International Conference
«Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security
Environment»
VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE
DEFENSE ISSUES
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation, Army General N.E.MAKAROV
Moscow, 2012
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Russian Core BMD Guidelines
Equal and
indivisible
security as crucial
feature of regional
and global
security
Solid linkage
between strategic
offensive and
defensive
weapon systems
Mutual nuclear
deterrence is key
to global security
and stability
FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972
The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed:
 to limit their Missile Defense systems;
 not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system;
 not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas;
 not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD
systems;
 not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.
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3
US SDI PROGRAM
SPACE-BASED
INTERCEPTOR
BOOST-BASED
SURVERLANCE &
TRACKING SYSTEM
NEUTRAL
PARTICLE
BEAM
BOOST-PHASE
SURVERLANCE &
TRAKING SYSTEM
RELAY
MIRROR
FRONTING
MIRROR
SPACE-BASED
LASER
SPACE-BASED
SURVERLANCE &
TRACKING SYSTEM
HIGH ENDOATMOSPHERIC
DEFENSE
GRAUNDINTERCEPTOR
BASED
LASER
GRAUNDBASED
INTERCEPTOR
GRAUND-BASED
RADAR
BATTLE
MANAGTR
The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting
the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .
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ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-s
Joint US-Russian statement on
global protection system
(Washington, 17th of June 1992)
Joint statement of Presidents of
the Russian Federation and the
United States of America
regarding Agreement on Ballistic
Missile Defense
Provision on Standing
Consultative Commission
(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)
First agreed statement
regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on
limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972
(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
General understanding to the
second agreed statement
dated 26th of September 1997
regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on
limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.
General understanding to the
first agreed statement of 26
September 1997 regarding
Agreement between the USSR
and the USA on limitation of
ABMD systems, dated 26th of
May 1972
Second agreed statement
regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on
limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.
Agreement on confidencebuilding measures regarding
systems for fighting Ballistic
Missiles, which are not strategic
ballistic missiles
Memorandum of understanding
regarding Agreement between
the USSR and the USA on
limitation of ABMD systems,
dated 26th of May 1972.
(New-York, 25th of September 1997)
(New-York, 26th of September 1997
(New-York, 26th of September 1997)
PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA
Possible trajectories of
Russian ICBMs
Kozelsk
Tatistchevo
TPA defense
zone
Radar ‘s
range in
Czech
Republic
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DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD)
Phase I(2011)
- deployment of MD
ships with «Standard3» 1А interceptors in
Aegean, Adriatic and
Mediterranean seas.
Protection of South
European States from
shorter range
missiles
PhaseII (2011-2015)
-deployment of MD base
with «Standard-3»
interceptors 1B in
Romania.
Phase III (2015-2018)
-deployment of MD base
with «Standard-3» 2А
interceptors in Poland.
Outfitting deployed MD
shooters with
«Standard-3» 2А
interceptors.
Phase IV (2018-2020)
- outfitting deployed MD
shooters in Europe with
«Standard-3» 2B
interceptors.
Protection of South and
South-East European
States from shorter range
missiles
Protection of
European states from
intermediate range
missiles
Protection of
European states from
ICBMs
RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH
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BM trajectories do not
cross NATO BMD
area of responsibility
NATO area of
responsibility
(NATO BMD assets only)
RUSSIAN AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY
(RUSSIAN BMD assets
only)
Territoies of European
states (NATO members)
covered by Russian BMD,
where deployment of
NATO BMD challenges
Russian Strategic Nuclear
Force capabilities
NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL
(information exchange and target distribution)
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE
European MD
system element
The Russian Federation
proposal («sectoral
approach»)
Joint sector wise area
NATO approach («cooperative
system»)
No
Responsibility
Responsible for interception
of any BM attacking Europe
in its «sector»
NATO responsible for NATO territory,
Russia – for Russian territory
Information
Full data sharing on shooter
performances, missile
threats, target distribution,
results assessment
Limited data sharing on missile
threats, joint exercises
All BMs within the area of
responsibility
Only the BM attacking the area of
responsibility (including adjacent
area)
National level
National level
Missile kills
Decision to
engage
«Buffer» zone
Concurrence
of views
Two independent areas
Defense area
No
No
No
Yes
Not required (possible
outside of Russian BM
trajectories)
Possible ( with NATO and Russian
areas overlapping to embrace
Russian territory)
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No
RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS
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CRITERIA LIST:
technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of
interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.),
deployment sites,
capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal
phases of flight.
joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the
relevant strategic deterrence capabilities
development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities
legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent
parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all
participants
RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION
to increase defense of fixed launching sites,
to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,
to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,
to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,
to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,
to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification
by Russian AD and BMD assets,
to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,
to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors
launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means).
All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a
threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO
deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be
adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.
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