Transit cities in transit countries:
steering the consequences of US an EU closed doors policies
by
Giovanna Marconi
Planning Department, Università Iuav di Venezia
Abstract
Transit migration is today a main geopolitical and politicized issue. The closed-doors policies pursued
in Western Europe and the United States are having deep impacts on the migration situation in
neighbouring countries that are part of the migration chain. Growing numbers of would-be migrants
from an increasingly diverse, and often distant, array of origin countries are using the territory of
countries neighbouring them as gateways to their target destinations.
These developments led to a paradoxical situation: on the one hand EU and US policies for limiting
unwanted immigration appear to be the main cause of transit flows through countries that used to be
major areas of emigration; on the other EU and US governments’ main reaction to a process
themselves activated, has been that of exercising strong political pressures on transit countries to
persuade them to collaborate in filtering migration flows and readmitting intercepted irregular migrants.
However, transit flows are adding to the traditional emigration ones, following analogous directions,
using the same facilities and networks than transit countries’ nationals intentioned to emigrate, thus
making unfeasible any effort to manage independently the two overlapping movements. Nevertheless,
countries found to be transited by migrants are increasing thought of as problematic. Labelled as
”guilty of transit migration”, they are held responsible for preventing migrants in transit reaching
Europe or the United States. But the so-called externalisation of border controls raises many
conflicting policy-related issues.
From the transit countries perspective, such an increasing transmigration through their territories
became a quite disturbing matter, complicating and interfering their decision-making processes in both
the domestic and foreign policy field. There are indeed several reasonable motivations behind their
reluctance in becoming their neighbours’ gatekeepers.
While academic and political discourse on transit migration mainly focuses on the challenges for, and
responsibilities of, “transit countries”, very little reference is made to the physical nodes of transit
routes, the strategic hubs where a multitude of networks converge and intersect facilitating mobility,
namely “transit cities”. These urban areas, are indeed the places where migrants can get useful
information on how to migrate further, as well as find anonymous accommodation, income
opportunities, and the social support needed to recover from their previous travel and organize their
onward journey. However their stopover is frequently longer than expected, and many end up
becoming permanent residents by default, with tangible impacts on the local economic, social and
spatial settings. These migrants often have scarce economic resources and cultural, social and
religious backgrounds quite different from that of local residents. Therefore the management of their
urban inclusion, when foreseen, is difficult and marked by conflict, while their living conditions are
increasingly characterized by alarming levels of marginalisation, vulnerability and violation of basic
human rights. With particular reference to the situation of Tijuana in Mexico and Istanbul in Turkey,
two very different contexts sharing similar migration dynamics, this paper aims at exploring the
challenges faced by the many cities that per se would not be main attraction poles, but are indeed
confronted with growing migration inflows.
***
1. Defining “transit migration”
Transit migration has become of growing concern for the European Union and the United States, and
is today a very popular issue. Yet, the concept of “transit migration” has entered the migration policy
discourse only since the early ‘90s, with “transit country” emerging in the migration lexicon as an
intermediate category besides migrants’ country of origin and destination.
Despite the term has been increasingly used in official documents of multilateral and
intergovernmental agencies, no adequate or commonly agreed definitions of “transit migration”,
“transit country” and “transit migrant” is available yet, nor it does exist a category or classification for
them in international policy or law (Düvell, 2006). Such expressions seem to have entered into the
political discourse simply for habit strength.
One of the earliest conceptualisations of the notion of “transit state” is included in the 1990 UN
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families. Article 6 asserts “the term ‘State of transit’ means any State through which the person
concerned passes on any journey to the State of employment or from the State of employment to the
State of origin or the State of habitual residence.” Since then, the attention for the phenomenon was
constantly on the rise and the attempts to provide accurate definitions to describe it proliferated.
Given a perceived “alarming increase” of irregular migrants from even quite distant areas of the global
South, passing through East European countries and CIS republics in their way towards Western
Europe, in 1993 the Population Activities Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
convened two workshops (in Geneva and Warsaw) on “The study of transit migration in Central
Europe”. In this framework, transit migration was defined as “migration in one country with the
intention of seeking the possibility there to emigrate to another country as the country of final
destination” (UN/ECE, 1993).
The following year, the International Organization for migration (IOM), through a series of papers
based on field studies, strongly recommended to the governments of its member states to consider
transit migration as an important pattern of international mobility, and as an increasingly challenging
feature of nowadays migration flows, due to the high levels of irregularity that characterise it 1.
In a report published by the Council of Europe in the year 2000, in which transit migration was
considered to be the most salient migration phenomenon affecting Central and Eastern Europe, transit
migrants were vaguely defined as “people who enter the territory of a state in order to travel on to
another” (Council of Europe, 2000). Even more general is the description given by the IOM’s Glossary
on Migration, in which transit is described as “a stopover of passage, of varying length, while travelling
between two or more countries, either incidental to continuous transportation, or for the purposes of
changing planes or joining an ongoing flight or other mode of transport” (IOM, 2004). According to this
explanation, most people in transit are indeed not “migrants”, but simply international travellers that
will go back to their country of origin after the end of their journey (Cassarino and Fargues, 2006).
At the 113th Assembly of the international organization of Parliaments of sovereign States, hold in
Geneva in 2005, it was openly stated that the international community has a universally accepted the
definition of migrants in transit, which reads: "transit migrants are defined as aliens who stay in the
country for some period of time while seeking to migrate permanently to another country" but, as
Düvell underlines, the only evidence given for the supposed “universal acceptance” is a publication by
IOM (Düvell, 2006).
Evidence that common definitions have not yet been agreed emerges from the fact that even the most
recent documents focusing on ”transit migration“ always include in their introductions some kind of
explanation of what is meant for “transit country”, clarification considered as not needed whenever
referring to countries of origin or destination. For example, the background paper prepared by the
International Centre for Migration Policy Development for its Meeting on management of Irregular
Transit Migration, convened in Sarajevo in June 2006, was once again specifying that “transit
countries are countries along the route from origin to destination, which have to be crossed in order to
reach the next or the final stage of a migration project” (ICMPD, 2006).
Within the academic world, the research for a proper and univocal description of transit migration, and
its related terms, is still in progress too. Irine Ivakhniouk refers to transit migration as “migration of
persons from a country of origin/departure to a country of destination/settlement through
intermediate/transit country, often in uncertain or insecure conditions: clandestineness, tourist visa,
false papers, etc” (Ivakhniouk, 2004). For Stéphan de Tapia transit migration “may be simply defined
as a temporary stay by an individual in one foreign country with a view to moving on to another”, while
1
Between 1993 and 1995, IOM published its research results on transit migration in 8 countries (Romania, November 1993;
Bulgaria, March 1994; Poland, April 1994; Czech Republic, May 1994; Russian Federation, June 1994, Ukraine, August 1994;
Hungary, December 1994 and Turkey 1995. A renewed interest for the issue was shown in 2003 with the publication of a study
on transit migration through Azerbaijan).
he proposes two functional definitions for i) transit migrant: “a foreign national in a legal or irregular
situation whose intention is to leave his/her current country of residence ‘as soon as possible’ in order
to reach a third country. ‘As soon as possible’ may, however, mean a variety of durations depending
on the individual in question”; and ii) transit country: “a country located geographically between the
departure/emigration country(ies) and the arrival/immigration country(ies), being required to manage a
temporary population liable at any time to turn into a legal or illegal resident population” (De Tapia,
2004).
Aspasia Papadopoulou defines transit migration as “the stage between emigration and settlement”
(Papadopoulou, 2005), while Cassarino and Fargues refer to “transit migrants” as “people on the
move finding themselves in a situation called ‘transit’, namely migrants staying on a temporary basis in
a country with a view to reaching another country, whether they eventually reach it or not” (Cassarino
and Fargues, 2006)
International agreement upon the use of terminology is always a complex process. However, a
conceptual misunderstanding lies behind the need of defining, in absolute terms, what is “transit
migration” or who is a “transit migrant”. The reading of the word transit is not problematic, since it
incontestably applies to a wide set of people temporarily staying in a country other then their own. On
the contrary, the word migrant is currently used in a misleading way. There is a widespread attitude to
use indifferently it instead of “immigrant” or “emigrant”, which are all but equivalent. In English
“migrant” can be used as an adjective (i.e. collocated with bird or worker), while the conventional
nominal form is immigrant, which is commonly considered a politically incorrect term thus replaced
with migrant. Nevertheless, being a migrant is not a static status (as being an immigrant or an
emigrant) but a temporary contingency. A migrant is a person during the action of migrating, an
individual in whatever stage of her migration process, thus the word applies to whoever emigrated
from her country of origin until she will voluntarily decide to stop (permanently or temporarily) in
another place, hence becoming a (permanent or temporary) immigrant. Thus, a “migrant” is per se “in
transit” while in her way towards the place where she desire to immigrate.
The fact is that, today, transit has become more and more problematic, because of the many
obstacles - mainly of economic and/or political nature – that are blocking migrants at some point of
their trip, leaving them in a stall situation without immediate possibilities to reach their target
destination nor, as is often the case, to go back home.
Expressions such as “transit migrant” or “transit migration” are highly confusing, because they refer to
“personal intentions” of individuals who are there but do not want to be there, hence to a phenomenon
that is hardly quantifiable. Indeed the core problem is not one of conceptual definition but of
identification. To the authorities of the “transit country” there is no such thing as transit migrant status,
this meaning that a “transit migrant” can be classified as a tourist, a student, a visitor, an undeclared
worker, an immigrant (regular or irregular), but never as a transit migrant, since such status simply
does not exist. Legally speaking, transit should be temporary and limited, but in practice it may end up
being long term and semi-permanent. The boundary between transit and immigration is actually
impossible to pinpoint, unless the migrants voice a desire to move into the territory of a different State
(De Tapia, 2004). If the target destination in question is an EU country or the US, any intention to
depart basically coincides with finding an illegal way to cross borders, thus it is highly improbable that
transit migrants show up as such. Nevertheless, the growth of problematic transit migrations is a direct
consequence of incoherent and ineffective migration policies, settled elsewhere than in transit
countries.
2. Mexico and Turkey: similar migration histories, outstanding examples of “transit country”
Turkey and Mexico share several similarities. Turkey is the third most populous country in Europe,
after Russia and Germany and Mexico is the third most populous country in the Americas, after the
US and Brazil. Both are secular states in countries with deep-rooted religious traditions (Escobar et
al., 2006). Since the mid-80s both countries are undergoing radical processes of economic and
institutional restructuring, mainly as a consequence of the negotiations for the NAFTA free-trade
agreement in the case of Mexico and for the accession to the EU in that of Turkey. They shifted from
protectionist states shielding their market from global competition to open economies increasingly
importing goods as well as promoting direct foreign investment. More recently, they experienced
fundamental political changes, with the dominant political party in Mexico losing the presidency for the
first time in 70 years in 2000 (Escobar et al., 2006) and the influence of the military on the Turkish
political system definitely reduced (Kirişçi, 2007).
