2ac
Intersectional Feminist Praxis is key to effective forms of knowledge
production and sustained efforts against oppression
Naples ’13 (Nancy- Director; Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of WGSS & Sociology @ Uof Conn) “Sustaining
Democracy: Localization, Globalization, and Feminist Praxis” (xo1)
The call for intersectional analyses were first heard from feminists of color who critiqued approaches that constructed women's
experiences without attention to the ways that race, class, and sexuality shaped their experiences. Subsequent work emphasized
the structural dimensions of what Dorothy Smith (1987) calls the “relations of ruling” and Patricia Hill Collins (1991) terms “the matrix
of domination” that contour different women's experiences. I take a multidimensional approach to intersectionality in considering
models of intersectional feminist praxis (see also Anzaldúa 1987; Collins 1991; Hancock 2007; Sandoval 2000). The first dimension
I highlight relates to the
epistemological formulation that different standpoints are contoured by the
intersection of diverse social experiences and produce different ways of knowing or different
knowledges about social life. Standpoints are achieved in community, through collective
conversations and dialogue among women in marginal social positions, and
through political struggle (Collins 1991; Haraway 1988; Hartsock 1983). Feminist standpoint theorists like Nancy
Hartsock (1999) and Sandra Harding (1986) linked their analysis to Marx's historical materialism, insisting that “our work produces
both our material existence and our consciousness” (Hartsock 1999:47). From the vantage point of intersectional feminist praxis,
knowledge develops directly from lived experiences rather than abstract
theorizing. This dimension speaks to the importance of diverse experiences and voices in enhancing understanding of the
dynamics of oppression and inequality. This intersectional analysis is evident in the following quote from the Combahee River
Collective (1983:264): The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to
struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated
analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions
creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold
and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. Of significance to intersectional feminist praxis, as captured in the
Combahee River Collective's statement, is the importance of reflection on experience in order to transform it into knowledge that is
then available for action. Haraway (1988), Hartsock (1983), and Collins (1991) emphasize that standpoints are achieved in
community, through collective conversations and dialogue among women in marginal social positions, and through political struggle.
This process of transformation is facilitated by a second dimension of intersectional
feminist praxis, empowerment for activism. Empowerment for activism underscores the significance of community
and the availability of safe spaces for providing the context in which individuals can critically reflect on their experiences and political
strategies in dialogue with others. Taking inspiration from Paulo Freire's (1970) analysis of “conscientização,”3 many feminist
activists and educators have developed strategies for empowerment that emphasize nonhierarchical and collective approaches.
a “counterhegemonic”
political process by which “subaltern” women would come together to discuss their
experiences and become aware of structural processes shaping their lives and that
of their communities (Sharma 2008). With this awareness, they would be mobilized to fight
against the different modes of oppression and transform power relationships in their
homes, communities, and larger society. The third dimension of intersectional feminist praxis speaks to the
significance of placing in dialogue situated knowledges generated in multiple
social locations by diverse social actors for generating collaborative strategies
for action. My formulation of this third dimension recognizes the interrelationship or intersections between the “actualities of
Feminists in the field of Gender and Development (GAD) define empowerment as
everyday life” (drawing on Dorothy Smith's [1987] conceptualization), the local context, as well as the social structures or relations of
ruling that are far from view. This
third dimension therefore highlights the interrelated processes
of localization and globalization as well as the diversity of sites and issues for
social justice organizing. The fourth dimension asserts that the knowledges
generated through these practices are used to inform actions that promote social
justice goals. In other words, the primary purpose of the collaborative process of deliberation and knowledge production is
Intersectional feminist
praxis encourages opportunities for cross-movement, cross-issue, and crossclass and -race collaborations that are necessary to sustain social activism and
democratic practice over time. The fifth dimension focuses on the process by
which actions taken as a consequence of these deliberative and participatory
practices are reflected upon to inform future actions. The process of reflexivity is
a collaborative and iterative one that also encourages assessment, critique, and
revision of strategies for inclusion, empowerment, and organizing across
to identify strategies for social action designed to reduce inequality and promote social justice.
