1
INTRODUCTION
Within the realist school of international relations, two primary powerequilibrium camps of explanatory theories for war exist: the “balance” camp hypothesizes that peace lasts in systems with equally strong powers or alliances that balance each other, whereas the “polarity” camp hypothesizes that the existence of hegemons or superpowers best maintains peace
1
. Scholars admit there has been a long debate between the two camps, and disagreement over which theory better predicts the outbreak of war
2
. Both theories rest on mutually exclusive assumptions about the international system, and both have numerous case- and large-N studies to back them up.
While the overall debate is interesting, this paper will focus on the assumptions, models, debates, and research methods of the polarity camp, and specifically, Power Transition
Theory.
Organski first proposed Power Transition Theory in 1958, in a book called World
Politics 3 . Organski introduced a new set of assumptions about the international order:
Organski proposed that the international system was not anarchy but instead an implicit order based on the rules imposed by great powers, challenging the predominant Balance of Power Theory. Some smaller powers under this rule are satisfied; others are not. When dissatisfied states rise to challenge the power of the dominant state, war is likely
4
. The
1 DiCiccio, Levy, 1999 write perhaps the most-read paper that uses the terms “polarity” and “balance” to explicitly describe the camps. They go into rather extensive detail to explain the makeup and content of the two camps, which I will only review.
2
Soysa, Oneal, Park, 1997 describe the history of the debate in some detail.
3
World Politics was originally written as a response to the dominance of Balance of
Power thought in International Relations.
4
Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980; DiCiccio, Levy, 1999 formalize these assumptions about the Power Transition model, though there are disagreements on some

2 mechanism of war is debated 5 , but it is generally agreed upon by Power Transition theorists that the faster the rise of a challenger state within a dyad, and the closer to equal the power of the two states, the more likely war becomes
6
.
Power Transition Theory’s importance lies in its ability to predict the likelihood of future wars, allowing policymakers to concentrate diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts more efficiently. If Power Transition Theory has more explanatory power than Balance of Power Theory, then a shift away from dependence on balance theories would improve
American and worldwide foreign policy efforts. Furthermore, Power Transition Theory has the potential to strengthen its measurements of power and conflict to increase its predictive power over time, allowing policymakers to better identify critical moments in power dynamics among state dyads such that they can take action. In addition, if policymakers have at their disposal an identified group of particularly significant antecedent conditions to power transition conflicts, then they would be able to change some of these conditions to dampen the risk of war.
One particularly urgent rising power case is that of China. Since the Cold War, the United States has remained the overwhelmingly dominant hegemon in the world, but within the next century, China’s rapidly growing economy and military are likely to rival that of the United States. Are China and the US barreling towards war? An improved other mechanisms, including the speed of the rise, the likeliness that the rising power will initiate war, and the importance of alliances.
5 Organski and Kugler hypothesize that the rising power is often motivated to go to war to unseat a great power from its position of dominance, and establish a new international order. Powell, 1996, proposes a choice-theory motivation for declining states to choose between appeasement and war. Levy, 1987, shows that declining states have a preventative motivation to put down a rising power before it can dominate. Levy points out that measuring which country initiates war is difficult, because one could provoke the other to striking first.
6 Kim, 1992; DiCiccio, Levy, 1999, Organski, 1958, Organski & Kugler, 1980.

3
Power Transition Theory framework will help policymakers in predicting, and thus managing, hostility between these two powers. Nevertheless, Power Transition Theory needs work, and certainly stronger models and tests to improve its predictive capabilities and to show whether, as a theory, it has greater predictive power than the competing balance theories.
I will propose through my research design to test Power Transition Theory as the literature currently maintains it, to better develop measurements of power and conflict, and to expand the key antecedent conditions of the theory. In this next section, therefore,
I will review the literature of Power Transition Theory. I will identify what is known (and with how much confidence), where the debates lie, what deficiencies remain in Power
Transition literature, and how my research will develop the theory as a whole. I intend to show that the literature is conceptually strong and identifies working mechanisms both in case studies and large-N studies, but that the correlations that scholars produce are weak due to both insufficient antecedent conditions and narrow definitions of power and conflict. My research design will incorporate intuitively important antecedent conditions; provide wider, more detailed, and more accurate measurements of power and conflict; and observe a wide range of both the independent variable (IV) and dependent variable
(DV) to strengthen the test of the theory’s predictions. Furthermore, my research will allow me to identify the most significant antecedent conditions, such that policymakers may identify important ways to retard the risk of war.