Despite the advancements of the two countries in both the democratisation and economic stabilization
processes, the US and the UE are reticent to grant visa-free regimes to these neighbours, afraid that
demographic pressures might result in a massive emigration of their nationals.
Mexico and Turkey are indeed among the world’s leading labour-sending countries, with about 11
million Mexican-born people living in the US and 3 million migrants of Turkish origin settled in the EU15, Germany in particular, representing about 10 and 4 percent of the population of receiving countries
(Escobar et al., 2006). In both cases emigration flows were prompted by the guest-workers
programmes implemented by the US and Germany.
However, there were significant differences in how migration evolved in Mexico and Turkey after guest
worker recruitments ended in 1965 and 1973 respectively. The outflow of Turkish workers peaked in
the early 1970s and emigration towards Germany for family reunification continued unabated until the
late 1980s. At the end of the 1990s, however, Turkey became a net immigration country while
remittances directed to it have been constantly falling. In contrast with the 1960s institutionalised
promotion of emigration as a mean to improve domestic development, exporting workers is no longer
seen by the Turkish government as a strategy to absorb its growing labour force. Instead in Mexico
emigration and remittances are at record levels. An average of 700,000 Mexicans a year move to the
US and yearly remittances to their home country amount at nearly 20 billion dollars. Under the
Presidency of Vincente Fox migrants were addressed at as “national heroes” for their essential
contribution to Mexico’s economic development (Escobar et al., 2006).
If Mexican and Turkish emigration trends were initially very similar with later diverging evolutions,
since the beginning of the 90s these two countries once again began to experience analogous
migration dynamics, this time witnessing a growing importance of transit migration flows through their
territories.
Each year thousands of people – coming mainly from the neighbouring Iran and Iraq, but increasingly
also from Maghreb, Ghana, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India, Palestine
and Azerbaijan – irregularly enter Turkey with the aim of emigrating further towards more attractive
destinations in the EU. Analogously, growing numbers of Latin Americans, but also Asian and
Africans migrants, are entering Mexico along its southern borders with Guatemala and Belize, in the
hope of crossing to the US.
According to Içduygu, there are four particular reasons, which make Turkey an ‘hot spot’ for transit
movements: firstly, Turkey’s strategic geographical position between Europe and the Middle East;
secondly, the ongoing political turmoil and clashes occurring in the neighbouring areas that have
pushed people away from their homelands; thirdly the policies of so-called ‘fortress Europe’ that,
introducing highly restrictive admission procedures and exacerbating border controls, have diverted
the Europe-targeted immigration flows to the peripheral zones around; finally Turkey’s relative
economic prosperity which act as a magnet attracting both migrants intentioned to earn their lives in
the country and those looking for income opportunities to fund their onward journey (Içduygu, 2003).
The same four factors are applicable in the case of Mexico: The three thousand kilometres land border
between it and the United States places this country at the geographic crossroads between the first
and the third world; the major events that shook the social structures in Latin American countries
during the 80s - namely the economic stagnation of the so called ‘lost decade’ and the subsequent
decade of “lights and Shadows” as well as the long civil wars which proved particularly cruel in Central
America (Alegría, 2005) – fuelled emigration flows from the most affected countries in the region; the
extremely restrictive security-based immigration policies pursued in the US and the scarcity of legalentry channels are driving would-be migrants to try their way to the ‘American dream’ through Mexico.
Finally, during the last thirty years Mexico has grown with an annual average rate of 4% (DecuirViruez, 2003), with a stronger economic expansion of northern regions that are increasingly attracting
immigrants from less developed countries.
In addition, the long and permeable borders2 of these two states make the task of controlling both
inward and outward migration movements very difficult, if not impossible.
3. Geopolitics of transit migration
Transit migration is a main geopolitical issue. The closed-doors policies pursued in Western Europe
and the United States are having significant impacts on the migration situation in other countries that
are part of the migration chain. Growing numbers of would-be migrants from an increasingly diverse,
and often distant, array of origin countries, are using the territory of states neighbouring them as
gateways to their target destinations.
These developments led to a paradoxical situation: on the one hand EU and US policies for limiting
unwanted immigration appear to be the main cause of transit flows through countries that used to be
major areas of emigration; on the other EU and US governments’ main reaction to a process
2
Turkey has nearly 3,000 kilometres of land borders, of which only 480 with the EU, plus another 8,330 of sea cost while
Mexico has 1,139 kilometres of land border with its southern neighbours and more than 11,000 of coastlines.
themselves activated, has been that of exercising strong political pressures on transit countries to
persuade them to collaborate in filtering migration flows and readmitting intercepted irregular migrants.
However, transit flows are adding to the traditional emigration ones, following analogous directions,
using the same facilities and networks than transit countries’ nationals intentioned to emigrate, thus
making unfeasible any effort to manage independently the two overlapping movements. Nevertheless,
countries found to be transited by migrants are increasing thought of as problematic (Düvell). Labelled
as ”guilty of transit migration”, they are held responsible for preventing migrants in transit reaching
Europe or the United States. But the so-called externalisation of border controls raises many
conflicting policy-related issues.
From the transit countries perspective, such an increasing transmigration through their territories
became a quite disturbing matter, complicating and interfering their decision-making process in both
the domestic and foreign policy field. There are indeed several reasonable motivations behind their
reluctance in becoming their neighbours’ gatekeepers.
First of all, the perceived risk of turning into mere puppets to the first world’s interests in reducing their
international migration inflows.
Secondly, emigration often represents an important development resource and a significant outlet for
transit countries themselves. The departure of, sometimes consistent, groups of their economically
active population is in fact considered, and in many cases even promoted, as a strategy to alleviate
domestic poverty and unemployment, to increase political stability, and to contribute to the economic
growth through the great inflow of foreign exchange remittances generate. Hence, transit countries’
governments have definitely little interest in closing their borders and stemming emigration until the
demand for cheap workforce supplied by regular and irregular migrants keeps so high in the nearby
global North.
Thirdly, due to the scarce technical and economic resources available, transit countries’ authorities are
often neither able nor willing to police their vast and porous borders. Despite EU and the US did
implemented programmes dispensing training and funds to carry on patrol operations and develop
stricter immigration policies, these initiatives have generally been considered by the beneficiaries as
an insufficient burden sharing in managing such a complex issue.
Fourthly, changing visa regimes or readmitting intercepted transit migrants for then implementing
massive expulsions, as their richer neighbours demand, might harm strategic political relations with
migrants’ countries of origin. This point is particularly salient among countries that are historically and
culturally interrelated, or that participate in regional trading blocs, based on mutual obligations and
commitments which favour the cross-border circulation of goods, services and persons (Cassarino
and fargues, 2006). In the case of readmission, signing agreements with the transit migrants’
destination countries implies the existence of similar agreements with origin countries, otherwise the
transit country itself risks to become an “irregular migrants’ reservoir” (Ivakhniouk, 2004).
Finally, many transit states fear that increased control measures would encourage more immigration
and settlement on their territory, mounting internal xenophobia due to competition for scarce
resources.
Despite all the above mentioned elements would be definitely enough for transit countries to reject EU
and US calls for collaboration in managing migration, other factors - in primis the advantages deriving
from maintaining or building good relations with the powerful neighbours - do intervene in the game.
The economic and political interests of transit countries in reaching a compromise, at least by
undertaking a number of visible actions to show public opinion of both sides the common efforts to
keep migration situation under control, is not negligible at all. Indeed, the issue of “transit migration”
offers to transit countries’ governments an unexpected bargaining power, opening up unprecedented
opportunities to obtain ambitious political goals. It is the case of Mexico, which embraces the transit
migration police role in the hope of achieving the free movement of labour within North America as
well as the regularization of its irregular migrants living in the States; of Morocco that is using transit
migration control to lobby the EU for a free trade agreement and other economic aid (Kimball, 2007);
of Libya that obtained in 2004 the abrogation of the international embargo imposed against it in 1992,
with great help from Italy that had long insisted for the lifting of the 18-year-old arms ban so that it
could supply Libya with hi-tech equipment intended to curb illegal migration (BBC, 2004); of Turkey for
which a better migration management is becoming a trump card for negotiating accession to EU.
Evidently transit countries’ governments are well aware that migration control can be used as a mean
of “parallel diplomacy” (Coslovi, 2007). But what actually might look like a win-win situation, with EU
and US externalising border controls and transit countries achieving strategic objectives in change of
acting as buffer zones, has indeed a nearly forgotten loser, namely transit migrants themselves. The
direct urgent demand of controls and the devolution of the delicate tasks of contrasting irregular
migrations to countries located at the European and US peripheries, often leads their authorities to
implement undemocratic control policies and, in some cases, even criminal-law measures to protect
the global North from any “undesirable invasion”, undermining migrants’ fundamental rights respect.
4. The roads to ‘Eldorado’, a hurdle race
The security-based approach to international migration adopted by the principal destination countries
in the developed world had three major side-effects heavily affecting would-be migrants’ security: i) the
extension and diversification of migration routes, translating into hazardous journeys; ii) the
transformation of spontaneous movements into migration flows that increasingly rely on the aid
services of human smugglers and criminal networks, thus exposing migrants to high risks; iii) the
transformation of transit into an insecure type of long-term settlement, with growing numbers of
migrants stranded at some point of their trip.
4.1 “fortress Europe”
The tightening up of visa requirements and control procedures in Europe, especially after the
introduction of the Schengen system in 1992, sent out immediate shockwaves, forcing many migrants
to choose lengthy, costly and rather insecure roundabout ways. The geographical relationships
between origin, transit and destination countries and existing transportation systems largely define the
main routes used by migrants (Europol, 2000). However transit migration flows have demonstrated to
be extremely flexible and continually evolving, channelled by any new contingent obstacle towards
those countries and paths that are perceived in actual conditions to offer most favourable opportunities
for crossing. There is no linear logic in transit migrants’ movements. Rather the routes they follow
develop in due course in response to new information and new opportunities. Shifting strategies and
growing risk of death are the main features of the fragmented journeys that became increasingly
common from the mid 1990s onwards. In their attempt to find better life opportunities, would-be
migrants started using a combination of overland, maritime and also air itineraries. The principal
routes heading towards Western Europe were soon identified3 (Simon, 2005; ICMPD, 2006), and this
information used as a strategic guidebook to plan where new fences were needed and with which
countries starting up diplomatic negotiations for externalising border controls.
