What support has the UK provided? - Department for International

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Type of Review: Annual Review
Project Title: Libya Humanitarian Situation
Date started:
Date review undertaken:
01/03/2011
07/09/2012
Introduction and Context
What support has the UK provided?
During the uprising In Libya (Feb 2011), the protection of civilians was a key concern. The UK,
together with international partners, was committed to supporting Libyan efforts to meet basic
humanitarian needs and save lives. Strong coordination amongst key humanitarian partners
was critical to ensure a timely and effective response, based on international humanitarian
needs. The UK’s humanitarian response to the crisis in Libya has saved lives, prevented
suffering and maintained the dignity of about 1.6 million civilians affected by the conflict.
What support the UK provided
The UK humanitarian response has focused on three priority areas:
a) Protection of civilians: We helped ensure civilians were protected from violence, abuse
and exploitation and supported awareness-raising on international humanitarian law
and human rights. The UK provided support to repatriate 12,493 people by air and
evacuate and repatriate 2647 people by sea including from Misrata. Our support also
helped to protect over a million people from mines and unexploded ordinance.
b) Assistance for survival: We provided for immediate humanitarian needs (health, food,
shelter, water and sanitation) for Libyans and third country nationals (TCNs) through
international humanitarian agencies. UK support enabled 2,500 trauma related
surgeries to be performed, provided emergency health supplies for 30,000 people, food
for 27,864 people, water purification for 7,000 people and emergency shelter for the
vulnerable, including 2,110 tents and 7,700 blankets.
c) Effective International Coordination: We supported the leadership, coordination,
preparedness, response and forward planning of international humanitarian agencies.
The overall result was an effective UN led and coordinated humanitarian response,
which provided timely assistance based on humanitarian needs.
How support was provided
The UK has delivered humanitarian aid in a fast and flexible way, on the basis of needs, value
for money and focused on delivering results and impact. The delivery of our support has been
channelled in large part through multilateral humanitarian partners, who are best placed to
deliver aid quickly to respond to urgent needs. We built on our knowledge of effective
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agencies and the results of the recent DFID Multilateral Aid Review, which enabled Ministers
to rapidly allocate support to effective agencies such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
The UK has provided humanitarian support in a range of ways including:

