The Characteristics of a High-Quality General: An

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SIENA COLLEGE
History Department
Fall 2012
HIST 499, Capstone, Section 6E
Professor Wendy Pojmann
The Characteristics of a High-Quality General:
An account of the career of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, K.B.
Larry Balkwill
December 17, 2012
The War of 1812 is not regarded as a major military achievement for Britain or for the
United States. Historians classify the war as a minor conflict for Britain, which could have had
many different results if the nation had not been occupied with the Napoleonic Wars. To
Americans, the War of 1812 is described as a stepping stone between the Revolutionary War and
the Civil War. However, the War of 1812 is a monumental conflict for Canadians; it brings pride
to Canada as a nation because its citizens successfully defended the only foreign invasion in its
brief history.
Canadians recognize Major-General Sir Isaac Brock as the hero of the War of 1812. His
legacy is remembered because of his confidence and determination to defend Upper Canada,
now Southern Ontario, from an American invasion. His superior officers believed that the area
was too susceptible to attack and could not be defended, and that the forces should regroup in
Quebec. Brock refused to give up his area of command and began preparing citizens in Upper
Canada to be ready to defend against an American attack. This preparation led to early success in
the war and multiple victories against American advances. Major-General Sir Isaac Brock was
successful for unconventional reasons; his organization and recruitment of militia, obsessive
belief that Upper Canada could be defended, and drive for war and glory were all unique traits
that led to success at the beginning of the war. Brock’s legacy is not simply battlefield command
or victorious battles, however. His force in Upper Canada was predominately militia and Native
Americans, and he received few reinforcements from the command outpost in Quebec. Still,
Brock was able to withstand and repel a foreign invasion in an area that seemed impossible.
Therefore, I will attempt to explain what qualities Brock possessed that made him a victorious
general during the War of 1812. I will make connections between actions that Brock took before
and during the war that caused him to be triumphant. I will also point out mistakes he made that
show what kind of leader he actually was, and question whether he was a wholly successful war
general. In any case, as often happens in the creation of historical myths, Brock is glorified in
Canadian and British history. His ambitious attitude towards war and glory helped the British
territory of Canada to be successfully defended from a foreign invader. Brock’s reputation may
be misunderstood in the present, but his inspiration of being idolized by history was
accomplished.
History remembers Brock as a British general who defended Canada from American
aggression at the early stages of the war. Lady Edgar, who published a biography in 1905 on
Brock, calls him “the savior of Canada.” She writes in her preface that many leaders show up at
the scene at the right time in history, and Brock was the right man to defend Canada. 1 Other
historians commend yet criticize Brock on his romanticism and infatuation with war. Daughan
comments that Brock’s belief that Canada could be defended was only proven because the
American generals did not coordinate an attack.2 Whether his success in the war was luck, skill,
or a mixture of both is something that historians argue. But the fact is Brock successfully
defended Canada which resulted in his death, a memory that Canadians still hold in high regard.
A key aspect of Brock that made him successful was his persona as a leader of men. Laxer
writes, “Many of the top officers were better suited to politics or administration. But among them
were men with genuine military talent, and, more rarely, warriors with the skills to inspire men
and the foolhardiness and daring to throw caution of the wind on the battlefield. One of these
was Isaac Brock.”3 Laxer supports Brock’s actions taken on and off the battlefield, and finds it
important how his leadership skills and ability to drive men to fight was important during his
1
Lady Edgar, preface to General Brock (Toronto: Morang & Co., Limited, 1905), Preface.
George C. Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s War (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 90-91.
3
James Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock: The War of 1812 (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc., 2012), 65.
2
small part of the war. Malcomson denounces Brock’s actions at the Battle of Queenston Heights,
drawing out major mistakes he made during the battle that resulted in his death, which he writes
was avoidable.4 Historians commend and criticize Brock’s willful battlefield style that was based
on instinct and directly resulted on his death.
Turner takes a different approach to writing a history of Brock where he attempts to
explain how Brock became a Canadian hero in so short of time, and why Canadians of Upper
Canada (now Ontario) remember his legacy and regard him as a hero.
No person on the British or Canadian side from the War of 1812 became memorialized as
immediately and as much as Isaac Brock. His combat record during the war appears
unimpressive…He is remembered not as a failed leader but as its victor, thereby
displacing Roger Sheaffe…What is astonishing about the glorification of Brock is that it
began among the Upper Canadian population immediately upon his death, remained
strong during the rest of the war years, and has continued ever since.5
With the works of these historians in mind, I will convey how, in agreement with Malcomson
and Turner, Brock was not a superb military general. The action that he saw, although successful
in most, was not by any means miraculous. They were, however, very important for the defense
and morale of Canadians, and the sacrifice that Brock made to defend Canada would not be
forgotten in Canadian culture. I will also convey that Brock was strategically important for the
defense of Canada, and his leadership and organizational skills were irreplaceable. His will and
belief to defend Upper Canada, and his tenacity to ensure that he was successful doing it was
demonstrated throughout his military career. He took initiative to meet the needs of his regular
soldiers and militia he raised, and was a personable leader who cared about his men. He did not
abuse his rank, but was forceful and sometimes harsh against anyone who attempted to disrupt
4
Robert Maclomson, A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston Heights, 1812 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio
Inc., 2003), 144, 152, 153.
5
Wesley B. Turner, preface to The Astonishing General: The Life and Legacy of Sir Isaac Brock (Toronto: Dundern
Press, 2011), 10.
the peace or disobey the Crown. His character and persona was the most important aspect of his
military career and success in the War of 1812. Although he did not have any real fondness of
Canada or its people and was not Canadian, he became one of the first true Canadian heroes.
Early life and military career before Canada
Isaac Brock was born on the Island of Guernsey on October 6, 1769, the eighth son of
John Brock and Elizabeth de Lisle. At a young age Brock was educated at Southhampton, and
was tutored for a year by a French clergyman in Rotterdam, Netherlands, where he learned how
to speak French. He entered the military at the age of fifteen, succeeding his oldest brother in the
8th, King’s regiment, on March 2, 1785. Ferdinand Tupper, who is Brock’s nephew and editor of
his memoirs, writes that Brock took it upon himself to continue his education by studying on his
own at any available time while serving in the military. In his youth, Brock was stationed in
different places including Britain, Guernsey, and Jersey. Brock was promoted to captain in 1791,
joined the 49th Regiment of Foot and joined them in Barbados. While in Barbados, he contracted
fever and returned to Britain on sick leave. While on leave he was in command of a recruiting
post in Jersey, and later purchased his lieutenant-colonelcy thus becoming senior lieutenantcolonel of the 49th in 1797. In less than a decade, Brock had turned the 49th from one of the most
disorganized regiments in the service into one of the best. The Duke of York, commander inchief of the regiment was extremely pleased with how Brock re-shaped and organized the 49th,
thus beginning his legacy as a successful officer and leader in the British military.
When Brock first joined the 49th in Barbados, there was an incident between he and
another soldier who was a duelist. The soldier challenged Brock to a duel, which he immediately
accepted. Brock’s first impression to his fellow men at arms was exemplified during this conflict
as Brock, in an attempt to not be intimidated, suggested that they not duel the standard way, but
at close range. The other soldier denied these terms and subsequently left the regiment, restoring
order much to the relief of the other soldiers in the 49th.6 Brock’s first impression to the men in
his new regiment was no doubt positive since he immediately solved a recurring problem
between them.