differences. Taken together, these five § Marked 23:52 § dimensions
bring into focus the significance of diverse voices and experiences, opportunities
for empowerment to enhance meaningful participation, critical dialogue,
coordinated action across differences, and critical reflection. The implications of these five
dimensions for identifying forms of intersectional feminist praxis are first, the need to assess the extent to which inclusive practices
are utilized that broaden the base for participation in decision making and action, especially as it relates to those decisions that most
directly affect different social actors. The second implication for democratic practice is the need to develop strategies for
empowerment to further expand meaningful political dialogue and activism. The third implication is the provision of ongoing
opportunities to link different analyses derived from diverse social locations and perspectives in order to generate coordinated action
plans. The fourth implication is the importance of identifying and implementing actions that are designed to promote social justice.
And fifth, the significance of critical reflection on the political actions taken as well as, among other issues, such as “who is or is not
deemed to be a legitimate knowledge producer, which spaces, institutions, and languages get excluded from practices of knowledge
making, and with what results” (Nagar and Swarr, 2010:16; see also Bose 2011; Salime 2010) in order to reshape strategies for
inclusion, empowerment, and deliberation as needed for future actions.
Refusal to vote, to pay war taxes, or to participate in capitalist competition
and over-consumption are all important actions when coupled with support
of alternative, non-profit structures (food co-ops, health and law
collectives, recycled clothing and book stores, free schools, etc.).
Thats the aff
Legal education of women has tangible impacts – more female law
students and professors directly correlates with favorable legal change,
their academic theorizing leaves the most vulnerable women by the
wayside
Cain 97 (Patricia A. Cain, Professor of Law and Associate Dean at the University of Iowa College of Law, “The Future Of
Feminist Legal Theory,” 1997 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, Summer,
1997, 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 367)
Law and law schools have a long history of male domination. If one thinks of the world of law
as progressing in Hegelian-like fashion from "thesis" to "antithesis" to "synthesis," then the thesis of " male domination"
remained in full control until at least the early 1970s. There were few women law
students before 1970 and even fewer wo- [*369] men law professors. n4 The decade of the 1970s lay the
groundwork for the "antithesis" to male domination, as women increased their numbers in the legal
academy and in the practice of law. In 1970, the first National Conference on Women and the law was held at
New York University. n5 In 1971, the Supreme Court began to rule in favor of sex
discrimination claims pursued under the fourteenth amendment. n6 One year later,
Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment, and within months at least 20 state legislatures had
ratified the amendment. n7 In 1972, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the lawyer in the 1971 Supreme Court victory, and also
a law professor, helped to organize a conference, again at New York University, on The Law School Curriculum
and the Legal Rights of Women. n8 By the mid 1970s most law schools had developed courses
in Women and the Law, sometimes taught by real faculty, but often taught by adjuncts or by
students themselves under the supervision of a faculty member. These courses focused on criminal law, family law,
During this period, feminist litigators developed
cutting edge theories to help women improve their legal status . For example, feminist
lawyers argued that in determining whether a woman killed in self-defense, the
defendant's perspective as a woman in a gendered world should be taken into account. n9 They also argued for the
first time that sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination. n10 This focus on
antidiscrimination law, and reproductive rights.
