The Trial of Alan Nunn May
1 May 1946, The Old Bailey, London
Introduction
In September 1945, a Russian cipher clerk named Igor Gouzenko walked out of
the Soviet embassy in Canada with a briefcase full of classified documents, and
attempted to solicit the help of Canadian authorities in order to defect. At first, the
Canadian authorities did not realize that Gouzenko carried valuable, classified Soviet
information, especially regarding a prominent spy ring that was active in Canada at the
time, in addition to many other documents; they initially turned him away. Gouzenko
was forced to seek asylum during the night with one of his Canadian neighbors. The next
day, Gouzenko made his way to the offices of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
where he convinced Canadian authorities that his request for aid in his defection was not
a joke.1
Eventually, the Canadian authorities accepted his story, offered him and his
family asylum in Canada, and began to scrutinize the documents that he carried out of the
Soviet embassy with him. The defection of Igor Gouzenko from Russia to Canada
sparked an international crisis, because it revealed an insidious Soviet spy ring that had
taken root within the top-secret atomic research facility in North America. The
Canadians, British, and Americans had already done a great deal to prevent security
Alan Moorehead, The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and Nunn May
(United Kingdom, White Lion Publishers: 1952), 5-10.
1
leaks, but it was now obvious that leaks were occurring anyway. Their worst fears had
come to light.
Alan Nunn May was a well-respected British physicist who had graduated at the
top of his class from Cambridge, quickly rising up the ranks of physicists in Britain. In
1943, while World War II was raging in Europe, British authorities asked Nunn May to
begin work on a highly secret project in Canada that was affiliated with the Manhattan
Project's atomic research program. While there, he had access to atomic research secrets
that the Soviets desperately wanted. Of the known secrets and materiel that Nunn May
turned over to his Soviet handler, the most important is probably the fact that he procured
some small samples of enriched uranium (U233 and U235). He also turned over data
from an atomic research report from the University of Chicago metallurgy lab, in addition
to other inconsequential (according to Nunn May) information about other American
made weapons.2 His handler also asked to be introduced to several important and
prominent researchers at the facility.
Alan Nunn May has been the constantly overlooked first spy who helped to spark
the Cold War. This neglect of his role as the first scientist to be caught and convicted of
spying for the Soviets in the atomic age is probably a mistake, as Nunn May's spying was
an alarm bell of which British intelligence should have taken more notice. His trial also
attracted little historical attention.
Moorehead, The Traitors, 35-38. Nunn May had access to the research library and
laboratory at the University of Chicago lab, which was, itself, affiliated with the
Manhattan Project that Nunn May was working on in Canada. He took advantage of
his ability to access the Chicago library on several occasions to gather data for the
Soviets.
2
2
A Note on the Sources
Until 2003, Alan Nunn May remained a largely unknown scientist, his unwanted
claim to fame having been that he was the first British scientist convicted of espionage.
A flood of obituaries was printed upon his death in that year. A good deal of hitherto
unavailable biographical information came out of those obituaries, in addition to their
recapitulation (in all of them) of his trial and conviction. The obituaries were from
Canadian, American, and British publications.
The bulk of the information about the trial of Alan Nunn May comes from
contemporaneous news accounts, mostly in the New York Times and the London Times,
although a handful of articles were from Canadian newspapers, and other American
publications, namely, The Washington Post and The Chicago Tribune. In March 2007,
the Security Service of MI5 in Britain released numerous declassified files about the trial,
including the transcripts from May 1946, along with other important documents relating
to Alan Nunn May's file.3 The transcripts offer important insights into the thinking of
Nunn May, and his compelling reasons for sharing atomic secrets with the Soviets. They
also shed some light on the Judge’s motivations for imposing the harsh sentence on Nunn
May. Finally, they confirm the facts as reported by the various news articles discussed
above.
The transcripts, themselves include a rather ordinary, mundane, probably ninety
minutes of pontification by the judge and the attorneys from both sides. Nunn May
himself spoke only once, and that was to plead, "Guilty, my Lord."4 They illustrate the
All secret MI5 documents covering the trial of Alan Nunn May were found on the
MI5 website at www.mi5.gov.uk/output/atomic-scientists-1.html
4 Rex v. Alan Nunn May, MI5 documents KV/2/2214 (Old Bailey 1946) 1.
3
3
likely thinking and motivations of Nunn May as revealed through the speech of his
attorney; they also reflect the focus and anxieties of the state regarding the larger political
ramifications of Nunn Mays espionage. Clearly, Britain's relationship with the United
States and the Soviet Union had become tenuous. Finally, the transcripts allow us to see
the thought-process of the judge, who imposed a severely harsh sentence on Nunn May.
The transcripts and the articles taken together provide a fuller account of the whole story.