4
LITERATURE REVIEW
Assumptions of the International Order
To assess what is known in Power Transition Theory, we should first review the fundamental assumptions of the theory, and then the conclusions that have been drawn in the last fifty years of literature. The generally accepted assumptions of Power Transition
Theory
7
are as follows.
1) States are the primary actors in international politics.
Power Transition models do not incorporate non-state actors. Rather, the theory assumes they are small forces in international politics. Recently, we have seen that this is a significant limit on the explanatory power of the theory (for example, terrorist cells have significant impact on international politics).
2) State leaders are rational actors in the international arena.
State leaders act in rational self-interest for their states. While this tendency does not mean that all state leaders are interested in power, it does mean that states that are dissatisfied with the international order will try to make themselves powerful enough to change it.
3) The international order is hierarchically organized under the leadership of the dominant power.
Unlike Balance of Power Theory, Power Transition does not assume that the international system is anarchy but that an organization and set of rules exists, created by the dominant power in the system.
7
These are voiced by Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980; DiCiccio, Levy, 1999, and others. DiCiccio and Levy, in particular, write these assumptions from the perspective of a 1999 review of the power transition literature.

5
4) The rules for interactions between entities in the international political system are similar to those for domestic systems.
Like within a domestic system (that is, a state), the ruling party rules largely by maintaining a monopoly of power and enforces its rules with force. Individual actors and coalitions lobby the ruling power to change policy.
5) Military and economic growth, especially industrialization, are the primary means of enhancing power.
Entities or polities increase their power, and thus their ability to reorder the system, by expanding their economic, industrial, and military might. This increase in power is a means for a dissatisfied country to achieve a more desirable international order.
6) Alliances are inflexible and thus are not the primary means of enhancing power.
While Balance of Power Theory assumes that alliances can be broken and re-formed to address a perturbation in the balance of power 8 , Power Transition Theory assumes that reforming alliances is difficult, due to ideological constraints, domestic politics, and the convergence of interests of two states in an alliance. Because breaking and reforming alliances is difficult, alliances are not the primary means through which a state accumulates power.
What makes Power Transition Theory consistently relevant is a further observation that the decline of hegemons is inevitable, due to the high costs of dominance. A dominant power must pay a high cost to sustain its dominance, including patrolling the seas, stationing troops in foreign countries, investing in new technologies,
8
See Walt, The Origins of Alliances, and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. These are probably the two most accessible texts on Balance of Power Theory.

6 and bearing the burden of enforcing the international order. Smaller states can free ride on these expenditures, allowing them to spend less to catch up 9 . As other states rise in relation to the hegemon, those that are not satisfied with the order consider unseating the old power using force
10
. Alternatively, the declining hegemon, unsure of the intentions and ambitions of the rising power, has the choice of either appeasing the rising power or fighting a preventative war to keep the rising power from achieving dominance
11
.
Explanatory Power
Many scholars have studied Power Transition Theory using large-N models of conflict and power to show an externally valid correlation between transitions in power and conflict
12
. Others have shown Power Transition mechanism at work using comparative case study and process-tracing methods
13
. Furthermore, scholars have tested
Power Transition Theory using different measurements of power and have shown it to be a statistically significant predictor of war; indeed, some have shown it to have predicted the majority of wars since the 17 th
century
14
. Case studies of Europe and Asia have explored the mechanisms by which power transitions lead to war. Kumar shows that
9
Kohout, 2003.
10
Kohout, 2003; Organski & Kugler, 1980
11
Levy, 1987 considers the conditions under which declining powers initiate preventative war, and uses empirical observations by military historians to show that preventative war is relatively common. Kim, Morrow, 1992; and Powell, 1996 develop the choice theory model of preventative warfare. They consider the cost/benefit choices that change over time—as the power gap shrinks, an equilibrium benefit point between appeasement and war emerges, after which war becomes a preferable option.
12
Chiu, 2003; Geller, 1993; Houweling, Siccama, 1988; Kim, 1992; Kim, Morrow, 1992;
Soysa, Oneal, Park, 1997 all conduct large-N studies.
13
Kim, 1989; Kumar, 2003; Lemke, 1997; Levy, 1987; Powell, 1996 all conduct case studies.
14
Kim, 1992 shows Power Transition Theory as applied to cases in the 17 th
and 18 th centuries. Kim, 1991; Geller, 1993; Houweling, Siccama, 1988 are large-N studies that show Power Transition Theory applying to wars of the 19 th and 20 th centuries.

7 conflict between Pakistan, India, and China over the last half-century has been largely governed by individual countries’ critical points in capability 15 , as well as power realignments, and suggests that joint mediating organizations be used to identify these points and to help these neighbors maintain peace during these tense periods
16
. Lemke shows that Power Transition theory can similarly be used to show when war will not happen—in the case of the Cold War, he uses Power Transition Theory to show why the
Soviet Union and the US never resorted to full-scale warfare. He tracks US versus Soviet economic and industrial power and shows that Soviet power never came closer than being half that of US power and, further, that the gap between US and Soviet power consistently increased over time. Because the power differential was always large and even growing, the Soviets and Americans never neared a power transition point and thus never went to war 17 . Nevertheless, while Power Transition Theory shows significant explanatory power, it contains “holes” and imperfections that have led to ongoing debates since it was introduced fifty years ago.
Debates on Theoretical Mechanisms
Debates in Power Transition Theory have sometimes focused on whether or not the theory has explanatory power
18
, but they more commonly raise questions regarding accuracy of assumptions, proper measurements, and the workings of some intermediate mechanisms in the explanatory process. One of the most fundamental debates in the literature of the theory centers on whether or not the relative rate of decline of the larger
15
Critical points represent the local peaks and valleys in a state’s absolute or relative power in a dyad or system.
16
Kumar, 2003.
17
Lemke, 1997.
18
Kohout, 2003 says that the empirical truth of Power Transition Theory is, as a whole, unclear, citing numerous examples of how he believes it fails.