harms to women and on the unmasking of the gendered nature of these harms gave rise to a core of feminist scholarship and the
introduction of specialty law school courses, in addition to women and the law courses, known as "feminist jurisprudence" or
"feminist legal theory." [*370] Scholarship using the term "feminist jurisprudence" can be traced to early writings of Ann Scales and
Catharine MacKinnon. n11 The 14th National Conference on Women and the Law, held in Washington D.C. in the spring of 1983
was the first conference to include a panel entitled "Developing a Feminist Jurisprudence." Panelists included LaDoris Hazzard
Cordell, Catharine MacKinnon, Phyllis Segal, and Nadine Taub, a panel intended to mix theory and practice. n12 But even before
the term "feminist jurisprudence" was coined, the Women and the Law Conference had panels that today would be identified as
focusing on feminist jurisprudence or feminist legal theory. n13 In 1991, I published a short essay in the Iowa Law Review, asking
whether feminist legal scholarship was taken seriously by the legal academy as a whole. n14 At the time, I feared that the subject
was being marginalized, despite its prominent publication in the Harvard n15 and Chicago n16 law reviews. Subsequent
developments have shown that my fears were not well founded. By
1996, every leading law school lacking
an established feminist legal theorist was clamoring for one. Articles continue to be published
in leading law reviews and there are several new feminist jurisprudence casebooks. n17 Nonetheless, there are serious questions
about whether this recent support for feminist legal theory or feminist jurisprudence is altogether a good thing. Specialty courses and
The risk of
marginalization concerns me, not just because of the possible tenure crisis for women professors who might
engage in marginalized scholarship, but also because of the separation (via ghettoization) of feminist
legal theory from realms of legal power outside [*371] the academy, e.g., courts and
legislatures. n19 Courts and legislatures are more likely than the academy to
produce real change in individual people's lives. And if the ultimate goal of feminist work in the
academy is to make real changes in women's lives, then feminist legal theory needs to be useful to the
practice of law in real cases. n20 No "synthesis" in male-dominated law will ever result from a feminist "antithesis"
specialty professors who teach them are still subject to marginalization even when in demand. n18
based on scholarly work alone. n21
Aff Solves the K – The legal process the affirmative initiates produces
useful and lasting institutional change and facilitates a revolutionary
reconceptualization of gender discrimination
Cain 97 (Patricia A. Cain, Professor of Law and Associate Dean at the University of Iowa College of Law, “The Future Of
Feminist Legal Theory,” 1997 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, Summer,
1997, 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 367)
When asked to think about the future of feminist legal theory, my focus becomes: how is the theory doing in practice? My short
answer is that feminist
legal theory, in the hands of feminist lawyers, has certainly
produced some short term gains in the lives of real women, but it has not
produced a feminist revolution. Nor should it be expected to have done so. Progress occurs in
stages and legal change tends to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Feminist legal theory must be forever fine-tuning itself to respond to each new
stage in the evolutionary process. In terms of the Hegelian dialectic, we might view the short-term gain position
of women as a partial "synthesis" which creates a new "thesis" from which the battle begins anew. If feminist legal [*372]
theory is to continue the battle successfully and accomplish long term gains, it
must be ever ready to shift in response to each new position or "thesis." In other
words, feminist legal theory must be prepared to construct an immediate critique of each short term gain (the antithesis step) and, at
practically the same moment, it must be prepared to construct a new thesis (the synthesis step). n22 This
move from
new thesis (usually a short-term solution) to critique of that thesis is required in
part by the nature of law reform. n23 The law is reluctant to give up old and familiar categories. Thus once a new
legal category is created, the law tends to force it into familiar old frameworks. Feminist legal theory needs to anticipate this
tendency and be prepared with a critique that will help new categories resist this domesticating tendency. Feminist legal theory
might create change that was more revolutionary if it were able in the future to move from antithesis to synthesis more quickly than it
has done in the past. Certainly the increase in the number of feminists in the legal academy and the various critiques that we offer
(often of each other) make it possible for change to occur more rapidly. B. Some Examples. At the NWLSA conference in Madison,
Martha Chamallas n24 identified three moves typically made by feminist legal theorists. I will use examples of two of these "moves"
to demonstrate how feminist legal theory must be positioned to respond to law's tendency to push new categories back into familiar
frameworks. 1. Is the Gender Classification Valid? The first move identified by Chamallas was this: when you see a gender
classification, ask whether the classification is valid. I associate this move with the first wave of feminism (which, for example,
questioned the male-only vote) and with the early days of the second wave (which, for example, questioned gender restrictions in
the workplace such as male-only police forces and male-only pilots). Many short-term gains have been earned by practitioners who
mounted legal chal- [*373] lenges to gender classifications which resulted in the expansion of public benefits (e.g., jobs and
education) to previously excluded individual women. To accomplish these gains, one thesis in need of challenge was that men
belonged in the public sphere as worker whereas women belonged in the private sphere of home and family. n25 One critique of
