laboratories managed by
the Office of Science, leveraging DOE national user facilities and intellectual collaboration. The DOE EPSCoR
effort to develop science and engineering research infrastructure and
human resources enables the states to contribute to the current and future
energy-related needs.
State grants can fund national lab projects
Brandon 12 [John, “Could EV car batteries be made from salt water?” Fox News, 10/05/12,
http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2012/10/05/could-ev-car-batteries-be-made-from-salt-water/, 07/14/14]
A California company is hoping to supply 20% of the world’s lithium by 2020 with an ingenious plan to produce this
material used in the batteries that power most electric cars. Simbol Materials says it wants to build a plant in the Salton
Sea near Imperial Valley, California, to extract lithium from the salt water brine that flows up from geo-thermal power
generators. The salt water extraction process was originally conceived at California’s
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) with funds from a state
grant , while Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago adapted it to be used with geothermal fluids.
States can fund national labs
YubaNet 12 [YubaNet, “Local Water Suppliers collaborate with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,”
02/03/12, http://yubanet.com/regional/Local-Water-Suppliers-collaborate-with-Lawrence-Livermore-NationalLaboratory-on-Martis-Valley-Groundwater-Model-and-Management-Plan-Effort.php#.UG-N4U0xByQ, 07/14/14]
The Truckee Donner Public Utility District (TDPUD), Northstar Community Services District (NSCSD) and Placer County
Water Agency (PCWA) continue its partnership in developing a groundwater management plan and groundwater
model for the Martis Valley basin. This effort recently gained
further technical resources with
the addition of a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) study of climate
change impacts to recharge and groundwater quality in the Martis Valley. Previous studies have indicated that some water
in the Martis Valley groundwater basin may be in excess of 1,000 years old. And in the case of groundwater, older seems
better as the age of water indicates how fast it is moving, how it is being replenished in the basin, and the outlook for longterm sustainable supplies. The LLNL water aging study will help further the ongoing efforts to determine how the aquifer
functions. The LLNL study is being funded by the State of California Groundwater Ambient
Monitoring & Assessment Special Studies Program. The results of the study will supplement and validate the Martis Valley
groundwater model being prepared under a separate grant to the Desert Research Institute (DRI) by the Bureau of
Reclamation.
National labs work in partnership with states on energy research –
ORNL proves
Wikipedia 14 [Wikipedia, “Oak Ridge National Laboratory,”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory, 07/14/14]
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a multiprogram science and technology national laboratory managed
for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) by UT-Battelle. ORNL is
the largest science and energy national laboratory in the Department of Energy system.[1]
ORNL is located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, near Knoxville. ORNL's scientific programs focus on materials, neutron science,
energy, high-performance computing, systems biology and national security. ORNL
partners with the
state of Tennessee, universities and industries to solve challenges in energy, advanced
materials, manufacturing, security and physics.
***Federalism NB***
Ocean Policy Key
CZMA fosters cooperative federalism – most efficient way to regulate
Kalen 10 (Sam, Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “Lingering Relevance of the Coastal
Zone Management Act to Energy Development in our Nation's Coastal Waters?”, Tulane Environmental Law Journal,
2010,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=139128&sr=AUTHOR(
Kalen)%2BAND%2BTITLE(Lingering+relevance+of+the+Coastal+Zone+Management+Act+to+energy+development+in
+our+nation%27s+coastal+waters%3F)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2010)
In statutes such as the CZMA, Congress intended that states, not federal
agencies, would play the primary management role with regard to coastal
resources. The CZMA is one of the cornerstone examples of, at least theoretically, how
the concept of cooperative federalism is to be played out in the regulation of
environmental protection. Cooperative federalism, a partnership between the state and federal
governments, has become the model approach to environmental regulation. n50 The cooperation between
the federal government and the governments of the several states is often
necessary as a consequence of the size and diversity of our nation, the variation of
environmental concerns among the many localities, and the policy considerations involved in environmental decisionmaking. Further, the federal government is without adequate resources to address
all of our nation's environmental regulatory programs and problems
without help from state and local authorities. n51 Quite often environmental programs are
more [*83] successful when the policies are tailored to local conditions, a process that also mandates the involvement of
the states. Finally, because environmental programs often affect landuse, lifestyles, and local economic activity, federal
officials often solicit local support through cooperation in order to alleviate local concerns about federal intrusion into
local matters. n52 Cooperative
federalism also fosters diversity in federal
regulatory programs, because "it promotes competition within a federal
regulatory framework" and permits "experimentation with different
approaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy."
n53 The ability of states to tailor environmental regulation to fit the specific needs of the community and the local
landscape demonstrates one of the main benefits of cooperative federalism. Indeed, Justice Brandeis illustrated this ability
of federalism to allow for adaptation to the local environment in this famous observation in 1932: To stay experimentation
in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory. n54
Giving more authority to states restores cooperative federalism and
prevents ecological disasters
Kalen 10 (Sam, Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “Lingering Relevance of the Coastal
Zone Management Act to Energy Development in our Nation's Coastal Waters?”, Tulane Environmental Law Journal,
2010,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=139128&sr=AUTHOR(
Kalen)%2BAND%2BTITLE(Lingering+relevance+of+the+Coastal+Zone+Management+Act+to+energy+development+in
+our+nation%27s+coastal+waters%3F)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2010)
For the CZMA to be more than a law of lingering relevance, overhaul is needed. The CZMA has
failed to provide a meaningful opportunity to states to voice their concerns
with federal permitting, as evidenced through Louisiana's problems with OCS activities and other states'
problems with LNG activities. It is evident that either a substan-tial rewrite of the CZMA is
in order such that the air of cooperative federalism under which the Act was crafted may
be realized or a new law is needed to revitalize the intent of the CZMA in a manner in which occurrences such as the
DEEPWATER HORIZON disaster can be minimized. We recommend amendment of the CZMA
as the easiest route to resolve its current inadequacies through legislative
means. Amendments must be accomplished in the vein of restoring the
cooperative federalism of the law by giving more authority to the affected
coastal states. As it currently exists, the CZMA provides no authority for the states to
undertake reviews of safety documents. This reality became an acute problem
with the DEEPWATER HORIZON disaster, as, under the current law, Louisiana and other
affected coastal states simply had to take the MMS's word that the technology used was adequate to protect against the
blowout. In fact, as testimony has since shown, even the MMS did not completely discharge its legal duties in this regard.
n178 Because of these shortcomings, assurances from the MMS as to the safety of the blowout preventer were empty.
However, simply providing the authority to make these reviews is not enough.
The states, on the other hand, must be capable of undertaking meaningful,
critical reviews of federal permitting documents. As it stands, at least in Louisiana, the
agency charged with reviewing leasing and exploration and development plans for consistency is not staffed with
engineers and safety experts. Rather, that agency, the Office of Coastal Management at the LDNR, is staffed with biologists
and other scientists whose tasks are to ensure compliance with environmental protection laws and guidelines.