8 power significantly changes the probability of war. As initially proposed by Organski,
Power Transition Theory could be summarized by stating that the probability of war is directly proportional to the relative rate of decline of the larger power (that is, relative to the other state in the dyad) and inversely proportional to the difference in total power at that moment
19
. Authors like Geller agree and use the theory in this form to demonstrate significant predictive power 20 . But Kim, in two papers, challenges the notion, showing that Power Transition Theory has higher predictive power when rate of change is not taken into account, by running control (traditional theory) and experimental (no rate-ofchange version) regressions on the same group of dyads
21
.
Additional debate on the nature of transition focuses around critical points. Not surprisingly, critical points occur when a state’s power has either peaked or bottomed and is turning around. There is debate both in how to measure critical points and whether they are significant. Scholars like Chiu have measured critical points with respect to percent share of total world power
22
, where others have measured them with respect to absolute power 23 . Both methods have shown to be effective, and some scholars believe that critical points are not only sufficient but also necessary concepts in Power Transition
19
Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1980, reiterate this.
20 Geller, 1993, shows that increased shifts towards equality decrease decision-making time, and increase the hope for both sides that force can be successfully employed.
Houweling, Siccama, 1988, use a model designed to challenge Organski’s findings to show that power transitions are statistically significant causes of war. Kumar, 2003, shows that higher-speed power realignments heighten crises in the Indian subcontinent.
21
Kim, 1989; and Kim, 1991 both use this technique to similar effect.
22
Chiu, 2003 looks at the critical points of major European nations over time and uses them as a strong predictor of war.
23
Both Kumar, 2003; and Lemke, 1997 use absolute power as the basis of measuring critical points in their papers. Kumar shows that war in the Indian subcontinent happens during large power shifts.

9
Theory 24 . While few other scholars have openly criticized or attacked this model, many have still simply failed to incorporate critical points into their models 25 . Other debates have shown similar one-sidedness.
Further debate centers on alliances. Organski and Kugler wrote that alliances, because of the difficulty with which one changes them, are not a primary means for a state to build power, and therefore do not play a significant role in the advent of war
26
.
Some scholars saw this lack of attention to alliances as one of Power Transition’s primary weaknesses 27 , but scholars like Kim have tried to tackle this issue and incorporate alliances into the Power Transition framework. Kim saw alliance transitions, similar to industrial or economic transitions, as strong motivators for war. If a small alliance neared power parity with a larger alliance, the risk of war increased. Especially important in alliance transitions, he said, was the fact that they could happen at a much higher rate of speed than industrial or economic transitions, increasing the crisis that both the growing and declining camp would face
28
. In these papers, Kim challenges the notion that
24
Houweling, Siccama, 1991 say that there is a synergistic effect between a period of power transition and a critical point for one of the powers in a dyad, together increasing the probability of war more than the sum of each alone. Chiu, 2003 says that critical points in the power of a state dyad are necessary (but not sufficient) for war between the states in the dyad. Lemke, 1997, and Kumar, 2003, do not openly defend their choice of using critical points in their models, but seem to accept it as a given element of the theory.
25
Many models, including Geller, 1993; Kim, 1989; Kim, 1991; Soysa, Oneal, Park,
1997, do not mention critical points in their models.
26
Organski, Kugler, 1980. Diciccio, Levy, 1999 confirm that inflexible alliances are a central assumption in power transition theory. Some models, like Geller, 1993; Kumar,
2003; and Lemke, 1997, silently agree by ignoring alliances in their models.
27
DiCiccio, Levy, 1999 say that ignoring alliances had been a serious problem for Power
Transition Theory, but that Kim has begun to address alliances in his work.
28
Kim, 1989; Kim, 1991, focus on alliance transitions in great power war, and show that they behave similarly to industrial power transitions. Kim, Morrow, 1992 suggest that

