Israel
1nc
US-Israeli strategic cooperation is high now
Berman 7/14/15, Ilan, Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An
expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has
consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense, and
provided assistance on foreign policy and national security issues to a range of governmental agencies
and congressional offices. He has been called one of America's "leading experts on the Middle East and
Iran" by CNN, National Review, July 14, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420065/formerisraeli-ambassadors-memoir-condemns-obamas-foreign-policy-matthew-continetti, CC
Amid all the negative press regarding the current, frayed state of bilateral ties, it’s easy to miss what’s
going right in the U.S.–Israel relationship. Yet today’s strategic cooperation has plenty of bright spots.
The most prominent of these is missile defense. Last summer’s two-month-long Gaza War showcased
the spectacular success of the jointly developed Iron Dome system, which intercepted nearly 90 percent
of the thousands of rockets shot at Israeli cities by the Hamas terrorist group. In the wake of that
conflict, cooperative missile defense has surged forward; in recent budgetary deliberations, Congress
more than doubled the funding requested by the administration for cooperative anti-missile programs
undertaken by Washington and Jerusalem, to nearly $350 million. Nor is missile defense the only area of
fruitful cooperation. For example, consultations between counterterrorism specialists from the two
countries continue, animated by the threat of the Islamic State and by a pressing need to move ahead
on things like anti-tunneling technology, to help deal with the threat of terrorist infiltration. Technical
discussions regarding the ongoing need to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME) — its
qualitative military superiority over its more numerous potential adversaries — have likewise been
robust (and productive) on the Obama administration’s watch. The bilateral strategic relationship, in
other words, is still going strong — even if the political one is not. Which brings us back to Oren’s opus.
As policymakers in Washington look ahead, it’s certainly useful to understand how and why the two
countries grew apart over the last several years. But it’s even more helpful to grasp the principles, ideas,
and values that brought Washington and Jerusalem together in the first place — and then to refocus on
them.
Recent commitment to enhanced intelligence cooperation is key to the relationship
Jones 15 (Keith Jones, 7-17-2015, "US seeks to placate Mideast allies angered by Iran nuclear deal," No Publication,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/07/17/iran-j17.html, MJW)
Obama is dispatching Defense Secretary Ashton Carter to the Middle East to placate Israel and
Saudi Arabia, key US allies that are angered by Washington’s recent nuclear accord with Iran.
US President Barack
Under the accord, Tehran has agreed to dismantle key parts of its civil nuclear program, roll back and freeze others for 10-15 years, and submit
to the most intrusive inspections regime ever devised. In return, and only after Iran completes the dismantling and rollback, the US and its
European Union allies are to lift the punishing economic sanctions that have halved Iran’s oil exports and denied it access to some $150 billion
of its own money—a sum equivalent to almost 30 percent of Iran’s annual GDP. For years to come, the sanctions will only be suspended,
however. They can be re-imposed should the US and its European Union allies deem Iran to have violated its commitments under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program reached Tuesday between Iran, the US, the four other permanent UN Security Council
members, and Germany. While no specifics have been provided, Obama and
his top aides have indicated that Defense
Secretary Carter will offer Israel and the Saudi monarchy new weapons systems and enhanced intelligence cooperation
and security guarantees. In Israel’s case some or all of the new weaponry may be gifted.
Ending surveillance programs hurts US-Israeli terror cooperation
Bob, Columbia honors JD, 6-1-15 (Yonah Jeremy, Yonah Jeremy Bob is legal affairs
correspondent and an international affairs commentator for the Jerusalem Post. He writes about war
and international law, the International Criminal Court, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, major terror trials in
the US and Israel, landmark Israeli and US Supreme Court decisions, significant criminal trials and
constitutional law. He also writes about Iran, North Korea and a range of other geopolitics and
international affairs issues. He has worked for the IDF International Law Division, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Justice International Law Division. Yonah has been interviewed and provided
international affairs and also legal commentary for BBC, Skynews, Voice of America, ABC Los Angeles
Radio, Russia Today and a range of other tv and radio programs. Yonah also delivers foreign affairs
lectures throughout the US, Canada and Israel. He is admitted as a lawyer in both the US and Israel and
has practiced law for over seven years. Hailing from Baltimore in the US, Yonah graduated with honors
from both Columbia University, receiving a BA, and Boston University, receiving a JD, where he focused
his studies on international relations and international law. He is married with three children, The
Jerusalem Post, "US NSA spy program ends, could impact Israeli anti-terror efforts,"
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/US-NSA-spy-program-ends-could-impact-Israeli-anti-terror-efforts404751, A.ZHU)
Obama administration and top US intelligence officials have warned that allowing such a lapse could
endanger their ability to protect the country’s national security. The lapse may signal a shift in
Americans’ attitudes toward fighting terrorism that could indirectly hurt Israeli efforts to combat the
scourge. Critics of the now defunct NSA spy program had said it had gone much too far in violating
privacy rights and civil liberties, that the checks on abuse of the spying powers were ineffective and that
the program had not racked up sufficient successes to justify its wide reach. Despite the drama of the
program ending, virtually all American officials expect a new, more moderate, version to pass within
days since it has passed initial votes in both houses of Congress and has firm support from the US
president. The Freedom Act would end spy agencies’ bulk collection of domestic telephone “metadata”
and replace it with a more targeted system. This week’s historic clashes over the issue are the
culmination of two years of public debate that started with revelation of the program’s existence by
former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. Although the Senate’s 77-17 vote in favor
of the compromise USA Freedom Act did not come in time to keep the program from expiring, the vote
was at least a partial victory for President Barack Obama, who had pushed for the reform measure as a
way to address privacy concerns while preserving a tool to protect the country from attack. The bill
passed the US House on a 338-88 vote on May 13. But final Senate passage was delayed until at least
Tuesday by objections from US Senator and Republican presidential hopeful Rand Paul (R-Kentucky). The
termination of aspects of the post-September 11, 2001, law known as the USA Patriot Act meant that
law enforcement and security agencies lost authority for various programs. Those allowed for “roving
wiretaps” aimed at terrorism suspects who use multiple disposable cellphones; permitted authorities to
target “lone wolf” suspects with no connection to specific terrorist groups, and made it easier to seize
personal and business records of suspects and their associates. The new bill could directly impact
Israeli national security by reducing the speed at which the NSA shares data with Israel’s NSAequivalent, IDF Military Intelligence’s Unit 8200, responsible for signal intelligence. The indirect affect
may even be greater, with many officials noting that Israel often follows the US on anti-terrorism
policies , and a weaker stomach for aggressive policies in the US could portend the same for Israel.
Finally, Israeli officials often cite examples of post-September 11, 2001, US anti-terrorism policies in
international forums to defend their policies.
Uniqueness
Iran-Specific UQ
!! Israel wants more military assistance from the US as a result of the Iran nuke deal
Williams 15 (Dan Williams, 7-17-2015, "Israel signals may ask for more US military aid over Iran deal," Reuters UK,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/17/uk-iran-nuclear-israel-usa-idUKKCN0PR26920150717,MJW)
Israel signalled on Friday that it would ask the United States for increased military aid to counter any
threats that may arise as result of the international agreement on Iran's nuclear programme. Israel gets $3
billion (£1.92 billion) in annual military aid from Washington under a package due to expire in 2017 and has in recent years secured hundreds of
millions of dollars in additional U.S. funding for missile defence. Israel and the United States had been in talks on future grants but Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suspended them in the run-up to Tuesday's agreement which curtailed Iran's nuclear projects, which he
Netanyahu plans to lobby the U.S. Congress not to approve the nuclear deal. But
Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon on Friday appeared to regard congressional ratification as a foregone
conclusion and described the deferral of aid discussions with Washington as an opportunity to assess
the ramifications of the agreement. "We talk about the American defence aid, it is clear that the situation here has changed and
must be studied," Yaalon told Israel's Channel 2 TV. Yaalon said Tehran's economic gains from a lifting of Western
sanctions could boost Iranian-backed guerrillas in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. It could also
lead to an arms race with Arab states unfriendly to Israel, he said. "We will ultimately, of course, have to
go and talk about the trade-offs that Israel has coming to it in order to preserve a qualitative edge," he
said, referring to Israel's military superiority in the Middle East. This would not be next week, when U.S. Defense
condemned as insufficient.
Secretary Ashton Carter visits Israel, he said. "It will be in several more months, certainly, after the (Iran) deal is approved and studied."
Before Netanyahu's suspension of aid talks, the two sides were close to a new package of grants starting in
2017 and worth $3.6 billion-$3.7 billion. U.S. and Israeli officials said. That sum would likely rise once talks
resumed, they said. In the interim, defence-related contacts between the allies have not ceased
completely. Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper said Defence Ministry director-general Dan Harel was in the United States
this week to assess the Obama administration's planned military aid to Gulf Arab states and its impact on
the Israeli "qualitative edge". An Israeli official confirmed Harel's U.S. trip to Reuters but did not comment on Yedioth's account of
what was discussed. Isaac Herzog, centre-left leader of Israel's parliamentary opposition, closed ranks with Netanyahu
against the Iran nuclear deal and said he would go to Washington "to work on advancing a package of security
measures befitting the new situation".
NSA involvement key to US-Israeli cooperation on deterring Iran
Wall 13 (Kim Wall is a graduate at School of International Public Affairs at Columbia University and a writer for the South China Morning Post,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?, EM)
America's National Security Agency helped Israel code the Stuxnet
computer worm used to attack Iranian nuclear facilities several years ago,
according to former NSA contractor and whistle-blower Edward Snowden. Involvement of the US and Israel in
creation and deployment of the sophisticated malware has been suspected for some time. But the NSA's role has
remained largely unknown. Snowden made the claim in an interview with WikiLeaks associate Jacob Appelbaum in
The NSA and Israel wrote
Stuxnet together," Snowden said. Stuxnet came to public attention in 2010 when it was
reported to have knocked out about a fifth of the centrifuges Iran was
using to enrich uranium. From the outset, computer security experts argued the worm's
unprecedented level of sophistication indicated it was a government-led cyberattack. The
May and published by the German weekly Der Spiegel on Sunday. "
New York Times chief Washington correspondent David Sanger reported the US and Israeli governments were
behind Stuxnet. Drawing on his earlier reports for the Times, Sanger wrote in his 2012 book Confront and Conceal
that Israel's Unit 8200 and the NSA took a key role in designing the worm. Snowden's claims back up Sanger's
anonymous White House sources and place the NSA at the heart of the operation. In light of the new information,
Washington's response to Snowden may - once again - be one of contradictions. "On one hand, they'll claim that
there is nothing new to debate, but on the other hand, the US may claim that irrevocable damage has been done
to national security," said Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at Cambridge University's Computer
Laboratory. Despite the Stuxnet offensive, Anderson said cyberwarfare was still unlikely to replace military force
any time soon. "It takes months and years of preparations to create these viruses and they have to be crafted
individually for attacking each target," he said, adding that it would take six separate programmes just to cut off
the electricity in Britain. "Planes, tanks and ships, however, can be manufactured and sent to anywhere in the
world."
General Relations on Brink
US-Israeli relations tense- Israeli espionage and WMD production
Stein 14 Jeff Stein is a columnist and at Newsweek. Previously, he was the SpyTalk columnist and
National Security Editor for Congressional Quarterlys website, CQ Politics, from 2002–2009. He
specializes in U.S. intelligence, military and foreign policy issues. In addition to his work for CQ, he has
written three books and hundreds of news articles, opinion pieces and book reviews, Newsweek, August
4, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/israel-flagged-top-spy-threat-us-new-snowdennsa-document262991, CC.
Israel was singled out in 2007 as a top espionage threat against the U.S. government, including its
intelligence services, in a newly published National Security Agency (NSA) document obtained by fugitive
leaker Edward Snowden, according to a news report Monday. The document also identified Israel, along
with North Korea, Cuba and India, as a “leading threat” to the infrastructure of U.S. financial and
banking institutions. The threats were listed in the NSA’s 2007 Strategic Mission List, according to the
document obtained by journalist/activist Glenn Greenwald, a founding editor of The Intercept, an online
magazine that has a close relationship with Snowden, a former NSA and CIA contractor who fled the U.S.
with thousands of top-secret documents last year. In this new document, Israel was identified by the
NSA as a security threat in several areas, including “the threat of development of weapons of mass
destruction” and “delivery methods (particularly ballistic and nuclear-capable cruise missiles).” The NSA
also flagged Israel’s “WMD and missile proliferation activities” and “cruise missiles” as threats. In a
section of the document headed “Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence; Denial & Deception
Activities: Countering Foreign Intelligence Threats,” Israel was listed as a leading perpetrator of
“espionage/intelligence collection operations and manipulation/influence operations…against U.S.
government, military, science & technology and Intelligence Community” organs. The term
“manipulation/influence operations” refers to covert attempts by Israel to sway U.S. public opinion in its
favor. In this, Israel has dubious company, according to the NSA: Other leading threats were listed as
China, Russia, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, France, Venezuela and South Korea. Israel has similar
company in threats against U.S. infrastructure, according to the NSA document. Under a section headed
“Mastering Cyberspace and Preventing an Attack on U.S. Critical Information Systems,” Israel, India,
North Korea and Cuba are identified as “FIS [financial/banking system] threats.” Israel also appears on
the list of countries believed by the NSA to be “enabling” electronic warfare “producers/proliferators.”
The new document again underscores the schizoid relationship between the U.S. and Israel, which
cooperate closely in military and intelligence operations but also aggressively spy on each other. A
previously released Snowden document said that “one of NSA’s biggest threats is actually from friendly
intelligence services, like Israel.” Another revealed that a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate ranked
Israel as “the third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S.,” behind only China and Russia.
Washington’s protective relationship toward Israel is heavily influenced by its close cooperation in
intelligence operations against common Middle Eastern threats , such as Iran, Syria, terrorist groups
and the Palestinians. Citing NSA documents, Greenwald’s piece in The Intercept says, “The relationship
has, on at least one occasion, entailed the covert payment of a large amount of cash to Israeli
operatives.” The NSA and its British counterpart also “rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including the
Jordanian monarchy and even the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying services
regarding Palestinian targets. “Over the last decade,” Greenwald added, “the NSA has significantly
increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its Israeli counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit
(ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used to monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases,
the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC.”
US-Israeli relations will recover from Iran deal, based on weapons
Abunimah 7/15/15 Ali, Palestinian-American journalist who contributes regularly to such publications
as The Chicago Tribune and The Los Angeles Times, he has also served as the Vice-President on the
Board of Directors of the Arab American Action Network, is a fellow at the Palestine Center,[2] and is cofounder of The Electronic Intifada, Electronic Intifada, July 15, 2015,
https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/obama-buries-gaza-under-iran-nuclear-deal, CC
In May, Obama agreed to fork over an additional $1.9 billion in US weapons to Israel that will more than
likely be used against Palestinians, and to reinforce Israel’s regime of apartheid and colonization. Obama
has made it clear that this is only a down payment. The president told the The New York Times
yesterday that despite Netanyahu’s efforts to “influence the congressional debate” against the
agreement, he was confident the deal would be implemented. But Obama affirmed that after
Netanyahu is done trying to sabotage the Iran deal, the president would “sit down” with the Israeli
leader to figure out what more the US could give him. The message is clear: no matter what Israel
does, Obama will reward it with weapons and deeper US ties . Above all, there will be no pressure over
the Palestinians. It would be foolish to think that the president’s successor – whether a Democrat or a
Republican – will do any less. The message for those concerned about the Palestinians is to step up the
pressure on Israel through all available means, notably boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS), which
Obama – like his would-be successor Hillary Clinton – has vowed to do all he can to oppose.
Link
Surveillance K2 Relations
Surveillance cooperation is key
Stein 14 Jeff Stein is a columnist and at Newsweek. Previously, he was the SpyTalk columnist and
National Security Editor for Congressional Quarterlys website, CQ Politics, from 2002–2009. He
specializes in U.S. intelligence, military and foreign policy issues. In addition to his work for CQ, he has
written three books and hundreds of news articles, opinion pieces and book reviews, Newsweek, August
4, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/israel-flagged-top-spy-threat-us-new-snowdennsa-document262991, CC.
Washington’s protective relationship toward Israel is heavily influenced by its close cooperation in
intelligence operations against common Middle Eastern threats , such as Iran, Syria, terrorist groups
and the Palestinians. Citing NSA documents, Greenwald’s piece in The Intercept says, “The relationship
has, on at least one occasion, entailed the covert payment of a large amount of cash to Israeli
operatives.” The NSA and its British counterpart also “rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including the
Jordanian monarchy and even the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying services
regarding Palestinian targets. “Over the last decade,” Greenwald added, “the NSA has significantly
increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its Israeli counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit
(ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used to monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases,
the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC.”
US surveillance provisions are key to sustaining Israeli relations
Greenwald, American lawyer, August 4, 2014 (Glenn Greenwald, American lawyer, author,
journalist, and columnist for the Guardian, “Cash, weapons and surveillance: The U.S. is a key party to
every Israeli attack”, The Intercept, 8/4/14, AKHB)
The U.S. government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel, providing cash, weapons and
surveillance technology that play a crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed substantial new light on how the U.S.
and its partners directly enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza.
Over the last decade, the NSA has significantly increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its
Israeli counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used
to monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases, the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British
and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC.
The relationship has, on at least one occasion, entailed the covert payment of a large amount of cash to
Israeli operatives. Beyond their own surveillance programs, the American and British surveillance
agencies rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including the Jordanian monarchy and even the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying services regarding Palestinian targets.
The new documents underscore the indispensable, direct involvement of the U.S. government and its
key allies in Israeli aggression against its neighbors. That covert support is squarely at odds with the
posture of helpless detachment typically adopted by Obama officials and their supporters.
General Intel
!! NSA and Israeli Intelligence Officers working together
Black 15 (Ian Black, the Guardian’s Middle East editor. In more than 25 years on the paper he has also
been its European editor, diplomatic editor, foreign leader writer and Middle East correspondent,
Wednesday 15 July 2015 14.00 EDT, The Guardian, “NSA document: Israeli special forces assassinated top
Syrian military official”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/nsa-reveals-israeli-commandoskilled-mahmoud-suleiman-syria)
The Intercept said that, according to three former US intelligence officers with extensive experience in
the Middle East, the document’s classification markings indicate that the NSA learned of the assassination
through surveillance. The information in the document was labelled “SI,” which means the intelligence
was collected by monitoring communications signals.
It added that knowledge within the NSA about surveillance of Israeli military units is especially sensitive
because the NSA has Israeli intelligence officers working jointly with its officers at NSA headquarters in
Fort Meade, Maryland.
!! US-Israel security cooperation overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel
Greenwald, Poitras, and Macaskill 13 (Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and
author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law. Laura Poitras is a Pultizer-winning
Guardian columnist. Ewen Macaskill the defense and intelligence correspondent for the Guardian, The
Guardian, September 11, 2013, “NSA shares raw intelligence including Americans’ data with Israel”,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents, CC.)
While NSA documents tout the mutually beneficial relationship of Sigint sharing, another report, marked
top secret and dated September 2007, states that the relationship, while central to US strategy, has
become overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel.
"Balancing the Sigint exchange equally between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge,"
states the report, titled 'History of the US – Israel Sigint Relationship, Post-1992'. "In the last decade, it
arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with NSA's only true
Third Party [counter-terrorism] relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of the partner."
NSA Data
Israel perceives NSA data as key to national security
Bamford 14 (James Bamford is an American bestselling author and journalist noted for
his writing about United States intelligence agencies, especially the National Security
Agency (NSA).Bamford has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, as a
distinguished visiting professor and has written for The New York Times Magazine, The
Atlantic, Harper's, and many other publications. In 2006, he won the National Magazine
Award for Reporting for his article, "The Man Who Sold The War", published in Rolling
Stone, New York Times, September 16, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/opinion/israels-nsa-scandal.html, CC.
WASHINGTON — IN Moscow this summer, while reporting a story for Wired magazine, I had the rare
opportunity to hang out for three days with Edward J. Snowden. It gave me a chance to get a deeper
understanding of who he is and why, as a National Security Agency contractor, he took the momentous
step of leaking hundreds of thousands of classified documents. Among his most shocking discoveries, he
told me, was the fact that the N.S.A. was routinely passing along the private communications of
Americans to a large and very secretive Israeli military organization known as Unit 8200. This transfer of
intercepts, he said, included the contents of the communications as well as metadata such as who was
calling whom. Typically, when such sensitive information is transferred to another country, it would first
be “minimized,” meaning that names and other personally identifiable information would be removed.
But when sharing with Israel, the N.S.A. evidently did not ensure that the data was modified in this way.
Mr. Snowden stressed that the transfer of intercepts to Israel contained the communications — email as
well as phone calls — of countless Arab- and Palestinian-Americans whose relatives in Israel and the
Palestinian territories could become targets based on the communications. “I think that’s amazing,” he
told me. “It’s one of the biggest abuses we’ve seen.”
NSA spying directly enables Israel’s military capabilities – Snowden leaks prove
Greenwald, Pulitzer prize journalist, 2014 (Glenn, Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional
lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law. His most recent book,
No Place to Hide, is about the U.S. surveillance state and his experiences reporting on the Snowden
documents around the world. Prior to his collaboration with Pierre Omidyar, Glenn’s column was
featured at The Guardian and Salon. He was the debut winner, along with Amy Goodman, of the Park
Center I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism in 2008, and also received the 2010 Online
Journalism Award for his investigative work on the abusive detention conditions of Chelsea Manning.
For his 2013 NSA reporting, he received the George Polk award for National Security Reporting; the
Gannett Foundation award for investigative journalism and the Gannett Foundation watchdog
journalism award; the Esso Premio for Excellence in Investigative Reporting in Brazil (he was the first
non-Brazilian to win), and the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Pioneer Award. Along with Laura Poitras,
Foreign Policy magazine named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers for 2013. The NSA reporting he
led for The Guardian was awarded the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for public service, The Intercept, "Cash,
Weapons and Surveillance: the U.S. is a Key Party to Every Israeli Attack," Intercept,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/, A.ZHU)
The U.S. government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel, providing cash, weapons and
surveillance technology that play a crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed substantial new light on how the
U.S. and its partners directly enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza. Over the last
decade, the NSA has significantly increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its Israeli
counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used to
monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases, the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British
and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC. The relationship has, on at least one occasion, entailed
the covert payment of a large amount of cash to Israeli operatives. Beyond their own surveillance
programs, the American and British surveillance agencies rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including
the Jordanian monarchy and even the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying
services regarding Palestinian targets. The new documents underscore the indispensable, direct
involvement of the U.S. government and its key allies in Israeli aggression against its neighbors . That
covert support is squarely at odds with the posture of helpless detachment typically adopted by Obama
officials and their supporters. President Obama, in his press conference on Friday, said “it is
heartbreaking to see what’s happening there,” referring to the weeks of civilian deaths in Gaza – “as if
he’s just a bystander, watching it all unfold,” observed Brooklyn College Professor Corey Robin. Robin
added: “Obama talks about Gaza as if it were a natural disaster, an uncontrollable biological event.”
Each time Israel attacks Gaza and massacres its trapped civilian population – at the end of 2008, in the
fall of 2012, and now again this past month – the same process repeats itself in both U.S. media and
government circles: the U.S. government feeds Israel the weapons it uses and steadfastly defends its
aggression both publicly and at the U.N.; the U.S. Congress unanimously enacts one resolution after the
next to support and enable Israel; and then American media figures pretend that the Israeli attack has
nothing to do with their country, that it’s just some sort of unfortunately intractable, distant conflict
between two equally intransigent foreign parties in response to which all decent Americans helplessly
throw up their hands as though they bear no responsibility. “The United States has been trying to broker
peace in the Middle East for the past 20 years,” wrote the liberal commentator Kevin Drum in Mother
Jones, last Tuesday. The following day, CNN reported that the Obama administration “agreed to Israel’s
request to resupply it with several types of ammunition … Among the items being bought are 120mm
mortar rounds and 40mm ammunition for grenade launchers.” The new Snowden documents illustrate a
crucial fact: Israeli aggression would be impossible without the constant, lavish support and
protection of the U.S. government, which is anything but a neutral, peace-brokering party in these
attacks. And the relationship between the NSA and its partners on the one hand, and the Israeli
spying agency on the other, is at the center of that enabling.
