Running Head: DISASTER, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Disaster, Public Health, and Law Enforcement
Hurricane Iniki 1992: How Public Health and Law Enforcement Agencies Work Together
Lindsay Ann Abrigo
Dr. Joseph Costa, DHSc., PA-C
MPH 525 – Health Policy and Management
June 10, 2013
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DISASTER, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
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Table of Contents
Chapter
Page
1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………........ 3
2. Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement Agencies ………………... 7
3. Disaster Management and Public Health Policies ……………………………………... 11
4. Summary ……………………………………………………………………………….. 13
5. Recommendations ……………………………………………………………………… 14
References ……………………………………………………………………………………… 16
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On the afternoon of September 11, 1992, a small but intense hurricane struck the state of
Hawaii. While all islands of Hawaii felt the impact of the storm, the islands of Kauai and Oahu
were most impacted (U.S Department of Commerce, National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration, 1993), with the eye passing directly over the island of Kauai. According to
Hendrickson and Vogt (1996), Iniki, meaning strong, piercing wind in Hawaiian, was classified
as a category four storm on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, with sustained winds of
145 mph. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is used to estimate potential property
damage based on a hurricane’s sustained wind speed. A category four hurricane is considered a
major hurricane because of its potential for significant loss of life and damage. The U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
characterizes category four hurricanes as those with sustained winds between 130-156 mph in
which catastrophic damage will occur (2013). Well-built framed houses can sustain severe
damage with loss of most of the roof structure and/or some exterior walls, most trees will be
snapped or uprooted and power poles downed, fallen trees and power poles will isolate
residential areas, and power outages will last weeks to possibly months (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, 2013). According to the Office of the
Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM) National Hurricane Operations Plan, “the SaffirSimpson Scale is not considered valid for the Pacific Islands,” as cited in the U.S. Department of
Commerce, NOAA’s Natural Disaster Survey Report: Hurricane Iniki (1993).
Tropical Depression Eighteen-E organized on September 5, 1992 as the precursor to
Hurricane Iniki in disturbed weather 1,600 miles southwest of Baja California, according to the
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U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA (1993). Eighteen-E was estimated to have wind speeds
of up to 25 mph and moved generally to the west around 10 mph, which continued until the
National Hurricane Center (NHC) passed responsibility for tracking the depression to Central
Pacific Hurricane Center (CPHC) during the morning of September 6, 1992. CPHC monitored
Eighteen-E during the day and by evening, the system appeared to be weakening. CPHC
forecasters had expected the depression to dissipate within 24 hours, but by late morning on
September 7, conditions had changed. Eighteen-E was better organized and stronger.
By the evening of September 7, the cyclone with estimated wind speeds of 40 mph was
upgraded to Tropical Storm Iniki. The following day it continued to intensify and increased its
westward motion to approximately 15 mph. It had developed hurricane force winds by 11 p.m.,
just 510 miles south southwest of Hilo and was moving west northwest at just under 15 mph and
was expected to continue on this course for the next 24 hours with a steady increase in intensity.
On September 10, Iniki was 465 miles south of Honolulu where it be began to slow and turn
northward through the night. But by late morning on September 11, Iniki began to accelerate and
was just 140 south-southwest of Lihue. Top winds had increased to 140 mph with gusts to 175
mph, peak sustained flight level winds at 155 mph, and central pressure at 938 MB, making it the
most intense portion of the storm’s lifetime. Iniki made landfall on the southwest Kauai coast
centered in the Waimea area during the middle of the afternoon on September 11. Iniki
accelerated rapidly northward reaching a forward speed of an estimated 30 mph after leaving the
islands and began to weaken rapidly. By September 13, Iniki was no longer a hurricane and by
September 15 it had become a northeasterly moving extra-tropical low.
Seventy percent, of the housing units on Kauai were damaged, while 50 percent sustained
major damages, stated Hendrickson and Vogt (1996). Approximately 14,350 homes on the island
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were affected with 1,421 destroyed and 5,152 suffering major damages, respectively (U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993). The
damage to Kauai was widespread with only the western sections of the island being spared from
the most severe devastation. Wind damage, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
NOAA (1993) was generally the major contributor and accounted for the most destruction,
although the buildings along the coast that were subject to water damage suffered total
destruction caused by the surf. On Oahu, wind damage was not as widespread as on Kauai,
asserts the U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA, although several homes and other buildings
located along the southwest coast of Barbers Point through Makaha and Kaena Point did suffer
substantial harm (1993).