10 alliances should be stricken from the model—while they may not be entirely flexible, alliance shifts do happen, and certainly affect the decisions of state leaders in power transition moments.
Debates on Measurement
The final large debate in Power Transition Theory focuses around measurements.
In essence, tests of Power Transition center around a comparison between the power shifts between two nations in a dyad and the conflict that arises between them as a result.
However, proper measurement of these two concepts has proven a contentious question in the literature. Many papers that test the theory use the binary measurement of whether or not war occurred as their sole conflict measure
29
. However, scholars have begun to use conflict codes to create an ordinal measurement to achieve a finer, more precise measurement of conflict; Geller seems to have led the way in developing this method 30 .
While it is clear that a more precise measurement would lead to a tighter regression, it is not clear what the most proper measurement of conflict is. Similarly, many scholars debate what measure of power is best. Scholars have used GDP, military spending, industrialization, military strength, or some combination of these to encode for power. It may remain difficult to agree on a fundamental measure of power that indisputably captures the concept, but many scholars have tried novel means of power measurement both to better represent the concept and to better match the concept’s meaning to the ally support is key in the choice theory of declining and rising powers in power transition moments.
29
Examples of this include Chiu, 2003; Houweling, Siccama, 1988 and 1991; Kim, 1989;
Kim, Morrow, 1992; Kumar, 2003; Lemke, 1997 (particularly here, Lemke ignores the conflicts that arose between the US and USSR, despite the fact that war did not occur).
30 Geller, 1993 uses the LHI-LHS conflict code, which is simple and accessible.

11 mechanism in Power Transition Theory to which it corresponds. Houweling and Siccama use their own power code that they derive from military and industrial power
31
; Soysa,
Oneal, and Park use a combination of GNP and the “Correlates of War Composite 32 ,” and claim that the strength of a Power Transition Theory test depends largely on the strength of the measurement of power used. Kumar uses only GNP
33
, and Kim uses a specifically non-industrial economic and military power code to try to expand Power
Transition Theory’s explanatory power beyond the Industrial Age 34
. While Power
Transition’s explanatory power has grown, its central debates have remained largely unsettled, leaving a series of holes in the theory as a whole. I will attempt to remedy some of these issues in my own research.
THEORETICAL HOLES
What holes remain? There are probably more than those I list here, but I believe that the following four holes are the primary weaknesses of Power Transition Theory.
Some of these are already a part of the debate in the literature among scholars, but sadly, some of them are not. These holes in Power Transition Theory do not completely undermine its validity, but filling them will increase the predictive power of the theory.
Better measurements, along with better mechanisms, will allow policymakers to more
31
Houweling, Siccama, 1988 use the “ADD/CON LEADS model”
32 Soysa, Oneal, Park, 1997. The Correlates of War Composite is available online, for free: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm
. The composite combines population, urban population, steel and iron production, energy usage, military personnel, and military expenditure.
33
Kumar, 2003.
34
Kim, 1989 shows that industrial power is not a necessary measurement of power, and that combinations of GNP, and military personnel and spending, can bring significant success in a power transition model.

12 effectively use the theory to predict times of danger in the power cycles of dyads. In addition, these improvements may give policymakers tools to diminish the risk of oncoming Power Transition war.
Antecedent Conditions
The first hole in Power Transition Theory is that scholars seldom try to apply antecedent conditions to tests of the theory and therefore seldom have control factors for their tests 35 . Many scholars then admit mild disappointment in not finding a tighter regression when testing the theory
36
, even though they do not consider antecedent conditions that would account for outliers. Locating antecedent conditions will not only lead to a stronger Power Transition model, but may bring insights on how to amplify certain antecedent conditions to reduce the risk of war. While it is not feasible to control for all antecedent conditions, a few should always be controlled for:
1) Geographic distance.
While geographic separation bears less importance with time (as transportation and communication technology allow a state to better project its power), in the last four centuries, states with land or sea buffers between them had much less to worry about with respect to each others’ rise than those that do not. Furthermore, dominant states have a finite sphere of influence, which often does not encompass the entire globe. Given that, a rising power may not have to unseat the dominant one by force to change international politics in its favor.
35
It is debatable whether or not critical points are an antecedent condition in, or a fundamental element of, power transition theory.
36
Houweling, Siccama, 1988 lament that less than half of great power transitions lead to war. Kumar, 2003, admits that some critical points through power transitions in the
Indian subcontinent have, indeed, not led to war.

13
2) Ideology.
Power Transition Theory depends on a state being “dissatisfied” for war to become likely
37
. Given this, it is likely that two countries of vastly different ideologies are more likely to be dissatisfied with each other’s international order than two countries of similar ideology. We see some cases, like World War II, in which ideologically similar states fought together to establish a mutually agreeable international order, even if territory was not always the major issue at stake for alliance members. Ideology could explain the
Power Transition outlier of the rise of the US over Britain in the early 20 th
century.
3) State power
The current literature only gives Power Transition Theory credit to apply to great powers
38
. It is clear, then, that state power is an important antecedent condition. But as the literature currently maintains it, this antecedent condition is binary (great power or not). Kumar’s consideration of India, China, and Pakistan is an excellent start, but scholars have largely failed to create a framework under which Power Transition Theory explains the wars of less powerful (or “smaller”) states. While the United States may be the current hegemon of the world, its power does not prevent China, Russia, Iran, India,
Britain, Australia, and Brazil from having great influence in shaping the order of their local regions. Certainly they do, and Power Transition Theory should be able to incorporate these smaller states if it is going to be able to explain wars that happen outside of the “great power” sphere. If the ability to influence a regional order depends on a relationship between the state’s power in relation to its neighbors and the distance of those neighbors, then states that do not make Organski’s “great power” cutoff could
37
Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Diciccio, Levy, 1999.
38 Ibid.