Israel relies on NSA data for security
Greenwald, Poitras, and Macaskill 13 Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and
author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law. Laura Poitras is a Pultizer-winning
Guardian columnist. Ewen Macaskill the defense and intelligence correspondent for the Guardian, The
Guardian, September 11, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americanspersonal-data-israel-documents, CC.
Although Israel is one of America's closest allies, it is not one of the inner core of countries involved in
surveillance sharing with the US - Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This group is collectively
known as Five Eyes. The relationship between the US and Israel has been strained at times, both
diplomatically and in terms of intelligence. In the top-secret 2013 intelligence community budget
request, details of which were disclosed by the Washington Post, Israel is identified alongside Iran and
China as a target for US cyberattacks. While NSA documents tout the mutually beneficial relationship of
Sigint sharing, another report, marked top secret and dated September 2007, states that the
relationship, while central to US strategy, has become overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel.
"Balancing the Sigint exchange equally between US and Israeli needs has been a constant challenge,"
states the report, titled 'History of the US – Israel Sigint Relationship, Post-1992'. "In the last decade, it
arguably tilted heavily in favor of Israeli security concerns. 9/11 came, and went, with NSA's only true
Third Party [counterterrorism] relationship being driven almost totally by the needs of the partner." In
another top-secret document seen by the Guardian, dated 2008, a senior NSA official points out that
Israel aggressively spies on the US. "On the one hand, the Israelis are extraordinarily good Sigint
partners for us, but on the other, they target us to learn our positions on Middle East problems," the
official says. "A NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] ranked them as the third most aggressive
intelligence service against the US." Later in the document, the official is quoted as saying: "One of NSA's
biggest threats is actually from friendly intelligence services, like Israel. There are parameters on what
NSA shares with them, but the exchange is so robust, we sometimes share more than we intended." The
memorandum of understanding also contains hints that there had been tensions in the intelligencesharing relationship with Israel. At a meeting in March 2009 between the two agencies, according to the
document, it was agreed that the sharing of raw data required a new framework and further training for
Israeli personnel to protect US person information.
The NSA acts in Israel’s
Impacts
Economy
US-Israel relationship helps the economy and supports thousands of jobs
Brillant, executive VP and head of International Affairs for the US Chamber of Commerce, 15 (Myron
Brillant, The Hill, Congress Blog, “The Strategic Imperative of US-Israel commerce”
March 3, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/234331-thestrategic-imperative-of-us-israel-commerce)
The U.S. and Israel have long-standing trade and investment ties that serve to benefit both countries, and
our close commercial bond supports game-changing innovation benefiting the global economy. Since the
signing of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement 30 years ago, two-way trade has multiplied tenfold to
over $40 billion per year with shared economic benefits for both countries.
In a country as small as Israel, it is amazing that over 250 multinational companies have R&D centers
there. And underscoring the importance of our relationship, two-thirds of them are U.S. companies. Intel,
Microsoft, IBM, and Cisco have been in Israel for decades, and just days ago, Apple CEO Tim Cook visited
Israel to inaugurate the company’s largest innovation center outside of California.
Israel is the top importer of U.S. goods in its region, despite representing a mere 2 percent of the
population. There are more companies listed on the NASDAQ exchange from Israel than from any country
besides the U.S. and China. And nearly half of all investment into the U.S. from the Middle East comes
from Israeli companies. The commercial relationship, while often glossed over given the focus on security
matters, is not only sparking new technologies but supports thousands of good jobs in both countries.
US- Israeli relations k2 preserving the economy and US global leadership
Eisenstadt and Pollock 12 (Michael, David, September 2012, report by the Washington Institute, “How the United States
Benefits from Its Alliance with Israel”, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport07.pdf, MJW)
There is bipartisan agreement that restoring the vitality and competitiveness of the U.S. economy is
crucial to preserving U.S. global leadership. Technological innovation is key to achieving this goal. While Israel is a small
country, it ranks among the top half-dozen countries world- wide in various indices of innovation. U.S.Israel investment, R&D, and joint ventures create tens of thousands of jobs for American workers in
informa- tion technology, medical R&D, and defense. Israel is among the top twenty international direct
investors in the United States, and two-way trade between America and Israel leads a number of much
larger countries, such as Spain and Saudi Arabia.
Cybersecurity
US- Israel relationship key to cybersecurity
Brillant, executive VP and head of International Affairs for the US Chamber of Commerce, 15 (Myron
Brillant, The Hill, Congress Blog, “The Strategic Imperative of US-Israel commerce”
March 3, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/234331-thestrategic-imperative-of-us-israel-commerce)
Following major cyber breaches on public and private institutions across the world, we have a better
understanding of the vulnerability of our companies and governments. With more than 10 percent of
global cybersecurity investment going into Israel—including from U.S. investors—and Israel’s own
establishment of a new cyber hub in Beersheva, we can already see the importance of our partnership in
this area.
US-Israeli relations are k2 cyber security
Eisenstadt and Pollock 12 (Michael, David, September 2012, report by the Washington Institute, “How the United States
Benefits from Its Alliance with Israel”, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport07.pdf, MJW)
U.S.-Israel cybersecurity cooperation in the private sector is substantial.
The architecture for many of Intel’s most successful computer chips was invented in Israel, accounting for an
estimated 40 percent of the firm’s revenues. Israeli-designed algorithms and techniques are also key to securing a
significant percentage of U.S. financial transactions and telecommunications. Thus, in early 2012, Cisco paid $5
Israel has emerged as a pioneer in IT, and
billion to acquire the Israeli-founded firm NDS, one of the top TV- encryption companies worldwide. Israeli researchers also play a
disproportionate role in many other computer-related and telecommunications inventions and applications, including instant messaging, voice-
Official U.S.- Israel cyber cooperation is also
reported to be significant, and may include offensive cyberwarfare against Iran’s nuclear program.
over internet protocol (VoIP), online money transfers, and data mining programs.
Iran Nuke Prolif
US-Israeli relations necessary to prevent war with Iran
Clawson and Makovsky 12 (“Preventing an Iranian Nuclear Breakout”, Stragetic Report 8 9/12,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport8.pdf, Pactrick Clawson is the director of research and head of the Iran Security Initiative at The Washington
Institute and has written for New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He has testified before Congress 20 times and been a witness in 30 federal cases concerning the Middle
East. David Mokovsky is the director on the Project of the Middle East Peace Project and author of the 2009 Washington Post bestseller Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for
America in the Middle East)
As for Israelis who think that America has no intention of striking, they believe Washington will ultimately adopt a policy of containment, despite
the public repudiation of this voiced by President Obama and repeated by other senior officials. No one can know for certain how U.S. leaders
will react if a crisis arrives, since past statements may not be a good predictor of future policies in real, rather than theoretical, scenarios.
Whatever the U.S. path, Washington’s slower clock may eventually, and unwittingly, provide the incentive for Israel to act on its own. In
Those security officials
Israeli cabinet ministers who are advising the Netanyahu government to resist
striking Iran hold this view not because they oppose a strike altogether, or because they support containment of Iran as applied to the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, but because they believe the responsibility of striking falls to the United States. Both
schools in the Israeli debate are united on the view that Iran’s declared enmity toward Israel is real, not theoretical. Even if Israeli
officials could ignore the many bloodcurdling threats from Iran’s leaders—which they cannot—there would still remain Iran’s actions. Iran
has spent more than $5 billion—some estimate much more—funding and arming every group dedicated to killing
Israeli civilians and eliminating the state of Israel, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran has proven
assessing the debate within Israel, commentators often misinterpret the view of opponents of an Israeli strike.
(present and former) and
that it will provide the arms with which to attack Israeli civilians. Israel, for its part, will not remain indifferent to Iran’s established track record
of hostility. In
the absence of U.S. action, the internal debate is likely to shift, over time, in the favor of
those who believe that the only alternative is an Israeli strike. Another argument used by some Israelis for a preemptive
strike is that Washington will be too late in concluding that Iran is about to get a bomb. These fears date to the ultimately inaccurate identification
of WMD in Iraq by U.S. intelligence and the scars inflicted by this failure. In this view, the U.S. intelligence community showed skittishness in
its response to the discovery in 2007 of a Syrian nuclear reactor well that had no purpose other than to build weapons. Prior to this discovery,
U.S. intelligence had not found a reprocessing plant for weaponization and so was unwilling to state with confidence that Syria’s objective was to
obtain weapons. U.S. failure to act was a post-Iraq phenomenon: the Bush administration and the intelligence community did not want to strike
because they wanted to avoid being accused of acting precipitously. Israel would argue that the price of this reluctance to attack before the
reprocessing plant was found reflected a willingness to allow the reactor to go “hot” and thereby preclude any prospects of an attack beyond that
point. Of course, there are differences between the Syria and Iran cases. For Israel, however, a commonality would be Israel’s concern
that the United States may not recognize that the final relevant point for decisionmakers is less the issue
of weaponization and more the ability of the United States or Israel to intervene and halt the program.
NSA- ISNU (Israel Sigint National Unit) key to prevent Iranian and Syrian nuclear prolif
NSA 13 (“NSA Intelligence Relationship with Israel” United States. National Security
Agency/ Central Security Service. Office of the Directorate. Foreign Affairs Directorate.
Israel Desk. Top Secret, Information Paper. April 19, 2013: 3 pp.)
(U) Success Stories _ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, ISR) A key priority for ISNU is the Iranian
nuclear development program, followed by Syrian nuclear efforts, Lebanese Hizballah
plans and intentions, Palestinian terrorism, and Global Jihad. Several recent and
successful joint operations between NSA and ISNU have broadened both organizations’
ability to target and exploit Iranian nuclear efforts. In addition, a robust and dynamic
cryptanalytic relationship has enabled breakthroughs on high priority Iranian targets.
(TS//REL TO USA, ISR) NSA and ISNU continue to initiate joint targeting of Syrian and
Iranian leadership and nuclear development programs with CIA, ISNU, SOD and Mossad.
This exchange has been particularly important as unrest in Syria continues, and both
sides work together to identify threats to regional stability. NSA’s cyber partnerships
expanded beyond ISNU to include Israeli Defense Intelligence’s SOD and Mossad,
resulting in unprecedented access and collection breakthroughs that all sides
acknowledge would not have been possible to achieve without the others.
Iran war causes WWIII
Hanchett, 7-14-2015, (Ian, citing Mark Reed Levin, Mark Reed Levin (born September 21, 1957) is an
American lawyer, author, and the host of American syndicated radio show The Mark Levin Show. Levin
worked in the administration of President Ronald Reagan and was a chief of staff for Attorney General
Edwin Meese. He is president of the Landmark Legal Foundation, has authored five books, and
contributes commentary to various media outlets such as National Review Online. Levin enrolled at
Temple University Ambler including summer classes and graduated with a bachelor's degree in Political
Science in 1977 at age 19, summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa.[5] Levin won election to the
Cheltenham school board in 1977 on a platform of reducing property taxes.[4] In 1980 Levin earned a
juris doctor from Temple University Beasley School of Law, "Levin: Iran Deal 'Planted the Seeds' 'For
World War III,' 'This Is Munich'," Breitbart, http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/07/14/levin-irandeal-planted-the-seeds-for-world-war-iii-this-is-munich/, A.ZHU)
Talk radio host and author of “Plunder and Deceit,” Mark Levin declared of the Iran deal “Barack Obama
has planted the seeds…for World War III” and “This is Munich” on Tuesday. Levin said, “Barack Obama
has planted the seeds, in my view, for World War III. They were already there, but he’s moved it along. I
honestly believe that the next, massive, conflagration, war will now be in the Middle East. And I believe
the Saudis are going to get nukes, and the Egyptians are going to get nukes, and others, and you can
hardly blame them.” He continued, “there’s no effective inspection regime here. There’s no effective
sanctions. The Russians and the Chinese are not going to allow them in any event. Obama has sealed the
fate of the next generation. … I really believe that one day this is going to lead to a horrific war.” And
that the deal has “sealed the fate of the people of Iran” and “may well have” sealed Israel’s fate.
!! Iran war leads to international terrorism and economic collapse
Kemp and Gay, MIT PHD, 14
(Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay are coauthors of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic
Consequences. Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Security Programs at the Center for the National
Interest. He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration as Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on
the National Security Council Staff. Dr. Kemp received his Ph.D. in Political Science at M.I.T. and his
M.A. and B.A. degrees from Oxford University. Gay is an assistant editor at The National Interest, 1124-2014, "The High Cost of War with Iran," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-war-iran-8265, A.ZHU)
This will not be the only front of a war, however. Iran’s leaders have threatened the West with
retaliation too frequently and too publicly to simply ignore an attack. Iran has agents and allies that may
commit acts of terrorism. Lebanese Hezbollah’s deadly bombing of a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas,
Bulgaria and the discovery of a similar plot in Cyprus are examples of this capability. And assassination
plots against Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya, as well as the Saudi ambassador in
Washington, show Iranian willingness to commit acts of terrorism as part of its strategy. Iran also has
many small military speedboats, midget submarines and antiship missiles. It may use these to attack
American vessels near its shores or to disrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz . An oil
blockade, if successful and sustained, would send shockwaves through the global econo my, as
roughly a fifth of the world’s internationally traded oil passes through the strait. But Iran’s leaders know
that such a severe step would risk a severe response, and it is unlikely that they’d be able to effectively
seal Hormuz. Thus, they are more likely to launch a sustained campaign of pinprick harassment—a
missile here, a few floating mines there, spread out over hours, days and weeks. When combined with
actions by Iranian operatives in neighboring countries and possibly by Iran’s ballistic missile forces, this
will create uncertainty for any attacker—too violent to be peace, but not fully war. This state of affairs
will put Iran on a more level footing with the United States , and will challenge U.S. policy makers to
come up with an appropriate response. A sustained entanglement may result. The economic impact of
this kind of war would be negative. Regardless of how the conflict proceeds, there would be a
significant spike in oil prices ; if the war is not swift and decisive, the spike could last for weeks or
months. The impact of this should not be underestimated , especially given the fragility of the global
economic recovery . A $10 increase in the price per barrel of oil would take a billion dollars from
American consumers in about five days. War could see oil between $150 and $200 per barrel. High
prices would harm most states, although oil exporters outside the Persian Gulf region, like Russia and
Venezuela, could see a windfall. The economic fallout would drive much of the war’s negative political
impact. Asian nations, which are the recipients of much Gulf oil, would be particularly unhappy .
Washington’s European allies also would be divided at best. Relations with Russia and China would
suffer most . Both states are alarmed by U.S. willingness to use force to reshape the strategic
environment, and a major conflict with Iran could see the two taking steps to be an effective
counterbalance. This could include helping Iran rebuild and rearm.
!! Iran bomb sparks worldwide proliferation, war causes them to pursue prolif
Kemp and Gay, MIT PHD, 14
Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay are coauthors of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic
Consequences. Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Security Programs at the Center for the National
Interest. He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration as Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on
the National Security Council Staff. Dr. Kemp received his Ph.D. in Political Science at M.I.T. and his
M.A. and B.A. degrees from Oxford University. Gay is an assistant editor at The National Interest, 1124-2014, "The High Cost of War with Iran," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-war-iran-8265, A.ZHU)
The United States might not start the war. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been
singularly determined to bring the Iran crisis to a swift resolution. The rest of the Israeli security
establishment shares many of Netanyahu’s worries. If Israel strikes Iran on its own, and the United
States is drawn in, the U.S.-Israeli relationship will likely suffer. Polls already show fading sympathy for
Israel on the American left; an unpopular war could fuel this trend. As counterintuitive as it may seem,
Iran could also start the war. Certain hardline cliques within Iran are willing to engage in provocative
actions. If a terror plot like that against the Saudi ambassador to the United States were to succeed, it
would likely be seen as a casus belli. Further, Iran’s economic isolation is a source of tension that it could
seek to alleviate by provoking instability. Needless to say, inaction has its own costs. There is not yet any
indication that Iran has chosen to build a bomb, but as its nuclear program steadily advances, detecting
and stopping a rush to weaponize will become more difficult. An Iran with a nuclear weapon will be
better-equipped to resist the efforts of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. There will be
fewer options if relations sour. Still, Iran isn’t likely to give atomic weapons to terrorists or launch
sudden nuclear attacks—history suggests that even the most radical regimes that get the bomb, like
Mao’s China, become very wary of using it. Iran’s leaders may sponsor terror, but they are not out to
commit national suicide by provoking nuclear retaliation against their country. Perhaps the biggest
concern with an Iranian bomb is that it will end the nuclear nonproliferation regime and provoke a
cascade of proliferation, not only in the Middle East but in South and East Asia, including South Korea
and Japan. This would be a significant setback for the United States, which has long made
nonproliferation a center of its foreign policy. The risk of a nuclear conflict would increase.
!! Iran war causes WWIII, unprecedented destruction
Hussain 12
(Murtaza Hussain is a journalist and political commentator now working for First Look Media. His work
focuses on human rights, foreign policy and cultural affairs. Murtaza’s work has appeared in The New
York Times, The Guardian, The Globe and Mail, Salon and elsewhere, 9-12-2012, "Why war with Iran
would spell disaster," Al Jazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html, A.ZHU)
War with Iran would be no quick and clean affair, as many senior political and military figures have
pointed out it would make the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost trillions of dollars and the lives of
thousands of soldiers and civilians, seem like "a cakewalk". The fact that it is becoming increasingly
likely, inevitable in the eyes of many, and that it is high on the agenda of so many leading political
figures warrants exploration of what such a conflict would really entail. Conflict on an unprecedented
scale Not a war of weeks or months, but a "generations-long war" is how no less a figure than former
Mossad chief Efraim Halevy describes the consequences of open conflict with Iran. In comparison with
Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries with relatively small populations which were already in a state of
relative powerlessness before they were invaded, Iran commands the eighth largest active duty military
in the world, as well as highly trained special forces and guerilla organisations which operate in
countries throughout the region and beyond. Retired US General John Abizaid has previously described
the Iranian military as "the most powerful in the Middle East" (exempting Israel), and its highly
sophisticated and battle-hardened proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have twice succeeded in defeating far
stronger and better funded Western military forces. Any attack on Iran would assuredly lead to the
activation of these proxies in neighbouring countries to attack American interests and would create a
situation of borderless war unprecedented in any past US conflicts in the Middle East. None of this is to
suggest that the United States would not "win" a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of
Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought again weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence,
politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be
guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison.
!! Iran war turns US Econ
Hussain 12
(Murtaza Hussain is a journalist and political commentator now working for First Look Media. His work
focuses on human rights, foreign policy and cultural affairs. Murtaza’s work has appeared in The New
York Times, The Guardian, The Globe and Mail, Salon and elsewhere, 9-12-2012, "Why war with Iran
would spell disaster," Al Jazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html, A.ZHU)
Oil shocks and the American economy The fragile American economic recovery would be completely
upended were Iran to target global energy supplies in the event of war, an act which would be both
catastrophic and highly likely if US Iran hawks get their way. Not only does the country itself sit atop
some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on the planet, its close proximity to the shipping routes
and oil resources of its neighbours means that in the event of war, its first response would likely be to
choke off the global supply of crude; a tactic for which its military defences have in fact been specifically
designed. The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf is the shipping point for more than 20 per
cent of the world's petroleum. Iran is known to have advanced Silkworm missile batteries buried at
strategic points around the strait to make it impassable in the event of war, and has developed
"swarming" naval tactics to neutralise larger, less mobile ships such as those used by the US Navy. While
Iran could never win in straightforward combat, it has developed tactics of asymmetrical warfare that
can effectively inflict losses on a far stronger enemy and render the strait effectively closed to naval
traffic. The price of oil would immediately skyrocket, by some estimates upwards several hundred
dollars a barrel, shattering the already tenuous steps the US and other Western economies are taking
towards recovery. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has said a war with Iran could
drag out years and would have economic consequences "devastating for the average American"; but
these facts are conspicuously absent in public discussion of the war.
!! Iran War turns Middle East and South Asia wars
Hussain 12
(Murtaza Hussain is a journalist and political commentator now working for First Look Media. His work
focuses on human rights, foreign policy and cultural affairs. Murtaza’s work has appeared in The New
York Times, The Guardian, The Globe and Mail, Salon and elsewhere, 9-12-2012, "Why war with Iran
would spell disaster," Al Jazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html, A.ZHU)
Conflict across borders Finally, a war with Iran would be not be like conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Libya where the fighting was constrained to the borders of the country in question. Despite widespread
resentment towards the country due to the perception of it as a regionally imperialist power as well
sectarian animosity towards it as Shia Muslim theocracy, Iran maintains deep links throughout the
Middle East and South Asia and can count on both popular support as well as assistance from its
network of armed proxies in various countries. In a report for Haaretz, Ahmed Rashid noted that an
attack on Iran would likely inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region, across both Shia and
Sunni Muslim communities. Despite Iran's poor human rights record and bellicose leadership, polls have
consistently shown that Iranian and Iranian-backed leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan
Nasrallah remain among the most popular figures throughout the Arab and Muslim world. This
popularity comes not necessarily out of respect for Iranian ideology, but from a perception that Iran is
the only assertive power in the region and is the target of aggression from the United States and its
allies. In Rashid's analysis, both the Middle East and South Asia would become unsafe for American
citizens and their interests for years to come; popular anger would reach a level which would render
these area effectively off-limits and would cause grave and immediate danger to both American
businesses and troops based in the region.
Aff
AT: Uniqueness
No US-Israel: General
Iran deal strains US-Israeli relations
NYT 7/14/2015 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-israel.html?_r=0, Isabel Kershner, EM)
JERUSALEM — Furiously denouncing the accord to limit Iran’s nuclear program on Tuesday as a “historic mistake,” Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu said that Israel would not be bound by the agreement and warned of negative repercussions in a region already riven with rivalries and
armed conflict. Contrary to President Obama’s assertion that the agreement will cut off every pathway for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons,
Israel’s leaders rejected the deal as a dangerous compromise that
will exacerbate regional tensions and pave the way over time for Iran to produce multiple bombs — “an entire
arsenal with the means to deliver it,” Mr. Netanyahu said. Israel views a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to its survival. For Mr. Netanyahu, the
accord is the bitter culmination of a long struggle that has severely
strained Israel’s relations with the United States, its crucial ally. The disagreement
showed no sign of abating. In a phone call hours after the signing of the deal, Mr. Obama told Mr. Netanyahu that it “will remove the specter of a
nuclear-armed Iran, an outcome in the national security interest of the United States and Israel,” according to a statement from the White House. Mr.
Netanyahu told Mr. Obama that the agreement raised the danger that Iran would obtain nuclear weapons either by waiting out the 10 to 15 years of
restrictions specified by the accord, or by violating it. Referring to the expected lifting of sanctions Mr. Netanyahu said in a televised statement in
English: “In the coming decade, the deal will reward Iran, the terrorist regime in Tehran, with hundreds of billions of dollars. This cash bonanza will
fuel Iran’s terrorism worldwide, its aggression in the region and its efforts to destroy Israel, which are ongoing.” Describing Iran as a “rogue regime,” he
added, “We will always defend ourselves.” Israeli experts said that even though the agreement contained positive aspects that freeze or even roll back
Iran’s nuclear program over the coming decade, it was still deeply problematic given the Israeli conviction that Iran is patient when it comes to building
its nuclear capabilities. Ephraim Asculai, who worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years, said the main problem he foresaw
after reading the agreement was verification of Iranian compliance, particularly inspecting sites other than declared nuclear installations. Mr. Asculai
said the verification mechanism “is lacking.” “Access is limited,” said Mr. Asculai, who is now at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.
