PUBLIC SECTOR MOTIVATION IN THE
ITALIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Alberto Petrucci
DISPA Meeting – Vilnius, 24-25 October 2013
In this presentation, the main results of a SNA–SDA Bocconi
School of
Management research on Public Sector Motivation (PSM) in the Italian Public
Administration will be discussed.
This is research is a part of a larger scientific project developed by SNA and SDA
Bocconi involving two lines of analysis on Italian Public Administration at a central
level:
a) one on PSM;
b) one on Public Sector Performance.
2
Research questions and aims of the analysis
• Research questions
• What is the relationship between PSM and performance?
• What are the main determinants of PSM?
• What is the PSM role for attacting and motivating public employee?
• Research aims
• Empirical analysis of PSM, extrinsic motivation as well as intrinsic
motivation for the Italian Public Adminstration at a central level
• Consequences for the Italian public management
• Public Administration policy implications
3
Searching for a theoretical framework
Perfomance depends on
• Ability
• Task understanding
• Motivation
• Environment
• Work motivation is related to
• Job importance
• Mission valence (perceived importance of inst. goals)
• Extrinsic elements (rewards, carrer, etc.)
• Self-efficacy (capacity to organize and execute actions requited to attain a
designated performance level)
• Job difficultty
• Job specificity
4
At the roots of intrinsic motivation: entering a black
box
Intrinsic motivation can be decomposed as follows
• Job satisfaction
• Compliance with standards for their own sake
•
•
•
•
•
Ethical standards
Fairness
Team spirit
Procedural fairness
Material fairness
• Achievement of personal goals
• Conscientiouness
5
Focus of the research: HR Management in the Italian
Public Administration at a central level
Sample
Dimensions of interest
•Civil servant size and profile
•Recruitment and selection
•Carrer system
•Training on the job
•Performance evaluation
•Payments and bonuses
• Foreign Office
• Min. of Envionment and Territory
Protection
• Min. of Arts and Culture
• Min. of Defense
• Treasury
• Min. of Justice
• Min. of Infrastructure and Transport
• Home Office
• Min. of Education
• Min. of Work and Social Policies
• Min. of Agricultural Policies and Rural
Affairs
• Min. of Health
• Min. of Economic Development
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Data and Methodology
Quantitative and qualitative analysis based on online survey –
Experimental studies
Eclectic approach that combines Management, Labor Psychology,
Behavioral Economics, Sociology, etc.
• Cross section: Survey for 2012
• Technical ingredients: Factorial analysis
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Online survey – Variables (1/4)
• Money incentives  work effort
Consider the following situation. You are currently working in a system in which the assessment of
your perfomance is fair and reliable. Suppose that from next year on you may receive according to
your perfomance a bonus equal to 50% of your base salary that has to be added to your current pay.
How much will you change your future work effort next year?
Work effort: from 0 to 100
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Online survey – Variables (2/4)
• PSM
• Intrinsic motivation
• Extrinsic motivation
I totally
disagree
...
I totally agree
40%
30%
30%
My work is exciting.
O
O
O
I work hard only for carrer and money reasons.
O
O
O
Carrying out a civil service that is relevant for the
society as whole is very important for me.
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Online survey – Variables (3/4)
• Conscientiousness
• Self-efficacy
• Job satisfaction
I totally
disagree
...
I totally
agree
I like orderliness.
O
O
O
I am able to work satisfactorily despite the current
fund cuts and other Public Administration stumbling
blocks.
O
O
O
All in, I am satisfied by my work.
O
O
O
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Online survey – Control variables
(4/4)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Gender
Age
Education degree
Service seniority
Public manager seniority
Private sector work experiences
Family of origin characteristics
Hierarchical level
Etc.