Accordingly, in addition to amending the CZMA to require state concurrence on safety plans and documents, we
recommend that these amendments also [*110] include a provision for the
immediate diversion of a portion of federal OCS royalties to each coastal
state. This would ensure sufficient funds for a safety review division within
each affected state's relevant consistency review agency.
States are left out of the process – federalism and environment
Kalen 12 (Sam, Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law, “ARTICLE: CRUISE CONTROL AND
SPEED BUMPS: ENERGY POLICY AND LIMITS FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASING”, Environmental &
Energy Law & Policy Journal, The University of Houston Law Center, lexis nexis)
Coastal states have an acute and unique interest in being involved in the OCS
leasing process. After all, their coastal resources, human capital, and onshore infrastructure necessary to support
OCS development significantly affect their coastal communities. When describing the legislative discussion that shaped
the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA, the late U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson observed that the "secondary impacts
onshore are far greater than the direct impact from oil spills and the activity on the OCS lease site itself." n50 The U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy observed that "[p]hysical damage to coastal wetlands and other fragile areas by OCS-related
onshore infrastructure and pipelines" remains one of the foremost environmental issues associated with OCS activity. n51
Affected coastal wetlands, for instance, provide a variety of ecosystem services, including absorbing and protecting a
state's populated areas from storm surges, affording essential habitat for fish and [*168] wildlife populations, and
functioning as protected environs for a portion of the nation's wintering waterfowl. n52 Along with the direct
impacts to coastal wetlands from onshore support activities that occur from
the construction of canals, pipelines, and shipyards, there are the many
indirect effects on vital public resources and services, such as roads, levees, utilities, water
supply, garbage disposal, and even increased educational resources for the families of OCS-related activities. n53 These
negative effects are all part of the oftentimes subtle socioeconomic effects that adversely impact communities. Professor
Robert Gramling has written about this phenomenon for OCS activity, n54 and in this symposium, Professor Fershee
describes its quite dramatic effect in the context of increased onshore oil and gas shale activity in North Dakota. n55 Both
the OCSLA and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) purportedly
afford coastal states the opportunity to shape whether, when, and how
leasing might occur off their [*169] coasts. n56 The CZMA, to begin with, represents "a
unique federal-state collaboration," n57 designed "to encourage and assist
States in developing and implementing management programs to preserve, protect,
develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of our nation's coast by the exercise of planning and
control with respect to activities occurring in their coastal zones." n58 Congress induced states to
develop coastal management plans by offering federal funding and
guaranteeing, in part, that federal activities would be consistent with the
enforceable policies of any such plans, unless otherwise precluded under the law or exempted by
the President. n59 The CZMA "offers the unprecedented inducement to coastal
states that upon federal approval of their coastal zone management
programs, federal actions within or affecting their coastal zones will be
conducted in a manner 'consistent' with the states' programs." n60 A state with a
coastal zone management (CZM) plan approved by the Department of Commerce, therefore, can review a proposed fiveyear leasing program or an individual lease sale and assess whether BOEM's proposed action is consistent with that state's
enforceable policies contained in the CZM plan. To the extent practicable--that is, to the extent not otherwise prohibited--
BOEM must ensure that its actions are consistent with those enforceable
polices. Any dispute between the state and federal government over
consistency effectively favors the federal government . n61 Also, once a lessee seeks to
engage in exploration [*170] or production and development activities, the lessee must ensure that its proposed activities
are consistent with the state's approved CZM plan, with any state objection subject to a Department of Commerce
override. n62 Of course,
the theory of the CZMA does not necessarily translate into
anything meaningful during the OCS process. As I have chronicled elsewhere, n63 the Interior
Department historically has been reluctant to embrace the CZMA's application to OCS activities. n64 Dr. Dubner aptly
captures much of this history when [*171] he observes the program is marked by "that of state/federal jurisdictional
conflict which was supposedly settled years ago, but has been going on in part for years." n65 Congress also designed a
second mechanism, § 19 of the OCSLA to afford states a significant role in the OCS leasing program. A principal objective
of the 1978 OCSLA amendments was to strengthen the role of coastal states in federal OCS oil and gas leasing decisions.
n66 Congress intended that affected coastal states could influence pre-lease
decisions regarding the size, timing, and location of a lease sale. Section 19(a) of the
OCSLA, therefore, provides the governor of an affected state the right to submit recommendations "regarding the size,
timing, or location of a proposed lease sale" to the Secretary of the Interior. n67 Congress described this
right as affording the states a "leading role" in the process. n68 Section 19(c) of the
Act instructs that Secretary "shall" accept these recommendations "if he
determines, after having provided the opportunity for consultation, that
they provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the
well-being of the citizens of the affected State." n69 The "Secretary" is further directed to
respond to the state in writing, with the "reasons for his determination to accept or reject such Governor's
recommendations, or to implement any alternative means identified in consultation with the Governor to provide for a
reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State." n70 [*172] But
this promise, too, has proven illusory . The Interior Department apparently
disagrees that this provision serves as a mandate, but instead treats the directive as a mere
requirement to explain itself--no different than any general administrative law requirement. In Blanco v. Burton, when
Louisiana sought to delay the issuance of a lease sale until after further review in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the
government argued that this provision merely served as a formal opportunity for the state to provide input, not an ability
to "veto"--apparently conflating an objection or recommendation as to the size, timing or location as a "veto." n71 The
government also argued that "[s]o long as the Secretary's decision to reject
the Governor's recommendation 'was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors' and there has not been a 'clear error of judgment' the Court
should defer to the Secretary's determination." n72 The government further explained that any
delay in the lease sale would cost the United States government revenue, affect jobs, and not be consistent with the
OCSLA's goal of expeditious oil and gas development. n73 And, the government added, it would
ignore the structure of the OCSLA leasing program, because actual
environmental impacts occur later on, during the exploration and development phases, n74 at a
time, however, when a state lacks the statutory right to affect, the size, timing or location of the sale.
War Impact
Federalism solves global war and promotes economic growth
Calabresi 95 [Steven G, Associate Professor at the Northwestern University School of Law, “A Government of
Limited and Enumerated Powers,” Michigan Law Review, December 1995, 07/14/14]
The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power
for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism
should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most
important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches
cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse
Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court
is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare
decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new,
prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional
wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion
[*831]
holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national
codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should
conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that
the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good
thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on
its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law
reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The
country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both
international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in
recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with
and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global
trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that
greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic
growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of
individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of
sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233
The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of
such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal.
Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would
wake up to the importance of what is at stake.
Democracy Impact
Federalism solves democracy
Stepan 99 [Alfred, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, founding Director of the Center
for the Study of Democracy, Toleration and Religion, founding President of Central European University in Budapest,
Prague, and Warsaw, former Director on Concilium on International and Area Studies at Yale University, Dean of School
of International Affairs at Columbia University, author on comparative politics, federalism, and democratic transition,
field researcher in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Israel, Palestine, and Brazil, "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S.
