DOE Response to Radiological Release from the Fukushima Dai

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DOE Response to Radiological
Release from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Plant
BWR Design
•
•
Fuel rods in the reactor vessel create heat
Steam-water mixture is separated at the top of the reactor vessel
– Steam turns the turbine
– Water is pumped out of the condenser and re-circulated through the reactor
vessel
• Water is condenser cooled by sea water in Japan
2
Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Overview of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear
Power Plant
• 6 Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) plants
• Years of commercial
operation: ~32-38
• Plant status on March 11
– Fuel Type – UO2
– Output (MWe)
– Unit 1–3: In operation
since Fall 2010
– Unit 4-6: Refueling Outage
• Unit 1: 460
• Unit 2-5: 784
• Unit 6: 1,100
Spent Fuel Pools
1
2
3
4
5
6
# of Spent Fuel Assemblies
292
587
514
1331
946
876
# of New Fuel Assemblies
100
28
52
204
48
64
1,020
1,425
1,425
1,425
1,425
1,497
Water Volume (m3)
Statement of Problem
Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
Accident Summary
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/f12np-gaiyou_e_1.pdf
7
Root Cause of Damage
Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
Core Damage Sequence
www.nuceng.ca/refer/japan/FukishimaEvent-FPLSummary.ppt
Core Uncovered
Core Damaged but
retained in vessel
Fuel Overheating
Some portions of core
melt into lower RPV head
Fuel melting - Core
Damaged
Containment pressurizes.
Leakage possible at
drywell head
Releases of hydrogen into
secondary containment
9
Unit 4 Fuel Pool - June 29
TEPCO Photo provided by Genn Saji
Summary of Fukushima Dai-ichi Damage
(Courtesy of AMS)
Unit 2
4
3
2
1
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 3
Unit 4
Estimated Releases
Nuclide
NISA1
NSC2
I-131
1.6X1017 Bq
1.5X1017 Bq
Cs-137
1.5X1016 Bq
1.2X1016 Bq
1
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(June 6, 2011 Press Release)
2
Japan Nuclear Safety Commission
Chernobyl
1.8X1018 Bq
8.5X1016 Bq
Public Protection Measures
• March 12: Government of Japan established
mandatory evacuation zone for people living
within a 20 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi
NPP and recommended shelter-in-place for
people living within 20-30 km
• March 13: US Embassy issued an advisory
restricting travel US citizens within 80 km of the
Fukushima NPP
• March 16: US Embassy and US Forces Japan
(USFJ) authorized voluntary departure for
dependents
DOE Support to Operation Tomodachi
Mission:
Assess the
consequences of
releases from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Plant
(FDNPP)
Deploy Assets
to Operation Tomodachi
• Objectives
– Assist the State Department mission to advise American
citizens on protective action and evacuation guidelines
– Assist DoD in its mission to safely conduct humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief operations and to provide advice
on departure/return of military dependents
– Partner with the Government of Japan (GOJ) through the
State Department to aid in developing guidelines for
protection of the public potentially affected by the
releases
DOE/NNSA Radiological Incident
Response
Resources
• Fixed
– Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)
– National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center (NARAC)
– Consequence Management Home
Team (CMHT)
– Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
– Radiological Triage
• Deployed
– Aerial Measuring System (AMS)
– Consequence Management
Response Team (CMRT)
– Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP)
Capabilities
• Predictive modeling
• Data collection
– Measurements
• Air
• Ground
– Samples
• Data assessment
• Data interpretation/
communication
DOE Timeline
• March 11:
– DOE/NNSA activated the following assets
• Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) in Washington, DC
• DOE/NNSA Consequence Management expertise on the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) in Tokyo
• National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
• Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) at Remote
Sensing Laboratory (RSL) with outreach to Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL), LLNL, and Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL)
• The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, TN
DOE Timeline (cont’d)
• March 14, 2011
• At White House direction, DOE deployed a
tailored CMRT and AMS capability via
military airlift to Yokota Air Base
Hangar 1503:
DOE’s home at
Yokota AB
Tent in
background is
AFRAT’s lab
Field Team
Attributes
• Experienced : operate in a
unique mission space.
• Interdisciplinary: address all
aspects of mission.
• Adaptable: dynamic
environment and nonstandard measurement
platforms.
• Communicate risk to
partners and decisionmakers.