14 experience Power Transition motivations, even if such motivations are not as strong as those for great powers. This antecedent condition may well have a linear, not binary, effect, and should be tested.
4) Trade Volume
Two states that share a high amount of trade or joint development may have strong economic motivators against going to war (and thus certainly closing trade). Given that the theory assumes that leaders are rational and concerned with the state’s self-interest, economic relations with rival states could be a major factor in the likelihood of war.
5) Diplomatic Exchange
Two otherwise equally hostile dyads are almost certainly less likely to go to war if they are in diplomatic communication, as the countries are exchanging feelings and ideas, as well as making efforts to negotiate.
Measurement Problems
The second hole in the theory is the binary measurement of conflict. Some scholars (as mentioned earlier) have begun to work on this problem, but the binary measure of “war or not war” should not remain the sole conflict measure in theoretical models. War is not the only form of conflict that can arise from transition—sanctions, military maneuvering, alliance-formation, and other types of conflict behavior can arise.
Clearly, if Power Transition Theory is to expand its explanatory power, it must first refine its measurement of conflict to be more precise and more accurate.
The third hole comes in the measurement of critical points. Scholars cannot agree on whether critical points are necessary or sufficient elements in the explanatory power of Power Transition Theory. Furthermore, there is great ambiguity in the definition of a

15 critical point. Surely, any country is frequently going to experience small downturns or upturns in its military and economic power. However, when are critical points actually significant enough to be considered significant motivators ? And even if we can find a means of measuring the magnitude of each critical point from the past, world leaders are unlikely to be able to measure with any accuracy how “significant” an upturn or downturn in power will be when it is just beginning to occur. Given the difficulty in perceiving significant critical points, how can scholars estimate their effect, and thus create an accurate measurement for them? This question needs to be explored.
The fourth hole in Power Transition Theory is that sea power is rarely considered in military-linked measurements of power. Many measurements focus on number of troops or raw military spending. But sea power often limits the ability of a state to project its power (and thus effectively command an international order). Without sea power, countries are only able to influence nearby states using ground-based might as a lever.
While in some cases a lack of sea power did not stop a local power transition war (like
Napoleon’s conquests in the19 th
century), a lack of sea power on the part of the rising power will certainly decrease the power transition tension between two states separated by ocean. Furthermore, command of the seas often means an ability not only to project troops, but also to influence trade routes and conduct more aggressive overseas diplomacy, helping the large state to better shape the international order in its favor
(Britain and the United States are excellent examples of this)
39
. Ultimately, sea power should be included in the measure of a state’s military power.
39
Barry Posen, “Comand of the Commons,” 2003, explains how assymetric sea and air power allow the United States to control the seas and enforce its order abroad.

16
FILLING THE HOLES
I intend to begin filling some of these holes with my work, using a different model to test Power Transition Theory concerning dyads across recent history. To address the issue of antecedent conditions, I intend to logically quantify the issues of geographical and ideological distance, inter-state trade, diplomatic exchange, and state power such that they can be included in power transition calculations. To measure both power and conflict between dyads, I intend use well respected, independent, third party coding systems that quantify dyadic conflict over time and aggregate power. Finally, my research will strive to include cases that span ranges of the independent and dependent variables of the study, to truly show whether power transition theory can effectively test both when war will happen and when it will not.
While these holes require work to fill, they do not mean that Power Transition
Theory as a whole does not have great potential to explain and predict. Now, fifty years into researching the theory, scholars should more aggressively attack the holes identified by debate in the literature, and also more aggressively seek out holes in the literature that need to be addressed. Power Transition Theory suffers from disagreement regarding both the mechanisms by which the theory operates and the means that best measure the independent (power and power transition) and dependent (conflict) variables of the theory. If these debates are settled by logically sound solutions that tighten the regressions of the two variables, the predictive and explanatory power of Power
Transition Theory will increase a great deal. Given such improvements, the theory could become a strong tool in international relations and foreign policy, helping policymakers