Another source used was the United States Congressional hearings on the
McMahon Bill. They are crucial in illustrating the concerns and anxieties of scientists
regarding the power of the atomic bomb. The testimonies of several prominent scientists
were recorded in these hearings. The Congressional Hearings are useful in that they
reflect the same concerns that Nunn May had, which impelled him to give secrets about
the technology away. The text of the actual bill that was passed in 1946 demonstrates the
United States' concern about sharing information, and with whom to share it. More
importantly, it ensured that no foreign scientist would have access to American research
facilities, thereby restricting the possibility of future leaks of classified information.5
The only non-media, secondary source that provides substantial information about
Alan Nunn May, his background, and the trial, is a book entitled, The Traitors: The
Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May, written by Alan Moorehead in 1952.
This source fills in essential gaps where MI5 Security files are not available or are still
classified. Most of the book's value is its biographical information of Nunn May,
particularly regarding his education, early career, and early leftist political leanings while
he was still a young university student in England. On the other hand, Moorehead did not
5
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Sec 10 (a) 1.
4
provide citations for any of his facts in the book, nor did he include a bibliographic essay,
so it is not clear how he acquired the information for the book. For the most part, I tried
to verify Moorehead's information with other sources, either news articles or information
from Nunn May's security filed with MI5 before I used it.
Finally, a few other secondary sources have been helpful in understanding the
British Secret Intelligence Service in general, but especially regarding Nunn May's case,
in particular. Michael S. Goodman's Spying on the Nuclear Bear is a useful resource in
understanding the British need to gain information on the Soviet Union, even during the
final years of World War II when the Soviet Union was a western ally.
Purpose and Focus
The conviction of Alan Nunn May might have been considered the proverbial
shot heard round the world in the twentieth century, except that the world did not notice
its importance until almost sixty years later. How did this important trial go essentially
unnoticed until the death of a convicted traitor? Interestingly, and somewhat
unfortunately, other espionage trials garnered more attention than Nunn May’s, although
his was probably more important to global security and international political affairs.
Nunn May's trial was important for several reasons, not the least of which is that it was
the first trial and conviction for espionage of a British scientist in the nuclear age; it did,
in fact, mark the beginning of the Cold War between the western democracies and the
communist Soviet Union.6 This discovery of espionage within the ranks of allied
scientists working on atomic research with the Manhattan Project prompted the United
Brian Cathcart. 2003. "Alan Nunn May: Britain's First Convicted Atom Spy," The
Independent, 29 Jan. Moorehead. The Traitors, 12.
6
5
States to end the practice of sharing secrets with all of her allies, not just Britain.7
Finally, this trial is also important in the ethical issues it reflects amongst the scientific
community about the use and possession of this new atomic power.
Before analyzing the trial, however, it is important to place the man in context,
and try to understand him further, if possible. Interestingly, Nunn May's obituaries from
2003 provide a more detailed picture of the man and his motives than any other available
file, document, article, or interview written or produced during his lifetime. Alan Nunn
May was born in Birmingham, England in 1911.8 While he was at Cambridge, he studied
physics under a prominent left-wing physicist, Patrick Blackett (described as "an ardent
admirer of all things Soviet").9
While at Cambridge, Nunn May was open about his leftist political tendencies.
He had no qualms about joining clubs or associations that were sympathetic to Soviet
ideology, and even managed to travel to the Soviet Union at some point.10 During his
lifetime, it was widely assumed, but never confirmed, that he had joined the communist
party as a student; this information was finally confirmed in a statement Nunn May made
approximately three weeks prior to his death. In this confession, he not only admitted to
being a communist party member, but he also confessed to having spied for the Soviets
while he was working in Britain, prior to his relocation to Canada to work on the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Section 10, p. 9-10.; 2003. "Alan Nunn May, 91, Pioneer
in Atomic Spying for Soviets," The New York Times, 25 Jan.; Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists online.
8 Cathcart. 2003. "Alan Nunn May," 29 Jan.; 2003. "Alan Nunn May Obituary:
Nuclear Scientist Who Served Six years for Passing Atomic Secrets," The Times, 24
Jan.
9 Cathcart. 2003. "Alan Nunn May," 29 Jan.
10 Ibid. This article is the only source that indicated such a degree of openness
regarding Nunn May's pro-Soviet or pro-communist leanings.
7
6
Manhattan Project.11 This information is telling, since Nunn May's MI5 security file
indicates that British intelligence was not aware that he had been contacted by the Soviets
prior to his work in Canada.