“One cannot go and search for undeclared facilities or undeclared materials and activities.” Permission to visit an undeclared facility depends on
inspectors presenting evidence of why they want to go there, he said. Since he speculated that that would involve revealing sensitive intelligence to the
Iranians, he said “their hands are tied from the beginning.” Emily Landau, the director of the institute’s arms control and regional security project,
asked, “If there is no perceivable change in Iran’s military aspirations in the nuclear realm, the question is, why would sun-setting the deal be a good
idea?” More fundamentally, Israeli experts say the agreement empowers Iran and affords legitimacy to its nuclear program, which it insists is for
peaceful purposes. That, they say, is likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey likely to want to acquire
similar capabilities. In a rare display of Israeli consensus, criticism of the deal crossed the political lines. Isaac Herzog, the leader of the center-left
Zionist Union party and head of the opposition in Parliament, said that Israel was on the verge of “a new era in the Middle East that poses security and
diplomatic challenges for Israel that are more dangerous and complex than any we have known before.” Avigdor Lieberman, the former foreign
minister and leader of the ultranationalist Yisrael Beiteinu party, which is also in the opposition, compared the accord to the Munich Agreement
reached with Nazi Germany in 1938, saying, “It is an agreement of total capitulation to unrestrained terrorism and violence in the international arena.”
But Mr. Netanyahu’s domestic opponents have differed on Israel’s approach, particularly toward relations with the Obama administration. Some critics
the prime minister, who infuriated the White House by
addressing a joint meeting of Congress in the spring to attack the negotiations. They
say that the spoiled relations with the Obama administration harmed Israel’s
ability to influence the outcome. Mr. Netanyahu is now gearing up for the next
fight: to lobby Congress to reject the deal and ultimately override any presidential veto. But that is likely to
lead to further confrontation between Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Obama at a time when many Israelis
say what is needed is the rebuilding of trust and intimacy between the allies.
are portraying the deal as a personal failure for
Amos Yadlin, a former chief of Israel’s military intelligence, said in an interview that his recommendation was for Israel “not to meddle in internal
American affairs.” But he said that Israel could still come to understandings with the United States about what happens if Iran violates the agreement
or decides to race toward building a bomb. At the same time, Mr. Yadlin said, Israel should maintain its “operational options,” including a military
option against Iran’s nuclear facilities “for when all other options are exhausted.” Aside from a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Israeli
experts are also concerned that American compensation for the deal in the form of arms packages for other United States allies in the region, such as
Saudi Arabia, could also erode Israel’s so-called qualitative edge when it comes to weapons. Although Israel and Saudi Arabia share concerns about
Iran, they do not have diplomatic relations. “There is an agreement between Israel and the United States, which I hope won’t be violated, that Israel
should keep its qualitative edge under any circumstances,” said Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser who is now at the BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv. “This is not compensation but an obligation,” he added. “In the Middle East,”
Mr. Amidror said, “the enemy of my enemy is not my friend, but another enemy.”
US-Israeli relations have collapsed now
Steele 15 (Michael, 4-2-15, “Can US-Israeli relations get any worse?”, MSNBC columnist and former RNC chairman,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/can-us-israeli-relations-get-any-worse, MJW)
Who would have thought, just a few years ago, that relations
between the United States and Israel would hit such an historic
rock bottom? Whether it’s from the assorted tantrums, slights or outright “in-your-face” moments, the
clear and present danger of the United States and Israel at odds with one another is troublesome. With the
March 17 re-election of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu behind them and the establishment
of a possible Palestinian state thrown into doubt, as well as Netanyahu’s legitimate opposition to the
nuclear deal that the Obama administration is negotiating with Iran, now is the time for both the president and the
prime minister to act less like playground bullies with each other and more like the leaders we need them to be.
The US- Israeli relationship is completely and permanently broken
Rosenberg 15 (MJ, contributor for the Huffington Post, 5-12-15, “The US-Israel Relationship Has Changed Permanently”,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/us-israel-relationship_b_6854930.html, MJW)
Don't believe it when you read that in a few days, weeks or months, everything will be back to normal in
the U.S.-Israel relationship. They won't be. This is an old lobby mantra and it tends to emanate from
friends of the lobby who simply cannot contemplate that anything will ever break the hold it has on
policymakers. In one sense it's true. It is as unlikely that AIPAC will go down as it was 10 years ago that most U.S. states would legalize gay
marriage! But it is going to happen because Prime Minister Netanyahu along with AIPAC (and its Congressional cutouts) have deeply
embarrassed the American Jewish community in several ways. Note: when it comes to the power of the lobby, the Jewish community is the ball
game. Those millions of Christian Zionists out there do not fund Congressional candidacies, nor are their votes in play. Moreover, for them
Israel takes a way back seat to such issues as gay rights, illegal immigration, abortion and hating liberals and secularism. AIPAC is focused on
The conservative Christians are irrelevant. That last point
the ways the Netanyahu/Letter of 47 brouhaha has permanently damaged Israel's standing in
America. It has made it partisan. Even before anyone contemplated Netanyahu coming to Congress to
challenge President Obama, support for Israel was becoming a Republican issue, with Republicans in near
solid support while Democrats were divided down the middle. That trend is only accelerating now, as the Israeli
government has made clear that it has no use for Democrats, and certainly not the Democratic
president who it has treated with an open contempt rarely seen in international relations. Given that the
overwhelming majority of American Jews are Democrats and Obama supporters, Netanyahu (with AIPAC's connivance) has
successfully launched a wrecking ball at the foundation of Israel's support base in America.
only one issue, and directs money to campaigns on only one issue.
gets to one of
Relations with Israel are dead
Bremmer 15 (Ian, 5-2-15, President of Eurasia Group, and Global Research Professor at New York University, “The U.S. and Israel Are
Divided — and That Won’t Change”, http://time.com/3768165/us-israel-relations-middle-east-iran-divide/, MJW)
Obama and Netanyahu don't like each other, but Israel and the U.S. will have problems even when
they're both out of office. Some accuse President Obama of undermining Israel’s security to protect a peace
process that’s going nowhere. Others say Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is poisoning Israel’s relations with
his country’s superpower protector and isolating Israel internationally. It’s clear that Obama and Netanyahu don’t
trust or like each other. But the widening divide between these countries can’t be reduced to a personality
conflict between leaders. Differences in the interests and worldviews of the two governments are
becoming more important. Begin with the “two-state solution.” In Washington, leaders of both parties
will continue to prioritize the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security. But Obama isn’t the only U.S. official
who publicly supports the idea of an eventual Israeli compromise with Palestinians. Former President George W.
Bush described himself in 2008 as the “first American president to call for a Palestinian state.” Support for this
aspiration remains part of the Republican Party platform. Israelis, on the other hand, even those who support a twostate solution in principle, are far more aware of the challenges in creating a viable country that
connects Gaza and the West Bank—to say nothing of the political nightmare of trying to evict thousands of Israeli settlers from
disputed land. Support
for a two-state solution is not dead in either country, but Americans and Israelis do
not look at this question with the same eyes. With every surge in Israeli-Palestinian violence, that gap
becomes more obvious. Obama and Netanyahu also hold opposing views on how best to ensure that
Iran doesn’t develop nuclear weapons, but that difference reflects divergent ideas within their
governments on the role Iran might play in the future. For the Obama administration, Iran might one
day become an agent of change in the Middle East, because it’s a country that holds genuinely contested elections, however
flawed, and it’s one in which a sizeable majority isn’t old enough to remember the religious revolution that the country’s leaders say gives them
their mandate. For
Israel’s government, Iran’s hardliners remain in firm control. Whatever the aspirations of
its young people, Israel believes Iran must remain isolated until its elections are fully free and fair and its leaders recognize Israel’s
right to exist. Nuclear negotiations have widened this gap.
US-Israel relations on the brink—lowest in years
Steele, American Politician, April 2, 2015 (Michael Steele, American Politician and MSNBC
political analyst, “Can US-Israeli relations get any worse?”, MSNBC, 4/2/15, AKHB)
Who would have thought, just a few years ago, that relations between the United States and Israel
would hit such an historic rock bottom?
Whether it’s from the assorted tantrums, slights or outright “in-your-face” moments, the clear and
present danger of the United States and Israel at odds with one another is troublesome. With the March
17 re-election of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu behind them and the establishment of a
possible Palestinian state thrown into doubt, as well as Netanyahu’s legitimate opposition to the nuclear
deal that the Obama administration is negotiating with Iran, now is the time for both the president and
the prime minister to act less like playground bullies with each other and more like the leaders we need
them to be.
Unfortunately, it doesn’t take much to get a sense of the impact the tensions between these two men is
having on the rest of us.
Support for Mr. Netanyahu’s speech before the Congress hit a brick wall with most Democrats. Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi summed it up this way: “As one who values the U.S.-Israel relationship, and loves
Israel, I was near tears throughout the Prime Minister’s speech — saddened by the insult to the
intelligence of the United States as part of the P5 +1 nations, and saddened by the condescension
toward our knowledge of the threat posed by Iran and our broader commitment to preventing nuclear
proliferation.”
Similarly strong views emerged regarding the administration after Mr. Netanyahu’s successful reelection: “Mr. Obama’s clumsy and malicious handling of relations with Israel … is but one brick in a wall
of failure and infamy,” Peter Wehner wrote in Commentary. ”The fact that … Netanyahu emerged
victorious in his (election) confrontation with Obama – a confrontation that can be traced to Obama’s
hostility not just to Netanyahu but to Israel – is a heartening development in a world that is increasingly
chaotic and violent.”
No US-Israel: Econ Specific
Israel wants to sever ties with US due to economy boom
NBC 13 (Written by Martin Fletcher, who’s a correspondent and writer for the NBC, 4/14/13, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/14/17690032-israels-boomingeconomy-puts-billions-in-us-aid-under-spotlight, “Israel’s Booming Economy puts Billions in US Aid Under Spotlights”, EM)
TEL AVIV, Israel -- Boosted by newly discovered natural resources, Israel is surging ahead economically – a
success that is pushing the issue of the country's $3 billion in annual aid from the United States onto the agenda. The country made
its first intervention in the foreign currency market in almost two years Tuesday, buying $100 million to peg back the growing
strength of its shekel. A Bloomberg survey this week said the
shekel was the strongest of 31 major currencies
tracked over the last six months. Last week, Israel passed another milestone, a potential gamechanger for its economy. Gas
began to flow from gas fields off the coast. By 2015 Israel is expected to be fully energy independent,
and may be a net exporter. And there’s more good news: In this water-challenged region, Israel is well on the way to
water independence. Its water desalination industry supplies up to 40 percent of the country’s demand for water, and another
40 percent comes from recycled water from domestic and commercial consumption. Israel reuses its water two to three times. The
boom may give a louder voice to calls for a reduction to the $3 billion worth of financial assistance Israel receives from the U.S.
each year – especially in the Washington, where budget battles continue. U.S. campaign groups such as Stop The Blank Check and
the Council for the National Interest have long campaigned for the aid program to end, but Republican Sen. Rand Paul recently
joined the debate by saying the U.S. could no longer afford to keep borrowing money and then handing it out to others. "It will be
harder to be a friend of Israel if we are out of money. It will be harder to defend Israel if we destroy our country in the process," Paul
told the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, an Israeli think tank, in January. 'A political football'
That view is echoed by some
Bennett, a software tycoon and leader of the right-wing Jewish Home political party,
the country needed to free itself from U.S. assistance. “Our situation
today is very different from what it was 20 and 30 years ago. Israel is much stronger, much wealthier, and we need to
be independent,” he said. Michael Koplow, program director of the Israel Institute, a Washington think tank, said: “Foreign aid
in Israel, such as Naftali
who during the recent election campaign said
is always a political football – even more so when it comes to Israel. There is no doubt American attention is focused on its own
finances.” However, he noted that 74 percent of the U.S. aid, which is meant for military and defense equipment, has to be spent
with U.S. companies. “Given that Israel is a reliable military spender, you would have to think the defense lobby is going to make
sure this aid continues,” Koplow said. Even those hostile to the aid think it unlikely that Israel’s prosperity will prompt a change. “The
money doesn’t help alleviate poverty in Israel now, so there is no reason why lack of poverty there would cause it to end,”
said Robert Naiman, director of Just Foreign Policy. Yossi Mekelberg, associate fellow of the Middle East and North Africa
Program at the U.K.’s Chatham House think tank, said: “It would be a matter of national pride to be economically successful and
independent, but providing financial support also gives some leverage with Israel.” And Israel still has economic problems.
Unemployment is relatively low at 6.3 per cent, but the gap between rich and poor is one of the highest of all developed countries,
according to the OECD. “I don’t think a natural gas boom is going to do much to change that,” observed Koplow. That disparity
swept Yair Lapid, an inexperienced but popular new politician, into the finance ministry earlier this year as part of Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu's ruling coalition. Most of his support came from the disillusioned middle class whose summer of protests in
2011 changed the country’s priorities from political to social issues. Now Lapid, 49, has to make good on his election challenge,
“Where’s the Money?” Newspapers on Wednesday reported that Lapid had clashed with officials in his department who proposed
increases to tuition fees for university students. Lapid responded on his Facebook page that “if students have to pay more I’ll go
home and demonstrate against myself.” And as the government searches for budgets to cut and taxes to raise, newspapers are full
of reports that Israel’s richest man, Idan Ofer, has decided to relocate to London in order to avoid paying more taxes – a motive his
associates deny. He has become a juicy target for critics who have long claimed that the country’s handful of tycoons have been
milking the country dry, leaving the poor to foot the bill. The gap between rich and poor, and how strange this is for Israelis brought
up on the kibbutz ethos of “we’re all equal,” was well illustrated by the proverbial taxi driver who told a reporter, “Israel has changed.
We all used to wear sandals. If you were rich, you wore better sandals.”
US-Israel Strong
US-Israeli relations unshakeable- common goals, security cooperation, economic
development
Garamone 15 Jim, US DoD reporter, DoD News, June 10, 2015,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=129015, CC
Though the United States and Israel disagree about the proposed deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program,
that does not affect America’s unshakable commitment to the defense of Israel, a senior administration
official said here today. Speaking on background, the official said the two countries have a “near
identical” understanding of the threat Iran poses to the region. U.S. and Israeli officials have said Iran
cannot be allowed to gain nuclear capability and that all options are on the table to prevent that from
happening . Where the two allies diverge is in determining the best way to proceed. The U.S. position is
that sanctions and negotiations are the best means to accomplish this, and the Israelis believe Iran
cannot be trusted, the official said. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the proposed pact
with Iran a “grave danger” to Israel and said it legitimized the pariah state’s nuclear program. Iran
agreed to the pact April 2, and negotiators are working out the details with a July 1 deadline for a final
agreement. The United States and Israel agree that Iran is a threat with or without nuclear weapons, the
official said. Iran is spreading ballistic missile technology, selling weapons in the region and operating
throughout the region via surrogates and proxies, he said. Iranian moves with naval mines and undersea
activities are another concern, as is Iran’s threat in cyberspace, the official said. But a nuclear Iran would
make all this much worse, he added. “The threat affects us differently because of our size and location,
but we agree on the threat completely,” the official said. “We agree on the strategic objective
completely, which is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.” U.S. officials say a pact will include
inspection and verification protocols that would preclude Iranian cheating. “We know we need to get a
good deal,” the official said. “There isn’t going to be a deal if it doesn’t meet those needs.” The bottom
line is the U.S. commitment to Israeli security is a bedrock commitment deal or no deal, he said. U.S.
support to Israel will continue even after an agreement with Iran, the official said. “As we look at the
world after the negotiations, … we will work with Israel on strengthening security cooperation further,”
he said. “If additional elements need to be brought into that security agreement, we will talk together
and figure those out.” That the Israelis look at the situation differently is to be expected, the official
acknowledged. They live in the region, and they have heard Iranian leaders “threaten to wipe them off
the map,” the official said. “They are the ones who see Iranian proxies from multiple directions being
armed and conducting terrorist activities or destabilizing neighbors, or shooting missiles at them,” he
added. “You can absolutely understand that when you sit here and look out at those threats at much
closer proximity, … you might have a different calculus on that decision than we do,” he said. “We need
to take that into account, and we do, and it frankly informed our decisions.” It’s never comfortable to
have public disagreements with a close friend, the official said. “Still, it’s a sign of how close the
relationship between the United States and Israel is, and how unshakeable -- that even when we have
an important disagreement on a serious subject and it’s become public, … all that bedrock joint security
cooperation, all that people-to-people work, all the joint economic progress continues apace,” he said.
AT: Impact
Israel-Iran
Israel won’t attack Iran
Keck 15 (Zachary, february 9 2015, “5 Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israelth
wont-attack-iran-9469, MJW)
if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since
getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted
proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel
bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News,
Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark
about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one. Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward
Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak
first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the
program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and
countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to
initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at
odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an
existential threat.
First,
Israel won’t strike Iran alone, despite nuclear deal
Tarnopolsky, 7-15-2015(Noga, Noga Tarnopolsky has two decades of experience covering the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US in the Middle East, and human rights in South America. Among many
destinations, Noga has reported from Argentina, Mexico, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Poland, Turkey and France.
Her work has been published in the New York Times, the New Yorker, the Washington Post, Ha'aretz, El
País and DailyBeast, among others, and she has appeared as an analyst on CNN, Univisión and Televisa.
She once was a food and wine columnist. Noga grew up in Switzerland where she attended the
International School of Geneva and is a graduate of Amherst College, "Israel won’t strike Iran alone, no
matter how much it hates the nuclear deal," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2015/07/15/israel-wont-strike-iran-alone-no-matter-how-much-it-hates-the-nuclear-deal/,
A.ZHU)
The day after a nuclear deal with Iran was announced, the sun rose high above Jerusalem’s shimmering
hills just as it does every July, as if the ancient land shrugged off two decades of apocalyptic warnings
from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and decided to go about its usual routine. Israeli
officials across the political landscape decried the “very bad deal,” as Netanyahu termed the agreement,
which the United States and five world powers hope will curb Iran’s weaponization of its nuclear
program. But no one, not even the prime minister, rattled the sabers of war. “An Israeli attack on Iranian
nuclear sites is no longer a relevant scenario,” wrote Amos Harel, military analyst for the Israeli daily
Haaretz. Once the agreement was announced late Tuesday night, Netanyahu’s first, brief statement
ignored the nuclear issue entirely and asserted that “the world is a much more dangerous place today
than it was yesterday.” “The leading international powers have bet our collective future on a deal with
the foremost sponsor of international terrorism,’’ the statement said. “They’ve gambled that in 10
years’ time, Iran’s terrorist regime will change while removing any incentive for it to do so.” It was not a
frivolous sentiment for the leader of a small state on permanent war alert with two of Iran’s ruthless
proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, on its northern and southern borders. In an interview with the New York
Times a few hours later, President Barack Obama responded soberly (if testily) to the charge. “What’s
been striking to me is that increasingly the critics are shifting off the nuclear issue, and they’re moving
into, ‘Well,’ ” the president said, slipping into his opponents’ characters, “‘even if the nuclear issue is
dealt with, they’re still going to be sponsoring terrorism and they’re still going to get the sanctions relief
and so they’re going to have more money to engage in these bad activities.’ ” “That is a possibility,” the
president acknowledged. “And we are going to have to systematically guard against that and work with
our allies, the Gulf countries, Israel, to stop the work that they are doing outside of the nuclear
program.”
No chance of Israel strike – CIA director
Ginsburg, 7-15-2015, (Mitch, Mitch Ginsburg, a literary translator and long-time journalist, is
military correspondent at the Times of Israel, "For Israel, Iran deal could signify a renewed military
option," Times of Israel, http://www.timesofisrael.com/for-israel-iran-deal-could-signify-a-renewedmilitary-option/, A.ZHU)
Internationally, there seems to be a sense of near unanimity regarding Israel’s inability to carry out a
debilitating strike in Iran. Former CIA director and commander of US forces in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus
practically ridiculed the notion in a recent conversation with Jeffrey Goldberg in Aspen. Patiently, as
though to a group of school children, he noted that Israel lacks the 30,000-pound bomb that the US has
and possesses no plane capable of carrying it. Therefore, he left unsaid, Israel has no way to thwart
militarily Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Impact Turn: Terrorism
Impact Turn- Us-Israeli relations motivate terrorism (including 911) and undermine all
US foreign policy goals
Madar 14 (Chase, February 10 2014, civil rights attorney in New York and writer for the Nation, “Why Bankrolling Israel Prevents Peace in
the Middle East”, http://www.thenation.com/article/washingtons-military-aid-israel/, MJW)
Silence about US-Israel relations is, to a large degree, hardwired into Beltway culture. As George Perkovich, director of the
nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told The Washington Post, “It’s like all things having to do with
This is
regrettable, as Washington’s politically invisible military aid to Israel is not just an impediment to lasting peace
but also a strategic and security liability. As General David Petraeus, then head of US Central Command, testified to the Senate
Armed Services Committee in 2010, the failure to reach a lasting resolution to the conflict between the Israelis
and Palestinians makes Washington’s other foreign policy objectives in the region more difficult to achieve.
It also, he pointed out, foments anti-American hatred and fuels al-Qaeda and other violent groups. Petraeus’s
Israel and the United States. If you want to get ahead, you don’t talk about it; you don’t criticize Israel, you protect Israel.
successor at CENTCOM, General James Mattis, echoed this list of liabilities in a public dialogue with Wolf Blitzer last July: “I paid
a military security price every day as a commander of CENTCOM because the Americans were seen as biased in
support of Israel, and that [alienates] all the moderate Arabs who want to be with us because they can’t
come out publicly in support of people who don’t show respect for the Arab Palestinians. Don’t believe the
generals? Ask a terrorist. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks now imprisoned at
Guantánamo, told interrogators that he was motivated to attack the United States in large part because of
Washington’s leading role in assisting Israel’s repeated invasions of Lebanon and the ongoing dispossession of
Palestinians.
Terrorists are motivated to attack the US because of our support for Israel
Blair 05 (Tony, National Post (Canada), July 18 2005, “Pulling the jihadis up by their roots”,
th
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, MJW)
From the mid 1990s onwards, statements from
al-Qaeda gave very clear expression to this ideology. According
to this way of thinking, every Muslim is supposed to carry hatred toward Americans, Jews and
Christians. The creation of Israel, they believe, is a crime that has to be erased. Thus, targeting
Americans and Jews and killing them anywhere you find them is presented as one of the greatest duties and acts
of piety one can offer to God Almighty.
No Israel Attack
No Israel attack—Israel should have attacked long ago
Keck, managing editor, February 9, 2015 ( Zachary Keck, editing manager of The Diplomat and
The National Interest, “5 Reasons Israel Won’t Attack Iran”, The National Interest, 2/9/15, AKHB)
First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since
getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted
proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon
programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single
nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after
discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm
the building was in fact housing one.
Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in
Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a
decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear
facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites.
Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as
far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last
minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.
No motive to attack—Israel attack bad for them and good for Iran; will cause Iran to
retaliate
Keck, managing editor, February 9, 2015 ( Zachary Keck, editing manager of The Diplomat and
The National Interest, “5 Reasons Israel Won’t Attack Iran”, The National Interest, 2/9/15, AKHB)
Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear
facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iranwould build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons
program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize
greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.
Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If
Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the
regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack,
giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.
3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel
Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel
Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure
against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an
outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world.
Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to
respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at
both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own
leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an
ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger.
Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations
against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries
would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance
themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further
blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.
Attack makes no sense—deal with Iran has been made to prevent access to a bomb
Mullen and Robertson, editor for CNN Digital and Senior International Correspondent
respectively, July 14, 2015 ( Jethro Mullen is a writer and editor for CNN Digital with a focus on
news in the Asia-Pacific region, Nic Robertson is a CNN Senior International Correspondent, “Landmark
deal reached on Iran nuclear program”, CNN Politics, 7/14/15, AKHB)
After arduous talks that spanned 20 months, negotiators have reached a landmark deal aimed at reining
in Iran's nuclear program.
The agreement, a focal point of U.S. President Barack Obama's foreign policy, appears set to reshape
relations between Iran and the West, with its effects likely to ripple across the volatile Middle East.
Representatives of Iran, the United States and the other nations involved in the marathon talks held a
final meeting in Vienna on Tuesday.
Obama will hold a press conference on Wednesday in the East Room of the White House to address
questions on the agreement.
The president praised the deal on Tuesday morning, saying the agreement met the goals he had in place
throughout negotiations.
"Today after two years of negotiation the United States together with the international community has
achieved something that decades of animosity has not: a comprehensive long-term deal with Iran that
will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon," Obama said from the White House, with Vice
President Joe Biden at his side.