Model," Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4,
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/6_7_Stepan_1999_Federalism_J_of_Dem.pdf, 07/15/14]
Yet in spite of these potential problems, federal rather than unitary states are the form most
often associated with multinational democracies. Federal states are also associated with large
populations, extensive territories, and democracies with territorially based linguistic
fragmentation. In fact, every single longstanding democracy in a territorially based multilingual
and multinational polity is a federal state. Although there are many multinational polities in the world, few
of them are democracies. Those multinational democracies that do exist, however (Switzerland, Canada,
Belgium, Spain, and India), are all federal. Although all these democracies, except for Switzerland, have had
problems managing their multinational polities (and even Switzerland had the Sonderbund War, the secession of the
Catholic cantons in 1848), they remain reasonably stable. By contrast, Sri Lanka, a territorially
based multilingual and multinational unitary state that feared the "slippery slope" of
federalism, could not cope with its ethnic divisions and plunged headlong into a bloody
civil war that has lasted more than 15 years. In addition to the strong association
between multinational democracies and federalism, the six longstanding democracies
that score highest on an index of linguistic and ethnic diversity--India, Canada, Belgium,
Switzerland, Spain, and the United States--are all federal states. The fact that these nations chose to
adopt a federal system does not prove anything; it does, however, suggest that federalism may help
these countries manage the problems that come with ethnic and linguistic diversity. In fact,
in my judgment, if countries such as Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, China, and Burma are ever to
become stable democracies, they will have to craft workable federal systems that allow
cultural diversity, a robust capacity for socioeconomic development, and a general standard of equality among their
citizens.
Democracy solves extinction
Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 95 (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former
Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with
authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source
of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered.
Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty,
and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons.
Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically
"cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face
ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one
another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one
another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable
climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because
they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are
better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders,
they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
Economy Impact
Federalism is key to the economy – innovation and policy creativity
Katz 12 [Bruce, Vice President and Director, Metropolitan Policy Program, Global Cities Initiative, “Will the Next
President Remake Federalism?” Brookings, 03/18/12, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/03/18federalism-katz, 07/15/14]
With the national and global economy in a period of disruptive change, now is
a
good time to challenge states and metropolitan areas to invent the next growth
model. Several states and metro areas might, for example, pioneer a new way of supporting advanced manufacturing.
Others might do the same with exports and attracting investment from foreign firms or with upgrading the skills of key
advanced-industry workers. With federal direction, this could be a golden era of state and metropolitan innovation.¶
Federalism is not a gift that Washington bestows on statehouses and city halls. Rather, it is a special, often
dormant vehicle
for galvanizing and unleashing the talents and energies of an
entrepreneurial nation. The next president has a historic opportunity to usher in a new era of pragmatic,
collaborative federalism that capitalizes on the economic power of metropolitan areas
and the policy creativity of state and local leaders. Remaking federalism is the path
toward an economy that is productive, sustainable and inclusive.
More broadly, it
can be a vehicle for economic prosperity, fiscal solvency and political comity - if the next president is willing to take it.
***Theory***
AT: 50 State FIAT
50 State FIAT is good – our interpretation is that the judge is a policy
analyst deciding to the plan –
1) Means it’s a logical opportunity cost – a policy analyst has the
jurisdiction to chose between state and federal action – net benefits
check abuse
2) Neg flex – The aff gets to parametricize the resolution by picking
one example – its an inherent advantage because they know way more
about their one aff than the neg who has to be prepared for every aff –
the only check is to allow the neg flexible fiat options
3) The aff is too utopian by fiating multiple entities – no one would do
the plan in the real world
4) Increases Ground – Aff gets all their State-based DAs
5) Key to topic education – states actively participate in ocean policy
CSO No Date [Coastal States Organization, “About CSO,” http://www.coastalstates.org/about-cso/, 07/15/14]
Serving the States Helping states to maintain their leadership role in the
development and implementation of national coastal and ocean policy is
among CSO’s most important functions. CSO works with Congress to shape legislation
and arrange for state testimony and works with Federal Agencies to comment on proposed regulations. CSO
advocates for increased federal funding and support for state-based coastal and ocean
programs, as well as responsiveness of federal agency program administration and policies to state concerns. CSO
provides information, updates and alerts that keep states attuned to developments in
Washington, DC to enable states to respond to legislative, regulatory and policy developments
as they occur. CSO serves as an important professional network for state coastal and
ocean managers. CSO Work Groups focus on coastal water quality, coastal hazards, coastal zone management, ocean
policy and island affairs. CSO also supports a state Legal Council which provides legal background and analysis when
needed.
6) Built in the Resolution – the Aff must defend the Federal
Government over states – key to topic education
At worst, reject the argument, not the team.
AFF ANSWERS
States Fail
Jurisdiction
The Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to research
in the EEZ- states would have to ask for permission- links to
politics
US Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN
JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_prime
r.pdf)
The exclusive economic Zone (12 to 200 Nautical Miles) The LOS Convention allows each coastal nation to establish an
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) adjacent to its territorial sea, extending a maximum of 200 miles seaward from the
baseline. Within its EEZ, the coastal nation has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring,
exploiting, conserving, and managing living and nonliving resources, whether found in ocean
waters, the seabed, or subsoil. It also has jurisdiction over artificial islands or other structures with economic
purposes. In 1983, President Reagan proclaimed the U.S. EEZ. which currently occupies the area between 12 miles (the
seaward limit of the territorial sea) and 200 miles offshore for international purposes. It also includes areas
contiguous to its commonwealths, territories, and possessions. Consistent with international law
and traditional high-seas freedoms, the U.S. does not generally assert control over surface or
submarine vessel transit, aircraft overflight, or the laying of cables and pipelines on the
ocean floor, nor does it assert juris- diction over marine scientific research in the U.S.
EEZ to the same extent that most coastal nations do. The United States requires
advance consent for marine research, if and only if, any portion of the research is
conducted within the U.S. territorial sea, involves the study of marine mammals,
requires taking commercial quantities of marine resources, or involves contact with the
U.S. continental shelf.
They only have jurisdiction over the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone
US Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING
LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_primer.pdf)
The Territorial Sea (0 to 12 Nautical Miles) Under international law, every coastal nation
has
sovereignty over the air space, water col- umn, seabed, and subsoil of its territorial sea,
subject to certain rights of passage for foreign vessels and, in more limited
circumstances, foreign aircraft. For almost two hundred years, beginning with an assertion by Secretary of
Slate Thomas Jefferson in 1793, the United States claimed a territorial sea out to 3 miles. In 1988, President Reagan
proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea for the United States, consistent with provisions in the
LOS Convention. The proclamation extended the territorial sea only for purposes of international law, explicitly
stating that there was no intention to alter domestic law. The Contiguous Zone (12 to 24 Nautical Miles)
International law recognizes a contiguous zone outside the territorial sea of each coastal
nation. Within its contiguous zone, a nation can assert limited authority related to customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws. In 1999, President Clinton proclaimed a U.S. contiguous
zone from 12 to 24 miles offshore enhancing the U.S. Coast Guard's authority to take enforcement actions against foreign
flag vessels throughout this larger area.
