Russia Enters the War:
The Battle of TannenbergMid August 1914
•Russia’s weaknesses had
convinced Schlieffen and his
successor Moltke that it would
take forty days for the Tsar’s
armies to mass on Germany’s
border. The Germans believed
they had forty days to
overwhelm France before they
had to turn and face the
Russians.
• Besides time, the Germans
also believed space was on
their side. Russia’s immense
spaces separated the
population centers from
which soldiers must mobilize.
There were also sparse
railroad connections
between the cities and the
frontiers.
• The Germans believed that
what would take them days,
would take the Russians
weeks.
• In 1914, Russia was committed to Plan A. Twofifths of it’s army would be concentrated around
Warsaw, from which it’s forces could be deployed
into East Prussia.
• Germany had little left over from the Western
Front to defend East Prussia with. Only one of it’s
eight armies and some reservists were available.
They were far outnumbered by Russian forces.
• However large their numbers, Russia’s forces had serious
problems. They had far greater cavalry numbers than
any other army. This put a large burden for animal feed
on the already weak transport system.
• It took forty trains to supply four thousand men in a cavalry
division, when the same number could supply sixteen
thousand infantry men.
• Russian officers were often poorly educated, while their
men were generally illiterate peasants.
• Despite their overwhelming numbers, the
Russians exposed themselves to defeat in detail-that is they allowed a weaker force to concentrate
against on portion of their army and then the
other, defeating both.
• Geography provided Germany with some definite
advantages. The Russian army was faced with a
chain of lakes nearly fifty miles long. The easiest
option was to split the forces and work around the
lakes.
• The armies would be separated by three days
marching time and not able to come to each
other’s aid easily.
• The Germans also had
better intelligence
gathering methods. The
Russians knew they
outnumbered the Germans,
but had no way of
determining the German
positions. Even with the
largest aerial reconnaissance
in Europe, the Russians
failed to detect German
movements all together.
• German aircraft however,
began to detect Russian
movement a full week
before they crossed the
frontier.
• By the time the Russian troops
arrived in force, the Germans
were already planning a sneak
attack under cover of darkness.
• The Russians however, had
prepared trenches and fortified
farm buildings. The harder the
Germans pressed, the higher their
casualties. The Tsar’s artillery
were the best trained arm of
his army. To add to the slaughter,
the Germans mistakenly, but
effectively fired on their own
troops.
• Molke was appalled by the reports
he was receiving from the front.
Only twenty of the vital forty
days had elapsed. He feared the
Schlieffen Plan was beginning
to crumble. He decided to change
commanders and sent in
Ludendorff and Hindenburg.
• The plan was to defeat Russian
forces on one side of the lake,
then use the railway lines to send
forces behind them and repeat the
process.
• Radio insecurity was to be a key
feature of the Tannenberg
campaign. Both sides were
guilty of signaling en clair. The
Russians had difficulty
distributing code books, while
the Germans operators felt
pressed for time and sent
messages hoping they would be
missed by listeners.
• On the morning of August 25,
Hindenberg had a stroke of
luck when an entire Russian
First Army order was
received. He used the
information to surround the
Russian army
• The Germans counted 50,000
Russian dead as well as 92,000
prisoners.
• The Germans had saved the
Prussian heartland and was
celebrated as saving Germany
from the barbarians of Russia.
• Tannenberg also reversed the
German way of thinking about
the war. Initially, the west was to
be won quickly, while the east
was held as best as possible, now
the east seemed tamed while
victory continued to be elusive in
the west.
• Tannenberg temporarily
devastated the Russians.
The Russian commander,
Samsonov was
inconsolable. Riding back
with his officers, he found
an excuse for a moment
alone and shot himself.
• Beyond stories like this, it is
difficult to represent the
stories of the Russian army
on an individual level. The
army was 80% peasant and
illiterate. Few personal
memoirs remain.