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Sample; 351 public managers
Average/representative respondent:
51.5 years old
23 years of civil service
13 years as a public manager
1.5 years of experience in the private
sector
40%
M
F
60%
20%
25%
Aff Esteri
2%
Ambiente
6%
11%
Difesa
13%
Giustizia
Interno
11%
3%
1%
2%
Istruzione
Lavoro
22%
18%
Pol Agricole
5%
15%
Salute
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
>=65
18%
28%
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Data analysis – Level of job effort
• Mean 90.03/100 (st. dev. 12.45)
• Negative correlation with PA seniority
• Positive correlation with executive seniority
• Positive correlation with intrinsec motivation
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100
100
Data analysis – Level of job effort
95.60
93.26
90.13
86.90
91.16
88.83
91.55
88.45
60
40
20
20
40
60
pre_eff media
80
80
84.97
0
0
Serv.
Trasf.
Staff
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
>=65
100
Reg./Ctrl.
90.63
20
40
60
80
86.73
0
Supp. pol.
pre_eff media
pre_eff media
98.33
94.82
89.84
Dirigenti che non dirigono alcuna struttura Dirigenti che dirigono una struttura
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Analysis of the results– PSM
• Mean 5.44/7 – 77%– (st. dev. 0.72) (other studies 0.78 EC)
• Positive correlation with hierarchical level
• Correlation with academic education (e.g. higher level of PSM
among people with law or political science degrees)
• Higher PSM among female managers
• Negative correlation with extrinsic motivation
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Analysis of the results – Intrinsic motivation
Mean 5.34/7 – 76.28% – (st. dev. 1.16)
• Lower for Directors General
• Higher for public employees’ descendants
• Positive correlation with conscientiousness
• Positive correlation with job satisfaction
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Analysis of the results – Extrinsic motivation
• Mean 2.46/7 – 35.14% – (st. dev. 1.17)
• Positive correlation with public manager seniority
• Negative correlation with PSM
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Data analysis – Job satisfaction
• Mean 4.86/7 – 69.42% – (dev st: 1.23)
• Higher for public managers with an academic degree
• Lower for public managers that descend from civil servant families
• Positive correlation with intrinsic motivation
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Result analysis – Job satisfaction
6
5.32
5
4.99
4.70
5.53
5.50
5.28
4.65
4.88
4.86
4.58
4.62
50-54
55-59
JS media
3
2
2
0
1
0
RAE
altro
35-39
40-44
45-49
60-64
>=65
5
5.06
3
4
4.53
2
prof. san.
1
II fascia
0
I fascia
JS media
JS media
4
4
4.00
M
F
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
1) Monitoring motivational capital
• Untested and erroneous hypotheses regarding public managers
motivations are at the basis of many public sectors’ failures
• Mismatch incentives–motivations
• This is the first photograph of motivational capital in the Italian
PA at a central level (like in many other advanced countries)
• Future challenges: systemic and continuous monitor of
motivational capital: i) Level; ii) Distribution; iii) Evolution20
2) Stimulating of motivational capital
• Individuals with different motivational profiles respond
differently to the same organizational conditions (one size does
not fit all)
• The present analysis adds new experimental/empirical evidence
on how the motivational profile reduces the effects of:
• Pecuniary incentives
• Contacts with beneficiaries
• Measures that induce self-persuasion
• Transformative leadership
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3) Accumulating motivational capital
• Today Public managers
• Close the motivational deficit
• Dynamic PSM
• Future Public managers
• Select and keep talents with high PSM
• Personality test
• Simulation of situational judgment
• Background analysis
• Direct observation of behaviors
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4) Adoption of an evidence-based approach
• Public management policy of the past
• Motivational hypotheses untested
• Fragmentary data
• Public management policy of the future
• Longitudinal monitor of motivations
• Experimental methods
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The analysis demonstrates that the problema of PA
performance and PSM should be analyzed through a richer
framework. A very fruitful standpoint is provided by the
Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel prize) “capabilities approach”, which
ensures a sustainable PA as it recognizes:
i) The importance of real freedoms in the assessment of a
person's advantage
ii) Individual differences in the ability to transform resources into
valuable activities
iii) The multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to happiness
iv) A balance of materialistic and nonmaterialistic factors in
evaluating human welfare
v) Concern for the distribution of opportunities within society.
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Philosophically speaking, our research confirm the Karl R.
Popper (1902-1994) dictum:
“Institutions are like fortresses: they resist if
garrisons are good”.
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