States only have jurisdiction for 3 miles out and 9 miles for Texas and
Florida
US Commission on Ocean Policy 04 (“PRIMER ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING
LINES IN THE WATER,” An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full_color_rpt/03a_primer.pdf)
The Baseline (0 Miles) For purposes of both international and domestic law,
the boundary line
dividing the land from the ocean is called the baseline. The baseline is determined according to
principles described in the 1938 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), and is normally the low water line along the coast, as
marked on charts officially recog- nized by the coastal nation. In the United States, the definition has
been further refined based on federal court decisions; the U.S. baseline is the mean lower
low water line along the coast, as shown on official U.S. nautical charts. The baseline is drawn across river
mouths, the opening of bays, and along the outer points of complex coastlines. Water bodies inland of the baseline——
such as bays, estuaries, rivers, and lakes—are considered "internal waters" subject to national sovereignty. State
Seaward Boundaries in the United States (0 to 3 Nautical Miles; 0 to 9 Nautical Miles for
Texas, Florida's Gulf Coast, and Puerto Rico) In the 1940s, several states claimed jurisdiction over
mineral and other resources off their coasts. This was overturned in 1947, when the Supreme Court determined that states
had no title to, or property interest in, these resources. In response, the Submerged Lands Act was enacted
in 1953 giving coastal states jurisdiction over a region extending 3 nautical miles seaward
from the baseline, commonly referred to as state waters. For historical rea- sons, Texas and the
Gulf Coast of Florida are an exception, with state waters extending to 9 nautical miles offshore.
(Note: A nautical mile is approximately 6,076 feet. All references hereafter in this Primer to miles are to nautical miles.)
Subsequent legislation granted the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa jurisdiction out to 3 miles, while
Puerto Rico has a 9-mile jurisdictional boundary.
Ecosystem Management
States fail at ecosystem management – differences in capability
Karkkainen 02 [Bradley C., Associate Professor at Columbia Law School, “COLLABORATIVE ECOSYSTEM
GOVERNANCE: SCALE, COMPLEXITY, AND DYNAMISM,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 2001/2002,
LexisNexis, 07/14/14]
iii. States. States, on the other hand, may be both too big and too small to serve as effective
coordinating units in ecosystem management. Their territorial boundaries, which generally
define the limits of their jurisdictional reach, tend to be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.
California, for example, is very large and extremely diverse - by its own calculation spanning ten
distinctive "bioregions," each made up of multiple subsystems. n58 Even if a state like [*215] California is
motivated to try to engage in ecosystem management, it must effectively find a way to
subdivide itself into smaller-scale units in order to manage even these very large regional
systems. But some of California's bioregions, such as the Sierra, in the east, or the Klamath, in the north,
spill over the state's territorial boundaries, and to that extent, too, the state's territorial boundaries are
mismatched to ecological realities.¶ Maryland, on the other hand, is too small. Most of Maryland is in
the Chesapeake Bay basin, and the Bay is the dominant and defining feature of its ecology.
But the state of Maryland shares the Bay with Virginia and the Chesapeake Bay's watershed - the source of
much of the nutrient pollution that plagues the main stem of the Bay - encompasses an even larger multistate region,
severely constraining Maryland's ability to manage ecological conditions in the Bay without
some significant degree of interstate coordination. n59 States, then, will tend to be either underinclusive or over-inclusive or both simultaneously, their boundaries poorly matched to the demands of
ecosystem stewardship.¶ Again compounding the difficulty is the question of capacity and
institutional competence. For all the categories mentioned so far - landowners, local governments, and states knowledge and money are likely to be critical limiting factors . States, in general,
may be expected to have greater in-house expertise, greater capacity to acquire and process the relevant scientific and
technical information, greater financial resources should they choose to deploy them, and a more robust and well-rounded
set of regulatory powers (again, subject to a political decision to deploy them) than either individual landowners or local
governments. But
states' capacities are highly variable. Some are relatively well endowed
with the relevant financial, managerial, and information resources, others less so. On the
other hand, because of their very size, states may lack what is possessed in great abundance by
more localized parties, that is, the capacity to generate fine-grained, high-resolution
information at more localized scales. Critically, this includes specific information as to the
localized costs of ecosystem management, as well as the opportunity costs of foregoing or constraining
[*216] real estate development in a particular community or on a particular parcel.¶ Although a state like
California may possess relatively high-quality information on the life cycle of the
California Gnatcatcher and the stresses on its coastal sage scrub habitat, it may have less precise and
locally detailed information on the costs and consequences of a rule curbing
development in the coastal sage scrub than is held or could be acquired by the largest local
landowners or the city and county governments, who are likely to be acutely sensitive to these
questions.¶ For all of these reasons, I shall argue that the shift toward ecosystem management, although it
devolves substantial authority toward regional scales, should not be equated with the more
familiar forms of federalist devolution of authority to the states . n60 Undoubtedly,
the states will have a prominent role to play, n61 and they have emerged as major players in all the collaborative
ecosystem governance arrangements I have cited. But
a high degree of state autonomy could
actually turn out to be antithetical to effective ecosystem management if, for
impedes interstate coordination where needed, or if authority becomes lodged
at a tier of government that is neither particularly well-informed about regional
ecosystems, nor places a high priority on managing them, nor has the informational,
technical, administrative, financial, or political resources at its disposal to manage them
example, it
effectively. This is not to say that all states would do a poor job at it. But there is a good deal more to
effective ecosystem management than for the federal government simply to stand down
from the leading role it has played in environmental stewardship in the past three
decades, and devolve authority to the states in the hope that they will do the job well and
wisely, because the states are not ideally matched to the task either territorially
or in terms of institutional capacities. n62
Perm
Generic
Perm solves and shields the link – states fail on their own
OPC 13 [State of California Ocean Protection Council, “CALL FOR ACTION: PROECT THE NATION’S OCEANS &
COSTS, 11/27/13, http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/project_pages/WCGA/0805COPC_02_Attachment.pdf,
07/15/14]
CLEAR PRIORITIES ¶ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coastal States Organization, and
other partners have ¶ held public discussions around the country centered on four priorities to direct the nation’s future
coastal efforts: ¶ • Support healthy coastal communities and coastal-dependent economies; ¶
•
Protect and restore coastal ecosystems, habitats, and unique resources; ¶ • Prepare for
impacts of climate change; and, ¶ • Make sure that local, state, regional, and federal
coastal programs work together at all appropriate scales. ¶ ¶ States will use these priorities
and scientific and technical assessments of state and local coastal conditions and ¶ need to prepare
multi-year strategic approaches to implement them. States will be accountable through
measures ¶ of performance in meeting priorities. State efforts will be evaluated periodically. ¶ ¶
STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIP AND ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ¶ State
and local government land use decisions and public infrastructure investments are key to the future of ¶ protecting coastal
resources and creating healthy communities. But
state and local governments need technical, ¶
planning, and financial assistance to improve decision-making and
management. National investments are critical ¶ to enabling local
governments to be strong partners in developing and carrying out
programs to meet coastal management objectives.