"This deal is not built on trust. It's built on verification," Obama said Tuesday.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also praised the deal, speaking after Obama finished, as televisions in
Iran broadcast the U.S. President's statement live, translated into Farsi.
"Negotiators have reached a good agreement and I announce to our people that our prayers have come
true," Rouhani said in a live address to the nation following Obama.
The essential idea behind the deal is that in exchange for limits on its nuclear activities, Iran would get
relief from sanctions while being allowed to continue its atomic program for peaceful purposes.
After news of the deal emerged, Yukiya Amano, the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
said he had signed a "roadmap" with the Iranian government "for the clarification of past and present
outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program."
Israel will not strike, deterrence focus
Beres and Edney, 7-14-2015, (Louis René and Leon, Louis René Beres is emeritus professor of
political science and international law at Purdue. He is the author of many major books and articles on
nuclear strategy and nuclear war, as well as several research monographs prepared for IDC Herzliya, the
BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Institute for National Security Studies in
Tel-Aviv. His tenth book, "Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving Amid Chaos," will be published later this
year, Leon "Bud" Edney, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, served as the vice chief of naval operations, NATO
supreme allied commander atlantic and commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. Adm. Edney,
who holds an advanced degree from Harvard, was also a distinguished professor of leadership at the
U.S. Naval Academy, "What Now for Israel?," US News & World Report,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/07/14/after-the-iran-nuclear-agreementwhat-are-israels-security-options, A.ZHU)
To be sure, following careful assessments of the new Iran agreement, Israel's prime minister will need to
make an 11th-hour decision on preemption. In principle, at least, considering any such defensive first
strike against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures could still make strategic sense if the following
conditions were assumed: 1. Iran will inevitably become militarily nuclear; 2. Iran will very likely plan to
use its new nuclear forces in a first-strike aggression against Israel; and 3. Iran's key decision makers will
likely be irrational. Regarding core definitions, irrational decision-makers would be those Iranian leaders
who could sometime value certain preferences or combinations of preferences (e.g., certain Shiite
religious expectations) more highly than Iran's national survival. In the absence of any one of these three
critical assumptions, the expected retaliatory costs to Israel of any contemplated preemption would
plausibly exceed the expected benefits. Moreover, there would be nothing genuinely scientific about
making such difficult policy choices. For one thing, all of the associated probability judgments would
need to be overwhelmingly subjective. How, for example, could Israeli analysts say anything
meaningfully predictive about unique or unprecedented circumstances? In science, probabilities must
always be based upon the determinable frequency of past events. Here, however, in pertinent history,
there exists no usable guidance. To wit, exactly how many preemptive attacks have already been
launched by a nuclear state against a nearly-nuclear state? The "zero" answer is obvious and irrefutable.
It must, therefore, be a cautionary reply. An additional complication exists. The nearly-nuclear state,
Iran, will still possess large conventional and chemical rocket forces. Many other threatening missiles
will remain under the operational control of its sub-state terrorist proxies. Hezbollah, the well-armed
Shiite militia, already has more rockets in its arsenal than do all NATO countries combined; it is even less
likely than Iran's own leaders to hold back on any post-preemption retaliations. All things considered,
Israel's best security plan, going forward, would be to enhance its underlying nuclear deterrence
posture, and to render this critical enhancement as conspicuous as possible . More precisely, this
means that Jerusalem should do everything possible to signal to any future Iranian aggressor that its
own nuclear forces are plainly survivable, and capable of penetrating any of Tehran's ballistic missile or
other active defenses. Correspondingly, it will also become necessary for Israel to move very carefully
beyond its traditional posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, or the so-called "bomb in the basement."
In the irremediably arcane world of Israeli nuclear deterrence, it can never be adequate that enemy
states should simply acknowledge the Jewish State's nuclear status. It is equally important that these
adversarial states believe Israel to hold usable and survivable nuclear forces, and be willing to employ
these weapons in certain clear and readily identifiable circumstances. Israel's nuclear doctrine and
weapons are necessary to various scenarios that could require conventional preemptive action, or more
residually, a specifically nuclear retaliation. In any event, for Israel, the core purpose of its nuclear
weapons must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. An integral part of Israel's multilayered security system lies in maintaining effective ballistic missile defenses, primarily, the Arrow or
"Hetz." Yet, even the well-regarded and successfully-tested Arrow could never achieve a sufficiently high
capacity for missile intercept, a quality needed to adequately protect Israeli civilians from any Iranian
nuclear attack. In essence, this means that Israel can never rely too heavily upon active defenses for its
national protection. What about the prospect of an irrational Iranian adversary? Any Israeli move from
ambiguity to disclosure, however selective, might not help in the particular case of an irrational nuclear
enemy . It remains possible, or even plausible, that certain elements of Iranian leadership will
determinedly subscribe to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. Still, taken by itself, such
subscription does not automatically or even persuasively call for an Israeli preemption. A few months
ago, the German Federal Security Council approved the delivery of a fifth Dolphin-II class submarine to
Israel. When it is time for Israel to selectively ease away from nuclear ambiguity, a fully-survivable,
hardened and dispersed strategic second-strike force should be made generally recognizable. Further,
such a robust strategic force should be designed to make any foe understand that the costs of planned
nuclear aggression against Israel would assuredly result in destruction of the attacker's key cities. On
this core point of high-value targeting, there should be reserved a very special place for sea-basing
(submarines) a suitable portion of Israel's nuclear deterrent. New agreements notwithstanding, growing
instability in the Middle East now heightens the prospect for expansive new wars, either by
deliberateness or by miscalculation. From the critical perspective of maintaining its credible nuclear
deterrence against a still-nuclearizing Iran, Israel should prepare, inter alia, to reexamine and aptly
modify its traditional policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity . As for any last-minute Israeli preemption
against Iran, there exists no compelling scientific reason to believe that such a defensive strike would
be ascertainably rational, or appropriately cost-effective.
!! Israeli attack not possible despite Iran deal
Harel 7/14/15 Amos, one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defense issues. He has been
the military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz for the last 12 years. In this role, he has
written extensively about Israel's ongoing fight against terrorist organizations, its battles during the
Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) and the last war in Lebanon. Bachelor’s in law. July 14, 2015, Haaretz,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.666059, CC
The serious crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations, at whose lies the tense relationship between Obama and
Benjamin Netanyahu, has produced a situation in which the prime minister’s influence over the nuclear
talks’ final stages was marginal. Now, beyond the criticism that he will level at the U.S. president,
Netanyahu is expected to gear up for the battle in Congress in an effort to hamstring Obama. In other
words, he will strive to block the administration’s promises to lift Congressional sanctions on Iran.
Despite Netanyahu’s following among Republicans and the fact that the delay of the Vienna signing date
added two months to the Congressional approval period, Netanyahu’s success hinges on recruiting 13
Democratic Senators to the nuclear agreement’s opponents. Prospects for that don’t appear high at the
moment, despite the agreement’s many flaws. In any event, the Prime Minister’s Office will invest huge
effort in the battle, which will of course also see a sharper tone vis-a-vis Obama and his policies. One
would hope that disagreements on principles and personalities won’t burn the bridges that link
Jerusalem and Washington. Ultimately, even after the confrontation in Congress, Obama is expected to
be waiting at the White House, checkbook in hand, for Netanyahu. He’s expected to put together a
package giving Israel generous military compensation for the Iranian agreement. Obama and his
spokespeople will try to promote the deal as a huge American foreign-policy success, as the most
important development in the president's two terms. In practice, one could have hoped for a better
agreement, but even if the Vienna accord is full of loopholes, it’s close to being a fait accompli. On the
other hand, despite the fervent rhetoric of some Israeli politicians, an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear
sites is no longer a relevant scenario . If, as Obama expects, he overcomes Congressional opposition,
we will be left with Iran as a strong regional power with its slew of bad intentions, but at this stage
without a military nuclear capability. The Israeli response to this threat depends on achieving closer ties
with the United States, enhancing the Israel Defense Forces’ capabilities with American assistance, and
strengthening the cooperation with the more moderate Sunni countries in the region. It’s a complicated
picture, but not necessarily the bleakest one.
Surveillence doesn’t solve Iran
War now with Iran only way to stop its quest for nuclear weapons
Muravchik 15 (The Washington Post, Joshua Muravchik is a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies,
“War
with Iran is Probably our Best Option”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/war-with-iran-is-probably-our-best-option/2015/03/13/fb112eb0-c725-11e4-a199-6cb5e63819d2_story.html,
EM)
The logical flaw in the indictment of a looming “very bad” nuclear deal with Iran that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
delivered before Congress this month was his claim that we could secure a “good deal” by calling Iran’s bluff and imposing tougher
sanctions. The
Iranian regime that Netanyahu described so vividly — violent, rapacious, devious and redolent with hatred for
Israel and the United States — is bound to continue its quest for nuclear weapons by refusing any “good deal”
or by cheating. This gives force to the Obama administration’s taunting rejoinder: What is Netanyahu’s alternative? War? But the
administration’s position also contains a glaring contradiction. National security adviser Susan Rice declared at an American Israel
Public Affairs Committee conference before Netanyahu’s speech that “a
bad deal is worse than no deal.” So if Iran will
accept only a “bad deal,” what is President Obama’s alternative? War? Obama’s stance implies that we have no
choice but to accept Iran’s best offer — whatever is, to use Rice’s term, “achievable” — because the alternative is unthinkable.
Sanctions may have induced Iran to enter negotiations, but they have not persuaded it to abandon its
quest for nuclear weapons. Nor would the stiffer sanctions that Netanyahu advocates bring a different
result. Sanctions could succeed if they caused the regime to fall; the end of communism in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and of
apartheid in South Africa, led to the abandonment of nuclear weapons in those states. But since 2009, there have been few signs of
rebellion in Tehran. Otherwise, only military actions — by Israel against Iraq and Syria, and through the specter of U.S. force against
Libya — have halted nuclear programs. Sanctions have never stopped a nuclear drive anywhere. Does this mean
that our only
option is war? Yes, although an air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would entail less need for boots on the
ground than the war Obama is waging against the Islamic State, which poses far smaller a threat than Iran does. Wouldn’t an
attack cause ordinary Iranians to rally behind the regime? Perhaps, but military losses have also served
to undermine regimes, including the Greek and Argentine juntas, the Russian czar and the Russian communists. Wouldn’t
destroying much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure merely delay its progress? Perhaps, but we can strike as
often as necessary. Of course, Iran would try to conceal and defend the elements of its nuclear program, so we might have to
find new ways to discover and attack them. Surely the United States could best Iran in such a technological race.
Much the same may be said in reply to objections that airstrikes might not reach all the important facilities and that Iran would then
proceed unconstrained by inspections and agreements. The United States would have to make clear that it will hit wherever and
whenever necessary to stop Iran’s program. Objections
that Iran might conceal its program so brilliantly that it
could progress undetected all the way to a bomb apply equally to any negotiated deal with Iran. And
finally, wouldn’t Iran retaliate by using its own forces or proxies to attack Americans — as it has done in
Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia — with new ferocity? Probably. We could attempt to deter this by warning that we would respond
by targeting other military and infrastructure facilities. Nonetheless, we might absorb some strikes. Wrenchingly, that
might be the price of averting the heavier losses that we and others would suffer in the larger Middle
Eastern conflagration that is the likely outcome of Iran’s drive to the bomb. Were Iran, which is already
embroiled in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza, further emboldened by becoming a “nuclear threshold state,” it would probably
overreach, kindling bigger wars — with Israel, Arab states or both. The United States would probably be drawn in, just as we have
been in many other wars from which we had hoped to remain aloof. Yes, there
are risks to military action. But Iran’s
nuclear program and vaunting ambitions have made the world a more dangerous place. Its achievement of a
bomb would magnify that danger manyfold. Alas, sanctions and deals will not prevent this.
No Iran War
Iran deal makes Iran war scenario the controlling impact
Daily Signal 7/7/15 (This article is written by Genevieve Wood, who works with the Heritage Foundation and writes for the Daily Signal,
http://dailysignal.com/2015/07/17/4-reasons-iran-deal-would-take-us-closer-to-nuclear-war/, “4 Reasons Iran Deal Would Take us Closer to War”, EM)
President Obama finally got his long sought after nuclear deal with Iran. But as many have said from the very beginning, no deal is better than a
bad deal – and The Heritage Foundation believes this
is a very bad deal. There are numerous flaws in the agreement. But it’s because of
the following four reasons Heritage national security experts believe this nuclear agreement with Iran means we have taken one step
closer to nuclear war. First, the deal leaves Iran’s vast nuclear infrastructure largely intact. Inspections
went from anytime/anywhere to sometimes/someplaces. This deal amounts to dismantling sanctions in exchange for a
partial freeze on uranium enrichment. Research and development on centrifuges and ballistic missiles is not included. Second, sanctions
relief will make the region far less safe as billions of dollars, potentially $300 to $400 billion, will now
flow into the Iranian economy. But let’s be clear – all those dollars won’t be finding their way in to the pockets of the Iranian
people. Much of this money will be taken in by the Iranian regime and that means a lot of money will go to fund terrorist
groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Shia insurgencies in Yemen. This could reshape the regional balance and undermine U.S.
interests in the region. This deal diminishes our influence and increases Iran’s. Third, Turkey and many of Iran’s Arab neighbors
will now be more inclined to start their own enrichment programs. Why should they sit by while the
biggest instigator in international terrorism is, at best, delayed in producing a nuclear weapon? This will make
an already unstable Middle East yet more unpredictable and dangerous. Fourth, the deal would be temporary. The restrictions
on uranium enrichment will come to an end – all the while Iran will be doing its homework on how to use
that uranium to build a nuclear weapon. And we shouldn’t assume Iran will delay and play by the rules. Iran
has frequently violated its obligations under other nuclear agreements. Here’s the deal on the deal: It does not block
Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon. That’s why it’s a good deal for Iran and a very bad deal for America and the rest of the world.
Iran deal means Iran war not a threat
Reuters 7/15/15 (“Rouhani: Iran will no Longer be Called a World Threat”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/15/us-iran-nuclear-rouhani-idUSKCN0PP0Z420150715,
EM)
The nuclear deal with world powers is a political victory for Iran, President Hassan Rouhani said on Wednesday, adding that the
agreement meant Tehran would no longer be regarded as an international threat. "No one can say Iran
surrendered," Rouhani told a cabinet meeting broadcast on state television. "The deal is a legal, technical and political victory for
Iran. It's an achievement that Iran won’t be called a world threat any more." Iran and six world powers reached a deal on Tuesday,
sanctions
imposed by the United States, the European Union and the United Nations will be lifted in return for
Iran agreeing long-term curbs on a nuclear program that the West has suspected was aimed at creating a
nuclear bomb. "No deal is perfect. There should be always compromise," Rouhani said in his remarks to cabinet ministers. "It
capping more than a decade of negotiations with an agreement that could transform the Middle East. Under the deal,
was really difficult to preserve some of our red lines. There was a time we doubted there could be a deal. It’s a historic deal and
Iranians will be proud of it for generations to come." Among Iran's main conditions, or "red lines", at the talks were a refusal to
accept a long freeze on nuclear research and development and a demand for a rapid lifting of sanctions.
Iran deal proves no chance of nuclear war with Iran
Ali 7/7/15 (“Energy and Economic Diplomacy can Trump the Nuclear ‘Threat” of the Iran Deal”, http://theconversation.com/energy-and-economic-diplomacy-can-trump-thenuclear-threat-of-the-iran-deal-44702, written by Saleem Ali who is a Chair in Sustainable Resource Development at The University of Queensland, EM)
The critics argue that although the new agreement defers Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability by more than a decade, this activity has not been
banned outright. This is true, but why
would Iran have even entered negotiations if it faced a prospect of no
nuclear technology development whatsoever? If Iran had been wedged into that position, the outcome would probably have
been similar to North Korea’s nuclear development, which was able to proceed despite sanctions. Estranged by the international community,
Iran could have withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and proceeded as a rogue nuclear
weapons state. The new accord’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will see Iran come under greater vigilance than it might otherwise
have done had it remained secretive about its activities. Even if we consider the most extreme pessimistic situation, in
which Iran through subterfuge were somehow able to develop a nuclear weapon even under this new
enhanced scrutiny, what would it gain? Apart from the bravado of nuclear ownership, the weapons
would have no potential for use because there is ample deterrence through mutually assured
destruction. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimates that Israel has at least 80 nuclear warheads – an arsenal big enough to obliterate
most Iranian cities. Add to that the enormous nuclear weapons capabilities of the United States, and there is little doubt that Iran would
stand no chance if it ever dared (either directly or indirectly, through terrorist proxies) to use nuclear weapons in the
region. Saudi Arabia has even less to fear, being hallowed ground for all Muslims, including Iran’s Shia majority. There is zero chance that Iran
would launch a nuclear weapon there. Perhaps the
nightmare scenario for nuclear weapons proliferation would be the
use of a nuclear weapon through a stealth terrorist attack to deliberately provoke a war, a scenario envisaged by the
2002 Hollywood film The Sum of All Fears. But as the movie points out, this danger is more likely to materialise through a
black market for lost weapons, or independently wealthy rogue elements, than from a state such as Iran. Prevention of such an
eventuality requires better intelligence, closer monitoring of existing nuclear stockpiles, and more attention to the issue of “lost bombs”, which
are not currently monitored by International Atomic Energy Authority inspectors.
AT: Cybersecurity
!! The threats of cyberattacks are overstated
Lewis 6 (James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2006,
“Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection”,
http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Cybersecurity%20and%20Critical%20Infrastructure%
20Protection.pdf)
The term “Digital Pearl Harbor” appeared in the mid 1990s, coinciding with the
commercialization of the internet. Digital Pearl Harbor scenarios predicted a world where
hackers would plunge cities into blackness, open floodgates, poison water supplies, and cause
airplanes to crash into each other. But no cyber attack—and there have been tens of thousands of
cyber attacks in the last ten years—has produced these results. The dire predictions arose from a
lack of insight into the operations of complex systems, from an overestimation of both the
interconnectedness of critical infrastructures and the power and utility of software as a weapon to
be used against them.
Determining the actual degree of risk posed by computer network vulnerabilities requires an
estimate of the probability that a computer malfunction will damage a critical infrastructure in
ways that will affect the national interest. For this to occur, a number of simultaneous or
sequential events must take place to let a digital attack in cyberspace have a physical effect. This
is not a simple transformation. Computer networks are indeed vulnerable, but this does not mean
that the critical infrastructures these networks support are equally vulnerable. Terrorists are
attracted to different kinds of weapons, particularly explosives, which are more reliable and
which better meet their political and psychological need for violence. Infrastructures are robust
and resilient, capable of absorbing damage without interrupting operations and accustomed to
doing so after natural disasters, floods, or other extreme weather conditions. In short, the cyber
threat to critical infrastructure has been overstated, particularly in the context of terrorism.
PCLOB
1NC
Congress should task the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board with studying
___________surveillance the aff curtails__________. The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board should recommend that
_______________________plan____________________________.
Prior PCLOB review is key to solvency- it’s the only way to guarantee compliance
Pell, Fellow at Stanford Law, and Soghoian, Visiting Fellow at Yale Law, 2013. (Stephanie K.
Pell - Principal, SKP Strategies, LLC; Non-resident Fellow at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society; former
Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee; former Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice;
former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice; and former Assistant
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida AND Christopher Soghoian - Principal Technologist, Speech, Privacy & Technology
Project, American Civil Liberties Union; Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School, “A lot more than a pen
register, and less than a wiretap: What the StingRay teaches us about how congress should approach the reform of law
enforcement surveillance authorities”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 134, 2013, DH/FDD)
After many months of almost weekly disclosures about classified NSA intelligence programs, we have
begun to understand how, at times, government agencies will interpret statutory language to authorize
bulk, indiscriminate collection in a way that is not apparent from a plain reading of the statutory text.
While some members of Congress were aware of this type of collection in the context of the Section 215
metadata program, we have argued that the StingRay has significantly expanded the government's
surveillance capabilities in criminal investigations while it has, nevertheless, gone largely unnoticed and
unregulated. Indeed, a plain reading of the Pen/Trap statute would not put a legislator on sufficient
notice that the government was interpreting the statute to authorize StingRay surveillance. n132 While
we are not suggesting that no congressional [*166] staffer or Member of Congress is aware of the
StingRay family of technologies and their capabilities, there is no public evidence that Congress has
formally evaluated the privacy implications of law enforcement use of such unmediated, indiscriminate
surveillance methods. n133 Moreover, given the scant number of published cases illustrating a court's
analysis and interpretation of statutes that may authorize law enforcement use of the StingRay family of
technologies, it would be unrealistic to expect judicial review to facilitate meaningful notice to Congress
in anything approaching a timely fashion. n134The StingRay, therefore, illustrates a larger gap in
congressional oversight insofar as new, invasive surveillance technologies and collection methods not
directly authorized by Congress can be used, often for decades, without any reliable notice to Congress
about their use. Simply put, before Congress can begin to regulate new surveillance technologies and
methods, it must have some notice of their nature and actual or likely use. An authoritative, reliable
mechanism is needed to produce information that can provide such notice. As part of the
Administration's response to the summer 2013 Snowden disclosures, which began with the revelation of
the 215 metadata program, President Obama announced his intention to convene an outside group of
experts to conduct a full review of NSA surveillance programs and issue a report about how these
programs impact security, privacy and foreign policy. n135 This expert panel has since issued its report,
which provided, among other things, recommendations about possible reforms to [*167] the Section
215 metadata program. n136 A far more detailed report focusing on the Section 215 metadata program
was subsequently released by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). n137 The PCLOB is
an independent, bi-partisian Executive Branch agency authorized by Congress in the context of the "war
on terrorism" to ensure, among other things, that "liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the
Nation against terrorism." n138 While Congress has currently authorized PCLOB oversight only of
government efforts to protect the nation from terrorism (and the recent PCLOB report on Section 215
and the operations of the FISC is part of that oversight effort), there is no impediment to congressional
expansion of the PCLOB's mandate to review, advise, and counsel more generally on surveillance
technologies and methods that permeate current criminal investigations (or those that could reasonably
be predicted to do so in the future), even if they do not necessarily relate to government efforts to
protect the Nation against terrorism. Congress could, for example, task the PCLOB with studying the
specific surveillance technologies and methods that are in use or reasonably likely to be used by various
law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations and the legal authorities the government believes
authorizes or, conversely, does not prohibit their use. The goal of such an assessment should be the
production of written recommendations by the PCLOB to Congress specifying which technologies are in
need of [*168] direct authorization or prohibition, and which statutory authorities need to be updated
and amended to accommodate or prohibit their use. In service of this goal, Congress should further
direct the PCLOB to write public reports at regular intervals (which could also, if necessary, include nonpublic or classified addenda) making such recommendations and directly identifying privacy issues
associated with law enforcement's use of new surveillance technologies or collection methods, as well
as old technologies like the StingRay, whose current or likely future use gives rise to new privacy
concerns. n139 Moreover, for purposes of conducting the investigation and analysis leading to its
written recommendations, Congress should both direct and empower the PCLOB to talk with all relevant
government agencies, surveillance technology manufacturers, outside technologists and any other
parties or entities that would provide relevant information. n140 The StingRay and its capabilities invoke
several important questions that should guide the PCLOB in making recommendations about
technologies and methods Congress should regulate directly. This brief list is illustrative, though in no
sense exhaustive, of some inquiries the PCLOB should consider: : (1) Is the technology or technique in
question invasive of common and legal conceptions of personal privacy?; (2) Does it challenge a
common-sense understanding of the statutory text that the government interprets to authorize its use?;
(3) Is it an indiscriminate collection method that intercepts data from innocent cell phones in the
coverage area of the mobile device being targeted?; (4) Is it an unmediated surveillance method that
leaves no trace of its use beyond internal government agency records?; and (5) Might it, without such
oversight or other regulation, otherwise remain hidden from any degree of public perception or
scrutiny?