Another incident that added to his growing reputation in the British ranks was during his
command of the 49th in Jersey. In 1800, while Brock was on leave, the command of the regiment
was given to a Junior Lieutenant-Colonel who was disdained by the other men. Upon the return
by Brock, the regiment ignited into cheers as he approached the barracks at St. Helier. Brock
reacted immediately by sending all of the men into the barracks where they were confined for a
week because of their disrespectful, unmilitary conduct. Brock’s reputation as a well-liked
commander yet a disciplinarian had already begun barely thirty years into his life.
Brock’s first military action came during the French Revolutionary Wars in September,
1799, during the invasion of the Batavian Republic (the Netherlands). His first conflict came
during the Battle at Egmont-op-Zee, also known as the Battle of Alkmaar or the Second Battle of
Bergen, on October 2. The 49th was ordered to the left of the column outside of the 79th, which
was commanded by Colonel Sheaffe (who would also serve with Brock during his time in
Canada). While Brock was observing the field, the 49th was attacked. Upon his return he
announced a charge in which he describes his regiment “executed with the greatest gallantry,
though not in the greatest order, as the nature of the ground admitted of none. The enemy,
however, gave way on every side, and our loss would have been very trifling had the 79th
6
Ferdinand Brock Tupper, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, K.B (London:
Simpkin, Mashall & Co., 1845), 5-6.
charged straightforward.” As the enemy retreated Brock was grazed by a bullet in the neck. He
recounts that he was knocked down and forced to leave the field, but returned within a half hour.
Brock returning to action after being wounded surly earned the respect of his men if they
questioned it before. He put himself on the same level as his men in battle; he may have been an
officer, but he, too, did his duty to serve the Crown on the field of battle. He summarizes the
result of the battle by stating, “I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of both officers
and men, and no commanding officer could be more handsomely supported than I was on that
day, ever glorious to the 49th.”7 Brock was never hesitant to give accolades to his fellow soldiers,
and did never claim to have won a battle by himself. He called for the duty of his men and if they
served well and they were successful then everyone was to thank. His words in the letter
demonstrate the amount of respect, pride, and gratitude he had for the men in his regiment, and
that they were able to serve Britain well.
Brock’s first military action was a success both for his regiment and for his personal
reputation. The success of the invasion was short lived as the territory gained was lost to enemy
forces and, Brock along with his regiment, British and Russian forces had to retreat back to the
coast. However, Brock had become an inspiration among the men of the 49th, and proved he had
the ability to lead in the heat of battle. He also showed dynamic leadership qualities as he was in
the middle of the charge and even when wounded returned to be with his men. Historians agree
that his first experience with war was a prelude to the rest of his military career. James Laxer
notes that, “Brock had discovered during his baptism of fire that he had nerve and that he could
use it to rally his men and lead them to success.”8
7
8
“Letter from Brock to his brother John, 26 November 1799” in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 9-17.
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 69.
After the invasion of Holland, the 49th and Brock returned to Jersey where they remained
until 1801. Under the command of Sir Hyde Parker and Lord Horatio Nelson, Brock was made
second in command of ground forces at the Battle of Copenhagen on April 2, 1801. He was
aboard the ship Ganges and was prepared to invade the beach to assault a series of Danish
batteries when the defenses had broken. However, the Danish defense proved too much for the
British Navy and Brock and his regiment were forced to stay aboard, abandoning the invasion.
He returned to London with his regiment and posted at Colchester. Roughly a year later in the
spring of 1802, Brock and the 49th were assigned to Canada.
Lieut.-Colonel Brock had been in the military for roughly sixteen years at the time of his
assignment to Canada. He had quickly risen to a high ranking officer, and had already served
across the Atlantic Ocean once before. He had fought on the front lines of the French Revolution,
been successful in the field, and had been wounded in battle. But most importantly, he had
developed a reputation while earning the respect of his men. His demands and expectations of his
regiment were of the utmost importance, and he would not accept anything less than perfection
when it came to service. His duty to the British Crown was his first priority, and even though he
was a demanding, perfectionist officer the respect and bond between him and his men was
extreme. His characteristics and reputation as an officer set up an encouraging situation to reform
the British forces in Canada to defend British territory against any foreign enemy.
Career in Canada to 1807
In 1804, Fort George, located in the Niagara region of Canada, was under the command
of a junior lieutenant-colonel. Unhappy conditions had led the men to organize a plan for mutiny.
The men at the fort intended to kill all of the officers present, minus one newly appointed officer,
and then board ships and cross the river to escape to the United States. The junior lieutenantcolonel had suspicions of a potential mutiny and sent a letter to Brock explaining the situation.
Upon receiving the letter, Brock immediately questioned the soldier that delivered the letter and
threatened to kill him if he did not explain who the leaders of the mutiny were. He went to Fort
George and while the soldiers of the fort were in the barracks, he surrounded the building with
the officers and went in to arrest the leaders of the conspiracy.
The conspirators were court-martialed and four sentenced to death in Quebec in March
1804. Ferdinand Tupper, Brock’s nephew and editor of his memoirs, says that the guilty soldiers
were executed by a firing line. However, instead of the usual eight yard distance of the shots, the
firing squad was ordered to fire from roughly fifty yards away. The added distance made the
execution long and painful as the shots were sporadic causing non-fatal bullet wounds. The firing
squad was ordered to keep shooting until all of the men fell. Once they did, the members of the
squad that would not fire were ordered to use their bayonets on their muskets ensure all of the
conspirators were dead. Tupper also says that the guilty conspirators claimed before the
execution took place that they would never had considered mutiny if they were commanded by
Brock and he would have saved them from their fate. 9 Brock’s reputation and attitude of respect
for the Crown and military order came across the Atlantic with him to Canada. As a commander,
he continued to demand respect of the regular troops and upheld the reputation of British military
doctrines. Regardless of whether or not Brock had personal relationships with his soldiers he was
not afraid to inflict punishment for any military misconduct. Brock’s reputation continued to
grow after his first few years in Canada.
9
Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 27-29.
Brock returned to Britain on leave in 1805. While there he made an appeal to the crown
to expand the forces in Canada and to establish a more permanent core of military presence. The
troops in Canada were drawn very thin. Brock’s note written to the commander-in-chief
describes that one battalion in Upper Canada was spread over eight different locations that were
many miles apart, and almost impossible to control the large land mass. Desertion was a major
problem in Canada since soldiers could be stationed for up to three years without leave. Brock
also states that the idea of desertion was continuously mentioned by Americans and acted as an
easy escape from duty. Brock explained how no regiment, no matter what its reputation was,
could withstand the temptations and troubles brought by serving on the frontier of Upper and
Lower Canada. 10 Brock did not hold the United States in high standing, and it no doubt affected
his command decisions while he was in Canada. Britain and the United States were at peace but
there were still many problems between the two nations. Brock’s loyalty was to the crown and
was suspicious of the United States and its people. His anxiety of not being at his post controlled
him so much that he returned to Canada early from his leave on June 26, 1812.
Brock clearly demonstrates an obsession for conflict and the desire to be in battle. Even
though he was in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, he was on leave and not participating in
any conflict. During this time, Napoleon and the Coalition were fighting over naval superiority.
Napoleon could not invade Britain until it tamed the navy, which would prove to be impossible.
Napoleon then turned to battling the powers inland, taking the fight away from Britain. It is
interesting to question how Brock’s part in history would have changed if Napoleon would have
been able to invade Britain while Brock was in Europe. He visited friends in Guernsey which
would have been right in the middle of a French invasion. Brock’s role could have been
“Letter from Brock to his royal highness the commander in-chief” in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 2830.
