Politics, States and
Social Contracts
Paul Nugent, Director of Centre of
African Studies, University of
Edinburgh
The Ubiquity of ‘Good Governance’
The Other Side of the Equation
• Governance = not simply about the choice and
implementation of policies, but about political
sustainability. ‘Good policies’ that clash with
political norms are unlikely to get very far
• Social contracts are about the sets of
understandings that underpin the relations
between rulers and ruled.
A Few Basic Points
• 1. A social contract does not imply an
inherently harmonious relationship, merely
that those who exercise power and those who
on the receiving end share a common
understanding of what that relationship
entails.
• 2. Social contracts are not necessarily written
down, or are not necessarily found in the
places where you might expect to find them
• >> In many countries, the way that politics is
actually contracted may has little to do with
the formal constitution and much more to do
with deeply-rooted understandings of ‘rules of
the game’
• . 3. Contacts often have an uneven application
across national space>> geographical spread
plus levels of government
• .
• 4. social contracts can only exist where there is
communication flow between rules and
ruled>> hence role of media is as crucial for
authoritarian regimes as democratic ones (e.g.
Mobutu)
Four Types of Social Contract
• 1. Coercive: regime claims the right to rule either
through the application (or threat) of coercion, or
the promise of protection [‘Le Guide’, President as
head of family writ large]. These might sound like
opposites, but are actually flip sides of the same coin
because the offer of protection contains an implicit
threat
• >> Note: insurgencies can weaken the moral
authority of the centre (e.g. Haile Selassie) and
warlords may stake own competing claims to offer
‘protection’
The Coercive Contract According to
Siyad Barre
• “I, Mohammed Siyad Barre, am singularly
responsible for the transformation of Somalia
and Mogadisho from a bush country and
scruffy hamlet into a modern state and
commodious city, respectfully. Consequently, I
will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me
out of here; and if they try, I will take the
whole country with me.”
• 2. Productive: contract is based on some
conception of active performance. That is,
consent is traded against the effective delivery
of public goods: security, social amenities,
legal regime
• In European & US history, contracts arose out
of a ‘creative friction’ encapsulated ‘as no
taxation without representation’
Representation without taxation?
• In African colonial systems, taxes typically
borne by subjects, ot citizens (e.g. Senegal)
• At independence, most nationalist parties
embraced versions of social contract forged in
late colonialism >> especially variants on
socialism
• But increase in aid flows (e.g. Tanzania) and
the decline of direct taxation made
appropriation and allocation of resources less
transparent
• By the mid 1980s, many countries had arrived at the
worst of worlds: minimal delivery of public goods
coupled with very little transparency. At this time,
there was little chance of redress either because the
one-party state or military regime remained locked
into command mode.
• 3. Permissive: A permissive contract is one in which
those who govern tolerate a range of activity that is
formally illegal in return for being absolved from
scrutiny>> e.g. ‘Article 15’ (débrouillez-vous) in Zaire,
and border trade in micro-states (e.g. Gambia)
• 4. Liberational>> formulated during struggles
for national liberation or against extreme
forms of dictatorship (e.g the Dergue) and
became frozen at the point when success was
achieved.
• >> primacy of the nation and the movement
as the embodiment of the national interest
(e.g. Eritrea, Zimbabwe). >>
Political Tenses….
• 1. Coercive contracts often have a peculiar
conception of political time>> often a dysfunctional
past that justifies a suspension of political time for
some purposes
• 2. Liberational Contracts begin as forward-looking
(the achievement of core goals), but tend to become
backward-looking
• 3. Permissive contracts are lived in the present
• 4. Productive contracts>> African socialism was all
about progress experienced in hyper-time. These
days still looking to future, but in slow-time (MDGs)
Co-existing contracts
• In particular countries, different modes may co-exist
especially as regimes mutate e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire
combined coercive and permissive; South Africa
combines liberational and productive >> result is
often rather confused state discourses
• Note: The line of least resistance is towards
permissive contracts which deflect potential conflict
(but prevent traction) The line of greatest resistance
is generally in the direction of productive contracts
for two main reasons: (i) high risk of failure and (ii)
for resource-rich states, the risk of fuelling demands
What’s in a Flag?