Perm solves efficiency, coordination and integration of state and
federal policies
JOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June
2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)
Support state and regional ocean and coastal priorities Coastal states and
regions play an essential role in fostering durable ocean policy solutions
that lead to both healthier ocean ecosystems and stronger coastal
economies. In fact, states and regions often play a leadership role, developing and
implementing innovative approaches that can serve as models for national efforts. It is widely
understood that decision-making approaches led by states and regions, with strong
Action 3:
federal support in the form of technical resources and engaged
commitment, are more effective and durable than those driven exclusively
from the federal level. The fact is that decades of insufficiently coordinated,
sector-based management of ocean and coastal resources at the federal level
have taken their toll on the health of our ocean and coastal ecosystems.
Fortunately, federal agencies are now working to create a more efficient ,
integrated approach to management by setting up mechanisms to increase
coordination and reduce duplication of federal agency policies and
activities. This should lead to increased transparency, support predictable
and efficient decision making, and be undertaken in close collaboration
with regional, state, and tribal entities. Such a coordinated approach will help to
reduce conflicts, redundancies, and inefficiencies that waste time and money, and will
also result in better resource management. Federal agencies must also make efforts to think
beyond their specific missions and collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries to address the priorities of each region in
which they operate in ways that are appropriate for states in the region.
Perm solves lack of state funding for ecosystem management
JOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June
2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)
support multi-state regional ocean partnerships For many years, multi-state regional
ocean
partnerships in the Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, South Atlantic, West Coast, Caribbean,
and Pacific Island regions have worked to address ocean issues across state
boundaries, with some focusing on planning for the expansion and
development of new and traditional ocean activities. These regional
partnerships often work closely with federal agencies and tribal governments to
improve communication and coordination, leading to enhanced scientific
understanding and improved resource management. In short, multi-state,
regional efforts are essential to successful ocean management, because
ocean ecosystems—including the marine species and ocean currents that help define their boundaries—span
jurisdictional lines. At the same time, these state and regional efforts are underresourced. For them to continue to succeed, additional federal funding and
technical assistance are necessary. In addition, federal support of state and
regional efforts should include high-level participation by all relevant
agencies, a willingness to think creatively to leverage resources, and a
dedication to improving the way decisions are made.
Perm do both solves best – key to coordination
JOCI 09 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Regional and State Ocean Leadership,”
http://oceanleadership.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Regional_and_State_Ocean_Leadership.pdf)
Due to the physical and ecological characteristics of oceans, coasts, and watersheds, marine resources are difficult to
delineate along traditional geopolitical borders, which confirms the need for regional cooperation in the protection and
management of the oceans. The current patchwork of federal, state, and local ocean
policies is inherently incapable of effectively and coherently addressing
such complex challenges as ocean dead zones, overfishing, habitat loss, and the
impacts of and possible adaptations to climate change along our densely populated
coasts. It also constrains our ability to explore and take advantage of promising new
opportunities such as ocean-based forms of alternative energy production, environmentally and economically
sustainable offshore aquaculture, and marine bioprospecting. Regional collaborations among states can
facilitate effective management across jurisdictional boundaries and are necessary for implementing
ecosystem-based management and the presence of such entities encourages region-specific science and management.
Moreover, multi-state and other regional governance mechanisms can strengthen the voice
of local stakeholders in communicating their needs to the federal government States have
been forging ahead, working to incorporate new alliances; these efforts should be further
supported by coordination with federal agencies. Guiding Principles for Effective Regional
Collaboration Regional ocean governance mechanisms can facilitate more coordinated and collaborative approaches to
realizing opportunities and addressing concerns in the region. By developing compatible and coordinated
plans and processes, governments at all levels can work together to develop regional
goals and priorities, improve responses to regional needs, and develop and disseminate regionally significant
research and information. Efforts to enhance regional and state ocean governance initiatives should observe the following
principles: ■ Regional Research and Information. Decision makers at all levels, but particularly at the local level, need
accurate and timely information about ocean and coastal ecosystems, including how human activities impact those
ecosystems. ■ Regional Ecosystem Assessments. Assessments of the natural, cultural, social, and economic attributes in a
region would help guide management decisions and improve the process mandated under the National Environmental
Policy Act by providing a single science-based regional assessment that can be the basis for individual environmental
impact statements. ■ Enhance Regional Governance Capacity by Improving Federal
Coordination in Regions. Our governmental institutions need to be recalibrated to
enable government at all levels to work together more effectively at the regional level.
One step toward improved regional coordination is for federal agencies to identify
opportunities and further coordinate existing programs and activities to assist and
support more effective response to regional priorities.
Federal coordination is key
JOCI 12 (“U.S. Ocean Policy Report card 2012,” Joint Ocean Commission Initiative,
http://www.jointoceancommission.org/resource-center/2-Report-Cards/2012-06-06_2012_JOCI_report_card.pdf)
What remains to be done to improve the grade? The Joint Initiative is encouraged that the federal
ocean agencies are improving communication and coordination among themselves and with
the states, but recognizes that there is still a great deal of room for further improvement .
The National Ocean Council should work more closely with regions, states, and local
communities to identify priority needs and issues that could benefit from the National
Ocean Policy. In those areas, the Council should support and help assist with the
development of collaborative strategies to achieve locally driven goals, while advancing
the implementation of the National Ocean Policy. As the National Ocean Council works on improved
engagement with stakeholders and citizens, an effective communication and outreach effort is needed to clearly articulate
the intent of the National Ocean Policy and clarify how it will lead to improved management of ocean resources, more
efficient regulatory processes, and greater coordination among levels of government. A major misstep in the
rollout and initial implementation of the National Ocean Policy was unclear communication about
why a new approach to management is needed, how the policy will be coordinated with existing
federal and state laws and regulations, and what the short and long term outcomes of the policy will be.
Concerns about regional ocean planning specifically need to be addressed, and the
National Ocean Council should reach out directly to stakeholders and citizens to clarify
the role of regional ocean planning, how it may impact existing ocean uses, and the
extent to which it will affect inland activities. It has become urgent that these
questions be answered clearly and explicitly. The Joint Initiative continues to emphasize the
importance of strong stakeholder engagement as the National Ocean Council works with the states and regions to
implement the National Ocean Policy. We urge the National Ocean Council to address the concerns being raised and
provide increased opportunities for stakeholders to ask questions and give input directly to members of the Council. To
this end, the National Ocean Council should establish routine opportunities in all regions for stakeholders to engage with
the Council members, through in- person forums or workshops, in order to gather input on the implementation process,
listen to concerns, and discuss specific examples and opportunities of how the region may benefit from the more
comprehensive and coordinated approach of the National Ocean Policy. The National Ocean Council should
also reach out specifically to ocean industries to work with them to better understand
their ideas and seek their increased engagement on how to best implement the policy so
that it leads to more efficient regulatory processes, reduces conflicts between uses, and
provides other benefits that achieve economic growth while protecting the health of the
ecosystems on which the industries depend. As a part of this communication effort, the Joint Initiative
urges the National Ocean Council to better utilize the Governance Coordinating Committee by engaging them more in
advising and providing feedback on Council activities and documents.