Representing a typical manifestation of national sovereignty, the conditions that regulate extracommunitarian migrants’ admission into the European Union’s territory are regulated by the national
laws of each Member State. However, since Amsterdam and Tampere treaties, which came into force
in 1999, a more comprehensive approach to migration is at the forefront of the European political
agenda. All member states are recommended to adopt a common two-tracks approach: on the one
hand by combating illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings, not only by controlling inflows
but also by rationalizing the actual possibilities for legal immigration and by fostering closer
cooperation with third countries; on the other by promoting comprehensive integration policies for
those third countries’ nationals who are lawfully resident in European Union cities, enhancing nondiscrimination in economic, social and cultural life and developing measures against racism and
xenophobia.
Yet, the reaction of the majority of EU countries to the growth of migratory pressures has been
principally of repressive nature, centred on measures to strengthen border controls, intercept irregular
inflows and intensify forced readmissions along the most popular routes followed by migrants.
Unilateral policies rather than the foreseen dialogue with third counties are definitely prevailing.
Cooperation with transit countries at the European frontiers has been often limited to political
pressures on neighbouring governments to secure a stricter filtering of flows toward Europe and the
possibility of sending the undocumented back.
3
• The North African Routes, originating in Maghreb countries and directed to Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Malta. The number of
Sub-Saharan Africans transiting through Maghreb, after dangerous crossing of overland desert routes, has been continuously
growing during the last few years. Furthermore it has been recently observed also a growth in Asian migrants from China,
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh who flight directly to Morocco, but also to Chad or Mali (Accra or Bamako) and join SubSaharan migrants in their way to Europe through Maghreb via Niger and Algeria.
• The West African Atlantic Route, starting in Western Sahara or in Western African coastal countries, somewhere from Niger
to Mauritania, heading to the Canary Islands. Transit migrants from western but also eastern Africa, as well as Asia use this
route.
• The Eastern Mediterranean Route; Significant flows of people from Asia, Middle East, Central Asia, and recently also
migrants from Maghreb and the Horn of Africa deviated from more traditional routes, are passing through Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria and Turkey to reach Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Italy.
• The Central and Eastern European Route; This route, with major origins in Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, is passing either
through Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic and on to Austria or Germany, or through Ukraine to Slovakia or Hungary.
• The Balkan Route; is an overland route that brings migrants from the Middle East and Asia via Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and further into the Schengen area (Austria or Germany). Sub-routes travel via
Albania or Serbia-Montenegro to Italy or through the Western Balkans to Slovenia and then Italy or Austria.
• The Baltic route, that travels from Russia via the Baltic states to Poland (with sub-routes going to the Scandinavian
countries) and from there on either directly to Germany or via the Czech Republic.
The tendency of some Member States to instrumentalize foreign policy for domestic political goals,
became more than evident at the Sevilla European Council Summit in June 2002, during which there
were even calls for the introduction of sanctions against countries failing to cooperate against illegal
migration (Kirişçi, 2004), including an highly criticisable British proposal of linking development aid to
transit countries’ commitment to clamp down on clandestine migration. In 2004 Germany and Italy
proposed the creation in transit countries of “reception processing centers”, even if “detention camps”
would better fit for defining these kind of structures. In May 2005 European efforts to fight clandestine
immigration reached a new threshold with the establishment of Frontex, the EU agency based in
Warsaw tasked to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of
external border control (Kirişçi, 2007).
Yet, transit migration flows are complex mobility systems, which mobilise and are based on a wide
variety of networks, which adapt to the prevailing circumstances and exploit loopholes in legislation
and surveillance systems. In many cases migrants organise certain parts of the journey themselves or
with the support of well established social, ethnic and family networks. However, the constant
reinforcement of European control measures is forcing growing numbers of migrants to rely on the
services provided by smugglers to overcome the new obstacles.
Today, the complete self-organisation of transit movements by migrants has to be assessed as
forming an exception. According to most recent estimates, 50% of the 830,000 migrants entering
Europe irregularly each year have paid for the services of smugglers, at least for some legs of their trip
(Simon, 2006). Smuggling can be a very profitable business. In 2001 it was estimated that human
smuggling operations worldwide worthed about US$9.5 billion annually and this business is likely to
have enormously increased since then (Richards 2001).
Smuggling networks have proved to be extremely flexible and able to react to improved immigration
control measures in one arrival or departure area, by shifting their activities to others or by adopting
different smuggling techniques, including corruption of police and immigration officers. The price is
mainly paid by migrants, since their desire to cross into Europe still exists, and smugglers continue to
exploit their situation by offering alternative – often more expensive and dangerous - opportunities
(ICMPD, 2006). An outstanding example of the negative side-effects border controls programmes may
have is Operation Ulysses, a multinational pilot project launched in 2002 by some EU Member States4
consisting in extensive navy patrols in the Mediterranean to intercept vessels transporting irregular
migrants. As a consequence, in 2003 it was observed a shift from the traditional route from Northern
Morocco to Spain through the Gibraltar Strait, to other routes heading towards the Canary Islands
from Western Sahara and Mauritania5. Soon another project, Atlantis, was activated to carry out joint
patrols between the Spanish Guardia Civil and Mauritanian gendarmerie, shifting departure points
even further south to the Gulf of Guinea. The distance to be covered when embarking from the
Western African shores, often on board of unseaworthy boats, makes such crossings highly perilous.
Furthermore, with the strengthening of controls and the increased risk of being intercepted, the
smugglers also changed their modus operandi and the type of “service” offered. While they used to
sail their vessels taking migrants to destination, then they simply began to supply them rickety
throwaway boats, a compass, a few brief instructions on how to manage the old engines, and
directions (Simon, 2006). Figures concerning verified deaths of migrants attempting the crossing from
Africa to Spain have increased substantially, from 369 in 2005 to up 1,167 in 2006, although the
Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) estimates that the real figure for 2006 may
be closer to 7,000 (ADPHA, 2007). The number of arrests also increased almost four-fold (11,781 in
2005 to 47,102 in 2006) showing the failure of EU policies to stem the flow of people seeking to
immigrate.
When in October 2005 eleven migrants were shot dead by security forces while trying to cross the
fences dividing the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla from the rest of morocco (and Africa), the
call for a new Global Approach echoed all around European member states. The urgent need for
taking into account the several dimensions of international migration in the EU Agenda, rather than
concentrating all the resources on border controls, became more evident than ever. In 2006, the two
Euro-African summits that convened, in Rabat and Tripoli, 27 African Countries and 30 European
ones had, at least in principles, the main goal of developing common policies in the migration field
based on cooperation, co-development and on the opening up of new legal channels for admitting
foreign workforce to the EU. However, the fight against clandestine migration was once again the
prevailing issue under negotiation, as demonstrates the subsequent strengthening of Frontex
operations and the setting up in April 2007 by the European parliament of Rabit (Rapid Border
Intervention Team) to enforce border control decisions (Coslovi, 2007). The only step to develop
immigration policies that are more coherent with the real demand of European labour market, has
4
5
Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK. Germany, Greece, Austria, Norway and Poland have sent observers.(Simon, 2006)
Border between Western Sahara and Mauritania is heavily mined along large sections (Collyer, 2006a)
been the EC communication on circular migration and mobility partnership (16 may 2007), though it
focuses just on skilled workers that do not indeed represent the bulk of the problem Europe has with
irregular immigration. Clearly, a gap is still existing between the on-going political discourse, stating as
primary policy objectives the need for respecting migrants’ human rights as well as a developmentoriented migration management, and the actual policies being implemented in the migration field that
continue to be based on security concerns and unjustified totalitarian closure.
The fact is that European Countries seem to be still reluctant in admitting that they do need unskilled
foreign workforce to fill those dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs (the famous 3Ds), poorly paid and
shunned by nationals. There is evidence that it is the high demand for this kind of labourers and the
general absence of adequate migration policies that fosters clandestine immigration through transit
countries. However, an unconfessable institutionalised opportunism rather than lack of awareness
underpins this apparently paradoxical situation. Employers profit from hiring undocumented workforce,
since their illegal status ensures that they will accept long working hours for very low wages in
unhealthy conditions and without any labour rights, a perfect deal for reducing production costs and
providing the market with cheaper goods. On the other hand, national governments also profit from
irregular inflows, since they compensate their deficit in providing social-welfare services to their
citizens in need.
4.2. United States’ de-fences
The situation in Northern America is rather similar, with the only difference that there is just one transit
country neighbouring the US, namely Mexico. Although models for managing borders areas are
seemingly different (in North America patrols are concentrated in the 3000 km land border with
Mexico, whereas in Europe the regions from which transit migrants arrive are so spread out that
implementation of analogous measures is rather impossible), the side-effect of the two security-based
approaches are equivalent: transit migrants are placed at greater risk, new migratory routes appear for
each new barrier created, and “polleros” or “coyotes”, as smugglers are called by Mexicans, have
been transformed into organized-crime figures.
The US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated there were five million illegal aliens6 in
1996, a number that grown up to nearly 12 million in 2006. This means that the number of irregular
immigrants in the U.S. more than doubled in just ten years, despite the increased emphasis on law
enforcement and border surveillance along the US southern border, where 98% of total apprehensions
are registered (Skinner, 2006).
During the 1990s, and particularly during the second half of that decade, the U.S. government opted
for stricter border controls as a mechanism for regularizing and controlling the flows of undocumented
migrants (Santibañez Romellón 2004). Building on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and
on the growing alarmism among United States’ population about what was perceived as a “massive
migrant invasion,” the Clinton administration introduced in the 1990s “prevention through deterrence”.
The border enforcement process began in 1993 and led to operations ‘Hold the Line’ in Texas in 1993,
‘Gatekeeper’ in San Diego in 1994, ‘Safeguard Arizona’ in 1995 and ‘Rio Grande’ in Texas in 1997
(Kimball, 2007). The strategy underpinning such operations to protect the US from the growing
immigration pressures was indeed not an “original” one. It consisted essentially in investing large
amounts of money7 in building high walls and fences at strategic points of entry (POE), constantly
patrolled by great numbers of agents heavily equipped, with motion- and heat-detecting sensors,
night-vision goggles, and even helicopters (Santibañez Romellón, 2004). These fortifications were
introduced under the premise that apprehension would become so probable that it would deter people
from migrating (Cornelius, 2001).