According to the MI5 security files, however, Nunn May had been noticed by
British intelligence as early as 1938, several years prior to their subsequent interest in
him in 1945, when he was actively spying.12 Nunn May caught their attention because he
was observed by British intelligence as attending a "Communist faction" meeting, a
different meeting from the one he was supposed to have been attending. He was in
London at the time "as the representative of the British Association of Scientific Workers
to the World Boycott Conference."13 This information is important for several reasons,
not the least of which is that if British intelligence were serious about weeding out spies,
it would have been expected to put him on a short list of people of interest, especially
since he was quickly becoming a prominent scientist, working with secret information,
and for the British government. Furthermore, this information may also shed light on
Nunn May's motivations for treason. Throughout the entire episode (the investigation,
the trial and the conviction), Nunn May remained staunchly quiet about his crimes, his
motivation for committing them and his Soviet contact, which will be discussed later in
greater detail. When Nunn May was convicted for sharing secrets, he originally
Ibid.
MI5 Security Service files. File refs. KV 2/2209, (1937-1945), National Archives,
United Kingdom. Found at https://www.mi5/gov.uk/output/atomic-scientists1.html.
13 Ibid.
11
12
7
confessed to the crime because he believed that all countries should have nuclear
capability, "for the safety of mankind."14
Many years later, in 2003, it was reported in one of his obituaries that he had
claimed to have shared intelligence once with the Soviets even before he left Britain to
work in Canada. Nunn May claimed he did it because he learned that the Nazis might
have the capability of detonating a "dirty bomb," one "that would spread radioactive
poison over a large area."15 This discrepancy in Nunn May's account of his motivations
for espionage will be analyzed further, below, but it raises questions about his real
motives.
Again, the obituaries are essential for the background information that they
provide, filling in further details of Nunn May's espionage, and perhaps shedding some
light on his motivations for sharing secrets. Because Nunn May was reluctant to grant
interviews, and he consistently shunned the idea of publishing public statements, many
questions remain regarding the circumstances that compelled him to spy. As we will see
later, much can be understood for what he did not say, as much as for what he did say.
The Trial
The information that Gouzenko provided to authorities in Canada following his
defection sparked immediate interest within MI5. British intelligence quickly made the
connection between the British physicist working in Canada–codenamed 'Alek', who had
14
15
2003. "Nunn May." New York Times obituary. 25 Jan.; Moorehead, The Traitors, 39.
Cathcart, 2003. "Alan Nunn May," 29 Jan.; Moorehead, The Traitors, 22.
8
access to secret information that was finding its way to the Soviets–and Nunn May.16
British intelligence began investigating Nunn May at this point, but they did not want to
tip him off that they were aware of his apparent treason; they believed that if they could
keep Nunn May from revealing that they were on to him, he might perhaps lead them to
his handler and uncover who was behind the spying, and perhaps enable them to discover
the more powerful individual(s) directing the spies.17
Nunn May's work in Canada was scheduled to end in fall 1945, and so he returned
to London very soon after Gouzenko's defection. According to Gouzenko's information,
Nunn May was supposed to meet his handler in London in late October. British
intelligence followed Nunn May in order to determine who his contact was, but that
meeting never happened.18 British intelligence speculated that Nunn May had been
tipped off that he was in danger and being followed, which may be why he did not show
up at the London meeting. After several months of watching Nunn May, authorities
realized that he apparently no longer intended to meet with his handler. That fact,
coupled with the fact that he no longer worked on the top-secret atomic research project,
convinced the British authorities that it was time to arrest Nunn May for his treasonous
Moorehead, The Traitors, 31-39; Richard Norton-Taylor. 2003. "How First Atoms
Spy was Uncovered: Soviet Clerk's Story 'Too Hot to Handle,'" The Guardian, 14
Nov.; MI5 Security Service files. File refs. KV 2/2209 and KV 2/2210, (1937-1945,
1945), National Archives, United Kingdom.
17 Moorehead, The Traitors, 33.
18 Moorehead and MI5 Security Files.
16
9
activities in Canada.19 He was arrested on 5 March 1946 for violating the Official Secrets
Act of 1911.20
The Official Secrets Act of 1911 states, in part, that anyone who is found guilty of
giving away any information "which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be
directly or indirectly useful to an enemy" shall be sentenced to up to seven years of hard
labor.21 This law also states that the mere fact of giving away information is a felony.
The law is clear that intent is not important in deciding guilt or innocence. The criminal
act is in the sharing of information regardless of malicious or benevolent intent.
On 1 May 1946, the trial of Alan Nunn May was held at the Old Bailey in
London. The trial itself was unremarkable and brief, lasting only an hour and a half with
Nunn May speaking only once to declare his guilt. Nonetheless, some important
developments took place in the trial. Gerald Gardiner, Nunn May's attorney, made a
speech to the court in an attempt to garner sympathy (and perhaps a lesser sentence) for
his client. Gardiner attempted to explain Nunn May's actions, perhaps in the hope that
knowledge of his reasons for sharing secrets would help to counter the idea that Nunn
May was an evil monster for having aided the Russians.22
In Gardiner's speech, he claimed that Nunn May had felt the pull of his
conscience when he decided to share atomic secrets with the Russians. At the time of his
Ibid.