17 and researchers alike better identify periods of great risk in international relations. It might also point out the mechanisms by which war occurs, so that peacekeeping resources may better be used to prevent war and improve the quality of life of the citizens of the world.
A NEW MODEL OF POWER TRANSITION CONFLICT
Questions and Hypotheses
I propose to conduct empirical research to test the internal and external validity of a novel model of power transition conflicts. The new model will attempt to answer the following questions:
1) Can power transition theory predict the onset of war significantly better than the null hypothesis?
2) Are there identifiable antecedent conditions that significantly amplify and retard the risk of war in power transition moments?
3) Can states that are not “great powers” experience significant power transition motivations for war?
I hypothesize that not only will the model show that power transitions are a significant cause of conflict, but that “small” powers will experience power transition conflict as well (though to a lesser extent, scaled to their size). Furthermore, I hypothesize that the model will find that antecedent conditions, including the size of the states involved, the ideological difference between the states’ governments, the geographical difference between the states’ borders, the level of diplomatic exchange, and the volume of interstate trade with respect to GDP, significantly amplify or retard the

18 probability of war in a given power transition, and that the implementation of these outliers can explain outliers that appear in previous power transition models. The fundamental assumption that changes between this model and previous models is in allowing “small” powers to participate in the model, but novel quantifications and measurements of independent and dependent conceptual variables, as well as inclusion of a host of antecedent conditions, make this model unique. In the rest of this paper, I will introduce the model, explain how it describes power transition conflict, introduce the antecedent conditions in detail, explain my data collection process, and explain how I will analyze the data.
Regression Modeling
I will use a large-N regression model of semi-randomly selected dyads (that is, a pair of states) in the 19 th and 20 th centuries that express a full range of the independent variable (IV) and dependent variable (DV). Using a large-N regression will allow me to determine the extent to which an antecedent condition may have an effect, as well as provide my findings external validity. My independent variable is a measure of the strength of the power transition; my dependent variable is a measure of conflict. The regression method will be used to seek a linear relationship between the level of power transition and the level of conflict in the dyad. The model will appear as such:
CONFLICT = a + (b
1
*AC
1
+ … + b n
*ACn) + c*1/

POWER - d*

POWER/
 t
Where: a)
“CONFLICT” is a third-party ordinal code of conflict. b)
“a” is the y-intercept.

19 c)
“b
1
*AC
1
+ … + b n
*ACn” is the series of antecedent conditions with scaling factors. d)
“c*1/  POWER” is the inverse of the difference in power in the dyad with a scaling factor, measured in the year of interest. e) “d* 
POWER/
 t” is the rate of change of the difference in power in the dyad with a scaling factor, measured over the five years before (and including) the year of interest. We choose five years to represent long-term memory and planning, while hopefully ignoring old and dilapidated effects. I chose five years based on intuition and convenience. f)
“POWER” is a coded measurement of the capability of a given state to wage war; a composite of military, population, and industrial measurements.
The model, in its essence, captures power transition theory’s basic elements 40 . The last two monomials of the right side of the model are the basic independent variable, known herein as the “power transition metric”. As a greater difference in power decreases the risk of war, and a higher rate of decline in the difference in power increases the risk of war, these elements capture the primary motivating factors that make up the theory. The antecedent conditions will serve as controls to strengthen the regression; furthermore, we can identify which antecedent conditions have a significant impact on conflict motivation by comparing a model with the particular condition to that without, and also by placing the antecedent condition in the independent variable’s place, and using all other elements as controls.
40
DiCiccio, Levy, 1999; Organski, Kugler, 1980; Geller, 1993; all explicitly explain that a higher difference in power within the dyad decreases the risk of war, and a higher rate of decline of the relative power in the dyad increases the risk of war.

20
The model benefits from the following: First, it allows for modular placement of antecedent conditions. Second, it scales state size linearly to incorporate small states into the theory. Third, its use of ordinal conflict coding allows for a spread of the dependent variable, and a more accurate regression. Finally, the quantification of power into a scalar variable allows us to measure not only the difference in power, but also its derivative. All cases can be fit into a single regression, which has the potential to universalize the model.
DATA COLLECTION
Improved concept measurement gives this model additional distinct advantages over previous power transition conflict models. Better precision in measuring conflict, and better accuracy in measuring the nebulous concept of power will lead to improved accuracy in the model’s regression. Antecedent conditions will be measured in logical and simple ways to allow them to be elegantly integrated, and all measurements requiring judgment (that is, not intuitively apparent, like geographic distance) will be measured using independent, peer-reviewed coding indexes to eliminate any operational bias. Case selection will be semi-randomized as to allow for increased internal and external validity to the project.
Measuring Concepts
Measuring conflict will not simply be through use of a binary “war or not war” metric; I intend to use the Correlates of War project’s data on Militarized Interstate
Disputes (MID). The database encompasses all interstate conflicts from 1816-2001, and rates each conflict on a barometer of 1-5, where levels 1 and 2 incorporate non-violent conflict (but include threats or displays of force), level 3 incorporates medium-intensity

