U.S. Department of Transportation
Office of Inspector General
Dulles Metrorail
Safety Complaint
National Fraud Awareness Conference
on Transportation Infrastructure Programs
July 27, 2010
Rodolfo Pérez, P.E.
Engineer Advisor, USDOT OIG
Dulles Metrorail Corridor Project
• The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) is
constructing a 23-mile extension of the existing Metrorail
system, from Arlington County to Loudon County in northern
Virginia in two Phases:
• Phase 1 of the Project will include five new stations for the
first 11.7 miles of the extension. Construction began in March
of 2009 and is now schedule for completion in 2014.
• Phase 2 is still in preliminary engineering. As each phase is
completed, they will be operated by the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
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The “Silver Line”
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Phase 1 Dulles Metrorail Project
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Prior OIG Involvement
• In July 2007, we issued an audit report that reported
on risk indicators that warranted FTA’s close monitoring
of the Dulles Project, including the project sponsor’s,
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA),
lack of experience in transit construction.
• We stressed the need for vigilant oversight to prevent
the cost increases, schedule delays, and construction
quality problems that we had observed on other
projects with similar risk indicators.
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Complaint filed with the OIG Hotline
• In September 2008, a complainant brought to the
OIG’s attention his allegation that eleven 30-year
old foundations to be used in the project were
not sufficiently tested for structural safety.
• MWAA and its design-build contractor, Dulles
Transit Partners (DTP), plan to use these existing
foundations to support the elevated track that
will span part of I-66 and merge with existing
Metrorail track near the West Falls Church
Station.
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After 30 Years, the Existing
Foundations are Buried Underground
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Only One Pier of the Existing
Foundations is Visible
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New Elevated Guideway Alignment
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EXISTING
Buried Foundation
The existing foundations must
carry a new elevated guideway
with railcars and passengers
throughout the useful life of the
project
Elevated Guideway
TO BE BUILT
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Safety complaint to the OIG Hotline
• The complainant alleged the Project planned
to use eleven 30-year old bridge foundations
without sufficient and reliable information to
verify their capacity to carry the loads and
their long-term durability.
• No allegation of fraud but the allegation raised
questions about the sufficiency of the testing
for the existing foundations.
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Safety Complaint Explained
• During preliminary engineering and early design stages, one visible existing
pier was to be used in combination with new piers. Its use was contingent
upon load test results (see Elevation Drawing).
• As the project advanced into final design, additional buried pile
foundations were discovered. DTP decided then to use 10 more of these
existing foundations in lieu of building new ones. The complainant alleged
that DTP decided to reuse the foundations without:
– Verifying that all 11 foundations could carry the required loads and
their piles driven as planned.
– Verifying the physical condition of the piles at all 11 foundations, to
assess whether any damage occurred during 30 years in the ground
that could reduce their service life.
• Insufficient verification can result in increased life-cycle costs or, in the
worst case, cause the collapse of the elevated structure.
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100 % Preliminary Engineering Drawings / 30% Final Design Drawings
Need for Load Capacity Verification Indicated
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Safety Complaint Explained
• Complicating the issue, DTP could not locate any original
construction records for the existing piles like as-built
drawings, pile driving logs, other tests.
• Only some design drawings were found, but design
drawings do not always represent as-built conditions.
• In the absence of construction records, the most reliable
method to determine the safety of the piles is to conduct a
comprehensive testing plan including pile load tests,
inspections and measurements of the piles physical
conditions (e.g. steel lost to corrosion) to assess their
durability.
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The First 8 Months
• We evaluated the merit of the allegations and
then referred the hotline complaint to FTA for
action in November 2008.
• In June 2009, FTA responded and asked the
OIG to “close the safety complaint” based on
assurances from MWAA and DTP that the piles
“were built according to as-built plans.”
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FTA Responses to the Hotline
• The initial FTA response did not resolve all our
concerns (no evidence of a testing plan for all
foundations) and the OIG requested additional
follow-up in July 2009.
• FTA provided a more comprehensive response in
September 2009, after having tasked their
oversight consultant (PMOC) to review the new
information provided by the grantee. However,
some of the new information provided
contradicted FTA’s initial response.
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Discrepancies with FTA Responses
• We found that there are no as-built drawings of the existing foundations,
contradicting FTA’s initial statements.
• We found that load tests were done and corrosion measurements taken at
two foundations, contradicting initial FTA statements of just one location
tested and limited visual inspection.
• The corrosion measurements taken called for additional tests to assess the
remaining service life of the piles, and for corrosion protection measures.
• FTA did not mention in its initial response that WMATA expected 100 years
of service life for existing the piles.
• After reviewing the new information, the PMOC recommended additional
testing of the existing foundations, contradicting FTA’s initial request for
closure.
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OIG Management Advisory
• Additional action was warranted to the
resolve the contradictions and issues that
emerged from the initial response.
• As a result, the OIG issued a Management
Advisory to the FTA Administrator on October
22, 2009.
“A potentially serious safety issue regarding the adequacy of
foundations at a segment of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project
(Dulles Project) remains unresolved nearly a year after we first
brought it to the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) attention.”
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FTA Takes Action: A Flurry of
Letters follows
• On October 2, 2009 FTA issued a letter to MWAA requesting a
resolution to their PMOC’s recommendation for additional testing.
• After a flurry of letters between MWAA and FTA, FTA was
unsatisfied with the MWAA response to the safety concerns.
• The FTA Administrator issued a strong letter to MWAA on
November 3, 2009, requesting that as Federal grantee – MWAA
“take ownership of the testing plan” rather than just forwarding
DTP’s proposal.
• On December 2, 2009, MWAA responded to FTA with a
comprehensive testing plan for the existing foundations. FTA
accepted the plan on January 8, 2010 and said they will review its
execution.
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Following discussions with the complainant, the
press reported the issue
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OIG Review Continues
• On November 19, 2009, the OIG announced
an audit to:
1) Evaluate the effectiveness of FTA’s
oversight of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail
Project.
2) Assess potential safety concerns.
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OIG Review Continues
• We are evaluating the efficacy of the PMOC as
FTA’s resource to oversee the execution of the
testing plan to verify the piles’ load capacity
and durability for the next 100 years.
• We are also evaluating the efficacy of the
PMOC’s oversight of the Dulles Project as a
whole including how it advises FTA on the
project schedule, costs, fleet procurement,
and other potential safety risks.
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OIG Review Continues
• We are paying close attention to the testing
activities and tests results.
• We are also reviewing other project issues
such as costs, schedule, and fleet
procurement.
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Final Design Drawings / Issued For Construction Permit
No Load Tests Indicated
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In Conclusion
• The OIG hotline works! Structural safety tests
that otherwise would not have been done are
currently underway.
• Proactive Federal oversight ensures the safety
of infrastructure projects.
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Thanks for your attention.
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