this thesis (the antithesis) was that if contributions to the public sphere of work were based on ability and merit, then there was no
justification for excluding women who proved to be as able and meritorious as men. n26 In the short run, this "women are as
competent as men" argument won and created short term gains for women who were as competent as men, so long as they were
also unburdened by family needs. In 1964, Congress bought this argument and enacted Title VII, prohibiting sex discrimination in
places of employment. n27 As originally introduced, Title VII barred only race discrimination in employment. The amendment to ban
sex discrimination as well was introduced by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia on February 8, 1964. It is often reported that
Smith's true intent was to defeat the bill as a whole on the theory that no one would support a bill that required employers to hire
women. Alternatively, some scholars report that the inclusion of "sex" in the final bill was intended as a joke. n28 While it is true that
many legislators who voted to include sex along with race did end up voting against the final bill and while it is also true that several
legislators could not resist speaking humorously about the abilities of the "fairer sex," the situation was a bit more complex than
most of these reports indicate. The vote to include "sex" was not purely a joke, nor was it solely the work of southern opponents of
racial integration. The National Women's Party had lobbied for the amendment and it was supported by key female legislators. On
the other hand, the Women's Bureau and the President's Commission on the Status of Women opposed the amendment to add sex,
arguing that race and sex should be kept separate. These opponents were concerned in part about the work/family conflicts that
would arise for [*374] women in the workplace and thought that adding "sex" to Title VII would not address this issue. Those who
supported including sex had supported the Equal Rights Amendment and saw Title VII as an opportunity to accomplish in the
The enactment
of Title VII might be viewed as a new thesis that resulted from feminist
arguments about equality in the workplace . Title VII was not the only victory for feminist equality
arguments. In the early 1970s, a variety of anti-sex-discrimination laws were passed
by Congress. Bella Abzug, a member of Congress in those days, reported that there was virtually no opposition to the
concept of equal rights for women in those days. n30 Those laws gave women the right to claim
public benefits, but gave no thought to the existential reality of women's lives. Thus, there were no provisions dealing with
pregnancy and childcare, issues that were certain to arise once more women moved into the workforce. It is worth noting
that these early legislative victories occurred long before the legal academy had
become populated with women. Indeed, they occurred long before anyone had coined the phrase "feminist legal
workplace what the ERA would have accomplished in cases involving governmental discrimination. n29
theory." Once "feminist legal theory" did appear on the scene, its role in addressing workforce gender barriers appeared to be one of
responding to the problems of pregnancy and childcare after those problems arose. n31 The explanation for this "responsive"
stance, as opposed say to a "predictive" stance, was not that early feminists in the academy were incapable of predicting what the
problems would be once male-only workforce rules were removed, but rather, that there were so few feminists in the academy and
that courts and legislatures seemed to listen only to those feminist arguments they could understand in terms of existing categories.
Sex equality was the new thesis, but the creators of this new law, courts and legislatures, explained the new thesis using old,
familiar doctrines. The radical notion that the law should ignore or undo distinctions made on the basis of sex quickly became the
doctrine that women who were similarly situated to men should be treated the same as men, and nothing more. Pregnancy was a
fact that made women different from men and thus, pregnancy was outside the new doctrine [*375] of sex equality. Feminists
responded in different ways to this conservative doctrine. Some argued that pregnancy was just another condition of the human
body that could easily be analogized to conditions experienced by men. In other words, they argued that men and women were
similarly situated and thus the conservative doctrine was available to provide benefits for pregnant women similar to benefits
provided for temporarily disabled men. n32 Other feminists argued that pregnancy was a difference that the law ought to address,
and that affirmative action was necessary to create sex equality, given the difference of pregnancy. n33 Still other feminists
questioned the core notion of sex equality as it was being developed by the courts, arguing that courts were applying pre-existing
male norms. n34 Thus, they claimed, an altogether new theory of sex discrimination that questioned pre-existing norms was
required. To answer the question is the gender classification valid, one must have a theory of sex discrimination. Some theories
would strike down every explicit classification, arguing either that gender is always irrelevant or that it is unjust to bar all women
when there are always exceptions. n35 Other theories prefer to retain flexibility and argue that, unlike race discrimination, sex
theories that are likely to create
lasting change, even revolutionary change , although perhaps at an evolutionary pace, are those
theories that attempt to explain what the harm of sex discrimination is . n37 The harm
of sex discrimination is something much more complex than legally imposed
gender classifications. Legal rules, explicit or implicit, n38 that burden women are but one means
of inflicting the harm of sex discrimination. To determine whether to strike those
rules, reform them, or create new, compensatory rules, one must identify the harm that
needs to be remedied and must understand the context in which the current
remedy is being applied.
