Quack Quack: 4 yr old duck, one of 5 IFs (the favorite is Stella, 100 yr old robin)
Deen and Elizabeth: live in a brown house in an imaginary world. Also her Paw Paw,
comes to visit when the child is sad (her grandfather who died when she was 1)
Cinderella: a little girl but is sometimes a blue dog
Bob and Jefette: Bob knows karate and Jeffette is sometimes a boy, Jeff
Ruth and George: IFs of 5 yr old Ruth; she shares George with her 3 yr old sister
Lacey, Han, Bia-Bia, Eliana, and Tea: Tea inspired by Beauty and the Beast film
Leah and Coda: Coda died but came back 2 weeks before the interview
He-tome and Bu-gong: celebrate Halloween and Hanukkah and play with Dad’s (former) IF
Jump Jump and Jump Jax: IFs that are 8 yr old brothers
Lucy: a rabbit but sometimes a baby, a mom, tiger, lion, or a mouse
Dowey and Sammey: IFs of 7 yr old, around since she was 3.
The Holy Spirit: IF of 6 yr old, came at Christmastime.
If a significant portion of the adult world continues
to hold an active belief in invisible spirits, let us not
be so surprised at our children’s creation of makebelieve friends or societies.
Dorothy and Jerome Singer (1990, p. 90)
Guardian angels? Fairies? Ghosts?
Creatures from outer space? Or even God?
Should any of these be considered imaginary
companions? I think not.
Marjorie Taylor (1999, p. 143)
Barrett, Richert, and Dreisenga (2001):
What does God Know?
ToM Studies with the “God question”:
Barrett, J. L., Richert, R. A., & Dreisenga, A. (2001)
Barrett, J. L., Moore Newman, R., & Richert, R. A. (2003)
Barrett, J. L. & Richert, R. A. (2003);
Knight, N., Sousa, P., Barrett, J. L. and Atran ,S. (2004)
Giménez-Dasí, M., Guerrero, S., & Harris, P. L. (2005)
Richert, R. A.. & Barrett, J. L. (2005)
Makris, N., & Pnematikos, D. (2007)
Knight, N. (2008)
Lane, J., Wellman, H. W., & Evans, E. M. (2009)
What will your friend think is in the
box?
Younger say: “rocks”
Older children say: “crayons”
Jeffette
But God is different: “rocks”
What will Quack Quack think
is in the crayon box?
Quack Quack
If God is a form of, or much like, an imaginary friend we
might expect—
Ho: There is no significant difference between the knowledge a
child attributes to an IF and the knowledge attributed to God in ToM
tasks, when a robust ToM emerges.
On the other hand, if God and imaginary friends are
different types of non-human agents, then we might
expect—
Ha: There is a significant difference between the knowledge a
child attributes to an IF and the knowledge attributed to God in ToM
tasks, when a robust ToM emerges.
3 types of ToM tasks
1) Occluded Picture
2) Secret Code
tree
4 agents:
book
3) False Belief
sun
1)VF Real/Visible friend; 2) IF Invisible Friend; 3) Dog; 4) God
Scoring:
Agent knows=0
Agent won’t know=1
Combined=3 possible
Results: Analysis by Age Groups
3 yr olds (n=9, M=41 months); 4 yr olds (n=16, M=52 months); 5-8 yr olds (n=11, M= 83 months).
Limits of Knowledge by Agent
Combined (all 3 tests)
120%
100%
80%
VF
60%
IF
40%
Dog
20%
God
0%
3's
4's
Age Groups
5+'s
All agents correlate significantly with age, p < .001, except God p = .36.
3s: No significant differences . All but dog are significantly below the mean for chance. p = .217
4s: Dog vs. God t (15) = 2.44, p = .028;
Dog vs. IF t (15) = 2.79, p = .014;
VF vs. IF t (15) = 2.11, p = .052, (approaching a trend to come)
Limits of Knowledge by agent
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
VF
IF
Dog
God vs. each agent, including IF, p < .001. Reject Ho.
Plus: IF vs. dog t (10) = 2.67, p = .023,
IF vs. VF t (10) = 2.39, p = .038.
God
Limits of knowledge by agent
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
VF
IF
Dog
God
n=12, M=77 months (losing two 5+s, gaining three 4yr olds)
God vs. VF or Dog, p < .001
God and IF, t (11) = 4.02, p = .002 Reject Ho
IF and VF, t (11) = 2.99, p = .012
Replication:
 3 yr olds—don’t disentangle well.

4 yr olds—can begin differentiating types of agents.

5 and older—treat God differently.

Children easily attribute omniscience to God.
Extension:
 IFs and God are different (Reject Ho/Cannot Reject Ha)

IFs in unique territory
Is God just another IF?
With Taylor—No, God is different
With the Singers—Well…




Ability to represent and reason about
immaterial individuals. (Keleman, 2004)
Ability to sense agency easily (whether seen
or not)
Ability to be in relation to invisible agency
The in-between as potential religious
territory. (Knight, 2008)
References
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Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Barrett, J. L., Moore Newman, R., & Richert, R. A. (2003). “When seeing is not believing: Children’s understanding of humans’ and nonhumans’ use of background knowledge in interpreting visual displays. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 3.1, 91-108.
Barrett, J. L. & Richert, R. A. (2003). Anthropomorphism or preparedness? Exploring children's God concepts. Review of Religious Research, 44,
300-312.
Barrett, J. (2004). Why would anyone believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
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Development, 72, 50-65.
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