21 conflict, and 4 and 5 incorporate high-intensity conflict
41
. All dyads selected that do not exhibit any conflict on this barometer will score a zero. The barometer metric is a weighted combination of fatalities, highest intensity action, duration, reciprocation, and hostility level of the conflict. By using an ordinal code, I can increase the precision with which the model responds to changes in the power transition metric.
Power is also measured using a Correlates of War coding. The National Material
Capabilities dataset is an index (called Composite Index of National Capability or CINC) of energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population, covering all states from 1817-2001
42
.
The index improves upon cruder measurements of power used in many power transition conflict models—unlike GNP, military expenditure, or an index of military strength alone, the CINC incorporates not only a state’s initial military capabilities, but also its ability to sustain protracted war (with industrial and population measurements). Both considerations would surely rest in the minds of state leaders when making decisions to initiate conflict (or otherwise force their will on others), and so measuring both of them will better represent the power transition motivation for war that states face.
Geographic distance between two states can be measured by the shortest distance between two points on their respective borders. The software program ArcGIS includes a feature that can give the shortest distance between two borders, but its data only includes
41
The data and methodology for MID can be found online: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID310.html
42
the CINC dataset and methodology can be found similarly: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm

22 maps from 1992 and 2005
43
. That said, geographic distance can be measured more crudely (and less accurately) with a digital map with ruler features, like Google Earth 44 .
State “size” or power, as used for scaling in this model, can be represented well with its national war capability; such capability was used by Organski & Kugler to break states down into four hierarchical groups
45
. Therefore, to model size, we will simply use our previous power measurement, the Correlates of War CINC, and add the CINC scores of both states in the dyad.
Diplomatic exchange is measured by the volume of diplomatic notes exchanged by two states on the charge d’affaires, minister, and ambassador level; Correlates of War keeps an intermittent index (every 5 years, with some holes) of diplomatic exchange from
1817-2005
46
.
Trade volume, similarly, is measured by Correlates of War’s Bilateral Trade dataset, which measures the total sum imports of two countries in a dyad (from each other) every five years
47
.
Finally, political ideology will be measured simply—we will measure whether or not a country is a liberal democracy. We will presume that two liberal democracies are likely to be relatively accepting of each other’s proposed international order (and if they disagree, will talk it through), whereas non-democracies are more likely to go to war over
43
A description of the data is available at: http://www.rockware/com/catalog/pages/arcviewdata.html
44
See http://earth.google.com
45
In The War Ledger,
Organski & Kugler describe “great powers” as those having an ability to project their power beyond their borders, and “dominant states” as those with a great preponderance of “power resources” (including population, productivity, and political capacity) over most other states.
46
See: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Diplomatic/Diplomatic.html
47 See: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Affiliate%20Data/ITrade/ITrade.ZIP

23 the issue
48
. We will measure whether a country is a liberal democracy using the Polity IV scale. As per convention, we will determine that a state is a liberal democracy if it scores an 8 on the Polity IV scale
49
. If both countries in the dyad are liberal democracies, the dyad will score a zero; otherwise, it will score a 1. Furthermore, to reflect that any two allied states are likely to approve of a common international order, allied states will score a 1 in a separate monomial, where two states that are not allied will score a zero. These measurements are somewhat crude 50 , but generally capture the notion of dissatisfaction in international order that Organski mentions is key to the theory
51
.
Case Selection
Case selection is likely to be the most complex part of data collection. Totally random selection of dyads (that is, random selection of each country, and then date, separately) is likely to bring forth very few cases that are not both low in power transition metric and low in conflict. While this would be a representative sample, it would make the collection process extremely intensive if I were to strive for a significant number of interesting cases (that is, cases whose IV and DV are not both low). Therefore, semi-
48
This assumption is drawn off of Democratic Peace Theory; because liberal democracies agree on a liberal international order, two democratic states are unlikely to be dissatisfied enough of each other’s ideal order that they would go to war to change it.
Furthermore, two authoritarian states are unlikely to approve of each other’s international order, as authoritarian states tend not to benefit from another authoritarian state’s illiberal order, unless they are allied.
49
See: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/
50 There are certainly going to be exceptions to these binary rules, where two allied states may disapprove of each other’s international order (for example, the USSR and USA in
World War II), or two authoritarian states that are not allied may approve of each other’s order (for example, some non-allied Communist states under the Soviet umbrella during the Cold War).
51
In Organski, 1958, and Organski & Kugler, 1980, rising states need to be dissatisfied with the current international order for a high risk of war to occur—otherwise, they are unlikely to try and militarily unseat the current dominant power.

