CRITICISMS OF HUME
Classification of Virtues
 Yesterday we looked at Hume’s two types of
virtue (Utility and agreeability). Hume
believed these could be either virtues to
ourselves or to other.
 Here is an example of some examples of the
virtues classified according to Hume’s
principle
To Others
To Ourselves
Qualities that have utility
Justice, benevolence,
humanity, generosity,
charity, gratitude,
friendliness, honesty,
fidelity, mercy, moderation
Industry, frugality, caution,
willpower, wisdom,
memory, economy,
prudence, patience,
judgement
Qualities that are
agreeable
Good manners, wit,
ingenuity, eloquence,
affability (friendliness),
modesty, decency,
politeness, cleanliness
Cheerfulness,
magnanimity (fairness),
courage, dignity,
tranquillity, delicacy,
serenity, chastity,
1. Do you agree with Hume’s classification of the virtues?
2. Do you think we still recognise and value all the virtues on this list? Why/why
not?
3. Are there any virtues that you think could be added to this list?
Criticisms of Hume’s Ethics
 The account of morality that Hume gives is
based on a kind of empirical investigative
approach – he even says that he is adopting an
‘experimental method’
 He thinks that by taking examples of dispositions
that we all agree are valuable and then by
analysing these qualities to see what they have
in common we are engaging in a science of
ethics
 But is this really a science?
Ethics and Science
 A science in its most basic form is generally
thought to consist of evidence gathering and
constructing hypothesis based on this evidence,
then testing the hypothesis against new pieces
of evidence
 But the virtues that Hume has identified do not
appear to be based on any concrete evidence in
the sense that we now understand it (e.g.
qualitative research questionnaires from a
sample of representative people)
Universality
 Hume seems to think that we would all agree
that the qualities he picks out are universally
valued
 So for Hume morality is common to all
humankind, and by definition a moral virtue
is a disposition approved of by everyone
 But is this so?
No Universality
 For many of these qualities Hume seems to
be describing what he and his peers value,
rather than virtues that are universally valued
 If this is so then Hume’s investigation must be
limited to his own historical era and possibly
his own social class
Optimism
 Hume seems optimistic in thinking that vicious,
non-virtuous people will always be disproved of by
majority of people
 The sensible knave now seems to be the default
position for many people
 At the more extreme end of non-virtuousness, we
need only look to the history of genocide in the past
hundred years to find out how frequently nonvirtuous behaviour becomes normal amongst a
majority, thus enabling a group systematically to kill
those who fall outside of it
Assumption
 A further criticism is that it appears as if Hume is already
assuming what he is setting out to prove
 Hume wishes to know what principle of morals we follow
 In order to do this he examines qualities that we admire
 His conclusion is that these qualities are based on utility or
agreeability. This is his principle of morals. But when faced
with a counter-example (e.g. Poverty, obedience, humility
[what Hume calls ‘monkish values’] he dismisses them
because they are not useful (or agreeable)
 However, if he is sincere in his empirical approach
then he should try to understand why so many
people do value these qualities
 These qualities are counter-examples that go
against his original principle of utility, and so either
Hume must amend his principle or say why they are
not genuine counter-examples
 Because he dismisses them outright, he must
already be assuming that his principle is correct,
even before his investigation has begun, which is
hardly in the spirit of empiricism