Solvency
Executive Says Yes
Despite 215 Issues, almost all PCLOB recommendations have been accepted
PCLOB 15 (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. January 29, 2015.
https://www.pclob.gov/newsroom/20150129.html. FDD)
To mark the one-year anniversary of its report on the Section 215 telephone records program and the
six-month anniversary of its report on the Section 702 surveillance program, the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board has released an assessment of the implementation of its recommendations. In
its two reports, the Board made a total of 22 recommendations directed at the Executive Branch,
Congress, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In its assessment, the Board discusses the
status of each recommendation’s implementation. Key findings include: Overall, the Administration has
accepted virtually all recommendations in the Board’s Section 702 report and has made substantial
progress toward implementing many of them, while also accepting most of the recommendations in the
Board’s Section 215 report. The Administration has not implemented the Board’s recommendation to
halt the NSA’s telephone records program, which it could do at any time without congressional
involvement. Instead, the Administration has continued the program, with modifications, while seeking
legislation to create a new system for government access to telephone records under Section 215. The
Administration has made substantial progress in implementing some of the Board’s recommendations
regarding transparency. The Administration has not yet developed, as the Board recommended, a
methodology for gauging the value of its counterterrorism programs. The Board’s assessment includes
a Fact Sheet, which provides a concise summary of the Board’s conclusions about the implementation of
its recommendations, and a Table summarizing the Board’s recommendations by subject matter.
PCLOB Reports generate public interest and unique insights
Monteiro, Fellow at the World Intellectual Property Organization, 14 (Renato Leite
Monteiro. Fellow Researcher of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Editor of the Singapore
Law Review, LL.M. in Intellectual Property and Technology Law by the New York University. May, 2014.
Article: The Balance between Freedom and Security in the Age of Surveillance. p. 9-11. FDD)
One week after the first news involving the disclosure of information by Edward Snowden, the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) of the United States Government was asked by US
Senators and President Barack Obama 36 to investigate the NSA programs37 that have already been
revealed by the media.38 The result of the investigation was the “Report on the Telephone Records
Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court” which analyzed two NSA programs. It concluded that the program under
section 215 of the Patriot Act, which is designed to only collect metadata, failed to comply with its legal
requirements. Nonetheless, an important finding of the review group was that there is no single
evidence that bulk collection of telephone and Internet metadata has contributed to counterterrorism
investigations. The board analyzed privacy and civil liberties implications of the program and concluded
that they were serious. It argued that telephone and Internet records, alone or aggregated with other
information, and subject to computer methodologies such as data mining, could be highly detrimental
to an individual’s privacy. It added that bulk collection of metadata by the government causes a shift of
power, giving the administration even more ability to perform compulsion, criminal prosecution, or even
misuse the information “to harass, blackmail, intimidate or to single out particular individuals and
groups”. It is important to highlight that the Board has found no evidence of such mishandlings, but
affirmed “while the danger of abuse may seem remote, given historical abuse of personal information
by the government during the twentieth century, the risk is more than merely theoretical”. This was,
indeed, the very same reason why the FISA Court was created, to avoid abuses. The report stressed the
chilling effects that bulk collection can have on free speech. Even groups and individuals lawfully
exercising their activities might have few reasons to believe in the confidentiality of their
communication. It may affect, for example, the ability of journalists to talk with their sources, advocacy
organizations to reach their members, whistleblowers and other public members. The Board finished its
analysis of Section 215 program by stating that even though its purposes are sound current rules have
implemented many safeguards, such an ineffective operation, with so many implications to individuals’
rights, cannot be justifiable. On January 2014, the President of the United States, based upon the abovediscussed reports, provided an overview of the reforms that would be imposed to US mass surveillance
programs. The government ordered more transparency, civil oversight and allowed for privacy
requirements for foreigners. It also determined that signals intelligence could only be used for
legitimate national security purposes, and not towards indiscriminately monitoring ordinary citizens. But
none of these envisioned solutions were new. Even the attempt to provide privacy rights to foreigners
was flawed due to an exception inserted in a footnote of the Presidential Directive. As mentioned,
these are some of the reasons why the FISA court was created. In practice, the response given by the
American government is neutral and ineffective.
Congress Says Yes
Congress will support and listen to the PCLOB
Hattem 5/15/15( Hattem is a correspondent and journalist for The Hill; Lawmakers want stronger privacy board,
http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/242208-lawmakers-want-stronger-privacy-board, 5/15/2015, AJZ)
A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House and Senate wants to strengthen the government’s small privacy
watchdog. Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Tom Udall (D-N.M.), and Reps. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii) and Trey Gowdy (R-S.C.) introduced
legislation this week to expand the authority of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and make its
five board seats full-time positions. “ By giving the board a broader mandate and more authority,
Congress can better protect the privacy and civil rights of law-abiding Americans ,” Wyden said in a statement.
“Our country must strike the delicate balance between protecting our national security and our civil
liberties,” echoed Gowdy. “Many Americans are rightly concerned the pendulum has swung too far
away from our civil liberties.” The PCLOB was created in 2007 following a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, but has long
been considered toothless. While the chairman — who was only seated in 2013, after waiting for Senate confirmation since 2011 — is a fulltime position, the four other board members serve part-time. The board gained some new visibility in recent years, however, following the
disclosures of Edward Snowden. In January of 2014, it issued an explosive report calling the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of
U.S. phone records illegal. A federal appeals court agreed that the program was illegal last week, and Congress is in the middle of a debate over
how to renew or reform the NSA.
FREEDOM Act written to respond to PCLOB report
Sensenbrenner, US Congressman, 14 (Jim Sensenbrenner, US Congressman, co-author of the USA
FREEDOM Act. http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=367530.
January 23, 2014. FDD)
As I’ve said since June, I am extremely troubled by President Obama’s misinterpretation of Section 215
of the Patriot Act. Both the president’s hand-picked panel and now the PCLOB agree that bulk collection
of Americans’ phone records has come at a high cost to privacy with little to no benefit to our national
security. Section 215 was designed to obtain business records relevant to an authorized terrorism
investigation. The PCLOB acknowledges the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone records does not meet
that criteria and concludes the program is not legally justifiable. It also raises Constitutional concerns,
citing the First and Fourth Amendments. This report adds to the growing momentum behind genuine,
legislative reform. The USA FREEDOM Act is narrowly tailored to strike the proper balance between
privacy and security. And if brought to the floor for a vote, it will pass with broad bipartisan support. The
president has failed to deliver on his promises of transparency and the protection of our civil liberties. It
is up to Congress to rein in abuse and restore trust in our intelligence community.
Compliance
Strengthened PCLOB key to solvency
Setty 15 (Sudha Setty is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Intellectual Life. She specializes in the
areas of comparative law and national security. Her scholarly publications address secrecy, separation of powers and rule of law issues in the
comparative constitutional context. Winter, 2015, Stanford Journal of International Law, 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, SYMPOSIUM: Surveillance,
Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, 2015, AJZ)
For example, on prospective matters, it is likely that intelligence agencies would consult the PCLOB only if the agency itself considers the issue
being faced new or novel, as the NSA metadata program was labeled prior to its inception. In such cases, decision
makers within an
agency generally ask whether the contemplated program is useful or necessary, technologically feasible,
and legal. If all three questions are answered affirmatively, the program can be implemented. Now that
the PCLOB is fully operational, it seems likely that if a contemplated program is considered new or novel,
an intelligence agency would consult the PCLOB at some stage of this process for its guidance on
implementing the program. This nonpartisan external input may improve self-policing within
the [*102] intelligence community and help intelligence agencies avoid implementing controversial
programs or, even if implemented, set better parameters around new programs. n189
If the PCLOB is able to exert some degree of soft power in influencing national security decision-making,
then the judiciary represents hard power that could be used to force the protection of civil liberties
where it might not otherwise occur. The FISC should be reformed to include a public advocate lobbying
on behalf of privacy concerns, making the process genuinely adversarial and strengthening the FISC against charges that it merely
rubber stamps applications from the intelligence community. n190 Article III courts need to follow the lead of Judge Leon in Klayman in
conceptualizing privacy as broad and defensible, even in a world where electronics-based communication is dominant and relatively easy for
the government to collect. If the judicial defense of privacy were combined with the possibility of liability for violations of that privacy, it is likely
that this would incentivize increased self-policing among the members of the intelligence community. The
creation of an active
PCLOB and a more adversarial process before the FISC will not provide a perfect solution to the
dilemmas posed by the government's legitimate need for secrecy and the protection of the public
against potential abuse. Yet because these changes are institutional and structural, they are well-placed
to improve the dynamic between the intelligence community, oversight mechanisms, and the public.
PCLOB gets other agencies on board – broad declassification and empirics prove, that
recommendations are an effective model for change.
U.S. Official News, informational newspaper on u.s. government 14, (“Washington: When
the Administration Asks Itself to Declassify” Pub. August 4, 2014 U.S. official news online, copyright Plus
Media Solutions Online Archive Gale Group http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?
id=GALE%7CA377284668&v=2.1&u=lom_umichanna&it=r&p=STND&sw=w&asid=8d3721a3ec81700405
70a4c80f92ab3f Accessed 7/16/15 DH)
In preparing its recent report on the Section 702 surveillance program, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) demonstrated an unusual mode of declassification, in which one executive
branch agency asks another agency to declassify information. In this case, the process was remarkably
productive, and it may offer a precedent for future declassification efforts. "During the process of
preparing this report we sought and obtained declassification of facts about this still highly classified
[Section 702] program in order to allow us to put in context how the program operates and clarify some
public misconceptions," said PCLOB Chairman David Medine at a July 2 public meeting. "As a result, over
one hundred new facts were declassified by the government to provide needed context for the
program's operation," he said. In what the PCLOB staff termed a "lateral declassification" model, it was
an executive branch agency (i.e., the PCLOB itself) -- rather than Congress or members of the public -that pressed another government agency (ODNI, NSA, CIA, FBI or Justice) to declassify specific
information. Such an interagency request for declassification differs from the "referrals" that agencies
routinely direct to one another. In those cases, the receiving agency is simply asked to review records to
identify its own classified information (or "equities") and then to advise the originating agency what
must be withheld and what may be disclosed. Here, the PCLOB didn't merely ask agencies to screen for
classified information under existing classification standards. It urged them to actually change those
standards. And in more than 100 specific cases, the agencies did so. Most of the declassified facts in the
PCLOB Section 702 report are not specifically flagged as having been declassified at the Board's request,
and they may therefore be easily overlooked. A partial compilation of such newly declassified facts,
prepared by a participant in the process, was obtained by Secrecy News. Several features appear to
have contributed to the efficacy of the lateral declassification approach. For one thing, the requesting
agency (the PCLOB) already possessed the requested information in classified form. So it knew exactly
what it was asking for, and why it was asking for it to be declassified. And then the fact that the
declassification requests originated within the executive branch itself (the PCLOB is an independent
executive branch agency) made it harder for the recipient agencies to ignore the request and easier for
them to fulfill it. By contrast, public requests through the Freedom of Information Act often seem to
decline into an adversarial contest, in which the agency adopts a defensive posture and offers only
minimal, grudging compliance with disclosure requirements. (At CIA, one gets the impression that asking
for a record to be declassified can make it less likely to be disclosed.) Requests from Congress also
inevitably have a political overlay, and may be seen to serve an agenda that does not coincide with the
Administration's own. But as part of the Administration, the PCLOB's many declassification requests did
not trigger the sort of immune response that any outside request would have done. Of course, the
PCLOB's work, including its declassification proposals, did not take place in a vacuum. "A lot of political
wind was at our back," said Peter Winn, acting general counsel for the Board. Not only had related
classified details entered the public domain through the Snowden disclosures, but calls for
declassification of more information regarding current surveillance programs had been explicitly
endorsed by the Director of National Intelligence and other senior officials. Because of these competing
factors, the role played by the Board's "lateral declassification" approach cannot be precisely delineated
or clearly distinguished from them. But its apparent effectiveness is consistent with the productive
declassification work performed by another executive branch body, the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which has declassified information in a large majority of the
mandatory declassification review appeals presented to it. Perhaps most important, the Board's
experience with declassification in the Section 702 report may serve as a precedent for similar initiatives
in the future. "For us, it's a model," said Sharon Bradford Franklin, executive director of the PCLOB.
PCLOB has the DNI on board with recommendations
Leithauser, Security Information Report Writer for UTC and Homeland Security 13 (Tom
Leithauser “Intelligence agencies will consult privacy board to modernize Policies” Pub. September 2,
2013, Aspen Publishers Proquest Online access Accessed 7/16/15 DH)
The intelligence community will work with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to
update policies governing the collection and use of Americans' personal information, according to
Alexander Joel, the civil liberties protection officer for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The
PCLOB recently asked the DNI and the Justice Department to consider updating policies designed to
protect privacy and civil liberties. Those policies "should be kept up-to-date to take into account new
developments including technological advancements," the board said in an Aug. 22 letter. The board
"has learned that key procedures that form the guidelines to protect 'information concerning United
States persons' have not comprehensively been updated, in some cases in almost three decades, despite
dramatic changes in information use and technology," it said. It asked the DNI and DoJ to provide by
Oct. 31 "an agency-by-agency schedule establishing a time frame for updating each agency's guidelines-'
In a statement posted Aug- 26 on the DN|'s new "IC On The Record' website, Mr. Joel said he agreed
with the PCLOB. 'As the PCLOB letter states, there have been 'dramatic changes in information use and
technology' in the past decades. We recognize the importance of reviewing and, as appropriate,
updating the guidelines in light of these changes," he said. He noted that previous updates of Executive
Order 12333, which guides the activities of intelligence agencies, had shown that "protective principles,
if stated in a technology-neutral manner, can continue to apply as technologies change-" "We welcome
the PCLOB's interest,' Mr. Joel added, "and will, in coordination with the Department of Justice,
continue to provide the PCLOB with information regarding these matters "
PCLOB is powerful
ACLU Novmber 5th, 2013 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual
rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States, Washington: What Powers
Does the Civil Liberties Oversight Board Have?, November 5th, 2013, AJZ)
Congress gave the board significant powers to access information. The statute directs that “If determined by
the Board to be necessary” to carry out its functions, the PCLOB “is authorized to” “Have access from
any department, agency, or element of the executive branch” to “all relevant” records or material,
“including classified information consistent with applicable law. “ “Interview, take statements from, or
take public testimony from personnel” of any element of the executive branch. “Request information or
assistance from any State, tribal, or local government.” Compel testimony by subpoena from persons
“other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch,” a majority of the board can
submit a written request to the Attorney General to issue a subpoena on behalf of the board. Within 30 days, the AG
must either comply or provide a written explanation for a denial to the board and to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. This is a
strangely contorted way of giving the board subpoena power, and inserts a powerful executive branch official whose agency may be a subject
of the board’s oversight into the process—but at least it only applies to subpoenas directed outside government.
Perception
Europe wants more US transparency
Smith-Spark, CNN, 13 (Laura Smith-Spark, CNN: Germany's Angela Merkel: Relations with U.S.
'severely shaken' over spying claims. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/europe/europe-summitnsa-surveillance/# October 24, 2013. FDD)
"Trust needs to be rebuilt." That's what German Chancellor Angela Merkel firmly asserted early Friday -as she had the previous day -- in the wake of reports the U.S. National Security Agency had
eavesdropped on her cell phone. This claim and others that she and other world leaders have been
spied on had "severely shaken" relationships between Europe and the United States, the German leader
said. Obviously, words will not be sufficient," Merkel said in the wee hours Friday at a summit of
European Union leaders. "True change is necessary." Talk of the NSA's reported spying on Germany and
other allies dominated Merkel's news conference in Brussels, Belgium. It illustrated the anger over this
story in Europe and the challenges facing Washington because of it. The Chancellor insisted she isn't the
only one concerned; other European leaders, she said, voiced similar sentiments during the first day of
the summit Thursday. Her comments echoed some she'd made upon arriving Thursday in Belgium, when
she said that discussions of "what sort of data protection do we need and what transparency is there "
should now be on European leaders' agenda. "We need trust,..." she said. "Spying among friends is
never acceptable."
UN Calls for more surveillance transparency
UN General Assembly Resolution, 14 (United Nations Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age, Passed by the UN General Assembly on Nov 25, 2014. Resolution sponsored by Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Uruguay
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/UN%20privacy%20resolution.pdf, FDD)
Emphasizing that unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and/or interception of communications, as well as
unlawful or arbitrary collection of personal data, as highly intrusive acts, violate the right to privacy, can
interfere with the right to freedom of expression and may contradict the tenets of a democratic society,
including when undertaken on a mass scale, Noting in particular that surveillance of digital
communications must be consistent with international human rights obligations and must be conducted
on the basis of a legal framework, which must be publicly accessible , clear, precise, comprehensive and
non-discriminatory and that any interference with the right to privacy must not be arbitrary or unlawful,
bearing in mind what is reasonable to the pursuance of legitimate aims, and recalling that States that
are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must undertake the necessary
steps to adopt laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
Covenant, Emphasizing that States must respect international human rights obligations regarding the
right to privacy when they intercept digital communications of individuals and/or collect personal data
and when they require disclosure of personal data from third parties, including private companies.
Business/Econ
Tech Companies demand more oversight and transparency
Friedersdorf, 13 (Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer for The Atlantic Magazine, “Google, Apple, and
Microsoft Agree: NSA Surveillance Undermines Freedom”
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/google-apple-and-microsoft-agree-nsa-spyingundermines-freedom/282143/ December 9th, 2013, FDD)
In an open letter to President Obama and Congress, eight of the most prominent U.S. tech companies
have demanded that strict new limits be put on government surveillance, citing revelations made earlier
this summer, when stories based Edward Snowden's leaked documents began running in The Guardian.
"The balance in many countries has tipped too far in favor of the state and away from the rights of the
individual," they argue, "rights that are enshrined in our Constitution. This undermines the freedoms we
all cherish. It’s time for a change." They've staked out an extraordinary position. Google, Facebook,
Apple, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo, LinkedIn, and AOL all have an interest in restoring public trust in their
products and averting new regulatory challenges in countries disinclined to let a spying hegemon control
the Internet. My colleague James Fallows has written eloquently about the damage the NSA's behavior
could do to U.S. economic might as other countries react to it. The companies could've made a
compelling case for reform on those grounds alone. Instead, they've gone quite a bit farther. Together,
they affirm that current surveillance policy—what Team Obama presides over right now—threatens
constitutional rights, individuals rights, and freedom. Prominent American companies don't often make
that sort of objection. And their reform agenda is grounded in five principles likely to please most NSA
critics: 1) Limiting Governments’ Authority to Collect Users’ Information Governments should codify
sensible limitations on their ability to compel service providers to disclose user data that balance their
need for the data in limited circumstances, users’ reasonable privacy interests, and the impact on trust
in the Internet. In addition, governments should limit surveillance to specific, known users for lawful
purposes, and should not undertake bulk data collection of Internet communications. 2) Oversight and
Accountability Intelligence agencies seeking to collect or compel the production of information should
do so under a clear legal framework in which executive powers are subject to strong checks and
balances. Reviewing courts should be independent and include an adversarial process, and governments
should allow important rulings of law to be made public in a timely manner so that the courts are
accountable to an informed citizenry. 3) Transparency About Government Demands Transparency is
essential to a debate over governments’ surveillance powers and the scope of programs that are
administered under those powers. Governments should allow companies to publish the number and
nature of government demands for user information. In addition, governments should also promptly
disclose this data publicly.
Lack of transparency will harm tech business
Naughton, Professor of the Public Understanding of Technology, 13 (John Naughton,
Professor of the Public Understanding of Technology at Open Univeristy, one of the UK’s largest
research universities and the largest part-time undergraduate university. He is the author of From
Gutenberg to Zuckerberg: What You Really Need to Know about the Internet. “Edward Snowden’s not
the Story: The Fate of the Internet Is” http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/28/edwardsnowden-death-of-internet, July 27th, 2013. FDD)
That's all at nation-state level. But the Snowden revelations also have implications for you and me. They
tell us, for example, that no US-based internet company can be trusted to protect our privacy or data.
The fact is that Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft are all integral components of
the US cyber-surveillance system. Nothing, but nothing, that is stored in their "cloud" services can be
guaranteed to be safe from surveillance or from illicit downloading by employees of the consultancies
employed by the NSA. That means that if you're thinking of outsourcing your troublesome IT operations
to, say, Google or Microsoft, then think again. And if you think that that sounds like the paranoid
fantasising of a newspaper columnist, then consider what Neelie Kroes, vice-president of the European
Commission, had to say on the matter recently. "If businesses or governments think they might be spied
on," she said, "they will have less reason to trust the cloud, and it will be cloud providers who ultimately
miss out. Why would you pay someone else to hold your commercial or other secrets, if you suspect or
know they are being shared against your wishes? Front or back door – it doesn't matter – any smart
person doesn't want the information shared at all. Customers will act rationally and providers will miss
out on a great opportunitys." Spot on. So when your chief information officer proposes to use the
Amazon or Google cloud as a data-store for your company's confidential documents, tell him where to
file the proposal. In the shredder.
Executive Authority
Executive legitimacy is destroyed by existing surveillance
New York Times Editorial Board, a board of 19 journalists to express the editorial
opinion of the NYT, 13 (The editorial board is composed of 19 journalists with wide-ranging areas of
expertise. Their primary responsibility is to write The Times’s editorials, which represent the voice of the
board, its editor and the publisher. The board is part of The Times’s editorial department, which is
operated separately from The Times’s newsroom, and includes the Letters to the Editor and Op-Ed
sections. Andrew Rosenthal, Terry Tang, Robert B. Semple Jr., Linda Cohn, Phillip M. Boffey, Francis X.
Clines, Lawrence Downes, Carol Giacomo, Mira Kamdar, Ernesto Londoño, Anna North, Eleanor
Randolph, Dorothy Samuels, Serge Schmemann, Brent Staples, Teresa Tritch, and Jesse Wegman.
“President Obama’s Dragnet” Pub. June 6, 2013 New York Times Official Website
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/president-obamas-dragnet.html?_r=0 Accessed 7/20/15
DH)
Within hours of the disclosure that federal authorities routinely collect data on phone calls Americans
make, regardless of whether they have any bearing on a counterterrorism investigation, the Obama
administration issued the same platitude it has offered every time President Obama has been caught
overreaching in the use of his powers: Terrorists are a real menace and you should just trust us to deal
with them because we have internal mechanisms (that we are not going to tell you about) to make sure
we do not violate your rights. Those reassurances have never been persuasive — whether on secret
warrants to scoop up a news agency’s phone records or secret orders to kill an American suspected of
terrorism — especially coming from a president who once promised transparency and accountability.
The N.S.A. and other government agencies declined to comment about the disclosures.U.S. Confirms
That It Gathers Online Data OverseasJUNE 6, 2013 The administration has now lost all credibility on this
issue. Mr. Obama is proving the truism that the executive branch will use any power it is given and very
likely abuse it. That is one reason we have long argued that the Patriot Act, enacted in the heat of fear
after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks by members of Congress who mostly had not even read it, was reckless
in its assignment of unnecessary and overbroad surveillance powers. Based on an article in The Guardian
published Wednesday night, we now know that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National
Security Agency used the Patriot Act to obtain a secret warrant to compel Verizon’s business services
division to turn over data on every single call that went through its system. We know that this particular
order was a routine extension of surveillance that has been going on for years, and it seems very likely
that it extends beyond Verizon’s business division. There is every reason to believe the federal
government has been collecting every bit of information about every American’s phone calls except the
words actually exchanged in those calls. Articles in The Washington Post and The Guardian described a
process by which the N.S.A. is also able to capture Internet communications directly from the servers of
nine leading American companies. The articles raised questions about whether the N.S.A. separated
foreign communications from domestic ones.
Declassification
Declassification is good.