Arctic
Federal-state coop key for Arctic Research and Oil Spill Management
JOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June
2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)
In order to effectively manage the rapidly changing Arctic, we must enhance
our scientific understanding of Arctic marine ecosystems, including how fish stocks are
migrating and trends in weather and climate patterns that could have significant economic, environmental, and human
health impacts. We must also gather the critical baseline information needed to
evaluate and guide economic development in the region and allow us to prepare for contingencies. This will require
significant investment in research infrastructure and monitoring programs. At present, many public, private,
and nonprofit entities are funding and conducting Arctic oil spill research.
Given declining federal budgets, more needs to be done to avoid duplication,
coordinate research, and pursue public/private partnerships and joint
funding opportunities. For instance, the Administration should further partner
with the oil and gas industry, other commercial interests, nongovernmental organizations, state
governments, local and tribal communities, and other interested stakeholders to assess challenges,
identify research priorities, and develop coordinated solutions. The engagement of
local communities and Alaska Natives is especially critical to ensure that traditional knowledge is integrated into research
programs and decision making. The Administration should also engage in international agreements with other Arctic
nations to share data, information, and research platforms. The recently released Interagency Arctic Research Plan:
FY2013-2017 provides a strong foundation to guide public and private investment in Arctic science. However, greater
support must be provided to implement the Arctic observation network so
that we can take advantage of the opportunity to properly manage human
activities in this sensitive ecosystem before it is too late.
Offshore Wind
Cooperative federalism solves offshore wind best – states prevents
regulatory uncertainty and shields the link to politics
Maxwell 12 [Veery, third year law student at UC Hasting with an interest in cleantech, “Wind Energy
Development: Can Wind Power Overcome Substantial Hurdles to Reach the Grid?,” West Northwest Journal of
Environmental Law & Policy, Summer 2012, LexisNexis, 07/13/14]
Currently, the wind turbine siting process lies largely in the hands of local and state
governments. As a result, the regulatory process is inconsistent and often
unpredictable . Given the national interest in supporting renewable energy production, the public at large
and the wind energy industry specifically stand to benefit from a cooperative
federalism framework for the regulatory process.¶ Several federal agencies,
in the process of developing and issuing guidelines
for siting wind turbines on federal land. n157 Most historical wind energy development, however,
has taken place on private land, thus the proposed Bureau of Land Management guidelines would
not even apply. States have adopted a variety of regulatory approaches for wind
developers; some states grant [*347] authority for siting decisions to special siting boards, while others use general
including the Bureau of Land Management, are
utility commissions. n158 It is common for state regulatory authority over wind developments to be spread among state
environmental, natural resource, parks, historical preservation, and transportation agencies. Additionally, developers
must comply with state laws relating to environmental impact reports, water quality, endangered species, wetlands, and
storm water runoff regulatory requirements. n159¶
Instituting a cooperative federalism
framework for the wind energy industry could reform the current
inconsistent and convoluted regulatory process. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("TCA") serves as a successful role model for such a framework. n160 The TCA was
enacted to support the deployment of a national telecommunications network, and includes a
cell tower siting policy as a part of the overall strategy. n161 The TCA siting policy largely leaves siting
decisions in local hands, but constrains certain local decisions in order to balance local
concerns with the national interest in developing a communications network. n162 Prior to the passage of the
TCA, local NIMBY-driven opposition to cell towers often prevented siting approval of projects, or made them prohibitively
expensive. n163¶ Cooperative federalism, when applied to wind regulatory processes, could
increase regulatory uniformity while continuing to encourage local
tailoring and experimentation . n164 According to the Department of Energy, deployment of
wind projects would be greatly facilitated by increased uniformity of regulatory
requirements across regions. n165 Local control of wind siting has resulted in increased
application and compliance costs, and provided local opponents with the opportunity to
revise local ordinances to prevent turbine construction. n166 However, this desire for
increased efficiency should be balanced against the fact that experience in environmental
regulation has shown the need to tailor land use policies to local circumstances. n167¶ [*348] The
diversity of siting options for wind turbines has been one of the impediments to promulgating uniform federal siting
guidelines, since the best practices for siting vary greatly depending on the specific location. n168 For this reason, a
federal wind-siting framework should provide suggested guidelines that allow localities
to experiment and surpass the base level established at the federal level. Additionally, a
cooperative federalism model is preferable to a complete preemption by federal authority
in terms of political feasibility . Any proposition that devolves authority from
local and state officials to a federal agency is likely to be met with staunch
opposition.¶ The framework that must be established by the federal action should be
mostly fluid, but must contain a couple of key preventative measures. These
requirements include prohibiting local governments from banning wind developments,
siting decisions must be made within a reasonable time window, and decisions must be
made in writing and supported by substantial evidence. n169 Such requirements would
alleviate many of the issues raised by local control over siting. These explicit federal constraints
strike the appropriate balance between local autonomy and the national interest in encouraging wind as a clean domestic
energy source.
Federalism Bad
Economy
Federalism is bad – only centralization can solve the economy and
competitiveness
Meyerson 09 [Harold, editor at large at The American Prospect and a columnist for The Washington Post, “Fed
Up With Federalism,” The American Prospect, 11/19/09, http://prospect.org/article/fed-federalism-0, 07/15/14]
By accident of its birth -- a collection of separate colonies that slowly came together to form an independent union and
revolted against the remote power of the British government -- the United States has an enduring bias toward localism, an
aversion to centralized government that is part of its DNA. For some on the left, this has been seen as a positive. "It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country," Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote. ¶
Even though progressives such as Brandeis have celebrated our federalism, it's important to remember that Brandeis lived
and worked at a time when the federal government was icebound in conservative orthodoxy and the cause of social justice
could be advanced only in a small number of states and cities. Segregationists like George Wallace and Richard Russell
have celebrated our federalism, too, arguing for states' rights at a time when the national government was moving to
abolish the Jim Crow laws throughout the South.¶ Conversely, liberals have argued for the right of the nation to move
beyond its federalist constraints during those periods when they controlled the national government (the 1930s and,
especially, the 1960s). And during the late, lamentable Bush presidency, conservative justices on the Supreme Court
frequently forbade the states from enacting stricter regulations on business than those that Bush's administration had put
in place.¶ The love of federalism is a sometime thing; its critics and champions switch places depending on who is in power
at which level of government. But the problem with our allegedly ingenious federal system is not simply that half the time,
if not more, it is an effective way to protect all that is biased and unfair in the American nation. The problem is also that
federalism inherently subverts a coherent national response to many fundamental
challenges the United States faces, at a time when other major nations -- our competitors in an
increasingly global economy -- face no such structural impediment. ¶ Given the sheer size of
America and the distinct cultural identity of its many regions, federalism has always made a certain amount of sense. The
abolition of the slave trade and the legalization of gay marriage had to begin somewhere. As the rise of national
government, transportation, and media have eroded regional identities, traditions, and isolation, however, more
conservatives than liberals have found a refuge in federalism.¶ But even though federalism is more often the refuge
of reactionaries than of visionaries, it has
an even deeper flaw: setting the nation at cross-
purposes with itself, and never more so than during a recession.¶ ***¶ There is a
classic algebra problem in which water pours into a bathtub from the tap at a specified rate but also exits the tub at a
different rate because someone has neglected to stop the drain. If you know the rates, you should be able to figure when
the water will rise to a certain level. During a recession, the United States becomes a version of that bathtub. The federal
government is the tap. The state and local governments are the drain.¶ That's no way to fight a recession. When
investment, production, and consumption are all in decline, the only way to
keep the economy from shrinking is for the federal government to deficit spend and create a
stimulus. But while the federal government pours money in, the state and local governments,
which cannot deficit spend, see their tax revenue shrinking, so they cut
spending, raise taxes, or both – taking money out of the economy.
