APT1 & M-Trends 2013 PRESENTED BY: Grady Summers © 2013 Mandiant Corporation. All rights reserved. MAY 9, 2013 At Mandiant We Live the Headlines Experts in Advanced Targeted Threats • Incident responders to the biggest breaches • We train the FBI & Secret Service • Our CEO wrote the book (literally) on incident response Our Products Are Based on Our Experience • Built to fill a gap for incident responders • We use our own products in our investigations • SC Magazine 2012 & 2013 “Best Security Company” Best Security Company Nationwide Presence • 350+ employees • Offices in DC, New York, LA, San Francisco, and Albuquerque 2 Free Resources Free tools Redline IOC Editor IOC Finder Memoryze Memoryze for Mac Highlighter Web Historian Resources M-Trends M-Unition blog.mandiant.com Forums Forums.mandiant.com Education Black Hat classes Custom classes Webinar series 3 Anatomy of a Targeted Attack Attackers Move Methodically to Gain Persistent & Ongoing Access to Their Targets • Backdoor variants • VPN subversion Maintain Presence Move Laterally • Sleeper malware Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon • Net use commands • Reverse shell access Complete Mission • Social engineering • Custom malware • Credential theft • Critical system recon • Staging servers • Spear phishing e-mail with custom malware • Command and control • Password cracking • Data consolidation • 3rd party application exploitation • “Pass-the-hash” • System, active directory & user enumeration • Data theft At organizations where Mandiant responded to a targeted attack in the last year, the typical attacker went undetected for 273 days. 4 Visibility is critical Maintain Presence Initial Compromise Unauthorized Use of Valid Accounts Establish Foothold Known & Unknown Malware Escalate Privileges Command & Control Activity Suspicious Network Traffic Move Laterally Internal Recon Files Accessed by Attackers Valid Programs Used for Evil Purposes Complete Mission Trace Evidence & Partial Files EVIDENCE OF COMPROMISE Of all of the compromised machines Mandiant identified in 2011, only 54% had malware on them. 5 Inside APT 1 Background Monday, February 18, 2013 Mandiant released intelligence report on threat group: APT1 Linked APT1 to PLA unit 61398 Provided hard evidence Released 3000+ immediately actionable indicators of compromise OpenIOC format Malware reports IPs/domain names MD5s SSL Certificates 5 minute video showing footage of the attacker in action Set the bar for actionable intelligence sharing The People ~30 core people worked on actual report Threat Intelligence IOCs M-Labs Marketing, legal, execs… Significant effort to validate and consolidate data (and conduct open source research) under tight deadline Though the “surge” was intense, it was made possible by 7 years of previous research 8 Why? Prolific Volume of data stolen Comprehensive understanding of tools, tactics, and procedures Example of actionable information sharing The timing felt right Traffic Light Protocol (TLP): Green indicator disclosure Not as intel-sensitive as other groups APT 1 – Targets by Industry APT 1 – Victims by Country APT 1 – Impact APT 1 – Command and Control Infrastructure Criticisms We’ve received lots of it! Why do you always pick on China?! Focusing on the country of origin is the wrong issue Don’t focus on the attacker, focus on your defenses Mandiant disclosed sensitive intel and ruined intelligence operations Publicity stunt Accuracy CNN video shows military chasing CNN vehicle near the building while filming https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yG2ezzLHSD0 Sen. Feinstein, Chairman Senate Intelligence Committee: “I read the Mandiant report. I've also read other reports, classified out of Intelligence, and I think the Mandiant report, which is now unclassified, it's public, is essentially correct,” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/terrorism/284721-intel-chairwoman-report-on-chinas-cyber-war-unitessentially-correct Accuracy – Netizen Research DOTA phone number discovered used in 2009 for apartment rental – 600 feet from unit 61398. SuperHard_M (aka Mei Qiang) likely studied at famous PLA Information Engineering University in 2005. 2004 recruitment notice on Zhejiang University website advertising for “Unit 61398 of China’s PLA (located in Pudong District, Shanghai) seeks to recruit 2003-class computer science graduate students.” LA Times found blog of possible 61398 worker: http://lat.ms/12OATUY https://www.mandiant.com/blog/netizen-research-bolsters-apt1-attribution APT1 – Reaction after a week Monday 2/18 – Business as usual Report is released at 10 PM EST – 11 AM CST Tuesday 2/19 – Clear signs of action plan being invoked Domains getting parked WHOIS registry getting changed Backdoor/tools removed Staging/working directories cleared New backdoors implanted (leverage public communications channels – hotmail/gmail/MSN) MACROMAIL malware from APT1 report Today: many indicators changed, but otherwise business as usual APT1 vs. APT12 NY Times disclosed internal name APT12 Tools: APT1 – WEBC2, public communication channels, noisy APT12 – DNS calc, cmdline backdoors, more stealthy Data theft: APT1 – everything APT12 - discriminating Skill: APT1 – good enough, large range of skillsets APT12 – more skilled Industries targeted: APT1 – everything APT12 – satellite, crypto, media M-Trends 2013 Targeted industries Compromise Detection Dwell Time Trend #1 – Outside In When targeted organizations increase their prevention and detection capability, weaker service providers and partners become targets Mandiant investigated several organizations that had been compromised through 3rd party connections 15% of victims in 2012 were notified by a service provider Trend #2 – ‘X’ Marks the Spot Attacks are becoming more surgical in nature: immediately targeting administrators for network diagrams, sensitive asset lists Change from historical reliance on internal network reconnaissance One victim had followed all the necessary precautions to protect their financial information, yet attacks against system administrators yielded necessary data to breach the environment Trend #3 – Once a Target, Always a Target Though long known anecdotally, Mandiant measured repeat victimization in 2012 38% of victims were recompromised within the year Reminder that persistence means constant attempts at recompromise until mission is accomplished Trend #4 – Strategic Web Compromise Mandiant observed frequent use of strategic web compromises, or “watering hole attacks” over the last year Financial institutions attacked via Java exploits on local news web sites Energy companies compromised through an industry portal Significant collateral damage