10
different, but the war slowed because Austria was defeated and forced to leave the Coalition.
Brock likely realized that his duty at the time called for him to return to Canada to organize his
troops and to ensure no further mutiny or desertion to the United States. His enemy was not clear
at the time but he knew that there were problems to be faced in Canada.
When Brock returned to Canada he took command of the forces in Upper and Lower
Canada as the highest ranking officer after Colonel Barnard Bowes resigned after his departure
to England. Brock took over command on September 27, 1806, and would hold the position for
just over one year. As commander of the troops, Brock began to lay the foundation to why he
was successful during the upcoming war. His review of the troops in Canada determined that
there were not enough. In 1806, Brock spoke of three regiments being in Canada: the 41st, 49th
and the 100th. The 100th however was too young and undisciplined to be dispersed across the
territory, so Brock could not recall the 49th at the time. As commander, Brock was stationed at
the main headquarters in Quebec, primarily overseeing the training of the 100th at the fort and
organizing the other stationed troops across the provinces. Brock writes of the condition of the
troops in March 1807, “Although I trust the garrison duty at Quebec is carried on with every
regard to the safety of the place…it is a pleasing task to report, that so exemplarily have the men
behaved that, even regimentally, only one corporal punishment has been inflicted for the last
three months.” 11 Brock goes on to write in the letter that he has never seen such a young
regiment come along so well, and that the problems they have are normally Northern Irish
recruits. He also writes that the troops in this country live in a perfect state of luxury unknown
anywhere else. The state of troops in Canada was not perfect but definitely improved since Brock
arrived in Canada. It is a recurring theme that troop discipline and organization seems to follow
“Letter from Colonel Brock to the Adjutant-General of His Majesty’s Forces,” March 1807, in Tupper, The Life
and Correspondence, 38.
11
Brock wherever he is stationed. Brock credits different officers for the order of the new
regiment, such as Lieut.-Colonel Sheaffe and Lieut.-Colonel Murray, but Brock should be
credited since he was the acting commander of all the forces. Brock’s leadership and
organization of the troops in 1807 improved the status of forces in Canada since Brock first
arrived in 1802.
Another issue Brock addressed while in command was the idea of forming an organized
militia. It was evident that the territory of Upper and Canada was much too large for a force of an
estimated 1500 regular soldiers to protect and control. Therefore, Brock suggested that an
organized militia would be an easy way to have a larger, somewhat trained military presence
throughout the provinces. His reasoning for this was Lieut.-Colonel John M’donald, who raised a
Scottish militia corps as a part of the Royal Canadian Volunteers in Glengary, Upper Canada.
Brock writes in a letter to the Right Honorable William Windham, “When it is considered that
both the Canadas furnish only two hundred militia who are trained to arms, the advantages to be
derived from such an establishment must appear very evident…The extent of country which
these settlers occupy, would make the permanent establishment of the staff and one sergeant in
each company very advisable.”12
This is a significant realization by Brock since during the war militia would play a crucial
role. Brock understood that the amount of troops would not be able to withstand a major
offensive, even at the stronghold in Quebec. Therefore, organizing the population for defensive
purposes would help defend the nation and support the regular British troops that were dispersed
throughout the territory. He questions the fact that at the time only 200 militia troops had been
raised at a time when Britain was at war. Brock explains how the two Canadian provinces have
12
“Letter from Colonel Brock to Right Hon. William Windham” in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 44.
the capacity to raise large numbers of militia and even support officers to control the different
corps. This way Britain would now have many numerous factions of militia spread out
throughout the nation, and also create a system that may create more recruits for the regular
army. Militia was not regarded as equal to regular troops and could not be counted on at a time
of need, but it was a way for Brock to counter the lack of regular troops stationed in Canada by
Britain. Brock writes to William Windham who was the Secretary of State of War and the
Colonies in 1807. Britain was at war and its borders were virtually defenseless from an attack.
As acting commander, Brock began to take action to address the problem of a lack of troops by
utilizing the sources that were available to him. Brock was not involved in a war in Canada, but
he ensured that he was doing his most to protect land that belonged to the Crown. He viewed the
United States as a threat and although he does not say it directly, the attacks he writes about in
his letters are attacks coming from America. The United States had rebelled only thirty years
ago, had previous allegiances and ties to France, and encouraged desertion with the British ranks.
Brock’s situation was not ideal, but he was threatened by the United States and would ensure that
Canada’s borders were protected as much as they could be.
Even at this time, Brock could see that an outbreak of war seemed evident between
Britain and the United States, and that the Canadian colonies were not prepared for war. In a
letter dated September 6, 1807, Brock wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel about the state of the
defenses in Canada and how unprepared they were for a possible war.
It is impossible to view the late hostile measures of the American government towards
England, without considering a rupture between the two countries as probable to happen.
I have in consequence been anxious that such precautionary measures might be taken as
the case seemed to justify; but his honor the president has not judged it proper to adopt
any other step, than merely to order one-fifth of the militia, which amounts to about 10,
000 men, to hold itself in readiness to march on the shortest notice. The men thus selected
for service being scattered along an extensive line of four or five hundred miles, unarmed
and totally unacquainted with everything military, without officers capable of giving
them instruction… I therefore very much doubt whether, in the event of an actual war,
this force could assemble in time, and be useful.
The Canadians have unquestionably shewn a great willingness upon this occasion to be
trained, and, I make not the least doubt, would oppose with vigour any invasion of the
Americans… From every information I can receive, the Americans are busily employed
in drilling and forming their militia, and openly declare their intention of entering this
province the instant war is determined upon; they will be encouraged to adopt this step
from the very defenceless state of our frontiers.13
Brock’s concerns for the defense of Canada began nearly five years before war officially broke
out, but it was clear to him that Canada was in a vulnerable state. There was still a shortage of
regular troops and the main priority was holding the central headquarters in Quebec, which
meant that the majority of regular troops would remain in Quebec during an American invasion.
The opportunity was there though to mount a formidable defense by utilizing militia. This is an
example of how Canadian identity started to take form. Brock’s opinion of Canadians was that
they would gladly stand up against America if they were called upon to do so and could act as a
valuable tool of defense. However, in its state in 1807 Canadian militia would be ultimately
useless. As a whole, the militia was disorganized and lacked weapons, which is something Brock
knew. Manning the vast border of Canada and America would be challenging. Malcomson
reports, “From the Appalachian Mountains in Vermont to the village of Cornwall on the St.
Lawrence and from there to the most distant garrisons in the northern regions of Lake Huron, the
border between British North American and the United States was just over a thousand miles
long.”14 However, Brock believed that with proper training and resources, which were available,
the militia could help support the small, regular force located in the colonies, and be very useful
in defense of the province from its small, regular force. This is why Brock pleaded with his
superiors in the colony to make preparations and train militia men. As a quality leader, Brock
“Letter from Brock to Lieut.-Colonel J.W. Gordon,” Sept. 6, 1807, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence 4344.
14
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 37.
13
was already anticipating a war and wanted to ensure that the defense of Canada was at its best
and the number of trained men, whether regular or militia, was at its highest. Also interesting is
how Brock reported that the Yankees were organizing and drilling militia who would be ready to
invade in an instant. Whether this is actually true or not is questionable since the common use of
militia is for defensive purposes; rarely do militia companies actually take part in an invasion.
The American officers had difficulties with their militia during the invasion of Canada in 1812,
much to the dismay of the American regular army. 15 This shows how dire Brock was about
receiving more troops and organizing the full force of militia, so much so that he may have
exaggerated information to his superiors to convince them that defensive steps needed to be
taken. Brock’s initiative to take action against potential American aggression this early would
prove to be vital towards the defense of Canada during the war, and his leadership and
knowledge of his enemy was already well developed.