Instead the areas where undocumented migrants crossed the border were progressively shifted in
regions far removed from urban areas, the road system, and the possibility of rescue (Santibañez
Romellón, 2004). Border fencing has merely channelled undocumented migration to more remote and
dangerous desert terrain. After triple-fencing was constructed in San Diego, apprehensions of
6
The concept of illegal migration, and even more its personalization under the terms illegal migrant - or worse illegal alien tends to reflect and reinforce prejudice over the status of the person concerned and the treatment which they shall be receiving
accordingly. Believing that “nobody is illegal”, in this paper I decided to use the adjectives irregular or undocumented to describe
migrants with irregular status, a part when citing pubblications referring to migrants as “illegal”. In this section, however I use the
adjective “illegal” because in the United State it is normally adopted in the migration discourse, evidencing a widespread
intolerance to the issue.
7
According to US Corps of Engineers declare that the costs of constructing a double layer fence amount at nearly $1.3 million a
mile, while the 25 year life cycle cost of the fence would range from $16.4 million to $70 million per mile depending on the
amount of damage sustained by the fencing. (Nuñez-Neto and Viña 2006). The barrier systems along the border vary greatly. In
the urban areas these barriers may be doubled to include a "Secondary" barrier with a "No Man's Land" between.
undocumented immigrants fell from 450,152 in 1994 to 100,000 in 2002, but apprehensions in the
Tucson sector increased 342 percent during this same period (Ackleson, 2005).
The growing complexities in crossing borders irregularly and the absence of rational mechanisms to
grant regular entry-visas to would be migrants deeply changed the nature of smuggling services
offered in Northern Mexico. The polleros, who were traditionally local residents charging US$200 to
show migrants “where to run to”, usually on the same day of their arrival at the border-crossing point,
were inevitably replaced by criminal organizations, better equipped to organize the difficult crossing.
Since it had to include accommodation (sometimes for long periods), transport and bribes to corrupted
police agents on both sides, the “crossing package” price suddenly rose to US$2,000 (Santibañez
Romellón, 2004), and even more to buy a safer passage through one of the several tunnels smugglers
excavate from inside houses next to the border.
According to the US Border Patrol, nearly 3000 people died crossing the United States-Mexico border
between 1998 and 2005, and the number of yearly border crossing deaths has doubled since 1995.
Although smugglers have been blamed for abandoning some migrants to their deaths in the desert,
the Mexican government has been hesitant to take concrete actions against them, knowing the
number of deaths would climb if people crossed on their own. According to Victor Clark, who heads
the Tijuana-based Binational Center for Human Rights, "Migrant traffickers have become a necessary
evil" (Watson, 2006). Undeniably, the more the U.S. enforces the border protection, the more lucrative
the immigrant smuggling business become, to the point that it is estimated to be the third largest
industry in Mexico, ranking behind only drugs and tourism in total estimated revenues (Skinner, 2006).
Parallely to the reinforcement of patrols along the US-Mexican border, during the 90s U.S. policy
makers were increasingly expressing concern over transit migration through Mexico, lobbying for
border controls and the interdiction of immigrants en route to the US (Kimball, 2007). Until the late
1980s, Mexican officials maintained a laissez-faire attitude, its southern boundary with Guatemala and
Belize referred to as la frontera olvidada (the forgotten border) (Flynn, 2005). Since the 1990s,
however, under hard diplomatic pressures from the United States and facilitated by the willingness of
Mexico to convince a sceptical U.S. Congress that it would be a responsible partner in NAFTA, Mexico
has drastically increased its efforts to curb transit migration. On average over 100,000 Central
Americans per year were apprehended in the last decade of XX century in Mexican territory, the
largest numbers from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, compared to only 10,000 per year
repatriated during the 1980s (Mahler and Ugrina, 2006)
A major venue for US pushing its externalisation policies has been the Regional Conference on
Migration, the so-called Puebla Process from the name of the Mexican city where the first meeting
took place in 1996. The Puebla Process, a yearly gathering of migration and foreign policy officials
from Canada, the United States, Mexico, and Central America, has been the locus for lobbying efforts,
with Mexico hoping that the meetings would be a way of advancing its own interests, and the United
States considering the process as a way to push its policy objectives in the migration field (Flynn,
2002).
In 1997 INS initiated ‘Global Reach’ program, which aimed at stopping migration at the source, namely
in origin and transit countries, thus even before migrants had the chance to reach the U.S. borders.
For the first time ever, the U.S. government established a permanent presence of intelligence analysts
overseas to deter irregular migration en-route to US by trying to intercept and dismantle smuggling
networks in third countries. The Global Reach Initiative has surely contributed in persuading Latin
American transit countries to consider transit migration without proper visas as a criminal offence
(Kimball, 2007).
At the beginning of the new millennium, the administration of Mexican President Vincente Fox
engaged into new interdiction efforts in Mexico's southern states, with the clear intention of persuading
the U.S. government to normalize the legal status of the 6 to 8 million undocumented Mexicans who
were living in the United States. Coyote 2000 and the Plan Sur (Southern Plan) in 2001 were Mexico’s
main attempts at reducing human smuggling and irregular migration through its southern borders. Plan
Sur dispatched there hundreds of immigration agents, formally employed the military in detection of
undocumented migrants and smugglers, and allocated 10 million dollars (evidently financed by US) to
the construction of roadside immigration checkpoints (Oja, 2002).
To impede apprehended Central American migrants’ return to Mexico after deportation, the
government8 started sending them directly back to their countries of origin, instead of just dropping
them off at the Guatemalan border. Mexico deported some 150,000 Central Americans in 2000, and
another 100,000 during the first six months of 2001 At about the same time, Mexico implemented a
short-lived plan to deport extra regional migrants to Guatemala if it could be determined that they had
8
With the support of i) Guatemala, which enacted the Venceremos 2001 - We Shall Overcome - to facilitate repatriation of its
own illegal immigrants (Oja, 2002), and ii) the United States which was investing great amounts of money in supporting LatinAmerican partners’ operations.
entered from that country. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, some 1,000 migrants from
India, Pakistan, Sudan, China, Colombia, Ecuador, and other countries were deported to Guatemala
in 2001, with the United States covering most of the transportation costs (Flynn, 2002).
Like the unintended consequences of the controls enhancement along the US Southern border, the
journey through Mexico has become increasingly dangerous and the price for contracting human
smugglers from Southern Mexico has rose from $6.000 to an average of $10.000 (Kimball, 2007).
Given the growing difficulty of avoiding controls on highways, alternative routes and means of
transport have opened up, such as freight trains, an extremely hazardous choice that cost the lives of
several migrants trying to jump on and off moving trains (Castillo, 2006). Not to say that the Mara
Salvatrucha, a dangerous central American criminal gang well known for its violence, often take
control over these freight trains, charging a fee to those whishing to get on and throwing those who do
not accept to pay further fees for their ‘protection’ off (Kimball, 2007). New routes have also been used
along quiet roads and ancient Mayan paths, that are nonetheless dangerous since they have become
the operating territory of organized gangs regarding migrants as an easy target, not only because of
the few though attractive resources they possess, but also because of their unfamiliarity with the area
(Castillo, 2006).
Furthermore, it is widely documented that corrupted police officials perpetuate an alarming number of
abuses on transit migrants. Existing Mexican law on migration (Ley General de Población) is more
than 30 years old and is so far removed from the current reality that it is not only inapplicable but it
makes room for oversights and a framework advantageous to perpetrating extortion on migrants in
transit (Santibañez Romellón, 2004). Allowing for a maximum penalty of twelve years’ imprisonment
for undocumented entry, it gives excessive discretion to immigration authorities and other law
enforcement officers, who frequently threaten migrants with incarceration or deportation as means to
obtain bribes. Despite only INM (Mexican National Institute for Migration) agents and the Federal
Preventive Police are legally authorized to detain undocumented foreigners, several other law
enforcement bodies, including the anti-narcotics police, the forest protection service, the military, and
even tax authorities as well as private police forces employed by the railway companies, are playing
an increasing role in irregular migration control.
The lack of a real effort by the Mexican government to crack down on these illicit activities has been
interpreted as a strategy to keep the number of apprehension high enough to comply with US
expectations. If the government were to crack down on corruption and claim a fair respect of the
population law, there would be a tremendous drop in the number of authorities working (albeit illegally)
to detect undocumented migrants (Kimball, 2007).
The September 11 terror attacks in the United States effectively quashed negotiations between the
administrations of Fox and US President George W. Bush over the status of undocumented Mexicans
in the United States (Flynn, 2002). In the US, undocumented crossings have been soon placed in the
same category as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. Irregular immigration is now directly
associated with factors that pose national security at risk, since the “enemies of the State”, Al Quaeda
in primis, might use the same channels, the same guides, or the same routes used by would-be
migrants looking for better opportunities in the US. The post-9/11 emphasis on illegal migration as a
national security issue was formalized with the creation of the Homeland Security Department (HSD),
which absorbed INS and the Border Patrol.
Despite the overall failure of border-control strategies heavily reliant on fences and increased number
of agents, militarisation of the physical frontier continues to be the most relevant policy to stem the
flow of migrants into the United States as they cross, or at least to present to electors the image that
these flows are being restricted. In fact, while numerous scholars have pronounced the ineffectiveness
of such an approach in deterring undocumented migration, the security-oriented approach appears to
be politically and symbolically successful (Ackleson, 2005).
Indeed, growing numbers of apprehensions might convince public opinion that the country is well
protected. However, the official estimate is that the U.S. Border Patrol intercepts only 1 out of every 4
illegal border crossers, while current and former Border Patrol officers often declare that the ratio of
those intercepted is much lower, probably 1:8 or even 1:10 (Ting, 2005). Thus any growth in the
number of migrants captured at the border should be read as a parallel growth in the number of
people attempting the crossing.
During the first years of the 21st century, it was registered an unprecedented increase in
apprehensions at US-Mexican border. In particular The U.S. experienced a rising influx of the socalled OTMs (Other Than Mexican nationals) illegally entering the country. The number of OTMs
apprehended passed from nearly 29,000 in the year 2000 to 66,000 in 2004 and more than 150,000 in
2005. Hence the number of people transiting trough Mexico is likely to have greatly increased over the
same period. One of the reasons behind this growth is that the Mexican government does not allow
the U.S. to send OTMs back into Mexico, while US authorities have limited detention space to keep in
custody OTMs until the procedures for repatriating them to their country of origin is completed. Most of
OTMs apprehended are thus given a “notice to appear” in court and released, but 90% fail to comply
with it. The success of border crossers who stay in the United States through this "catch-and-release"
process seems to have encouraged others who hope to enter the country the same way (Spencer
Hsu, 2006). Border Patrol agents report that, instead of hiding from the authorities, illegally entering
OTMs actually seek them out in order to obtain the document charging them with illegal entry, jokingly
called “Notice to disappear”. In fact, if they are challenged while moving deeper into the U.S. from the
border, they can produce this document to show that they have already scheduled an appointment
before immigration judges (Ting, 2005). By the end of 2005, president Bush vowed to expand the use
of expedited removal proceedings, a practice highly criticized by human rights organizations since it
empowers HSD inspectors to order the summary deportation of intercepted undocumented immigrants
without court hearing.