differences are sometimes relevant. n36 [*376] In my opinion, however, the
Racism Turn A. The negative’s focus on undifferentiated “male violence” normalizes
women as white and ignores the racist history of the feminist movement
Coulson 86 (Kum-Kum Bhavnani and Margaret Coulson, “Transforming Socialist-Feminism: The Challenge of Racism,”
Feminist Review, No. 23, Socialist-Feminism: Out of the Blue (Summer, 1986), pp. 81-92)
In our conversations, both with each other and with others, we have tried to identify some of the problems of entering into these
black women and white women
have different histories and different relationships to present struggles, in Britain and
internationally. White women who enter these debates must acknowledge the
material basis of their power in relation to black people, both women and men. It
is also necessary to acknowledge the complexities of this power relationship -as
between white women and black men, where white women may be privileged, oppressed, or
both. In contributing to these discussions white women cannot avoid the legacy of racism
within feminism. This legacy has a long history which includes the dominance of eugenicism in
both the early and more recent birth control movements, the eager acceptance by
the majority of the suffragettes of imperialistic nationalism , and at best, the failure
of anti-rape campaigns to challenge racist stereotypes of the sexuality of black
men. Not only have these generally not taken up racism as an issue, nor seen how their campaigns against
male violence are complicated in the context of racism , but by their actions they have reaffirmed
discussions, given the tensions that are involved. This means recognizing that
racist ideas by marching through black areas and calling for greater policing.
B. The affirmative solves the turn by pursuing legal reform – creates lasting
change
Austin 89 (Regina, Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., University of Rochester, 1970; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1973, “Sapphire Bound,” Wisconsin Law Review May, 1989/June, 1989 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539)
It is imperative that our writing acknowledge and patently reflect that we are not
the voices of a monolithic racial/sexual community that does not know class
divisions or social and cultural diversity. This recognition should check the basically conservative impulse
to rely on generalizations about racism and sexism that are the product of our own [*545] experiences. n22 It should also make us
vigilant about lapsing into outrageous themes which suggest that black people are united by biological essences that produce in all
Our positions as "scholars" set us apart to some
extent from the women about whom we write, and our work would be better if we
acknowledged the distance and attempted to bridge it. For a start, we must accept that
there is skepticism about both the law and intellectual pursuits n24 in our communities. It
of us a refined instinctive sense of justice. n23
accordingly behooves us to eschew the role of self-annointed spokespersons for our race and sex and instead take our lead as
we must be responsive to
the attacks that are leveled against us as well-paid, relatively assimilated
professionals. As we are validly critiqued, so should we critique. We are obliged, therefore, to look at the needs and
teachers and scholars from the ongoing liberation politics of black women. Moreover,
problems of black women to determine the role black elites (male and female) have played in their creation or perpetuation. n25
Similarly, in
seeking jurisprudential reference points in the wisdom of black women
at the bottom of the status hierarchy, n26 we must reject the romanticization of their "difference." It is
patronizing, tends to support our position as intermediaries, and ignores the role that state-tolerated violence, material deprivation,
and the dominant ideology play in minority cultural production. We
must not be deterred from maintaining
a critical stance from which to assess what black women might do to improve
their political and economic positions and to strengthen their ideological
defenses. At the same time, however, we must scrupulously avoid the insensitive disparagement of black women that ignores
the positive, hopeful, and life-affirming characteristics of their actual struggles, and thereby overlooks the basis for more overt
political activity. Our contributions will not be divisive to the cause of the liberation of minority peoples and women if our scholarship
Anti-racist or anti-sexist scholarship that
is overinclusive and abstract is dangerous because it [*546] misconceives the often
knotty structural nature of the conditions that are its subject. In addition, such
scholarship frequently reflects the assumption that oppressed groups are pitted
against one another in a competition for scarce attention and resources, with the
victory going to the most downtrodden. (I call this phenomenon "the running of the oppression
is based on the concrete, material conditions of black women.