Moorehead, The Traitors, 39; 1946. "Nuclear Physicist Arrested in London," New
York Times, 4 Mar.; 1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge: Scientist Remanded to Custody,"
The Times (London), 6 Mar.; MI5 Security Files, KV 2/2213 (1946).
21 Official Secrets Act of 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5; Ch. 28) 3.
22 In the trial transcripts and several contemporary articles about the matter, the
Soviets are referred to as Russians, perhaps with the 1940s understanding that the
terms Russian and Soviet could be used interchangeably. I use Russian in this
context because Russian is used in the original transcript.
19
20
10
crime, the Russians were still allied with Britain, Canada, and the United States, and their
common enemy was still Germany. Gardiner argued that, although Nunn May should not
have given away secrets, he should not be considered a traitor, as he was hoping that the
information might help the Russians defeat Germany faster, thus also helping out the
allied cause.23
Furthermore, Nunn May felt that since the Russian scientists were also working
on atomic research, and since, again, Russia was an ally, then the other allies (Britain,
Canada, and the United States) were obliged to share this information with them.24
Cooperation with all of the allies would ensure that the common enemy, Germany, would
be quickly vanquished. Nunn May held that if the allies kept secrets from each other,
then they were working at conflicting purposes, and would serve to hinder their progress
in the war effort against Germany. Finally, Nunn May, through Gardiner, further argued
that responsibility fell to the scientists, who make such important discoveries, to share
them with everyone, essentially for the good of all mankind, that "this discovery was one
of great consequence to humanity."25 In the only recorded statement Nunn May released
prior to his incarceration, he stated that his actions were a "contribution I could make to
the safety of mankind."26
In sentencing, Mr. Justice Oliver, the presiding judge, displayed his contempt for
Nunn May. Clearly, Oliver was unconvinced of the good intentions of Nunn May's
actions, referring to him, the man, as "dishonourable," and "dreadful," his actions full of
"crass conceit" and "wickedness;" Oliver sentenced Nunn May to ten years of hard labor
Rex v. Nunn May, 7.
Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Cathcart, "Alan Nunn May."
23
24
11
for his crime. Setting aside the fact that Nunn May was entrusted with sensitive
information, and that he had taken an oath to abide by the Official Secrets Act of 1911
before he left Britain to work on atomic research in Canada, the sentence was harsh for
the damage or perceived damage that Nunn May's spying accomplished. 27
That is, in addition to the fact that Nunn May's espionage affected Britain's
international relations with its allies, particularly the United States (which issue will be
analyzed later), it seemed to succeed in helping the Soviets in their quest to understand
the science of atomic power. At least the information that Nunn May provided to the
Soviets seemed valuable to the Soviets, whether or not it really was.28
What important considerations does this trial introduce? The trial reflects a
number of things that were happening in the world. The first important issue that the trial
raises is the ethical issue of atomic power, who should have this power, and whether or
not it should remain secret. Nunn May's major concern was his seemingly crisis of
conscience, although he made no secret of his leftist leaning politics or his support for the
communist cause. Nunn May makes it clear that he gave secrets to the Soviets because
he believed that one country should not have the monopoly on this powerful technology.
In fact, he was indignant that atomic technology was not shared with the Soviets,
especially given the fact that in 1945 they were supposed to be England's ally in World
War Two.29
Although Nunn May refused to testify on his own behalf at the trial, his barrister,
Gardiner, implored the judge, on Nunn May's behalf to take into consideration the fact
Ibid., 8; 1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge: Scientist Sent for Trial, Bail Refused," The
Times of London, 20 Mar.
28 Moorehead, The Traitors, 28-29.
29 Rex v. Alan Nunn May, 7.
27
12
that Nunn May gave the secrets on account of his conscience and not from any malicious
intent. Gardiner also reminded the judge that in all of Nunn May's many years as a
scientist, his work was directed at only good things for the country, and that he should be
considered a national hero, taking into consideration all of the grand contributions that he
made to science, and for the benefit of England. That fact coupled with the fact that
Nunn May thought he was helping mankind should have added up to a lighter sentence, if
not acquittal altogether. Again, the barrister spoke on behalf of the scientist, but used
Nunn May's words very carefully.