1808 – 1810
In 1808, Brock was appointed to Brigadier. At the time, he was hopeful and excited that
he may assume command of Quebec since it was unknown if Major-General Fergeuson would
visit the colony or remain in Britain. Brock was excited for his potential of command within the
colony, since relations with the United States had not improved. This time however, seemed to
take a strong toll on Brock mentally. Due to lack of action taken by either government, Brock
found himself stranded in a distant colony that had no role in the current war Britain was focused
on. Napoleon’s continued success, along with harassment from the United States and mutinous
rumblings by Canadians greatly troubled Brock beginning in 1808. Brock writes to his brothers
15
Laxer, Tecumseh and Brock, 133.
in July of 1808 about the current relations and actions between the United States and British
forces in Canada.
What will be the result of our present unsettled relations with the neighbouring republic,
it is difficult to say… We have completely outwitted Jefferson in all his schemes to
provoke us to war… Jefferson and his party, however strong the inclination, dare not
declare war, and therefore they endeavour to attain their object by every provocation. A
few weeks since, the garrison of Niagara fired upon several merchant boars passing the
fort, and actually captured them. Considering the circumstances attending this hostile act,
it is but too evident it was intended to provoke retaliation: these boats fired upon and
taken within musket shot of our own fort; their balls falling on our shore, was expected to
have raised the indignation of the most phlegmatic… A representation of this affair has
been made at Washington, and, for an act certainly opposed to existing treaties, we have
been referred for justice to the ordinary course of law!16
Brock viewed this as a clear act of war, and was troubled by the fact that the British government
had not taken action to retaliate. In the same letter, Brock states that if England is willing to
witness the attack and capture of its own subjects within range of its own guns, then the Niagara
Garrison should be taken down rather than witness such indignity and humiliation of the British
force. However, little action taken by the British government and the commanding officers was
very frustrating to Brock. The defense of Canada was still vulnerable and little action had been
taken to organize and develop militia other than the Militia Act of Upper Canada in 1808. This
act passed by the British Parliament stated that all males between the ages of 16 to 60 were
required to attend an annual training exercise while providing their own muskets and
ammunition; subjects would face a steep fine if they did not attend. These annual training
exercises were useful and made known that men were expected to join their local militia for up
to six months if called upon.17 However, there was limited involvement of high-ranking officers
to train the militia, and it would not be until 1812 when there was more organization of colonial
militia.
“Letter from Brock to his Brothers,” 20 July, 1808, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 48.
W. S. Wallace, ed., “Militia,” in The Encyclopedia of Canada, Vol. IV, (Toronto: University Associates of
Canada, 1948), 290-294, 400.
16
17
Through communications with his brothers along with the events taking place in Europe,
Brock had full intentions of getting back to Europe to fight Napoleon. Brock recounts that the
extreme weather in Quebec during 1808, along with sickness caused him to be confined to his
room for most of that winter as well as be separated from his regiment, the 49th. Many of these
hardships he went through in Canada caused him dismay and through correspondence with his
brothers he conveys that he is hoping for a transfer to Europe.
My object is to get home as soon as I can obtain permission; but unless our affairs with
America be amicably adjusted, of which I see no probability, I scarcely can expect to be
permitted to move. I rejoice Savery has begun to exert himself to get me appointed to a
more active situation. I must see service, or I may as well, and indeed much better, quit
the army at once, for no one advantage can I reasonably look to hereafter if I remain
buried in this inactive, remote corner, without the least mention being made of me.
Should Sir James Saumarez return from the Baltic crowned with success, he could, I
should think, say a good word for me to some purpose.18
The iconic leader, well-liked and vigorously respected by the soldiers he routinely commanded,
was greatly suffering from the inactiveness of Canada during this time. He is struggling to cope
with the action that is taking place in Europe, and seems to understand how historical the war
with Napoleon will be. Frustrated with the lack of action taken against America, this is the only
time where Brock seems to question whether his dedication to the service is worth it. He goes on
to write that he is thankful that he has not been promoted to a higher rank because if the 49th was
reassigned back to Europe, he would still be liked close enough to the regiment to follow.
Another aspect that wares on Brock’s morale is French sympathy and threat of mutiny by
Canadians in Quebec. During this correspondence, which is dated December 31, 1809, is a time
where Napoleon continues to be successful in Europe. It is known in England, Canada, and the
United States that Napoleon wants control of the Canadian Colonies. The natural resources at
18
“Letter from Brock to his Brothers,” November 19, 1808, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 54.
this time are vital to Britain since it has lost many trade allies in Europe and refuses to trade with
the United States. Brock has a very good grasp of this knowledge and continues to watch the
Americans as they are still his most direct threat to war. He writes that the American government
does not have the capital to support a war with Britain, but continues to antagonize the colony to
tempt them into war.19 However, more importantly to Brock is the vulnerability of a French force
crossing the Atlantic and attacking the Canadian Provinces. Not only is it more conceivable that
France would need only a small force to conquer which it could easily support, but the Canadian
population, especially in Quebec, would support French intervention rather than defend British
rule.
A small French force, 4 or 5000 men, with plenty of muskets, would most assuredly
conquer this province. The Canadians would be so few as to be of little avail… The idea
prevails generally among them, that Napoleon must succeed, and ultimately get
possession of these provinces. The bold and violent are becoming every day more
audacious and the timid, with that impression [that Napoleon will continue to be
successful], think it better and more prudent to withdraw altogether from the society of
the English, rather than run the chance of being accused hereafter of partiality to them…
More troops will be required in this country, were it only to keep down this growing
turbulent spirit… Every victory which Napoleon has gained for the last nine years, has
made the disposition here to resist more manifest.20
Brock’s same worries that he had two years before about the defense of the colonies had not
changed and his despair continued to grow. Continuous threat of a war with America along with
a new threat of internal mutiny because of French influence was a lot to bear in Brock’s position.
He did not have as much power as he would have liked and wanted to have more influence on
the decisions made in Canada. In another letter dated six months later, Brock writes, “It is but too
evident that the Canadians generally are becoming daily more anxious to get rid of the English.
This they cannot effect unless a French force come to their aid, and I do not think Bonaparte
19
20
“Letter from Brock to William Brock,” 31 December, 1809, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 54.
Ibid, 55.
would risk the loss of a fleet and army for the chance of getting possession of the country.”21 It
shows how Brock’s character could not handle being stagnant, and the lack of action was causing
him to contemplate leaving the army altogether. He was a soldier through and through, and
longed to be in action not only to serve the Crown in a way he was best at, but also to strive for
personal achievement and recognition for himself and his regiment. There is connection between
how he speaks now and how vigorous his action would be before and during the imminent war.
Along with a change in the course of the war in Europe, Brock would fully dedicate himself to
the war against America and finally be able to act upon his anticipation he had upon coming to
Canada.
Brock’s anxiousness led him to request a leave of absence to return to England near the
end of 1810. Colonel Baynes reported Brock’s will to leave Canada to Sir James [Craig]. The
response from Colonel Baynes documents what kind of respect and admiration he had for Brock.