America's distinct brand of federalism inherently impedes an economic
recovery.¶ Consider the state with the biggest tap and the biggest drain: California. The sum total of the federal tax
cuts for Californians included in last year's Bush administration stimulus legislation and this year's Obama administration
stimulus came to $15.5 billion for the years 2008 to 2010 -- money desperately needed to boost consumer spending in the
midst of the worst downturn since the Depression, says Jean Ross, executive director of the California Budget Project. But
the sum total of state tax increases enacted by the California Legislature and signed into law by Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger in 2008 and 2009, Ross says, came to $12.5 billion for the years 2008 to 2010 -- money desperately
needed to keep public services in California from grinding to a halt in the midst of the worst downturn since the
Depression. "The state negated 80 percent of the feds' tax cut," Ross says. "And the cuts and the increases pretty much
targeted the same lower-income groups."¶ Nor were the negations limited to tax cuts. Ross calculates the federal
government's direct aid to education, its block-grant programs and other education-related expenditures for California
total $9.5 billion from 2008 to 2010. The state government's cuts to K-12 schools, community colleges, the California State
University, and the University of California add up to $17.4 billion for the same years.¶ California leads the fiscal--disaster
pack, but it is anything but alone. A September paper from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports that since
the recession began, at least 41 states and the District of Columbia have slashed their budgets for a wide range of services - 27 for health care, 25 for aid to the elderly and disabled, 26 for K-12 education, 34 for higher education, and some states
for all of these. Forty-two states have reduced wages to state workers through layoffs, furloughs, and salary cuts. At least
30 states have raised taxes during the same period. "All of these steps remove demand from the economy," the center
concludes. They "reduce the purchasing power of workers' families, which in turn affects local businesses." ¶ Without the
Obama stimulus, which appropriated roughly $140 billion to the states to reduce their budgetary shortfalls during 2009
and 2010, these numbers would be even worse -- though keep in mind that $140 billion in federal funds isn't engendering
growth; it's merely offsetting state cutbacks. The center estimates that the federal bailout enabled states to reduce their
budget gaps by 40 percent. But with state financial shortfalls in those two years coming to a whopping $350 billion, that
leaves $210 billion in unrecompensed state budget shortfalls, which the states have to make up by cutbacks or tax hikes or
financial gimmicks. Dean Baker and Rivka Deutsch of the Center for Economic and Policy Research estimate that the
cutbacks and tax hikes of cities, counties, and school districts in 2009 and 2010 will come to an additional $15 billion. ¶ So
how much does the government's stimulus come to when we subtract the amount the states and localities are taking out of
the economy from the amount the feds are putting in? The two-year Obama stimulus amounted to $787 billion, of which
$70 billion was really just the usual taxpayers' annual exemption from the alternative minimum tax, and $146 billion was
actually appropriated for the years 2011 to 2019. That leaves $571 billion that the federal government is pumping into the
economy during 2009 and 2010. Subtract the amount that state and local governments are withdrawing from the
economy (they have a combined shortfall of around $365 billion, but let's say they do enough fiscal finagling so that the
total of their cutbacks and tax hikes is just $325 billion), and we're left with $246 billion.¶ At $787 billion, the stimulus
came to 2.6 percent of the nation's gross domestic product for 2009 and 2010 -- not big enough, but a respectable figure.
At $246 billion -- the net of the federal stimulus minus the state and local anti-stimulus -- it comes to just 0.8 percent of
GDP, a level lower than those of many of the nations that the U.S. chastised for failing to stimulate their economies
sufficiently.¶ But
other major nations don't have federal systems that turn them
into unstopped bathtubs in times of recession. They have states and municipalities, to be
sure, but either the responsibility for funding most functions of government resides with the national government, or, as
in Japan, state and local governments are not required to run annual balanced budgets. In China, which probably has had
the most robust recovery of any major nation, taxes and spending for everything are set in Beijing (including the lower tax
rates for provinces in which manufacturing for export is the main economic activity). In France, taxing and spending has
been controlled by the national government at least as far back as Louis XIV. In Britain, funding for local government also
comes from the national government; "local taxation," says Thomas Barry, first secretary for economic affairs in the
British Embassy in Washington, D.C., "is a very small fraction of the total tax burden in the U.K." ¶ Such is obviously not
the case in the U.S. The national government alone funds defense and the two great social programs, Social Security and
Medicare, created at moments (1935 and 1965) when liberals controlled both Congress and the White House. But state
and local governments, which can't run deficits, remain the primary funders of education, transportation, local
infrastructure, and public safety and split the cost of health care for the poor with the feds. What this means is
that the governmental impediments the United States encounters during a
recession are far greater than those encountered by the other major
nations with which we compete in the ever more global economy. What this
means is that our federal system is, in this very significant particular, massively dysfunctional.¶ ***¶ This September, the
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the agency that runs LA's growing subway system and its farflung bus lines, struck a novel deal with an Italian rail manufacturer. In return for its purchase of 100 light-rail cars from
the company, the MTA got the company to agree to locate a unionized factory in Los Angeles. Problems with the
manufacturer caused the deal to collapse, though, and the MTA is now searching for another company that will build the
trains in Los Angeles. The agency's attempt to bolster local industry with a Buy-LA policy has encountered opposition,
however, from the Los Angeles Times, which noted in an editorial that federal funds available for buying clean, green rail
transport are denied to states and cities that insist on making the product locally. To be sure, the Obama administration
has allotted billions of dollars to incubate an electric-car industry. But it is not insisting on domestic content, nor has it cut
a deal with a foreign manufacturer to locate a factory here, as Los Angeles is trying to do with rails and as Southern states
have done for years with foreign automakers.¶ The federal government doesn't do that. Well, our federal government
doesn't do that. Foreign federal governments do that all the time. China has spared no expense to
attract foreign manufacturers, routinely abating their taxes, holding wages
in check, offering help to construct new facilities. In the U.S., states and cities woo foreign
and domestic investors with an array of tax and zoning incentives; right-to-work states promise to hold down wages, too.