The Bottom Line….
• For those interested in promoting better
governance the challenge lies in making the
alternatives (coercive and permissive
contracts) seem less attractive, while
simultaneously making productive contracts
feel less risky and rendering them more
sustainable in practice….
a tall order
Key Issues: What is the Point of
Elections?
• 1. Role of Elections – a Waste of Resources?
• Certainly not a panacea, but they are
important to enabling citizens to express their
judgement about the performance of those in
office
• >> and they may have cumulative effect
(Lindberg) – a few successful rotations helps!
• << although bad habits catch on quickly (e.g.
governments of national unity)
• Elections force governments to keep track off
their population and to articulate their claims
• Some minimum requirements>>
• (i) autonomous election commission
• (ii) a credible voters’ register
• (iii) a savvy electorate that is prepared to go
shopping
• (iv) a modicum of trust amongst elites (the
difference between Ghana and Kenya)
Popular interest
• Although electoral participation typically falls
after the founding election, the rates of
participation are not bad at all considering the
conjuncture of logistics and the fact that
governments are doomed to disappoint
• Average turnout for Africa, 1990-2001: 64%
for Africa, vs 65% for North America and
Caribbean, 78% for Western Europe and 79%
in Oceania
• 2. Citizenship and Belonging>> constitutions
often start from the abstract citizen, whereas
popular discourses of politics often follow
different principles. National differences:
• (a) Francophone states have tended to import
a state-centric model in which the state
defines citizenship>> reflected in the passage
of national domain laws … but does not
always over-ride local conceptions
• (b) in some former British colonies, less from
above
• >> in Ghana a strongly rooted idea of colonial
state having been constructed from the
bottom upwards on the basis of primary units
(‘native states’). While the post-colonial state
has elaborated its own rules, it is an axiom
that one cannot really be a citizen unless one
claim identity through membership of a
primary community.
• >> infuses all aspects of national politics and local
administration
• (c) in South Africa, the state effectively defined
citizenship since apartheid days, but removing the
apartheid legacy has also re-inforced state logics
• (i) internalised in popular conceptions of belonging
defined by international border (hence the definition
of foreigners)
• (ii) spatial claims internally less important than racial
ones
Royal Bafokeng Nation… flags again
• The messiness of social contracts often lies in
the lack of a fit between what exists on paper
and the rules of the game as generally
understood…. But ‘good governance’
interventions ignore these understandings at
their peril
• >> the re-engagement with traditional
authorities is a reflection of that reality
Chiefs inc.
• (c) Public Goods: The possibility of developing
a productive social contract hinges on the
ability of those who hold office to identify
meaningful priorities and to deliver
However, pressure on public services is
immense, and nowhere more so in Africa’s
cities
Levels of Urbanisation
Levels and Rates of Urbanisation,
2010
Country
Percentage Urban
Rate of Urbanization
Algeria
92.0
2.4
Djibouti
87.0
2.2
Gabon
85.0
2.1
Republic of Congo
(Brazzav)
61.0
2.7
South Africa
61.0
1.4
Botswana
60.0
2.5
Ghana
50.0
3.5
Nigeria
48.0
3.8
Kenya
22.0
4.0
Malawi
19.0
5.2
Ethiopia
17.0
5.4
Uganda
13.0
4.4
Africa’s Largest Cities, millions
City
2010
1980
1970
1950
Cairo
11.0
7.4
5.6
2.5
Lagos
10.6
4.8
1.4
0.3
Kinshasa
8.8
2.0
1.1
0.2
Johannesburg
& East Rand
6.1
2.8
2.2
1.5
Khartoum/3
city
5.2
1.2
0.7
0.2
Luanda
4.8
1.0
0.5
0.1
Alexandria
4.4
2.5
2.0
1.0
Abidjan
4.1
1.4
0.6
0.07
Nairobi
3.5
1.0
0.5
0.1
Cape Town
3.4
1.6
1.1
0.6
Kano
3.4
1.4
0.5
0.1
Dar es Salaam
3.4
0.8
0.4
0.07
Lagos in by-gone days
Lagos today…. Go slow
World Development Report 2009
• Bretton Woods institutions are beginning to realize
the downside of state-bashing.
