“The Trolley Problem”
Judith Jarvis Thomson

• In the natural sciences, the goal is to stipulate principles that are at work (e.g. gravitation, entropy, the electromagnetic force) to explain the facts, that is, our observations. These principles are the large scale components of theories of nature.
• Ethics is no different. The goal is to identify principles
(the large scale pieces of ethical theories) that explain our considered moral judgments (the evidence). Any of these basic ethical principles, like any principle of any theory, must be consistent with itself and consistent with the evidence.

• This course will be concerned with identifying, discussing, and testing a variety of ethical principles.
• Some examples include the principle of utility, the categorical imperative, moral virtues, the principle of benevolence.
• Thomson’s article is concerned with finding a moral principle that explains a pair of our considered moral judgments

• There is a difference between a considered moral judgment and a mere moral sentiment. The considered judgments admits of at least some justification besides how people feel about it.
• The considered moral judgment is the primary evidence in the evaluation of ethical theories and principles.

• Our considered moral judgment in the case in which a runaway trolley may be turned to result in one death to avoid the death of five
• A plausible moral principle that explains this is a principle of numbers. A greater number of people dead is a greater moral wrong.

• Our considered moral judgment in the case of a surgeon who proposes to cut up a healthy man just in for a routine checkup to save five who need organs flies in the face of the previously stated moral principle of numbers.
• What moral principle explains our considered moral judgments in these cases?

• Foot: the morally relevant difference between the two cases is explained by the following two principles:
– (I) Killing one is worse than letting five die
– (II) Killing five is worse than killing one
• Thomson: Introduces Bystander at the
Switch to replace Trolley Driver which seems to indicate that (I) is incompatible with our considered moral judgment.

• If (I) is false, then there is no reason why the surgeon cannot then operate on the one to save the five.
• Further, consider Transplant with an evil doctor who intentionally caused the circumstances that lead the five to require organs. If he does not give them organs, he kills them, not just lets them die. If he stil may not morally operate, then it appears that (II) is false as well as (I).

• Either (II) is true and the surgeon may operate
• Or (II) is false and the surgeon may not operate
– The above claim may require the following: just because one thing is worse than another doesn’t mean it’s always allowable to do the other.
– Or, (II) is false and some other principle, much like (II) is true.

• (II') If a person is faced with a choice between doing something here and now to five, by the doing of which he will kill them, and doing something else here and now to one, by the doing of which he will kill only the one, then
(other things being equal) he ought to choose the second alternative rather than the first.
• This explains why the bystander may turn the trolley, but simply leaves out why the surgeon may or may not operate. Also, should the present tense really matter so much?

• Perhaps (III) Never use a person as a means only (a Kantian idea that we will get to later) works?
• No, (III) explains why the surgeon cannot operate, but does not explain why the bystander may turn the trolley (especially in the loop case)

• (i) “The reason why the surgeon may not proceed in
Transplant is that if he proceeds, he maxi-mizes utility, for he brings about a net saving of four lives, but in so doing he would infringe a right of the young man's.”
• (ii) “The reason why the bystander may proceed is that if he proceeds, he maximizes utility, for he brings about a net saving of four lives, and in so doing he does not infringe any right of the one track workman's”
• However, it appears difficult to say that the bystander does not infringe the rights of the one he kills, so (ii) is on doubtful ground, and if (ii) is false, it implies that (i) is false as well.

“The bystander who proceeds does not make something be a threat to people which would otherwise not be a threat to anyone; he makes be a threat to fewer what is already a threat to more. We might speak here of a "distributive exemption," which permits arranging that something that will do harm anyway shall be better distributed than it otherwise would be-shall (in Bystander at the
Switch) do harm to fewer rather than more. Not just any distributive intervention is permissible: It is not in general morally open to us to make one die to save five. But other things being equal, it is not morally required of us that we let a burden descend out of the blue onto five when we can make it instead descend onto one.”

• Hospital cases seem to bear this out, but there are difficulties.
• If Thomson’s distributive exemption proposal were true, then it would be morally permissible to push a fat man over the railing of a footbridge to stop the trolley from hitting the five.
• This troubles most people.

• Thomson believes that her distributive exemption principle, combined with the truth of (II), and the principle that an action’s being worse than some alternative does not preclude one from taking that alternative.

• Are there other solutions to this dilemma that
Thomson does not discuss?
• Are your reactions to any of the cases
Thomson presents different than hers?
• Consider taking a rights-based approach so strictly that the Bystander may not stop the trolley at the expense of infringing any right.
What does Thomson say of this?
• Consider taking the numbers approach so seriously that the surgeon is allowed to operate. What does Thomson say of this?