The issue that Nunn May introduced regarding the powerful moral and ethical
implications of the use of atomic power and how to regulate its use and dispersal was a
recurring theme amongst the scientific community at the time. Many scientists working
on the Manhattan Project (or somehow affiliated with the important atomic research for
it), academics, lawyers, University presidents and the Secretary of Commerce testified at
the American Congressional Hearings for the McMahon Bill in late January and early
February 1946.30
Robert Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago, was the first to testify
at the hearings on 25 January 1946. His testimony was valuable because the University
of Chicago was a major research center for atomic power before the Manhattan Project
was started. After the Manhattan Project had been up and running for some time, the
University of Chicago organized and ran several more prominent research centers
The McMahon Bill, also known as the Atomic Energy Act, was introduced to
Congress for the purpose of regulating atomic power and research; after the
disclosure of Nunn May's security leak, the Bill included language that restricted the
United States from sharing atomic research and knowledge with her allies. The Bill
was passed in August 1946.
30
13
affiliated with the Manhattan Project and atomic energy. Hutchins, and three other
prominent representatives of the University of Chicago, testified to the committee,
offering their expertise regarding the moral issues of atomic research, its regulation and
use.31
Hutchins testified to the effect that any legislation regarding nuclear power must
include some international or global agreement, since it was not likely that war could be
averted indefinitely. Hutchins was concerned that if war broke out, and those countries
(or country) that held atomic weapons used them against their enemies, then a
catastrophic destruction would occur, to both sides, not just the attacked. He was
adamant that the United States, in having this power, make international agreements to
reassure other nations that the United States would not use the powerful weapons as a
tool to instill fear or the threat of force. Furthermore, according to Hutchins, a first step
in this reassurance would be to place control of atomic power in the United States in the
hands of civilian authorities and, not under military control.32
Hutchins seemed to be supporting Nunn May's claim that atomic secrets should
not be so secret. The difference, though, is that Hutchins, although he wanted to control
the power and technology responsibly, may have to been open to sharing these scientific
secrets with everyone, not just those who share our ideology (as in Nunn May's case
wanting to share secrets with the Soviets, but not the Germans).
Edward Teller, physicist at the University of Chicago, and prominent scientist and
researcher, was the final scientist to testify at the hearings. The message of his testimony
Hearings Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy for the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946, Part 2, 25 January 1946, p. 101.
32 Ibid., 103-104.
31
14
was essentially the same as that of Hutchins, although Teller was even more radical in his
desire simply to end atomic research altogether. He testified about the inordinate power
of this new technology and the danger that it posed to mankind if it were allowed to
continue to be harnessed. In the end, though, Teller agreed that it was probably too late
to go back to a time when this power did not exist, so he believed it was important to
regulate it intelligently. On this issue, Teller agreed with Hutchins that atomic power
must be regulated by some civilian and international regulations and laws, that it was too
dangerous for one entity to have a monopoly on controlling this awesome power.33
Teller agreed with both Nunn May and Hutchins in the fact that security
regulations regarding atomic research were too oppressive, not conducive to collaborative
discoveries, and even a "hindrance to progress."34 Since there were so many secret
regulations imposed on the scientists, their progress was significantly affected in their
compliance to the regulations. Teller held that science can only be effective in an
atmosphere of collaboration.35
It seems clear from these testimonies that collaboration of scientific principles is
common amongst members of the scientific community, so it would not be unheard of for
Nunn May to be inclined to share the information with other scientists. Perhaps his crisis
of conscience got the better of him during his research, and even though he signed an
agreement not to share secrets, he passed on the information anyway because his
profession and training taught him to do that.
Ibid., 276-279.
Ibid., 276.
35 Ibid., 277.
33
34
15
Although only two witness testimonies have been analyzed, they are enough to
get a good idea about what the remaining scientists, professors, lawmakers and policy
makers testified to. They all wanted to inform the United States Congress of the
importance of atomic regulation by a civilian body, and the importance to progress and
scientific advancement of restricting security regulations. In other words, they all wanted
to ensure collaboration in the scientific community, especially with such a powerful and
catastrophic weapon.
Although the committee hearings for the McMahon Bill did not take place as a
result of Nunn May's conviction in Britain,36 they are important in demonstrating a
common feeling among the scientists, regardless of nation of origin or political ideology.
Nunn May wanted to share the secrets of the Manhattan Project because he did not
believe that the United States should have a monopoly on atomic research or weapons.
He believed that a more collaborative approach to atomic power was necessary.
Furthermore, Nunn May, as a trained scientist, believed that collaboration was essential
for the success of his project.
Of course, none of this is to justify Nunn May's actions, or even to argue that he
should not have been convicted for treason. The point is to demonstrate that many
scientists, many prominent scientists, were unsatisfied with the system set up for the
Manhattan Project atomic research program, and they were calling for important and
necessary modifications. Nunn May did just that, although he did it in such a way as to
preclude any chance of his complaints or protestations being taken seriously.