Prevention strategies also were strengthened, including U.S. government media campaigns of placing
flashy advertisements in Mexican electronic media warning of the possibility of death at the U.S.
border (Kimball 2007).
In the post-9/11 era, border security has thus become a growth industry. President Bush’s Fiscal Year
2006 budget, submitted to Congress on February 2005, requested a nearly 4.8 percent increase in
funding for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, bringing the agency’s total to $6.7 billion. Next to
defence spending, this represents one of the highest growth rates in the federal government
(Ackleson, 2005). Since great part of this budget is to be used for the expansion of the actual 128
kilometres of fences to more than 1,100, it is hard not to recognize that the issue of international
migration continues to be managed under the logic of U.S. national security and not under that of
labour-market integration and complementary demographic processes. Repeated proposals for more
fencing and Border Patrol agents along the U.S.-Mexico border will only perpetuate an unsuccessful
and counterproductive policy that already demonstrated to be ineffective in actually enhancing national
security or curb undocumented immigration (Ackleson, 2005).
On the Mexican Side, efforts to limit transit migration also were strengthened after 9/11. Perhaps
because of the criticisms the government earned with Plan Sur, which not only failed in stopping
transit migration but was also negatively perceived by public opinion as emulating the U.S. policy by
militarising Mexico southern border area, the government withdrew from this strategy and opted for a
new tactic, namely the intensification of internal controls along highways and transportation routes.
Mexico has today one hundred and seventy-two official interdiction points, fifty-two INM migration
stations and more than 50 detention centres for irregular migrants (Kimball, 2007).
The INM’s 2005 policy proposal, entitled “Integral Migratory Policy Proposal for the Mexican Southern
Border,” provides evidence on the future vision of immigration controls in Mexico. While introducing
major immigration restrictions and increased controls both at the southern border and internally,
statements used are always softened by human rights language. Each proposed measure, ranging
from raids in work-places to find out irregularly hired migrants to improving methods of detecting false
documents, is followed by the clause “in strict observance of their rights”, though the policy proposal
never specifies how exactly this might be achieved (Kimball, 2007).
Wetback, a recent documentary by a Mexican filmmaker who has been living in Canada for the last
four years, dramatically shows that Mexico did become a vertical border to the US, within which
several transit migrants get stranded for months and even years before ending up their dangerous trip,
in the United States, in a Mexican city or in the oblivion.
5. Re-defining the paradigm: transit cities rather than transit countries
International debate on transit migration often address that growing numbers of migrants cannot
legally enter Europe or the United States, so they are waiting at the doors of it to have a chance to get
to the other side. That candidates for migration wait sometimes for a few days, sometimes months, but
it also happens that they cannot cross to their target destination for years and are forced to stay in a
transit country, is a well known reality.
What is less pointed out is that the places where many transit migrants stop over, and often get
stranded, are not just “countries”, but specific points of the territory of transit countries, where
particular services and opportunities are available. In fact, the geography of transit migration heading
towards Europe or the US is organized around several nodes along the way. The actual itineraries
connecting these strategic hubs, the origin of migrants passing through, the networks facilitating their
trip and the means of transportation used between each focal point can vary greatly but, to a large
extent, the nexus points remain constant (Europol, 2000). Surprisingly, the current academic and
political discourse on transit migration largely focuses on the implications for, and responsibilities of,
“transit countries” or on the irregular situation of “transit migrants”, but very few reference is made to
the physical nodes of transit routes where migrants stop-over. There is indeed a great lack of
research, debate and literature on “transit cities”.
Transit cities are places where a multitude of networks converge and intersect, creating a wealth of
opportunities for migrants. Existing transport and telecommunications systems, political and economic
connections, but also intangible networks based on ethnic, family, religion, ideological and nationality
relations, as well as mafia-like practices, enable migrants both to reach these particular locations and,
once there, quickly establish contacts, get information, access resources and be taken care of. The
density of “social interactions” offered by these urban areas creates an environment that is highly
favourable to mobility (Perouse, 2004). Their connections or proximity with the most desired target
destinations act as magnet for would-be migrants. In a nutshell, it is the “hubs” that shape the routes
converging towards Europe, and it is for the opportunities offered by these cities that migrants resolve
to cross the territory of what is then labelled as “transit country”.
Given its prevailing irregular character, there is an absolute lack of data on the urban dimension of
transit migration. Most of these migrants are either irregular residents, and therefore not resulting in
official statistics, or all but willing to express their purpose to migrate further. The only reliable figures
come from the police services when they arrest people infringing employment legislation or residence
regulations, holding forged documents or intercepted while attempting to cross borders illicitly (De
Tapia, 2004). Clearly, such apprehensions fail to be representative since, on the one hand they only
account for a limited proportion of actual migration flows and, on the other, they might include also
irregular immigrants not intentioned to move. Nevertheless, available figures at least give some
information on the origin and dynamics of transit flows.
5.1 Transit cities in Mexico and Turkey
The number of transit migrants intercepted in Mexico rose to 240,200 in 2005 from 138,000 in 2002,
according to INM. That number dipped to 182,700 in 2006, probably as a side-effect of October 2005
Hurricane Stan that devastated part of the railway system diverting transit routes in less patrolled
paths (Miller Llana, 2007). An average of 3,000 Central Americans a day is believed to attempt to
cross Mexico to reach the U.S. and Canada.
For migrants from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and, to a less extent Ecuador,
Colombia and also Asia, the trip through Mexico begins in the southern states of Chiapas and
Tabasco. In the former, researchers counted up to 24 easy crossing points and 35 routes controlled by
smugglers (Luna, 2004).
The other main entry zone in Southern Mexico is the state of Quintana Roo, used principally by transit
migrants from Asia and Africa passing first through Belize, but also by Cubans crossing the Caribbean
Sea. A minor flow of Asians also arrives directly by sea to the Baja California Peninsula, from where
they head towards Tijuana.
Tecun Uman, a small town in northern Guatemala, is one of the principal meeting point where would
be migrants from Central and South America converge in their way towards north. The first thing
whoever arrives there usually hears is "Van a Mexico?" (Are you going to Mexico?) In the center of the
city there is an incessant traffic made up of vans filled with migrants while polleros wait for their
customers, offering from a simply passage to the nearby Mexican city of Ciudad Hidalgo to an allinclusive travel towards the US. Along the Suchate river separating Mexico and Guatemala, an
indefinite number of camareros ferry migrants for few cents on board of makeshift inflated boats
(Kimball, 2007).
There are 4 principal routes from southern to northern Mexican borders, three of which converge to
mexico city before taking different directions towards north. The forth is the Pacific route, which runs
all along the Pacific coast up to Mexicali and Tijuana. In addition, there are several minor both
maritime and terrestrial routes that are often changing. Since motorways and other roads are highly
patrolled, railway is the most popular mean of transport to cross the more than 3,000 kilometres that
separate the Mexican southern and northern frontiers.
From ciudad Hidalgo the main migration corridor was heading to Tapachula, a city known most of all
for its station where the famous “gusano de acero” (the steel warm) was leaving daily to the north.
Until Hurricane Stan devastated part of the railway and several bridges, the local NGOs assisting
migrants used to attend three to four hundred of them a day. According to INM officials, apprehension
rates in the Tapachula area began to drop dramatically in March 2006, about five months after the
passage of the hurricane, that means it had taken roughly five months for the information to travel
south through the migrant network to inform potential migrants that there were no longer any trains
leaving from there (Kimball, 2007).
Now transit migrants use to walk until Arriaga, a city 270 kilometres north of Tapachula, where the
trains are still running (Gonzales, 2006). Those who can afford it pay coyotes to travel until there,
hidden in the double bottom of lorries. Cargo Trains have not a regular timetable nor are frequent, thus
up to 800 migrants end up waiting day and night along the railway. All kind of services to cater their
needs are flourishing in the city (León M., Renoso 2007). From Arriaga, next stop after 10 hours travel
is Ixteptec, in the state of Oaxaca (Gómez, 2007). From there migrants either head to Veracruz for
then taking the Gulf route to Reynosa on the border with US, or move to Mexico City where they take
the central route passing through San Luis Potosí-Zacatecas-Parral and heading to Ciudad Juarez
and the other border cities in the north.
Mexico’s 2000 national census showed that the largest concentration of international migrants was in
Tijuana. With China and Latin America at the top of the list, natives of up to 37 countries reside in this
city. Latin Americans (mostly from El Salvador, Argentina, Colombia, and Guatemala) and Koreans
form the most consistent groups. Among Latin American immigrants, few see Tijuana as their final
destination. The great majority ended up there after failing to immigrate to the United States. A second
group is comprised of individuals who had illegally crossed the border into the USA and were expelled
back to Mexico, where US immigration services “erroneously believed” those migrants belonged
(Alegría, 2005). Since 2003, a total of 9,368 undocumented migrants were apprehended in Tijuana by
the INM (Alegría, 2007). US INS stopped people from 73 different countries trying to cross to San
Ysidro on the other side of the border.
Map 1. Transit cities and routes in Mexico
Elaboration made on the basis of: Kimball (2007), Casillas (2006)
According to official statistics, the number of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey increased
steadily during the last few years, peaking in 2000 at 94,500. However experts estimate that among
90,000 and 200,000 migrants in transit enter the country each year (Içduygu, 2003; Kirişçi, 2003).
As regards the nationality of transit migrants, Iraqis and Afghans appear to be top of the list, followed
by Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Iranians, and nationals of former Soviet Republics (Içduygu, 2003). The
number of Maghrebis, has also increased in recent years, suggesting that some are taking the indirect
rather than the direct route to Europe. Other nationalities include Indians, Sri Lankans, Filipinos,
Nigerians, Somalis, Sierra Leoneans and Eritreans and to a lesser extent, migrants from Togo,
Namibia, Liberia and Uganda.
The largest proportion of irregular transit migrants enters Turkey across its eastern borders. They
principally arrive by land (by trucks, bus or even on foot) via Urva, next to the Syrian border 9 or via the
cities of Van and Hakkari respectively next to the Iranian and Iraqi frontiers. Agri, next to Armenian
border, is the other main transit city in eastern Turkey. From there transit migrants travel to Ankara, for
then reaching the great harbours in the west and the south-west coastal cities, Istanbul in primis but
also Smirne, Antalya, Cannakale, Bodrum, and Izmir. Here they wait until they succeed in embarking
for a European country, principally for Greece and Italy (Koppa, 2007). The most well-off directly entry
9
The Turkish-Syrian border was heavily mined until improved relation between the two countries culminated in the 2004
decision of removing mine fields (Kirisci, 2007).