All Kauai residents were left without electricity and telephone services as 50 percent of
electric lines and poles were destroyed, cited the U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA (1993).
Twenty percent of the power supply was able to be restored four weeks after Hurricane Iniki hit,
but it took nearly four months before all electricity, telephones, and water were restored to all
parts of Kauai were restored (Hendrickson and Vogt, 1996; U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993).
Hurricane Iniki was the costliest and most powerful hurricane to strike the Hawaiian
Islands. In a statement for the Washington Post, Mayor JoAnn Yukimura estimated property
damage on the island at more than $500 million and Kauai Governor John D. Waihee III put the
total for the state at $1 billion (Kamen, 1992). With damage estimates of $1.8 billion dollars,
Iniki is believed to be the sixth costliest hurricane in United States history (U.S Department of
Commerce, National Atmospheric Administration, 1993; 2012; 2013).
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Despite widespread damage, death and injury numbers were low. There is, however, a
conflict in the actual number of reported deaths during Hurricane Iniki. As stated by Kamen
(1992), three people were reported dead and 98 injured. Of these three, according to Mayor
JoAnn Yukimura of Kauai, two of deaths were on Kauai (Kamen, 1992). On the other hand, the
U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA states, “seven persons died from injuries associated with
Iniki while about 100 were injured” (1993; 2012). Of these seven people that were killed, two
mariners were lost when their boat was swamped south of Kauai, one mariner was lost at sea
north of Kauai, one man on Kauai was hit and killed by flying debris, one woman on Kauai was
crushed when her home collapsed on her, one person on Kauai died of a heart attack, and the
seventh person died of a fire on Oahu believed to have been started by a candle used for light
during the power outage caused by Hurricane Iniki. (U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993; 2012).
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Chapter 2
Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement Agencies
On September 13, President Bush made a statement addressing disaster assistance for
Hawaii following Hurricane Iniki. In his statement President Bush mentioned that Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, Wallace Stickney, and the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration and a native Hawaiian, Pat Saiki, were
“already out there coordinating the relief operation,” awaiting the “shipments of water, food,
tents, generators, and other relief supplies being delivered to the island” (Bush, 1992). These
efforts involved the cooperation of State officials; FEMA, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Command (CINCPAC), and other military people worked closely with the Governor of Kauai. In
addition to Governor Waihee’s request, the President also stated, “I’ve declared most of the
island a Federal disaster area, eligible for grants and low-cost loans to cover property losses. We
stand ready to provide further assistance for the Governor to speed the relief” (Bush, 1992).
FEMA officials sent two search and rescue teams were dispatched in advance of the storm along
with 30 to 40 officials from several agencies, including the Public Health Service, the
Transportation Department, the Forest Service, and the American Red Cross (Kamen, 1992).
State Civil Defense
During Hurricane Iniki, the State Civil Defense (SCD) coordinated operations of state
and federal assets with the civil defense (CD) operations of each island. The SCD had little direct
interface with the CPHC relying instead on the Hawaii Warning System (HAWAS), an interisland version of the National Warning System (NAWAS), which is used across the mainland
United States, and the state CD communications circuit, an inter-island data network that also
relays National Weather Service material to emergency managers throughout the islands, for its
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information (U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
1993). Most of the direct CPHC coordination was with the Oahu Civil Defense (OCD) officials.
SCD relies primarily on dedicated phone lines for information coordination, and command and
control purposes, states the U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA, which is supplemented and
backed-up by a radio network of volunteer amateur radio operators (1993). When Iniki knocked
out telephone lines to SCD operations, these operators were used until the National Guard set up
a closed network of satellite radios. Although SCD has the ability to locate amateur radio
operators at the CPHC, this was not done during Iniki.
Oahu Civil Defense
The primary government agency for disaster response is the Oahu Civil Defense Agency
(OCDA), a department in the city and county of Honolulu, states Prizzia (2007). The OCDA
facilitates agency coordination through communication, training, procedures, and information
within the city and county of Honolulu. OCDA also coordinates disaster responsibilities among
various private organizations and educates the public about emergency preparedness (Prizzia,
2007). OCDA personnel continuously review, revise, and test procedures outlined in the EOP.