Technical Assistance: DFID humanitarian advisers on the Tunisian and Egyptian
borders, in Malta, Cairo and Libya itself and air operations advisors seconded to
UNHCR;
 In kind support: We provided tents, blankets and flights directly to humanitarian
agencies dealing with those in need of shelter and repatriation at the borders;
 Partner funding: We contributed to the UN emergency appeals, including funding for
the International Office of Migration (IOM), UNHCR, ICRC, United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), World Health Organisation (WHO)
and International Medical Corps (IMC);
 Advocacy: We have called for free and unfettered humanitarian access to affected
populations and lobbied other donors to support humanitarian efforts in Libya.
Total funding
An allocation of £18.4 million (February 2011 – December 2012) for humanitarian assistance.
What are the expected results?
The UK Government’s humanitarian response to the crisis in Libya saved lives, prevented
suffering, and supported the dignity of civilians affected by the conflict. Overall, the range of UK
interventions has supported up to 1.6 million people. The results are set out in detail in the
logframe attached to the business case for this project.
(a) Protection of civilians
We helped to ensure civilians were protected from violence, abuse and exploitation and
supported awareness-raising on international humanitarian law and human rights. The results
were to provide the vulnerable with life-saving emergency shelter (2,110 tents and 7,700
blankets The UK provided support to repatriate 12,493 people by air and evacuate and
repatriate 2,647 people by sea including migrant workers and injured civilians from Misrata. We
are also helping to protect over one million people (including 450,000 children) from the dangers
of mines and unexploded ordinance in Eastern and Western Libya.
(b)
Assistance for Survival
We provided for immediate humanitarian needs (health, food, shelter, water and sanitation) for
Libyans and Third Country Nationals through support to ICRC, WHO, UNICEF, WHO, IMC and
UNHCR. The results on health include over 20,000 patients treated, over 2,500 surgical
operations and over 450 patients medically evacuated, the provision of emergency health
supplies for 30,000 people and early development support for 3,750 children. Food was
provided for 27,864 people and water distribution and purification for 7,000 people.
(c)
Effective International Coordination
The UK supported the leadership, coordination, preparedness, response and planning of
international humanitarian agencies, including through the in-country cluster system. The overall
result was an effective UN led and coordinated humanitarian response, which ensured
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contingency plans were in place and provided timely assistance based on humanitarian need.
What is the context in which UK support is provided?
The uprising that began in February 2011 triggered a political and security crisis across Libya.
A timely response from the UK helped to prevent a logistical problem from developing into a
humanitarian emergency when large numbers of people fled over the borders. The UK
response was instrumental in galvanising action from the rest of the international community.
As the crisis unfolded, humanitarian needs emerged along the border and in areas of conflict,
requiring a range of needs to be met. The east of the country quickly regained a degree of
normal life (though pockets of need remained), but conditions in the west were difficult as
fighting intensified and access was restricted. In particular, urgent relief was required in the
city of Misrata which had been under siege by Gadhafi’s forces for several weeks. Other areas
affected by conflict such as the Nafusah Mountains, Tripoli and Sirte, also required
humanitarian assistance.
From the onset, the UK took a leadership role in responding to the humanitarian situation
through its role in the UN and in leading the humanitarian response with the US, Australia and
the EU. The UK was one of the first to respond and support the ICRC and other specialised
agencies such as IMC, UNICEF and WHO. This included support for the provision of doctors,
medical supplies, medical equipment and food. The UK also provided tents and blankets to
shelter Libyans driven out of their homes by the fighting, and supported IOM to evacuate
vulnerable migrant workers and injured civilians from Misrata.
The UK focused on areas where it could add value, using our comparative advantage as a
fast, flexible donor and ensured that we supported interventions that offered a timely,
appropriate and high quality response. We worked to identify and meet gaps in the
humanitarian response that others were not able to address. We were well placed to do this
through our advisers on the ground, who assessed and monitored the humanitarian situation.
Post-conflict, DFID humanitarian activities continued to play an important role in supporting
early recovery efforts. Our support for demining is helping to protect over a million civilians
from death or injury from unexploded ordnance and has helped thousands of people return
safely to their homes. The ICRC has continued to work with the Libyan authorities in order to
support returnees to Sirte and Bani Walid, to address the protection needs of vulnerable
minority groups, and to address other residual humanitarian needs in areas including health
and shelter. WHO has continued to work with DFID funds to provide assistance to mental
health support services.
Section A: Detailed Output Scoring
Output 1: Increased protection of civilians - Libyan and third country nationals – from
the immediate effects of armed conflict in line with International Humanitarian Law
(IHL).
Output 1 score and performance description:
A – Output met expectation
Progress against expected results:
3
We helped to ensure civilians were protected from violence, abuse and exploitation and
supported awareness-raising on international humanitarian law and human rights. The results
were to provide the vulnerable with life-saving emergency shelter (2,110 tents and 7,700
blankets), repatriate 12,493 people by air and evacuate and repatriate 2,647 people by sea
including from Misrata. We also helped protect over one million people (including 450,000
children) from the dangers of mines and unexploded ordinance in Eastern and Western Libya.
Results achieved against logframe output targets:

35 flights for the repatriation of those fleeing to the border camps in Tunisia.

12,493 migrants repatriated by air, and 2,647 evacuated/repatriated by sea from Sfax
and Misrata.

With UK and other funding, IOM evacuated by sea a total of 8,432 migrants from
Misrata between April and August 2011.

Deployment of 50 emergency experts to conduct family tracing, support for the
establishment of asylum seekers, visits to detainees and other protection activities.

De-mining teams operational in eastern, central and western Libya to reduce the risk of
unexploded ordnance to up to 1 million people.
Recommendations:

Acting early to repatriate third country nationals fleeing Libya’s borders helped to avoid
greater humanitarian consequences. We worked closely with IOM to encourage them to
focus on a longer term, funded operation which allowed them to respond to needs more
quickly and flexibly. IOM managed this arrangement well and should be encouraged to
do so in future situations.

Channelling a large proportion of our funding through ICRC helped allow this focus on
protection issues. ICRC has also had a longer-lasting presence in Libya than many
NGOs and so has been able to follow up on persistent protection issues such as on
detainees and marginalised and displaced groups.

