THE BRICS AND R2P:
CONTESTATION, REINTERPRETATION AND NORM
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Andrew Garwood-Gowers (QUT)
Overview
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BRICS’ perspectives on R2P
The BRICS and pillar III during the Libyan and Syrian crises
Recent normative initiatives:
- Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP)
- China’s semi-official “Responsible Protection” (RP)
An assessment of RP’s significance
Shifts in global power and the promotion of non-Western
normative preferences :
- implications for normative development in the
international system
- implications for R2P’s future development and
implementation
Central arguments
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All five BRICS generally comfortable with pillars I
and II but cautious about coercive pillar III measures
Controversy over pillar III implementation reflects
deeper contestation over R2P’s content, scope and
its implications for international order
Brazil’s RwP and China’s RP initiatives represent
more restrictive interpretations of pillar III
Global shifts in power point to the emergence of a
more diverse, pluralistic international order
Recent practice on pillar II measures suggests pillar
III controversy has not “infected” the whole of R2P
R2P - a “complex norm”
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A multi-faceted political concept based on existing
principles of international law
 Evolution: 2001 ICISS to 2005 WSOD paras 138, 139
 3 pillar structure (SG 2009 R2P Report):
- pillar I: protection responsibilities of the state
- pillar II: international assistance and capacitybuilding
- pillar III: timely and decisive response
Pillar III coercive responses operate through existing UN
Security Council mechanisms on a “case-by-case” basis
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BRICS’ perspectives on R2P
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Similar but not identical perspectives on R2P
 Influenced by historical, cultural and political values and
experiences, as well as national interests in specific cases
 In general, BRICS emphasise primacy of pillars I & II, with
cautious approach to non-consensual pillar III measures
 Both pragmatic and normative concerns over pillar III:
- risk of abuse by powerful (Western) states
- emphasis on regional organizations
- scepticism about the efficacy of military force
- preference for non-coercive civilian protection
measures (e.g. dialogue)
Pluralist resistance to an assertive, liberal vision of R2P
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BRICS and R2P in Libya and Syria
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All 5 BRICS were on UN Sec Council in 2011 – a window into
the future of civilian protection?
Libyan crisis suggested possibility of a unified BRICS position
(despite SA’s affirmative vote on res 1973)
But on Syria the BRICS gradually splintered into 2 sub-groups:
- RC (4 double vetoes)
- IBSA (more flexible, unpredictable stances)
BRICS’ concerns:
- externally-facilitated “regime change”
- unbalanced nature of draft resolutions
- use of force as a humanitarian protection strategy
Brazil’s RwP: norm entrepreneurship
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RwP concept note:
- decision-making guidelines
- accountability mechanisms
Initial reactions – criticism, hostility from Western powers
and RC
Refinement:
- retreat from “strict sequencing” of
pillars to “prudential sequencing”
- apparent narrowing to exclusive UN Sec Council
authorisation
2012 UN Sec Gen R2P report – detailed discussion of
RwP
China and R2P
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3 main phases
1.
2001-2005
2.
2005-2011
3.
2011-present
Various classifications of China’s position towards R2P
– “rejectionist” (Claes) vs. “cautious supporter”
(Quinton-Brown)
- a “dichotomous” view, depending on which pillar of
R2P is discussed
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China’s “Responsible Protection” (RP)
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Developed by Ruan Zongze, vice-president of China
Institute for International Studies (CIIS) in mid-2012
 Dual purposes:
- an explanation of China’s position on Syria
- distinctive Chinese contribution to the normative debate
 How “official” is the concept?
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CIIS is the think-tank linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CIIS hosted an international conference to discuss RP
(October 2013)
Some references to “responsible protection” by officials
Not yet formally adopted by China
RP: elements 1 & 2
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First, the object of RP must be made clear. Of course, it is the
people of the target country and peace and stability of the
relevant region. The objects of protection must be the innocent
people, not specific political parties or armed forces. Only
such kind of protection is rightful and well-intentioned and is
protection in its true sense
Second, the legitimacy of the “protection” executors must be
established. The government of a given state bears the
primary responsibility of protecting its citizens. Besides that,
the UN Security Council is the only legitimate actor to perform
this duty while no countries have such a right, let alone the
legal status to do so
RP: element 3
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Third, the means of “protection” must be strictly limited.
The prerequisite for invoking protection should be
exhaustion of diplomatic and political means of solution.
Non-military means like diplomatic efforts, though timeconsuming, produce long-lasting results with lesser side
effects. On the contrary, using military force at every
turn would not only cause huge civilian casualties but
also bring severe damage to infrastructure and
downturn of national economy in the country or region
to be “protected”, eventually aggravating humanitarian
disasters and plunging the object of “protection” into
protracted and distressful post-crisis reconstruction.
