Planning with clear goals
and objectives
How the State-Level concept and objectives
based safeguards are essential elements
of future safeguards developments
Russell Leslie – SGOC-OC1
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Layout of presentation
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Review the need to make better use of resources
Look at the information that drives safeguards
Introduce the State Level Concept (SLC).
Explain the safeguards objectives
Explain why it is important for safeguards to be
objectives-driven
• Look at what we get when we implement safeguards
that are information driven and objectives based at the
State Level.
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What are our resource limitations
• “Zero-real growth budgets” have been the norm for
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more than two decades (which is at least better than
zero-nominal growth” some UN organisations faced.)
Size and complexity of facilities and the amounts of
material subject to safeguards have grown substantially
in that time.
Understanding of the Agency’s role has changed.
“Business-as-usual” not a viable approach – must adapt.
Adaptation requires intelligent uses of resources.
Safeguards implementation needs to change.
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What “information” drives safeguards?
• Safeguards have always been “information driven” (e.g.
information on the nature of the facilities inspected, their
inventories and operations schedules).
• The IAEA now has a very wide range of additional
information:
• Information declared by the state (under CSA, AP, VRS etc);
• Collected by inspectors (inspection, DIV, CSA, ES etc.);
• Reported by third party states (e.g. AP export declarations);
• Scientific, technical and engineering literature;
• Trade data (including trade denials and export reports);
• Satellite imagery (including verification of declared sites and
investigation of possible undeclared sites); …..
IAEA
What is the State Level Concept (SLC)
• Information in isolation doesn’t convey meaning.
• All information needs context in order to be interpreted.
• The IAEA possesses a lot of information about States
(declared, retrieved or discovered).
• In essence the SLC aims for the optimum context to
both examine and use this information.
• Older form safeguards broke down information to the
level of facilities and locations.
• SLC aggregates information and examines it at the level
of States.
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What are safeguards objectives?
The technical objective of safeguards is given in
INFCIRC/153 – paragraph 28:
The Agreement should provide that the objective of
safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of
significant quantities of nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of
such diversion by the risk of early detection.
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How are the objectives explicitly stated?
Objective A – detect undeclared nuclear materials or
activities.
Objective B – detect undeclared production or
processing of nuclear material.
Objective C – detect diversion of declared nuclear
material.
Common
– Follow-up on questions, discrepancies,
anomalies and inconsistencies identified
when performing activities necessary to
meet the above objectives.
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Why objectives based safeguards?
• Safeguards criteria (SC) and State Level Approaches
(SLA) are simply guidance for how to achieve
safeguards objectives.
• They are like a road-map to follow to get to a desired
destination.
• Contents of the SC or SLA do not give a “why” for a
safeguards activity – they merely explain “what to do”
or “how to do it”.
• Objectives lie at the core of these issues – they are the
“why” behind every safeguards activity.
IAEA
Why are the objectives important?
A clear understanding of the objective of a safeguards
activity makes it possible to determine alternative means
of achieving the same objective e.g.:
• Do I need to physically visit a mine location or can the
same objective be achieved by the use of imagery?
• Does resolution of an anomaly require re-verification of
the affected strata or can reference to an alternative
information source achieve the same objective?
• Is the explanation given by the State for an
environmental sampling result sufficient or is further
investigation required?
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What are State Factors?
State Factors (SF) are facts about a State that influence the
implementation of safeguards in that state such as:
• Is the nuclear infra-structure indigenous or dependent
upon international suppliers (independent information)?
• Is the electrical power grid integrated with the regional
grids (independent information about reactor operation)?
• Do atmospheric conditions favour the use of imagery?
It is important to emphasise that SF are just relevant matters
to consider when planning and implementing safeguards.
They are not used to score or rank “good” or “bad” States.
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State Level, information-based, objective-driven
The Agency can significantly optimise resource usage if it
is able to:
• Use all of the information available from all-sources
• Examine that information in the most appropriate State-level
contexts (local, national, regional etc.)
• On the basis of that information and appropriate State
Factors, implement safeguards at the level of the State rather
than atomistically at the facility and location level
• Keep goals and objectives at the forefront of planning
implementation to enable full consideration of alternatives.
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State Level Concept
• SLC is not a revolution but more of step in the
evolution of safeguards implementation
• Provides the best context in which to examine
and use information available to the Agency
• Provides opportunities to alternate means of
achieving goals when planning with clear
objectives
• Provides opportunities to improve both the
efficiency and the effectiveness of safeguards.
IAEA