Baynes reports that Sir James was very high on the idea of appointing a third General to Upper
Canada, but did not have the power to be able to appoint such a position even though he fully
supports it. Baynes responds, “I tell you this, my dear general, without reserve, and give you, as
far as I can recollect, Sir James’ words. If he liked you less, he might perhaps be more readily
induced to let you go; as matters stand, I do not think he will.”22 Two of Brock’s superior
officers share positive feelings towards him and do not like the fact that he is getting denied his
will even though he has performed his duty to the fullest. Brock is still held in high regard in
Canada, and had set him up perfectly to assume control of Upper Canada.
21
22
“Letter from Brock to Irving Brock,” 10 July, 1810, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 59.
“Letter from Colonel Baynes to Brock,” October 11, 1810, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 67.
Career military men give their entire lives to the service of their nation. Brock was no
different, as the army was all he had known or wanted to do from a young age. Brock’s life
through the years leading to the war seemed to be dormant and lonely. He was held in high
regard by almost everyone he interacted with and was well respected, but during this time in his
life there was no real enemy to fight and he likely reflected on his life and how he lived it. His
letters to his family members are on a much personal level, and while writing to Irving he
describes how he longs for a companion.
I mentioned in a former letter that the new arrangements deprived me of the comfort of a
companion. Expecting to obtain leave to visit England, I thought it of little consequence,
but now that such an indulgence is denied me, I feel sadly the want of a lively,
communicative associate. I hardly ever stir out, and, unless I have company at home, my
evenings are passed solus. I read much, but good books are scarce and I hate
borrowing… Should you find that I am likely to remain here, I wish you to send me some
choice authors in history, particularly ancient, with maps, and the best translated works…
I never had the advantage of a master to guide and encourage me. But it is now too late to
repine. I rejoice that my nephews are more fortunate.23
Brock is writing on a very personal level, and realizes that he has never known anything but the
Royal Army, and though it is doubtful he has any regrets, he understands that there is much that
he has missed out on in life. Although he seems very smart, his education was limited since he
joined the army at such a young age. He was never married and never had any legitimate
children, and at a time of peace he longs for someone to accompany him. He understands that he
will not see his family for an extended period of time because of his duty in Canada. He has
always put his loyalty to the Crown before his own life; his tour in Canada and his lack of action
has taken his toll. This letter gives a new image of Brock, not as a general in the British army but
as a man. He had thoughts, dreams, and needs that every soldier does but his loyalty to the
Crown were more important to him than his own life. Family was also very important to him, but
23
“Brock to his Brother Irving,” January 10, 1811, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 70.
he still accepted his role and duty in Canada. His dedication and honor for his country was
outstanding, a true statement of his character and likely a contributing factor to why he was
regarded as such a good leader by his fellow soldiers.
Continuous lack of action made Brock contemplate leaving the Canadian colonies to seek
employment in Europe. Still he maintained his respectable nature and character. General
Drummond writes to Brock expressing his respect and common view of Brock and their situation
in Canada. It depicts the close knit relationships that British military men like Brock and
Drummond shared, and how much of a challenge it was to suffer in Canada away from action.
Yet it did not taint his character as a leader, soldier, or person at all.
… It must be the wish of every military person to seek active employment; I should most
willingly sacrifice many domestic comforts to obtain it, but I fear the rank I have just
attained will interfere with my prospects. I have often regretted, during my residence in
this country, that we have been so much separated, which has deprived me of the
opportunity of cultivation your friendship, which I shall ever feel anxious to possess; and
be assured it will always afford me the most sincere satisfaction to renew and
acquaintance with one for whom I have so great a regard.24
However, major changes in the British ranks affected Brock’s future outlook. In the
summer of 1811, Sir James Craig, due to ailing health, returned to England thus giving up his
command of Canada and leaving Thomas Dunn in command of the government of Lower
Canada. Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond assumed command of the forces, which
numbered 445 artillery, 3783 regulars, and 1226 Fencibles (trained militia). Brock was promoted
to Major-General in June, 1811 and spent much of his time stationed in Upper Canada. With the
arrival of Sir George Prevost to assume control of the government of Canada, succeeding Sir
James Craig, Brock finally had attained a position in which a transfer to Europe would be
“Letter from General Drummond to Major-General Brock,” August 31, 1811, in Tupper , The Life and
Correspondence, 95-96.
24
feasible. By Prevost coming to Canada, it fulfilled the requirement for an officer worthy of rank
and command to oversee the transfer of Brock back to Europe.
But Brock’s feeling towards leaving Canada to return to Europe would change by the end
of 1811. Because of the aggressive speeches made by President Madison, war between Britain
and the United States was clearly going to happen according to Brock. Correspondence between
Brock and Colonel Edward Baynes discussed this possibility through much of 1811, and it was
clearly on Brock’s mind.25 It was Brock’s choice to remain in Canada and make the preparations
for war. Although he did not feel any particular sentimental feeling towards the Canadian
colonies, he was most familiar with the country and the relationship it had with the United States.
He had been stationed there for nearly a decade, and understood what needed to be done to
ensure the British colony would be protected from foreign threat. Prevost writes of Brock’s
decision to remain in Canada, “It is the opinion of the adjutant-general that you will not wish to
avail yourself of the conditional leave of absence I have received authority to grant you. I shall
hear with particular satisfaction that Baynes is not mistaken, as I value your services highly.”26
The War of 1812 may not have officially started until June of 1812, but for Brock the
preparations would be made much sooner to ensure Canada remained protected.
Pre-War and War
Canada’s defenses had not been improved much since Brock’s time in Canada, and he
knew that any regular force by the United States would be able to penetrate Canada’s borders
very quickly. The 49th was desperately spread throughout the country and there was still a
shortage of available British regulars. Due to the war still ongoing in Europe, Canada was not the
25
26
“Letter from Colonel Baynes to Brock,” November 21, 1811, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 99.
“Letter from Prevost to Brock,” January 22, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 118.
main focus of British Parliament. Brock knew this and took it upon himself to organize the
nation to be able to resist invasion. In December of 1811, Brock pleaded to Prevost that a total
reorganization of troops, ammunition, and focus was needed along with organization and training
of militia in order to prepare the country for war.
The information contained in the message of the president to congress, relative to the
existing differences between England and the United States, will justify, I presume to
think, the adoption of such precautionary measures as may be necessary to meet all future
exigencies… The military force which heretofore occupied the frontier posts being so
inadequate to their defence, a general opinion prevailed that no opposition, in the event of
hostilities, was intended… I feel happy in being able to assure your excellency, that
during my visit last to Niagara, I received the most satisfactory professions of a
determination on the part of the principal inhabitants to exert every means in their power
in the defence of their property and support of the government… It will be utterly
impossible for the very limited number of military, who are likely to be employed, to
preserve the province.27
Brock makes clear to the commander that Canada would not hold against an invasion unless
preparations were made. He comments how the troops stationed in the nation, along with
Canadian citizens would be willing to take up arms in defense, and he puts trust in Canadian
militia as well as Native Americans in the fight against the Americans. Other subjects written in
the letter are genius as Brock predicted the intent that the Americans would have once war was
started. He writes how Amhurstberg (town along the Detroit River, now part of the greater
Windsor area) is of strategic importance as it will prove to be the defense along the Detroit River
should the Americans cross. He also comments how the Native Americans will be a valuable ally
if they take a stance of attack and prove they are willing to actually wage war.
The Indians, I am made to understand, are eager for an opportunity to avenge the
numerous injuries of which they complain. A few tribes, at the instigation of a Shawnese,
have already although explicitly told not to look for assistance from us, commenced the
contest. The stand which they continue to make upon the Wabash, against about 2000
Americans, including militia and regulars, is a strong proof of the large force which a
“Letter from Major-General Brock to Major-General Prevost,” December 2, 1811, in Tupper, The Life and
Correspondence, 101-102.