Turkey through the Ataturk airport, since Istanbul is an important international place for all the
Sunnites and tourist visas for pilgrimages are easily obtainable for residents of Islamic countries.
Istanbul is a staging post for stays of varying length, a hub for international mobility, migration and
traffic. It acts as a point of contact and interface between economic, political and geopolitical worlds.
This teeming metropolis, which is ultimately very difficult to police, and the relative anonymity it
provides, offers a wealth of opportunities to the Kaçak (irregular migrants) in transit. Among the
hundreds of thousands of empty dwellings and vast, deserted industrial estates, it is nearly impossible
for the police – complicit a sound level of corruption among its officials - spotting which ones are used
for activities linked to clandestine travel. Nevertheless, transit migrants relying on informal networks,
always are able to find the right information and get in touch with smugglers, counterfeiters or forgers.
The Akasaray district and surrounding areas on the historic peninsula in the core of the city, are well
known for their somewhat specialised travel agencies which issue false papers or travel documents for
Europe (Perouse, 2004).
Map 2. Transit cities and routes in Turkey
Elaboration based on the basis of: Simon (2006), ICMPD, EUROPOL, FRONTEX (2006)
5.2 Transit cities in North Africa
Maghreb is the major region of transit for migrants heading towards Europe. About 100,000 to 120,000
Sub-Saharan migrants enter it annually, most of them with the specific intention of reaching one EU
Member State. During the last few years, a smaller but increasing number of migrants from the
Middle-east (Kurds, Iraqis, Palestinians, Egyptians), East Africa (Somalis, Ethiopians) and even Asia
(Pakistanis, Indians, Sri Lankans, Chinese) is joining these transit flows (Boubakri, 2004).
The majority of migrants enter the Maghreb overland from Agadez in the north of Niger, that is now a
city of nearly 100,000 inhabitants, but it had only 30,000 in 1985. A historical crossroads of transSaharan trade routes, Agadez has developed into an important ‘passenger transport centre’, from
where trucks and pick-ups cross the Tenere Desert, the only possible – although very dangerous way to transport migrants towards the large cities in the southern Maghreb (Simon, 2006). From
Agadez, migration routes bifurcate to the Sebha oasis in Libya – from where migrants move to Tripoli
and other coastal cities or to Tunisia - and to Tamanrasset in southern Algeria.
Algerian authorities arrested 35,000 irregular migrants from 55 African and Arab countries over the a
six years period (2001-2007) and deported 32,000. A part from 3,200 Maghrebis, most of those
detained or sent home were from Africa's Sahel region with 11,000 from Niger, 7,000 Malians and
1,600 Nigerians. The total also included migrants from the Middle East and Asia with 1,600 Syrians
and 150 Indians (Riad, 2007). During the last few years, the Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale
have repatriated 2,000 to 3,000 sub-Saharan migrants per year, but in 2002 the number of
deportations increased to 4,600 and in 2003 to nearly 9,000 (Simon, 2006).
In the case of Tamanrasset, its population rose from 3000 people in 1966, of whom 332 subSaharans, to 70,000 in 1998, with 31,300 Sub-Saharans (Simon, 2006). After a few days, weeks,
months or even years in Tamanrasset, migrants intentioned to use this city just as a place of transit,
proceed to Libya via the city of Ghât on the Algerian-Libyan border or to northern Algeria, in particular
to Algiers or Maghnia. The metropolitan area of Algiers, which now counts with more than 3,5 million
inhabitants, is a strategic place where migrants in transit can access important information and
resources to plan their crossing to Europe. Along the coastal area around Algiers the smuggling
industry is booming. Given the growing demand, many fishermen are converting their traditional
activities in a very profitable business, by filling their old boats with would-be migrants and sail them
up to the Balearic islands (170 kilometres away), Sardinia or even directly to the French southern
coast (nearly 450 kilometres from Algiers). Instead, migrants leaving from Tamanrasset in the direction
of Maghnia, use the latter city as stopover in their way towards Ojuda in Morocco (de Haas, 2006).
Morocco is the country where transit migration has been more investigated. Among an average of
28,000 would-be emigrants arrested in Morocco each year, the number of Sub-Saharan Africans has
rapidly grown, till making up now the majority of migrants attempting to cross towards EU 10 (Simon,
2006). From Oujda, all the available options for reaching Europe usually include long periods of
permanence in transit cities, where migrants get stranded until they succeed in organizing and
financing the last – and largely most complicated and expensive - leg of their trip. The northern cities
of Tangier and Nador act as a magnet for migrants in transit, since the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla are so incredibly close, just behind tall but transparent fences, and the Spanish mainland alike,
well visible only few kilometres away on the other side of the Strait.
Tangiers, also known as “the getaway to Africa”, has always been a staging post, a place of retreat,
concentration and negotiation. With its five ports, 70% of all maritime passenger traffic and nearly 400
kilometres of coastline, Tangiers and its region offers a multitude of possible transfer points for
migrants, including a number of smaller fishing ports from where smugglers organise the crossing on
board of boats famous as “pateras”. Traditionally a city complicit in every kind of traffic, clandestine
migration is just one more profitable activity among many others (Charef, 2004). Recently, maritime
patrols have been significantly intensified to deter any attempt at clandestine emigration. Ceuta and
Melilla become nearly inaccessible, protected by double layer wire fences, bugging devices on the
ground, helicopter patrols and infrared detection systems. As a reaction, the smugglers simply offer
more expensive new options to the harragas, the Arab word meaning burners with which they call
transit migrants, since they use to destroy (burn) any identity papers to avoid being expelled back to
their home country in case of being caught (Lehtinen, 2005).
From Ojuda many migrants now opt for taking the alternative southern routes, along which Rabat and
Casablanca are the main hubs. These two cities, with populations of respectively 1,5 and 3,5 million
inhabitants are actually hosting significant immigrant populations, and offer to transit migrants enough
invisibility to stay hidden while finding a way to migrate further. Those who succeed in getting ready to
leave are usually transferred in small groups by night to Agadir. Once migrants have gathered in
sufficient number to fill the pateras (usually 25 to 30 people) a 700 kilometres night voyage is set up in
the direction of the city of El Aioun, in Western Sahara, a novel major ‘waiting area’ from which
embarking for the Canary Islands (Simon, 2006).
Tunisia, is also an important transit country. During the period 1998 to 2004, the Tunisian authorities
apprehended nearly 45,000 migrants attempting to cross to Italy, among them at least 10,000 foreign
nationals, mainly sub-Saharan Africans. The main harbours in which smuggling syndicates are active
are the ports of La Goulette, Sousse El Katanoui and Sfax (Simon, 2006). The latter and Tunis
definitely are the principal transit cities of the country. Greater Tunis houses two of the ten million
inhabitants of the country, and probably as much as 60% of the total number of irregular migrants.
Concentrating and redistributing all air, sea and land traffic between central Saharan Africa and the
Italian peninsula, the capital city is the main gateway for Tunisian and foreign travellers, goods and
businesses (De Tapia, 2004). In parallel, a highly structured, shadow system of illicit services for
would-be migrants do also exist, mainly managed by criminal smugglers from disadvantaged
neighbourhoods of greater Tunis.
Finally Libya is currently considered the main transit country in North Africa. Its authorities estimate
that 600,000 foreigners are living in the country with regular permit, while a further 750,000 to 1.2
million are residing illegally (Hamood, 2006). Since the mid 70’s Libya have been a major target
destination for sub-Saharan Africans filling local labour shortage and fitting into policies to revitalize
underpopulated parts of the country. However, a growing popular resentment against immigrants,
culminated in tragic clashes between local and foreign workers in 2000, lead Libyan authorities to
introduce a number of repressive measures, including restrictive immigration regulation, lengthy and
arbitrary detention of immigrants in poor conditions in prisons and camps, physical abuse, and the
forced repatriation of tens of thousands of Sub-Saharans. Of the estimated 75,000 to 100,000
foreigners who are actually entering Libya each year, the majority do not consider it anymore as a
place for immigration but rather for transit. The sizeable communities of sub-Saharan Africans,
established in the principal Libyan cities, represent a wide network providing crucial support and
guidance for the newcomers. In the South of the country, Shebha and Koufra are the main points of
entry for commercial traders as well as for irregular arrivals. In 2004 the Governor of Kufra estimated
that 10-12,000 people pass through the city every month. Given the intensification of police controls,
10
42% in 2002, 31% in 2003 and 65 % in 2004
transit migrants in Libya are reported to pay smugglers’ services also when travelling within the
country to reach the main transit cities in the north, Tripoli and Benghazi in particular. The former, with
all the opportunities it offers as a capital city, is indubitably the most strategic waiting area of the
country. Its proximity with the coastal cities of Zilten and Zuwarah, hubs of departure and cores of the
smuggling networks, is a strong incentive for using Tripoli as city of transit. Migrants remain hidden in
the anonymity of the urban area, preparing for the journey, saving money, establishing contacts with a
wasit (facilitator), often from the migrant’s own national community, who acts as a link between the
traveller and the Libyan smuggler (Hamood, 2006).
5.3 The reaction of local governments
Transit cities are markedly the principal loci of international migration systems, used by migrants as
antechambers and switching points where accumulating capital – primarily financial capital, but also
social, cultural (language) and professional capital – in order to prepare themselves to move on (De
Tapia, 2004).
All the mentioned cities, despite being very different share many common features, first of all that of
being areas of intense exchange (international tourism, legal migration and migratory movements,
circulation of capital and commercial trade, etc). In their day-to-day administrative procedures (State
departments, municipalities, social services and civil society), all of them are facing national and
international pressure to supervise and control migration flows (De Tapia, 2004).
Although local policymakers and the media stress the temporary, transitory character of transit
migration, and despite migrants themselves intend to use these cities just as transit points, due to the
tremendous difficulties in moving on, an increasing proportion of these migrants become permanent
settlers, and now form small, highly vulnerable minorities in a variety of cities neighbouring Europe
and the US. Their presence confronts local authorities with an entirely new set of complex social and
legal issues, which they are not prepared to cope with and do not resound with the existing self-image
as cities belonging to emigration countries (De Haas, 2005a). Furthermore, this substantial flow of
immigration is mainly occurring in urban contexts where living conditions are deteriorating for large
numbers of local residents and urban poverty - as well as social and spatial marginalisation and
segregation - already reached alarming levels.
of transit cities look at transit migrants as unwanted newcomers, because of the many
challenges they represent to: i) their economy, since local labour markets are already confronted with
unemployment and underemployment among nationals and ii) their society, since transit migrants form
additional groups in precarious conditions (Fargues & Bensaad, 2007).