Sepper 10 (she is an associate professor of law,at Washington University at St. Louis. She is currently a Center for Reproductive Rights
Fellow at Columbia Law School, where she has been in residence since 2010, Texas International Law Journal, Texas International Law Journal,
Fall, 2010, Texas International Law Journal, 46 Tex. Int'l L.J. 151, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, Fall 2010, AJZ)
Under such circumstances, the
consequences of declassification generally will be beneficial, not harmful, to
proper intelligence work. Intelligence operatives report that the current system's "presumption of
secrecy makes it tempting to ignore longer-term costs." n257 Transparency, therefore, can be expected to
generate more effective and efficient intelligence over time. n258 The knowledge that their activities will
be made known in the future should generate intelligence policies and behavior that resonate more
clearly with democratic values. For example, French intelligence agents might have reconsidered engaging in surveillance of
peaceful Iraqi dissident groups in France and providing reports to Iraqi intelligence had there been a system that would eventually declassify
their wrongdoing. Instead, this collusion, which the French people did not support, was revealed by documents seized during the Iraq invasion.
n259
Indeed, wrongdoing often
eventually emerges to the detriment of an intelligence service's reputation and
respect - through media reports, whistleblowers, or eventual declassification. n260 The result is that policymakers and other
intelligence consumers question the judgments of intelligence agencies and doubt
their [*197] legitimacy. n261 What is reported and leaked regarding intelligence largely brings transgressions and errors to the public
attention with a "negative effect on motivation and morale" among intelligence agents. n262 By contrast, greater transparency
through declassification of information should help bring intelligence successes as well as failures to
light and result in greater legitimacy for intelligence agencies.
Declassification results in transparency, which is key to democracy.
Smith 2014 (Jeffery A. Smith is a Professor, Department of Journalism, Advertising and Media Studies, University of WisconsinMilwaukee; with Robert E. Drechsel, Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison; W. Wat Hopkins,
Professor of Communication, Virginia Tech; Derigan Silver, Assistant Professor, Department of Media, Film and Journalism Studies, University of
Denver; Erik Ugland, Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Research, Diederich College of Communication,
Marquette University.2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Communication Law and Policy, Winter, 2014, Communication Law & Policy, 19 Comm.
L. & Pol'y 129 UMMIT REPORT: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY -- AN AGENDA FOR THOUGHT AND ACTION: PANEL IV:
THE FUTURE OF THE PRESS AND SECRECY, Fall 2014, AJZ)
Exceptions to the general expectation of openness are usually based on dire warnings that turn out to be uninformed, illogical or deliberately
alarmist. The fears themselves, even when presented in good faith, are often illusory. Disclosure
rarely has calamitous effects.
Democracy requires a high degree of transparency that can involve some necessary risks or perhaps
simply some ingenuity in avoiding harm. Reconciling openness and secrecy is more complicated than merely fine-tuning
doctrinal law; it is also a matter of significantly changing behavior. The most carefully worded law will accomplish little if those who implement
it have been absorbed into a culture of secrecy. Officials
who are supposed to serve the public have assumed broad
powers to decide what citizens can know and even think. The federal government has a long history of
resorting to repressive laws, loyalty oaths, access restrictions, censorship, propaganda, news
management and secrecy. The volume of classified documents is exploding. A November 2012 report to President
Obama from the Public Interest Declassification Board noted that federal agencies annually create petabytes of classified information, more
than the amount of information that had been declassified in the previous seventeen years. At this rate, the report says, the backlog of records
awaiting declassification will grow exponentially. (Two petabytes is the equivalent of the contents of all U.S. academic research libraries
combined.) Such
numbers suggest that the only hope for meaningful change is stopping over-classification
before it occurs. Doing so will require that openness be the norm. Some will fear blame for any adverse results, but
dangers also exist when citizens cannot scrutinize what is being done with the authority they ultimately possess. The workings of excessive
secrecy regimes can frustrate even the most basic information [*132] gathering and generate aggressive efforts to track down and severely
punish laudable whistleblowers. Officials
at all levels of government need to be committed to the principles of
transparency that undergird the entire democratic system. They cannot do their work properly if they
do not understand that public knowledge is clearly part of our constitutional ethos and an essential
precondition of self-governance. They should neither be placed in a position of having to violate a law to provide information
citizens should have, nor be conditioned to believe that they must constantly make balancing decisions that favor suppression over disclosure.
Restrictions on information need to be minimal. Otherwise, the power of knowledge is being usurped.
Neglecting the need for openness is not an option. If we seek to be a transparent society in addition to a
free-speech society, we must begin to treat all acts of secrecy as illegitimate unless they are proven
genuinely necessary and authorized expressly by the people's representatives in government. All
government records, meetings and actions ought to be routinely open to public inspection. Any
exceptions ought to be clearly outlined by statute and judged by a standard akin to the one used by the
Supreme Court to evaluate prior restraints. Specifically, any government system or act of secrecy ought
to bear a heavy presumption against its validity. The burden must be firmly placed on the suppressors of
information to justify their restrictions
Privacy
PCLOB is key to privacy
Setty 15 (Sudha Setty is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Intellectual Life. She specializes in the
areas of comparative law and national security. Her scholarly publications address secrecy, separation of powers and rule of law issues in the
comparative constitutional context. Winter, 2015, Stanford Journal of International Law, 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, SYMPOSIUM: Surveillance,
Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, 2015, AJZ)
For example, on prospective matters, it is likely that intelligence agencies would consult the PCLOB only if the agency itself considers the issue
being faced new or novel, as the NSA metadata program was labeled prior to its inception. In such cases, decision
makers within an
agency generally ask whether the contemplated program is useful or necessary, technologically feasible,
and legal. If all three questions are answered affirmatively, the program can be implemented. Now that
the PCLOB is fully operational, it seems likely that if a contemplated program is considered new or novel,
an intelligence agency would consult the PCLOB at some stage of this process for its guidance on
implementing the program. This nonpartisan external input may improve self-policing within
the [*102] intelligence community and help intelligence agencies avoid implementing controversial
programs or, even if implemented, set better parameters around new programs. n189
If the PCLOB is able to exert some degree of soft power in influencing national security decision-making,
then the judiciary represents hard power that could be used to force the protection of civil liberties
where it might not otherwise occur. The FISC should be reformed to include a public advocate lobbying
on behalf of privacy concerns, making the process genuinely adversarial and strengthening the FISC against charges that it merely
rubber stamps applications from the intelligence community. n190 Article III courts need to follow the lead of Judge Leon in Klayman in
conceptualizing privacy as broad and defensible, even in a world where electronics-based communication is dominant and relatively easy for
the government to collect. If the judicial defense of privacy were combined with the possibility of liability for violations of that privacy, it is likely
that this would incentivize increased self-policing among the members of the intelligence community. The
creation of an active
PCLOB and a more adversarial process before the FISC will not provide a perfect solution to the
dilemmas posed by the government's legitimate need for secrecy and the protection of the public
against potential abuse. Yet because these changes are institutional and structural, they are well-placed
to improve the dynamic between the intelligence community, oversight mechanisms, and the public.
A/T
PCLOB Powerless
PCLOB is powerful
ACLU Novmber 5th, 2013 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual
rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States, Washington: What Powers
Does the Civil Liberties Oversight Board Have?, November 5th, 2013, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/,
AJZ)
Congress gave the board significant powers to access information. The statute directs that “If determined by
the Board to be necessary” to carry out its functions, the PCLOB “is authorized to” “Have access from
any department, agency, or element of the executive branch” to “all relevant” records or material,
“including classified information consistent with applicable law. “ “Interview, take statements from, or
take public testimony from personnel” of any element of the executive branch. “Request information or
assistance from any State, tribal, or local government.” Compel testimony by subpoena from persons
“other than departments, agencies, and elements of the executive branch,” a majority of the board can
submit a written request to the Attorney General to issue a subpoena on behalf of the board. Within 30 days, the AG
must either comply or provide a written explanation for a denial to the board and to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. This is a
strangely contorted way of giving the board subpoena power, and inserts a powerful executive branch official whose agency may be a subject
of the board’s oversight into the process—but at least it only applies to subpoenas directed outside government.
Politics
Internal checks give credibility to the executive by checking back overreach
Sales, Professor of Law @ Syracuse 14 (Nathan Alexander Sales is testifying to PCLOB
(“Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy” Pub. Summer
2014 2014 I/S: A Journal of Law & Policy for the Information Society, Lexis Online Accessed 7/17/15 DH)
This sort of oversight by the courts and Congress provides an obvious, first-order level of protection for
privacy and civil liberties--an external veto serves as a direct check on possible executive [*538]
misconduct. Judicial and legislative checks also offer an important second-order form of protection. The
mere possibility of an outsider's veto can have a chilling effect on executive misconduct, discouraging
officials from questionable activities that would have to undergo, and might not survive, external
review. n64 Moreover, external checks can channel the executive's scarce resources into truly important
surveillance and away from relatively unimportant monitoring. This is so because oversight increases the
administrative costs of collecting bulk data--e.g., preparing a surveillance application, persuading the
judiciary to approve it, briefing the courts and Congress about how the program has been implemented,
and so on. These increased costs encourage the executive to prioritize collection that is expected to
yield truly valuable intelligence and, conversely, to forego collection that is expected to produce
information of lesser value. In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance regime
also should feature a system of internal checks within the executive branch, to review collection before
it occurs, after the fact, or both. As for the ex ante checks, internal watchdogs should be charged with
scrutinizing proposed bulk collection to verify that it complies with the applicable constitutional and
statutory rules, and also to ensure that appropriate protections are in place for privacy and civil liberties.
The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence is a well known example. The unit, which presents the
government's surveillance applications to the FISA court, subjects these requests to exacting scrutiny
with the goal of increasing the likelihood of surviving judicial review. n65 Indeed, the office has a strong
incentive to ensure that the applications it presents are airtight, so as to preserve its credibility with the
FISA court. n66 Ex post checks include such commonplace mechanisms as agency-level inspectors
general, who can audit bulk collection programs, assess their legality, and make policy
recommendations to improve their operation, as well as entities like the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, which perform similar functions across the executive branch as a whole. Another
important ex post check is to offer meaningful whistleblower protections to officials who know about
programs that violate constitutional or statutory requirements. Allowing officials to bring their concerns
to ombudsmen within the executive branch (and then eventually to Congress) can help root out
lawlessness and also relieve [*539] the felt necessity of leaking information about highly classified
programs to the media. These and other internal checks can achieve all three of the benefits promised
by traditional judicial and legislative oversight--executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they
conclude would be unlawful, the mere possibility of such vetoes can chill overreach, and increasing the
costs of monitoring can redirect scarce resources toward truly important surveillance. External and
internal checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints are rough substitutes for
one another. If outside players like Congress and the courts are subjecting the executive's programmatic
surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for comparably robust safeguards within
the executive branch tends to diminish. Conversely, if the executive's discretion is constrained internally
through strict approval processes, audit requirements, and so on, the legislature and judiciary may
choose not to hold the executive to the exacting standards they otherwise would. In short, certain
situations may have less need to use traditional interbranch separation of powers and checks and
balances to protect privacy and civil liberties because the executive branch is subject to an "internal
separation of powers" n67 that can accomplish much the same thing.
House bill does nothing to limit PCLOBs power
Aftergood June 10th 2015 (directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works to
reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government information.
House Intelligence Bill Would Limit PCLOB Oversight, http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/06/hpscipclob/. , 6/15/2015, AJZ)
By contrast, the same House bill directed that the DNI shall provide the Government Accountability
Office with the access to information that it needs to perform its authorized functions. The relevant
directive (ICD 114) “shall not prohibit the Comptroller General [i.e., the head of the GAO] from obtaining
information necessary to carry out an audit or review at the request of the congressional intelligence
and defense committees.”
The new House Committee measure may be gratuitous in any event, since the PCLOB is an executive
branch agency and is already subject to the authority of the Director of National Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods, and to regulate access accordingly.
Rubber Stamp
PCLOB isn’t rubber stamp, actual deliberation from an independent group (solves
PRISM)
Messmer writer and consultant for the Palma Sola legal group 14 (Ellen Messmer is also
the senior editor at Network World, an IDG website, where she covers news and technology trends
related to information security. “NSA's civil liberties impact to be measured by federal watchdog” Pub.
March 5, 2014 Network World Online; Lexis Academic Accessed 7/15/15 DH)
A government watchdog group tasked with overseeing whether actions the President's executive office
takes to combat terrorism don't throw civil liberties overboard in the process is taking aim at the
National Security Agency's "PRISM" data-collection surveillance program. The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) is the federal agency within the executive branch that's expected to
independently review anti-terrorism efforts to see if they comply with established law and to ensure
"liberty concerns" are addressed. Some think a privacy group so close to the President would only be a
"rubber-stamp" operation. But the PCLOB surprised more than a few when its recent 238-page report
bluntly condemned the NSA surveillance program collecting bulk telephony call records as illegal, saying
it should be shut down. Now the PCLOB is turning its attention to "PRISM," the purported NSA
surveillance program that has come to light through leaks to the media from former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden. "Our responsibility is to provide advice to the President," said David Medine, chair of
PCLOB, speaking on a panel at the recent RSA Conference in San Francisco. He said the group hopes to
be able to issue its report on PRISM within the next few months. The group is obtaining information
about PRISM from various agencies, including the NSA, and the private sector. Medine notes the PCLOB,
whose five members have top-secret clearances, can gain access to surveillance court decisions, agency
officials and can even see program demonstrations. PRISM is a secret NSA program in which high-tech
giants such as Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and Facebook, among others, must cooperate by providing data
on end users to the NSA. PRISM has been described in various ways by journalists, mainly from The
Guardian, New York Times and Washington Post, who were given top-secret documents from Snowden
directly, though sometimes only PowerPoint slides. "There's a lot of inaccurate reporting in the media"
Medine remarked about what he's seen in the news about PRISM in comparison to what the PCLOB is
learning. Though he didn't go into detail about how news reporting on PRISM may be off the mark, he
suggested that news stories are sometimes simply reporting older information as current, for example.
In any event, the PCLOB hopes to issue its own findings on the NSA PRISM program fairly soon, though
the PCLOB itself, composed of lawyers, is somewhat hobbled by the fact that only Medine is a full-time
member and the four other board members, split between Democrat and Republican party
representation, do this part-time while holding down regular jobs. This part-time aspect of running the
board puts a strain on what can be done, some PCLOB members acknowledge, though some, such as
James Dempsey, think it's a good model for oversight. As regards, PRISM, "I hope in our report we can
be more clear about how that works," Dempsey said during the panel discussion at RSA Conference.
Though the PCLOB was created through federal law in 2007, it only really got into working gear last May
-- right before the Snowden leaks began -- when Medine was appointed as its chair after a Congressional
review process. The group anticipates there will be many more privacy and civil liberties issues it will
take up, not all of them related directly to NSA Internet surveillance. Medine thinks the group could one
day take on the privacy and civil liberties implications of drones used by the government. In addition,
the question has come up whether the PCLOB could play the role as a "safe haven" for "whistleblowers"
to share information about government programs they think violate civil liberties. Medine is open to this
idea of the group being "the central place to go" for whistleblowers in this regard.
PCLOB changed - now it’s an independent agency that has legitimacy
Levy, Political Journalist for Newsweek, IBI, and The American Prospect 13 (Pema Levy is
a graduate from Georgetown University “http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-spying-controversy-new-agencycould-change-government-surveillance-1342409” Pub. July 7, 2013 International Business Times Online
http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-spying-controversy-new-agency-could-change-government-surveillance1342409 Accessed 7/17/15 DH)
Created in 2004 at the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, the PCLOB did not get off to an
auspicious start. It was originally located within the Executive Office of the President, and its first report
to Congress was edited by the Bush White House, prompting one Democratic member to resign. In
response, in 2007 the new Democratic Congress made the board an independent agency within the
executive branch. Then-President George W. Bush clashed with Senate Democrats over board
nominees, and ultimately none were confirmed. President Barack Obama dragged his feet in choosing
nominees and when they finally did come, Republicans refused to approve them. Four part-time
members were finally approved in the last nine months. The board’s chairman, David Medine, was not
formally installed on until May 29, 2013. One week later, the Guardian newspaper published its first
scoop, based on leaked National Security Agency documents, showing the government collected and
stored metadata on the phone calls of millions of Americans. Over the next few days, the documents
leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that the government went further, collecting and storing metadata
on the phone calls of virtually all Americans. The government was also scooping up an untold amount of
Americans’ electronic communications as part of its foreign surveillance operations. These revelations
thrust the board into the middle of the most important debate over privacy and civil liberties in years.
Sen. Tom Udall, D-N.M., sent a letter to the board asking it to “make it an urgent priority to investigate
the programs” and provide an unclassified report on their legality and whether they take the “necessary
precautions to protect the privacy and civil liberties of American citizens under the Constitution.”
Twelve additional senators, including two Republicans, signed Udall’s letter. On June 21, the board met
with Obama. All this before its office space was even ready or emails set up. The full board’s first public
appearance came Tuesday at a workshop in Washington, D.C., where the five members -- three
Democrats and two Republicans -- queried three separate panels of experts on how the surveillance
programs might be brought more in line with civil liberties concerns. Civil liberties advocates appear
cautiously optimistic about the new board, whose opinion could help determine whether Congress
decides to take on the massive surveillance programs. Advocates are also aware of the board’s ability to
actually move their cause backward and entrench these programs. “If it blesses these programs, they
are likely to continue,” privacy rights advocate Greg Nojeim, who participated in one of Tuesday’s
panels, said in an interview Wednesday. Whether the board deems the phone metadata collection is
unlawful or not will be “one of the most significant tests of PCLOB,” said Nojeim, a lawyer at the Center
for Democracy and Technology. But whatever its recommendations ultimately are, the PCLOB is armed
by circumstance with the power to shape the laws governing the surveillance state, particularly Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act, also known as the “business records” provision, under which the government
claims the authority to collect Americans’ call data.
Perms
Prior key
Prior review process is key to enforcement
Pell, Fellow at Stanford Law, and Soghoian, Visiting Fellow at Yale Law, 2013 . (Stephanie
K. Pell - Principal, SKP Strategies, LLC; Non-resident Fellow at Stanford Law School's Center for Internet
and Society; former Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee; former Senior Counsel to the Deputy
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice; former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General,
National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice; and former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern
District of Florida AND Christopher Soghoian - Principal Technologist, Speech, Privacy & Technology
Project, American Civil Liberties Union; Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School, “A
lot more than a pen register, and less than a wiretap: What the StingRay teaches us about how congress
should approach the reform of law enforcement surveillance authorities”, Yale Journal of Law and
Technology 134, 2013, FDD)
Knowledge and perception must precede oversight. Congress cannot understand or regulate a
surveillance technology it cannot "see" clearly, whether through conceptual understanding of its
operation before the fact or actual analysis of the history of its use. The StingRay is a law enforcement
surveillance technology that has, for nearly two decades, evaded direct congressional scrutiny, much
less informed authorization or regulation. Moreover, the StingRay illustrates how law enforcement
agencies can use surveillance technologies and methods, justified by expansive and potentially
problematic interpretations of existing statutes, for years before they ever come to the attention of
Congress--if they ever do. We have thus argued that an authoritative, reliable procedure must be
established to put Congress on notice about the functions, capabilities and historical use, if any, of new
surveillance technologies and methods if the law is ever to keep pace with technological change. As they
are for the [*169] newest of technologies, the need for such procedures is applicable even to decadesold technologies like the StingRay, whose expanding surveillance capabilities, combined with its
increasing frequency of use by law enforcement at ever-descending costs, n141 invoke privacy
implications not heretofore appreciated. Indeed, we are entering an era where law enforcement
agencies have the technical capability to hack into the computers and phones of surveillance targets,
allowing them covertly to activate webcams and microphones, search through documents, and obtain a
person's web browsing history. n142 These capabilities have been acquired and used
without [*171] any public congressional hearings or other open debate, much less any explicit
legislative mandate. As it hints at technological disruptions to come and how the legal disorder they
bring may unfold, the StingRay offers strong evidence that now is the time to establish a reliable
mechanism that will be a continuous source of useful guidance to Congress as more powerful
surveillance tools emerge and evolve to challenge the very notion of privacy as they strengthen the
ability of the government to monitor and control the lives of its citizens. For more new and powerful
surveillance tools shall certainly emerge in the coming age than are "dreamt of in [our] philosophy" of
personal privacy or its current practical expression in our laws. n143
AT: do both
1. PCLOB preserves pres powers- it precludes external review of executive actions
Sales, Professor of Law @ Syracuse 14 (Nathan Alexander Sales is testifying to PCLOB
(“Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy” Pub. Summer
2014 2014 I/S: A Journal of Law & Policy for the Information Society, Lexis Online Accessed 7/17/15 DH)
This sort of oversight by the courts and Congress provides an obvious, first-order level of protection for
privacy and civil liberties--an external veto serves as a direct check on possible executive [*538]
misconduct. Judicial and legislative checks also offer an important second-order form of protection. The
mere possibility of an outsider's veto can have a chilling effect on executive misconduct, discouraging
officials from questionable activities that would have to undergo, and might not survive, external
review. n64 Moreover, external checks can channel the executive's scarce resources into truly important
surveillance and away from relatively unimportant monitoring. This is so because oversight increases the
administrative costs of collecting bulk data--e.g., preparing a surveillance application, persuading the
judiciary to approve it, briefing the courts and Congress about how the program has been implemented,
and so on. These increased costs encourage the executive to prioritize collection that is expected to
yield truly valuable intelligence and, conversely, to forego collection that is expected to produce
information of lesser value. In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance regime
also should feature a system of internal checks within the executive branch, to review collection before
it occurs, after the fact, or both. As for the ex ante checks, internal watchdogs should be charged with
scrutinizing proposed bulk collection to verify that it complies with the applicable constitutional and
statutory rules, and also to ensure that appropriate protections are in place for privacy and civil liberties.
The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence is a well known example. The unit, which presents the
government's surveillance applications to the FISA court, subjects these requests to exacting scrutiny
with the goal of increasing the likelihood of surviving judicial review. n65 Indeed, the office has a strong
incentive to ensure that the applications it presents are airtight, so as to preserve its credibility with the
FISA court. n66 Ex post checks include such commonplace mechanisms as agency-level inspectors
general, who can audit bulk collection programs, assess their legality, and make policy
recommendations to improve their operation, as well as entities like the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, which perform similar functions across the executive branch as a whole. Another
important ex post check is to offer meaningful whistleblower protections to officials who know about
programs that violate constitutional or statutory requirements. Allowing officials to bring their concerns
to ombudsmen within the executive branch (and then eventually to Congress) can help root out
lawlessness and also relieve [*539] the felt necessity of leaking information about highly classified
programs to the media. These and other internal checks can achieve all three of the benefits promised
by traditional judicial and legislative oversight--executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they
conclude would be unlawful, the mere possibility of such vetoes can chill overreach, and increasing the
costs of monitoring can redirect scarce resources toward truly important surveillance. External and
internal checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints are rough substitutes for
one another. If outside players like Congress and the courts are subjecting the executive's programmatic
surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for comparably robust safeguards within
the executive branch tends to diminish. Conversely, if the executive's discretion is constrained internally
through strict approval processes, audit requirements, and so on, the legislature and judiciary may
choose not to hold the executive to the exacting standards they otherwise would. In short, certain
situations may have less need to use traditional interbranch separation of powers and checks and
balances to protect privacy and civil liberties because the executive branch is subject to an "internal
separation of powers" n67 that can accomplish much the same thing.
