Identifying and Preventing Healthcare-Associated Infections: A Global Challenge Kate Ellingson, PhD Epidemiologist, Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion Centers for Disease Control and Prevention October 11, 2012 Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion Healthcare-Associated Infection (HAI) Types HAI Pneumonia Deviceassociated infections (subtypes) Ventilatorassociated (VAP) Urinary tract infection Bloodstream infection Catheterassociated (CAUTI) Central lineassociated (CLABSI) Target of many prevention efforts Picture courtesy S Schrag http://www.lightstalkers.org/images/show/305512 http://www.featurepics.com/FI/Thumb300/20090428/Foley-Bag-1166380.jpg Surgical Site Infection Others HAI: Pathogens Reservoirs Skin: Staphylococcus aureus Water/environment: gram-negative organisms (e.g., Klebsiella spp., E. coli, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Acinetobacter spp.) Antimicrobial resistance Severely limits treatment options Methicillin-resistance Extended-spectrum β lactamase production (E. coli, Klebsiella spp.) Multidrug resistance Objectives Provide overview of the current national landscape of HAI activities Provide justification for a global approach Worldwide burden of HAIs Global proliferation of invasive healthcare Antimicrobial resistance Describe examples of CDC’s international HAI efforts Discuss key elements of a responsible global approach to HAI prevention moving forward HAIs Under the National Spotlight Paradigm shift in past decade: HAIs increasingly viewed as preventable Prevention research demonstrates dramatic decreases in HAI rates with implementation of evidence-based practices Consumers mobilized, demanding action and transparency States begin to pass laws mandating reporting of HAIs First HHS Action Plan finalized in 2009 HAIs become CDC Winnable Battle $39 million to state health departments to build local capacity for HAI surveillance and prevention AHRQ funds national prevention efforts CMS invokes payment non-reimbursement incentives for hospital-acquired conditions and incentives for reporting Partnership for Patients established Stakeholder Landscape: Societies, organizations, and initiatives Federal agencies and programs Increasing Demands, Need for Coordination State Health Department Local Universities State Hospital Associations State QIO Local APIC Chapters State Public Health Labs State survey and certification Vision: Coordinated Public Health Approach Infrastructure Prevention Collaborative Coordination Other NonGovernmental Initiatives Surveillance HAI expertise Outbreak response Survey/Cert PH Lab Standardized Metrics CDC’s DHQP: www.cdc.gov/hai Response Prevention Surveillance Local Capacity Need for a Global Approach Global burden: HAIs lead to excess morbidity, mortality, and healthcare costs worldwide Proliferation of invasive healthcare internationally without commensurate infection prevention infrastructure Antimicrobial resistance: everyone’s problem Global Burden Healthcare-associated infection (HAI) in the United States (2002) 1/20 patients 1.7 million HAIs 99,000 deaths Developing countries Limited data from low income countries Estimated prevalence: at least three times greater than United States Klevens et al Public Health Reports 2007. Allegranzi et al Lancet 2011. International Nosocomial Infection Control Consortium 422 ICUs in 36 countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe used National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) definitions for device-associated infections Similar amount of device use in INICC units as in US hospitals Rosenthal et al. Am. J. Infection Control. 2012 . Why might there be more HAIs in middle- and low-income countries? Less infection prevention and control infrastructure Training lacking in general infection control Improper use of equipment (e.g., reuse of single-use equipment) Insufficient reprocessing Less surveillance, awareness, and targeted prevention efforts Proliferation of invasive medical care across the globe Large dialysis organizations expanding across boarders Increase in medical tourism Increase in Incidence and Prevalence of ESRD Internationally USRDS 2009 Report. Published 2011 . Antimicrobial Resistance Studies suggest that approximately ½ of antimicrobial use in US healthcare settings is inappropriate Rising resistance leads to decreasing treatment options and increasing cost Inappropriate prescribing contributor to C. difficile epidemic National Estimates of US Short-Stay Hospital Discharges with C. difficile, National Inpatient Sample Number of Discharges 400,000 350,000 Any listed 300,000 Primary 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year Elixhauser, A. (AHRQ), and Jhung, MA. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Clostridium Difficile-Associated Disease in U.S. Hospitals, 1993–2005. HCUP Statistical Brief #50. April 2008. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. And unpublished data http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb50.pdf Gram Negative Pathogens Reported to NHSN Jan 2006- Sept Overall 2007 CLABSI CAUTI VAP SSI percentage (rank) E. coli 10% (5) 3% 21% 5% 10% P. aeruginosa 8% (6) 3% 10% 16% 6% K. pneumoniae 6% (7) 5% 8% 18% 3% A. baumannii 3% (9) 2% 1% 8% .6% Hidron A, et al. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008; 29: 996-1011 Klebsiella Pneumoniae Carbapenemase KPC confers resistance to all b-lactams including extended-spectrum cephalosporins and carbapenems Is the predominant mechanisms of carbapenem resistance in Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) in the US. Mortality-associated with Resistance OR 3.71 (1.97-7.01) OR 4.5 (2.16-9.35) Patel et al. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008;29:1099-1106 Geographic Distribution of KPCProducers: 2006 Patel, Rasheed, Kitchel. 2009. Clin Micro News MMWR MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Jun 25;59(24):750. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Sep 24;59(37):1212. CDC, unpublished data Geographic Distribution of KPCProducers: 2010 Patel, Rasheed, Kitchel. 2009. Clin Micro News MMWR MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Jun 25;59(24):750. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Sep 24;59(37):1212. CDC, unpublished data Novel Mechanisms Conferring Carbapenem Resistance Since 2009, in addition to KPC-producing Enterobacteriaceae, several different metallo-βlactamase-producing strains have been identified New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM) Verona integron-encoded metallo-β-lactamase (VIM) imipenemase (IMP) metallo-β-lactamase Enzymes are more common in other areas of the world In United States generally been found among patients who received medical care in countries where these organisms are known to be present. Geographic Distribution of KPCProducers: 2012 KPC KPC, NDM KPC, NDM, VIM KPC, NDM, VIM, IMP Patel, Rasheed, Kitchel. 2009. Clin Micro News MMWR MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Jun 25;59(24):750. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2010 Sep 24;59(37):1212. CDC, unpublished data Novel Enzymes: Many Related to Healthcare Exposure Outside US To date CDC has confirmed 14 NDM-producing Enterobacteriaceae ( all but 1 had received care outside the U.S. 3 IMP-producing Enterobacteriaceae 3 VIM-producing Enterobacteriaceae (2/3 had received care outside the US) 2 OXA-48 producing Enterobacteriaceae (both with healthcare exposure outside the US) Spread of novel resistance mechanisms is bidirectional between US and other countries Worldwide Distribution of KPC • Walsh. 2010. International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents Prevention http://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/cre-toolkit/ How Should we Approach HAIs Globally? International Efforts Abroad Two case examples: Surveillance and prevention in Egypt Infection Control training and infrastructure building in Kenya Both countries CDC International Emerging Infection Program Sites Egypt: Successfully Partnered International Agencies • 2-year interagency agreement between USAID and NAMRU-3: “Promotion of Quality and Safety of Healthcare in Egypt” Egypt: Program Components 1. Design, pilot & implement a surveillance system to measure HAIs and AMR 2. Implement targeted IC prevention strategies to reduce rates of HAIs 3. Optimize Antibiotic Use in Egypt 4. Strengthen/create hospital infection control programs in Egypt Challenges in Implementing Surveillance for HAIs and AMR in Egypt Complexity of CDC case definitions Limited Resources Labor intensive Staff not motivated Limited financial and human capacities Data management capabilities Limited hospital laboratory capacities Medical Records not well maintained Political- confidentiality issues Infection Control Unit Global Disease Detection & Response Program US Naval Medical Research Unit No.3 Head IC specialists IC training coordinator Epidemiologists M &E specialists Pharmacist Health communication specialist Anthropologist What is the Best Strategy for Surveillance of HAIs and AMR in Egypt? 1st Panel of experts: Jan, 2011 Infection Control Unit CDC/DHQP WHO/HQ Cornell University MOH/University Reps Proposed Surveillance Approach Panel of Experts - January 2011 Phase I: (Pilot - 9 months) Active prospective surveillance CDC – NHSN case definitions Select eligible hospitals Only ICUs All types of HAI monitored Four pathogens reported by infection type Regular monitoring to hospitals Evaluation - 6 months after implementation Egypt HAI Surveillance Timeline Phase 1 = pilot Apr/2011 Goal: Inform surveillance methodology for phase 2 Phase 2 = limited roll-out Oct/2011 Phase 3 = full-scale surveillance Oct/ 2012 Training to Implement Surveillance Surveillance training Epi & Surveillance Clinical practice in identifying HAI Use of PDAs 583 people trained Microbiology training standardized lab techniques: Organism identification Antimicrobial susceptibility testing 40 lab people trained System Description Surveillance Coordinators attend ICU rounds Review Clinical, Lab, Radiology