27
general combination of the Indians will render necessary to protect so widely extended a
frontier.28
Brock mentions a specific Shawnese native who could be the great Shawnee warrior Tecumseh,
or his brother better known as the Prophet. Brock’s experience in the province of Upper Canada
gave him the knowledge of its borders, people, and attitudes towards the United States. He again
comments on the willingness and importance Canadian militia would make in the war if utilized.
He calls for further development of the militia act, as well as provisions and munitions to be
distributed to Canadians and commissioning an officer to oversee the training of militia. Brock
and Prevost were both brilliant in understanding the delicacy of entering a war with the United
States, and what would be needed to render success against foreign aggression and the
preservation of a valuable colony of the British Empire.
An important aspect that reflects Brock’s leadership was the influence that Native
Americans could have on the outcome of a conflict in North America. Relations between Natives
and the United States were bad since 1800, especially in the area near Upper Canada. The United
States government was continuously making land-transfer deals, pushing Native Americans off
their land. One representative was William Henry Harrison. By 1809, Harrison had overseen
thirteen land treaties that acquired over 200, 000 square kilometers of land from Native
Americans, using methods like “bribery, intimidation, subterfuge, and whiskey.”29 Tecumseh
was a Shawnee warrior who had been fighting against American expansion for nearly two
decades by the time of the War of 1812. Due to the popularity of his brothers Cheeseekau and
Lalawethika, along with much military experience, Tecumseh became the leader of multiple
tribes that bordered the frontier of American expansion. In the time before the war, Tecumseh
“Letter from Major-General Brock to Major-General Prevost,” December 2, 1811, in Tupper, The Life and
Correspondence, 102-103.
29
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 77-78.
28
had multiple meetings with Harrison on the issue of the protection of Native American land,
along with other pressing issues like an evident conflict between Britain and the United States.
Tecumseh demanded that the United States retract recent land claims and vow to ever attempt to
take land from his tribes again, in return he would ally his tribes against Britain in the looming
war. Harrison presented Tecumseh’s demands to the President, but no deal would be made and
Tecumseh sided with the British.30
Brock’s relationship would turn out to be a close connection between two great leaders of
their respective clans. Brock continued to prepare for war as commander of British forces in
Upper Canada. He spoke to the legislature at York (Toronto) preparing the government that
every step would be taken to defend Canada. “I have, without reserve, communicated to you
what has occurred to me on the existing circumstances of this province. We wish and hope for
peace, but it is nevertheless our duty to prepare for war.”31 It is interesting how Brock appears
this way in front of the Legislature, yet his personal letters to commanders convey his
anxiousness to prepare for war. He presents a bill that the legislature should pass that calls for an
amendment to the Militia Act calling for a supplementary force of roughly 2000 be raised to be
trained and forced to serve for the summer months for three successive years.32 Brock writes in
the letter, “If I succeed in all this, I shall claim some praise.”33 Brock’s enthusiasm to ready the
country for war and to further his legacy, like his brothers were doing in Europe, is evident at
this time in his life. Brock’s militia act was passed and he attained a sufficient militia force to
defend Upper Canada. He continued to press for British regulars to be transferred to the
province, but Prevost was hesitant to release troops from the defense of Quebec. Baynes reports
30
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 82-84, 94.
“Speech made by Brock to York Legislature,” February 4, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 120.
32
“Letter from Brock to Baynes,” February 12, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 124.
33
Ibid, 124.
31
to Brock that Prevost was willing to send reinforcements if they came from England, but because
of reported heightened hostilities in Portugal and Spain, it was unlikely that any would arrive in
Canada in the summer of 1812.34 Brock would be forced to face the United States with his
remaining regulars in Upper Canada, a new militia force consisting of 2000, and a loose alliance
with Tecumseh’s Native warriors.
The United States declared war on Great Britain in June of 1812. Brock did not learn of
the war until nearly a week after it was formally declared, and it was not from an official military
document. Upon getting formal word that war had been declared, he released a Proclamation to
the Province of Upper Canada.35 In it he informed all occupants in Upper Canada that Britain
and the United States were at war, and that each person should do their duty to disrupt
communications and to protect the loyal citizens of the Crown. Brock immediately moved his
command post to Fort George in the Niagara region, where most of the 49th was stationed. Brock
reports that the militia is gathered and ready for defense but are weary of the upcoming summer
harvest and wish to return to their farms when that time commences, to which he can do little to
stop them.36 He reports that they are in need of munitions and more regular troops to reinforce
the troops, a common problem that Brock had continuously worked for. Brock has already faced
numerous troubles yet is still optimistic and ready to wage war against the United States; even
through Upper Canada is weak Brock was still contemplating all paths of action, including
attack. An American newspaper from Buffalo wrote of Brock, “Major-General Brock is at
present at Newark, superintending the various defences on the river. He is stated to be an able
“Letter from Baynes to Brock,” March 19, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 135.
Niagara Historical Society, “Proclamation: Province of Upper Canada, 1812”
http://images.ourontario.ca/niagarahs/70338/image/169936 (accessed Nov. 7, 2012).
36
“Letter from Brock to Prevost,” July 12, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 180-182.
34
35
and experienced officer, with undoubted courage.”37 Brock’s reputation had surpassed the
borders and Americans were no doubt aware that he was a threatening figure of the British
forces. However, Brock’s focus would shift to Amherstburg again when he learned that General
William Hull has crossed the Detroit River, demanding the surrender of the fort and the
cooperation of Canadian citizens. Brock’s legacy in the war would unfold in the coming months.
Prevost strongly believed that the colony needed to take a defensive stance against
American aggression, and did not possess the strength to invade the United States. Brock
strongly argued this philosophy and had a better sense of what the troops in Canada could do.
Others, like Captain Charles Roberts, shared the opinions of Brock. Roberts was stationed at Fort
St. Joseph on Lake Huron, fifty miles from Fort Michilimackinac, which overlooked the straight
between Lake Huron and Michigan serving as a guardian of the fur trade through the Great
Lakes. The fort was important both for strategic and economic reasons, and Brock viewed it as
an opportune fort to take at the beginning of the war.38 Prevost had also been in contact with
Roberts to take a defensive standpoint and not to provoke the American cause and keep control
of the Native forces. Roberts decided to take a force combined of British, Canadian, and Natives
to attack Fort Michilimackinac, which was taken with little resistance. The consequence of this
victory won over many Native allies in the western part of Ontario and northern Michigan, who
began to favor the British and raided towns and villages along the frontier. This was troublesome
for British and American relations as the British could not always control the actions of the
Natives, which were in some ways brutal. However, the victory did secure positive relations with
the Natives at Detroit.39
“Extract from an American Newspaper,” Buffalo, July 14, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 183.
Turner, The Astonishing General, 112.
39
Ibid, 120.
37
38
General Hull led a march from Ohio to Detroit to reinforce the defense of the town. His
force was made up of mostly Ohio militia who were not fond of the idea of an invasion.40
Nevertheless, Hull crossed the Detroit River on July 12 and occupied the town of Sandwich
(Windsor). This would become a war of propaganda as both sides tried to keep allegiance with
the people (mainly the militia) of Sandwich. Upon learning this, Brock recalled the York
volunteers along with any force he could spare to send to Amherstburg to repel the invasion.
Brock also released a proclamation on July 22 calling to arms all inhabitants to defend the
province and their land, while assuring them that the Crown was going to protect them from
American aggression.