The social dimension of transit migration is particularly challenging. Transit migrants – when they tend
to stay in a transit city for rather long period of time – can be a reason for ethnic tension since their
origin might be distant and often unconnected with local residents’ social, cultural and religious
background (Charef, 2004). Xenophobia, racism and fear often spread among natives, especially
when these newcomers are perceived as undesirable competitors for scarce resources. On the other
hand, as these migrants are there – at least in theory - just for transiting, they neither are willing to
integrate, their main purpose being to use of that particular transit city just what they need to achieve
their desired destination: its transport facilities, income opportunities, networks’ assistance, smuggling
services, and so on (Charef, 2004). In any case, these dynamics are taking place in a general vacuum
in terms of migrant and refugee reception and protection policies.
6. Migrants’ life in transit cities
Transit migrants are not necessarily irregular migrants. It is quite common for people, attempting to
illegally enter the EU or the US, not declaring transit as their main purpose when arriving in a whatever
country neighbouring their target destination. Nevertheless, many migrants enter transit countries with
regular permits as visitors, tourist, students, asylum seeker and so on. In most countries, an ordinary
visa for international travellers is valid for up to three months. It is thus evident that, the more transit
migrants have to wait in transit cities along their way, the more it is easy for them slipping into an
irregular status. Being forced, for whatever reason, to reside in the intermediate country without any
legal documents recognised by local authorities, mean limited and disadvantage access to jobs,
housing and health services, as well as not being able to claim basic rights to dignity and security of
person, or to freedom to move (Roman, 2006). Once in abusive situation, they are vulnerable to
severe exploitation, since lack of papers and fear of arrest or deportation even prevent them from
seeking help from authorities. The alternative protection frame comes from informal ethnic solidarity or
criminal organizations (Ivakhniouk, 2004). Evidently, insecurity and vulnerability affect their daily
livelihood strategies. Although the empirical context, particularly in terms of policy, varies widely the
situation faced by migrants in transit cities is strikingly similar.
6.1 Finding a shelter
Social networks have primary importance for newcomers’ first urgent need: a cheap and safe
accommodation. Since the first moments of their arrival in transit cities, migrants get into contact with
informal reception mechanisms (Didem Danış, 2007). NGOs sometimes play an important role in
assisting migrants in transit, particularly in Mexico.
Migrants who do not have relatives or friends in Tijuana can find accommodation at the Casa del
Migrante (the Migrant’s House). Run by the Scalabrinians, a Roman Catholic religious order, this
structure equipped with 180 beds provides migrants with support and shelter at the penultimate stop
on their migratory route and, for many, a transition prior to final settlement in the city (Alegría, 2005).
Since its foundation 20 years ago the casa del migrante hosted more than 150,000 migrants in transit
(both Mexican and foreigners) but the number of people looking for their services have been
constantly growing. In the first four months of 2007 it assisted a total of 3000 migrants. Scalabrinians
have other 4 migrants’ houses in Mexico (Tapachula, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, and Agua Prieta)
and one in Tecun Uman in Guatemala. Local churches, and even civil society organizations, have
implemented similar initiatives in Tijuana and several other Mexican transit cities.
However, these structures offer accommodation for only few days, usually no more than three. Only
Tijuana migrants’ house host migrants for up to 15 days, since it is a well known reality that they need
some time for organizing their cross to the US. For most of them this period is still insufficient, thus
they then move somewhere in the vast informal settlements where great share of local population also
live. Here they become nearly invisible and undetectable by the migration authorities. In fact the
majority of them is Latin American and share the same cultural, racial and linguistic background with
Mexicans.
In Istanbul the situation is different. Since the government prefers avoiding interference by outsiders in
domestic affairs, NGOs still have a low profile in Turkey. The only associations truly active on the
ground are those linked to Catholic, Protestant or evangelical churches, operating sometimes just at
parish level. They offer migrants help in terms of shelter (often in the church itself), material resources,
information or even training (especially language classes) and legal aid. However they are allowed to
help only migrants of their same religion. As for Turkish NGOs (STKs), their level of involvement too
remains low (Perouse, 2004).
In any case, it is not very difficult for transit migrants finding a shelter in Istanbul. A number of rundown districts on the historic peninsula are well known for their squalid furnished rooms and other
lodgings, bedsits or garrets where international migrants live together. Segmentation by nationality is
an evident outcome of the different networks to which migrants of different origins refer. Senegaleses
mainly find accommodation in dilapidated housing blocks in the historic districts of Beyoglu and
Eminönü, while Nigerians concentrates in the surroundings of Sultanahmet, and Bangladeshis in
Talabasi. Lâleli district, not far from the Grand Bazaar, houses a centuries-old Iranian trading colony
which has recently been joined by a Maghrebi trading colony (De Tapia, 2004). Assisting compatriots
in transit is a good business for immigrants who established here, to the point that some of them are
even incentiving and facilitating their arrival. With hundreds of cheap hotels and illicit rents for
miserable lodging, Aksaray district is another popular waiting point for transit migrants, in particular
Iranian, African, Afghan and Iraqi.
All these neighbourhoods are strategic places not just for accommodation, but also for the bulk of
opportunities they offer to get in contact with providers of employment, as well as with the smuggling
networks for Greece and Italy. When local authorities have implemented politics of “cleaning” of the
historical peninsula, like happened in 2005 when the police evacuated and sealed tens of pensions
considered to be suspect in Eminönü, the poles of lodging simply shifted in other areas (Didem Danış,
2007). The large number of empty dwellings and buildings 11 in greater Istanbul are an inexhaustible
resource for those making money from migrants. Another strategy adopted by those who have a job,
is that of accepting lower salaries by employers in change of the permit for living in the sweatshops
where they work. This surely decreases the risk of facing police but often at the cost of increasing
migrants’ vulnerability.
In Tunis “New arrivals” tend to rent rooms, either individually or in groups, in cheap hotels around the
station and in the vicinity of place Barcelone. Others, armed with address books, find shelter in rooms
rented by “compatriots” or contacts who are legally residing in Tunisia or have not yet exceeded their
statutory period of stay. This second category is found mainly in the outlying districts where interaction
between Africans and the local population tends to be easier: Cité Ibn Khaldoun, Omrane Supérieur,
Cité Laouina, cité Olympique, Hammam Echatt, L’Ariana (Boubakry, 2004).
Tangier region, one of the most attractive tourist centres in Morocco, obviously abound in formal
reception structures that sum up the 16.2% of the national total. As a response to the increasing flows
11
The Istanbul urban planning authorities estimated in June 2004 that almost 15 million dwellings were unoccupied throughout
Greater Istanbul (Perouse, 2004).
of transit migrants using Tangiers as stopover, it began flourishing also a parallel informal market of
lodging houses and makeshift hotels specialising in this specific type of customer, by offering cheap
accommodation, anonymity and also useful information (Chalef, 2004).
When an urban area becomes a transit city, the explosion in demand of whatever service activated by
migrants is usually met soon with an equal growth in those ready to provide it. In Algiers Kasbah a
myriad of rough hostels offer for two euros a night, and without requiring any identification document,
shanty rooms where migrants are usually allowed in only after 6 PM. During the day they roam the
streets looking for any job to pay for morning coffee, piece of bread, and that filthy piece of floor
shared, sometimes for months, with dozens of other migrants.
In a growing number of transit cities local governments – as a tentative of enforcing national guidelines
- are adopting repressive measures to curb irregular migration, with significant consequences on
transit migrants’ urban life. In the majority of the cities analysed, police inspections of the residence
status in immigrant neighbourhoods have been strongly intensify, as well as regular deportation
campaigns. Life for these migrants is becoming so structured by mechanisms of migration control that
migration policy has become the dominant factor determining the options open to them. (Collier,
2006a).
The case of Morocco is significant for illustrating the impact repressive urban policies might have. Until
few years ago it was common to see large groups of Sub-Saharan Africans in the medinas of Tangiers
or Tetouan, where the cheapest accommodation is located. The geography of this presence began to
change in 2003 as, in the face of growing pressure from the European Union, improved relations with
Spain and new legislation criminalizing undocumented migration, controls became more and more
frequent (Collyer, 2006a).
Rather than discouraging transit migration, these strategies have contributed to worsen migrants’
living conditions, forcing many of them to retreat to makeshift encampments in rural areas outside the
cities. In the forest next to Oujda there is a camp housing almost 3000 Sub-Saharan Africans hoping
to leave one day for Europe (Charef, 2004). Other two are just outside Ceuta and Mellila, the first
called ‘Ben Younech’ after the forest where it is situated, and the second ‘Gourougou’ as a reminder of
Sub-Saharan Africa. Conditions in these encampments are extremely primitive, and earning
opportunities, thus perspectives to leave, are obviously nearly inexistent. Migrants have been also the
victims of numerous police operations (robbery, violence) to prevent transits, not to say that since
October 2005 the military also began occupying water points in the forests.
Migrants residing in the cities further south, particularly Rabat and Casablanca, are a less obvious
target for police enforcement measures. However, round-ups in neighbourhoods with high
concentrations of sub-Saharan Africans are becoming common, and migrants reported increasing
concerns about venturing out into the streets, preferring to remain in the relative safety of their
apartments (Collyer, 2006b). Furthermore, the new control regime frightened most of landlords, who
now take the risk of renting houses to undocumented migrants only in change of high revenues.
Apartments are rented to these migrants for double or triple the price that Moroccans would pay,
forcing them to live in very unhealthy overcrowded conditions to share the costs.
In Tripoli too, the threat of detention increasingly affects transit migrants everyday lives, forcing them
to alter their behaviour in order to try to avoid any contact with the police. This includes reducing
outings from the house to a strict minimum to comply with those tasks needed to fulfil their basic
needs. Given a widespread racism among local officials, often reported as lacking in accountability to
any human rights standards, the situation in this city seems to be very difficult also for those transit
migrants holding a temporary permit of stay. It is not rare that, if the police find out that a group of
“black Africans” is living in a particular house, its residents are compelled to move in order to avoid
arrest (Hamood, 2006). This is evidently weakening the mutual assistance and solidarity potential of
ethnic networks, which are usually the only providers of socio-economic assistance for transit
migrants.