36
The Bill for the Regulation of Atomic Research (The Atomic Energy Act of 1946) was
in the process of being passed anyway; it was, however, modified after it became
apparent that a foreign national had given away important secrets on an American atomic
energy project.
16
One important global consequence of Nunn May's trial and conviction was its
effect on Anglo-British relations, especially regarding progress in atomic research. In
March of 1946, news of the leak on the Manhattan Project was made public with the
arraignment of Nunn May in London. Prior to Nunn May's arrest, there was a fear that
vital information would be shared with enemies, and there was plenty of suspicion that it
was already taking place. When this fear was finally confirmed with Nunn May's arrest
and arraignment, the American Congress took notice, and took action.37
On 19 March 1946, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) announced to the
American Senate that there had, in fact, been a security leak at the University of Chicago
atomic research lab. The senator suspected possible leaks prior to the official notice, but
he could not substantiate his intuition. Just a month before this disclosure, the American
Secretary of State, trying to assuage growing alarm among the public, declared that the
technical knowledge of how to make an atom bomb was safe, and that there was no cause
for concern about security leaks.38
Hicklenlooper disclosed to the Senate on this day that Nunn May took advantage
of his position at the laboratory in Canada to make trips to the affiliated lab in Chicago,
and to make use of the highly classified materials housed in the metallurgical lab and
library there. Nunn May took several trips to this highly secured library, checking out
materials that he copied and passed on to the Soviets. General Leslie Groves, the military
commander in charge of the American project at the lab, became highly suspicious of
Nunn May after his repeated research trips to the library. According to Groves, in a letter
1946. "Spy Suspect's Visit to U. of C. Atom Lab Bared," Chicago Daily Tribune, 20
Mar., 3.
38 Ibid., 3.
37
17
he had written to Senator Hickenlooper regarding the concerns he had about Nunn May,
"[he] had spent more time and acquired more knowledge[...]than any other British
physicist. Although I had absolutely no reason to suspect him, I did not like to have him
acquire such a wide knowledge of later developments."39 Groves was beginning to feel
uncomfortable with the frequency of Nunn May's research trips.
In the United States, the Atomic Energy Bill of 1946 reflected the concerns of
scientists and lawmakers alike regarding the awesome capability of atomic power.
Furthermore, the research into atomic energy was still in its infancy, so much of its true
potential was not understood. Congress needed to establish guidelines and regulations for
the research, use, protection, and ownership of atomic power, and that is what it set out to
accomplish in the passage of the Atomic Energy Bill. The section that dealt with the
sharing and dissemination of atomic energy, especially regarding its industrial use was an
important addition to the McMahon Act, as it came to be known by the senator who
introduced the bill.
Section 10 (a)1 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 states that:
until Congress declared by joint resolution that effective and enforceable
international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive
purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information
with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial
purposes;40
The United States had decided to restrict sharing any information on how to weaponize
atomic power with anyone, including its important allies. The British were now forced to
perform atomic research alone. The ramifications of Nunn May's security leak would last
Moorehead. The Traitors, 25; 1946. "Spy Suspect's Visit to U. of C. Atom Lab
Bared," Chicago Daily Tribune, 20 Mar., 3.
40 Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Public Law 585, 79th Congress, Sect. 10 (a) 1.
39
18
for quite some time. From this point in 1946 until 1958, when the United States relaxed
its restrictions on sharing information with its allies (presumably because by this point,
Britain had already weaponized atomic power on its own), Britain was cut off from any
information sharing with the United States, even after repeated attempts by the British
government to relax the new American regulations.41
The Americans continued to cite national security as the prime reason for
restricting access to their discoveries by any other nation, even such a close ally as
Britain. Certainly, the fact that such a substantial security leak had been discovered
within the ranks of their British allies did not help to convince the Americans that the two
countries should continue to work together and to share sensitive information. For the
time being, in 1946, sharing information was too risky for the safety of the country.
The Trial Raises Other Concerns
In addition to rattling the nerves of Britain's staunchest ally, the trial of Nunn May
introduced other questions and issues. One important question is, what are we to make of
the verdict in this case? According to the Official Secrets Act of 1911, the penalty for
sharing (secret) documents that are "calculated to be or might be or [are] intended to be
directly or indirectly useful to an enemy" is harsh labor ("penal servitude") for a period of
not less than three years, but not more than seven years.42 Justice Oliver sentenced Nunn
May to ten years of penal servitude, citing violation of the Official Secrets Act of 1911,
Matthew Grant, ed. The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and
the Bomb 1945-1975 (London, Continuum UK Publishing: 2009), 16, 18.