24 random selection of two case-groups will be employed: a regular random selection method will be employed for a “random” group, and a dyads of interest from the power transition literature will be selected from the “literature” group. Of these two groups, an equal number of cases will be randomly selected, and used in empirically testing the model. This method should achieve the internal validity of random case selection as well as the external validity achieved by a full range if independent and dependent variable appearance in the model. Case selection will be restricted to the period between 1817 and
2001, to better accommodate my central data sources.
The collection effort as a whole will be time-intensive, but simple. Extensive, accessible data capable of representing each central and antecedent concept will ensure that data collection will not be hindered by external factors or effects, besides time. But after an arduous case selection process, bringing forth data for each case in full will be tedious and time-consuming. Such consequences come from detail-oriented work, and should not prove a significant enough obstacle to risk the completion of the project.
ANALYSIS
Data analysis will lie in a series of simple regressions, each of which can show definitively whether each prediction made has validity or not. To test the original theory with the new model, we should regress a random selection of the “literature” dyad group and determine whether or not the correlation between power transition metric and conflict. Should the model fail this first test, one would be unlikely to write off the whole theory, but first, look for some flaw in the model, as most models of power transition

25 theory find significant correlations between the IV and DV
52
. Should the model be sound, its increased precision and accuracy will probably lead to a stronger regression (that is, higher correlation and lower standard error), and bring greater validation to the significance of the theory.
Incorporating antecedent conditions as controls will make the regression even stronger—unless a given antecedent condition has no effect on motivation for conflict.
Each antecedent condition can be tested for significance by making it the independent variable and using all other elements as controls. This will prove to be one of the more interesting results of the model, as it will be able to identify such antecedent conditions to the international relations theory for the first time. My prediction that such antecedent conditions have a significant effect on the power transition motivation for war would be invalidated if the regressions of each condition did not lead to significant correlations.
We can test the final prediction, that “small” states experience power transition motivations by incorporating both the “literature” and “random” groups into the model,
(noting that the “size” antecedent condition, scaling for state power, will be incorporated, as well as the other controls). Should this regression not bring forth a correlation with significance near that of the “literature” group alone, then the prediction is invalidated: small states will experience a decline in power transition motivation for conflict that is not linearly related to size. A confirmation of the prediction, though, will be the second particularly interesting finding of the model, should it happen. If we find that Power
Transition Theory scales to the relative power of the states involved, then we will show that the theory does not only apply to Organski’s “great powers,” but to all states. Such a
52
Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Geller, 1993; Kim , 1992, and De Soysa,
Oneal, Park, 1997, all show significant

26 finding would bring about a significant paradigm shift in the basic assumptions of power transition theory 53 , and open power transition theory’s explanatory power to all interstate conflict.
This model is not designed to specifically tackle the validity of each causal process
54
, but alternative explanations for positive regressions should nonetheless be considered. As for reverse causation, it is rather easy to intuit that the onset of conflict itself is not causing the convergence of concept before such an onset. While anticipation of conflict is certainly a motivating factor for a state to increase its capabilities, such a story is incorporated into the theory
55
. The other general explanation for such a correlation would be a third, independent cause of both power transition metric (which is, in general, the relative growth of one state over another) and conflict. An economic point of view might suggest that asymmetric economic growth between two states would cause animosity between the two states, and thus a heightened motivation for war; the asymmetric growth of one state’s capabilities would only be coincidental. Regressing the difference of a dyad’s GNP or GDP growth with our conflict measure, and seeing whether the correlation is significant could test such an explanation. I find this intuitively unlikely, but it may well be worth testing in the future.
53
The theory currently assumes that power transition motivation only occurs to states in the “dominant” and “great power” places in the hierarchy.
54
The aforementioned case studies of power transition theory have gone to great lengths to validate and explain its causal mechanisms, and I will not attempt to re-invent the wheel on the matter.
55
By both assuming that capability increase is the primary means through which a state gains power and security, and also assuming that rising, dissatisfied states are motivated to use their power to unseat larger powers that create the international order, it is easy to see a story of a rising state’s ambitious intent feeding a sense of inevitability of war

27
CONCLUSION
It should first be noted that this model does not consider alliance shifts or critical points as the model is currently proposed. The modularity of the model should allow these two concepts to be incorporated should they be operationalized and quantified.
Since many power transition papers and scholars find these two concepts to not only be significant, but critical, parts of the theory, future research along these lines should make great efforts to incorporate both into a similar large-N model. But this model has the potential to make significant advances in power transition theory. First, incorporation of small states into the model could bring about a paradigm shift in the theoretical literature, and significantly expand the explanatory power of the theory to all interstate war.
Second, identification of the existence and significance of antecedent conditions can not only improve the explanatory power of the theory and create general answers to outlier questions, but also lead to a number of tools for policymakers to use to retard the risk of war in a likely power transition conflict.
The model I intend to use will lead to a simple data-collection process that will encourage the use of many semi-randomly-selected cases, despite being somewhat timeconsuming. The case selection methods and use of independent coding remove biases and strengthen the validity of the empirical tests of the model. The quantification of key power transition concepts and antecedent conditions will lead to elegant regression tests of my predictions, and largely unambiguously answer the question of their validity.
Because of its simplicity, internal and external validity, and potential to give scholars and policymakers alike answers to critical questions, I believe this new model of power transition conflict will be a valuable addition to the field of political science.

28
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