Composition
• Small field footprint with
large capability
• 33 personnel to Yokota AB
– 12 scientists of many
disciplines (nuclear, GIS,
environmental, 5 PhDs, 2
CHPs)
– Technicians with a diverse
skill set
• 1 DOE HQ liaison to US
embassy, Tokyo
F RMAC
Distribution of responsibilities
• Field
– monitoring and sampling
– preliminary data
assessment
– product development
• CMHT
– detailed assessment
– coordination of sample
analysis
– response to requests for
information/assistance
• NIT
– initial command and
control of deploying assets
– coordination and
communication for field
assets and headquarters
elements
• Embassy
– assessment interpretation
for Ambassador
– coordination of bilateral
monitoring and
assessment activities
DOE Timeline (cont’d)
• March 16: CM Assets arrive at Yokota AB and
fly first AMS Test flight
• March 17: First aerial measurement activities
over plant conducted; first field monitoring
mission completed
• March 22: Initial data published on DOE
website
BILATERAL ACTIVITIES
Stakeholders
United States
Japan
• Department of State
•
•
•
•
– American Embassy
• Department of Defense
– US Forces Japan (USFJ)
• Department of Energy (DOE)
• National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)
• Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
• Advisory Team for
Environment , Food and
Health
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
Nuclear Safety Commission
Ministry of Defense (MOD)
Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI)
– Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA)
•
Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science & Technology
(MEXT)
– Nuclear Safety Technology Center
(NUSTEC)
•
•
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (MAFF)
Ministry of Health, Labour &
Welfare (MLHW)
Coordination & Advisory Activities
• DOE aviation support requirements with USFJ
• Radiological consequence management advice
for US Ambassador
• Planning, operations, and assessment with
applicable Ministries and agencies of the
government of Japan
• Field expedient early warning system for US
Embassy and USFJ to be used while reactors were
considered unstable
These activities aided key leaders in decision-making and
informed DOE monitoring and assessment efforts
AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEM
ACTIVITIES
Aerial Monitoring
What was done
Why it was done
• Fixed wing and
helicopter
• Up to 3 aircraft per day
• Surveys over US bases
• Joint DOE & GOJ survey
• Map ground deposition
out to 80 km from
FDNPP
• Support evacuation,
relocation, agricultural
decisions
AMS on USAF Aircraft
Typical flight path
Typical Results
Summary of Activities
• Daily aerial measuring missions over US
installations and in the area around the
FDNPP
• > 85 flights
• > 490 flight hours
• Orientation on flying aerial measuring
missions for USFJ and GOJ assets
FIELD MONITORING ACTIVITIES
Ground monitoring
What was done
• Mobile monitoring
• In-situ measurements
• Exposure rate
measurements
• Air sampling
• Soil samples
• Swipes
Why it was done
• Calibrate aerial
measurements
• Define Isotopic mix
• Characterize the inhalation
component of integrated
dose
• Assess vertical and
horizontal migration of
deposited material
Mobile monitoring
In SITU
Exposure rate
measurements
Air sampling
Soil sampling
Core Sampling
Summary of Activities
• Daily monitoring activities at the U.S.
Embassy, U.S. military installations,
and in support of “ground truth”
measurements for AMS.
• > 590 air samples
• > 110 in situ spectra
• > 95 soil samples
ASSESSMENT
ACTIVITIES
Assessment Activities
• Field
– Preliminary evaluation of
raw data
• Ground level exposure rate
from aerial measurement
• Deposited activity by
isotope
• Activity concentration in air
– Referenced to protective
action measures
– Inform future mission
planning
• CMHT
– Detailed analysis of raw
monitoring and sampling
data
– Trend analysis and
quality control
– Integrated dose
assessment
– Analysis of postulated
scenarios to inform
future planning
REPRESENTATIVE RESULTS
Sources of Data
• DOE/NNSA aerial measurements
• DOE/NNSA field monitoring (measurements and
samples)
• US Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT)
monitoring (measurements and samples)
• Monitoring by USFJ assets in-country (US Army,
Navy, Marine Corps)
• MEXT aerial measurement results
• Japanese sensor data
Maiden Aviation Voyage
Maiden Aviation Voyage
Joint Survey Final Results
Seawater Map
Water Deposition Map
Then and now…
Field Team Activity Successes
• DOE was able to perform on-the-fly analysis to
deal with multiple ongoing releases, unknown
source terms, challenging terrain as well as
non-technical pressures.
• DOE Scientists developed customized products
for U.S. military (data products, InField
Monitoring System).
• DOE scientists embedded with Japanese
scientists to create joint data products.
Activity to date
• Daily aerial measuring system missions over US
installations and in the area around the FDNPS
• >80 flights
• >450 flight hours
• Daily monitoring activities at the U.S. Embassy,
U.S. military installations, and in support of
“ground truth” measurements for AMS.
• >590 air samples
• > 110in situ spectra
• >95 soil sample
Assessment
An assessment of measurements gathered through April 20 continues to
show:
• Radiation levels continue to decrease
• No measurable deposit of radiological material since March 19
• US bases and facilities all measure dose rates below 32 microrem/hr
(32 millionths of a REM) – a level with no known health risks
• Agricultural monitoring and possible intervention will be required
for several hundred square kilometers surrounding the site:
• Soil and water samples are the only definitive method to
determine agricultural countermeasures
• Ground monitoring can give better fidelity to identify areas
that require agricultural sampling
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End State
• USFJ and Government of Japan to continue
monitoring activities as needed
– Japanese trained & equipped to fly DOE AMS
– Japanese equipped with an enhanced laboratory
analysis capability
– USFJ trained & equipped to fly contigency AMS
– DOE continues to support Japanese and USFJ from
Home Team
Resilience following a nuclear catastrophe
Miscellaneous HP gear in Hangar 1503
Miscellaneous detectors in Hangar 1503
Soil core sample + in situ
In situ + AMS overhead
Unit 2
Summary of Damage
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 4
Unit 5 & 6
Unit 3
BACKUP SLIDES
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