EPR-Public Communications
L-01
Case Studies
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Learning objectives
• Review past nuclear and radiological
emergencies that have been of public and
media interest.
IAEA
Chernobyl accident – Overview
• Unit 4 reactor on April 26th,
•
•
•
•
•
1986;
Low power test with safety
systems bypassed;
Sudden uncontrollable power
surge;
Temperature increased;
Violent explosion and 1000
tonne lid blown off;
Fuel, core components and
other debris were released
into the environment.
IAEA
Chernobyl – Dose ranges (workers)
• 134 of the 600 emergency workers
showed signs of Acute Radiation
Syndrome (ARS)
Dose Range
(Sv)
Number of Emergency
Workers on-site
Number of Deaths
0.8 - 2.1
41
0
2.2 – 4.1
50
1
4.2 – 6.4
22
7
6.5 – 16
21
20
IAEA
Goiânia, Brazil (1987)
• Goiânia: the capital
of Goiâs State,
Brazil;
• Population:
approximately
1 million;
• The emergency
happened in a poor
section of the city,
in an old abandoned
radiotherapy facility.
IAEA
Goiânia
Rio de
Janeiro
São Paulo
Goiânia, Brazil (1987)
IAEA
Goiânia – Abandoned radiotherapy
clinic
IAEA
Goiânia – Monitoring people for
contamination
 Established area for public
monitoring;
 Public found out through
rumours - no public
announcement made;
 Many people
(unnecessarily) – 112,000
went to be monitored;
 Strained limit resources.
IAEA
Goiânia – City contaminated
Significant contamination
0.5 km
IAEA
Goiânia – City contaminated
• 730 workers;
• Houses:
• 41 evacuated;
• 6 demolished.
• Public places
decontaminated: 58.
IAEA
Goiânia – Communicating with the
public
• No early public announcements were made;
• People found out about the emergency by
rumours;
• This increased public concern and confusion
about what actions they should take.
IAEA
London polonium incident
• On 3 November, Mr. Litvinenko was
admitted to a north London general
hospital with vomiting, diarrhoea and
abdominal pain;
• His condition deteriorated and he was
transferred to a specialist hospital in
London;
• Mr. Litvinenko said to a broadcast
interviewer: “I had defected from a
foreign security service and I had
been poisoned.”
IAEA
London polonium incident
• Police requested the assistance of their scientific
advisers and the HPA in identifying what could
have caused the clinical picture.
• Mr. Litvinenko had a significant quantity of Po-210
in his body!
• HPA indicated that an intake in excess of 1 GBq of
Po-210 would have been required to explain the
clinical course.
IAEA
London polonium incident – Public
health response strategy
• HPA developed key objectives for the public health
response:
• To prevent further exposure of the public:
• work closely with the police to aid their criminal investigation and
identify sites and individuals that might be contaminated;
• develop an environmental monitoring strategy to support this;
• assess and advise on public access and remediation of
contaminated sites.
• To assess risks to those potentially exposed:
• develop and implement risk assessment criteria;
• offer, implement and report on personal monitoring though urine
analysis.
• To provide advice and reassurance to those exposed
and the general public.
IAEA
Polonium contamination
• More than 40 locations (hospitals, hotels,
offices, restaurants, bars, transportation)
were identified that had to be monitored and
assessed;
• HPA co-ordinating the monitoring
programme using resources from several
organisations across the UK;
• At the peak there was 70 monitoring staff
working in shifts.
IAEA
London polonium incident – Public
health response 1
• On 25 November, HPA requested to the
media asking members of the public who
were in specific potentially contaminated
locations in a specified period to call NHS
Direct (a 24-hour National Health Service
helpline);
• A questionnaire was used to assist the
collection of key information from callers.
IAEA
London polonium incident – Public
health response 2
NHS Direct : 3,837 calls
questionnaire
HPA follow-up : 1,844
Public Health Team
Assigned to each of the main locations and site specific risk
assessments and questionnaires developed to identify those at
risk and requiring monitoring using an alpha spectrometry
technique on 24 hour urine samples.
Clinical Assessment Team
Triaged individuals identified from any source who reported
symptoms which could be associated with radiation effects, or
were seriously concerned.
IAEA
London polonium incident –
Individual monitoring programme
• HPA developed a monitoring technique and
protocols;
• Urine samples from 752 persons:
• 139 individuals above reporting level;
• The highest assessed dose was for the family
member caring for Mr. Litvinenko at about
100mSv.
• 664 individuals from 52 countries and
territories were also monitored:
• 13 individuals above reporting level.
IAEA
London polonium incident –
Communicating with the public and media
• HPA announced in the first press conference on 24
November:
• Test on Mr. Litvinenko had detected a significant
quantity of Po-210;
• The nature of alpha radiation and how Po-210 was only
a hazard it if was ingested inhaled or absorbed through
wounds;
• The proactive monitoring that was being carried out at
the locations identified by the police.
• HPA released press statements each day in the
weeks as well as responding to thousands of
media calls and ensuring the website was up-todate with information.
IAEA
TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident

Biological effects
Acute and/or late

Environmental effects

Psychological effects

Social problems
Economical
IAEA
20
TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident
“Internal Contamination
Induces Brain Damage
- from Chernobyl
Experience”
“20 years later in Japan,
Malformation, Curious
Illness, Mental
Retardation”
IAEA
21
TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident
People are confused?!
What is good ?
What is wrong ?
“Information on Radiation Effects”
based on their own ideas
“Many Experts”
IAEA
22