42 Ofiicial Secrets Act of 1911, Sect. 1(c).
41
19
Section 1 (c). Oliver seemed unmoved by the heart-felt defense of Nunn May's lawyer;
he was, in fact, contemptuous of Nunn May.
Why was the sentence so harsh? It was clear by this point, in May 1946, that
tensions were growing between western democracies and Soviet communism, and had
been developing for some time. The problem is that in the post-World War II world,
Britain and the Soviet Union were ostensibly allied, and supposed to be working together
in rebuilding Germany. How could this relationship be sustained if England's own
citizens were undermining British advancements?
Perhaps the sentence was so harsh because the judge wanted to send a message to
the Soviets that, even in the face of overt tensions, the fact that England and Soviet Union
were allies in post-war Europe was extremely important to England, and it was important
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that England would do what it could to maintain
diplomatic relations, even in the face of this obvious difficult adversity.
The harsh sentence could have been Justice Oliver's way of establishing the fact
that espionage against the homeland would not be tolerated on his watch. This is
probably the most likely option. Perhaps he imposed such a harsh sentence because he
wanted to dissuade others from attempting to spy against Britain or the United States;
clearly he felt contempt for Nunn May since his espionage could have ultimately
undermined Britain's global status. There is no question that this incident adversely
affected England's relationship with the United States, at least in the short run.
How was the trial received in the press? Many news outlets around the world
were watching the developments, partially for the intrigue of the incident. It is possible,
too, that this story was closely watched because it involved the three of the most powerful
20
countries in the post-War world, and they were supposed to have been working together
to rebuild Germany. What would happen to these tenuous alliances if it came out the
Soviets were spying on their purported ally?
Interestingly, the trial itself was largely ignored in the British press. The details
of Nunn May's arraignment were more widely reported than the actual trial. The lack of
information about the trial could perhaps be attributed to the fact that it did not introduce
any new evidence from the arraignment, or that the information in the trial was still
considered secret.43 The news of Nunn May's arrest was reported the day after he was
detained directly from King's College where he was working as a lecturer. The report
indicated that Nunn May had violated the Official Secrets Act. He was accused "having,
on a day in 1945, for a purpose prejudicial to the safety and interests of the State,
communicated to some person unknown certain information which was calculated to be,
and might be, directly or indirectly useful to an enemy."44
Although the charge was no doubt purposely vague, it is clear that Nunn May was
being accused of something serious and threatening to national security. The article also
reported that Nunn May had refused to reveal the identity of the person to whom he
passed the secrets, and more importantly, where that mystery person was from.
Even more intriguing regarding the country of origin of the person to whom Nunn
May gave the secrets, in both the arraignment and the trial of Nunn May, the authorities
reacted dramatically, when it was revealed that the person was 'Russian.' During the
See, 1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge: Scientist Remanded in Custody," The Times, 6
Mar., 2, on the arrest of Nunn May; 1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge: Scientist Sent for
Trial, Bail Refused," The Times, 20 Mar., 2, on Nunn May's arraignment and holdover for trial in May.
44 1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge," 6 Mar., 2.
43
21
arraignment, it was reported that when Gardiner asked Nunn May whether or not Russia
had been a "gallant ally in February of last year" (referring to the Soviet Union as an ally
with Britain and the United States during the final months of the war), the prosecutor
defensively demanded to know why Russia had even been mentioned at that point; he
insisted that neither Russia nor America had been mentioned during the proceedings, and
insinuated that it was inappropriate for Gardiner to mention Russia at this point.45
Gardiner seemed to have felt the need to get this information into the official record; the
prosecutor and the Judge seemed to act as if it was important to keep it out of the official
record.
Something similar happened during the trial when Gardiner sought to emphasize
the fact that the Russians were Britain's allies during the war, reminding the court that the
Russians had been instrumental in the invasion and occupation of Berlin during the final
years of the war. Again, the attorney general reacted at the mention of the Russians, and
the defense attorney's insinuation that, at this point, the Russians could be considered
enemies. He interrupted Gardiner's speech to interject, "I think I ought to make it
abundantly clear that there is no kind of suggestion that the Russians are enemies or
potential enemies."46 He went on further to reiterate that the Official Secrets Act
prohibits sharing of information with unauthorized individuals, and that this was the
crime that Nunn May was accused of, not of sharing secrets with an enemy or with an
enemy country.47
1946. "Atomic Secrets Charge," 20 Mar., 2.
Rex v. Alan Nunn May, 7.
47 Ibid.
45
46
22
For whatever reason, British authorities did not want to establish an official
record of the Russians being considered enemies of Britain. Tensions had already been
building at this point in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the western
democracies, and it is possible that the British authorities did not want to further damage
their tenuous relationship. None of the sources reveal why the judge or the Prosecutor
seemed unwilling to establish the Russians as enemies of Britain. Any speculation about
their reluctance is just that, speculation. It would seem plausible, however, to speculate
that there may have been a concern about Russia's reaction to being declared an enemy of
Britain in the official court record.