2. Presidential Power key to maintain the economy
Bernstein, Senior fellow @ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 8 (Jared Bernstein was
the chief economist and economic adviser to Joe Biden. Formerly, senior economist and the director of
the Living Standards Program at the Economic Policy Institute. Former deputy chief economist at the
U.S. Department of Labor. “Presidential Power to Influence the Economy” Pub. April 15, 2008 Oped
online http://www.opednews.com/articles/2/opedne_jared_be_080415_presidential_power_t.htm
Accessed 7/21/15 DH)
Yes, Virginia, presidents do matter when it comes to the economy—in fact, they matter a lot more than most economists like
to admit. It’s de rigueur to dismiss all the usual presidential bluster on the economy as just that. And presidents do have a way of crowing about
how their fingerprints are all over positive economic developments while nowhere near the scene of lousy economic outcomes. But modern
presidents do have a major effect in a few key areas: fiscal stimulus, or giving the economy a jolt when it needs it;
setting spending priorities; and good old power dynamics. The first part, what is often called Keynesian stimulus, after the great
economist who legitimized such actions, is less common, because, thankfully, we’re not usually in recession. When we are in a
downturn, however, the mechanisms that keep the economy humming are jammed. For one reason or another, consumers aren’t
consuming, investors aren’t investing, and employers aren’t hiring. In such cases, presidents can work with Congress to stimulate the
economy through a tax cut or even a “tax rebate” (lots of people get a check for a few hundred bucks), or through juiced-up
government spending on one project or another. President George W. Bush shoved a Keynesian tax cut through Congress in 2001, though with
this guy there’s always an angle. In the midst of a strong economy in 2000, he ran on a plan to cut taxes. But it wasn’t until a recession was
declared in 2001 that he used economic stimulus as a rationale. And, in fact, later Bush tax cuts that occurred outside of recession had other
rationales. Recession? Tax cut. Recovery? Tax cut. War? Tax cut. Colts win the Super Bowl? Tax cut. When your only tool is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. Certainly, presidents don’t always go to the Keynesian place. If the recession looks shallow or short lived, it’s going
to be hard to get the stimulus into the system in time.11 But it is one of their important tools. The big story regarding presidents and the
economy, however, lies elsewhere, deeply embedded in our power and trade-off principles (#’s 1 and 3). Specifically, where presidents flex
their economic muscles is in the nuanced area of setting
spending priorities and the resultant redistribution of power,
resources, and opportunities. Let me hit you with what I consider a pretty big number: $3 trillion. That’s just about the size of the
most recent U.S federal budget, and it amounts to about a fifth of the economy. How you spend that kind of money matters
a great deal, and presidents have a lot to do with that. So don’t let anyone ever tell you they don’t influence economic outcomes. Of course,
Congress plays a big role in shaping the budget, too, but the
document originates from the executive branch, and the
party that composes the first draft of the legislation always has the most sway. To be shamefully, but usefully,
reductionist, when setting spending priorities, presidents operate in three modes: redistributing, investing, and constraining. When aredistributing he or she goes, keep an eye on the president’s target. Principle #3, trade-offs matter, is in play here. You
can give tax cuts
for people who don’t need them, though they really do want them. You can funnel spending projects to your friends. No politician is
blameless in this game, but just to take a pointed example from current events, let’s look at the George W. Bush record. One of the best outfits
for crunching numbers on who benefits from tax cuts is the group Citizens for Tax Justice. Their name suggests an edge (though I don’t think
“Justice” implies a bias we should be worried about), but their reputation for purity in how they go about their analysis is stellar. In 2006, they
took a look at who gained, and by how much, from the spate of Bush tax cuts that occurred over the president’s first term, and this is what they
found.12 The poorest group of families, those in the bottom fifth of the income scale (average income: $11,300), ended up with less than a
hundred bucks from the cuts. Middle-income families, in the $40K range, ended up with about $700; and those at the top end, with an average
income of about $1.5 million, well, they came away from the table with $52,000 in tax cuts. Bill Clinton had a better record in this regard. In his
first budget, for example, he raised taxes on the wealthy and greatly expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). That’s a wage subsidy for
low-income workers, but it works as pure income redistribution through the income tax system. So this was kind of a Robin Hood moment, in
terms of the president’s redistribution mode.13 But lest you think this stuff always follows a partisan pattern, note that President Reagan also
championed a big boost in the EITC. - Investing some of that $3 trillion is another way presidents can affect the economy, often well down the
road, by spending money on potentially productivity-enhancing projects that the private sector is unlikely to embrace. Al Gore may not have
invented the Internet, but the government was the major player in getting it off the ground, and the productivity payback has been enormous.
Moreover, the start-up costs and linkage needs of such an ambitious project put it outside the reach of the private sector. The same could be
said of lots of medical and other scientific research. But before you get too excited, or too incensed, depending on your orientation, keep in
mind that federal investment in R&D amounts to about 1 percent of our economy. As I suggest later, while that may have been adequate in the
past, it’s not enough if we’re going to get ahead of the environmental threats we face. Constraining spending is another way in which
presidents can influence the economy, for better and for worse. Generally, economists worry about the lack of spending restraint by presidents
and other elected officials, and government spending has a pretty bad rep. But while presidents can hurt the economy by spending too freely,
especially when they don’t pay for it, the converse is also true. By neglecting productive in­vestments or spending on services that people really
want and need, like health care, it’s possible to retard growth. So how can we in the electorate recognize the right balance? What should we be
listening for when presidents run their economy rap by us? First, in an era when the market itself is generating huge inequalities, government
should not exacerbate them. So when presidents go into distributional mode, watch out for Robin Hood in reverse. Someone who dropped in
on our economic policy in the 2000s could be forgiven for thinking the big problem facing the American economy was that rich people didn’t
have enough money. I know all the mumbo-jumbo about cutting their taxes so they’ll be more productive, but that supply-side nonsense has no
credibility. In fact, as I’ve stressed throughout, the problem in today’s economy is much less slow productivity growth than it is the distribution
of that growth. So beware of upward redistribution. Regarding spending restraint, economics is all about the best way to spend scarce
resources, and when said resources come from you, me, and, if the spenders neglect to pay the bill, our children, restraint is a venerable goal in
and of itself. That said, it’s easy to overdo this one. Especially when it’s “our money,” we can easily resent its being spent. But before we jerk
our knees in response to plans for government spending, we should look as closely as we can at what that spending is for. Is it for productive
investments on behalf of future generations, or health care that’s provided more efficiently than it is by the private, or protection for our least
advantaged citizens for stuff outside of their control, like, oh, I don’t know, say, levees in poor neighborhoods? Finally, presidents
can
throw their weight around in important ways that end up having an influence over how income gets distributed.
When Bush acted by executive order to change the overtime rules in a way that favored employers over workers, this had obvious
distributional consequences (even the generally pro-business Republican Congress tried to stop him, twice, but he didn’t need their approval on
this one). When Reagan fired the PATCO workers and Clinton opted to make NAFTA (a trade agreement that labor was against) his first big
legislative priority,
such actions sent important signals to markets about who was in and who was out. They
tilted the balance of power, and power is at the heart of how economic outcomes get distributed.
3. Economic Decline causes a nuclear war which kills is all- Multiple Instances
Harris and Burrows ‘9 Dr. Mathew J. Burrows serves as the Director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Initiative in the
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He was appointed Counselor to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in 2007 and Director of
the Analysis and Production Staff (APS) in 2010. As Director of APS, Burrows was responsible for managing a staff of senior analysts and
production technicians who guide and shepherd all NIC products from inception to dissemination. He was the principal drafter for the NIC
publication Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, which received widespread recognition and praise in the international media and among
academics and think tanks. Jennifer M. Harris is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Council, Harris was a
member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State responsible for global markets, geo-economic issues and energy security. In
that role, Harris was a lead architect of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Economic Statecraft agenda, which launched in 2011. Before joining
the State Department, Harris served on the staff of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, covering a range of economic and financial issues.
“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrows.pdf
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting
and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is
a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not
likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies
(think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period).
There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the
ways in
which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks,
the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as
resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth
continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their
reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures,
command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the
angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The
most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,
worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire
additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed
between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low
intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended
escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.
The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities
and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian
intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating
crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows
and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take
actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential
for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will
have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries
indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased
tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea
lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be
increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
AT: do cp
1. CP is not normal means – that’s the 1nc Pell evidence. PCLOB is not currently
tasked with reviewing this surveillance tech
2. The perm seversa. It severs should --- it means mandatory and the counterplan is only a
recommendation
Foresi 32
(Remo Foresi v. Hudson Coal Co., Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A. 910; 1932
Pa. Super. LEXIS 239, 7-14, Lexis)
As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is
also the preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century
Dictionary: "Obliged or compelled (to); would have (to); must; ought (to); used with an infinitive
(without to) to express obligation, necessity or duty in connection with some act yet to be carried
out." We think it clear that it is in that sense that the word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely
advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit,
the word 'should' is not used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought
to' and carries [***8] with it the sense of [*313] obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion . A
natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate claimants who have been injured while doing
something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify, provisions
which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the
hazardous occupation of mining.
b. Curtail means reduce budgetary authority- Inspector General doesn’t have that
authrotiy
Dembling 78 – General Counsel @ GAO (Paul Dembling, General Counsel, General Accounting Office,
“Oversight Hearing on the Impoundment Control Act of 1974,” hearing before the Task Force on Budget
Process, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, 6-29-1878, Hein Online)
(3) "Curtail" means to discontinue , in whole or in part, the execution of a program , resulting in the
application of less budget authority in furtherance of the program than provided by law.
3. Severance is a voting issue – it allows the aff to shift out of all our DA links and
makes the aff a moving target.
4. Fiat should be certain and immediate – its key to neg ground --- every DA relies on
implementation and status quo uniqueness to determine risk. Aff delays results in
moving targets and avoids our best arguments.
at: textual competition good
Textual competition bad –
1. Kills neg ground – doesn’t allow “ban the plan” and other opportunity cost checks
of the aff.
2. Not logical – a CP that excludes “in the United States” would be plan-plus but
competes.
3. Doesn’t check – the neg will just use word substitutes to circumvent competition.
4. Reject bad CPs when they happen
Whistleblowers
1nc
Strengthened PCLOB key to whistleblowers
Messmer writer and consultant for the Palma Sola legal group 14 (Ellen Messmer is also
the senior editor at Network World, an IDG website, where she covers news and technology trends
related to information security. “NSA's civil liberties impact to be measured by federal watchdog” Pub.
March 5, 2014 Network World Online; Lexis Academic Accessed 7/15/15 DH)
A government watchdog group tasked with overseeing whether actions the President's executive office
takes to combat terrorism don't throw civil liberties overboard in the process is taking aim at the
National Security Agency's "PRISM" data-collection surveillance program. The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) is the federal agency within the executive branch that's expected to
independently review anti-terrorism efforts to see if they comply with established law and to ensure
"liberty concerns" are addressed. Some think a privacy group so close to the President would only be a
"rubber-stamp" operation. But the PCLOB surprised more than a few when its recent 238-page report
bluntly condemned the NSA surveillance program collecting bulk telephony call records as illegal, saying
it should be shut down. Now the PCLOB is turning its attention to "PRISM," the purported NSA
surveillance program that has come to light through leaks to the media from former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden. "Our responsibility is to provide advice to the President," said David Medine, chair of
PCLOB, speaking on a panel at the recent RSA Conference in San Francisco. He said the group hopes to
be able to issue its report on PRISM within the next few months. The group is obtaining information
about PRISM from various agencies, including the NSA, and the private sector. Medine notes the PCLOB,
whose five members have top-secret clearances, can gain access to surveillance court decisions, agency
officials and can even see program demonstrations. PRISM is a secret NSA program in which high-tech
giants such as Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and Facebook, among others, must cooperate by providing data
on end users to the NSA. PRISM has been described in various ways by journalists, mainly from The
Guardian, New York Times and Washington Post, who were given top-secret documents from Snowden
directly, though sometimes only PowerPoint slides. "There's a lot of inaccurate reporting in the media"
Medine remarked about what he's seen in the news about PRISM in comparison to what the PCLOB is
learning. Though he didn't go into detail about how news reporting on PRISM may be off the mark, he
suggested that news stories are sometimes simply reporting older information as current, for example.
In any event, the PCLOB hopes to issue its own findings on the NSA PRISM program fairly soon, though
the PCLOB itself, composed of lawyers, is somewhat hobbled by the fact that only Medine is a full-time
member and the four other board members, split between Democrat and Republican party
representation, do this part-time while holding down regular jobs. This part-time aspect of running the
board puts a strain on what can be done, some PCLOB members acknowledge, though some, such as
James Dempsey, think it's a good model for oversight. As regards, PRISM, "I hope in our report we can
be more clear about how that works," Dempsey said during the panel discussion at RSA Conference.
Though the PCLOB was created through federal law in 2007, it only really got into working gear last May
-- right before the Snowden leaks began -- when Medine was appointed as its chair after a Congressional
review process. The group anticipates there will be many more privacy and civil liberties issues it will
take up, not all of them related directly to NSA Internet surveillance. Medine thinks the group could one
day take on the privacy and civil liberties implications of drones used by the government. In addition,
the question has come up whether the PCLOB could play the role as a "safe haven" for "whistleblowers"
to share information about government programs they think violate civil liberties. Medine is open to this
idea of the group being "the central place to go" for whistleblowers in this regard.
Whistleblowers key to corruption
Goel and Nelson ’13 ([Rajeev K. Goal] research in industrial organization, energy economics, economics of corruption and applied
microeconomics appears in numerous academic outlets including the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Managerial and Decision
Economics, Research Policy, Economic Development and Cultural Change and The Energy Journal. Professor Goel served as a visiting faculty
member with the Indian Institute of Management and Tata Energy Research Institute. He joined Illinois State University after spending two
years at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Michael A. Nelson Assistant Professor , History Department , Presbyterian College "Effectiveness of
whistleblower laws in combating corruption Effectiveness of whistleblower laws in combating corruption,"
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1398732029?pq-origsite=gschola)
Whistleblower laws are becoming important governance tools in both the public and private sectors. To
examine the effectiveness of whistleblower laws and their awareness, this study creates a unique
internet-based measure of awareness about whistleblower laws and provisions, focusing on the United
States . Placing the analysis within the larger corruption literature, our results show that greater
whistleblower awareness results in more observed corruption and this holds across specifications.
Internet awareness of whistleblower laws appears to be more effective at exposing corruption than the
quantity and quality of whistleblower laws themselves. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Corruption causes poverty and kills the economy - increases income equality and
reduces public revenue.
Tanzi 98 Vito Tanzi is an expert economist with extensive experience in academia, government and international institutions. In addition
to serving as a senior consultant to the Inter-American Development Bank from 2003-2007, Tanzi has consulted for the World Bank, the United
Nations, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Organization of American States. Tanzi’s extensive research and writing credentials include the authorship of nearly 20 books, published in
several countries, as well as many editor credits, and hundreds of articles in professional economic journals. His recent works on Latin America
include Taxation and Latin American Integration (edited with A. Barreix and L. Villela, Harvard University 2008) and The Charm of Latin America:
Economic and Cultural Impressions (New York: 1Universe Inc. 2010). He holds a B.A. (1959) and M.A. (1961) in Economics from the George
Washington University as well as an M.A. (1963) and Ph.D. (1967) in Economics from Harvard University. Corruption Around the World:
Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures Pgs. 582-584 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867585?seq=24#page_scan_tab_contents
Qualitative Effects of Corruption on the Economy Corruption
reduces public revenue and increases public spending. It
thus contributes to larger fiscal deficits, making it more difficult for the government to run a sound fiscal
policy. Corruption is likely to increase income inequality because it allows well-positioned individuals to
take advantage of government activities at the cost of the rest of the population. There are strong indications
that the changes in income distribution that have occurred in recent years in previously centrally planned economies have partly been the
result of corrupt actions such as nomenklatura privatization. Corruption
distorts markets and the allocation of resources
for the following reasons, and is therefore likely to reduce economic efficiency and growth. It reduces
the ability of the government to impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct for
market failures. Then the government does not satisfactorily perform its regulatory role over banks,
hospitals, food distribution, transportation activities, financial markets and so on. When government
intervention is motivated by corruption, as for example when the government creates monopolies for private interests, it is likely to add to the
existing market failures. It distorts incentives. As already mentioned, in a corrupt environment, able individuals allocate their energies to rent
seeking and to corrupt practices and not to productive activities. In some cases, the resulting activities have a negative value added. It acts as
an arbitrary tax (with high welfare costs). Corruption's random nature creates high excess burdens because the cost of searching for those to
whom the bribe must be paid must be added to the cost of negotiating and paying the bribe. Also, the contractual obligations secured by the
payment of a bribe are more likely to be violated when corruption is decentralized. It reduces or distorts the fundamental role of the
government in such areas as enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. When a citizen can buy his or her way out of a
commitment or out of a contractual obligation, or when one is prevented from exercising one's property rights because of corruption, this
fundamental role of the government is distorted and growth may be negatively affected. It
reduces the legitimacy of the market
economy and perhaps also of democracy. In fact, the criticisms voiced in many countries, especially in transition economies,
against democracy and the market economy are motivated by the existence of corruption. Thus, corruption may slow down or
even block the movement toward democracy and a market economy. Finally, corruption is likely to
increase poverty because it reduces the income earning potential of the poor. In many countries (e.g., Ukraine,
Russia, and Indonesia), enterprises especially small ones-are forced by public officials to pay to make things happen or even to keep bad things
from happening. Often these payments must be made if the enterprise is to remain in business. In Indonesia, there is a term for these
payments ("pungli") and, according to a recent report, these payments may raise the costs of doing business for small activities by as much as
20 percent of total operating costs (see Sjaifudian, 1997). This is equivalent to imposing very high sales taxes on these enterprises. Similar
information has been reported for Russia (Shleifer, 1996) and for Ukraine (Kaufmann, 1997), but the problem may be much more widespread.
Economic Decline causes a nuclear war which kills is all- Multiple Instances
Harris and Burrows ‘9 Dr. Mathew J. Burrows serves as the Director of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Foresight Initiative in the
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. He was appointed Counselor to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in 2007 and Director of
the Analysis and Production Staff (APS) in 2010. As Director of APS, Burrows was responsible for managing a staff of senior analysts and
production technicians who guide and shepherd all NIC products from inception to dissemination. He was the principal drafter for the NIC
publication Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, which received widespread recognition and praise in the international media and among
academics and think tanks. Jennifer M. Harris is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Council, Harris was a
member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State responsible for global markets, geo-economic issues and energy security. In
that role, Harris was a lead architect of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Economic Statecraft agenda, which launched in 2011. Before joining
the State Department, Harris served on the staff of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, covering a range of economic and financial issues.
“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrows.pdf
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting
and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is
a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not
likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies
(think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period).
There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the
ways in
which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks,
the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as
resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth
continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their
reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures,
command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the
angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The
most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,
worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire
additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed
between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low
intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended
escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.
The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities
and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian
intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating
crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows
and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take
actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential
for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will
have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries
indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased
tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea
lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be
increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Econ extensions
Whistleblowers good for the economy- save the US billions
The Economist ’02 Corporate malpractice; In praise of whistleblowers Jan 10th 2002 http://www.economist.com/node/930052
WHEN Philip Bowman was chief financial officer of Coles Myer, an Australian retailer, he exposed the fact that a vice-chairman had used a big
chunk of the retailer's money to buy shares in a company that he, the vice-chairman, controlled. The case made headline news. Yet even after a
two-year court battle to win compensation for wrongful dismissal, Mr Bowman was, in effect, ostracised from working in his home country. He
says that companies that might have hired him worried about skeletons lurking in their own cupboards. Yet Mr Bowman was lucky: he moved
to Britain and subsequently became chief executive of Allied Domecq, the world's second-largest wines and spirits group. Sadly,
few
whistleblowers' stories end so happily. Many ruin their careers, and sometimes even their health.
Because of society's aversion to people who are often seen more as snitches than as heroes, those who blow
the whistle (and put up with the persecution and harassment that almost invariably follow) have to be abnormally persistent. They become
obsessive about their cause and blind to other aspects of their life. Many end up pursuing personal vendettas as well as the wrongdoing that
originally sparked their action. Whistleblowers provide an invaluable public service. An
employee who (to quote Black's Law
Dictionary) “reports illegal or wrongful activities of his employer or fellow employees” can save his
organisation millions, quite apart from carrying out his public duty. The American government claims
that most of the billions of dollars that it retrieves from those who defraud federal agencies come via
whistleblowers' reports. Many investigations carried out by antitrust authorities into illegal cartels, such
as the recent vitamin price-fixing case in Europe, are initiated by reports from whistleblowers. Despite a
growing body of legislation to protect whistleblowers, their lot remains a miserable one. In the United
States, many lawyers are reluctant to take up cases involving public-sector whistleblowers because their
chances of winning are so slim. Those who pursue lawsuits for wrongful dismissal through the courts can find themselves enmeshed
for years. And any damages eventually awarded are seldom a match for the damage actually suffered. It is no surprise that employees are
reluctant to fulfil their public duty when they get such faint praise for doing so. Can anything be done to encourage whistleblowers? Who's
afraid of denouncing crooks? Many
hold back because they are afraid—afraid that they will lose their jobs, and
maybe also their friends. Mr Bowman says: “So-called friends congratulated me privately, but would not lift a finger of support in
public.” So the first essential is to provide a secure environment in which whistleblowers will feel safe
discussing their suspicions. (Whistleblowers usually start off with little more than a vague sense that something fishy is going on.)
Employers themselves are reluctant to provide such an environment, although there are some notable exceptions (see article). Such an attitude
is understandable; whistleblowers rarely bear good tidings for a company's share price. Yet in
the long run they can save their
employers far more than they cost, for instance by uncovering embezzlement. Even in cases such as
price-fixing or cartels, where revelations by whistleblowers may unequivocally damage a company, it
can be better to provide a forum that stops the practice without the glare of publicity that comes when
trustbusters knock on doors at dawn. This month, Britain's financial-services regulator is setting up a hotline for whistleblowers.
Uniquely, British law sees a substantial role for regulatory bodies acting as an independent outside party that is at the same time discreet and
knowledgeable about industry practices. In
America, there is legislation in the pipeline designed to speed up the
processing of whistleblowing cases. More legislation and more independent intermediaries are certainly
welcome. But ultimately the answer is for employers, in both private and public sectors, to learn to appreciate the
merits of whistleblowing, and to reward genuine whistleblowers with promotion rather than the sack. They might even then
eliminate the malpractices that trouble their conscientious employees in the first place—and what a
good thing that would be.
Democracy scenario
Whistleblowers good- help preserve democracy
Macintyre ’13 Linden MacIntyre (born May 29, 1943) is a Canadian journalist, broadcaster and novelist. He has won eight Gemini
Awards, anInternational Emmy and numerous other awards for writing and journalistic excellence, including the 2009 Scotiabank Giller Prize for
his 2009 novel, The Bishop's Man. Well known for many years for his stories on CBC's the fifth estate, in 2014 he announced his retirement
from the show at age 71. His final story, broadcast on November 21, 2014, was "The Interrogation Room" about police ethics and improper
interrogation room tactics.[1] 10-31-2013, "Why whistleblowers are crucial for democracy: Linden MacIntyre," No Publication,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/why-whistleblowers-are-crucial-for-democracy-linden-macintyre-1.2288168
The conscientious public servant, having agreed verbally with the reporter that the conflict of interest in his department is egregious, has
privately explained how it works - and has now nervously consented to make available a document that will authenticate the story. There is a
brief encounter in a busy public square. An envelope appears out of one briefcase, disappears into another. A silent whistle has been blown.