The unprovoked declaration of War by the United States of America against the United
Kingdom…has been followed by the actual invasion of this Province, by a detachment of
the armed force of the United States. The Officer Commanding that detachment has
though proper to invite His Majesty’s subjects, not only to a quiet and unresisting
submission but insults them with a call to seek voluntarily the protection of his
Government…Every Canadian freeholder is by the most solemn oaths to defend the
monarchy as well as his own property; to shrink from that engagement is a treason not to
be forgiven. Let no man suppose that if in this unexpected struggle, His Majesty’s arms
should be compelled to yield to an overwhelming force, that the Province will be
abandoned.41
Brock had difficulty holding militia volunteers near the borders and pleads with them to stay
loyal to the Crown as they were imperative for the defense of the Province. Although British
allegiance was dwindling in the area, Fort Amherstburg continuously held off Hull’s advances.
Hull never unleashed the power of his full force as he believed the troops were not trained well
enough to be capable of a successful attack of the fort without support of heavy guns. Hull’s
delay allowed the British to reinforce the fort. Earlier in a letter from Brock to Prevost, Brock
commends Roberts for his victory which has created an increase in morale causing more militia
40
41
Turner, The Astonishing General, 112.
“Proclamation given by Brock,” July 22, 1812, in Turner, The Astonishing General, 258.
to volunteer. “The militia stationed here volunteered this morning their services to any part of the
province without the least hesitation. I have selected 100, whom I have directed to proceed…for
the relief of Amherstburg.”42 Because of the threat of American garrisons continuing down the
Thames River attempting to disrupt the allegiances of the militia stationed there, Brock decided
to leave York with the militia to drive back any American forces found in the Province while
attempting to recruit more volunteers as well as Natives. They set off on this long journey on
August 6, and reached Fort Amherstburg with a mixed force of militia and Natives on the
evening of August 12. Unbeknown to Brock, Hull had pulled back from Sandwich back to
Detroit on August 8. Many factors caused Hull to retreat, including the confirmed capture of Fort
Michilimackinac which confirmed that most Native tribes in the area would side with the British,
the news that Brock was on his way to Amherstburg, and the inability to arrange enough forces
and artillery to launch a siege against the fort.
Brock made three important leadership decisions during the occupation of the Americans
in Sandwich; first, he organized defenses and reinforcement of Fort Amherstburg which deferred
Hull from a siege. Second, he took it upon himself to travel to Amherstburg, recruiting new
forces which helped his numbers grow and expel any American forces within the frontier of the
Province. It is clear that he was an excellent leader, but his ability to motivate troops and keep
positive relations with the Natives allowed him to put together a respectable sized force to bring
to Amherstburg. His final decision, which may have been unknown to him, was that he came to
defend Amherstburg himself. His reputation was known to almost everyone in Upper Canada
and his enemies along the Michigan and Niagara frontier. Morale was brought to Canadian and
British forces because he was there himself. He also had a psychological effect on Hull, who
42
“Letter from Brock to Prevost,” July 29, 1812, in Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 207.
immediately retreated even though the American force was larger than Brock’s combined force.
By Brock being there in person, he brought excitement to his own troops and fear to his enemies;
qualities of a strong leader.
Brock had successfully defended Canada from the invasion, but wanted to continue to
take action against the Americans to fit his aggressive stance towards the war. Brock knew that
he needed to remain offensive if he wanted to keep the relations with the Natives in good
standing. By Brock being in Amherstburg, he finally came face-to-face with the legendary
Shawnee leader Tecumseh. Tecumseh at this time was the leader of a large Native force that only
he could control.43 Upon meeting each other and discussing the next plan of action, both the
British and Native intentions were the same in a continued offense against the Americans which
meant an attack of Detroit. Laxer writes how the introduction of Brock and Tecumseh went.
“The tall general in his scarlet uniform with gold-fringed epaulettes and the lithe, athletic
Shawnee chief sized each other up and concluded that they could work together.”44 It was
evident that Hull was afraid of the British and Native force due to Hull’s personal
correspondence that was captured by Tecumseh and his Native forces shortly before Brock’s
arrival. With this in mind, Brock, Tecumseh, and the other officers of militia and British regulars
created a plan of action to attack Detroit.
On August 15, Brock sent a message to Hull demanding the immediate surrender of
Detroit to the British. “The force at my disposal authorizes me to require of you the immediate
surrender of Fort Detroit. It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination; but you
must be aware, that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to m troops,
43
44
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 144.
Ibid, 141.
will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences.”45 Brock, who throughout his
writings always used clever language when writing official works, says it is a war of
extermination which is what Hull called the war in his proclamation after he invaded
Sandwich.46 Hull’s response was expected as he refused to surrender since his force was larger.
Brock immediately ordered a crossing of the river. Under Colonel Elliot and Tecumseh, the
Native force crossed the river through the night with artillery cover. The rest of the force of
about 800 split between regulars and militia crossed the river a few miles down. As forces were
assembled and organized, the main force marched to Detroit meeting no resistance from
abandoned batteries, while the Native force moved through the woods near Fort Detroit.47 Brock,
aware that Hull was a coward and feared him, his force, and the Natives, took measures to
exaggerate the strength of his force. He had the militia dress in mixed uniforms of British
regulars to give off the impression that most of his force was in fact regulars. He also had
Tecumseh and his Natives cross in front of Fort Detroit several times, while sneaking back under
cover each time to create the impression of a larger Native force.48 Brock aligned his force in a
manner that was all or nothing; either the fort would be taken or he would lose all, since he faced
a larger force inside the fort as well as several hundred Ohio volunteers miles behind him. His
psychological measures to deceive Hull worked as he sent his own son, a colonel in the
American army, under a flag a truce to surrender the fort to the British.
This victory was very important as the plunder of munitions as well as the prisoners taken
both numbered in the thousands. Moreover, it gave the British full control of the Detroit River,
and a garrison on American soil. Brock’s actions and leadership qualities throughout the first
“War dispatch from Brock to Hull,” August 15, 1812, in Tupper , The Life and Correspondence, 230.
“Hull’s Proclamation,” July 13, 1812, in Turner, The Astonishing General, 255-257.
47
Tupper, The Life and Correspondence, 231-234.
48
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 153.
45
46
campaign of the war allowed Britain to greatly increase their strength and standing in Upper
Canada without firing a shot, while bringing humiliation to the American government who
believed Upper Canada would fall very easily. Brock was the most important figure in this
campaign; his leadership of his men, relationship with Tecumseh and the Natives, and his
psychological warfare steps to deceive Hull were so important that it did not give him need to
give any battlefield commands. It was a true victory for all parties involved and was the principle
incident that led to Brock’s legacy. His upcoming sacrifice would be the final thing he needed to
cement himself into Canadian culture.
After Fort Detroit, Brock began his journey North, accompanied by the prisoners
captured to Detroit on their way to Montreal. Brock accompanied the escort as far as Fort
George, where he resumed command preparing defense of an American retaliation. He
redistributed his troops along the Niagara frontier, overlooking Queenston Heights he only sent a
small portion of the 49th with matching militia as a crossing of the river there would be very
difficult. Along the frontier he also tried to muster the Iroquois tribes in the area with little luck
as the Iroquois remained neutral, although favoring the Americans as they historically did. Brock
remained in Fort George and was present there on October 13, when the Americans crossed the
Niagara River and invaded Canada at Queenston.49
Death and Legacy
The American army on the New York side of the Niagara River was led by General
Stephen Van Rensselaer, who was fixated on launching an offensive against Britain. He received
reinforcements at Lewiston throughout September of 1812, and by the beginning of October he
49
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 166-168. [fix]
had cumulated a force of 2300 regular soldiers and 4000 militia. Brock’s force across the river
totaled 1200 regulars and 800 militia, as well as the support of a few hundred Natives.50 Van
Rensselaer ordered the invasion and it began with 300 regulars crossing the river at 3:00 A.M. on
October 13. 51 As the Americans reached the shore, the British rallied their troops and met them
near their landing point. Close, bloody conflict ensued with both sides suffering heavy losses.