Following the appointment of the Transitional Government in November 2011 and the
set-up of the Libyan Mine Action Centre, UNMAS has had difficulty in establishing a
clear role in supporting the coordination of mines action activities and on agreeing its
mandate with the Libyan Government. Relationship-building, communication and a
pragmatic approach is important to ensure that UNMAS can properly fulfil its role
building the capacity of the local mines organisation and in bringing its expertise to
support coordination.
Impact Weighting (%): 40%
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N
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Output 2:Provision of assistance for Libyans, Third Country Nationals and refugees
Output 2 score and performance description:
A – Output met expectations
Progress against expected results:
We provided for immediate humanitarian needs (health, food, shelter, water and sanitation) for
Libyans and Third Country Nationals through support to ICRC, WHO, UNICEF, WHO, IMC
and UNHCR. The results on health include over 20,000 patients treated, over 2,500 surgical
operations and over 450 patients medically evacuated, the provision of emergency health
supplies for 30,000 people and early development support for 3,750 children. Food was
provided for 27,864 people and water distribution and purification for 7,000 people.
Results achieved against logframe output targets:
 Emergency health kits for 30,000 people.
 Obstetric kits and midwifery kits for 200 deliveries.
 Facilitated deployment of medical staff to carry out over 2,500 surgical operations and
to escort 500 patients from Misrata for treatment in Benghazi, capacity building of
medical staff at pharmacies as well as hospitals.
 3,510 tents and 45,700 blankets for Libya and the Tunisian border.
Recommendations:

Important to put mechanisms in place where possible to account for distribution of relief
items, for example simple agreements with local councils or relief organisations over
the ownership and distribution of the items.
Impact Weighting (%): 40%
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Output 3: Improved leadership, coordination, preparedness and response by
international humanitarian agencies
Output 3 score and performance description:
A - Output met expectations
Progress against expected results:
The UK supported the leadership, coordination, preparedness, response and planning of
international humanitarian agencies, including through the in-country cluster system. The
overall result was an effective UN led and coordinated humanitarian response, which ensured
contingency plans were in place and provided timely assistance based on humanitarian need.
Results achieved against logframe output targets:
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 Air operations specialists supported by UK aid funding for support to UNHCR
repatriation efforts: 3 specialists for one month, then 2 specialists for one month.
 Funded health cluster coordinator to continue in post until December 2011.
 All key areas (Libya, borders of Libya, London) have DFID humanitarian capacity in
place to provide information for needs based DFID programming and humanitarian
information.
Recommendations:

Local, regional and diaspora organisations and private traders played a major role in
meeting humanitarian needs in Libya during the crisis. These actors were probably able
to deliver a greater volume of food and fuel to those in need than the international
community was able to do, because of their level of risk-taking, greater freedom of
movement, and greater local knowledge, contacts and connections with local
information
networks
on
where
needs
were
greatest.

The UN Cluster system brought together UN agencies, NGOs, bilaterals and
multilaterals and tried hard to coordinate with the poorly-staffed Libyan Aid organisation
LibAid. However with such a large amount of support being provided outside the
Cluster system, it is advisable to make every effort to coordinate with non-traditional
actors and to use the information from these actors to better target the international
effort.

In other Arab Spring contexts in particular, more efforts need to be made by the
traditional international coordination mechanisms (including DFID) to establish working
relationships, share information and coordinate with Arab/Gulf actors such as Qatar,
UAE and Turkey. These countries played a major role in providing humanitarian relief
and supporting the revolution.
Impact Weighting (%): 20%
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Risk: Medium
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Section B: Results and Value for Money.
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1. Progress and results
1.1 Has the logframe been updated since last review? N
1.2 Overall Output Score and Description:
A – Output met expectations
1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries
Obtaining direct feedback from beneficiaries is difficult in a crisis context. However, IOM has
collated a number of beneficiary stories which are included in their reports to us (see Quest
3116975 and 3291783). One is included here:

Babul is a Bangladeshi migrant who travelled to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 5 May
to work at a building construction company. He had worked very hard to accumulate
220,000 Bangladeshi taka (USD 3,055) for travel and a two-year contract with the
company. He used to send BDT 20,000 every month to support his mother, two
brothers and five sisters.

However, by the end of February, amidst the violence, Babul crossed to the Egyptian
border. There, he lived with thousands of other destitute Bangladeshis in the worst of
conditions. He had no access to food and water and slept on the road at night. Some
days, he would survive only on a biscuit and little water.