• “But the top priority is the set of aspatial policy
instruments that apply universally to all places –
establishing market institutions to regulate land use
and transactions, and delivering such basic services
as schools, streets and sanitation. So in the countries
of sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, the role of
national government is pivotal in laying the
foundations of inclusive urbanization.”
Traction
• Intelligent urban planning requires enhanced
capacity for state and municipal authorities,
plus an efficient and equitable system for
raising revenues - Traction
• In many cities, the claims of the ‘landowners’
is a real political issue that cannot be ignored
•
social contracts have to involve two-way
bargains in which urban land is freed up in
return for service improvements
In other contexts, state is needed to
cement local agreements esp in relation to crossborder resource use (an emerging public good in
context of climate change)
• (d) Externality: Does the externality of the African
states makes productive contracts effectively
unattainable?
Depends on both the degree and nature of the
externality: acute aid dependency is one form, the
dominance of rents from the extractive sector is
another, and remittances are a third.
• The track-record of oil-states is not good, but
Botswana and Cape Verde demonstrate that
some externality can be helpful in sustaining
social contracts
• In Cape Verde, remittances accounted for 12%
of GDP in 2006>> the importance of the
diaspora raises questions of the boundedness
of the national community> diaspora vote?
A final thought: Is small beautiful?
• Why is it that small states, and especially,
island states perform much better in
governance indices? Possible answers:
• (a) the level of demand on the state is more
manageable>> In 2006, there were 145 million
Nigerians (probably!) and only 1.8 million
Batswana.
• (b) elite tends to be much more compact and
inter-connected.
Top of Ibrahim Table on
Governance in Africa 2008-9
Country
Overall Governance
Ranking
Participation and Human
Rights Ranking
Mauritius
1
2
Seychelles
2
5
Botswana
3
4
Cape Verde
4
1
South Africa*
5
3
Namibia
6
8
Ghana
7
6
Tunisia
8
35
Egypt*
9
39
Lesotho
10
7
Sao Tome and Principe
11
9
Benin
12
10
Bottom of Table
Country
Overall Governance
Ranking
Participation and Human
Rights Ranking
Angola*
42
27
Guinea-Bissau
43
26
Cote d’Ivoire
44
46
Guinea
45
42
Equatorial Guinea*
46
52
Sudan*
47
48
CAR
48
30
Zimbabwe
49
44
Eritrea
50
50
DRC
51
45
Chad*
52
49
Somalia
53
53
• (c) closer proximity of borders tends to embed
the economies of smaller countries within
regional economies, creating less pressure on
state
• (d) in small countries, the overall influence of
diasporas is likely to be that much greater
• (e) Finally, there is argument that it is simply
easier for the state to ‘broadcast’ its power in
small countries.
Conclusion
• 1. If we take the long view, there is nothing
inevitable about a transition to productive
contracts. Indeed, this is often the line of
greatest resistance>> the preference for
permissive contracts may even be
accentuated by governance reforms that
parcellize the state and privatize resources
• 2. But coercive contracts are more difficult to
sustain these days >> especially coups
• 3. Social contracts are grounded in political
cultures than cannot simply be ignored or
regarded as unfortunate obstacles>> in many
cases a balance between group/individual
rights and elected/’traditional’ authorities
may be the most viable option>> institutional
pluralism has its merits.
• 3. Growth of urban population is likely to
make service delivery play out more openly at
election time.
• 4. In some countries, the diaspora factor
looms large (party funding etc)
• 5. Successful elections tend to build trust in
the process, but failed elections may create a
climate of mutual suspicion that lingers… 2011
is a big election year and a few flops could set
the clock back
• 6. Reforming electoral institutions is probably
the intervention which is able to give the best
returns in a short period of time