6.2 Earning a living, financing a passage
During their journeys, migrants spend considerable sums of money for a variety of services including
assistance evading controls at borders, clandestine transport, forged documentation and bribes, not to
say that they are constantly exposed to an high risk of being robbed or defrauded. The last leg of the
trip is often the most expensive one. For example, in 2003 the boat trip from Morocco to Spain was
costing $700 for Moroccans, and up to $800 to $1,200 for Francophone and Anglophone sub-Saharan
Africans, respectively (Barros et Al., 2002). Coyotes actually charge $1300 for Mexicans and around
$2000 for transit migrants willing to irregularly reach a city in the US.
Transit cities do provide opportunities to make money through either work or begging but, for the many
who have exhausted all their funds, these sporadic earnings are nearly sufficient to pay for their daily
necessities, hence it is highly improbable that they will be able to save up the sum required to pay for
the last passage.
For the luckiest, an important source of revenue might be offered by kin or friends elsewhere. Those
with family in Europe or in the US, or those whose relatives at home have something to sell (land,
houses or valuable possession), might rely on relatively regular or forfait sums they can collect from a
money transfer agency, another type of service that is booming in transit cities. All transit cities in
Mexico, even the smallest, have at least one Elektra12 office where, as Mexican collect remittances
from their relatives abroad, transmigrants collect the sum needed to reach the next transit city,
avoiding to travel with large amounts of money. In Rabat, it is common to see sub-Saharan Africans in
queues outside the Western Union offices that are located even in the poorest neighbourhoods where
migrants tend to live (Collyer, 2006a).
All the others, the majority, get stranded in a limbo in which they nearly manage to survive.
Despite their growing length of residence, it remains exceptional to find migrants with any sort of
regular employment. Great part of transit countries are characterized by high unemployment rates,
with great shares of their own population living below the poverty line. As a normal reaction
governments place restrictions on foreigners’ right to work, in order to protect domestic labour force.
However, transit cities are located in countries where the informal sector is widespreading (Morocco,
Tunisia, Turkey, Mexico). In these contexts, undeclared labour is still a prime fact of economic and
social life, which facilitates very flexible employment arrangements and lower cost prices in the
globalised economies (De Tapia, 2004). The same informal nature of large sectors of the labour
market in transit cities opens up plenty of opportunities for migrants to pick up various kinds of work,
mainly on daily basis.
Again, given the general absence, even for regular immigrants, of urban policies fostering - or at least
merely addressing - their integration, social networks have primary importance for migrants’ survival
and economic incorporation (rather than inclusion) in the urban fabric. An occupational clustering of
international migrants is observed in all the main transit cities, principally due to the opportunities
opened up by ethnic groups already established there, and their subsequent possibility to insert
newcomers in easily accessible activities. Furthermore, even in poorer transit countries, a growing
number of natives is shunning underpaid unskilled or semi-skilled jobs and instead prefer to migrate
themselves, leaving to transit migrants good opportunities to fill some niches markets (De Haas,
2006a). Transit migrants are usually concentrated in a limited number of sectors of the urban informal
employment market, namely catering, general tourist activities, the carpet and textile industry,
construction, petty trade, and domestic or industrial cleaning.
In Tijuana international migrants are employed mainly in the informal tertiary sector (commerce and
other services), where their participation is much higher than that of native Mexicans. They also work
in manufacturing, for the “maquiladoras, the big export-oriented US-owned assembly plants, which
Tijuana’s residents consider as positions of ‘last resort’ in view of the tough work conditions (Alegría,
2005).
In Tamannraset, they are principally engaged in unskilled work on building sites, paid two to three
hundreds Algerian Dinars a day (2-3€). Also in Kufra transit migrants find temporary jobs primary in
the construction industry, but also in other activities such as loading trucks, washing cars, or working
as a waiters in one of the many local restaurants or cafés. Salaries are typically lower than in the
coastal cities of Tripoli and Benghazi where they will move after (and if) having saved enough money
(Hamood, 2006).
In big metropolis, the vibrant shadow economy offers migrants even more opportunities. It is the case
of Istanbul, where undeclared work is commonplace and widespread. Local trade unions and
chambers of commerce estimate that 40% of the city economic activities takes place in the black
market. In the textile sector alone, two-thirds of the 1.5 million workers in Greater Istanbul are
employed on irregular basis, while three in twenty of these workers are undocumented migrants.
Foreign labour, therefore, is just one dimension of a huge and worrying phenomenon (Perouse, 2004).
The many campaigns carried out in Turkey against informal foreign workers, supported both by new
laws and media coverage, pushed foreign undocumented workers into invisibility, worsening their
working conditions and precariousness. However the strong opposition against migrant workers is
highly criticised by Istanbul textile Trade Unions. In fact, what is seldom recognised, by the media as
well as by local authorities and society, it that migrants do contribute to the economic dynamism
related to the foreign trade business prospering in the city. Transit migrants provide the most suitable
reserve of labour for temporary, unskilled, low-wage jobs in the whole manufacture sector, which goes
up-and-down according the tides of global neo-liberal economy. They play a relevant role within the
urban overall economy, making it possible to change the level of production quite flexibly in proportion
to the variable demand of international traders. Some of them may contribute not just with their
human, but also linguistic capital, as the several Turkmens and Maghrebis migrants who work as
12
Elektra is the leader electronic money transfer in Mexico, with a distribution network of nearly 800 offices in the country.
sales persons, translators and interface with all the Arabic-speaking customers of the shops located in
Laleli and Osmanbey (Didem Danış, 2007).
Until (and if) the day of departure comes, Istanbul offers also other options for transit migrants to earn
a livelihood in burdensome daily jobs, for the most in construction, haulage and handling, in smallscale chemical industries, restoration, woodworking and the recycling sector.
In Tangier, which is regarded as the second industrial centre after Casablanca, generating some
39,000 permanent jobs, 76% of them in the textile sector, the wide range of craft industries and
sweatshop represent a possible income generating activity also for transit migrants (Charef, 2004).
Tunis, Sfax and the surrounding tourist centres, offer to the many Sub-Saharan Africans stranded
there, several opportunities to earn some money. They work illegally in the leisure and entertainment
industry, engaged in activities that goes from art crafts commerce to “Afro” hairdressing services
provided for western women visiting the country, from catering to selling food and drinks (Boubakri,
2004).
All these types of employment are temporary, unreliable and at high risk of exploitation. In most cases,
there is no guarantee that payment will be forthcoming, migrants are generally paid barely more than a
subsistence wage and sometimes directly in kind or even in assistance for onward migration. The only
lucrative jobs, permitting to build up savings and fund the onward journey, are reduced to dangerous
criminal activities, from drug trafficking to robbery and prostitution. Some migrants, after being
deported to a previous node of the route they followed (direct deportation to the country of origin is
rather costly and therefore very rare), and thus having experience of particular border crossings,
become smugglers themselves earning some money guiding others (collier, 2006b). Many of these,
will probably succeed in their crossing.
The majority of the others will continue to live stranded in their “would-be transit city”, becoming
permanent settlers by default. Although this is hardly a sustainable existence, there is evidence that
many of them are beginning to become involved in the economic and social life of these cities, albeit
on a tremendously unfavourable level. Furthermore, transit migration has caused trade to flourish and
has helped revitalize many cities along ancient routes, such as the Mayan paths, the silk road, or the
traditional trans-Saharan caravan routes. After having been used for centuries by nomads, traders and
pilgrims, these routes were gradually erased from maps and memory alike to be replaced by modern
modes of transport (by sea and air). The passage of these new flows of nomads fuelled an economic
and demographic revival.
Finally, for a city, the presence of transit migrants might result in an economic outlet for a considerable
section of the population. Many local economies have indeed benefited from the migration-related
services and business activities carried out by informal entrepreneurs (De Haas, 2005b).
7. Conclusions
Capital cities and others principal urban conurbations at the doors of Europe and of United States offer
many opportunities and an infinitely diverse supply of legal and illegal services facilitating international
mobility. These are strong pulling factors for migrants willing to reach their European or American
dream with any possible mean. The risks of irregular migration are both minimized and fairly well
understood by would-be emigrants, who weigh them up against their current situation. The rationale
behind their decision to leave is a bid to improve their own living conditions as well as to strengthen
the livelihoods of those who stay at home through remittances and their potential to broaden the asset
base. International migration, once started, is a self-sustaining process. As such, it is bound to endure
in the future unless effective distributive policies are implemented between richer and poorer
countries, and between dynamic and stagnant or declining cities in different countries.
The emphasis put on “the control against clandestine migration” in the EU and US political agendas,
through an increasing pressure on transit countries’ authorities to stop migration flows, demonstrated
to be an illusory and unrealistic strategy. With each new border closure, migrants have applied original
tactics to get around the obstacles, and, what is even worse, migration has become criminalized with
the expansion of smuggling networks.
Most of all, such an approach is having serious impacts in transit cities, where international migration
takes place in the total absence of explicit policies for protecting migrants’ rights. Local authorities,
without even having had the time to realise the challenge this phenomenon poses, have been
compelled to introduce new prohibitions, restrictions and controls, often with no other relevant result
than worsening migrants’ living conditions.
Forced by circumstances to spend longer and longer periods in transit cities, migrants live and work in
precarious situations, de facto deprived of even the most fundamental rights such as to live in
adequate housing, to be free to meet in public spaces, to access healthcare services, to work in safe
and respectable conditions. The segregation of transit migrants is evident, and their vulnerability to
iniquity and marginalisation is growing.
Despite the increasing numbers of foreigners living in these cities, there is a great lack of data and
research on the issue. Thus local governments are still not fully aware of it nor of the consequences,
both negative and positive, the phenomenon brings with it. Policy makers, first of all, need evidence of
the potential benefits of international migration as an important contribution to the social and economic
dynamism of their cities. And they also need to understand the costs of failing to manage increasingly
diverse societies, especially in terms of decay in civic values and in the cohesion of urban society as a
whole. The arrival of new groups of migrants, many of whom settling permanently, might have strong
impacts on the behaviour of urban population, fluctuating between solidarity (because this type of
situation is felt so similar to that experienced by the many relatives and friends emigrated abroad) and
rejection, which may sometimes be violent. Due to their limited legal, financial and institutional
capacities, transit cities are generally unprepared to deal with these issues, and would need help for
addressing the situation and planning adequate actions. It is out of doubts that EU member states or
US intervention, when foreseen, should be based on ethic and democratic principles, and on human
rights respect and protection. Instead, national security rather than human security has been up to
now the main concern of the developed world. Transit countries have exploited the situation to bring
ahead their political objectives. From both sides, all the actions taken have not been directed to
assisting local stakeholders in making informed choices, but rather to influence their policies with the
only aim of curbing irregular flows, no matter if, at the end of the story, the cost of all this is mainly paid
by migrants.
***
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