Finally, after weeks of struggle and almost giving up hope, Babul was contacted by
IOM officials, who arranged flights, documentation and subsequent travel back to
Bangladesh. In Dhaka, he was greeted by IOM staff and assisted until he boarded his
bus and travelled back home to his family. He says he is truly indebted to IOM for its
timely assistance, but he also hopes that IOM will collaborate with the government on
initiatives to help him and others like him get back on their feet.
1.4 Summary of overall progress
The UK Government’s humanitarian response to the crisis in Libya has saved lives,
prevented suffering, and supported the dignity of civilians affected by the conflict. Overall, the
range of UK interventions has supported up to 1.6 million people through the three areas of
our Strategic Framework: protection of civilians, assistance for survival and effective
international humanitarian coordination.
1.5 Annual Outcome Assessment
A – Outcome met expectation.
Performance against outcome indicators:

Approximately 1.55 million people affected by the conflict assisted by UK aid supported
humanitarian interventions

Over 15,000 people repatriated or evacuated
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Over 2,500 trauma related surgeries performed.
2. Costs and timescale
2.1 Is the project on-track against financial forecasts:
The nature of humanitarian support in a crisis situation is that it is responsive to needs as they
arise. Funding has been provided in line with commitments.
2.2 Key cost drivers
Key cost drivers included cost of repatriation flights, cost of non-food items (tents and
blankets), operating costs for organisations delivering using our funding, including
accommodation, security, transport and communications.
Direct procurement is through the CHASE-OT contract and other existing and competitively
tendered contracts (e.g. Air Services). DFID ensures that our service contracts and prequalifying arrangements offer value for money and are open to competition when the contracts
come up for renewal, in order to obtain best value for money.
2.3 Is the project on-track against original timescale: Y
3. Evidence and Evaluation
3.1 Assess any changes in evidence and implications for the project
Context in which this project was implemented is set out on pages 2-3 above.
3.2 Where an evaluation is planned what progress has been made? N/A
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4. Risk
4.1 Output Risk Rating: Medium
4.2 Assessment of the risk level
Medium: The majority of the humanitarian support has been delivered on time in response to
identified need – the mine clearance programme, delivered through UNMAS, is due to be
completed by December 2012. Recent security incidents in Benghazi have led to a review of
security by donors and implementing partners but it is not anticipated to impact delivery of the
remaining activities.
4.3 Risk of funds not being used as intended
Low. The majority of the funding was used to procure flights or fund IOM to procure flights,
make contributions to appeals of large, reputable international humanitarian organisations
such as ICRC, or to NGOs, in which case we carefully monitored expenditure, deliverables
and results through accountable grants.
4.4Climate and Environment Risk
Low: Implementing partners take the appropriate mitigating actions and activities such as mine
clearance are anticipated to have positive benefit to the local environment.
5. Value for Money
5.1 Performance on VfM measures
The unit costs tended to be low where humanitarian supplies were delivered. Where unit costs
were higher this reflected start-up and coordination costs that provided a foundation for further
work. Goods and services procured directly by DFID compared favourably with those procured
by multilaterals. Repatriations/evacuation costs were very high cost per capita however costs
of supporting someone in camp were also high and still left the problem of getting people
home eventually.
5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money
Multilateral and international NGO procurement processes were used in procuring
humanitarian supplies, transportation and deploying the necessary technical expertise. These
adequately monitored value for money and competitive costs within the constraints of the
context. Where goods and services have been procured directly by DFID, value for money is
obtained through the CHASE-OT contracting process.
5.3 Role of project partners
Main project partners are multilateral agencies (WHO, UNICEF, ICRC, IOM, UNHCR and
UNMAS) and international NGOs (IMC and MAG). The multilaterals have strong systems for
financial accountability and their management budgets are reasonable compared with the
project’s outputs. The international NGOs budgets were carefully scrutinised and costs
deemed appropriate given the goods and services delivered and the intended impact.
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5.4 Does the project still represent Value for Money : Y
5.5 If not, what action will you take?
6. Conditionality
6.1 Update on specific conditions
N/A
7. Conclusions and actions
Without the live-saving and protection interventions described above, the humanitarian impact
on the civilian population of Libya would have been much greater:
o Protection of civilians: Without repatriations from the borders and evacuations from
Misrata, the number of TCNs left without shelter, food and water would have been
much higher. Without repatriations from the borders, numbers in the camps would
have built up and a humanitarian crisis may have developed.
o Assistance for survival: Without providing emergency health support, morbidity rates
from the conflict would have been higher.
o Effective international humanitarian coordination: Without an effective early
humanitarian response, integrated with HMG’s wider political and economic actions,
unrest in Libya and on its borders could potentially have been worse and more
destabilising for the region.
This project is complete except for the support to UNMAS for mines action work. We will
continue to monitor UNMAS’s progress in undertaking the UK-funded de-mining work in
western Libya, their work on risk education, their efforts to coordinate mines action work and
to build capacity of the Libyan Mines Action Centre.
8. Review Process
This was an internal desk review based on reports provided on a regular basis by
implementing partners and interrogation of data.
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