results Denominator data collected manually: - Pt days - Device days Suspect HAI? Request more investigations YES Enter in PDA PDA confirms one of 43 HAIs coded Lab & x-rays results Device-Associated Infection Rates, Selected ICU Types CLABSI HAI/1,000 device-days VAP CAUTI ICU type Adult Medical 1.07 6.23 0.95 Adult Surgical 0 9.71 0 Adult/Ped Surgical 0.70 13.25 3.70 NICU 1.57 5.59 NA Pediatric Med/Surg 0.48 6.88 0 NHSN 2010 Annual Report. http://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/PDFs/dataStat/NHSN-Report_2010-Data-Summary.pdf Pathogens Reported: All HAIs Most common pathogens reported for all HAI, N = 533* Pathogen No. reported % of total isolates Rank Egypt US Acinetobacter spp. 115 22 1 14 Klebsiella spp. 97 19 2 4 Pseudomonas aeruginosa 77 15 3 5 S. aureus 67 13 4 1 Candida spp. 61 12 5 7 Other 106 20 *More than one pathogen/HAI can be reported NHSN unpublished data. Proportion of isolates with resistance Antimicrobial Resistance for Isolates Received, Selected Pathogens (N=180) 100% 100% 81% 80% 71% 60% 59% 62% 40% 20% 0% Acinetobacte r spp. K. pneumoniae Pseudomona s aeruginosa S. aureus E. coli Multidrug resistance Extendedspectrum βlactamase Multidrug resistance Methicillin resistance Extendedspectrum β lactamase N=39 N=42 N=27 N=21 N=11 Recommendations HAI prevention should focus on: Pneumonia (all ICUs) CLABSI (NICUs) Identify sources of multidrug-resistant organisms and implement measures to control transmission Build laboratory capacity Egypt-specific adaptation of VAP prevention materials Kenya –Medical Education Partnership Initiative Healthcare-associated infection “carve out” from PEPFAR funds CDC guidance for infection prevention in resource-limited settings Modules to be vetted and piloted in Kenya, then disseminated more broadly Kenya- Local Production Project iFund grant to improve HH in Kenyan hospitals through local production of ABHR Production underway in 3 hospitals using WHO recipe for local production of ABHR Mixed-methods evaluation underway Kenya: ABHR Project Adapt training materials to local context Use permanent ink to mark the 5-Litre water level. Kenya: ABHR Project Adapt training materials to local context Calibrate and Label 20-Litre Jerrican for First Use (cont.) Repeat this process until the 20-Litre jerrican is marked with the 5 Litre, 7.5 Litre, and 10 Litre calibration marks Kenya: ABHR Project Adapt training materials to local context Step 1: Add isopropyl alcohol Pour a total of 7515 mL of 99.8% isopropyl alcohol into the 20L jerrican. (This can be done in three increments using the 5-litre container and a funnel). CDC Kenya: Infrastructure Building Production of ABHR occurring at 3 hospitals Intervention staggered for intervention-control evaluation Hand hygiene audit rates fed back to healthcare workers Final report in 2013 to be sent to ministry for broader consideration Other CDC-Kenya HAI-related efforts Syndromic surveillance for respiratory HAIs Laboratory capacity building for MDRO surveillance Integration of HAI training into medical school curriculums Future Considerations Related to Global HAI Infrastructure, Surveillance, and Prevention Raising awareness of HAI as a public health issue is key Paradigm shift in United states mobilized action Can learn from successes/failures of US approach Basic training and infrastructure are the foundation of robust surveillance and prevention efforts Before implementing surveillance Focus on documentation and laboratory capacity Understand local barriers Multi-facility, infection-specific collaborative models have shown success globally Prioritization and balance is key Thank You! I look forward to further discussion kellingson@cdc.gov For more information, please contact Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1600 Clifton Road NE, Atlanta, GA 30333 Telephone, 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)/TTY: 1-888-232-6348 E-mail: cdcinfo@cdc.gov Web: www.cdc.gov The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion Prevention http://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/cre-toolkit/ Surveillance and Definitions Facilities/Regions should have an awareness of the prevalence of CRE in their Facility/Region Could concentrate on Klebsiella and E. coli CDC definition (based on 2012 CLSI definitions): Your lab might not be using these definitions NS to one of the carbapenems (doripenem, meropenem, imipenem) Resistant to all 3rd generation cephalosporins tested Some Enterobacteriaceae are intrinsically resistant to imipenem (Morganella, Providencia, Proteus) Interventions Core Hand hygiene Contact Precautions* HCP education Minimizing device use Patient and Staff cohorting Laboratory notification* Antimicrobial stewardship CRE Screening* * Included in 2009 document Supplemental Active surveillance cultures Chlorhexidine bathing Hand Hygiene Proper protocols Available supplies (soap, towels, etc.) HCP education Adherence monitoring and feedback More information: www.cdc.gov/handhygiene HCP Education Regular education about MDROs Proper use of