But the kinds of sweeping guarantees that national governments can offer
are beyond the capacity of states and localities to promise, much less deliver.¶ China,
for instance, is halfway through a stunningly ambitious project to build 100 university science parks roughly modeled on
North Carolina's fabled Research Triangle. On average, the parks, according to the testimony of attorney Alan Wolff to the
U.S.?China Commission, are 150 percent the size of North Carolina's triangle. "China has taken our model and expanded
dramatically on it," Rick Weddle, CEO of the Research Triangle Foundation, testified to the commission. "We toured a
research park in Suzhou that is a joint venture between the Chinese government and Singapore. We wouldn't even think
about that."¶ The industrial policies of American states are dwarfed by those of
foreign nations, while the one entity with the resources to compete with
foreign nations -- the federal government -- stays out of the game. States
seek new factories while the federal government shuns domestic content
requirements. As with stimulus policy during recessions, state and federal industrial policies seem totally at
cross-purposes.¶ Federalism also enables federal and state governments to punt
the responsibility for funding politically contentious programs to each other
-- a pretty good way of ensuring that the programs will end up underfunded. A quick way to grasp the contrasting levels of
political power wielded by the elderly (considerable) and the poor (negligible), for instance, is to look at how the
government funds their health care. Medicare, for seniors, is entirely federally funded. Medicaid, for the poor, has the
responsibility for its funding split between the federal government and the states. Despite the fact that Medicaid is
nominally a national program, the levels of financial support that states allot it vary considerably. During the current
recession, many states have opted to slash Medicaid benefits, even as federal Medicare benefits have largely stayed intact.¶
The perverse consequences of this hybrid funding have seldom been clearer than during the health-care reform battle, in
which the Senate Finance Committee's bill to open Medicaid rolls to more Americans without pledging full federal funding
for the program has presented recession-wracked states with a problem they could do without. After Gov. Schwarzenegger
stated that the increased cost to his state could amount to $8 billion annually, Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, who
backs the health-reform efforts, announced that she couldn't support a bill that increased the state's costs. (In the House
bill, the federal government picks up almost all of the states' increased Medicaid costs.) Federal mandates on
states that must balance their budgets during recessions are problematic
policy, and they illustrate the buck-passing that is inherent in the federal
system. Historically, the price for this feature of federalism has been paid neither by the federal nor state
governments but by the poor.¶ In regulatory matters, the gap between federal and state standards can work as Brandeis
thought it should, but it can also enable businesses to comparison shop for the lowest level of regulations. While
federalism is an effective way to create multiple governmental power centers in a nation, it creates a system that powerful
private players can game. The diffusion of power inherent in federalism works best when power in the private economy
and civil society is also diffused, so that, for instance, business will get push-back from labor when it attempts to arbitrage
the gaps between state and federal law.¶ The boundary between federal and state functions in the United States has always
been a flexible one, and one that has moved slowly and haltingly toward the federal level throughout most of the nation's
history. By the standards of nearly every other major nation, however, and increasingly by the standard of common sense,
the United States retains a system of government that frequently subverts its own policies and enables federal and state
governments to negate each other's endeavors. Federalism has its points, but in a growing number of ways, and
especially during a recession, it makes
no damn sense at all.
Federalism wrecks stimulus and economic recovery – prevents
growth
Surowiecki 09 [Surowiecki, staff writer at The New Yorker, “Fifty Ways to Kill Recovery,” The New Yorker,
07/27/09, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2009/07/27/090727ta_talk_surowiecki, 07/15/14]
If you came up with a list of obstacles to economic recovery in this country, it would include all the usual suspects—our
still weak banking system, falling house prices, overindebted consumers, cautious companies. But here are fifty culprits
you might not have thought of: the states. Federalism, often described as one of the great strengths of the American
system, has become a serious impediment to reversing the downturn. ¶ It’s easy
enough, of course, to mock state governments nowadays, what with California issuing I.O.U.s to pay its bills and New
York’s statehouse becoming the site of palace coups and senatorial sit-ins. But the real problem isn’t the fecklessness of
local politicians. It’s the ordinary way in which state governments go about their business. Think about the $787-billion
federal stimulus package. It’s built on the idea that during serious economic downturns the government can use spending
increases and tax cuts to counteract the effects of consumers who are cutting back on spending and businesses that are
cutting back on investment. So fiscal policy at the national level is countercyclical: as the
economy shrinks, government expands. At the state level, though, the opposite is happening.
Nearly every state government is required to balance its budget. When times are bad, jobs vanish, sales plummet,
investment declines, and tax revenues fall precipitously—in New York, for instance, state revenues in April and May were
down thirty-six per cent from a year earlier. So states have to raise taxes or cut spending, or both, and that’s precisely what
they’re doing: states from New Jersey to Oregon have raised taxes in the past year, while significant budget cuts have
become routine and are likely to get only deeper in the year ahead. The states’ fiscal policy, then, is
procyclical: it’s amplifying the effects of the downturn, instead of mitigating them. Even as the federal
government is pouring money into the economy, state governments are
effectively taking it out. It’s a push-me, pull-you approach to fighting the recession.¶ Now, state cutbacks
have not been as severe as they might have been, thanks to the stimulus plan, which includes roughly $140 billion in aid to
local governments. That aid, according to a recent study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, has covered thirty
to forty per cent of the states’ budget shortfalls. Money for the states translates directly into jobs not lost and services not
cut—which is why you can make a good case that more of the stimulus should have gone to state aid. Yet there’s no sign
that those budget gaps are getting smaller, and, as the federal money runs out, state tax increases and spending cutbacks
are only going to become more common. In the midst of this downturn, some of the biggest players in the economy—state
and local governments together account for about thirteen per cent of G.D.P.—will be doing precisely the wrong thing.¶
Fiscal federalism
efficiently.
also makes it harder to spend the stimulus money
Much of the tens
of billions of dollars that will be spent on roads, for instance, will
be funnelled through the states. As a result, a disproportionate amount of
the money will be spent in rural areas (which exert disproportionate influence on state
cities—which happen to have most of the people and most of the traffic—
shortchanged. The top eighty-five metropolitan areas in the country are responsible for about three-quarters of
governments), leaving
the country’s G.D.P. Yet less than half of the road money will be invested there. The billions in stimulus money that’s going
to high-speed rail will likely be spent more sensibly, since the Obama Administration has placed a premium on interstate
cooperation in building the network. Still, whether we end up with true regional, let alone national, rapid-transit networks
will depend largely on decisions made at the state, rather than the national, level. In other words, you may be able to get
from Miami to Orlando quickly, but it could be a slow train (at best) to the rest of the country.