sweepstakes.") For example, the much-touted concept of the "feminization of poverty" would be fine if it did not obscure the reality
Black
women in particular have much to gain from efforts to understand the complexity
of the interaction of race, sex (including sexual orientation), and class factors in
the creation of social problems. n28 The mechanics of undertaking a research
project based on the concrete material and legal problems of black women are
daunting. The research is hard to do, but I believe it can be done. I have twice embarked on such projects. My first effort
that poverty varies with race, has a class dimension, and in many minority communities afflicts both sexes. n27
concerned industrial insurance, the rip-off life insurance with the small face amounts that my mother and grandmother purchased.
n29 I was stymied because of a lack of information going beyond my own experience regarding the motivations that prompt poor
black people to spend so much for essentially burial protection. I have more nexus with, respect for, and intellectual curiosity about
the cultures of poor black people than to mount a scholarly project on the assumption that the women in my family are typical of the
whole. The
second project grew out of my interest in the causes of excess death in
minority communities or what is the unacknowledged genocide of the poor black,
brown, and red peoples of America. n30 I [*547] decided to start with the problem of infant mortality. The infant
mortality rate for blacks was 18.2 per 1,000 live births in 1985 as compared with 9.3 per 1,000 live births for whites. n31 I thought
that I would begin by examining the extent to which the vilification of the cultural modes and mores of low-income minority females
affects the prenatal care they receive. The inquiry would then extend to the role the law might play in curbing the mistreatment or
non-treatment of pregnant women of color. I have not entirely abandoned this one. The problems these projects involve are difficult
The world with which many
legal scholars deal is that found within the four corners of judicial opinions. If the
because they do not begin with a case and will not necessarily end with a new rule.
decisions and the rubrics they apply pay no attention to race, sex, and class (and the insurance and malpractice cases generally do
not), then
the material conditions of minority females are nowhere to be found, and
the legal aspects of the difficulties these conditions cause are nearly impossible
to address as a matter of scholarly inquiry. It is thus imperative that we find a way
to portray, almost construct for a legal audience, the contemporary reality of the
disparate groups of minority women about § Marked 23:58 § whom we
write. We really cannot do this without undertaking field research or adopting an interdisciplinary approach, relying on the
empirical and ethnographic research of others. The latter route is the one that I have taken in this Article and elsewhere. n32
Interdisciplinary research provides additional benefits. It gets one out of the law school and among scholars who are supportive and
receptive to modes of analysis that are not Eurocentric or patriarchal. I have found that academics from other parts of the university
where I [*548] teach supply the intellectual community, stimulation, and encouragement that are essential to doing research.
Furthermore, black scholars from other disciplines have provided me with useful strategies for dealing with the hostility my
intellectual agenda might evoke. Looking at legal problems against the context of non-legal perspectives has its dangers. The legal
scholar's obligation to take the law seriously generally requires that her writing be legalistic -- that she show the inadequacy of the
existing rules, and either propose clever manipulations of the doctrine that overcome the weaknesses exposed by her critique or
draft model legislation. This approach tends to collapse the inquiries into what black people need and want, and what they are likely
to get, into one. The conservatism that is an inherent part of traditional doctrinal legal analysis can be a stifling handicap for the
black female researcher. Speculation concerning proposals that are not rule-bound and lawyer-controlled (like, for example,
strategies by which poor women might increase their power to shape the gynecological services provided by health care facilities
ostensibly serving them) n33 seems beyond the pale. That is utopian politics, not law or legal scholarship. Of course, black people
get almost nowhere in terms of gaining and enforcing legal entitlements without also exercising their political clout or scaring white
people. (Truly powerless people do not "get" rights on account of their helplessness, and the rights they do "get" are protected only
the black feminist legal scholar must be
able to think political and talk legal if need be. Her pedagogical mission should extend to educating
so long as they are backed up by the threat of disruption.) Thus,
black women about the political significance of their ordinary lives and struggles. She must translate their frustrations and
aspirations into a language that both reveals their liberatory potential and supports the legal legitimacy of their activism and their
The remedies we contemplate must go beyond intangibles . We must
consider employing the law to create and sustain institutions and organizations
that will belong to black women long after any movement has become quiescent
and any agitation has died. Full utilization of the economic, political, and social resources that black women
demands. [*549]
represent cannot depend on the demand of a society insincerely committed to an ethic of integration and equal opportunity.