The British retreated into Queenston and the Americans fell back to their landing spot on the
shore to regroup. Brock, who was at Fort George at the time of the battle, either heard the gunfire
or was awoken, and immediately rode to the site of the battle on horseback with any troops he
could organize. Malcomson criticizes Brock’s intentions for riding to Queenston without giving
orders or consulting his other officers if he was expecting a stronger attack on Fort George. It is
unclear why Brock immediately rode for Queenston but, true to Brock’s nature, he arrived at the
scene of the battle as soon as he could to support his troops. Malcomson writes of Brock’s
actions, “Brock was a man of action who preferred to appraise things for himself rather than
listen to a report and it must have been this trait that prompted him to climb into his saddle.”52
Malcomson also comments that the ride from Fort George to be mythical because of his popular
war-horse “Alfred” and a surprise stop to see a young woman of a close friend who gave Brock a
“stirrup” cup of coffee. There is no proof that these events ever happened but they give reason to
why Brock is so popularized in Canadian culture as they are still popular in oral histories.
As Brock approached the battlefield, he came across a dethatched unit of York militia
who were heading to help defend Queenston. Brock, still on horseback, motioned them to follow
him heading for the same place. Upon reaching the town, Brock issued orders for reinforcements
50
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 168.
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 132.
52
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 142.
51
from Fort George and other available forces along the Niagara frontier while assessing the
situation. Near this time, a strategically important battery was overlooking the town and the river
which had been constantly firing on American boats crossing the river while providing support
for the town was taken by the Americans. Brock, afraid now that the Americans controlled the
high ground, decided to put together a mixed unit of all available troops near him and launch an
attack against the battery. Upon reaching the Heights on the low ground, Brock led his force
from the front to attempt to retake the battery. Recognizable by American troops as a high
ranking officer or even known to be Brock, he was shot and died almost instantly.53
Accounts of Brock’s death are argued by historians since many accounts were given of
how it happened. Brock was shot somewhere in the chest and died relatively quickly. A common
account of Brock’s death used by historians is by fifteen-year-old George Jarvis, who served in
the 49th as a gentleman volunteer. He accounts that Brock was singled out by one of the
American troops who came forward to make the shot.
He was loudly cheered as he cried: “Follow me, boys!” and led us at a pretty smart trot
towards the mountain; checking his horse toa walk, he said, “Take breath, boys, we shall
want it in a few minutes!” Another cheer was the hearty response, both from regulars and
militia… On arriving at the foot of the mountain, General Brock dismounted and waving
his sword climbed over a high stone wall, followed by the troops; placing himself at the
head of the light company of the 49th…and ere long he was singled out by one of them,
who, coming forward, took deliberate aim and fired…and our gallant General fell on his
left side, within a few feet of where I stood. Running up to him I enquired, “Are you
much hurt, Sir?” He placed his hand on his breast and made no reply and slowly sunk
down. The 49th now raised a shout, “Revenge the General!”… anxious to revenge the gall
of their beloved leader.54
Historians agree that this is the most accurate account of what happened during Brock’s death
and is cited among many historians writing about the War of 1812 and Brock’s death. There are
53
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 153. Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 172.
“Narrative of Volunteer G. S. Jarvis, 49th Regiment,” found in History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara
Frontier in the Year 1812. Collected and edited by the Lundy’s Lane Historical Society. (Welland, Ontario: The
Tribune Office, 1812), 116.
54
accounts that Brock gave final orders for the attack to press on, but historians agree that they are
exaggerated stories to idolize Brock’s death. Malcomson is very critical of Brock’s actions
during the battle which led to his untimely death. He believes that Brock did not take the time to
assess the situation of the battle and acted too quickly in his attempt to take back the fallen
battery. He also argues that Brock had many capable officers present to lead the charge, which
resulted in the death or capture of most of Brock’s mixed force.55
The mistakes Brock made on the battlefield are evident, but his warmongering attitude
along with his ‘lead from the front’ charisma made a death at Queenston Heights a fitting end to
his legacy. All through his life Brock sought glory on a battlefield and the need to be in action. A
true soldier has the need to be in battle, and serving in Canada was no doubt miserable for Brock
for most of his time there. So when war broke out, Brock knew this was his opportunity to finally
see action, and was not afraid of death. For Brock, death may have been welcomed by him if it
meant he would forever live in history. Laxer writes about the career of a soldier who dies in
battle stating, “Warriors who fall in battle appear in retrospect to have been journeying all their
days to their appointed places of death…So it is with Brock and Queenston Heights. It can
scarcely be doubted that Brock was likely to die on a battlefield.”56 Brock’s whole career in
Canada led to Queenston Heights, and the ultimate legacy that he is remembered for. However,
from a historical standpoint, it is a shame that Brock died so early in the war. There were
multiple major battles in the War of 1812 like the Burning of York, the Burning of Washington,
and the Battle of New Orleans. Brock no doubt proved himself as a distinguished leader and
motivator of troops in Canada, but his military career was so short. He was involved in few
major battles, and although he was distinguished in all of these events during the War of 1812,
55
56
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 152.
Laxer, Tecumseh & Brock, 163.
history was robbed of a potential wartime genius. On the other hand, his actions at Queenston
Heights were rash and impulsive, which is a factor that led to his death. If it was intent to die on
the battlefield, to receive a hero’s burial, and be remembered in history for his part of a war
between Britain and the United States fought on the Canadian frontier, then he achieved it.
Brock’s legacy in Canada is an idolized war hero in a generally peaceful nation that has had few
battles on its own soil. Brock made the ultimate sacrifice in the defense of Canada, and
Canadians, along with historians have not forgotten that even though on a world scale the war
was a very minor conflict. Brock was a major character for all residents of Canada and many
people were affected by his death. His funeral attracted thousands of attendees when he was put
to rest in Fort George. The British fired a twenty-one-gun salute at Brock’s burial, and as a sign
of respect for Brock, the Americans fired their own salute.57 The utmost respect was shown by
both sides with the death of such an influential general. Brock’s work in Canada was
commemorated by the Crown and he was knighted, and his sacrifice was never forgotten by
Canada. He is one of the most respected war generals in Canadian history, and the impact he had
in Canada and its protection was immense. His remembrance may be blown out of proportion as
a perfect general who had no military flaws. He did have flaws and did make mistakes. But as a
leader in Canada, there was none such as him that Canada had seen before. Militarily and
politically, he helped defend a province that seemed doomed to fall by his commanding officers.
He believed in the defense of British territory and in turn, had the support of not only his troops,
but the Canadian people and Natives of Upper Canada. Canadians may forget that Brock was not
defending Canada and had no particular favor towards it, but it was part of the crown and should
be defended as so. Brock refused to submit to American aggression, and did so to the best of his
ability. There was no better leader in the world to defend Upper Canada. Whether Brock wanted
57
Laxer. Tecumseh & Brock, 177.
to be remembered or wanted any accolades at all is irrelevant; he is remembered as a Canadian
hero.
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Hicky, Donald R. The War of 1812: A forgotten conflict. University of Illinois Press, 1989.
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