One group that was watching the trial with especially great interest was the
scientists. The brotherhood of scientists was waiting to see the outcome, as presumably it
would affect their lives directly. There was a substantial outcry in the London papers,
especially over the harsh sentence imposed on Alan Nunn May. He was sentenced to
twice the average penalty that his crime called for. On 13 May, the executive committee
of the Association of Scientific Workers issued a statement condemning the harsh
sentence, declaring that Nunn May's crime called for a maximum sentence of only five
years. They were also especially disturbed that none of Nunn May's previous patriotic
work for the country had been taken into consideration. In fact, they argued, Nunn May's
prior scientific work had contributed much to Britain's ability to win the war.48 Whether
that was true or not, it is clear that the scientific community in Britain was unsatisfied
with the way Nunn May had been treated.
48
1946. "Dr. Nunn May's Sentence," The Times, 13 May, 2.
23
On 17 May, The Times reported that Nunn May's sentence had been brought
before the House of Commons in a petition to have it reduced. A Mr. Brown of Rugby,
indicated that it was clear that Nunn May was not a common criminal, and that the facts
of the case should be more closely scrutinized.49 Ultimately, the Commons determined
that it would not interfere with the sentencing because it could not find any evidence of
wrongdoing by the court.
Another paper watching the outcome of the trial was the Chicago Daily Tribune.
Interestingly, a tiny blurb of an article appeared there on 23 June 1946 regarding the
sentence. It is unfortunate that this is the only evidence that others were considering the
verdict, because it introduces an interesting perspective on the verdict, and from a foreign
point of view. The article reports the sentence as "remarkable," but not for why one may
think. The writer asserts that if Nunn May were really guilty of treason then this sentence
was "grossly inadequate;" if he were guilty of just "indiscretion," then the sentence was
extraordinarily harsh.50 This is a good question posed to the British authorities. It was
strange that Nunn May was publicly referred to as a traitor in Britain, but given such a
light sentence. It asks whether or not he should be considered a traitor; if so then punish
him as such. If not, then reduce the sentence.
It is quite interesting that there seems to be a discrepancy between the public
diplomacy or the public face of Britain regarding its "ally" the Soviet Union and the
official, private concerns that Britain had toward such an ally. Although the judge made
a public spectacle of the fact that Nunn May was spying for the Soviets, British
intelligence itself had been actively spying against the Soviets even while the two
49
50
1946. "House of Commons report," The Times, 17 May, 8.
1946. "Mysterious Justice," Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 June.
24
countries were allied against Germany. The secret Section 9 of MI5, dedicated to
gathering intelligence about the Soviet Union, was established as early as August 1944, a
year before the end of the war.51 Although British authorities outwardly and publicly
denounced the idea that the Soviets were "enemies" or a threat, British intelligence had
reason to believe that the Soviets were not as strong or reliable an ally. This secret
section had to be established to keep tabs on the Soviets as the most dangerous potential
enemy of the British.52
Cold-War tensions dominated the political, social and military life in the west
during most of the second half of the twentieth century. The trial of Alan Nunn May
reflects the global tensions in that it affected the United States' willingness to share
nuclear secrets with her allies; it marked the beginning of the Cold-War tensions with the
Soviets, but it also reflected the difficult relations that the British had with the Soviet
Union as its ally in the war. This trial brought to light the fact that the Soviets had a spy
network within Britain, and possibly elsewhere, even if Britain did not yet understand the
depth or breadth of it. It raised important moral and ethical issues with which the
scientists themselves grappled with in developing this powerful tool into a weapon. As a
spy Alan Nunn May was not on par with other, more notorious spies like Klaus Fuchs or
the Rosenbergs. His espionage did not take place over a long period of time, nor was he
as entrenched or his expertise as essential to atomic research on the Manhattan Project as
Klaus Fuchs, for example. He was, however, still important as a harbinger of
international tensions to come for a very long time.
Michael S. Goodman. Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and
the Soviet Bomb (Stanford, Stanford University Press: 2007), 8-9.
52 Ibid.
51
25
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Hearings Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy for the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, Part 2, 25 January 1946.
MI5 Security Service at the National Archives of the United Kingdom. File refs. KV
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MI5 Security Service files. File refs. KV 2/2210, (1945), National Archives, United
Kingdom. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/atomic-scientists-1.html.
Official Secrets Act of 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5; Ch. 28).
Rex v. Alan Nunn May, MI5 documents KV/2/2214 (Old Bailey 1946).
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26
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27