The administrator of the OCDA also works closely with the mayor and acts as an advisor for
disaster preparedness and emergency management (Prizzia, 2007. The Oahu Civil Defense
(OCD) operational manager assessed the coordination between OCD and CPHC during Iniki as
good but not ideal. It is better that the OCDA received the severe weather warning sooner to
facilitate public evacuation procedures more effectively. CPHC and OCDA staff became
familiarized with the other agency’s facility and mission so that there was an “accelerated and
efficient flow of information during Iniki” (U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, 1993). The local CD office began tracking the storm with the
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CPHC almost 72 hours prior to landfall and when the CPHC issued the tropical storm warning,
the OCD Emergency Operation Center (EOC) was ready and immediately began operation. As
cited by the U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA (1993), it remained in regular contact with
the CPHC via the EOC’s 50 telephone lines.
Civil Defense sirens that reach over 85 percent of the population of Oahu did an effective
job of informing the public of the approaching storm. CD officials did not sound the sirens when
the warning was first issued. Instead, it was decided that it would be more effective to sound the
sirens early on September 11, prior to the morning rush hour. However, this resulted in public
confusion over what to do when the sirens sounded. The standard operating procedure,
advertised in many places throughout the state, called for people to turn on their radio and listen
for instructions, but some people, especially those in outlying areas, particularly on Kauai, took
the siren as a signal to move to the evacuation shelters (U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993). Another concern was that the siren system
could not be turned on selectively to separate parts of the island. Everyone would be warned at
the same time even though the timing or magnitude of the threat may be quite diverse. OCD
sought to look into procuring a selective siren system.
Kauai Civil Defense
Weather Service Office (WSO) Lihue maintains a close relationship with Kauai’s Civil
Defense organization. CD authorities have installed radio equipment in the WSO that is
generally capable of allowing contact even if telephone lines go down. Unfortunately, Iniki
destroyed the antenna on the EOC so it was unusable during most of the storm and its aftermath.
The CD did have access to the HAWAS and the CD communications circuit, thus allowing for
direct voice contact with CPHC, which was not available to WSO Lihue (U.S. Department of
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Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1993). Thus, the CD knew about
the hurricane warning and began dissemination procedures even before the WSO did.
Information updates were provided over these various systems and through personal contacts
until the storm hit. When that occurred, all links, including the radio links with the Kauai EOC,
were severed.
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Chapter 3
Disaster Management and Public Health Policies
Coordination among emergency personnel of the local level in Kauai and Oahu and the
state and federal governments prior to, during, and after Hurricane Iniki significantly minimized
the number of casualties. Local officials on Kauai reported approximately 8,000 people were in
shelters prior to the arrival of Hurricane Iniki (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1993; Prizzia, 2007). After the storm, public shelters were
used to accommodate to some 12,000 people, respectively. On Oahu, 110 public shelters were
opened, and an estimated 30,000 people sought public shelter for evacuation (U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1993). Prizzia stated, “rather than
sending tourists to public shelters, two major hotels kept their visitors in the buildings during the
storm” (2007). The shelters were extremely crowded and people were fearful of the approaching
hazards of Iniki. Officials stated that more shelters needed to be identified and more shelter
managers needed to be trained. Should another hurricane threaten Kauai, officials believed that
many more residents and tourists would seek public shelter. Employees from the Department of
Parks and Recreation, with some support from the American Red Cross, State Department of
Education, the Salvation Army, and volunteers from the University of Hawaii, primarily staffed
the shelters. The shelters on Oahu were opened as “refuge only” shelters so they did not provide
food, cots, blankets, medications, or other comfort items (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1993).
Kauai participates in the National Flood Insurance Program. The NFIP is a Federal
program created by Congress to mitigate future flood losses nationwide through sound,
community-enforced building and zoning ordinances and to provide access to affordable,
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federally backed flood insurance protection for property owners (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). The NFIP is designed to provide an
insurance alternative to disaster assistance to meet the escalating costs of repairing damage to
buildings and their contents caused by floods. As a condition of flood insurance availability,
Kauai County agreed to and has adopted regulations that meet or exceeds NFIP minimum
standards. The NFIP standards call for enforcement of prudent construction practices in flood
hazard areas, which pertain to the construction of new and substantially improved buildings and
to the repair of substantially damaged buildings in flood hazard areas as designated on the Flood
Insurance Rate Map (FIRM). The cornerstone of the NFIP requirements also states that the
lowest floors of buildings must be elevated to or above flood heights shown on the FIRM (1993).