CP Hand hygiene Contact Precautions CP for patients colonized or infected with CRE Systems in place to identify patients at readmission Duration of CP unclear Education of HCP about use and rationale behind CP Adherence monitoring Consideration of pre-emptive CP in patients transferred from high-risk settings Contact Precautions in Long-Term Care CP could be modified in these settings: CP should be used for residents with CRE who are at higher risk for transmission • • • • Dependent upon HCP for their activities of daily living Ventilator-dependent Incontinent of stool Wounds with drainage that is difficult to control For other residents the requirement for Contact Precautions might be relaxed Standard Precautions should still be observed Device Use Minimize use of invasive devices Urinary catheters Central venous catheters HICPAC recommendations for: Urinary catheters Central lines Patient and Staff Cohorting CRE patients in single rooms (when available) Cohorting (even when in single rooms) Staff cohorting Recommendation applies to both acute and longterm care settings Preference for single rooms should be given to patients at highest risk for transmission such as patients with incontinence, medical devices, or wounds with uncontrolled drainage Laboratory Notification Facilities should have protocols for timely notification of appropriate staff when CRE isolated from surveillance or clinical specimens Facilities who send cultures to off-site laboratories should ensure that protocols are established with those labs Antimicrobial Stewardship Programs to ensure: Antimicrobials used for proper indications and duration Appropriate spectrum Link to Get Smart for Healthcare: http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/healthcare Antimicrobial Stewardship and MDR GNRs Antimicrobial stewardship program in Surgical/Trauma ICU Specific protocol for therapeutic antibiotics Surgical antibiotic prophylaxis protocols Quarterly rotation and limitation of dual antibiotic classes • Dortch et al Surgical Infections 2011; 12:15-25 Antimicrobial Stewardship and MDR GNRs Proportion of MDR GNR pathogens decreased (37% to 9%) Rate of infections caused by MDR GNRs decreased yearly by 0.78/ 1,000 patient days Yearly decrease was for: MDR Pseudomonas (-0.14/1,000 pd), MDR Acinetobacter (-0.49/1,000 pd), MDR Enterobacteriaceae (-0.14/ 1,000 pd) • Dortch et al Surgical Infections 2011; 12:15-25 CRE Screening Used to identify unrecognized CRE colonization among contacts of CRE patients Stool, rectal, peri-rectal Link to laboratory protocol http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/ar/Klebsiella_or _E.coli.pdf Applicable to both acute and long-term care settings Description of types Point prevalence survey • Rapid assessment of CRE Prevalence on particular wards/units • Might be useful if lab review identifies one or more previously unrecognized CRE patient on a particular unit Screening of epidemiologically linked patients • Roommates • Patients who shared primary HCP Active Surveillance Cultures Controversial Studies suggest that only a minority of patients colonized with CRE will have positive clinical cultures CRKP Point prevalence study in Israel (5.4% prevalence rate); fewer than 5/16 had a positive clinical culture for CRKP. (WeinerWell et al. J Hosp Infect 2010;74:344-9) A study of surveillance cultures at a US hospital found that they identified a third of all positive CRKP patients. Placing these patients in CP resulted in about 1400 days from unprotected exposure. (Calfee et al. ICHE 2008;29:966-8. • r Active Surveillance Cultures One study from Israel used surveillance cultures (ICU) admission and weekly; (non-ICU) patients with epi-links to CRE patients Found a 4.7-fold reduction in in CRKP infection incidence Kochar et al. used rectal surveillance cultures as part of a multifaceted intervention in an ICU Found decrease in number of new patients per 1,000 patient days per quarter that were positive for CRKP Ben-David et al. ICHE 2010; 31:620-6 Kochar et al. ICHE 2009; 30:447-52 Active Surveillance Cultures Potential considerations: Focus on patients admitted to certain high-risk settings (e.g., ICU) or specific populations (e.g., from LTCF/LTAC) Generally done at admission but can also be done periodically during admission Patients identified as positive on these surveillance cultures should be treated as colonized Applicable to both acute and long-term care settings. Chlorhexidine Bathing Reviews basics of this process Limited evidence for CRE • Used effectively by Munoz-Price in outbreak in LTAC as part of a package of interventions Applied to all patients regardless of CRE colonization status In long-term care: Might be used on targeted high-risk residents (e.g., residents that are totally dependent upon healthcare personnel for activities of daily living, are ventilator-dependent, are incontinent of stool, or have wounds whose drainage is difficult to control) Might be less frequent depending on the facility’s usual bathing protocol. Munoz-Price et al. ICHE 2010;31:341-7