That was an actual transaction that occurred on an overcast autumn day in 1977. A crooked mayor lost his job because of it. It's a scenario that
has played out many times. A provincial cabinet minister once handed me a devastating analysis of a hugely expensive public project. I had it
for a weekend, it was about 150 pages long. Trusted friends and I laboriouslycopied the entire document on a typewriter before I gave it back and started to report its contents. Another leak: an associate in Ottawa drove to a residential address where, by arrangement, an envelope was
recovered from a private mailbox. The document retrieved from that mailbox was instrumental in derailing a secret process to licence an
agricultural drug of dubious value and demonstrated peril. That’s the way the whistle blew in “the old days.” Now the
revolution in
technology has simplified the process and amplified the whistle to a degree that would have been
unimaginable even 20 years ago. The secret diplomatic pouch is now potentially transparent, as
demonstrated by an outraged U.S. army private, Bradley/Chelsea Manning, who co-operated with Julian
Assange and Wikileaks to blow the whistle on a global scale. And even the agencies of espionage are
now publicly accountable for their tactics - all because a young civilian named Edward Snowden found
some of their activities abusive and corrupt. The names Assange, Manning and Snowden are associated with a transformation
in the vulnerability of institutions in both the public and private realms. Institutions gather, store and analyze vast amounts of information
about individuals and other institutions. The process, even when intentions are benign, is nonetheless invasive. The purpose of the information
gathering is, in one rendering, to protect us from each other and ourselves. But it is also for the purpose of manipulation, to influence how we
vote and spend and think. And so, people of a certain moral profile who have access to the information will be offended and some will risk
liberty and life to let us in on what the institutions know about us. That’s the way the world has worked since people first discovered the utility
of information and the power of secrecy. In a memorable scene from the movie The Fifth Estate, a journalist opines that speeches in the British
House of Commons were once so secret that people caught leaking them to the public were hanged for it. Not exactly true - but the Commons
debates were conducted secretly, and people went to prison for reporting them in pamphlets. Public outrage, fired by whistleblowing,
eventually put a stop to secrecy in parliament. The modern pamphlet is a blog or tweet, the brown envelope is now a tiny thumb-drive with the
information-carrying capacity of a truckload of paper documents. And from the opposing perspective, technology has also enabled institutions
to delve deeply into private lives for law enforcement, commerce and the vague new project known as “public safety”. Technology has
changed, but human nature hasn’t and that’s a good thing. The
human tendency to be offended by abuse - torture in a
secret prison, a lie told under oath to fool the public, squandering of public treasure - remains a vital
force in conscientious people. And we witness their responses with sufficient frequency to remind the
advocates and practitioners of secrecy that they are vulnerable, too. They're at the mercy of basic
human instincts (be they narcissistic or humanitarian), and the technology that makes their secrets more accessible
and portable than at any other time in human history. The furious response to Manning and Wikileaks and Snowden
underscores the impact of the message in their actions just as it obscures a fundamental question: Why did they do what they did and for
whose benefit? There was no possibility of personal gain and almost certainly they faced the prospect of severe punishment. They have been
accused of recklessness and treachery. Extremists have called for their deaths. Manning will spend decades in prison. Both Julian Assange and
Edward Snowden are fugitives from a prosecution that would be familiar to a Guantanamo detainee. Maybe they were delusional. But the
information inherent in the act of whistleblowing is perhaps more useful than the sordid details in the documents they leaked. What
we
know shapes what we think. What we think determines our behaviour. There will always be clandestine
efforts to manage what we think and thus control how we behave as consumers and as citizens. But
there is also a fundamental human impulse to resist manipulation and, because secrecy is essential to
manipulation and control, there will always be individuals who will rebel against it. The English philosopher
Jeremy Bentham put it strongly - but his words have been embraced in principle and often quoted by
politicians and jurists while making and interpreting our laws: “In the darkness of secrecy, sinister
interest and evil in every shape have full swing.” In another essay more than 200 years ago, Bentham
said, “Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular
government”. Those are words that whistleblowers live by, which makes them auditors of governance
and guarantors of our democracy.
Democracy prevents war and promotes economic growth.
Lagon ’11 Mark P. Lagon is Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) Program at Georgetown
University. He teaches MSFS courses on Ethics and Decision-Making, and on the UN and Global Institutions. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow for
Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International
Community A Markets and Democracy Brief; http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-statesinternational-community/p24090
Stakes in Democracy Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for
strategic policies. Yet there
are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of
democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and
frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth. Democracies often have conflicting
priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in
international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy
“realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character,
and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic
politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.
There has long been controversy about whether democracy enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly
challenges this notion. Still, history
will likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding
the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracy’s elements facilitate long-term
economic growth. These elements include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote
innovation, and rule of law to foster predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good governance
as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for
impoverished peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be reversing the order of
influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship between political and economic liberalization. Finally,
democracy
affords all groups equal access to justice—and equal opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy.
Democracy’s support for pluralism prevents human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being
squandered. Indeed, a shortage of economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed significantly to the ongoing upheaval in
the Middle East. Pluralism is also precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world.
Aff
Politics
Congress Reps hate PCLOB: trying to tapper PCLOB’s power
Nakashima 6/10/15 (a national security reporter for The Washington Post. She focuses on issues
relating to intelligence, technology and civil liberties. Upset over op-ed, lawmakers seek to curb privacy
board. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/upset-over-op-ed-gop-lawmakersseek-to-curb-privacy-board/2015/06/10/11ee864e-0f12-11e5-adec-e82f8395c032_story.html.,
6/10/2015, AJZ)
the House Intelligence Committee, upset by an opinion piece penned by the chairman of a government watchdog
on privacy issues, have advanced a measure to block the agency’s access to information related to U.S.
covert action programs. The provision, in the 2016 intelligence authorization bill, takes a jab at the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board, an independent executive-branch agency whose job is to ensure that the
government’s efforts to prevent terrorism are balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil
liberties. David Medine , the board’s chairman, co-authored an essay in April arguing that if the United
States were to continue killing U.S. citizens by drone strikes, an independent review panel was needed
to assess whether targeting decisions are appropriate. In the piece, Medine, who was speaking for himself,
suggested that the PCLOB would be a good candidate to serve as that review board. That article “really stirred
the pot,” said one congressional aide, who like others interviewed for this article was not authorized to speak on the record. The
committee majority saw that suggestion, along with other reviews the board was undertaking, the aide
said, as “mission creep.” The provision, which the committee approved by voice vote last week, was an
attempt by Republicans to make sure the board members “stay in their lane,” as another aide put it.
“Covert action, by its very definition, is an activity that the United States cannot and should not
acknowledge publicly,” said the committee’s chairman, Devin Nunes (R-Calif.). “Review of such activity is ill-suited for a public board
Republicans on
like the PCLOB.”
Congress trying to decrease PCLOB’s power
Aftergood June 10th 2015 (directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works to
reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government information.
House Intelligence Bill Would Limit PCLOB Oversight, http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/06/hpscipclob/. , 6/15/2015, AJZ)
The House Intelligence Committee inserted language in the pending intelligence authorization bill that
would bar access by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to classified information
pertaining to covert action. “Nothing in the statute authorizing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board should be construed to allow that Board to gain access to information the executive branch
deems to be related to covert action,” according to the new Committee report on the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 2016 (section 306), published yesterday. To the extent that covert action is
employed against terrorism and is therefore within the scope of PCLOB’s charter, the House Committee
action would preclude PCLOB oversight of the implications of such covert actions for privacy and civil
liberties. That “unduly restricts” PCLOB’s jurisdiction, according to Rep. James Himes (D-CT), a member
of the House Intelligence Committee who unsuccessfully sought to modify the provision. It is possible
that there is some tacit rivalry between PCLOB and the congressional intelligence oversight committees,
particularly since the PCLOB found that the Section 215 program for collection of telephone metadata
was unlawfully implemented while the oversight committees had approved and embraced it. (The
recurring failure of the intelligence oversight committees to accurately represent broader congressional
and public perspectives over the past decade is a subject that remains to be addressed.) By contrast, the
same House bill directed that the DNI shall provide the Government Accountability Office with the
access to information that it needs to perform its authorized functions. The relevant directive (ICD 114)
“shall not prohibit the Comptroller General [i.e., the head of the GAO] from obtaining information
necessary to carry out an audit or review at the request of the congressional intelligence and defense
committees.”
PCLOB Isn’t Real
PCLOB is so secret that we wouldn’t even notice if it didn’t exist.
Roberts, Washington Bureau Chief @ The Guardian, 13 (Dan Roberts – previously
national editor of the Guardian. “Mysterious privacy board touted by Obama has deep government ties”
Pub. June 21, 2013 The Guardian Online Mysterious privacy board touted by Obama has deep
government tieshttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/privacy-civil-liberties-obamasecretive Accessed 7/19/15 DH)
The body charged by President Obama with protecting the civil liberties and privacy of the American
people exists in shadows almost as dark as the intelligence agencies it is designed to oversee. The
Privacy & Civil Liberties Board (PCLOB) was due to meet Obama at the White House on Friday afternoon
at 3pm in the situation room to discuss growing concerns over US surveillance of phone and internet
records – or, at least, that's what unnamed "senior administration officials" said would happen. The
meeting did not appear on the president's official diary issued to journalists, nor has the PCLOB issued
much public confirmation beyond saying "further questions were warranted". To be fair, that might be
because the PCLOB does not have a website, nor an email address, nor indeed any independent fulltime staff. Its day-to-day administration is currently run by a government official on secondment from
the office of the Director of National Intelligence. In fact, even the office address given out by the PCLOB
in the few public letters that exist does not appear to be functioning. A security guard at the federal
buildings on 2100 K Street in Washington said he had no record of the mystery body that claimed to
occupy suite 500. On Tuesday, Obama announced that the PCLOB would be at the heart of his efforts to
address the growing scandal over the National Security Agency's surveillance programmes. "I'll be
meeting with them and what I want to do is to set up and structure a national conversation not only
about these two programs but also about the general problem of these big data sets because this is not
going to be restricted to government entities," he told Charlie Rose in a TV interview. Yet, the White
House appears to be scrambling to set up infrastructure that can support such a conversation and has
placed its trust in a body with a chequered history of independent scrutiny. Set up as an agency within
the Executive Office of the President in 2004, the PCLOB for many years had no members at all. After
criticism, in the words of a congressional report, that it "appeared to be presidential appendage, devoid
of the capability to exercise independent judgement and assessment or to provide impartial findings and
recommendations", it was reconstituted as an independent agency in August 2007 on the
recommendations of the 9/11 commission. But even then, oversight moved at a glacial pace. Obama
nominated two members in January 2011 and a further three in December 2012 but the Senate only
confirmed four of them in August 2012. The fifth, chairman David Medine, was confirmed just last
month. Obama told Charlie Rose that it was "made up of independent citizens, including some fierce
civil libertarians". But there is little in the published biographies to elaborate on that. Medine was a
partner in the DC law firm WilmerHale and previously served as a senior advisor to the White House
National Economic Council. From 1992 to 2000, he worked at the Federal Trade Commission and
previously worked at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and US Securities and Exchange
Commission. The White House says he has long been interested in "internet privacy and data security".
Three of the others meeting Obama on Friday have also worked for the government or courts. Rachel
Brand is now a regulatory lawyer at the US Chamber of Commerce, but formerly worked at the
Department of Justice. Patricia Wald is a former DC appeals court judge and Elisebeth Collins Cook is
also a lawyer at Wilmer Hale, who once worked for the Department of Justice. Only Jim Dempsey, of the
Center for Democracy and Technology, does not appear to have worked for the government or served
on the judiciary. The Washington Post described him as "a reasoned and respected civil liberties
advocate routinely summoned to [Capitol] Hill by both political parties to advise lawmakers about
technology and privacy issues." Following a meeting with intelligence chiefs on Wednesday, Medine
said: "Based on what we've learned so far, further questions are warranted." He told the Guardian by
email on Friday that the board would issue a statement after the meeting with Obama. NSA director
Keith Alexander implied it understood the need for such programmes. "My deputy met with the board
yesterday and actually briefed them for a couple of hours on both programs so that they understood,"
he told a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on Thursday. Official board meetings of the PCLOB
are closed to the public, because of the classified issues to be discussed, a notice published on the
Federal Register said.
PCLOB isn’t real, it doesn’t exist.
Wogan, Masters in public policy @JHU and Staff Writer for Politifact 12 (JB Wogan is a
staff writer for Governing newsletter, The Seattle Times, and winner of the News Writer of the Year
from the “Washington Newspaper Publishers Association” Pub. June 22, 2012 Tampa Bay News Online,
Politifact Edition, Retrieved Lexis Online Accessed 7/20/15 DH)
In theory, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is an independent watchdog that makes sure
national intelligence efforts against terrorism don't infringe on people's privacy and civil liberties. The
key phrase is, "in theory." In practice, the board does not exist. It doesn't have any confirmed members
and can't have a meeting. As a candidate, Barack Obama said he would strengthen the board with
subpoena powers and reporting responsibilities. The board came out of recommendations from the
9/11 Commission. A law passed in 2007 mandated that the board would be bipartisan, an independent
agency within the executive branch and would have five members. President George W. Bush
nominated members to the board in 2008, but the Senate never confirmed them. That left President
Obama with the task of appointing the new board. Sharon Bradford Franklin, senior counsel at the
Constitution Project, said Obama's efforts to establish and strengthen the board were "very
discouraging to say the least ... He clearly did not make this the kind of priority we would have hoped."
Obama announced two nominees in December 2010, but waited another year for the final three. Before
then, he hadn't nominated enough people to constitute a quorum -- in other words, it couldn't have
conducted business. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the nominees in May, but as of this
writing, the Senate has yet to vote on them. Kara Carscaden, a spokeswoman for the Obama campaign,
blamed Senate Republicans for slowing down the nomination process by blocking the president's
nominees. We find that's a stretch. Although it's true that all eight Republicans on the Senate Judiciary
Committee voted against David Medine -- slated to be the board's chairman -- they weren't successful in
blocking his nomination. And we've seen nothing from the White House that indicates Obama made a
significant effort to get the board up and running before December 2011. Chris Calabrese, legislative
counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union, said that with the Obama administration's late
nominations, "you're not strengthening (the board), but weakening it and hollowing it out." "The most
relevant thing is that this nomination took three years to happen," Calabrese said. "It only happened in
an election year, essentially." During his campaign, Obama said he would give the board subpoena
powers. Under current law, the board relies on the Attorney General to issue subpoenas for people's
records. The board has to submit a written request -- which can be modified or denied by the Attorney
General. If the board had direct subpoena power, it might improve the efficiency and ease of
investigations, Calabrese said. The board already has the power to request records from departments,
agencies and other parts of the executive branch. In that case, if the board does not receive the desired
documents, it would lodge a complaint with the head of the department or agency. As for reporting
responsibilities, the 2007 law requires that the board testify before Congress on request and submit at
least semi-annual reports to a variety of congressional committees. As with subpoena powers, we didn't
find any sign that this had changed. To review, we found no evidence that the Obama administration
pushed for new subpoena powers or reporting responsibilities. As Calabrese said, such efforts would be
"nonsensical" since the board has no members or staff. We consider a nonexistent board with no
additional subpoena powers or reporting responsibilities a Promise Broken.
PCLOB Won’t Solve
Government overspill is inevitable, PCLOB is a corrupt agency, the government
literally rewrites the recommendations before they get sent to congress.
Davis, Former Member of PCLOB 2005-2007, 7 (Lanny Davis was the only Democrat to serve on
Bush’s PCLOB committee, he Is a celebrated lawyer and a graduate of Yale Law School, where he won
the Thurman Arnold Moot Court prize and served on the Yale Law Journal. “Why I Resigned From the
President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board — And Where We Go from Here” Pub. May 18,
2007 The Hill News Online http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/34214-why-iresigned-from-the-presidents-privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board--and-where-we-go-from-hereAccessed 7/17/15 DH)
But regardless of my resignation, the most important issue remains and must now be addressed by
Congress, which is considering changes in the present structure of the Board: Is there a role for a parttime civilian oversight board on executive-branch anti-terrorist programs that potentially might infringe
on basic civil liberties and privacy rights in the Constitution and under U.S. laws — or not? I ask this
question because it is not obvious to me that there is such a role or one that can be filled within the
Office of the President or even within the executive branch. After all, this Board will, under any proposal
I have seen, be filled, in whole or in part, by part-time civilians, not by career government professionals.
First, one has to ask why the U.S. Congress should not be the one to provide such oversight rather than a
part-time body. Second, can there be effective oversight if most of the Board is only part-time? And
most important, can there be effective oversight if the body is placed within the Office of the President,
where it was placed when Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004? It was the latter
contradiction — providing independent oversight of the same people the Board is supposed to report to
— that ultimately led to my resignation, as the letter explains. The White House in good faith genuinely
believed that when the 2004 Congress chose to compromise and place the PCLOB in the Office of the
President, it did so knowing that it would be under supervision and control, including substantive and
editorial control of written work product. That is why they believed it was their right, even their duty, to
extensively edit the final report to congress of the PCLOB, due on March 31, 2007, and ultimately
delivered on April 20 — the most important reason why I chose to tender my resignation. But a
supervised and controlled PCLOB was not what the 9/11 Commission had in mind when it
recommended in its final report an independent PCLOB in the executive branch, with subpoena power
— such as the FTC or even such as inspectors general within executive departments. But the White
House opposed that concept at the time. The final compromise, as part of the Intelligence Reform Act,
created in effect the "square peg in a round hole" concept — an "oversight" entity (that was, after all,
the word Congress chose to put into the Board's name) placed inside the Office of the President, and
thus part of the White House. I had thought that the hybrid or even contradictory nature of that
compromise could be reconciled if senior levels of the White House — up to and including the highest
level — insulated the Board and insisted on three words: "Leave them alone." But I had underestimated
the culture of the vast array of alphabet soup agencies and bureaucracies in the national security
apparatus that would resist that concept of independence, or at least be unable to resist the temptation
to control and modify the Board's public utterances so long as they were able to — i.e., so long as the
Board was seen as part of the White House staffing structure. This phenomenon of control and
management by the White House of entities considered to be part of the White House is neither
surprising nor that unique to this particular Republican administration. Those who view this as a partisan
issue to criticize a Republican administration and expect it would be completely different under a
Democratic one are missing the larger point. I disagreed strongly with the view that just because the
PCLOB was part of the White House it had to be part of White House management and control, although
I do not question the motives of good faith of those who had that opinion.
PCLOB is overly optimistic, recommendations are ignored or not implemented.
Leithauser, Security Information Report Writer for UTC and Homeland Security 14 (Tom
Leithauser, “Many Surveillance Recommendations Still Await Implementation, PCLOB Says” Pub. 2014
CPR Online Proquest Online Accessed 7/16/15 DH)
An Obama administration advisory board this week noted that many of the recommendations it
released last year to reform U.S. intelligence programs have not been implemented by the White House
or Congress. "Overall, the administration has been responsive to the board's input," the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) said. "Most recommendations directed at the administration are still
in the process of being implemented, however, or have only been accepted in principle, without
substantial progress yet made toward their implementation." In particular, the administration has not
halted the bulk collection of telephony metadata, a counterterrorism program that generated
controversy after it was exposed in 20 I 3 by a former National Security Agency contract worker, the
board said. The White House made several significant changes to rein in the metadata program but has
been waiting on congressional action, even though such action is unnecessary, the board said. "The
administration can end the bulk telephone records program at any time, without congressional
involvement," it said. Legislation that would have ended the bulk records program, the USA FREEDOM
Act, did not win congressional approval last year but is expected to be reintroduced. The report issued
Jan. 29 by the PC LOB reviews 22 recommendations it made in two separate reports last year -- one that
was released in January and another published in July. (CPR, Jan. 27, 2014, and July 7, 2014
Perm
ALONE, the PCLOB cannot solve for privacy
Setty 15 (Sudha Setty is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Intellectual Life. She specializes in the
areas of comparative law and national security. Her scholarly publications address secrecy, separation of powers and rule of law issues in the
comparative constitutional context. Winter, 2015, Stanford Journal of International Law, 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, SYMPOSIUM: Surveillance,
Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, 2015, AJZ)
One promising move with regard to oversight and transparency has been the establishment and staffing
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). n186 This board, tasked with assessing many
aspects of the government's national security apparatus both for efficacy and for potentially
unnecessary incursions into civil liberties, has a broad mandate and, compared with many national security decision makers,
significant independence from the executive branch. n187 Retrospectively, the PCLOB has, among other things, issued the highly
critical report of the NSA Metadata Program in January 2014 that led to further public pressure on the Obama administration to curtail this
program;
it is promising that the PCLOB's prospective agenda includes further analysis of various
surveillance programs. n188 However , the PCLOB's potential influence in protecting civil rights may be
limited by its position: The PCLOB is an advisory body that analyzes existing and proposed programs and
possibly recommends changes, but it cannot mandate that those changes be implemented. The ability to have a high
level of access to information surrounding counterterrorism surveillance programs and to recommend changes in such programs is important and should be lauded, but over-reliance on the
PCLOB's non-binding advice to the intelligence community to somehow solve the accountability and
transparency gap with regard to these programs would be a mistake.
Perm is the best way to solve
Setty 15 (Sudha Setty is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Intellectual Life. She specializes in the
areas of comparative law and national security. Her scholarly publications address secrecy, separation of powers and rule of law issues in the
comparative constitutional context. Winter, 2015, Stanford Journal of International Law, 51 Stan. J Int'l L. 69, SYMPOSIUM: Surveillance,
Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/, 2015, AJZ)
Domestically, it could be argued that the types of reform recommended here to improve actual accountability and transparency over programs
like the NSA Metadata Program are overkill: They involve multiple branches of government, the PCLOB, and the public. However,
much of
the accountability apparatus that has been in place was dormant until the Snowden disclosures, and
would have remained passive without those disclosures . A multi-faceted , long-term, structural
approach [*103] to improving transparency and accountability - one that involves at a minimum the
courts and the PCLOB, but hopefully Congress, the executive branch, and the public as well - improves
the likelihood of sustained and meaningful accountability as new surveillance capabilities are developed
and implemented.
Perception
CP can’t solve the perception of executive overreach
Ackerman, National Security editor for the Guardian 13 (Spencer Ackerman is an American
national security reporter and blogger. He began his career at The New Republic and wrote for Wired
magazine's national security blog, Danger Room.[1] He is now the national security editor for the
Guardian US “Surveillance review will have little effect on NSA's bulk spying, reports suggest” Pub.
December 14, 2013 The Guardian Online Lexis Nexis Accessed 7/14/15 DH)
A White House-sponsored review of surveillance activities will leave most of the National Security
Agency's controversial bulk spying intact, according to reports in the US. Sascha Meinrath, director of
the Open Technology Institute, said yesterday that the review panel that he advised was at risk of
missing an opportunity to restore confidence in US surveillance practices. "The review group was
searching for ways to make the most modest pivot necessary to continue business as usual," Meinrath
said. Headed by the CIA's former deputy director, Michael Morrell, the review is expected to deliver its
report to Obama tomorrow, the White House confirmed, although it is less clear when and how
substantially its report will be available to the public. Should the review group's report resemble
descriptions of it that leaked late on Thursday, it "does nothing to alter the lack of trust the global
populace has for what the US is doing, and nothing to restore our reputation as an ethical internet
steward", said Meinrath, who met the advisory panel and White House officials twice to discuss the bulk
surveillance programmes that have prompted international outrage. Leaks to the New York Times and
Wall Street Journal about the review group's expected recommendations strengthened Meinrath and
other participants' long-standing suspicions that much of the NSA's sweeping spy powers would survive.
The Times quoted an anonymous official familiar with the group saying its report "says we can't
dismantle these programmes, but we need to change the way almost all of them operate".
USFG just ignores all the recommendations, does what it wants
Bradley, journalist for technology @ Forbes Magazine 14, (Tony Bradley is a regular
contributor to Forbes, PCWorld, CSO, TechRepublic, DevOps, and Windows Secrets, As well as an
experienced information security professional, speaker, author / co-author of 10 books, and thousands
of web and print articles. “NSA Reform: What President Obama Said, And What He Didn't” Pub. January
17, 2014 Forbes Online http://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2014/01/17/nsa-reform-whatpresident-obama-said-and-what-he-didnt/ Accessed 7/14/15 DH)
The President is also asking advisers to explore how to move the phone records database out of
government control. It’s unclear how that will be accomplished, but they have 60 days to come up with
a solution. Finally, Obama is asking Congress to put together a panel of public advocates to represent
the general population before the FISA court. The panel would be made up of technology, privacy, and
civil liberties advocates. This is arguably the most important of the reforms proposed by President
Obama because it will give some voice to law abiding citizens with the secret court that meets behind
closed doors. It is unclear at this point, though, just how much weight the panel will have, and under
what circumstances the panel would be allowed to intercede. The President’s Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies produced a 300-plus page report, outlining 46
recommendations in all for how to reform the intelligence community to enable it to do its job without
blatantly ignoring the Constitution or trampling the rights of law abiding citizens. Most of those
recommendations are either being ignored completely, or they’re being delayed for further review. A
post on the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Deeplinks Blog, praised President Obama, but cautions
that there is still a long way to go. It quotes EFF legal director Cindy Cohn stressing, “Now it’s up to the
courts, Congress, and the public to ensure that real reform happens, including stopping all bulk
surveillance—not just telephone records collection. Other necessary reforms include requiring prior
judicial review of national security letters and ensuring the security and encryption of our digital tools,
but the President’s speech made no mention of these.” Part of the problem in trying to rein in the
activities of the NSA is that there was already a Constitution in place, and there was already some
manner of congressional oversight. The NSA seems to have decided that its mission and the interests of
national security trumped the rules, and operated with impunity despite those restrictions. There are no
guarantees that these reforms will affect any real change, and it’s virtually impossible to monitor the
activities of an agency that exists in the shadows of national security.