Buildings located in flood hazard areas, according to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, that have been “substantially damaged”
during Hurricane Iniki for whatever reason, must be repaired or reconstructed and a building is
considered substantially damaged “when the cost to fully repair the building equals or exceeds
50 percent of its pre-damaged market value” (1993).
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Chapter 4
Summary
Hurricane Iniki was the most powerful hurricanes to hit the Hawaiian Islands. Effective
disaster preparedness and management require coordination and collaboration among public and
private agencies and organizations on the local, state, and national levels. The massive potential
and actual loss of life and property due to natural disasters compel emergency planners and
managers to improve upon existing disaster readiness and response plans and actions to
minimize the devastating consequences. The damages caused by Iniki were indeed devastating
and amounted to a sobering $1.8 billion, respectively, making it the sixth costliest hurricane
United States history. Despite the damages caused by Hurricane Iniki, the in-place emergency
broadcast and warning system and response of the local, state, and federal responders as well as
the general populace was effective in preventing a larger human tragedy from occurring.
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Chapter 5
Recommendations
It is absolutely necessary that disaster relief be provided immediately in cases of an
emergency such as Hurricane Iniki, especially to a state such as Hawaii that does not have a
neighboring state to provide assistance right away. Food, water, shelter, and medical services
would be of utmost importance. Government officials should seek immediate assistance to find
sources that can provide these necessities to the population impacted by the disaster. It can be
assumed that within the community will be individuals who are doctors or health care
professionals who can provide health care services and aid in treating other individuals that can
be cared for, in case hospital/emergency services are unavailable or inaccessible. These
individuals can delegate and attempt to treat others. Those who are well and able can come
together to gather any supplies, food, and water that are available to sustain everyone until
further assistance from the government arrives.
With regard to the public education about an evacuation or preparedness plan, it is the
responsibility of government officials at all levels and the general public to be well versed and
well prepared on proper procedures in case of an emergency. All levels of government have the
responsibility of providing the necessary materials and resources and making them available to
leaders in the community, such as doctors, business owners, teachers, etc, so that they can
educate others on the importance of hurricane preparedness or just a general evacuation plan.
Providing families and individuals with the necessary information that will better prepare them
in case an emergency was to happen will allow for better outcomes after the disaster or
emergency has passed because they will be equipped with what to have with them, where to go,
what to do or what not to, etc.
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An efficient communication system is crucial in times of emergency. A communication
system should be put into place that can withstand the brunt of any storm or disaster so as to
relay important information as necessary to and from key agencies. There should be a single line
that only government agencies can access through which they can communicate directly to one
another quickly and securely in case an emergency occurs without fear that the landlines or
wireless phones will not work. It is important for the safety of the public as well as the
emergency responders and government personnel that are trying to keep the general public safe
that the communication systems are able to remain operational when disasters strike.
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References
Bush, G. (1992). Remarks on disaster assistance for Hawaii following hurricane iniki. Retrieved
from U.S. Government Printing Office website: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP1992-book2/pdf/PPP-1992-book2-doc-pg1548-2.pdf
Hendrickson, L. A., & Vogt, R. L. (1996). Mortality of Kauai residents in the 12-month period
following Hurricane Iniki. American journal of epidemiology, 144(2), 188-191.
Kamen, A. (1992, September 13). Hawaii hurricane devastates Kauai: Iniki blamed for 3 deaths,
scores of injuries. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/weather/hurricane/poststories/iniki.htm
Prizzia, R. (2007). The role of coordination in disaster management. Disaster Management
Handbook, Retrieved from http://www.huizenga.nova.edu/5463/Readings/C005
Coordination in Disaster Management.Prizzia.pdf
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1993). Hurricane
iniki assessment: Review of hurricane evacuation studies utilization and information
dissemination. Retrieved from Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc. website:
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/hes/docs/postStorm/H_INIKI_ASSESSMENT_REVIEW_HES
_UTILIZATION_INFO_DISSEMINATION.pdf
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2012). The
1992 central pacific tropical cyclone season. Retrieved from National Weather Service
website: http://www.prh.noaa.gov/cphc/summaries/1992.php
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
(1993). Natural disaster survey report: Hurricane iniki. Retrieved from National Weather
Service website: http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/iniki/iniki1.pdf
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
(2013). Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale. Retrieved from National Weather Service
website: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2011). Answers to questions about the national flood insurance program. Retrieved
from website: http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1404
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal
Insurance Administration. (1993). Mitigation Assessment Team Report: Hurricane iniki
in Hawaii. Retrieved from website:
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2767