The permutation is the best option – history is marked by extreme and
ongoing violence, but the response CANNOT be to turn to violence
ourselves, as the alternative requires, only through the creation of
commonality, by recognizing the possibility for social hope can the future
be reclaimed
Enns 13 (Diane Enns, PhD Suny Binghamton, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Peace Studies, McMaster University,
“Just Rage: Politics Without Consensus” in On Terror and Extreme Violence, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade:
forthcoming 2013)
Arendt stresses often enough the
devastating effects of violence on politics, arguing, as
Rancière does regarding terrorism, that violence is for the most part at cross--‐
purposes with political life. But ultimately, faced with the grim reality of the Holocaust, she is unable to say violence
is never justifiable. In one of the most intriguing passages of On Violence, we read: "Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be
legitimate. Its justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end recedes
into the future. No one questions the use of violence in self--‐defense, because the danger is not only clear but also
present, and the end justifying the means is immediate."67 The distinction she makes between legitimate and justifiable helps us to
manage the contradiction between the belief that harming or taking another human life is wrong—unlawful, illegitimate—and yet
after the fact, paradoxically just or reasonable, provided there was no other means of escape or possibility of resistance. It is not an
absolute principle of nonviolence we need to establish if we agree that self--‐defense is a right. The
challenge for us is
to consider, in each case, at what point self--‐ defense ceases to be self--‐defense
and becomes something else: a pre--‐emptive attack, premeditated murder, a
"disposition matrix." The temporal aspect matters—we can't justify violence as self--‐defense
if its proposed ends are found far in the future. But we could establish the care for existence
as a universal principle, or a politics of civility that is essentially a politics of the right to
have rights, a politics that establishes the conditions for all politics . Concretely this
means we must do everything possible to preserve these conditions. Rather than
repeat the well--‐worn question—when is violence justifiable?—we might ask
instead: what can we find in our power to do at this very moment to protect the
space of exchange and agreement? How do we keep open this space, guard its
fragility from those who would destroy it, especially in the face of tyranny, of
brutal repression fueled by fear of the just rage of the masses? I am arguing that we could
amend the terms of Rancière's tenth thesis on politics to read: The essence of politics resides not in the
modes of dissensual subjectivation that reveal a society in its difference to itself,
but in the modes of consensual subjectivation that reveal a society in what is
common to itself. The intractable nature of many conflicts in the world today
makes this "common to itself" extraordinarily difficult to find, but all the more
necessary. The only hope of reversing the effects of extreme violence, and
preventing further cycles of violence, rests in finding the fragile points of contact
between individuals and groups, friends and enemies, victims and perpetrators, all
suffering the aftermath of violence to varying degrees. Crossing the threshold to
violence means "that politics may vanish entirely from the world." Now, in this "era of
protest," the desperate yearning for what Arendt specified as the content of political life—inserting ourselves into
the world by word and deed, beginning something entirely new—might give birth
to new forms of agreement and civility .
1ar
Reformism is effective and brings revolutionary change closer rather than
pushing it away
Richard Delgado 9, self-appointed Minority scholar, Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the
University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for
outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer
Prize nomination. Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590
CLS critique of piecemeal reform¶ Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal
reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale
reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social
system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize
oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the
occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as
evidence that the system is fair and¶ just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the¶ common law or using the case method in law school is a
2. The
disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars¶ urge law professors to abandon the case
method, give up the effort to find rationality and order¶ in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion.¶
The CLS critique of
piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court
victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand . The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other
oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them. A court
order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized
housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order
keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does
to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to
assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now ,¶
unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental
changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away.
Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for
further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants‘ union meeting in their
heated living room. CLS scholars‘ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these
possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes,
will be what we want.