RP: elements 4, 5 & 6
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Fourth, the purpose of “protection” must be defined. Just as
doctors should not kill patients by means of treatment, the
purpose of protection must be to mitigate humanitarian
catastrophe. It is absolutely forbidden to create greater
humanitarian disasters because of protection, let alone to use
protection as a means to overthrow the government of a given
state
Fifth, the “protectors” should be responsible for the post“intervention” and post-“protection” reconstruction of the state
concerned. They should absolutely not smash and go, leaving a
terrible mess to the country and people subject to “protection”
Sixth, the United Nations should establish mechanisms of
supervision, outcome evaluation and post factum accountability
to ensure the means, process, scope and results of “protection”
Comparing ICISS/RwP/RP
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Principle/
guideline
ICISS 2001
Report
R2P Brazil’s RwP
Just cause
"unwilling or unable"
prevent or halt large
scale
loss
of
life/ethnic cleansing
Right
intention
"primary
purpose
must be… to halt or
avert
human
suffering"
Last resort
Force only after nonmilitary
measures
have
been
"explored"
Proportional
means
scale
of
military
action should be
minimum necessary to
achieve
protection
aims
N/A (but assumes
2005 WSOD standard
of "manifestly failing"
with respect to 4 mass
atrocity crimes)
N/A (but implied by
requirement
that
military action be
“limited
to
the
objectives established
by
the
Security
Council”)
exhaust all peaceful
means;
logical
sequencing of 3 pillars
(later
relaxed
to
require
“prudential
sequencing”)
use of force must
produce “as
little
violence and instability
as possible”
China’s Responsible Protection (RP)
N/A (but assumes 2005 WSOD
standard of "manifestly failing" with
respect to 4 mass atrocity crimes)
Element 1: "the objects of protection
must be the innocent people" and
"peace and stability of the region"
Element 4: "the purpose of protection
must be to mitigate humanitarian
catastrophe"
Element 3: "exhaustion of diplomatic
and political means of solution"
Element 3: "the means of protection
must be strictly limited”
Comparing ICISS/RwP/RP
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Principle/
guideline
ICISS 2001
Report
Reasonable
prospects
"reasonable chance of
success"; "consequences
of action not likely to
be worse than the
consequences
of
inaction"
“under no circumstance
can it [military force]
generate more harm than
it was authorized to
prevent”
Right authority
authorization by UNSC
or
in
exceptional
circumstances
by
UNGA/regional
organization
N/A
authorization by UNSC
or UNGA (under Uniting
for Peace resolution)
Monitoring
mechanism
Postintervention
responsibility
R2P Brazil’s RwP
“The responsibility to
rebuild… provide full
assistance
with
recovery, reconstruction
and reconciliation”
“Enhanced
Security
Council procedures are
needed to monitor and
assess the manner in
which resolutions are
interpreted
and
implemented”
N/A
China’s Responsible Protection (RP)
Element 1: must consider "peace and
stability of the region"
Element 3: avoid military force
“aggravating humanitarian disasters”
Element 4: "absolutely forbidden to
create greater humanitarian disasters
because of protection"
Element 2: "UN Security Council is the only
legitimate actor to perform this duty"
Element 6: “establish mechanisms of
supervision, outcome evaluation and post
factum accountability”
Element 5: “the protectors should be
responsible for the post-intervention and
post-protection reconstruction”
The significance of RP
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Like RwP, RP seeks to provide safeguards against abuse
of pillar III
Resurrects decision-making criteria or guidelines from
earlier R2P proposals (ICISS, High Level Panel etc.)
Is RP a valuable normative contribution OR “a mere
spoiling operation with a more sophisticated face”?
(Evans, Daily Star, 28/10/2013)
RP’s elements are framed more restrictively than RwP
and ICISS guidelines
Nevertheless RP remains significant:
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Deeper insights into Beijing’s current position
How China views itself and its role in the world
RP as norm entrepreneurship?
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Internal debate about how active China should
be in contributing to R2P’s normative
development
 RP is explicitly framed as China “contributing
its public goods to the international community”
 Conference on RP in Beijing in October 2013
 Remains unclear whether China is seeking to
assume a more prominent role as a norm
entrepreneur
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Rising powers and normative
development
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RwP and RP illustrate increasing willingness of
emerging powers to assert their own normative
preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global
governance
Implications:
- a need for the West to adapt to and accommodate
non-Western perspectives
- towards Burke-White’s “multi-hub” system of
international law?
A more diverse, pluralistic international order?
R2P in the future?
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Risk of pillar III controversy “infecting” the whole R2P
concept? (Gareth Evans; Justin Morris)
Evidence of UN Security Council and Gen Assembly practice
since Libya indicates greater use of pillar I and II e.g.. Cote
d’Ivoire, Yemen, Mali, CAR, South Sudan (Bellamy, 2014)
“Norm resistance spin-off effect” – pillar III contestation has
strengthened support for, and implementation of, pillar II
- precedent in Bush Doctrine debate? Rejection of
claims to pre-emptive self-defence produced stronger
consensus on narrower right of anticipatory selfdefence
The international community’s role likely to involve pillar II
measures, rather than coercive pillar III action